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- Herausgeber: ibidem
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
- Sprache: Englisch
This book aims to explain the reasons behind Russia's international conduct in the post-Soviet era, examining Russian foreign policy discourse with a particular focus on the major foreign policy schools of Atlanticism, Eurasianism, derzhavniki, realpolitik, geopolitics, neo-Marxism, radical nationalism, and post-positivism. The Russian post-Soviet threat perceptions and national security doctrines are studied. The author critically assesses the evolution of Russian foreign policy decision-making over the last 25 years and analyzes the roles of various governmental agencies, interest groups and subnational actors. Concluding that a foreign policy consensus is gradually emerging in contemporary Russia, Sergunin argues that the Russian foreign policy discourse aims not only at the formulation of an international strategy but also at the search for a new national identity. Alexander Sergunin argues that Russia's current domestic situation, defined by numerous socio-economic, inter-ethnic, demographic, environmental, and other problems, dictates the need to abandon superpower ambitions and to rather set modest foreign policy goals.
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Seitenzahl: 518
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
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ibidemPress, Stuttgart
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
A number of generous grants from different organizations made this book possible. First of all, I have to mention a number of grants from St. Petersburg State University(SPSU)(2008–2010) that were devoted to international security (both on the theoretical and practical levels). In 1993, 1996–98 and 2000–2003 I've conducted several research projects on Russian domestic debate on European security and EU-Russia relations which have been sponsored by the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)[1].In the same periods, the Research Support Scheme, Open Society Institute (Prague) (1996–98), NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowship Program (1997–99), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (2000–01), Finnish Institute of International Relations (UPI) (2000–01, 2004–06), East-West Institute (2000) andInternational Policy Fellowship (2003–04),Curriculum Development Competition program, Curriculum ResourceCenter(2007–08),Special Projects Office, Special and Extension Programs (2012) at theCentral European University, funded my projects onthe Russian and global post-Cold War security discourse and politics.
In the spring 2004 semester I was teaching a course of Russian foreign policy in the Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (as a part of the Fulbright exchange program). The fruitful dialogue with my students and colleagues was very helpful for developing and testing fresh ideas.
In 2003–2004 Prof. Pavel Tsygankov (Moscow State University) led a research project on the Russian post-Soviet IR and the earlier and shorter versions of this study were published both in Russia and the U.S. (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2005; Sergunin 2003–2004).
Another research project on mapping the post-Cold War International Relations (IR) (both Western and non-Western) was launched by Dr. Arlene Tickner (University of Andes, Columbia) and Prof. Øle Wæver (University of Copenhagen) at the 2004 Montreal International Studies Association (ISA) Convention. Within this project, I was responsible for examining the Russian post-Soviet IR debate.
In 2004, Dr Arkady Moshes from the Finnish Institute of International Relations (UPI) has launched an ambitious research project on the EU-Russia relations with the title"Assessing Russia's European Choice". I was responsible for examining the Russian decision-making mechanism on Europe. The above-mentioned study was followed up by a book project led by Dr. Ted Hopf from the Ohio State University.
In 2011–2015, a series of short-term projects on Russian policies in the East and North Europe was conducted with University of Helsinki, Free University Berlin(FUB), University of Tartu and Stockholm University.In 2015 I was a coordinator of a pilot project on German-Russian relations in the context of the Ukrainian crisis(joint project sponsored by the SPSU and FUB).The SPSU-sponsored project on BRICSinitiated in 2015 was also helpful in understanding Russia's foreign policies toward key developing countries.
To sum up, this book is bothanend-result and follow-up of these projects.
Alongwith the above-mentioned organizations and projects, I remain indebted to Professor Håkan Wiberg, ex-Director of COPRI, who played a key role in launching and executing the above-mentioned projects by being its principal consultant and by providing me with useful advice at all their stages. I also extend special thanks to Dr. Pertti Joenniemi,formerSenior Research Fellow, COPRI/DIIS, for his extensive and insightful comments and suggestions during my work on the projects.
It is a pleasant duty to mention here my gratitude to many colleagues who have helped me with especially useful advice or materials for this book. They include: Dr. Roy Allison, Senior Lecturer,Oxford University(former Head, Russian and CIS program, Royal Institute of International Affairs); Dr. Derek Averre, Research Fellow, The University of Birmingham; Dr. Pavel Baev, Senior Research Fellow, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Vladimir Baranovsky, former Project Leader, Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (until 1998), and currently Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO, RAS, Moscow); Dr. Christopfer Browning, (COPRI, Birmingham/Keele/Warwick universities); Professor Barry Buzan, University of Westminster; Dr. Olga Potemkina and Dr. Dmitry Danilov, Institute of Europe, RAS; Prof. Michael Emerson, Senior Research Fellow,Centerfor European Policy Studies, Brussels; Prof. Mathew Evangelista, Cornell University; Dr. Frank Fischer, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University; Geir Flikke, Dr. Jakub Godzimirski and Dr. Iver Neumann, research fellows at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI);Prof. Tuomas Forsberg, University of Tampere;Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Senior Researcher, DIIS;Prof. Lassi Heininen, University of Lapland;Dr.Zlatko Isakovic, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics (Belgrade); Dr. Lena Jonson, Senior Research Fellow, Swedish Institute of International Affairs; Prof. Valery Konyshev, St. Petersburg University; Dr. Wojciech Kostecki, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Political Studies (Warsaw);Dr. Natasha Kuhrt, King's College, London University;Gunnar Lassinantti, ex-Project Leader, Olof Palme International Center (Stockholm); Professor Margot Light, London School of Economics; Prof. Marina Lebedeva, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); Dr. Raimundas Lopata,ex-Director, Institute of International Relations & Political Science, Vilnius University; Prof. Andrei Makarychev, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic Universit/University of Tartuy; Dr. Andre Mommen, Department of Sociology, Amsterdam University; Dr. Arkady Moshes, Project Leader, Finnish Institute of International Relations (UPI); Kari Möttlöa, Special Adviser, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/University of Helsinki; Dr. Hans Mouritzen, Senior Research Fellow, COPRI/DIIS; Dr. Ingmar Oldberg, FOA (National Defense Establishment)/Swedish Institute of International Affairs;Prof. Bob Orttung, George Washington University;Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Senior Research Fellow, IMEMO, RAS;Prof. Mikhail Rykhtik, Nizhny Novgorod State University;Professor Klaus Segbers, Institute for East European Studies, FUB; Dr. Tatyana Shakleina, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of USA & Canada Studies (ISKRAN), RAS, Russia; Professor Jane Sharp, Department of War Studies, King's College (London);Dr. Hanna Smith, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki;Dr. Stephan Spigeleire, University of Leiden/the Hague Center for Strategic Studies;Dr. Fabrizio Tassinari,Senior Researcher, DIIS; Dr. Arlene Tickner (University of Andes, Columbia); Dr. Dmitry Trenin, Moscow CarnegieCenter; Professor Ivan Tyulin, ex-First Vice-Rector, and Dr. Andrei Zagorsky, ex-Vice-Rector, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); Dr. Christian Wellmann,formerDeputy Director, Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research;Prof.Øle Wæver, University of Copenhagen; Irina Y. Zhinkina, Senior Research Fellow, ISKRAN, RAS.
I am thankful to a number of research centers and institutions—the Department of International Relations Theory & History, SPSU;Department of Political Science, St. Petersburg campus, Higher School of Economics;Department of International Relations & Political Science,Institute of International Relations & World History, Nizhny Novgorod State University;Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, Russia; COPRI/DIIS, Denmark; Department of Government, Cornell University; SIPRIand Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Sweden; International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK, and the Department of Politics, School of Sociology, Politics & Anthropology,La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, which provided me with excellent research environments and warm hospitality. Without their liberal support and help this work was not possible.
Alexander Sergunin
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
December 2015
Acronyms
ACV
Armored combat vehicle
ASEAN
Association of South-East Asian Nations
BA
Bachelor of Arts
BALTCOM
Baltic Communication System
BASREC
Baltic Sea RegionEnergy Cooperation
BEAC
Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BMD
Ballistic missile defense
BPS
Baltic Pipeline System
BRICS
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CBSS
Council of the Baltic Sea States
CERI
Centerfor International Studies, Paris
CES
Common Economic Space
CFDP
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy
CFE
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFM
Committee on Financial Monitoring
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
COPRI
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CPRF
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPSU
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRM
Conflict Resolution and Mediation
CSCE
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO
Collective Security Treaty Organization
DAAD
German Academic Exchange Program
DC
Decile coefficient
DIIS
Danish Institute for International Studies
DPR
Donetsk People's Republic
EaP
Eastern Partnership
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
ECTS
European Credit Transfer System
ECU
European Currency Unit
EEZ
Exclusive economic zone
EEU
Eurasian Economic Union
ENP
European Neighborhood Policy
EST
European Security Treaty
EU
European Union
FEZ
Free economic zone
FIS
Foreign Intelligence Service
FOI
National Defense Establishment(Sweden)
FSS
Federal Security Service
FTA
Free Trade Area
FUB
Free University Berlin
G-7
Group of Seven
G-20
Group of Twenty
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GRU
Glavnoe Razvedavatel'noe Upravlenie – the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
JHA
Justice and Home Affairs
IAN
International Affairs Network
ICTs
Information and communication technologies
IFRI
French Institute for International Studies, Paris
IISS
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
IMEMO
Institute of World Economy & International Relations
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INTAS
International Technical Assistance (to the CIS countries), EU program
INTERREG
EU's program on interregional co-operation
IR
International Relations
ISA
International Studies Association
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force
ISKRAN
Institute of USA & Canada Studies, RAS
KOR
Kaliningrad Defense District
LDPR
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
LPR
Lughansk People's Republic
MA
Master of Arts
MED
Ministry for Economic Development
MFA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGIMO
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
MGU
Moscow State University
MNEPR
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation
MoD
Ministry of Defense
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Area
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA
Northern Dimension Area
NDEP
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NDI
Northern Dimension Initiative
NEGP
North European Gas Pipeline
NEP
New Economic Policy
NGO
Non-governmental organization
NIS
New Independent States
NPP
Nuclear power plant
NPT
New Political Thinking
NRC
NATO-Russia Council
NSS
National Security Strategy
NUPI
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
PfP
Partnership for Peace (NATO program)
PHARE
Poland and Hungary, Aid for the Reconstruction of Economies
PIR-Center
Centerfor Russian Political Research
PR
Public relations
PRC
People's Republic of China
PRIO
Peace Research Institute Oslo
PTT
Power transition theory
RAAS
Russian Association of American Studies
RAND
Research & Development Corporation
RAS
Russian Academy of Science
RAU
Russian-American University
RFPF
Russian Foreign Policy Foundation
RISA
Russian International Studies Association
RISS
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
ROC
Russian Orthodox Church
RPSA
Russian Political Science Association
RUSI
Royal United Services Institute
SCO
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEZ
Special economic zone
SIPRI
Stockholm Peace Research Institute
SPSA
Soviet Political Science Association
SPSU
St. Petersburg State University
START
U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TACIS
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAPRI
Tampere Peace Research Institute
TEMPUS
Trans-European Mobility Program for University
Studies
TLE
Treaty-limited equipment
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UNESCO
United Nations Education, Science & Culture Organization
UNIDO
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSC
United NationsSecurity Council
UPI
Finnish Institute of International Relations
US
United States
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU
West European Union
WTO
World Trade Organization
Introduction
Russiain search of itself:a post-Soviet identity discourse
It became a common-placefor the Western scholars and politiciansto ascertain thatpost-Cold warRussia's foreign policy behavioris often unpredictable, irrational, anti-Western, aggressive/expansionist and even irredentist(Carafano 2015;Cox 2014;Gaddy and O'Hanlon 2015;Granholm et al. 2014;Gressel 2015;Lukas 2009;Mankoff 2009;Snetkov 2015; Stoner and McFaul 2015).Moscow'sharsh reaction to NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention (including Russian commandos'surprise movefrom Bosnia to the Pristina airport) andtheGeorgian 2008 offensive in South Ossetia, Crimea's takeover and Donbass rebels'support by Russia in 2014, Moscow'sunexpectedintervention to the Syrian civil warand air strikes against the Islamic Statein 2015are some examples ofsuch a behavior.
Foreignpolicyanalysts differ by their specific explanations of the Kremlin's foreign policies over the last quarter of the century (see the first chapter). However, many of themtend to see a clearconnectionbetween Russia's"unpredictable"and"aggressive"behavior and its ongoingsearch for a new national identity. Russia is still at the stage of nation-building. It never existed within the current borders as anindependent state or had such economy,system of government,administrativeand societalorganization.
Shaping of a new identity always has two dimensions—domestic and international. The domestic dimension implies creating internal cohesion, reaching a national consensus on the fundamental principles of government and values, sharing some common cultural and spiritual features. Self-perception is also important. Internally, a nation perceives itself as a united entity, as a bounded community. In this case people treat other people as members of the same community. The international dimension suggests self-assessment in relation to people belonging to a different community rather than to the same one. Understanding differences between nations and uniqueness of its own nation is also crucial for the formation of an identity. As Richter rightly comments,'National identity serves as the crucial organizing principle justifying and providing coherence to the state's domestic order, yet the boundaries defining this identity can be formulated only with reference to theexternal environment'(Richter1996,74).
As the humankind's history demonstrates, international impulses were often even more significant than domestic factors. For many countries, national debate on foreign relations has been an easiest way to form an identity of its own. They looked at the outer world as at the mirror to see what images they have got. The trouble is that there could be some aberrations and the external dimension of national identity can be formed on the nationalistic or even chauvinistic basis which most likely would have negative implications both for a nation and its neighbors.
Since the Russianforeign policydiscourse definitely aims, among other things, at forming of a new national identity, it is important to examine whether this debate is immune from nationalism and xenophobia or not, whether it facilitates the birth of a new type of identity based on the democratic principles or can regress to authoritarianism and totalitarianism. This is also important in terms of civilizational orientations: whether Russia will choose European/Western orientation or the Asian/Eastern one? Or perhaps Russia would prefer a civilization of its own, as some Russian theorists claim? Self-perception and self-identification of the country is also crucial for becoming a reputable and authoritative actor on the international arena. If Russia to solve (or starts to solve) an identity'puzzle'it could define properly its national interests, foreign policy priorities and formulate sound national security, military and foreign policydoctrines. It also would become more predictable and responsible international partner which could be able to contribute to the creation of a stableandsecuresystems bothon theregional and global levels.
As far as the'geographic dimension'of the Russian identity discourse is concernedEurope takes a unique position in Russian mentality and particularly in security thinking. For centuries Europe was a source of both cultural inspiration and security threat, advanced technologies and innovations which destroyed Russian traditions and values. In modern times, major wars and aggressions against Russia came from Europe ranging from the Polish invasion in the beginning of the 17th century to the Nazi aggression of 1941.
Some Russian historians date the origins of the Western offensive even by earlier times. They note that from the beginning of the 13th century Russians were mainly concerned with the German expansion to the Baltic lands. The German crusaders captured the Russian forts on the Dvina, and pushed into Russia before being defeated by Prince Alexander Nevsky in the'Battle on the Ice'of Lake Chudskoe (Peipus) in1242. Inaddition to strategic-military dimensions, the German-Russian rivalry turned out very soon into the religious confrontation between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. This, however, did not prevent Orthodox Russians to support Catholic Poles and Lithuanians at the famous battle of Grünwald in 1410 resulted in the crushing defeat of the Teutonic Knights.
Even in the 20thcentury, Russia (and the Soviet Union) retained its perception ofEast Europeas a front-line against Western expansion either in the form of GermanDrang nach Ostenor NATO'aggressive plans.'Moscow's diplomacy, military doctrines and armed forces posture in the area were subordinated to the objectives of the global confrontation with the West.
It should be noted thatcivilizational or identity'flavor'has always been present in the Russian debate on Europe.
Since the time of Peter the Great Russian elites looked at Europe with both hope and apprehension. They wanted to be Europeans by their habits and mode of life (sometimes even by language—for one and half century French was a main language spoken by the Russian aristocracy), but, at the same time, they had to assert their'Russianness'in order to keep their national identity and links to the Russian people. Russia was always eager to be a part of Europe not only in geographic sense but also in terms of civilization. However, Europe with rare exception was reluctant to acknowledge Russia's'Europeanness'. Russia's century-dated efforts to form a system of European alliances where Moscow could act on the equal footing with other great powerswerea story of failure. Even within the framework of theEntente CordialeMoscow has not been treated by Britain and France as a really equal partner. The West's reluctance to admit post-Communist Russia into major security and economic Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the EU convinced Kremlin that the old practice continued.
This contradiction between Russia's eagerness to be European and theWest's unwillingness to recognize Moscow as a part of Europe has received much attention in Russian philosophy and social sciences and led to the split among the Russian political and intellectual elites. Since the mid-19th century controversy between the Slavophiles and Westerners could be traced as a main dividing line between different Russian foreign policy schools. While the Westerners are unreservedly in favor of Russia's joining Europe at any price—even at the expense of national interests and sovereignty, the Slavophiles believe that Russia forms the civilization of its own. According to the Slavophiles, Russia is neither Europe nor Asia and should retain its own identity. If Russians themselves would respect their country and traditions, then foreigners (including Europeans) would do the same(see chapter 2).
The entire Russian policy towards Europe over the two last centuries can be roughly described as a pendulum swing between the two above extremes. Periods of Europe-oriented Russian policy (Alexander I and its participation in the anti-Napoleonic coalition,Entente Cordiale,Litvinov's'collective security'strategy in the mid-1930s, Gorbachev's Common European House concept, Kozyrev's early course) have been succeeded by the more nationalistic or globalist (the Soviet period) patterns. As the post-Cold War history shows, it is safe to assume that the'pendulum model'will be effective in a foreseeable future as well.
With the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of most dangerous threats from the West, the Russian policy makers suddenly found themselves in a new strategic and geopolitical situation. According to a majority of Russian theoristsof the early 1990swhich belonged to different foreign policy schools, main external threats to Russian securityshouldoriginate—in the foreseeable future—from the South or East rather than West (Arbatov 1994, 71; Lukin 1994, 110;Vladislavlev and Karaganov 1992,35; Zhirinovskiy 1993).
Under these circumstances, quite animated discussions on Russia's national interests have been started by the Russian political, military and intellectual elites. Do any constant Russian interests exist? Or should they be completely re-defined? What place in the set of the Russian foreign policy priorities shoulddifferent regionstake?For example, someanalystssuggestedthat, fromsecurity point of view, Europe was no longer as important for Moscow as it was during the Soviet times (Fadeev and Razuvayev, 1994: 114; Baranovsky, 1996: 167). Others arguedthat the area will retain its traditional meaning as a border zone or bridge between the East and the West (Uspensky and Komissarov, 1993: 83; Institute of Europe, 1995: 21–23; Sergunin, 1996b: 112–115). Some Russian theorists underlinedthat given the changing nature of world power (economic power now matters more than military might) Europe became one of the global poles and, for this reason, Russia should pay more attention to economic cooperation with the EU (Pichugin, 1996: 93; Pierre and Trenin, 1997: 16–18; Trenin, 1997: 117–118; Zagorski, 1996: 67; Zagorski and Lucas, 1993: 77–107). Other analysts believed that the region was becoming strategically important again as NATO and the EU were moving to the Central and East European countries. To their minds, Russia and its allies were vulnerable for potential Western encroachments again as in the times of German crusaders or Hitler'sBlitzkrieg(Gromov, 1995: 9–13; Lyasko, 1995: 2; Trynkov, 1995: 65–68;Nezavisimaya Gazeta,11 April 1996).With the resumption of Europe-Russia tensions in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis this theme became popularagain(Guschinet al 2015;Krutikov2014; Markov 2014;Sergunin 2014b;Tauscher 2015; Trenin 2015). At the same time, some Russian foreign policy schools insist on the need topay more attention to the consolidation of the post-Soviet space under the Russian leadership (Bolgova 2015; Lukyanov and Krastev 2015;Michel 2014) and/ordevelop closer relations with the BRICS countries (Lukyanov 2011and 2014; Okuneva 2012;Panova 2013;Simha 2013; Stuenkel 2014).
Similarly, an animateddiscussion is taking place with regard to the Russian threat perceptions and national security doctrines. What are the domestic and international determinants of Russianforeignpolicy? Which security threats are more vital—internal or external? What type of security—'hard security'or'soft security'—is more important? What kind of threats (if any) is posed by the recentinternationaldevelopments? How should the post-Cold War dynamics be reflected in a national security, military and foreign policydoctrines? Does Russia need such doctrines at all? Whether the national security, foreign policy and military doctrines play an important role in shaping Russia's European strategy or they are empty declarations? It should be noted that the study of the doctrinal component of the Russianforeign policy andsecurity discoursesis particularly helpful in understanding how theories and concepts produced by the foreign policy schools are translated into the language of practical politics.
In addition to changes in the geopolitical landscape, there was a revolution in the paradigmatic basis of Russian post-Communistforeign policy andsecurity thinking. The Marxist paradigm collapsed and Russian theorists started the search for new ones. The former theoretical and methodological uniformity has been succeeded by pluralism. On the one hand, this environment has been susceptible for the rise of new foreign policy schools and approaches. On the other hand, a number of unexpected problems emerged. Some Russian analysts borrowed Western theories without any critical evaluation or taking into account the situation in the Russian scholarship and politics. Others converted into anti-Communists and anti-Marxists with the same energy and vigor as they took stand on the Marxists principles before. Meanwhile, achievements and strongest points of the Soviet school of International Relations (IR) have been forgotten. The general economic decline in the countryin the 1990sand the'brain drain'from the Russian academia to the commercial sector, government and foreign countries were also detrimental to the quality of the Russian security discourse.
In dealing with the'paradigmatic revolution'and its implications for both Russian IR theory and foreign policy a student of Russian post-Communistforeign policythinking confronts one more set of research questions. Is it possible to produce any categorization of the Russian foreign policy schools or not? Which criterion (criteria) should be used? Whether these schools are genuine Russian production or have been copied from the Western samples? In which direction does theRussian foreign policydebate move—further polarization of views or their convergence, reaching a sort of a foreign policy consensus? Is such a consensus possible in principle? If yes, what can unite and divide different currents of Russian security thought? What is the mainstream of the present-day Russian security thinking? Is a dialogue between the Russian andnon-Russian (Western, Eastern)discourses—modern and post-modern problematiques—possible or not?
An important aspect of the problem is how the above discourse affected the decision-making process. The radical changes in the Russian decision-making system posed a number of questions which are also far from thorough exploration. What is the constitutional framework for Russia's foreign policy-making? Whether it matters or, in reality, different—unwritten—rules of the game exist? Who are the key figures in policy-making? Where are the core and the periphery of the decision-making system? What are the particular procedures? Whether there is some competition between the government agencies or not? If yes, how are their activities coordinated? Whether implementation system works properly or decisions simply remain on paper? Does some rivalry between political appointees and bureaucracy exist or not?
The study of the decision-making system not only provides the analyst with knowledge of the behind-the-scenes process but also encourages him to question why democratization of the above system has not been completed. Why is there still no effective parliamentary control over Russian foreign and security policies which could be comparable with the Western, democratic, standards? Why were the President and Parliament often unable to establish working relationship? What are the sources of conflict and areas of contention? Whether the Russian leadership succeeded in establishing civilian control over the military and intelligence community or not? In addressing these questions, a student of Russianforeign andsecurity policieshas to link this particular problem to the broader context of Russian domestic politics and highlight the difficulties in creating of an effective foreign policy decision-making mechanism in a period of transition.
The post-Communist era brought about not only changes in the decision-making procedures but also some new political actors. Numerous pressure groups, NGOs and regional elites claimed their rights to take part in formulation of Moscow's international strategy and the federal government was unable to ignore these claims any longer. What kind of interest groups and regional elites has been involved in shaping Russia'sforeign andsecurity policies? Did they really affect Moscow'sinternationalcourse? If yes, whether their impact was negative or positive? A more theoretical question may be raised: whether their participation in foreign policy making can be interpreted as a sign of an emerging civil society in Russia or it is just an evidence of parochial politics in this country?
It should be noted that the lack of reliable sources limits the scope for profound analysis of the current decision-making system. Moreover, this system and regulations are extremely unstable in post-Communist Russia. Foreign policy legislation, procedures and key actors change so fast that it is very difficult to define by whom, when and why a decision has been taken, what can be expected in the near future and so on.
The above questions form the core of a broad research agenda which, however, can be reduced to thefourmain issues:
Which IR theories are applicable to explaining Russia's present-day foreign policy?What are the main foreign policy schools in post-Communist Russia and what sort of theories do they produce?How did the Russian threat perceptions and national security doctrines evolve in the post-Sovietperiod?How does the Russianforeign policydecision-makingsystem operate?Sources.Despite the fact that a student of contemporary politics always feels a lack of sources (especially reliable ones) some of them are available. The data for this research were drawn primarily from eight main categories of sources:
Documents of international and intergovernmental organizations(CIS,BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, Nordic Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States(CBSS), Barents-Euro-Arctic Council(BEAC), etc.). These publications are helpful in reconstructing the international context in which Russian foreign and security policies have been shaped and operated. They shed light on three levels of Russia'sforeignpolicy—sub-regional, regional and global. It should be noted, however, that these documents reflect the end-product of the debate rather than the Russianforeign policy andsecurity discoursesas such.
Russian government documents and publications.There are several categories of such materials:
(a)Presidential and prime ministerial decrees and other documents which regulate various aspects of Russian foreign and security policies and activities of executive agencies in these areas. This sub-group of sources is crucial for studying decision-making process at the top level of the Russian foreign policy machinery albeit it provides little information on the behind-the-scene activities.
(b)Publications of certain government agencies involved in Russia'sforeignpolicy making and implementing such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Security Council and so on. They assist in understanding which particular role the executive bodies play in taking decisions. They also shed light on interdepartmental differences and competition.
(c)Parliamentary publications and documents. Laws and resolutions on foreign and national security policy which the Russian legislature passes from time to time help to examine both legal framework and conceptual basis of international policy making.
Both houses of the Russian Parliament (the Federal Assembly)—the State Duma, the lower one, and the Council of the Federation, the upper house of the legislature (as well as the Supreme Soviet, their predecessor)—publish bulletins on the regular basis where plenary and committee debates are covered.
Documents of the party factions as well as interviews with the leaders of the legislature (speakers, committee chairmen, leaders of party factions, prominent foreign policy experts, etc.) are also of significant interest.
Some drafts of legislative acts as well as background materials are available. This is important because a student of Russian politics can realize how the legislature operates and how decisions within this body are taken.
Parliamentary documents are particularly valuable for discovering links between various foreign policy schools, political parties and groups in the Parliament. Since the legislature is more open than the executive branch of the government sometimes it is easier to investigate different undercurrents in Russian foreign policy making on the basis of the parliamentary rather than executive sources.
3. Publications of political parties and organizations.Parties used to publish their political platforms (including foreign policy sections) on the occasion of either parliamentary or presidential elections. Sometimes it is done via policy-oriented journals. The party leaders used to publish books or pamphlets where they elaborate their views on topical foreign policy issues. Parties also encourage publishing of expert assessments and analytical papers on various issues. Almost each party has a newspaper or journal of its own. For example, Our Home Russia sponsored a be-weekly editionNash Dom i Otechestvo(Our Home and Fatherland). Communists publishedPravda(Truth) andDen(Day). Social Democrats were grouping around the journalSvobodnaya Mysl'(Free Thought) while the Slavophiles favored toNash Sovremennik(Our Contemporary) andMolodaya Gvardiya(Young Guard). The Liberal Democratic Party printed up a huge number of its publications—Liberal(The Liberal),Pravda Zhirinovskogo(Zhirinovskiy's Truth),Sokol Zhirinovskogo(Zhirinovskiy's Falcon) and so on.
4. Publications of the Russian think tanks.Numerous think thanks—both those working on government and independent—have been established in the post-Soviet period. They mainly provided decision-makers with expertise and some of them took part in policy making itself. Most of the Russian think tanks are not concerned about theory and quite pragmatic in terms of combination of principles of different IR schools. A majority of Russian'brain trusts'claim non-party or independent status. However, they are connected to one of the political groups or government in one way or another. For example, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy led by Sergei Karaganov and the Fund'Politics'led by Vyacheslav Nikonov hadvery close relations with the government agencies. RAU (Russian-American University) Corporation cooperatedwith the Communist Party. The Gorbachev Fund was close to the Social Democrats.
There is also a number of foreign think tanks and foundations which established their branches or networks in Russia—Moscow Carnegie Center, Heritage Foundation, McArthur Foundation, Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation), Eurasia, Moscow Research Foundation (in fact, this was a branch of the Ford Foundation), Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Naumann Foundation and so on. They triedto establish links between the Russian and Western political and intellectual elites as well as to form a pro-Western elite in Russiaviaexchange programs, grants, joint research projects, seminars and publications.Some of these institutions were closedbecause they have been considered as'foreign agents'.
Think tanks publish bulletins, occasional papers, books and proceedings of the conferences sponsored by them. Some of them run journals. For instance, the Gorbachev Fund sponsoredSvobodnaya Mysl'while the Moscow Carnegie Center publishedPro et Contra(in addition to occasional papers and monographs). Think tanks'publications are important for examining how the link between the academia and decision-makers (the government and political parties) is created and how the leadership is provided with foreign policy expertise.
5. Books and monographsproduced by the Russian scholars belonging to various IR schools. This is one of the most important categories of sources for this research because the book-size work provides a researcher with rather complete and systematized information on an author and views of the school which he/her represents. Since the book format allows it, an author has sufficient space to develop his/her argumentation and describe his/her theory at length. Not only theory itself but also the author's way of reasoning, research methods and technique, system of arguments, intellectual precursors and empirical basis can be examined.
Along with the writings of the Russian theorists a number of review works produced by both Russian and foreign authors are helpful as well. Some provide a student of the Russianforeign policy discourse with a systematized outlook of different foreign policy schools, including their categorization, history, basic doctrines, comparison with other schools, evaluation of their impact on policy making and so on (Baranovsky 1997;Dunlop 1993; Malcolm 1994; Malcolm et al. 1996;Sergunin 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007a and 2009;Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2005).
Otherscholarsdescribe Russia's foreign policy making, including the role of formal and informal actors(Blackwill and Karaganov 1994;Clunan 2009;Crow1993;Donaldson and Nogee 2009;Gvosdev and Marsh 2013;Malcolm et al. 1996; Sergunin 2007b and 2008).
The third group of works examinesMoscow's policies inspecific regions—Europe (Baranovsky 1997;Blackwill and Karaganov 1994;Dawisha and Parrot 1994;Dunlop 1993;Engelbrekt and Nygren 2010;Institute of Europe, 1995; Kolobov and Makarychev 1998; Mouritzen 1998;Roberts 2013;Zagorski and Lucas 1993),relations with the U.S. (Blackwill and Karaganov 1994;Goodby and Morel 1993;Roberts 2013; Stent 2014),post-Soviet space (Bolgova 2015; Lukyanov and Krastev 2015; Michel 2014), Middle East andAsia Pacific (Blackwill and Karaganov 1994).
However, fewworkscover the whole range of the above research questionsproviding a comprehensive analysis of the problem(Baranovsky 1997;Kanet 2010;Legvold 2007;Malcolm 1994; Malcolm et al. 1996;Mankoff 2009;Smith2005;Tsygankov 2012and 2016).
6.Working and occasional papers. Research papers on Russianforeignpolicies published by various Russian, European and US research institutes and universities, such as theRAS institutes—Institute of Europe,Institute for the USA and Canada Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations;Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Moscow; School of International Relations, St. Petersburg University; Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University; Copenhagen Peace Research Institute/Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Department of Peace Research, Uppsala University,Swedish Defense Establishment (FOI),Sweden; Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI), Oslo; Peace Research Institute Oslo; Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), Finland; French Institute for International Studies (IFRI), theCenterfor International Studies (CERI), Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris; Institute of Eastern Europe, Free University Berlin; the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London;Brookings Institution,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies,Heritage Foundation,Washington, DC; East-West Institute, New York; Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.; RAND, Santa Monica and others.
7. Periodicals and journals.Articles and essays published by the Russian and foreign IR theorists and foreign policy and security experts in journals and newspapers also augmented the data-base for this research. This category covers a more wide range of foreign policy schools than book-size publications because the representatives of these schools sometimes have no opportunity, time or capability to write and publish book-format works. Journal and newspaper publications are also more sensitive to the changes both in the political conjuncture and theories. However, they used to be less profound and analytical and more empirical and policy-relevant than books and monographs. One should be careful as far as this category of sources is concerned. Seriousness of the author, his/her data-base, real authority and impact on the Russian security discourse should be double-checked.
The following journals have been most helpful for this research:Alternatives, Conflict and Co-operation, Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, The Economist, European Journal of International Relations, European Security, Europe-Asia Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs (London), International Affairs (Moscow), International Organization, International Relations, International Security, The International Spectator, Journal of Peace Research, Military Review, Millennium, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Orbis, Perspectives, Polis, Political Science Quarterly, Pro et Contra, Review of International Affairs, RUSI Journal, Security Dialogue, Survival, Svobodnaya Mysl, World Affairs, etc.
Among newspapers the following editions can be mentioned:The Baltic Independent, The Guardian, International Herald Tribune, Izvestiya, Krasnaya Zvezda, Le Mond, Moscow News, Nash Dom i Otechestvo, New York Times, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, Novaya Gazeta, Pravda, Rossiyskaya Gazeta,Russia Direct,The Times, Washington Post, etc.
8.Interviewswith experts, scholars, governmental officials, and legislators involved in making and study of security policy were valuable sources as well. Similar to the previous category, these sources can be subjective. Nonetheless, they are particularly helpful in understanding of motivation of Russian foreign policy makers and relations between various political groups and schools.
As mentioned above, it is very difficult to deal with such a fragmented and sometimes contradictory data-base. Numerous problems, such as comparability, reliability, systematization, classification and interpretation of sources, inevitably emerge at some point. To solve these problems the scholar must examine different accounts, carefully compare them with each other, verify their authenticity and information value. Methods such as classification and systematization, which are based on identification of homogenous groups of sources as well of similarities and dissimilarities between them, bring an analytical order into research efforts and help in organizing sources for comparative procedures. It is also important to select sources which properly represent different schools of thought (in other words, they should be exemplary, typical) and reflect their major principles. Finally, preference should be given to original rather than secondary sources in order to reduce the risk of error and create an adequate image of the object.
These research tools can serve as more or less reliable safeguards against misinterpretations and help to overcome the limitations of the sources and compile substantial and sufficient data for the study.
Structure of the book
The structure of this book is determined by the research questions posed above. Following the introductory section where the research agenda is defined, sources and the structure of the book are described, it is divided into three chapters.
Chapter 1 demonstrates that most popular Western theories that aims to explain Moscow's foreign policy behavior often do not hold much explanatory power. In contrast with the power transition theory, this book argues that Russia is neither a status quo state aiming at keeping the main international system rules intact nor a revisionist one that aspires to radically change those rules.Rather, Russia is a reformist state which is unsatisfied with the existing rules of the"game"but it does not want to change them radically. It only wants to adapt these rules to new global realities and make them more acceptable for all the members of the world community. That's why the concepts of"peaceful coexistence"and"soft power"are better designed to describe Russia's post-Soviet international policies.
The"status panic"theory is applied in this chapter to explain Russia's seemingly"irrational"behavior. The collapse of the USSR, which is perceived by current Russian leadership as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, and the concomitant loss of super power status have left Russia with an agonizingly uncertain status. While Russia's nuclear arsenal still makes it qualify for top tier, its performance in almost any other area leaves it among states which were, until recently, inferior to it. This relatively sudden development has arguably resulted in a kind of status inconsistency or even"status panic", from which post-Soviet Russia is still struggling to emerge. This chapter discusses Russia's post-Soviet international course from a status perspective. It will focus on the status aims—political privileges and prestige—and instruments to elevate Russia's standing in relation to other world players.
Chapter2examines different Russian foreign policy schools that emerged during the post-Communist period. Sources of change in Russian foreign policy and security thinking, such as geopolitical cataclysms in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era, collapse of the Marxist IR paradigm and opening up of the Russian security discourse for the dialogue with the outer world, etc., are studied. A new categorization of Russian foreign policy schools is introduced. Major schools, such as'Atlanticism','Eurasianism','derzhavniki', realism, geopolitics, neo-Communism, social democracy, environmentalism and post-positivism, are described. The causes and parameters of the emerging foreign policy consensus are examined. This chapter also aims at finding out what ideas that circulated among the academics and experts have been picked up by the decision-makers.The chapter demonstrates that the foreign policy discourse is a way of searching for both a proper international course and Russia's new national identity.
Chapter3analyses the evolution of the Russian threat perceptions and national security doctrines in the post-Communist period. Basic provisions of thelaws and concepts such as the lawsonsecurity of 1992and 2010, foreign policy conceptsof 1993, 2000, 2008 and 2013,military doctrines of 1993,2000, 2010 and 2014 andnational security conceptsand strategiesof 1997,2000,2009and 2015are reviewed and their implications for the country'sforeignpolicies are investigated. The study shows that there were fundamental changes in Russia's threat perceptions. The most recent documents underline that there is no immediate external threat to Moscow and that internal rather than external processes challenge the country's security.
Chapter 4describes the Russian security policy decision-making system. It is both documentary and analytical in nature and presents data on constitutional powers of the President and Parliament, organization of the foreign policy machinery and its evolution—over the last twoand halfdecades, decision-making procedures, functions of and relations between different governmental agencies, coordination of these bodies'activities, sources and areas of tension between the executive and legislative branches, impact of interest groups, NGOs and regional elites on policy making, organization of foreign policy expertise and so on.The author argues that, although the current decision-making mechanism is far from perfection, it has dynamically evolved from the state of chaos and unpredictability to a system with clear purposes, established procedures, proper division of labor and coordination. However, the problems with the lack of transparency and democratic control over the Russian foreign policy decision-making remain to be solved.
The concluding section presents some broad conclusions related to the past, present and foreseeable future of Russianforeignpolicies.
Chapter 1.Theorizing Russian Foreign Policy
Russian foreign policy has always been an"uncomfortable"or exceptional case for IR theorists.Theories which they have tried to apply to the study of Moscow's international course in the post-Cold war era worked poorly or did not work at all.Scholars,who want to apply Western theories to Russian foreign policy, often have to justify this against claims that Russia issui generisand thatempiricalknowledge ofRussia'shistory,culture andcurrent policiesare far more important to understandMoscow's international behaviorthan any theoretical sophistication.However,as we know fromthehistory of science,itisuseless and counterproductive to contrapose theory toempirical knowledge.Ideally, theyshouldgo hand in hand, and support each other.As some European experts on Russian foreign policy rightly note,"Without theoretical reflection research on Russian foreign policy risks to remain a branch of area studies that relies ondescriptive approaches but at the same time is full of hidden commitments to dubious theoretical assumptions"(Forsberget al.2014, 262).To continue this way of reasoning, withouttheoretical foundations, research often lacks either the critical edge or credibility.
In this chapter, the most popular theoretical interpretations of the Kremlin'spost-Sovietforeign policyare critically reviewed and some alternative explanations are suggested.
Power transition theory
The realist/neo-realistpower transition theory(PTT)developed by A.F.K. Organski (1958) and his followers (Wittkopf1997; Tammen 2000)is the most popular IR theory among the Western experts on Russia's foreign policy.This theory aimsat explaining the causes of international conflicts and wars by the rise of emerging powers thatare discontent with international rules established by the dominant powers. According to this theory,all states can be classified to one of two categories—eitherstatus quoorrevisionist. Powerful and influential nations such as the U.S. who have benefited from the previously established world order fall under the category ofstatus quostates while nations dissatisfied with their place on the international spectrum are often consideredrevisioniststates. The PTT was based on the assumption that the revisionist state aims at either a radical change of old rules or imposing new rules on other international actors.
According to the PTT school, Putin's Russia is a typical revisionist state.For example, the experts from the U.S.-based Heritage Foundation believe thatRussia poses four distinct, but related problems fortheU.S.and other international actors:First, Putin's regimechallenges core democratic values bycombininga lack of respect for political, civil,and economic rights with a dysfunctionaleconomy.Secondand most dangerous for theWest, Russia poses a series ofworldwide strategic and diplomaticchallenges, including buildup of its nucleararsenal and military.Third, Russia poses threats to discreteU.S. alliesand friendly regimesaround theworld, such as the Baltic States,Poland, Finland, Sweden, Georgia and Ukraine.Fourth, Russia's cooperation with"rogue"states (Iran, Syria, North Korea)and its increasing tendency to play aspoiler role pose another set of threats(Carafano 2015, 1).
The followers of the"revisionist"school believe that, in security affairs, Russia maintains a zero-sum view of the world. Absolute security is the goal, which if successful would mean absolute insecurity for everyone else. The belief in the military instrument is strong, and Russia has focused on rebuilding its military capability in the last decade. Use of force against smaller neighbors and illegal annexation is a part of the policy (Granholm et al. 2014, 10, 25).
In explaining the sources of Russia's foreign policy behavior, the"revisionist"school tends to reject any wrongdoings on the part of the West. The developments such asthe NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999(and subsequent Kosovo's secession from Serbia), the U.S. missile defense program in Eastern Europe, U.S.-and EU-supported efforts to"promote democracy and good governance"in post-Soviet nations(which iscalledby the Kremlin a series of"color revolutions"), and above all theeastwardexpansion of NATOare not considered threatening Russia's security and a legitimate ground for Moscow's counter-reaction.This school accuses the Kremlin ofhaving the aspirationsto exercise a neo-imperial control over its neighbors andbelievingthat those neighbors have no corresponding right to determine their own destiny. What the Russian regime could not tolerate, the protagonists of this school maintain,is quite simple: any independent sources of power on its borders or inside them that could resist the regime's will(Carafano 2015, 3).
The moderate version of the"revisionist"school tries to explain the radical change inMoscow'sforeign policy behavior paradigm by the failure(or incomplete nature)of democratic reformsin post-Soviet Russia. These reforms derailed from a"proper"way and degenerated to a state/oligarchic capitalism model based on natural resources exports, centralism and dominance of kleptocratic bureaucracy. Such a regimehas been reluctant to be integrated on globalized terms and it can only survive by maintaining a strict domestic control and generating an image ofRussia's"hostileencirclement"—mainly for internal consumption(Granholm et al. 2014, 10, 26–29).At the same time, high revenues from oil exports in the 2000s madeaffordable forthe Putin and Medvedev regimes tohave both"butter and guns", i.e. toraise living standardsfor common Russians and launch military modernization programs. In turn, this created an illusion among the Russian leaders that Moscow could allow itself to conduct a more assertive international course and even to dream about the returning the great power status.
The extreme version of this school prefers to see Russia asan"incorrigible spoiler"or even a"rogue"who is in principle unable to assimilate/internalize democratic values and play by established international rules.For the supporters of this sub-school, the entire Western neo-liberal course on engaging post-Soviet Russia in democratic transformation and international cooperation was doomed to failure.As one neoconservative analyst observes,"Since at least the 17th century, Russia has been torn—and has oscillated—between viewing itself as a basically Western nation or as a great and imperial power that embodies values apart from those of the West and has historical license to control its neighbors in the name of increasing its power and advancing its concept of civilization"(Carafano 2015, 3). For this sub-school, the rise of the Putin regime is simply another moment in Russian history when the pendulum has swung away from the West.
The proponents of the"revisionist"interpretation of the present-day Russian foreign policydiffer by their views on how serious the Russian threats to international security are and whether Moscow's revisionist ambitions are of short- or long-term character. Some Western analysts believethat Russia is serious about playing a more assertive role in world politics, returning a great power status and becoming one of the power poles in the international relations system (Granholm et al. 2014, 15). They point to the factors such asRussia's size and geopolitical centrality of its territory, its energy resources, its nuclear arsenal, the modern portion of its conventional armed forces, and above all its willingness to attack, subvert, and play the role of a spoiler. Thissub-school underlines that Moscowis actively reshaping old (CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),SCO, etc.) and building new alliances (Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), BRICS) trying to challenge the West both on the regional and global levels.
This grouping acknowledges the fact that Russia has shown that it is a force to be reckoned with in the international system. It admits that the Ukrainian crisis has acted as a catalyst and speeds up the process of transformation of the international order. The present-day international system is most likely only at the beginning of a long process of structural changes that will have an impact on the local, regional and even the global level. Among other things, Moscow's policies challenge regional cooperation around the world, the design of the European security architecture, the level of defense expenditures, the robustness of energy policies, and great power relationships in Europe, Asia and the Americas.
This sub-school also notes that the Ukrainian crisis has triggered intense identity-searching on what it means to be Russian, Ukrainian, European and what a globalised world stands for. As onescholar dramatically emphasizes,"We may have a new ideological rivalry brewing, where the global liberal world order stands against an authoritarian, state-capitalistic model"(Granholm et al. 2014, 15).
However, the dominant sub-schoolwithin the"revisionist camp"is the grouping which believesRussia is"a declining power with feet of clay"(Carafano 2015, 4). Theanalysts from this groupingpoint out that Russia is economically weak and dependant on oil exports whichisnownot that profitable as before the 2014 oil price crisis.Today's Russia has no wide ideological appeal comparable to the Communist ideology. As for Moscow's international partners,
