Evermore Shall Be So E-Book

Ficino ..

• Herausgeber: Shepherd Walwyn Publishers
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 552

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

Featuring philosophical commentary from Marsilio Ficino-a leading scholar of the Italian Renaissance who translated all the works of Plato into Latin-this work is the first English translation of Ficino's commentary of Plato's dialogue between the philosopher Parmenides and the youthful Socrates. In the scene, the older man instructs his student on the use of dialectic to draw the mind away from its preoccupation with the realm of matter and attract it towards contemplation of the soul.

"What made the Renaissance tick? Why had it such a force that its thinking spread from a small group of scholars in Florence, working in their own brilliant ways but coming together in a small villa on the Florentine hillside where Marsilio Ficino (143399) lived, to affect the thinking of the whole of Europe, and eventually of America, for five hundred years and is continuing to do so?
Cosimo de’Medici, the virtual ruler of Florence, had been attracted to the philosophy of Plato by Gemistos Plethon during the Council Florence in 1439 and had instructed his agents to gather together Plato’s works before Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453. In 1462 he commissioned Marsilio Ficino to translate them from Greek into Latin for the benefit of the Latinspeaking world, a task he completed in under five years according to his biographer Giovanni Corsi.
This, the first volume in a four volume series, provides the first English translation of the 25 short commentaries on the dialogues and the 12 letters traditionally ascribed to Plato. Later volumes will provide translations of his longer commentaries on the Parmenides (2008), the Republic and Laws (2009) and Timaeus (2010).
Though this book will be an essential buy for Renaissance scholars and historians, its freshness of thought and wisdom are as relevant today as they ever were to inspire a new generation seeking spiritual and philosophical direction in their lives."

Leseprobe

Evermore Shall Be So

Commentaries by Ficino on Plato’s Writings a four-volume series

Gardens of Philosophy

Evermore Shall Be So

When Philosophers Rule

All Things Natural

EvermoreShall Be So

FICINO ON PLATO’SPARMENIDES

ARTHUR FARNDELL

SHEPHEARD-WALWYN (PUBLISHERS) LTD

© Arthur Farndell 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be

reproduced in any form without the written permission

of the publisher, Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd

First published in 2008 by

Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd

15 Alder Road

London SW14 8ER

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record of this book

is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-85683-256-7

Typeset by Alacrity,

Sandford, Somerset

Printed and bound through

s|s|media limited, Wallington, Surrey

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Translator’s Introduction

An Overview of Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary

Commentary by Marsilio Ficino to Plato’s Parmenides

Glossary

Name Index

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE TRANSLATORis very happy to give the first accolade to his wife, Phyllis, who as ‘an help meet for him’ has been with this work from its inception to its completion. Her encouragement and her intuitive guidance have proved invaluable.

John Meltzer has supported the work throughout; Adrian Bertoluzzi and Christophe Poncet have kindly supplied Latin texts; Nathan David has again magnanimously granted permission for jacket designs based on two of his beautiful sculptures; Emma Bomfim has courageously transposed handwriting into meticulous typing; Jean Desebrock has imparted intelligence and artistry to the appearance of the book; and Anthony Werner has deftly waved his publishing wand over the whole project.

Clement Salaman, John Meltzer, Andrew Sisson, and Ian Murray have given generously of their time and attention to join the translator and his wife in reading the work and in making pertinent observations.

Each of these fine people is hereby acknowledged and thanked.

Arthur Farndell

TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTIONto Ficino’s Parmenides

MULTIFARIOUSare the introductions that could be written to the commentary made by Marsilio Ficino to Plato’sParmenides. The translator has chosen to focus on the two themes that particularly struck him as he read and re-read Ficino’s text. The first is the care shown by Parmenides in the training he imparts to Socrates. The second is Ficino’s presentation of Plato’s text as a work of practical spirituality.

The care shown by Parmenides

IN HIS DEDICATIONof the commentary to Niccolò Valori, Ficino remarks that ‘Parmenides, though older, does not contradict Socrates’. In Chapter 15 some correction does occur in dealing with the doubts expressed by Socrates: ‘Parmenides does not correct the first doubt, but he does correct the second.’ It is the next chapter that clearly depicts the care evinced by the elder philosopher, whom Ficino here presents in the likeness of a midwife:

Just as Socrates, the son of a midwife, performs the office of a midwife in different places towards boys and youths and proclaims this before others, so the aged Parmenides, like a dutiful midwife, exhorts and helps the youthful Socrates to give birth to the wonderful, almost divine, opinions with which he is pregnant and which he is trying to bring forth.

Moreover, he does not reject or destroy the children that are born lacking beauty, but rather he takes them up and cherishes them in a wonderful way. He strengthens the weak, straightens the crooked, gives shape to the shapeless, and perfects the imperfect. No one, therefore, will think that Parmenides the Pythagorean, the friend of Ideas in the manner of his fellows, and the pursuer of Being, which is detached from sensory perception, and of the One Itself, which is above Being, condemns opinions of this kind; but every follower of Plato will remember that Socrates is being very carefully trained by Parmenides in dialectic, in order that he may be much more heedful when considering the divine mysteries, that he may proceed with greater care, and that he may reach the end of his journey in greater safety.

The portrayal of Parmenides as a midwife appears again in Chapter 26, where he is also compared to a teacher:

That Parmenides does not pursue Socrates at every point like a disputant and rebuke him, but in the manner of a midwife encourages, assists, cherishes, guides and corrects him, is plain to observe, because this young man does not gradually wane but gains strength at every step, being led towards better things … Therefore, being now guided by Parmenides as by a teacher, he puts forward a true and definite view of Ideas.

The third comparison of Parmenides to a midwife occurs in Chapter 34, where Ficino says:

When Parmenides pursues, in relation to Socrates, the dedicated function of midwife which he introduced at the beginning, stimulating the inner powers of the young man to a most precise consideration of Ideas and showing on numerous occasions that very serious errors arise from imprecise answers and responses, and that it is a difficult task, and one that requires an excellent mind, to prove that Ideas exist, to show how they exist, to truly resolve doubts as they arise, and to teach with clear reason the person who is listening, all of these things make Socrates very careful and precise.

In Chapter 18 Ficino portrays Parmenides as being a particularly careful tutor when Ideas are being considered:

When Parmenides, therefore, is going to instruct Socrates, or rather encourage him, to contemplate that true way of participation by which Ideas are perceived by what is below them, he rejects, one by one, the ways which are not lawful … Thus Socrates is advised to consider a non-physical, indeed divine, way of understanding, for we are considering either the power of an Idea or the property of an Idea … Moreover, in comparing an Idea to the light of day he speaks rightly, but in thinking that light spreads through air like heat and is like a sail spread over the heads of many men, and in thinking that this is how an Idea is present is many objects, he is refuted by Parmenides, who says that, if this were the case, an Idea would not be totally present in anything but would be present in some parts of the objects through some of its own parts; and in this way he compels the young man to answer with greater care.

In the following chapter Ficino indicates that Socrates, for his part,is a ready student:

Step by step Socrates is instructed in these matters so that he may consider a partaking of the Ideas which is higher than any physical principle. To this instruction Socrates readily assents, being inclined towards it by nature.

The measured restraint practised by Parmenides throughout the training imparted to Socrates is clearly in evidence in Chapter 21 of Ficino’s commentary:

As a Pythagorean with due regard for Ideas, Parmenides does not cross Socrates when the latter supposes that, on account of assemblages of items coming together within something definite in response to a cause related to form, type, nature, and perfection, there is a single Idea for each and every assemblage within a type.

He does, however, temper Socrates’ enthusiasm, in order to avoid the possible inference that any collection of items has to be related to a specific Idea, even if these items seem to come together by some accidental or passing circumstance, by some deficiency, artificiality, or name; for if this were the case, there would be an unnatural number of causes for many of the occurrences within nature, and the number of Ideas would be infinite … This is how Socrates is advised not to imagine a new Idea for every apparent combination.

The restraint continues to be evident in the following chapter, where Ficino, after comparing Socrates to ‘a young man without sufficient training’, says:

Finally, Parmenides does not in fact reprove Socrates for seeking refuge in such notions, but he does reprove him for appearing to stay there. He therefore takes pains, through this reference to new notions which relates to the naturally implanted types, to call him back next not only to these types but also to the divine types.

However, from this point onwards the training of the young man’s mind does seem to become somewhat stricter:

For this reason Parmenides, intending to lead Socrates on to a fuller explanation of these things, will henceforth insist upon many reasonings.

(Chapter 26)

… when Socrates was being tested by Parmenides.

(Chapter 27)

Parmenides advises the young man … to proceed more carefully henceforth.

(Chapter 27)

Parmenides therefore advises Socrates, in relation to the divine Ideas, to acknowledge both the pre-eminence of their nature and their ability to impart their power.

(Chapter 28)

In brief, Socrates had to answer Parmenides by saying that the ideal lordship and the ideal service are not related to us but to each other, I mean through their first indissoluble relationship.

(Chapter 30)

For this reason Socrates is now carefully trained, so that he learns to resolve doubts about Ideas, which, if unresolved, would detract from divine providence.

(Chapter 32)

Even in the later chapters of the commentary Ficino reminds us of the unremitting dedication shown by Parmenides in his instruction of Socrates. In Chapter 87 he says that ‘Parmenides hones the young man’s mind ever more keenly’, and in Chapter 90 we find:

Parmenides, when preparing to train the mind of the noble young man along these lines, obliges him repeatedly, by means of the tightest constraints, either to withdraw from the false or else to make use of these abstractions, in which, as the man whom you know also says, there is no falsehood … Parmenides tacitly reminds us of these things, partly instructing the mind of the young man by means of some logical stratagem and partly sowing some hidden teaching here and there.

Finally, in Chapter 93, Ficino again draws our attention to the same theme:

Notice how Parmenides, at times when philosophic tenets are being torn to shreds, trains the young man to be careful in his replies and judicious in his discrimination.

What effect did this training at the hands of Parmenides have upon Socrates? Ficino gives the answer in Chapter 37 by referring to a response given by Socrates in theTheaetetus:

In theTheaetetus, when Socrates was asked to refute those who posited a single motionless being, he did not undertake to do so himself but gave this answer: Although I honour Melissus and others, who say that there is one self-consistent totality, for it may seem immodest of me to cross them, yet I honour them less than I do Parmenides alone, for Parmenides, to use Homer’s words, strikes me as one who is sagacious and worthy of great honour. I once conversed with him when he was advanced in years and I was but a youth, and he struck me as having a wisdom that was profound and noble in all respects. This is why I fear that we do not have the slightest understanding of his sayings and expressions, and what he himself implied by his words is, I fear, even more of a closed book to us.

Practical Spirituality

FICINO SEES MANas made in the image of God, and he recognises that the full realisation of human nature is nothing less than to become God. In his commentary to Parmenides, the dialogue which he says embraces all theology, Ficino presents this realisation as an ascending movement, which starts from the material forms of the universe, rises through the hierarchy of creation, and ends in God. In Chapter 41 Ficino tells us that ‘Plato rises to the Supreme by two paths: by the path of analogies in theRepublicand by the path of negations inParmenides.’ This is a process that is available to every human being. In Chapter 31 Ficino says:

But we do at times cognise, through the forms which are objects for us or which are innate in us, the intellectual Ideas which shine clearly in our minds subsequent to the first Idea and through which, being illumined particularly by the higher minds, we finally ascend, as far as we may, after the expiation described in thePhaedrus, to the first Ideas, which are rightly named the intelligible types, ourselves being raised above the human condition.

Our capability is portrayed in Chapter 34:

With this process of reasoning and with very many others given in theTheology, we have shown conclusively that the patterns and models of all things are naturally implanted within our mind … This is why, as Parmenides says, we shall find no true substance to which we may properly turn the eye of the mind, for it is not right to move towards higher things, except through the world within, or to hold the contents of the inner world as worthy of respect when they are taken from the worthless outer world … Man himself, however, as universally defined, should embrace each and every thing totally.

In Chapter 35 Ficino re-states the aim and gives directions for achieving it:

Since the hierarchy of creation strives, step by step, towards perfection, and since the order of the universe takes its origin from the most perfect principle, we must finally reach the most perfect forms, that is, the ideal and intelligible types, which are totally devoid of all the limitations of material forms … For anyone who would consider matter is obliged to lay aside every form, and this runs counter, of course, to the usual operation of consciousness; and anyone who would contemplate Ideas is compelled to discard all the mists and wisps of material forms, an action quite contrary to the normal mode of human consciousness. In this way, Ideas are finally attained by the simple gaze of steady intelligence, a gaze utterly dissociated from all considerations of material things.

In Chapter 44 Ficino continues his words of practical guidance in the process of contemplation:

Being about to perceive the single best principle of the universe, we are obliged, first of all, to lay aside whatever is most at variance with it, that is, evil and multiplicity, and to use all our powers to be called back to our unparalleled and best quality, back to the simple and peaceful contemplation of sublime intelligence.

And so, according to the measure of the divine light shining within the first intellect and within Ideas, we look up to that in exactly the same way as we look up on a clear night to the stars in the firmament, employing all our powers to contemplate that intellect through our own intelligence and to contemplate Ideas through the ideal forms innate within our own intelligence … If we progress by long perseverance in such contemplation, the new and incredibly wonderful light of the Good itself at last flashes upon us from on high, just as the radiance of the sun illumines astronomers who have been observing the stars until daybreak, the radiance which miraculously removes the stars at once from their eyes, just as the light of the Good itself, if it is to be perceived, obliges us to put in second place its intelligence as forms, as well as the intellect itself and Ideas and all intelligible things.

Just as we look up at the sun with half-closed eyes, so we look up at, or rather worship, the light of the Good with half-closed intelligence. For it is not permissible or right ever to direct the gaze of the intelligence upon that which is above the intelligible … Finally, if it can in any way be right to describe the Good itself, look around at all the perfections in the creation, which are to be sought for their own sakes. Their well-spring is therefore the Good itself, which resides as the centre in all things that are sought, in part producing perfections to be sought after within desirable things, and in part, with these perfections as baits, enticing all that seek to come to itself.

In Chapter 45 we are told that ‘mind, perfected through the Good, now possesses truth, joy, and fulfilment.’

For Ficino the whole process is a live reality, and to dispel any thought that it might be otherwise he exclaims in Chapter 50, ‘This One, therefore, is not a name invented by some logician, but it is the very principle of the universe.’ And in Chapter 53 he continues to describe a movement which he has clearly followed himself:

But shall we, in the manner of Proclus, rise from the intelligible which is within the intellect to the intelligible which is outside the intellect? Indeed, wherever the intelligible resides within any intellect – not the intelligible in all respects, but some intelligible, and not, in fact, identical with the substance of mind – there we shall search for a more exalted intelligible.

But after we have reached the first intellect, where the intelligible is so complete and so deep within the intellect as to be the very essence of this intellect, we shall yearn for no intelligible beyond this.

However, since the unity here is not simple unity itself, but a unity which is essential, intellectual, and intelligible, and which has formal number as its companion, we shall proceed from here to the simple One Itself, from which, as from a watchtower, we shall contemplate the divine unities, the gods, flowing forth in their hierarchy.

Ficino’s use of the language of the mystics intensifies as the commentary proceeds:

Indeed, a movement of change within the soul occurs when the soul, as if now changed, undergoes the emotion, the life, the form, and the action of things that are higher or of things that are lower. There is a direct, inward, rational movement from the higher to the lower, an outward change of place, and a quickening of the body.(Chapter 63)

The language used by Ficino reaches a new pitch of intensity in Chapter 78:

If it is not perceived by knowledge and intelligence, much less will it be perceived by the lower faculties of imagination, belief, and the senses. This is what Plato maintains in his Epistle to the Syracusans, where he says that the Self can in no way be taught or declared, but that at length the light of the One suddenly flashes on those minds that are fully turned towards the One Itself through unity and silence, that is, through the absence of the usual activity … And so, by this marvellous sense and yearning, all things are turned towards the First, even though they do not cognise the First; and the soul likewise, even prior to a clear notion and choice made by her own counsel, seeks the One Itself by her natural sense and inclination through a single impression made by it upon her … Parmenides thinks that the One Itself is not directly attainable even by intelligence, the guide of knowledge, since intelligence takes many forms and it is through forms that it is conveyed to beings. But after the clarity and the flash of intelligence, another light now shines from above – the light by which our own unity is miraculously united with the One Itself … Finally, in his Epistle to the distinguished Hermias and his companions, Plato gives evidence that the supreme God can in some way be perceived, for he says that if, through the right practice of philosophy, we seek God, the Guide and Father of all, we shall eventually cognise Him clearly, as it is given to the blessed to cognise Him … The words of Proclus are very satisfying: By the name of the One it is not the One within itself that is being expressed but that which is deep within us from the One, the one hidden concept of the One; for within all beings there is an innate yearning for the first principle as the end of all. And so, before the yearning there is a hidden sense (if I may call it that) of That.

The following chapter (79) focuses on the need for inner silence and trust in God:

We therefore ask: ‘Where in Plato’s writings does the process of dialectic rise step by step through all negations and up to the first cause of all beings and intelligibles?’ For if it is not in this dialogue it is definitely nowhere … For this reason Parmenides is right to advise us to put our trust not in negations so much as in a silence that is peaceful, divine, and loving … The prophet David, too, says, ‘Silence praises Thee, O God.’ … We have travelled thus far along these roads, indeed through places where there are no roads, with Proclus and Syrianus as our guides or at least as sign-posts for us. But beyond this, where there is no one to guide us, we must move forward with God as our guide and trust henceforth in inspiration alone.

Since it would be difficult to find better guides for our own spiritual journey, let us joyfully move forward with Proclus and Syrianus, with Parmenides and Socrates, and, of course, with Plato and Ficino.

AN OVERVIEW of Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary

Dedication to Niccolò Valori

‘Plato … has embraced all theology withinParmenides[Plato … universam in Parmenide complexus est theologiam].’

‘He seems to have drawn this celestial work, in a divine way, from the deep recesses of the divine mind and from the innermost sanctuary of philosophy [videtur et ex divinae mentis adytis intimoque Philosophiae sacrario caeleste hoc opus divinitus deprompsisse]. Anyone approaching his sacred writings [Ad cuius sacram lectionem quisque accedet] should prepare himself with sobriety of soul and freedom of mind before daring to handle the mysteries of the celestial work [prius sobrietate animi mentisque libertate se preparet, quam attrectare mysteria caelestis operis audeat]. For here the divine Plato [Hic enim divinus Plato], speaking of the One Itself, discusses with great subtlety how the One Itself is the principle of all things [de ipso uno subtilissime disputat quemadmodum ipsum unum rerum omnium principium est]: how it is above all [super omnia], and all things come from it [omniaque ab illo]; how it is outside all and within all [Quo pacto ipsum extra omnia sit, et in omnibus]; and how all come out of it [omniaque ex illo], through it, and to it [per illud atque ad illud].’

‘Parmenides … unfolds the whole principle of Ideas [Parmenides integram idearum explicat rationem].’

Parmenides ‘introduces nine hypotheses [suppositiones] …, five on the basis that the One exists and four on the basis that the One does not exist.’

Ficino gives a brief statement on the nature of each hypothesis, and he points out that Parmenides’ main intention is to affirm that ‘there is a single principle [principium] of all things, and if that is in place everything is in place, but if it be removed everything perishes.’

The first hypothesis ‘discusses the one supreme God [de uno supremoque Deo disserit].’

The second ‘discusses the individual orders of the divinities [de singulis Deorum ordinibus].’

The third ‘discusses divine souls [de divinis animis].’

The fourth ‘discusses those which come into being in the region which surrounds matter [de iis, quae circa materiam fiunt].’

The fifth ‘discusses primal matter [de materia prima].’

The Preface of Marsilio Ficino to his Commentary on Parmenides

‘Under the guise of a dialectical and, as it were, logical game aimed at training the intelligence [sub ludo quodam dialectico et quasi logico exercitaturo videlicet ingenium], Plato points towards divine teachings and many aspects of theology [ad divina dogmata passim theologica multa significat.]’

‘The subject matter of thisParmenidesis particularly theological [Materia … Parmenidis huius potissimum theologica est] and its form particularly logical [forma vero praecipue logica].’

Chapter 1: Setting the scene for the dialogue

A request is made for a previous discussion involving Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates to be recounted.

Chapter 2: How the whole of being is one, but the One Itself is above being [Quomodo omne ens sit unum, ipsum vero unum super ens]

‘The universe, or the all [universum sive omne] is appreciated in these three ways [tribus his modis accipitur]: individually, collectively, as a whole [singulatim, congregatim, summatim].’

‘Beyond that unity which partakes perfectly of the intelligible world [praeter unitatem illam intelligibili mundo perfecte participatam] he (Parmenides) postulates a supreme unity [eminentissimam excogitat unitatem] higher than the one universal being [universo ente uno excelsiorem], for the nature of being is different from the nature of unity [alia enim ipsius entis, alia unitatis ipsius ratio est].’

‘Therefore the one being [Unum igitur ens] is not the simple One Itself [non est ipsum simpliciter unum] but is in all respects a composite [sed quoquomodo compositum] mixed with multiplicity [multitudinique permixtum].’

Chapter 3: All multiplicity partakes of Unity [Omnis multitudo est particeps unitatis]

Zeno, Parmenides’ disciple, confirms his master’s proposition with another, ‘whereby he shows that beings are not many [ens non esse multa], that is, not only many [id est, solum multa], but beyond their multiplicity [sed praeter multitudinem] they partake of unity [esse partecipes unitatis].’

Chapter 4: The Existence and Nature of Ideas [Ideas esse, et quales]

‘Human nature depends on the Idea of man [ab idea hominis humana natura (dependet)].’

‘Now the cause which is unmoving and universal at the same time [Causa vero immobilis simul universalisque] is necessarily the intellect [necessario est intellectus] and the intellectual Idea [et intellectualis idea].’

‘Again, there are many Ideas [Ideae rursus multae sunt], as least as many as the types of natural phenomena [quod saltem rerum species naturalium], and each one is called a unity [et unaquaeque unitas appellatur], I mean, not simply unity [unitas inquam non simpliciter], but a unity [imo quaedam].’

‘For this reason [quamobrem] there exists above ideal unities [super ideales unitates extat] the One that is simply itself [ipsum simpliciter unum], governing the full expansion of all species [per quaslibet multitudines latissime regnans].’

Chapter 5: In what respects Ideas differ among themselves and in what respects they agree [Quomodo ideae inter se differant et conveniant]

‘Since Ideas are eternal and intellectual in their extreme purity [Ideae cum sint aeternae et ad puritatis summum intellectuales], they produce within the same sequence beneath them unmoving and pure effects prior to moving and impure effects [effectus procreant in eadem sub ipsis serie stabiles atque puros, priusquam mobiles et impuros].’

Chapter 6: For what there are Ideas, and for what there are no Ideas: there are as many Ideas as there are rational souls [Quorum sint ideae. Quorum non sint. Quot sunt rationales animae, totidem earum sunt ideae]

‘There is a single Idea for the whole of a single type [unius communiter speciei una est idea].’

Chapter 7: There is no Idea for matter [Nulla est idea materiae]

Chapter 8: There are no Ideas for individual items [Singularium non sunt ideae]

Chapter 9: There are no Ideas for parts [Partium non sunt ideae]

‘One is prior to multiplicity [unum antecedit multitudinem].’

Chapter 10: How there are Ideas for the Accidental [Quomodo accidentium sint ideae]

Chapter 11: There are no Ideas for Skills [Artificiorum non sunt ideae]

Chapter 12: There are Ideas for only the Speculative Branches of Knowledge [Scientiarum solum speculativarum sunt ideae]

Chapter 13: There are no Ideas for Evils [Non sunt ideae malorum]

‘God Himself is every Idea [quaelibet … idea est ipse Deus].’

Chapter 14: There are no Ideas for vile things [Sordium non sunt ideae]

‘There is no Idea for mud [Non est idea luti], but there is an Idea for water and for earth [sed aquae terraeque idea].’

Chapter 15: Even those things which are not expressed through Ideas are related to Providence and to a divine cause [Etiam quae per ideas ipsas non exprimuntur, ad providentiam pertinent causamque divinam]

Chapter 16: Parmenides corrects or modifies the replies of Socrates, but does not destroy them [Parmenides responsiones Socratis corrigit vel dirigit, non disperdit]

Chapter 17: How the things of our world partake of Ideas, being the images of Ideas, without their having any identical or common cause [Quomodo res nostrae participant ideas, tanquam imagines idearum. Neque his atque illis est ulla ratio eadem vel natura communis]

‘The ideal causes [Ideales … rationes] are in the intellect of the Maker [in conditore sunt intellectu] and also in the world-soul [et in ipsa mundi anima] and in universal nature [et in universali natura].’

Chapter 18: An Idea is not partaken of in a physical way, so that neither the whole nor any part of it is received [Idea non participatur corporeo more: ita ut vel tota vel pars eius aliqua capiatur]

‘Nothing in our world [Nulla quidem rerum nostrarum] apprehends the whole power of an Idea [totam capit ideae virtutem]: that eternal, effective, and totally indivisible essence, perfect life, and perfect intelligence [scilicet aeternam illam efficaciam individuam prorsus essentiam, vitam intelligentiamque perfectam].’

Chapter 19: Ideal largeness, ideal equality, and ideal smallness are not partaken of by any nature divisible into parts [Ipsa magnitudo aequalitas, parvitas ideales non participantur conditione quadam in partes divisibili]

‘Let us consider ideal equality [consideramus idealem aequalitatem]: an intellectual ratio [scilicet rationem quandam intellectualem] which is both a model and a unifier [tam exemplarem, quam conciliatricem] of universal harmony [universae congruitatis] and of harmonic proportion [et proportionis harmonicae] and of any kind of equality [aequalitatisque cuiuslibet].’

Chapter 20: Neither by nature nor by circumstance do Ideas meet with material things [Ideas non convenire cum materialibus neque natura neque conditione]

‘It is clearly the case [plane constat] that Ideas are remote from [illas procul ab] all differentiation, all place, all movement, and all time [omni divisione, loco, motu, tempore esse], being indivisible, unmoving, eternal, and present everywhere [impartibiles, immobiles, aeternas, ubique praesentes]: so present [ita praesentes] that each quality of an Idea [ut cuiuslibet ideae proprietas quaedam] extends to the uttermost ends of creation [ad ultimas perveniat mundi formas].’

‘However, it is important now to remember [Meminisse vero nunc oportet] that forms in the physical world [formas in materia] are not produced directly from Ideas, but are made through the seed-powers of nature derived from Ideas [non proxime ab ideis, sed per vires seminales naturae illinc infusas effici].’

Chapter 21: We should not suppose that every assemblage of multifarious items suggests that there is a single Idea for those items [Non debemus ex qualibet multorum communione, unam illorum ideam excogitare]

Chapter 22: From types which are created by the soul we must rise to types which are naturally present in the soul, and then rise from those to types which are divine [Oportet a speciebus quae fiunt ab anima ad species ascendere quae naturaliter insunt animae. Ab his insuper ad divinas]

‘We use reason aright to take physical things back to their non-physical causes [resque corporeas ad incorporeas causas recta ratione reducimus].’

Chapter 23: The first types of creation, which are also the principal subjects of the intellect, are prior to the intelligences [Primae rerum species, quae etiam sunt principalia intellectus obiecta intelligentias antecedunt]

‘Just as true sense [quemadmodum verus sensus] focuses on something perceptible [circa sensibile quiddam versatur] which actually exists [quod et revera existit], which is prior to sense [et antecedit sensum], and which is united with sense at the time of perception [ac denique cum sensu iam sentiente coniungitur], so true intelligence [sic intelligentia vera], which he now callsnotion[quam nunc nominat notionem], is directed towards something that is intelligible to it [ad intelligibile suum dirigitur], that really exists and is prior to it [revera existens atque praecedens], and is more united withnotion[et magis cum notione coniunctum] than the perceptible is with sense [quam cum sensu sensibile].’

Chapter 24: Ideas are intelligible things rather than intelligences, and these intelligible things are prior to intelligences [Ideae non tam intelligentiae quam intelligibilia sunt. Atque haec intelligentias antecedunt]

‘This universe has taken its rise not so much from the intellect or the intelligence as from intelligible things, namely, the first essence, which is full of intelligible types and powers [universum hoc non tam ab intellectu vel intelligentia quam ab intelligibilibus, id est, ab essentia prima intelligibilium specierum virtutumque plena].’

Chapter 25: The quality of an Idea somehow remains one throughout an entire sequence, while the power of an Idea varies [Proprietas idealis una quodammodo est in tota serie. Virtus autem varia]

Chapter 26: Ideas are not simple notions but natural types which possess model power and effective power [Ideae non sunt simplices notiones quaedam, sed species naturales, vim exemplarem efficientemque habentes]

‘The nature of the Idea is not conveyed to our world [neque ipsa ideae natura ad haec nostra transfertur], nor, conversely, do the things of our world in any way meet Ideas [neque haec igitur in re ulla conveniunt cum ideis], but merely reflect them [sed solum illas referunt], just as the image in a mirror reflects the face [quemadmodum specularis imago vultum].’

Chapter 27: Natural forms are rightly said to be similar to Ideas, but Ideas must not be described as similar to natural forms [Naturales formae dicuntur quidem ideis similes. Ideae vero harum similes appellari non debent]

Chapter 28: Contrary to the opinion of the Stoics and the Aristotelians, Ideas and all things divine are separate from nature and have a power that can be imparted to everything [Contra stoicos atque peripateticos, quod ideae divinaque omnia et natura segregata sunt et virtutem habent cunctis communicabilem]

‘The first Good acts and cares with the greatest possible providence [primum denique ipsumque bonum quam maxime facit et providet].’

Chapter 29: The ways in which Ideas cannot be known by us, and the ways in which they can be known [Quomodo ideae a nobis cognosci non possint. Item quomodo possint]

‘But when we say in this discussion that the first types are within themselves, you should understand [Tu vero inter haec ubi primas species esse dicimus in seipsis, intellige] that they are not within the first intellect [non esse in primo intellectu] like parts within a whole [velut partes in toto], or like qualities within an object [vel qualitates aliquas in subiecto], but like numbers within unity [sed quemadmodum in unitate numeri], like the beginnings of lines within a centre [in centro capita linearum], like the rays and colours within the light of the sun [in solis luce, radii, vel colores].’

Chapter 30: The ways in which Ideas are not related, or may be related, to the things of our world, and vice versa. Also concerning lordship and service and relationships in the realm of Ideas [Quomodo ideae non referantur vel referantur ad nostra, et haec ad illas. Ac de dominatione illic et servitute, et relationibus idearum]

Chapter 31: How pure knowledge relates to pure truth, while human knowledge relates to human truth. How Ideas may be unknown or known [Quomodo ipsa simpliciter scientia ad ipsam simpliciter veritatem refertur. Scientia humana, ad humanam. Quomodo ideae ignotae vel notae]

Chapter 32: Concerning the way of divine consideration and providence [De modo divinae cognitionis atque providentiae]

‘By being aware that He Himself is the origin of all [cognoscendo se ipsum principium omnium], He immediately cognises all and makes all [omnia statim et cognoscit et facit].’

Chapter 33: On divine lordship and consciousness, and on the six orders of Ideas or forms [De dominatione et cognitione divina, atque de sex ordinibus idearum vel formarum]

‘For it is not by intelligence [Non enim intelligentia] but by some more mysterious act [sed occultiore quodam actu] that we are able to appreciate the first principle of the universe [frui primo universi principio possumus].’

Chapter 34: If there be no Ideas in the presence of God and no ideal patterns within us, then Dialectic will perish, and so will all Philosophy. There will be no proof, definition, division, or explanation [Nisi sint et ideae penes deum et ideales in nobis formulae, peribit dialectica omnisque philosophia. Non erit demonstratio vel definitio, vel divisio, vel resolutio]

‘We have shown conclusively [confirmavimus] that the patterns and models of all things [formulas regulasque rerum] are naturally implanted within our mind [esse menti etiam nostrae naturaliter insitas].’

Chapter 35: On the practice of Dialectic through the intellectual forms and with the intelligible types as the aim [De dialectica exercitatione per formas intellectuales, ad species intelligibiles]

Parmenides ‘will begin [exordietur] from the One [ab uno] as the cause of Ideas and of divine matters [tanquam causa idearum atque divinorum], showing throughout the debate [significans in toto disputationis cursu] that this One [ipsum unum] produces all beings step by step [producere entia omnia gradatim].’

In this way Ideas [Illas igitur] are finally attained [attingit tandem] by the simple gaze of steady intelligence [stabilis intelligentiae simplex intuitus], a gaze utterly dissociated from all considerations of material things [ab omnibus materialium cogitationibus penitus segregatus].’

Chapter 36: The rules of Dialectic which pre-suppose being or non-being, and the number of ways in which non-being is described [Regulae dialecticae supponentes esse vel non esse, et quot modis dicitur non ens]

‘Parmenides maintains that the most powerful form of reasoning is [Potissimam argumentandi formam esse vult] that which proceeds from hypothesis [quae ex suppositione procedit] and examines carefully [perpendens], with many steps [multis gradibus] what follows [quid sequatur] if something is affirmed and what follows if it is denied [affirmato quolibet vel negato], for this form of reasoning [forma enim eiusmodi] does not depend on any human contrivances [non machinis quibusdam confidit humanis], but relies on a rational succession of natural and divine things [sed ipsa rerum naturalium divinarumque consequenti serie nititur] and has the hierarchy of the universe as its teacher of truth [praeceptoremque veritatis habet ipsum ordinem universi].’

Chapter 37: The subsequent discussion is said to be difficult, because it is not only logical but also theological [Futura disputatio dicitur ardua, quia non solum logica est sed etiam theologica]

Chapter 38: On the hypotheses of Parmenides; and on the Good, which, according to the words of Plato, is higher than being and higher than intellect [De suppositionibus Parmenidis. Et de uno bonoque quod ente et intellectu superius, per verba Platonis]

‘It is shown in thePhilebus[In Philebo probatur] that from the One [ab ipso uno], which is the beginning of creation [rerum principio], two are immediately produced [statim produci binarium]: the principles of beings [scilicet principia entium], or the two elements known as limit and limitlessness [vel elementa duo, terminum scilicet infinitatemque] … From these two [ex quibus] all beings are directly compounded [omnia prorsus entia componantur], but before the compounding of other beings [sed ante aliorum entium compositionem] the first to be compounded and mixed from these two [primum ex his confici mixtum] is the first being [scilicet ens primum], which contains universal being within itself [in se continens ens universum].’

Ficino draws support also from the sixth book of theRepublic: ‘The Good Itself [ipsum bonum] is not the intellect or the intelligible [neque tamen est intellectus vel intelligibile] or the truth or essence [vel veritas vel essentia], but is higher than all these in excellence and power [sed his omnibus dignitate et potestate superius].’

Further support is taken from theSophist: ‘It is clear that in the first being [probatur in primo ente] there are all those things [omnia esse] which are necessarily required for the perfection of being [quae ad perfectionem entis necessario requiruntur].’

‘Finally, he shows in theSophist[probatur denique in Sophiste] … that the first universal being [ipsum primum et universum ens] is subject to the One [patitur unum], both in its parts [tum in partibus suis] and as a whole [tum in toto].’

Chapter 39: Next, how Plato proceeds to the First. Its name. The Idea of the Good [Item quomodo Plato procedit ad primum. De nomine eius. De idea boni]

‘Throughout his writings Plato reduces perceptible multiplicities to intelligible unities, that is, to Ideas [Plato … ubique sensibiles passim multi-tudines ad intelligibiles redigit unitates, id est, ideas]: for his intention is to relate each single multiplicity [scilicet unamquamque multitudinem invicem cognaturum] to a single Idea [ad ideam unam], and then to relate the intelligible unities to the simple One Itself [ad ipsum simpliciter unum], which excels the intelligible world by at least as much [quod ita saltem intelligibilia superat] as the intelligible world excels the perceptible world [quemadmodum ab his sensibilia superantur].’

Chapter 40: Next, Plato’s two paths to the First; and the two names of the First [Rursus duae Platonis ad primum viae. Duo nomina primi]

‘Plato rises to the Supreme by two paths [Plato per duas ad summum vias ascendit]: by the path of analogies in theRepublic[per comparationes quidem in Republica] and by the path of negations inParmenides[per negationes autem in Parmenide]. Both the analogies and the negations [Utraeque pariter tam comparationes quam negationes] affirm that God is set apart from all beings and from all intelligibles [declarant Deum esse tum ab omnibus entibus et intelligibilibus segregatum], and that He is also the beginning of creation [tum etiam principium universi].’

‘He defines God as the sole beginning of everything, totally simple and totally supreme [Deum principium omnium unicum, simplicissimum, eminentissimum esse designat].’

Chapter 41: Some Platonic discussions follow which show that the One is the beginning of all things, and that the One Itself, the Good, is above being. The First Discussion [Secuntur discursus Platonici probantes unum esse principium omnium, et esse ipsum unum bonumque superius ente. Primus discursus]

Chapter 42: The Second Discussion on the same subject [Secundus ad idem discursus]

‘The One indwells all things both individually and collectively [omnibus et singulatim et summatim inest unum]; and with the very multitude [et in ipsa multitudine] which seems opposed to the One [quae uni videtur opposita], the One Itself makes the multitude [unum ipsum conficit multitudinem], for what is a multitude but one repeated over and over again [quid enim aliud multitudo est nisi aliquod saepius repetitum]?’ ‘This One, therefore [Hoc igitur unum], which is absolutely common to all [omnibus communissimum], derives its existence from the simple One which is the most common of all [ab ipso tandem existit simpliciter uno omnium communissimo].’

Chapter 43: The Third Discussion on the same subject. Also on the simplicity of the first and the last [Tertius ad idem discursus. Ac de simplicitate primi et ultimi]

‘In the hierarchy of the universe [In ordine universi] there is the first and there is the last [ad primum pervenitur et ultimum], and each of these is of necessity [utrumque necessario est] one and simple [unum atque simplex], devoid of multiplicity [multitudinis expers].’

‘Certainly matter is in the highest degree one in its ability to receive form [Est certe materia maximum unum scilicet formabile], just as the first being [sicut ens primum] is in the highest degree one in its power to impart form [maxime unum est formale]. But neither of these is the simple One Itself [Neutrum vero est ipsum simpliciter unum].’

Chapter 44: The Fourth Discussion on the same subject; and on the contemplation of the Good [Quartus ad idem discursus, et de contemplatione boni]

‘For these reasons [Propterea] we consider the One Itself and the Good to be absolutely identical [ipsum unum bonumque idem prorsus esse coniicimus].’

Chapter 45: The Fifth Discussion on the same subject; and on the naming of the First [Quintus ad idem discursus, et de appellatione primi]

Chapter 46: The Sixth Discussion on the same subject; and what is chosen is not simply being, but well-being and the Good [Sextus ad idem discursus. Et quod non eligitur simpliciter esse, sed bene esse atque bonum]

Chapter 47: The Seventh Discussion on the same subject; and how the cause of being differs from the cause of the Good [Septimus ad idem discursus. Et quae differens ratio entis atque boni]

‘The Good is therefore higher than being [bonum igitur ente superius].’

Chapter 48: The first principle of the universe is the simple One Itself, the first in every rank, and most truly One. On the sun, on nature, on intellect [Principium universi est ipsum simpliciter unum principium in quolibet ordine quod ibi est maxime unum. De sole, natura, intellectu]

‘Just as division is the worst condition for all things [Sicut pessimum omnibus est divisio], dragging everything to ruin [ad exitium singula trahens], so union is the best condition [sic optimum est unio]: union of the parts with each other [et partium invicem] and with the whole [et ad totum], and of the whole with its cause [et totius ad causam suam], which is its origin and nature [et originem atque naturam].’

Chapter 49: The first principle of creation is unity and goodness, above intellect, life, and essence [Primum rerum principium est unitas bonitasque super intellectum, vitam, essentiam]

Chapter 50: The unity above essence; the unities within essences; the gods; the general aim of Parmenides in his hypotheses [De unitate super essentiam. De unitatibus in essentiis. De diis. De communi intentione Parmenidis in suppositionibus suis]

‘Just as simple unity itself is above universal being [Sicut ipsa simpliciter unitas est super ens universum], so in the hierarchy of creation [ita in ordine rerum] the unity of every being [sua cuiusque entis unitas] is to some extent higher than its essence [quodammodo est essentia sua superior].’

Chapter 51: Plutarch’s analysis of the hypotheses of Parmenides [Dispositio propositionum Parmenidis apud Plutarchum]

‘That this dialogue was held to be divine among the ancients is attested by Plutarch [Dialogum hunc divinum apud veteres iudicatum, testis est Plutarchus].’

Chapter 52: The meaning of the negations and of the affirmations within the hypotheses. Which ones are dealt with and in which order [Quid significent in suppositionibus negationes. Quid affirmationes. Quae et quo ordine tractentur in eis]

‘Since the first hypothesis [Quoniam vero suppositio prima] focuses attention upon the simple One Itself [colit ipsum simpliciter unum], which is higher than being [ente superius], it negates all the conditions of beings with respect to the One [ideo omnes ab eo entium conditiones negat], which is detached from all things [est enim ab omnibus absolutum], being their final principle [tanquam principium finale], a principle which is especially – even predominantly – efficient [praecipue et eminenter efficiens].’

‘The first hypothesis [suppositio prima], if we are allowed to believe the ancients [si antiquis licet credere], deals with the way in which the first God creates and orders the respective hierarchies of gods [tractat quomodo primus Deus singulos deorum ordines procreat atque disponit]; the second hypothesis treats of the divine hierarchies [Secunda vero de divinis ordinibus], how they have come forth from the One [quomodo processerunt ab uno], and of each essence [et de qualibet essentia] that is conjoined by God to every unity [unicuique Deo unitati videlicet coniugata]; the third hypothesis [Tertia] deals with those souls [de animabus] which do not possess substantial divinity [Deitatem quidem ipsam substantialem non habentibus] but do have a manifest likeness to the gods [sed similitudinem ad deos expressam]; the fourth hypothesis treats of material forms [Quarta de formis materialibus], how they proceed from the gods [quomodo proficiscuntur a diis], and which ones depend on which respective order of gods [et quae proprie ab unoquoque deorum ordine pendent]; the fifth hypothesis deals with primal matter [Quinta de materia prima], how it is not composed of formal unities [quomodo formalium unitatum non est compos] but depends on the unity that is above essence [sed desuper ab unitate superessentiali dependet], for the action of the first One extends right through to final materialisation [nam usque ad materiam ultimam unius primi actio provenit], which in all manner of ways sets limits to the unlimited nature of the One through particular participation in unity [interminatam illius naturam, per quandam unitatis participationem quoquomodo determinans].’

The First Hypothesis (Chapters 53-79)

Chapter 53: The Aim, the Truth, and the Arrangement of the First Hypothesis [Intentio, veritas, ordo suppositionis primae]

Chapter 54: When the characteristics of beings are negated with respect to the One, this indicates that the One surpasses and creates all these [Ubi entium proprietates de uno negantur, significatur ipsum haec omnia antecellere atque procreare]

‘Affirmations concerning almighty God [Affirmationes circa summum Deum] are very misleading and dangerous [fallaces admodum periculosaeque sunt], for in our everyday affirmations we usually think of a particular type and characteristic to name and define something [solemus enim in quotidianis affirmationibus nostris certam quandam speciem proprietatemque concipere, et appellare aliquid alteri atque definire]. But to do this in relation to the First is unlawful [Hoc autem agere circa primum, nefas].

Chapter 55: On the one being. On the simple One Itself. On the aim of Parmenides both here and in his verses. The aim and conclusion of his negations [De uno ente. De ipso simpliciter uno. De intentione Parmenidis hic et in poemate. Intentio et Epilogus negationum]

‘Perhaps it would now be useful to repeat briefly [Operaepretium forte fuerit repetere breviter in praesentia] what we have said many times before [quod saepe iam diximus]: the principle of unity [rationem unitatis] is different from the principle of being [a ratione entis esse diversam].’

Chapter 56: On the universal being and its properties; and why these are negated with respect to the First. Which multiplicity is negated, and why it is negated [De universo ente et proprietatibus eius. Et quomodo negantur de primo. Et quae multitudo negatur et quare negatur]

Chapter 57: Through the negation of all multiplicity, parts and totality are negated with respect to the One: number is prior to essence, and all multiplicity partakes of unity. The first essence, life, and mind are identical [Per negationem multitudinis negantur de uno partes et totum. Numerus est ante essentiam. Omnis multitudo particeps unitatis. Idem est prima essentia, vita, mens]

Chapter 58: An opinion affirming the abstracts of abstracts with respect to God. Again, negations and relations about God are safer [Opinio affirmans abstractorum abstracta de deo. Item tutiores sunt negationes relationesque circa deum]

Chapter 59: If the One has no parts, it follows that it has no beginning, no end, no middle [Si unum non habet partes consequenter nec habet principium vel finem aut medium]

Chapter 60: In what way the One Itself is called the limitless and the limit of all [Quomodo ipsum unum dicatur infinitum, omniumque finis]

Chapter 61: How shape is negated with respect to the One, as well as straight lines and circular lines [Quomodo negatur de uno figura et rectum atque rotundum]

‘Indeed, movement is the beginning of differentiation [Processus quidem discretionis principium est].’

Chapter 62: The One Itself is nowhere, because it is neither within itself nor within something else. How discrete things are said to exist of themselves or to be produced from themselves [Ipsum unum nusquam est. Quia nec est in se ipso nec in alio. Item quomodo separata dicuntur ex se ipsis existere vel produci]

Chapter 63: How the One is said to neither move nor rest; and how movement and rest are in everything except the First [Quomodo unum neque moveri neque stare dicatur et quomodo sit motus et status in omnibus praeter primum]

‘In ourTheology[In Theologia nostra] we have shown [probavimus] that in everything after the First [in omni re post primum] there is a differentiation of these four [quatuor haec inter se differre]: essence, being, power, and action [essentiam, et esse, et virtutem, et actionem].’

And so the Good Itself, the One Itself [Ipsum itaque bonum unumque], creates and perfects all things, not through something else, but by its own unity and goodness [non per aliud, sed ipsa unitate bonitateque facit et perficit omnia].’

Chapter 64: The One moves neither in a circle nor in a straight line [Unum neque circulo movetur nec in rectum]

Chapter 65: How stillness is negated with respect to the One [Quomodo negatur de uno status]

Chapter 66: The five kinds of being; the three levels of negations; the ten predicates negated; a few words on the same and the different [Quinque genera entis. Tres negationum gradus. Decem praedicamenta negata. De eodem alteroque nonnihil]

Chapter 67: The One is neither different from itself nor the same as the different, but is completely free of all conditions [Unum nec a seipso alterum est, nec idem alteri, et ab omnibus conditionibus est absolutum]

Chapter 68: The One is not different from other things [Unum non est ab aliis alterum]

Chapter 69: The One is not the same as itself [Unum non est sibi ipsi idem]

Chapter 70: The One is neither similar nor dissimilar to itself or to anything [Unum nec est simile neque dissimile vel sibi vel cuique]

Chapter 71: The One is neither equal nor unequal to itself or to others [Unum nec sibi nec aliis est aequale vel inaequale]

Chapter 72: Confirmation of the above [Confirmatio superiorum]

‘The principle of equality is different from the principle of the One [Alia aequalitatis alia unius ratio est], for the One is absolute [unum enim est absolutum], while equality is relative [Aequalitas relativa], since equal is related to equal [aequale enim ad aequale refertur].’

Chapter 73: In relation to itself and to other things, the One cannot be younger or older or of the same age [Unum neque iunius neque senius neque coetaneum vel ad se vel ad alia esse potest]

Chapter 74: The One Itself is above eternity and time and movement. It cannot, on any basis, be said to be within time [Ipsum unum super aeternitatem et tempus et motum est. Nec ulla ratione esse in tempore dici potest]

Chapter 75: A rule for relatives, with some confirmation of what has gone before [Relativorum regula cum confirmatione quadam superiorum]

Chapter 76: Since the One is above time, it transcends the conditions of time and of things temporal [Cum unum sit supra tempus, consequenter conditiones temporis temporaliumque excedit]

Chapter 77: The One Itself does not partake of essence; it is neither essence itself nor being itself, but is far higher [Ipsum unum nec est essentiae particeps, nec ipsa essentia nec ipsum esse. Sed longe superius]

Chapter 78: How essence, or being, is negated with respect to the One; and why the One cannot be known or named [Qua conditione negatur essentia vel esse de uno. Item quare cognosci vel nominari non possit]

Chapter 79: On the unshakeable nature of the first hypothesis. The One is higher than being [De firmitate suppositionis primae. Et quod unum ente superius]

The Second Hypothesis (Chapters 80-95)

Chapter 80: The aim of the second hypothesis [Secundae suppositionis intentio]

Chapter 81: In the same being there is the principle of the One and there is also the principle of being. The whole has parts and infinite multiplicity [Quomodo in uno ente alia sit ratio unius alia entis sit, totum partes habeat et multitudinem infinitam]

Chapter 82: Within the one being all the numbers are held by means of two and three. The numbers are prior to the development of the one being into many beings [In uno ente per binarium et ternarium omnes numeri continentur. Qui numeri distributionem entis unius in entia multa praecedunt]

Chapter 83: How essence, together with the One, is distributed in the intelligible world, and how multiplicity is either limited or unlimited [Quomodo in mundo intelligibili dividatur essentia simul et unum, multitudoque finita vel infinita sit]

Chapter 84: Within the intelligible world the multiplicity of parts is subsumed in a double form of the whole; it has limits and a mean, as well as forms [Quomodo in mundo intelligibili partium multitudo sub gemina totius forma concluditur. Quomodo terminos mediumque habet atque figuras]

Chapter 85: The one being is within itself and within something other than itself [Quomodo unum ens in se ipso sit et in alio]

Chapter 86: The one being is always unmoving, and yet it moves [Quomodo unum ens stet semper atque moveatur]

Chapter 87: The one being is the same as itself and different from itself. Again, it is the same as other things and different from them [Unum ens est sibimet idem atque alterum. Item caeteris idem atque alterum]

Chapter 88: The one being is similar to itself and to others; it is also dissimilar to itself and to others [Unum ens et ad se ipsum et ad alia simile est atque dissimile]

‘In thePhilebusit is shown [In Philebo probatur] that within all things subsequent to the First [in omnibus post primum] there are simultaneously the One and multiplicity [esse unum simul atque multitudinem]. It follows that within all things [Igitur in omnibus] there are the same and the different [est idem et alterum], the convergent and the divergent [convenientia atque differentia], and therefore similarity together with dissimilarity [igitur similitudo simul et dissimilitudo quaedam].’

Chapter 89: How the one being touches and is touched; but it neither touches nor is touched insofar as it belongs to itself and to other things [Quomodo unum ens tangit et tangitur. Neque tangit, neque tangitur, quantum ad se et ad alia pertinet]

Chapter 90: The one being is both equal to itself and unequal to itself; it is also equal to others and unequal to others [Quomodo unum ens sit aequale, vel inaequale sibi, vel aliis]

‘Now anyone who does not know how to make use of such rigorous exercises [Qui autem discretiones eiusmodi uti nescit] is not a Platonist [non est Platonicus] and never uses the intellect [nec unquam utitur intellectu].’

‘Moreover, as we have indicated from the outset [Praeterea quemadmodum significavimus ab initio], he (Parmenides) conducts the whole discussion [totam disputationem agit] as an exercise in logic [ut logicam exercitationem quandam]. But in this form of dialectic [Sub hac vero Dialectica forma] he often commingles mystical teachings too [mistica quoque dogmata frequenter admiscet], not in a continuous unbroken sequence [non ubique prorsus continuata], but sporadically [sed alicubi sparsa], as befits an exercise in logic [quatenus admittit exercitatio logica].’

Chapter 91: The one being, in relation to itself and to all else, is numerically the same. It is also both more and less [Quomodo unum ens sit numero par: et plus et minus ad se ipsum atque caetera]

Chapter 92: How the one being, in relation both to itself and to everything else, may be described as older and younger and of the same age [Quomodo unum ens dicatur senius et iunius atque coetaneum ad se ipsum atque caetera]

‘Remember, too [Memento rursus], as we have advised you to do from the beginning [quemadmodum admonuimus ab initio], that Parmenides is here taking up the divine soul, in addition to the intellectual nature and the animate nature [Parmenidem hic ultra naturam intellectualem, animalem iam assumere animamque divinam].’

Chapter 93: How older becoming is distinguished from younger becoming, and also how older being is distinguished from younger being. Concluding words on the one being [Quomodo distinguitur senius iuniusve fieri, rursus senius iuniusve esse. Ac de uno ente conclusio]

Chapter 94: A summary or review of the second hypothesis. On distinguishing the divinities [Summa vel Epilogus suppositionis secundae. De distinctionibus divinorum]

Chapter 95: The distinctions made in the summary or review. On the one being; on multiplicity; on limitless number; and on the orders of the divinities [Summae huius vel Epilogi distinctiones. De uno ente multitudine, numero, infinito, ordinibus deorum]

The Third Hypothesis

Chapter 1: The aim of the hypothesis. How the soul may be called being and also non-being. On movement and time within the soul. On its eternal quality. How it manifests all things through some change in itself [Tertia suppositio. Intentio suppositionis. Quomodo anima ens dicatur atque non ens. De motu et tempore in anima. Item de quodam eius aeterno. Rursus quomodo commutatione quadam sui ipsius omnia repraesentet]

‘Just as the soul consists of opposites [quemadmodum anima componitur oppositis], as we have shown in theTimaeus[ut probavimus in Timaeo], so the third hypothesis [ita suppositio tertia], which examines the soul [tractans animam], is a mixture of affirmations and negations [ex affirm-ationibus negationibusque miscetur].’

The Third Hypothesis

Chapter 2: Why the celestial soul moves and makes an orbit around the steadfast mind. How many movements of the soul there are. The number of movements and the stillness within time. Concerning the mean between movements [Qua ratione caelestis anima circa mentem stabilem moveatur, agatque circuitum. Quot sint motus animae. Quod motus et quies in tempore; et de medio inter motus]

The Third Hypothesis