Evolution and Holiness E-Book

Matthew Nelson Hill

• Herausgeber: IVP Academic
• Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
• Serie: Strategic Initiatives in Evangelical Theology
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Seitenzahl: 497

Beschreibung

Theology needs to engage what recent developments in the study of evolution mean for how we understand moral behavior. How does the theological concept of holiness connect to contemporary understandings of evolution? If genetic explanations of altruism fall short, what role should we give to environmental explanations and free will? Likewise, how do genetic explanations relate to theological accounts of human goodness and holiness? In this groundbreaking work, Matthew Hill uses the lens of Wesleyan ethics to offer a fresh assessment of the intersection of evolution and theology. He shows that what is at stake in this conversation is not only the future of the church but also the fine-tuning of human evolution.

Leseprobe

STRATEGIC INITIATIVES IN EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

MATTHEW NELSON HILL

Foreword by DARREL R. FALK

To Helene with all my love

CONTENTS

Foreword by Darrel R. Falk

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1 The Aim of This Study

1.2 Brief Summary of Main Chapters

1.3 What Is at Stake?

1.4 Brief Clarifications Before Main Chapters

2 Sociobiological Explanations of Altruism

2.1 An Introduction to Biological Altruism

2.2 Sociobiological Altruism: From Darwin to Dawkins

2.3 Moving Forward

3 Altruism and the Explanatory Limitations of Evolution

3.1 The Environment and Its Influence on Human Behavior

3.2 Problematic Language

3.3 Reductionism and Its Relationship to the Explanation of Altruism

3.4 A Reductionist-Driven False Opposition Between Philosophy/Theology and Sociobiology

3.5 Conclusion

4 Overcoming Genetic and Environmental Constraints on Altruism

4.1 The Determined Human Person?

4.2 The Human Person as Influenced but Not Determined

4.3 Humans are Genuinely Free and Consequently Responsible

4.4 Conclusion

5 Wesleyan Holiness Against a Backdrop of Evolution

5.1 The Quest for Holiness

5.2 Genetic Selfishness and Its Implications for Wesleyan Ethics

5.3 Conclusion

6 How Wesley Nurtured Altruism Despite Biological Constraints

6.1 Wesley’s Structure and Organization

6.2 How Wesley Understood and Nurtured Altruism by Way of Holiness

6.3 Environmental Constraints That Temper Biological Constraints

6.4 Conclusion

7 A Lifestyle of Holiness

7.1 Brief Summary of Main Chapters

7.2 Holiness Outside the Wesleyan Community

7.3 Practical Implications and Further Explorations

7.4 Conclusion

Appendix 1: Excerpt from “Principles of a Methodist” on the Topic of Christian Perfection

Appendix 2: Excerpt from “A Plain Account of Christian Perfection”

Appendix 3: Rules of the Band Societies—Drawn Up Dec. 25, 1738

Notes

Bibliography

General Index

Praise for Evolution and Holiness

About the Author

Strategic Initiatives in Evangelical Theology (SIET)

More Titles from InterVarsity Press

FOREWORD

Darrel R. Falk

This is a unique time for Christian theology. Biologists have demonstrated with near certainty that humans were created through the evolutionary process. The extensive fossil data is now in hand; we can see the physical changes that took place as the hominin body gradually became increasingly like our own bodies—step by step—over the past five million years. The archaeological data demonstrates in a remarkably unambiguous fashion the temporally well-defined development of increasingly sophisticated tools and the growing ability of hominins to modify raw materials to meet their needs. Genetic analysis of humans and other primates allows us to trace the coming and going of DNA elements that leave “watermarks” in our genomes telling us a coherent story of our common ancestry with the great apes. Clearly we have been created through the evolutionary process.

Even though the data supporting evolution is solid, this is no indication that the broader ramifications of the evolutionary process are settled. The fact is that a cadre of highly visible evolutionary biologists have yielded to the temptation to move beyond the confines of their discipline, venturing into realms defined more by personal philosophy than real scientific data. Equipped with little more than Sunday school knowledge of the Christian faith, they, with their evolution research journals in hand, purport to have scientifically demonstrated that Christianity is null and void—a mythical remnant of ancient humankind’s baseless quest for meaning. In the meantime, influential evangelical leaders have attempted to show that it is science that is baseless. As they set out to dismantle the discipline of biology, they try to pull it up by its evolutionary roots and proceed to declare it to be null and void despite 150 years of all-encompassing data to the contrary. Frequently, without ever having taken a course in evolutionary biology, they have tried to develop a set of arguments to fill in the void that they think exists. So the two sides, one equipped with a childlike knowledge of Christianity, the other with little knowledge of evolutionary biology, have been busy filling in voids that likely exist only in their imaginations. In the meantime, new pathways into the theological richness of exploring God’s creative processes are being ignored.

This book is a wonderful first step in initiating change. It examines a particular theological concept—the 250-year-old Wesleyan doctrine of holiness—and shows how its understanding can be enhanced and better appreciated through concepts that emerge from evolutionary biology. In actual fact, we are moving into what is potentially a very exciting time for both evolutionary biology and Christian theology. Although the basic framework laid out by Charles Darwin is clearly correct, it is now apparent that there is much more to the story. As its details have been emerging, not only are they consistent with core tenets of Christian theology, they can profoundly enrich it as well.

Natural selection as characterized by Darwin still lies at the core of our knowledge about evolution: (1) organisms do vary in the traits they possess; (2) the variation does frequently have a hereditary component; (3) some of that variation does result in more offspring; and (4) certain characteristics do come to predominate in a population over time because of the increased reproductive capacity they provide. The ramifications of this algorithm are huge. Self-centeredness, for example, is a significant outcome of the natural selection process. If your cat is hungry it is likely not willing to share a just-caught mouse with other cats, and your dog, no matter how good-tempered its breed, will likely growl if approached by another dog while it is chewing on the meat of a juicy bone.

In human evolution though, a different component started to kick in. As hominins transitioned from the trees to the lifestyle of small hunter-gatherer bands in the savannahs, traits that facilitated group dynamics began to really blossom. Characteristics like a cooperative spirit, a caring disposition, even self-sacrificing love emerged and spread. Tasks were divided up for the good of the group. As mothers more quickly weaned their young, becoming pregnant again sooner, extended family members like grandmothers, young aunts and older siblings helped care for children. This extended family became even more significant as preadult years expanded to almost two decades. Humans learned to communicate with one another through language, and they began to think in abstract terms envisaging the ramifications of their actions well out into the future. Never before had anything like this been seen—not in a billion years of multicellular life. Individuals who possessed these traits for fitting well into the group were, on average, much more successful than those who didn’t, so cooperative communities flourished like never before in the animal world.

Still, even today, in part because of our ancient prehuman roots in self-centeredness, we frequently find ourselves looking out for “number one.” We, like Eve listening to the voice of the serpent long ago, still hear that whisper, “Take the fruit, take the fruit.” Indeed, we resonate with the words the apostle Paul penned so long ago in Romans 7:21-23: “So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members.” We have a divided spirit, but by grace we are called to something more, just as it also by grace through the power of the Spirit that we’re enabled to respond.

Our genes have been honed through a process that includes over two million years of living together in communities, functioning as cooperative small groups, that are almost like a single body with each part taking on its own specific role. The more we know about our early heritage, the more we can understand why Paul tells us that life is most fulfilling as we live together functioning as a single body. Indeed we are called to be a single body—the body of Christ.

So this book by Matthew Nelson Hill, which I have found so inspiring to read, exhibits the fruitfulness that emerges as we explore the connection ­between Christianity and evolutionary biology. It embraces science, even as it shuns the illegitimacy of scientism. It is among the first to take the work of a highly influential figure in Protestant Christian thought—John Wesley in this case—and then demonstrate how his thinking, indeed his life’s work, is enhanced as it is examined through knowledge gained from the study of human evolution. John Wesley was greatly interested in and highly knowledgeable about the scientific thinking of his time. Had he been able to fast-forward through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the twenty-first, this book, given Wesley’s fascination with science, would have thrilled his soul. Hill shows that Wesley’s bands and classes provided an accountability that resembled the small hunter-gatherer groups of perhaps thirty or so individuals, and it was in those ancient groups in which our genetic proclivity for cooperation and even love was nurtured for tens of thousands of generations.

Hill’s excellent critique of the overextending reach of new atheists and of sociobiology is timely and extremely important. He shows why these approaches have been academically naive and why despite their distracting rhetoric, the two millennia of the still-unfolding Christian tradition is left largely intact regardless of the premature announcement of its death.

There is a broader theological dimension to this book that also must not be overlooked. Although Hill focuses largely on one particular aspect of the Christian tradition (holiness), he demonstrates that the approach he has taken can be adapted to evolutionarily informed studies of holiness within other theological traditions as well. Indeed, as he points out, this type of analysis is readily transferrable to theology in general.

In summary, this is a book that breaks new ground and ought to serve as a model that will be of great value to scientists, pastors, theologians and perhaps especially, laypersons. What an inspiration it has been to read the book and what a joy it is to look forward to seeing how it will stimulate a change in focus in the evolutionary biology/Christian faith discussion. No longer do we Christians need to attempt to dismantle biology; we are into a new day when we can critically examine the discipline and, given that scientists are just exploring God’s truth anyway, we can celebrate the theological and philosophical beauty that emerges.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At the end of any significant sacrifice there are inevitable feelings of relief and dependency. So it is for me with this book. Relief speaks for itself but dependency might warrant some explaining. Through the writing process I have often felt a sense of reliance on others: guidance, personal mentoring, emotional support and the like. Yet despite this stretching process, I have realized that if I desire to be a person of sacrifice—especially for the greater good of the church and the academy—I will have life-long dependencies. If writing this book has taught me anything, I have realized that I cannot do life on my own. This reliance is both the joy and burden of living in community and my realization that we are all contingent on each other. For these reasons, I desire to thank the following individuals who have helped me through this journey.

First, I would like to thank Professor Robert Song. His guidance and direction was beyond what I could have asked for. He introduced me to a complex field with patience and grace. With every conversation we had, I walked away truly amazed at his unique perspective and intelligence. I am also forever grateful to Professor Song for changing the way I think and who I am.

Next, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge my friends and colleagues who graciously read early drafts of this book. I want to especially thank Ken Brewer and Robert Moore-Jumonville who encouraged me to present and publish my research through various venues and critiqued my chapters on John Wesley’s theology. Darrell Moore’s Wesley Study Group has also been immensely helpful, and I appreciate his kindness and mentoring. I am also thankful to various editors who read through early portions of this project: my sister-in-law Diana Welkener, who labored with me in those early stages, as well as Marie Slisher and Anna Tabone, who helped me in a pinch. I also want to thank Bryan Zinn for helping me with some research for the last chapter. I am significantly indebted to my friend Jack Baker, who tirelessly worked through this entire book. Jack is truly one of the most gifted people I know, for he has the unique ability not only to make my writing better, but to teach and guide me in the writing process while encouraging me to relax and continue on. I also want to thank Spring Arbor University for giving me a reduced teaching load for two years while I dedicated significant time to this manuscript. This reduction enabled my schedule to be much lighter and freed me up to finish well. I am also grateful for IVP—and David Congdon in particular—for both believing in this project and for their sustained support. Furthermore, I want to thank the Department of Theology at Spring Arbor University, as well as Alexander Angelov, Robbie Bolton, Brent Cline, Brian Lugioyo and Eric Slisher, who were constant sources of encouragement through the writing process. Additionally I would like to thank Kyle Poag, who stayed with me when I had a “dark night of the soul” moment and nearly gave up and walked away.

Last of all, and most significantly, I want to thank my children (Connor, Anna, Lucas and Eva), friends and family, and particularly my parents, Nelson and Karen Hill, who gave me grace throughout this journey. During the last several years I have neglected conversations, did not keep in touch, and sacrificed significant time and attention in order to finish this book. Despite all of this, they have stuck by my side and chose to understand instead of giving up on our relationship.

Yet far above all, I want to thank my wonderful wife, Helene, for her patience and love over the last few years. She has not only read and critiqued my whole project, but has also shown me what true altruism and holiness looks like, and I am grateful she allows me to share part of her life. I tear up every time I think of her kindness and only hope to be half the person she is. This book is wholly dedicated to her.

The interface between science and religion is, in a certain sense, a no-man’s land. No specialized science is competent here, nor does classical theology or academic philosophy really own this territory. This is an interdisciplinary zone where inquirers come from many fields. But this is a land where we increasingly must live.

Holmes Rolston IIIScience and Religion: A Critical Survey

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Aim of This Study

A man lives in a rural part of the Ontario Province in Canada in a community of low socioeconomic status.1 Everyone around him drinks excessively, and so does he; the difference between this man and his peers, however, is that he happens to be a First Nations Canadian compared to his European-descended friends. Unfortunately for this man, he has a genetic disadvantage that his friends do not have: he is lacking an enzyme that quickly breaks down alcohol, making him more predisposed to alcoholism than non–First Nations people.2 Is he less morally responsible for his actions than his friends? Are there ways he might overcome the biological roulette that led to his disease? Questions like this are never easy to answer. Yet genetic predispositions like this are quite common. Perhaps the broader and more interesting question concerns how moral behavior is constrained by our biological makeup. If one can locate these influences, it might be possible to understand the environmental conditions that contribute to moral behavior.

In recent years, new research in evolutionary biology and sociobiology has made the above scenario more intelligible, leading to the knowledge that humans possess numerous behavioral traits that directly link to genetics. Yet, despite much innovative research in socio­biology—a field that applies evolutionary theory to social behavior—theological ethics is still coming to terms with what this new knowledge means for how we understand moral behavior. Therefore, this book finds itself at the intersection of theological ethics and the sciences and seeks, in part, to address questions such as these: (1) How much does sociobiology fully explain moral traits such as human altruism? (2) If genetic explanations do not fully explain human altruism, what role should we give to environmental explanations and free will? (3) How do genetic explanations of altruism relate to theological accounts of human goodness?3 To move toward answers for these questions, I will be reading them through the lens of Wesleyan theology and ethics, offering a unique perspective within the interface of sociobiology and ethics. To propose such a reading, however, the following concerns must be considered: Can Wesleyan bands and classes provide the environmental conditions within which people may develop holiness, beyond their genetic proclivities? If so, how are we to understand Wesleyan holiness against a background of evolutionary biology? Consequently, it is the central aim of this book to explore the significance of human evolutionary theory for Wesleyan holiness.

For the sake of clarity, the reader should note that I purposely use a Wesleyan understanding of holiness throughout this book for two primary reasons. First, John Wesley’s view of holiness was particularly stringent. While Keswickian, Reformed and even Eastern Orthodox notions of sanctification and holiness have their own interactions with human evolution (addressed later in the book), Wesleyan holiness is by far the most rigorous and extreme. I do not mention this caveat to imply any negative connotations attached to either Wesley’s concept of holiness or other formulations from various parts of Christianity. Instead, I use Wesley’s holiness as a lens because, if this demanding concept of holiness can connect to human evolution, then so too can the others. Second, it would simply be beyond the scope of this book to fully address all notions of holiness in every tradition. By focusing on Wesley’s view, while still bringing in concepts from Reformed, Orthodox and other traditions, I hope to connect the disparate fields of holiness and sociobiology in a cogent and orderly way.

Through the process of connecting Wesleyan holiness to sociobiology, there are several other important issues on which I hope to elaborate. I will establish the connection between the sociobiological understanding of human nature, which places human behavior somewhere on a spectrum between egoism and altruism, and accountability groups that have the potential to engender generosity and altruism. I will also articulate how John Wesley, in particular, uniquely approached communicating and transmitting his social ethic. One of his primary modes was the organized bands that held members answerable to a high standard. In regard to the social context of the time, the small groups formed by Wesley, called bands and classes, encouraged people to live out a more altruistic social ethic through accountability.

What is more, from the rise of sociobiology as a self-conscious enterprise, the assumption of sociobiologists has been to explain behavior by the “selfishness” of genes, which gave rise to the problem of altruism. Altruism has been a puzzling phenomenon within sociobiology and has created problems for those who solely appeal to genetic explanations.4 Yet, even within the field of biology, recent studies by Frans de Waal, among others, suggest that their biological “make up” puts humans more to the center of the selfish/selfless spectrum. The ability for change along the spectrum makes it possible for intentional community—structured by environmental constraints on behavior—to shift humans who are genetically inclined to both selfish and altruistic inclinations to favor either the former or latter. This type of intentional community was at the heart of the early Methodist movement. When individuals dwell within community, they learn traits and qualities that are characteristic of altruism, as can be observed in Wesley’s bands and classes, which were powerful vehicles for the communal lifestyle of altruism toward the poor.5 To such a degree, sociobiology confirms what Wesley knew to be true of human nature: humans who dwell within a system of constraints motivated by Christian perfection can cultivate altruistic behavior.

Still, within the context of these highly structured groups there are left open numerous theological and ethical puzzles that need solving. If certain individuals who are cultivating a lifestyle of holiness are more or less inclined to selfish behavior, an adequate theological explanation is necessary in order to account for these genetic differences and how they relate to the Christian call to move toward holiness. One should not separate humans into dualistic categories of body and spirit such that attention focuses only on sociobiological traits, which are inherently material. Instead, I will develop a fuller account of how Wesleyan groups function with the dual concepts of genetic/environmental constraints and ideas of Christian perfection. Although it may seem a contradiction, these concepts can form a cohesive and holistic account of the Christian person.

To be sure, the relationship between morality and holiness can sometimes seem blurry. While I recognize the differences between acts of altruism, morality and the spiritual process of becoming holy, I do not hold the position that these are unrelated activities. In much the same way as the book of James discusses the connection between works and faith, altruism and morality can be linked with holiness. As I will expound upon this throughout the book, one cannot become holy without seeing the fruit of altruism and moral development along the way. Similarly, those practicing altruism and positive moral behavior are in some sense heading in the direction of holiness. As I will discuss later, this process does not happen without the intervention of God. We can see an analogy of this from Wesley himself: when struggling with his faith, his friend Peter Böhler charged him to “preach faith till you have it and then because you have it, you will preach faith.”6 In a similar way, while practicing altruism is not tantamount to practicing holiness, they are never very far from one another.

1.2 Brief Summary of Main Chapters

I intend to begin with a sociobiological look at altruism and conclude with how Wesleyan ethics might express its own account of altruistic behavior as a theological concept of Christian perfection.

The intention of chapter two, “Sociobiological Explanations of Altruism,” is to address the main sociobiological narrative that altruism is a “problem” that needs explanation and solving. Within sociobiology in particular, this behavior has always been considered problematic because it seems to go against the idea of individual selection. How can something that, by definition, reduces individual gene fitness end up being a behavior trait?7 To answer this question, and to set the tone for the following chapters, I explain sociobiological theories of altruism while showing the possibility of biological unselfishness—drawing upon concepts such as kin and reciprocal altruism as well as game theory. Lastly, I investigate the contemporary conversation and the implications of such a discussion within sociobiology.

In chapter three I will discuss how sociobiological explanations of altruistic human action, especially on the basis of genetic evolution alone, are not fully satisfying. I will establish in this third chapter that, although biological explanations account for some of our understanding of altruism, they do not define the phenomena of altruism in its totality. There are also serious environmental influences that impact human action. I will also explain how habitual dimensions factor into altruistic action. Here, any action by an individual creates new behavioral patterns and norms. In other words, what biologists decipher from our genetic past does not prescribe what our future action will necessarily be, or what our moral behavior should be. There is much in the study of human action that we do not understand, even for those in the community of sociobiologists.8

This chapter has three major critiques of sociobiological explanations of altruism. The first criticism addresses the role of culture and its influence on learned human behavior, showing that we are not merely the products of our genes. The second critique discusses sociobiological invocations of problematic language when explaining altruism, which exposes numerous inconsistencies. The third criticism revolves around the inability of sociobiology to explain altruistic behavior without resorting to reductionism. The main issue with such oversimplification is that sociobiologists do not acknowledge the whole human person.9 The last major section in this chapter builds off the former criticisms and shows how a false opposition is developed by sociobiologists between philosophy/theology and sociobiology. This false opposition causes sociobiologists to moralize outside the bounds of science as well as commit a naturalistic fallacy.

One important obstacle to understanding the proper relation between Christian ethics and human evolution lies in the inappropriate forms of reductionism presumed by sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.10 Simon Conway Morris argues that sociobiology is “not so much wrong, as seriously incomplete” when it comes to explanations for altruistic behavior.11 Accounting for genes does not suffice for a total explanation.12 Stephen Pope speaks to this with clarity:

Even on the micro-level, it makes no sense to assume a genetic determinism according to which genes by themselves somehow cause behavior. Genes never function as isolated cases of behavior but, as Rose emphasizes, rather as essential components of complex networks. Behavior, moreover, reflects the influence of a multitude of genes (they are “polygenic”). Genes play an important role in the cluster of causes that lie behind behavior, but are not “the” cause of behavior.13

What Pope describes here is one of the fundamental errors of reductionist thinking. To be fair, most sociobiologists do not believe traits are the result of single genes. When they talk of a “gene for altruism” or a “gene for egoism” it can sometimes be done for linguistic convenience. Still, although sociobiologists like Dawkins are not gene “fatalists”—Dawkins specifically acknowledges that genetic causes and environmental causes are in principle no different from each other14—the line is often considerably blurred. This ambiguity is not isolated. Many concepts elicit opposing views that are paradoxically held by the same ­sociobiologist. For instance, there is a complicated dance that Dawkins in particular performs when he wants to call humans “merely animals” yet at the same time “set apart” from animals. Early in The Selfish Gene, Dawkins claims that humans are distinct from other animals:

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to.15

One can see how, on the one hand, Dawkins wants to claim humans as animals that need to be taught altruism. Yet, on the other hand, humans are the only animals that can “upset” their designs. This troubled logic is inconsistent at best, and will be something I heavily critique in this chapter. Recent research is discrediting blanket statements by those, like Dawkins, who believe humans are born selfish and have to be taught how to be altruistic.16 Primatologist Frans de Waal, in particular, has numerous studies that display how primates (some of whom are our closest nonhuman ancestors) have a biological bent toward kindness, empathy and altruism.17 It should be clearly stated, however, that de Waal only provides qualified optimism because there are a whole host of less admirable traits that can be found among our primate ancestors18—a concept that I pursue throughout my critique in this chapter.19

In chapter four, I will discuss the biological constraints on human behavior, both genetic and environmental, and how these constraints impact human freedom and responsibility.20 One cannot simply ask humans to “be moral,” or to “be altruistic.” Different people reside in different locations on the spectrum of biological and environmental constraints. I aim to demonstrate that although altruistic behavior is significantly influenced by biology, it does not mean that all altruistic actions are solely limited to neurobiological processes. Humans have the ability (unique amongst animals)21 to overcome influences on their behavior. To do this, I will first look at some specific ways in which biology constrains human altruism. Some of these factors include the mind/body connection associated with neuroscience and genetic determinism. There are interesting parallels between altruistic action and sexual reproduction, and I will provide evidence for the similarities between these two phenomena. Next, I will show how individuals can overcome such behavioral constraints, such as defying one’s genes and overcoming environmental barriers. Last, I will argue that by embracing a better understanding of freedom and responsibility, humans have the capacity to make moral decisions, including altruistic decisions, with authentic freedom.22

These environmental and genetic restrictions necessarily impact human freedom and, subsequently, responsibility.23 However, because humans are not wholly subjugated to these influences—having the capability to overcome such constraints—it is within their power to practice genuine altruism. Nonetheless, not all individuals start at the same location on the selfish/selfless spectrum. Those who have stronger genetic drives toward selfishness will have a more difficult time overcoming those urges in order to act altruistically. Others with less biological complications, or those with environmental influences that support altruistic behavior, are more able to make altruistic decisions.

Again, it is important to note that genes alone cannot explain the totality of human behavior.24 Daniel Dennett, for instance, is correct in saying that humans are somehow different than other animals in their capacity to live freely.25 Yet human freedom, stemming from biological causes, is constrained by both the genetic and the environmental history of the individual.26 Those influences contain the parameters of freedom but do not fully hamper genuine choice. Each individual differs in where they dwell on the continuum of constraints. These constraints can be located in both one’s family of origin and the communities one belongs to.27

Chapter five is titled “Wesleyan Holiness Against a Backdrop of Evolution.” John Wesley created an environment for the early Methodists by which holiness might be better actualized. Yet significant issues between the concept of Wesleyan holiness and genetic predispositions remain. Although the intersection of Wesleyan ethics and sociobiology has not been explored at great length, even within current research the Wesleyan perspective on Christian perfection is conspicuously missing as compatible with sociobiological explanations of human behavior. This explanatory problem is particularly troubling when it concerns moral behaviors, including altruism.

For instance, as we have seen, sociobiologists have found evolutionary links to prosocial behavior. These discoveries might appear to put the idea of Christian perfection in jeopardy. It would seem that an individual does not need to be concerned about experiencing Christian perfection if she or he is bound by genetics. Or, it might make more sense to simply cultivate inherited behavioral traits. Likewise, if genetic understandings of Homo sapiens convey that humans are predisposed to certain moral behaviors, either being more selfish or more selfless than others, does the notion of Christian perfection mean that humans no longer have to worry about their genetic history because they can “spiritually overcome” such heritages? Then one might wonder if “perfected” Christians somehow use free will to “trump” genetics.

Within the intersection of sociobiology and Wesleyan ethics rest other important explorations I will address in this chapter. I will show that explaining human selfishness as a mere “defect of the will” is reductionist at best; instead it is a defect of the person. By this I will show that Wesleyan ethics helps explain how the holistic person impacts selfish and selfless behavior. One cannot have only care for either the “spirit” or “body” in some kind of reductionist dualism. Furthermore, when an individual works within her or his community, especially a community such as John Wesley’s highly structured groups, the individual can develop the kind of character necessary to be able to overcome genetic constraints.

To make the connection between sociobiology and Wesleyan ethics—specifically the concept of Christian perfection—I will first introduce Wesley’s theological underpinnings, including the concepts of original sin and prevenient grace. Next, I will use the concept of theosis to elucidate Christian perfection in light of sociobiological discoveries. Last, I will discuss genetic selfishness and its implications for Wesleyan ethics—positing a new theory about how one might overcome genetic constraints and subsequently reach Christian perfection.28

In chapter six, “How Wesley Nurtured Altruism Despite Biological Constraints,” I will discuss how, given that the biological human condition rests somewhere between total selfishness and altruism, there are some environmental constraints that end up pushing individuals closer to altruism.29 John Wesley found a way to work within biological constraints, while utilizing environmental constraints, to encourage people to be more selfless through his bands and classes. It is obviously anachronistic to say that Wesley knew about the biological human condition. Instead, he placed people in groups for both the practical reasons of organization and the theological reasons of engendering holiness. This environment is what I will call Wesley’s “world of constraints.” Through this, he nurtured group members’ biological proclivities toward altruism and mitigated egoistic tendencies.

To establish this claim, I will first look at the organization of the early Methodist groups. I also feel it is important to understand some terminology as well as the culture of the early Methodists before discussing the reasons behind such groups. I will walk through the specific accountability structure that included a host of environmental constraints put forth by Wesley. It is also important to account for Wesley’s theological understanding of holiness, which was parsed into inward and outward holiness. As we will see, theology was practical for Wesley, and his sermons became tools for spiritual formation.30 Understanding this will demonstrate to us the foundation with which Wesley was working and help us to know how his groups nurtured altruism. While his core theological concepts included a distinct view of the doctrine of original sin that was coupled with prevenient grace,31 a direct connection can be made to current sociobiological discoveries of human nature not being totally selfish but also bearing altruistic behavior and potential.32

Wesley engaged the biological human condition in order to promote the holistic altruism that was at the heart of his drive toward holiness. When individuals dwelled within these intentional communities, they exhibited the distinguishing virtues of selflessness and altruism. This chapter finishes with some practical questions. Primarily, how does someone living in the era of Frans de Waal, understanding that the human condition is not totally depraved by egoism, follow Wesley’s example and engender Christian holiness?

Besides being a catalyst for revival in England and America, Wesley articulated, through practical service to social needs, what it meant to be a Christian living in the world. For Wesley, living among the poor was part of working out one’s salvation. In this way, being socially active was a key component for John Wesley’s ministry and discipleship model.33 Wesley seemed to intuitively understand the human condition to be moveable on the selfish/selfless spectrum. With the creation of his world of constraints, his intention was to move people toward inward holiness that resulted in outward holiness. This environment helped nudge Wesley’s followers ever closer to what it means to live a life lived sacrificially for others. As Alasdair MacIntyre says, moral training frames our responses to our body and allows us to gain distance from our response to the “good of our animal nature.”34

1.3 What Is at Stake?

Human action is often (maybe almost always) generated by mixed motives.35 This fact cannot easily be ignored by those who may want to reduce every act of altruism to a “single egoistic motivation” of a selfish gene or environmental constraint.36 One example of this is that humans often display extraordinary sacrificial, and consequently altruistic, behavior that reduces reproductive success without compensatory reciprocation or benefit to kin.37 One could look to countless anecdotes to see individuals sacrifice for strangers, individuals practicing celibacy to better serve others and so on. Consequently, it is possible to have actions that are freely made to the detriment of the agent.

Nevertheless, all human action will necessarily be found within the context of community. The character of morality (or even the natural law) constrains the person to moral standards that encourage the well-being of the person and her or his community: it is not right to be sexually unfaithful, murderous, a thief and so on.38 Thus, proper Christian community “does not level off the sharp edge of individuality but demonstrates the fathomless goodwill that defines Christian love.”39 What is at stake is the preservation of Christian communities to recognize the responsibility to follow what John Wesley did: capitalize on a biological phenomenon given to us by human evolution. To fail to do this would be disastrous for communities and would neglect the call to become a holy people; this would happen through succumbing to the temptation to be selfish while lacking inner transformation.40 As Neil Messer says,

The Church, for all that it has too often been part of the problem rather than part of the solution, is called to live as a community that embodies and bears witness to this transformation, in ways that also have the potential to challenge and change the wider society within which it is located.41

If the church can muster up an intentional community that can take the biological state of humanity and encourage it to be more holy (which would lead toward a fuller expression of altruism compared to reductionist sociobiological definitions), then what is at stake is not only the future of the church but also the fine tuning of human evolution.

1.4 Brief Clarifications Before Main Chapters

The question of the sociobiological explanation of altruism is experiencing renewed attention and has considerable impact on contemporary Christian ethics. In 2007, two pieces of work in the area of human evolution and Christian ethics influenced how an understanding of evolution may impact the church and ethics. Stephen Pope, a Roman Catholic, published a book called Human Evolution and Christian Ethics,42 in which he discusses the origins of morality and engages with evolutionary theory on its own terms. The second work, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics,43 written by Neil Messer—a Reformed Protestant—seeks to find a cogent theory of morality that goes beyond evolutionary theory alone while dealing justly with it. There are, of course, many other works that have recently influenced this field.44 But for the purposes of my argument, these two works are both exigent and pertinent—thus, I will refer to them frequently.

Since I find their works to be convincing, I will not be arguing with either Pope’s or Messer’s positions; instead, I wish to build off their arguments by looking into the normative aspect of how the church can foster moral actions given biological predispositions. I will develop a framework to convey how human action is not destined to be entirely selfish, and demonstrate what can be achieved if certain conditions on individuals can be met. In building this framework, I will be drawing on much of Frans de Waal’s research with primates and present the connection between our ancestors and our natural prosocial tendencies. Of course, as might be expected, I will be dealing with Richard Dawkins’s idea of selfish genes.45 Although I have numerous disagreements with his and other sociobiologists’ reductionistic readings of the human condition, I agree that we have many naturally selfish tendencies. Thus, I will show how humans are caught somewhere toward the center of the selfish/selfless spectrum, arguing, therefore, that it takes a certain kind of community to encourage46 individuals to be more altruistic.

Messer also suggests, and I think rightly so, that a Christian account of the created world should locate humans as part of God’s good creation, and that right moral action should be defined, especially by Christians, as “going ‘with the grain’ of God’s good purposes in creation.”47 He goes on to claim that this understanding can better address how moral claims call for an authentic concern for others and why such claims matter.48 Being in agreement with his articulation, I do not intend to introduce a new theological paradigm. I do, however, acknowledge what Messer says: “Even if we understand our natural inclinations properly, they will not necessarily (so to say) tell us the truth about our good.”49 Instead, what I intend to do is exhibit how John Wesley worked within the restraints of natural tendencies, redirecting and reshaping them to help create an environment within which holiness was possible, and by which people were able to become more altruistic.

To make the argument of this book more cogent, it is necessary to pause and outline a key clarification. Altruism, which is the most complicated of the terms in this book, is traditionally defined as an action motivated by a concern for the welfare of at least one other person—a definition that contains four primary components:50 (1) to have a certain kind of psychological motivation—that is, to act on behalf of others; (2) to understand and make a judgment on the worthiness of the motivation—that is, is it truly good?; (3) to decide to act on the basis of this judgment about what is good—that is, to become the directing motive of the altruistic act; and (4) to intend to do something—that is, to pursue a certain course of action to obtain the desired good. Another clarification about altruism concerns what Pope suggests: “An act need not be purely or exclusively self-sacrificial or involve heroic levels of self-denial on the part of an agent to count as genuinely altruistic.”51

Not all people share the same genetic predispositions. A nonreductionist reading of motivation holds that genetics is only one of multiple factors that influence an individual’s particular motivation.52 For instance, a person who, through a traumatic incident, developed a psychologically unhealthy disposition may have different motivations for action than someone who has lived a sheltered life. To this end, looking at ­altruistic action as solely stemming from biological urges does not take traumatic brain injuries and other extrinsic factors into account.

In Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, Messer promotes a healthy caution toward the word altruism, pointing out the word’s complicated history. Sociobiologists tend to use the word to imply that everything kind (or even moral) can be explained through kin selection or reci­procal altruism.53 This, however, is not the case. As Messer points out,

Some evolutionary explanations have a tendency to reduce “morality” to a relatively small number of behaviours and traits, exemplified by altruism: there is sometimes a tendency to assume that if altruism can be explained in evolutionary terms, it should also be possible to explain the other behaviours and traits that make up morality. But from a theological standpoint, how satisfactory is this as an account of what we mean by morality? Within the framework of a Christian theological anthropology, what is meant by it, and is it the kind of thing that could be susceptible to a natural scientific (for example, evolutionary) explanation?54

Messer’s cautions are helpful, and I do not wish to dispute them in this book. However, for the sake of moving the conversation forward, I will be using the word altruism throughout. This term forms a cohesiveness between acts of self-sacrifice and kindness, which are rooted in free will, environment or religion, and sociobiological accounts of the same phenomena. For the purposes of my argument, I will attempt to stay within the confines of Pope’s definition of altruism rather than that of many sociobiologists, in particular E. O. Wilson’s definition: “When a person (or animal) increases the fitness of another at the expense of his own fitness.”55 I realize and acknowledge that altruism, especially taking into account a Christian anthropology (which I unapologetically hold), is deeper than mere biological urges.

Besides not wanting to get caught in the semantics of what altruism is, moving the conversation forward adds not only to the field of sociobiology but also to the field of Christian ethics in general and Wesleyan ethics in particular. Understanding what altruism might look like in religious communities provides specific relevance to Christians because humans share prosocial tendencies with animals, and this can sometimes seem quite threatening.56 Beyond the surface of the evolution/­creation debates—which I do not intend to visit beyond this mention—understanding altruism holds enormous significance for the church.57 If we can understand the biological constraints that have been placed on us by nature, then we, just like John Wesley, might be able to capitalize58 on such a phenomenon in order to encourage the church to be a more altruistic Christian community. This altruistic community would be assembled with a holistic approach, taking the entire person into account, rather than focusing only on the person as an embodied spirit, or some other iteration of dualism.

2

SOCIOBIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ALTRUISM

2.1 An Introduction to Biological Altruism

The quest for an answer to the “quandary of altruism” leads somewhere beyond biological or sociobiological explanations alone. These disciplines cannot, on their own, be expected to provide a sufficient basis for comprehending altruism or cooperative behavior, as I will argue in chapter three.1 In order to show the inadequacies of sociobiological explanations alone, one ought first to review the biological account of how organisms are understood within evolutionary theory, as I intend to do in this chapter.

For some evolutionary biologists, organisms came about in order to act as hosts for “replicator genes.” In a rapid changing environment, replicators—forced to compete with harsh consequences, where only those best adapted to the particular environment survive—had to find means of adapting faster than other entities less able to adapt. Cooperation in groups, then, arose because it conferred adaptive advantage.2 Thus, as eons passed, genes in cooperative groups were selected to sacrifice in the short-term in order to benefit their individual gene fitness (via the group) in the long-term. The payoff in the end was greater than unadulterated selfishness, and a form of altruism had begun. Yet, according to Philip Clayton, sociobiologists disagree on whether biology is sufficient to account for altruism or whether a source is required that lies completely outside the purview of evolutionary theory.3 This dispute is especially evident when dealing with Homo sapiens. If replicator genes try to find the best-suited host through the natural selection process, humans are a very good expression of that “host” due to their capability to be highly adaptive in various environments. The point of contention concerning standard sociobiology is that there is no room left for an agent to be “purely” altruistic, even if it does enjoy benefits of some kind, either through reciprocal behavior or kin preferences. Genuine altruism in humans, then, gets typically examined under the microscope of the selfish gene theory.4

2.1.1 Darwinian history

According to Darwinian history, the beginning was simple. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection5 aims to show how simplicity can change into complexity over time: molecules group themselves into more complex patterns, moving toward the complexity found in Homo sapiens.6 All life hails from simple beginnings, most probably in hot undersea vents where basic molecules such as amino acids and RNA are assembled. These molecules are then able to replicate and mutate to adapt to their environment, and then copy that change through multiplication. For evolution to happen, there has to be the correct blend of both mutation and replication. If replicators did not possess the ability to copy and reproduce, then the whole process is random at best and would not build and progress. Yet, having the ability to copy oneself, replicator molecules drifted in the sea, where they found stability quicker and more efficiently than others and survived the primordial chaos.7 Due to the nature of environmental conditions (for example: limited resources in the sea), as well as the earth in general, these replicators proved fitter to survive the competition of other contending life.8 After hundreds of millions of years, replicators stopped floating in the sea, having pushed and competed their way to more stable forms of living within “hosts.” As Dawkins puts is, “Their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of genes, and we are their survival machines.”9 Consequently, the story of the replicator lives on in their host organism.

Stephen J. Gould later developed an important concept called “punctuated equilibrium” that proposes that geological tempo of speciation differs radically from gradual anagenesis, or the progressive evolution of species.10 The idea of anagenesis stems from species formation that does not subdivide from the evolutionary line of descent.11 This differs from cladogenesis, or the process of adaptive evolution that leads to the development of a greater variety of animals or plants.12 Here, Gould proposes the notion that certain periods in evolutionary history moved more rapidly (punctuated) than others and resulted in cladogenesis where species split in the evolutionary process.13 Gradual anagenesis, which was the commonly held timetable for evolutionary thinking before Gould, did not account for the adaptive qualities of some organisms that pointed toward short bursts of change in the midst of much evolutionary stasis.14 For the laity, it might not seem like a major discovery in science. Yet, this new theory is noteworthy due to the necessary impact of nonbiological influences on the host that inevitably come from such short bursts of evolutionary change. In such a rapidly changing evolutionary environment, forced to compete through harsh environmental circumstances, replicators had to find means of progressing faster with greater stability in order to out-replicate their competitors.

In trying to compete for fitness and stability, cooperation became a fruitful strategy by enhancing group fitness, which ultimately increased individual fitness. For instance, if a group had members that sacrificed for the community, that group would out-select groups that did not sacrifice in such an efficient way. This kind of group selection, in turn, aided cooperative groups—and the individual organisms that compose such groups—in their evolutionary competition. It was thought, prior to the 1960s, that most adaptation to selection, where an organism struggles for survival of the fittest, was considered adaptive and a benefit to the whole group. Yet, recent reviews of the evolutionary process show that the individualistic emphasis of Charles Darwin’s original theory is probably more valid.15 It just so happens that these individuals resided within groups; thus, the fate of both the individual organisms and the groups were intimately woven together. Accordingly, replicators in groups traded short-term sacrifice for long-term benefits, and altruism became a valuable and necessary action.

Still, it was unclear if cooperation itself could be considered, as Thomas Jay Oord calls it, “absolutely altruistic,”16 especially if the replicators in organisms were more likely to survive if they looked after their own gene fitness. Richard Dawkins attempted to address this very issue. In his book, The Selfish Gene, he endeavors to elucidate the genetic drive for reproductive fitness found in nature, describing the reasoning behind what appears to be cooperative actions. In the end, he denies the likelihood of any human altruistic motives in the pure sense of the word. He contends that all behavior is based upon genetic foundations that have a long evolutionary history of survival and have determined, to a large extent, just how organisms behave. He states, “The fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit of heredity.”17 This genetic makeup affects the phenotypic behavior—or the observable characteristics when genes interact with the environment18—and also functions as the impetus for all action and motivation for decision making, whether conscious or unconscious. Dawkins asserts that genes function as “replicators” whose primary responsibility is to survive by whatever means necessary.19 Accordingly, the organism merely functions as a vehicle for the replicators’ survival. The genes that are the most fit will survive; thus, the most productive mechanism to insure the best longevity is an openness to constant adaptation. Therefore for Dawkins, if the genotype—the genetic construction of an organism—determines not only the phenotype, but also largely the organism’s behavior, organisms do not possess the ability to resist the genetic urgings of the replicators, thus rendering any concept of altruism unlikely.20 Consequently, the complicated phenomenon of altruism—and whether it is beneficial, self-destructing, or able to be “purely” practiced—became a “problem” to be solved within sociobiology.21

2.1.2 Kin preference and reciprocal altruism

Darwin poses a serious question about acts of altruism under the assumption that the purpose of our existence is to survive and reproduce. If this is true, one should question why an individual would risk such altruistic behavior. If there is not adequate reciprocation, the individual might suffer some kind of fitness loss. Darwin says,

It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those that were the most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater number than the children of selfish and treacherous parents of the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. The bravest men, who were always willing to come to the front in war, and who freely risked their lives for others would on average perish in larger numbers than other men. Therefore it seems scarcely possible . . . that the number of men gifted with such virtues, or that the standard of their excellence, could be increased through Natural Selection.22

If this is the case, one should ask, then why sacrifice in the first place? Given what we know about the modern synthesis, where genetics is combined with evolutionary theory, it might not benefit genes one bit to be self-sacrificing or altruistic.

Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, approaches the altruism phenomenon by arguing that kin altruism and reciprocity explain the bulk of altruistic acts. For Ruse, there is a connection between a sense of sympathy and likelihood of reciprocity. Organisms have evolved to where they may be dependent on one another through social bonds—such as flock, herd or other community—or are at least organisms that are capable of reciprocating good deeds. Still, Ruse often argues that genetic reciprocators, such as direct kin, are more influential over any nonbiological obligation (whether social, cultural, moral etc.).23 Accordingly, “biologically, our major concern has to be towards our own kin, then to those at least in some sort of relationship to us (not necessarily a blood relationship) and only finally to complete strangers.”24 These concerns, therefore, are not out of any sort of “pure” altruistic desire, but out of the biological drive to receive payback for any amount of exertion or self-sacrifice—a process that fosters a more fertile environment for gene fitness.

It is the role of a gene, then, as many sociobiologists might attest, to function without caring about its own fitness but rather about the immortal genetic set of replicas existing in other related organisms.25 This long-term genetic urge causes the host organism to act in altruistic ways—or at least not competitively.26 According to biology, when it comes to gene self-preservation, genes will do anything that enhances their chances of replication. This drive for multiplication trumps even the host organism itself. What makes complex organisms a worthy host for such a powerful force is that they are able or willing to be “self-deceived” in order to attain gene fitness and perpetuation of their genotype.27 Consequently, authors such as Richard Alexander would say, “When we speak favorably to our children about Good Samaritanism, we are telling them about a behavior that has a strong likelihood of being reproductively profitable.”28 This subversive and even subconscious notion is that the host’s replicators might reap beneficial results in subsequent generations from such a behavior through creating a more fertile environment for gene fitness—that is, helping to create a world that is more amiable to the replicator’s next generation.

Regarding this kind of gene fitness, there are two major theories of why organisms display altruistic behavior: kin preference, also known as kin altruism, and reciprocity. Kin preference is when an agent is inclined to assist another because of genetic relation whereas reciprocity is due to some kind of positive tradeoff that might manifest itself at a later date. These two major theories of assistance giving do not logically have to depend on firm egoistic presuppositions.29 The term kin in sociobiology terminology refers solely to genetic relationships.30

2.1.2.1 Kin altruism

Genetics drive organisms to be inclined to favor their own kin.31 Degrees of closeness in relation to kin also matter in regard to favor. For instance, a father baboon will have genetically more in common with his son than with his cousin. In turn, however, he would have more in common with his cousin than with a baboon in the same colony. Yet he would still have more in common with that baboon than one from a different area or genetic line. Thus, he would be more inclined to aid a baboon depending on proximity or degree of closeness.32 In theory, a cycle in which altruism was genotypically advantageous became more and more prominent among organisms at various stages in the evolutionary process. With such communal advantages, organisms in groups such as these formed better systems of protection, developed communication (dolphin sonar, crow calls etc.) and inevitably established culture for symbolic means of social coordination.33

Take crows, for example, who are highly sociable and communicative. During periods of overpopulation or times when food is scarce, they tend to reduce their numbers by having fewer young.34 As pointed out by David Lack in his Population Studies of Birds, many animals put the interest of kin over those who are unrelated. Almost without exception, those that do not are actually sacrificing for family rather than unrelated groups.35 Likewise, wolf packs, ants, as well as crows all dwell in very large families, not unrelated groups. Any sacrifice they endure is for kin altruistic purposes. After all, if an unrelated group reduced the number of offspring during a time of scarce food, the rogue selfish individual animal would produce more kin and in a few generations all genetic propensity toward altruism would have been evolved out of the group.36

These systems, as well as related genotype, contributed to group loyalty and protection within genetically related groups. One can see that more complex organisms intrinsically have both competitive and altruistic-cooperative behavior that is dependent upon what promotes reproductive fitness better at any given time. Altruism, then, is regarded as involving a complex symbolic system that ensures cooperation within the group and protects it from threats by outside groups.37 An individual organism may even take on losses to their own well-being to enable an organism with high relatedness (especially within an animal’s immediate family).38 The evolution of the honeybee worker, which has a suicidal barbed sting, might be an example of this.39 All of this selfless behavior promotes the replicator gene hosted within the organism and its closest kin.