Erhalten Sie Zugang zu diesem und mehr als 300000 Büchern ab EUR 5,99 monatlich.
- Herausgeber: Atlantic Books
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
In the tradition of the best writing on human behaviour and moral choices in the face of disaster, physician and reporter Sheri Fink reconstructs five days at New Orleans' Memorial Medical Center during Hurricane Katrina and draws the reader into the lives of those who struggled mightily to survive and to maintain life amidst chaos. After Katrina struck and the floodwaters rose, the power failed, and the heat climbed, exhausted caregivers chose to designate certain patients last for rescue. Months later, several health professionals faced criminal allegations that they deliberately injected numerous patients with drugs to hasten their deaths. Five Days at Memorial, the culmination of six years of reporting, unspools the mystery of what happened in those days, bringing the reader into a hospital fighting for its life and into a conversation about the most terrifying form of health care rationing. In a voice at once involving and fair, masterful and intimate, Fink exposes the hidden dilemmas of end-of-life care and reveals just how ill-prepared we are for the impact of large-scale disasters - and how we can do better. A remarkable book, engrossing from start to finish, Five Days at Memorial radically transforms our understanding of human nature in crisis.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 986
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013
Das E-Book (TTS) können Sie hören im Abo „Legimi Premium” in Legimi-Apps auf:
Ähnliche
FIVE DAYS AT MEMORIAL
ALSO BY SHERI FINK
War Hospital: A True Story of Surgery and Survival
First published in the United States of America in 2013 by Crown Publishers, an imprint of the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.
First published in Great Britain in 2013 by Atlantic Books, an imprint of Atlantic Books Ltd.
Copyright © Sheri Fink, 2013
The moral right of Sheri Fink to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
“The Deadly Choices at Memorial,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2009 by Pro Publica, Inc. All rights reserved. Portions reprinted by kind permission of Pro Publica, Inc. First published in the New York Times Magazine.
“Flu Nightmare: In Severe Pandemic, Officials Ponder Disconnecting Ventilators From Some Patients,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2009 by Pro Publica, Inc. All rights reserved. Portions reprinted by kind permission of Pro Publica, Inc.
“Rationing Medical Care: Health Officials Struggle With Setting Standards,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2009 by Pro Publica, Inc. All rights reserved. Portions reprinted by kind permission of Pro Publica, Inc. First published on MinnPost.com.
“Preparing for a Pandemic, State Health Departments Struggle with Rationing Decisions,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2009 by Pro Publica, Inc. All rights reserved. Portions reprinted by kind permission of Pro Publica, Inc. First published in the New York Times.
“Doctors Face Ethical Decisions in Haiti” and “Rationing Health in Disasters,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2010 by Sheri Fink. All rights reserved. First broadcast on PRI’s The World.
“In Hurricane’s Wake, Decisions Not to Evacuate Hospitals Raise Questions,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2012 by Sheri Fink. All rights reserved. First published on ProPublica.org.
“Beyond Hurricane Heroics: What Sandy Has to Teach Us All About Preparedness,” by Sheri Fink. Copyright © 2013 by Sheri Fink. All rights reserved. First published in Stanford Medicine Magazine.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Trade paperback ISBN: 978-1-78239-374-0E-book ISBN: 978-1-78239-376-4Paperback ISBN: 978-1-78239-375-7
Printed in Great Britain.Maps by Jeffrey L. Ward
Atlantic BooksAn Imprint of Atlantic Books LtdOrmond House26–27 Boswell StreetLondonWC1N 3JZwww.atlantic-books.co.uk
For Mary Fink,every living moment
CONTENTS
SELECTED INDIVIDUALS
Affiliations listed as at the time of the events in the book.Relatives listed only if they appear in the book.
Doctors (many on staff at both Memorial and LifeCare)
Dr. Bill Armington—Neuroradiologist
Dr. Horace Baltz—Internal medicine specialist, one of the longest-serving medical staff members present for storm
Dr. Reuben Chrestman—Medical staff president; on vacation
Dr. Ewing Cook—Chief medical officer, retired pulmonologist experienced in critical care medicine
Minnie Cook, wife, former surgical intensive care unit nurse
Stephanie Meibaum, daughter, current surgical intensive care unit nurse
Dr. Roy Culotta—Pulmonologist and critical care specialist; grandmother sheltering at LifeCare
Dr. Richard E. Deichmann—Chairman, Department of Medical Services
Dr. Kathleen Fournier—Internal medicine specialist
Dr. Juan Jorge Gershanik—Neonatologist
Dr. Bryant King—Internal medicine specialist
Dr. John Kokemor—Internal medicine specialist; former coroner assistant under Dr. Frank Minyard
Dr. Anna Maria Pou—Otolaryngologist; head and neck surgeon, specialist in cancer surgery
Vincent Panepinto, husband
Peggy Perino, sister
Dr. Frederick Pou, father
Frederick Pou Jr., brother
Jeanette Pou, mother
Jeannie Pou, sister
Michael Pou, brother
Dr. Paul Primeaux—Anesthesiologist
Dr. John Skinner—Pathologist
Dr. John Thiele—Pulmonologist experienced in critical care medicine
Dr. John J. Walsh Jr.—Chairman, Department of Surgical Services
Memorial Medical Center
Nurses
Lori Budo—Surgical intensive care unit nurse
Cathy Green—Surgical intensive care unit nurse
Thao Lam—Medical intensive care unit nurse
Cheri Landry—Surgical intensive care unit nurse
Patients and Their Family Members (ages and locations as of time of storm)
Helen Breckenridge—77, intensive care unit, eighth floor
Jannie Burgess—79, intensive care unit, eighth floor
Linette Burgess Guidi, daughter
Johnny Clark, brother
Gladys Clark Smith, sister
Bertha Mitchell, niece
Essie Cavalier—79, fourth-floor medical ward
Donna Cotham—41, fourth-floor medical ward
Tesfalidet Ewale—66, intensive care unit, eighth floor
Merle Lagasse—76, fourth-floor medical ward
Karen Lagasse, daughter
Rodney Scott—63, intensive care unit, eighth floor
Hospital Administrators, Managers, and Nonclinical Staff
Fran Butler—Nurse manager of fourth-floor west and south medical and surgical units
Sandra Cordray—Community relations manager; designated communication leader for Hurricane Katrina
Mary Jo D’Amico—Operating-room nurse manager
Curtis Dosch—Chief financial officer
Sean Fowler—Chief operating officer
L. René Goux—Chief executive officer
David Heikamp—Laboratory director
Father John Marse—Chaplain
Susan Mulderick—Nursing director, head of emergency preparedness committee, designated incident commander for Hurricane Katrina
Karen Wynn—Nurse manager of the intensive care units; head of hospital ethics committee
Eric Yancovich—Plant operations director and part of emergency leadership team
Tenet Corporate Officials
Michael Arvin—Business development director for Texas–Gulf Coast region
Trevor Fetter—President and chief executive officer
Bob Smith—Senior vice president for operations in the Texas–Gulf Coast region
LifeCare
Seventh Floor
Patients and Their Family Members
Hollis Alford—66
Wilmer Cooley—82
Emmett Everett—61
Carrie Everett, wife
Carrie (Ma’Dear) Hall—78
George Huard—91
Alice Hutzler—90
Elvira LeBlanc— 82
Mark and Sandra LeBlanc, son and daughter-in-law
Wilda McManus—70
Angela McManus, daughter
Elaine Nelson—90
Craig Nelson, son
Kathryn Nelson, daughter
John Russell—80
Rose Savoie—90
Doug Savoie, grandson
Lou Anne Savoie Jacob, daughter
Ireatha Watson—89
LifeCare Nurses and Therapists
Cindy Chatelain—Registered nurse
Andre Gremillion—Registered nurse
Terence Stahelin—Respiratory therapist
Hospital Administrators, Directors, and Nonclinical Staff
Tim Burke—Administrator for LifeCare Hospitals of New Orleans; not present at hospital for the storm
Steven Harris—Pharmacist
Gina Isbell—Nursing director, LifeCare Chalmette campus, relocated to Baptist (Memorial) before the storm
Kristy Johnson—Physical medicine director
Therese Mendez—Nurse executive
Diane Robichaux—Assistant administrator, incident commander
Dr. John Wise—Medical director; absent for the storm
LifeCare Corporate Officials
Robbye Dubois—Corporate senior vice president for clinical services; in Shreveport, LA
People Involved in the Investigation
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office
Attorney General Charles Foti
Julie Cullen—Assistant attorney general, head of criminal division
Virginia Rider—Special agent, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit; lead investigator, Memorial case
Arthur “Butch” Schafer—Assistant attorney general, Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit; lead prosecutor, Memorial case
Kris Wartelle—Public information director
US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General
Artie Delaneuville—Special agent
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
Eddie J. Jordan Jr.—District attorney
Michael Morales—Assistant district attorney; lead prosecutor, Memorial case
Craig Famularo—Assistant district attorney, senior to Morales
Orleans Parish Coroner’s Office
Dr. Frank Minyard—Coroner
Forensic Consultants
Dr. Michael Baden—Forensic pathologist, New York City
Dr. Frank Brescia—Oncologist, palliative care specialist, Medical University of South Carolina
Arthur Caplan—Bioethicist; chairman, Department of Medical Ethics, and director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania (until 2012; now at New York University)
Dr. Steven B. Karch—Cardiac pathologist; former assistant medical examiner, San Francisco, CA
Dr. Robert Middleberg—Laboratory director, National Medical Services, Inc.
Dr. Cyril Wecht—Forensic pathologist; coroner, Allegheny County, PA (until 2006)
Dr. James Young—Special advisor to the Government of Canada on emergency management; president, American Academy of Forensic Sciences (2006–2007); former chief coroner of Ontario, Canada
Others
Government Officials
Louisiana governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco (2004–2008)
US senator Mary Landrieu (since 1997)
Mayor Ray C. Nagin, City of New Orleans (2002–2010)
Emergency Responders and Experts
Knox Andress—Health resources services administration district regional coordinator for part of northwest Louisiana, based in Shreveport; registered nurse at CHRISTUS Schumpert Health System; communicated with LifeCare corporate officials during the disaster
LTJG Shelley Decker, US Coast Guard (now LT); at emergency command center, Alexandria, Louisiana
Cynthia Matherne—Health resources services administration district regional coordinator for part of southeast Louisiana, including New Orleans; based at the emergency operations center in New Orleans City Hall; communicated with Tenet Healthcare officials during the disaster
Michael Richard, US Coast Guard Auxiliary; at emergency command center, Alexandria, Louisiana
Dr. Robert Wise—Vice president, division of standards and survey methods, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, JCAHO (now medical advisor, division of healthcare quality evaluation at the organization, renamed the Joint Commission)
Colleagues and Patients of Dr. Anna Pou
Dr. Daniel Nuss—Chairman, Department of Otolaryngology; head and neck surgery, Louisiana State University Health Science Center
James O’Bryant—53, patient of Dr. Anna Pou
Brenda O’Bryant, wife
James Lawrence O’Bryant, son
Tabatha O’Bryant, daughter
Defense Attorneys
Eddie Castaing—Attorney for Lori Budo
Richard T. Simmons Jr.—Attorney for Dr. Anna Pou
NOTE TO THE READER
THIS BOOK RECOUNTS what happened at Memorial Medical Center during and after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 and follows events through the aftermath of the crisis, when medical professionals were arrested and accused of having hastened the deaths of their patients. Many people held a piece of this story, and I conducted more than five hundred interviews with hundreds of them: doctors, nurses, staff members, hospital executives, patients, family members, government officials, ethicists, attorneys, researchers, and others. I was not at the hospital to witness the events. I began researching them in February 2007 and wrote an account of them in 2009, copublished on the investigative news site ProPublica and in the New York Times Magazine: “The Deadly Choices at Memorial.”
Because memories often fade and change, source materials dating from the time of the disaster and its immediate aftermath were particularly valuable, including photographs, videotapes, e-mails, notes, diaries, Internet postings, articles, and the transcripts of interviews by other reporters or investigators. The narrative was also informed by weather reports, architectural floor plans, electrical diagrams, and reports prepared by plaintiff and defense experts in the course of civil litigation; and I visited the hospital and other sites depicted in the book.
Dialogue rendered in quotation marks is reproduced exactly as it was recalled in interviews, or is taken directly from transcripts and other primary sources. If one person recounted an important conversation, I generally attempted to contact all participants, but some declined to speak, and at times memories were at odds. The main text and Notes highlight areas of significant dispute and indicate the sources of quotes when they do not derive from interviews with me. Typographical mistakes are preserved in quoted e-mails to give the reader a sense of the urgency involved in their production.
This book relates the thoughts, impressions, and opinions of the people in it, perhaps the most fraught aspect of narrative journalism. Attributed thoughts or feelings reflect those that a person shared in an interview, wrote down in notes, a diary, or a manuscript, or, less commonly, expressed to others whom I interviewed. As any book reflects the interwoven interpretations and insights of its author, I have tried to make these distinct. All errors are mine.
PART I
DEADLY CHOICES
Blindness was spreading, not like a sudden tide flooding everything and carrying all before it, but like an insidious infiltration of a thousand and one turbulent rivulets which, having slowly drenched the earth, suddenly submerge it completely.
—José Saramago, Blindness
PROLOGUE
AT LAST THROUGH the broken windows, the pulse of helicopter rotors and airboat propellers set the summer morning air throbbing with the promise of rescue. Floodwaters unleashed by Hurricane Katrina had marooned hundreds of people at the hospital, where they had now spent four days. Doctors and nurses milled in the foul-smelling second-floor lobby. Since the storm, they had barely slept, surviving on catnaps, bottled water, and rumors. Before them lay a dozen or so mostly elderly patients on soiled, sweat-soaked stretchers.
In preparation for evacuation, these men and women had been lifted by their hospital sheets, carried down flights of stairs from their rooms, and placed in a corner near an ATM and a planter with wilting greenery. Now staff and volunteers—mostly children and spouses of medical workers who had sought shelter at the hospital—hunched over the infirm, dispensing sips of water and fanning the miasma with bits of cardboard.
Supply cartons, used gloves, and empty packaging littered the floor. The languishing patients were receiving little medical care, and their skin felt hot to the touch. Some had the rapid, thready pulse of dehydration. Others had blood pressures so low their pulses weren’t palpable, their breathing the only evidence of life. Hand-scrawled evacuation priority tags were taped to their gowns or cots. The tags indicated that doctors had decided that these sickest individuals in the hospital were to be evacuated last.
Among them was a divorced mother of four with a failing liver who was engaged to be remarried; a retired church janitor and father of six who had absorbed the impact of a car; a WYES public television volunteer with mesothelioma, whose name had recently disappeared from screen credits; a World War II “Rosie Riveter” who had trouble speaking because of a stroke; and an ailing matriarch with long, braided hair, “Ma’Dear,” renowned for her cooking and the strict but loving way she raised twelve children, multiple grandchildren, and the nonrelatives she took into her home.
In the early afternoon a doctor, John Thiele, stood regarding them. Thiele had taken responsibility for a unit of twenty-four patients after Katrina struck on Monday, but by this day, Thursday, the last of them were gone, presumably on their way to safety. Two had died before they were rescued, and their bodies lay a few steps down the hallway in the hospital chapel, now a makeshift morgue.
Thiele specialized in critical care and diseases of the lungs. A stocky man with a round face and belly, and skinny legs revealed beneath his shorts, he answered often to “Dr. T” or, among friends, “Johnny,” and when he smiled, his eyes crinkled nearly shut. He was a native New Orleanian, married at twenty, with three children. He was a golfer and a Saints football fan. He liked to smoke a good cigar while listening to Elvis.
Like many of the hospital staff around him, his professional association with what was now Memorial Medical Center stretched back decades, in his case to 1977, when he had rotated at the hospital as a Louisiana State University medical student. A classmate would later say that Johnny Thiele had turned into the sort of doctor they all wished to be: kind, gentle, and understanding, perhaps all the more so for having struggled over the years with alcohol and his moods. When Dr. T passed a female nurse, he would greet her by name with a pat on the back and sometimes call her “kiddo.”
Thiele had undergone part of his training at big, public Charity Hospital, one of the busiest trauma centers in the nation, where he learned, when several paramedics burst into the emergency room in close succession, to attend to the most critical patients first. It was strange to see the sickest here at Memorial prioritized last for rescue. At a meeting Thiele had not attended, a small group of doctors had made this decision without consulting patients or their families, hoping to ensure that those with a greater chance of long-term survival were saved. The doctors at Memorial had drilled for disasters, but for scenarios like a sarin gas attack, where multiple pretend patients arrived at the hospital at once. Not in all his years of practice had Thiele drilled for the loss of backup power, running water, and transportation. Life was about learning to solve problems by experience. If he had a flat tire, he knew how to fix it. If somebody had a pulmonary embolism, he knew how to treat it. There was little in his personal history or education that had prepared him for what he was seeing and doing now. He had no repertoire for this.
He had arrived here on Sunday. He brought along a friend who was recovering from pneumonia and was too weak to comply with the mayor’s mandatory evacuation order for the city, which had exempted hospitals. Early Monday, Thiele awoke to shouts and felt his fourth-story corner office swaying. Its floor-to-ceiling windows, thick as a thumb, moved in and out with the wind gusts, admitting the near-horizontal rain. He and his colleagues lifted computers away and sopped up water with sheets and gowns from patient exam rooms, wringing out the cloth over garbage cans.
The hurricane cut off city power. The hospital’s backup generators did not support air-conditioning, and the temperature climbed. The well-insulated hospital turned dank and humid; Thiele noticed water dripping down its walls. On Tuesday, the floodwaters rose.
Early Wednesday morning, Memorial’s generators failed, throwing the hospital into darkness and cutting off power to the machines that supported patients’ lives. Volunteers helped heft patients to staging areas for rescue, but helicopters arrived irregularly. That afternoon, Thiele sat on the emergency room ramp for a cigar break with an internist, Dr. John Kokemor, who told him doctors were being requested to leave last. When Thiele asked why, his friend brought an index finger to the crook of his opposite elbow and pantomimed giving an injection. Thiele caught his drift.
“Man, I hope we don’t come to that,” Thiele said. Kokemor would later say he never made the gesture, that he had spent nearly all his time outside the building loading hundreds of mostly able-bodied evacuees onto boats, which floated them over a dozen blocks of flooded streets to where they could wade to dry ground. He said he was no longer caring for patients and too busy to worry about what was going on inside the hospital.
Wednesday night, Thiele heard gunshots outside the hospital. He was sure people were trying to kill each other. “The enemy” lurked as near as a credit union building across the street. Thiele thought the hospital would be overtaken, that those inside it had no good way to defend themselves. He lost his footing in an inky stairwell and nearly pitched down the concrete steps before catching himself. Panicked and convinced he would die, he reached his family by cell phone to say good-bye.
Thiele felt abandoned. You pay your taxes, he thought, and you assume the government will take care of you in a disaster. He also wondered why Tenet, the giant Texas-based hospital chain that owned Memorial, had not yet sent any means of rescue.
Finally, on Thursday morning, the company dispatched leased helicopters, while other aircraft from the Coast Guard, Air Force, and Navy hovered overhead awaiting a turn to perch on Memorial’s helipad. Airboats came and went with the earsplitting drone of airplane engines.
The pilots would not allow pets on board the aircraft and watercraft, creating a predicament for the staff members who had brought them to the hospital for the storm. A young internist held a Siamese cat as Thiele felt for its breastbone and ribs and conjured up the anatomy he had learned in a college dissection class. He aimed the syringe full of potassium chloride at the cat’s heart. The animal wriggled free of the doctor’s hands and swiped and tore Thiele’s sweat-soaked scrub shirt. Its whitish fur stuck to him. They caught the animal and tried again to euthanize it, working in a hallway perhaps twenty feet away from the patients in the second-floor lobby. It was craziness.
A tearful doctor came to Thiele with news she had been offered a spot on a boat with her beautiful twenty-pound sheltie. She had quickly trained it to lie in a duffel bag. Several of the doctor’s human companions were insisting they would not leave without her. Since the floodwaters had surrounded them, the doctor had been sick to her stomach and continuously afraid. She wanted to go while she had this chance, but she felt guilty about abandoning her colleagues and the remaining patients. “Don’t cry, just go,” Thiele said. “An animal’s like a child.” He reassured her: “We gonna get by without you. I promise you.”
Thiele walked back and forth through the second-floor lobby multiple times as he journeyed between the hospital and his medical office. As the hours passed, the volunteers fanning the patients on their stretchers were shooed downstairs to join an evacuation line snaking through the emergency room.
Thiele knew nothing about the dozen or so patients who remained, but they made an impression on him. Before the storm, the poor souls would have had a chance. Now, with the compounding effects of days in the inferno with little to no medications or fluids, they had deteriorated.
The airboats outside made it too loud for Thiele to use a stethoscope. He didn’t see any medical records, he didn’t feel he needed them to tell him that these patients were moribund. He watched a doctor he didn’t know direct their care, a short woman with auburn hair. He would later learn her name: Dr. Anna Pou, a head and neck surgeon.
Pou was among the few doctors still caring for patients inside the stifling hospital. Some physicians had departed; those who hadn’t were, for the most part, no longer practicing medicine—they had assumed the roles of patient transporters or were overseeing the evacuations outside where it was somewhat cooler. But Pou looked to Thiele like a female Lone Ranger. After enduring four stressful days and four nights of little sleep, she retained the strength and determination to tend to the worst-off. Later, he would remember her saying that the patients before them would not be moved from the hospital. He did not know if she had decided that, or if she had been told that by an administrator.
Hospital CEO L. René Goux had told Thiele that everyone had to be out by nightfall. A nursing director, Susan Mulderick, the designated disaster manager, had given Thiele the same message. The two leaders later said they had meant to focus their exhausted colleagues on the evacuation, but the comments left Thiele wondering what would become of these patients when everyone else left.
He also wondered about the remaining pets, which he’d heard would be released from their kennels to fend for themselves. They were hungry. And Thiele was sure that another kind of “animal” was poised to rampage through the hospital looking for drugs. He later recalled wondering at the time: “What would they do, these crazy black people who think they’ve been oppressed for all these years by white people … God knows what these crazy people outside are going to do to these poor patients who are dying. They can dismember them, they can rape them, they can torture them.”
What would a family member of a patient want Thiele to do? There was no one left to ask; they had all been made to leave, told their loved ones were on their way to rescue.
The first thing, he thought, was the Golden Rule, do unto others as you would have them do unto to you. Thiele was Catholic and had been influenced by a Jesuit priest, Father Harry Tompson, a mentor who had taught him how to live and treat people. Thiele had also adopted a motto he had learned in medical school: “Heal Frequently, Cure Sometimes, Comfort Always.” It seemed obvious what he had to do, robbed of almost any control of the situation except the ability to offer comfort.
This would be no ordinary comfort, not the palliative care he had learned about in a week-long course that certified him to teach the practice of relieving symptoms in patients who had decided to prioritize this goal of treatment above all others.
There were syringes and morphine and nurses in this makeshift unit on the second-floor lobby. An intensive care nurse he had known for years, Cheri Landry, the “Queen of the Night Shift”—a short, broad-faced woman of Cajun extraction who had been born at the hospital— had, he believed, brought medications down from the ICU. Thiele knew why these medications were here. He agreed with what was happening. Others didn’t. The young internist who had helped him euthanize the cat refused to take part. He told her not to worry. He and others would take care of it.
In the days since the storm, New Orleans had become an irrational and uncivil environment. It seemed to Thiele the laws of man and the normal standards of medicine no longer applied. He had no time to provide what he considered appropriate end-of-life care. He accepted the premise that the patients could not be moved and the staff had to go. He could not justify hanging a morphine drip and praying it didn’t run out after everyone left and before the patient died, following an interval of acute suffering. He could rationalize what he was about to do as merely abbreviating a normal process of comfort care—cutting corners—but he knew that it was technically a crime. It didn’t occur to him then to stay with the patients until they died naturally. That would have meant, he later said he believed, risking his life.
He offered his assistance to Dr. Pou, but at first she refused him. She tried repeatedly to convince him to leave the area. “I want to be here,” he insisted, and stayed.
With some of the doctors and nurses who remained, Thiele discussed what the doses should be. To his mind, they needed to inject enough medicine to ensure the patients died before everyone else left the hospital. He would push 10 mg of morphine and 5 mg of the fast-acting sedative drug Versed and go up from there as needed. Versed carried a “black box” warning from the FDA, the most serious type, stating that the drug could cause breathing to cease and should only be given in settings where patients were monitored and their doctors were prepared to resuscitate them. That was not the case here. Most of these patients had Do Not Resuscitate orders.
It took time to mix the drugs, start IVs, and prepare the syringes. He looked at the patients. They seemed lifeless apart from their breathing— some hyperventilating, some gasping irregularly. Not one spoke. One was moaning, delirious, but when someone asked what was wrong, she was unable to respond.
He took charge of four patients lined up on the side of the lobby closest to the windows: three elderly white women and a heavyset African American man.
It had come to this. Dr. T’s mind began to form a question, perhaps in the faint awareness that there might be alternatives they had not considered when they set this course. Perhaps he realized at the moment of action that what seemed right didn’t feel quite right; that a gulf existed between ending a life in theory and in practice.
He turned to the person beside him, the nurse manager of the ICUs who also served as the head of the hospital’s bioethics committee. Karen Wynn was versed in adjudicating the most difficult questions of treatment at the end of life. She, too, had worked at the hospital for decades. There was no better human being than Karen. At this most desperate moment, he trusted her with his question.
“Can we do this?” he would later remember asking her. “Do we really have to do this?”
CHAPTER 1
FOR CERTAIN NEW ORLEANIANS, Memorial Medical Center was the place you went to ride out each hurricane that the loop current of the Gulf of Mexico launched like a pinball at the city. But chances are you wouldn’t call it Memorial Medical Center. You’d call it “Baptist,” its nickname since it had existed as Southern Baptist Hospital. Working a hurricane at 317-bed Baptist meant bringing along kids, parents and grandparents, dogs, cats and rabbits, and coolers and grocery bags packed with party chips, cheese dip, and muffulettas. You’d probably show up even if you weren’t on duty. If you were a doctor and had outpatients who were unwell, you might check them in too, believing Baptist a safer refuge than their homes. Then you’d settle down on a cot or an air mattress, and the hurricane, which always seemed to hit at night, would rage against the hospital and leave. The next day, the sun would rise and you would help clean up the debris and go home.
For nearly eighty years the steel and concrete hospital, armored in reddish-brown tapestry brick blazoned with gray stone and towering over the neighborhood near Claiborne and Napoleon Avenues, had defended those inside it against every capricious punch the Gulf’s weather systems had thrown. In 1965, it “took the century’s worst storm in stride,” weathering Hurricane Betsy “like a sturdy ship” and protecting more than one thousand people who sheltered inside, its administrator bragged in the hospital newsletter. A year before Katrina, when “[Hurricane] Ivan knocked, Memorial stood ready.” As Cathy Green, a nurse in the surgical intensive care unit, told her worried adult daughter when Katrina threatened: “If I’m in trouble at Baptist Hospital, if Baptist Hospital fails, it means the entire city would be destroyed.”
Utter faith in the hospital traced back to its founding: “I have an optimism that is almost explosive,” the president of the Southern Baptist Hospital Commission board of directors wrote in a letter to the hospital’s superintendent in February 1926, less than a month before a simple luncheon in the basement cafeteria and a dedication in the chapel marked the hospital’s opening. “In my humble opinion we have begun at New Orleans what is destined to be the greatest hospital in all the Southland.”
The property of the $2 million hospital stretched for two city blocks. Breathless news of its opening, with accompanying ads, occupied nearly three full pages of the Sunday, March 14, 1926, New Orleans Item-Tribune. The newspaper profiled the superintendent of the “magnificent” hospital, fifty-year-old Dr. Louis J. Bristow, and filled several column inches with a list of more than fifty of the items Bristow had carefully selected for it, from electrocardiographs to potato peelers. The hospital, its potential patrons learned, had the appearance of a modern hotel or private home, providing a “general atmosphere of cheerfulness” found wanting in New Orleans’s older hospitals. Nearly an entire page was given over to a tour that described such minute details as the lighting system that produced “ample illumination without glare,” the steam-heated blanket warmers on each floor, and the “dainty electric reading lamp” perched on each bedside table gracing the hospital’s private bedrooms. “Ice is frozen in cubes on each floor in sufficient quantities to supply all patients,” one article trilled. The stories, which read more like press releases or ad copy than news, may well have been penned by superintendent Bristow himself, or perhaps his daughter, Gwen, a writer. “The new institution stands unsurpassed among the hospitals of the south in point of modern conveniences.”
The age of electrical invention afforded a comfortable convalescence as doctors applied new technologies to their increasingly science-based practices. Suppliers of newfangled appliances filled the Item-Tribune with advertisements celebrating their affiliation with Southern Baptist. The Acme X-Ray Sales Co. had equipped the hospital with a Precision Type Coronaless Roentgen Apparatus, “internationally recognized as the foremost X-Ray machine.” Barnes Electric Construction Co., Ltd., of Gravier Street, which had laid the hospital’s electrical and phone wiring, had also installed a call system incorporating musical gongs and silent luminescent indicators. All operating rooms had been equipped with compressed air and vacuum attachments. The hospital’s design included “ventilation methods productive of coolness in the summer” to shield patients from the Southern heat.
New Orleans Public Service Inc., NOPSI, a newly consolidated utility company, purchased a nearly full-page advertisement announcing it had installed Frigidaire electric refrigerators on every floor of Baptist. “If the hospital MUST have the protection of FRIGIDAIRE, surely the home, the store and the restaurant SHOULD have it.” To a city where many homes still had iceboxes, the refrigerators’ low, even temperatures were described as a form of health insurance, preventing food spoilage and “the incipient development of germ life.”
Baptist had its own power plant. A smokestack rose seven stories above it. Workers prepared to feed the hospital’s furnaces 20,000 gallons of oil per week.
Seven years earlier, city missionary Clementine Morgan Kelly had stood before congregants at a church meeting and announced the conclusion she had reached after years of “prayerful study, deep thinking, hard labor,” and visits to medical charity wards. “The crying need of the hour is a Baptist hospital for New Orleans,” she said. “We shall never convince New Orleans of the seriousness of our purpose to give this city Christ’s pure gospel, until we do missionary work through a Baptist hospital.” Baptists could open people’s hearts to Christ by engaging, as Christ did, in healing.
The Southern Baptist press spread Kelly’s idea to a receptive church already engaged in a hospital-building movement. New Orleanians of other religions supported the idea too. Almost eight hundred city dwellers donated money to purchase land for the new hospital.
The Saturday afternoon of the hospital’s dedication, superintendent Bristow, the champion who had brought Clementine Morgan Kelly’s dream to fruition, rose to speak. “The purpose of the Southern Baptist Hospital, in a single phrase, is to glorify God,” he said. Poor charity patients would have their own rooms like the wealthy instead of being placed in the ghettos of separate wards. “We do not wish to capitalize the sufferings of human beings, but to relieve them.” The hospital opened its doors to serve its stated, three-pronged mission: the alleviation of pain, the prolongation of life, and the relief of suffering.
The operation was not boundlessly munificent. To receive charity care, a poor family had to supply a letter from a church that testified to the family’s need and promised the hospital a donation. “We cannot undertake to help those whose own church declines aid,” Bristow wrote. The definition of charity cases was narrow at first, limited mainly to widows, orphans, and the elderly. A poor man whose wife required treatment would be given credit and a lecture about how charity would steal his dignity. Bristow often used the stories of charity patients, especially children, to fill pamphlets soliciting donations for Southern Baptist. He highlighted the important missionary work Southern Baptist Hospital was performing as it won converts and raised the profile of “white Baptists” in New Orleans, who were a minority in the city’s twenty-eight Baptist churches and whose Convention had a history of support for slavery, Jim Crow laws, and racial segregation.
The new hospital sat in one of the lowest parts of a city that dipped below sea level like a basement below the water table. Runoff had to be caught, channeled, and pumped skyward to expel it into surrounding lakes.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, $15.3 million had been spent on drains, canals, and pumps to help transform the soggy, typhoid-and malaria-ridden basin between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain into a modern city. Since then, rapid development had paved over ground that had once absorbed rainfall, but when the hospital opened, the city hadn’t increased its pumping capacity in a decade.
The 11,700 densely populated acres in the uptown drainage section of the city that encircled Baptist were served by a single pumping station that lifted the water into a relief canal that channeled it to another pumping station, which raised the water high enough to flow into Lake Pontchartrain. An upgrade in the area’s pumping and canaling capacity had been envisioned to go along with the development, but while buildings went up, the work below ground lay undone. With no storms of great magnitude, the improvements had not been prioritized.
SUNDAY, MAY 2, 1926
THE UNSEASONABLY HOT weather was subsiding, and that pleasant afternoon some families set out for Heinemann Park to cheer for the New Orleans Pelicans batters as they took on Little Rock. Others laid out the suits, dresses, and hats they planned to wear to a show at one of the downtown theaters along Canal Street. Many thousands were expected to ride the streetcar to New Orleans’s giant public playground, City Park, for its annual opening fete. Sport exhibitions, musical performances, vaudeville acts, and movies packed the schedule. In the evening, festivalgoers would be invited within the Ionic columns of an open-air peristylium and dance for hours to the beat of the Hotsy Totsy Jazz Band. Above them, a grand exhibition of fireworks would paint the heavens with Chinese Spiders, Silver Comets, Turkish Crosses, Caskets of Jewels, Revolving Wheels, Large Waterfalls, and a bouquet of a hundred skyrockets.
Storm clouds began assailing the city just after three p.m. Uptown, where Southern Baptist Hospital had been open less than two months, raindrops knocked against the steep sides of tarred roofs and slapped onto newly laid pavement, gathering in rivulets that quickly joined streams. Thunder rattled windows. The temperature dropped nearly twenty degrees. During the first four hours of the storm, a gauge recorded a rainfall of nearly six inches, a record-setting pace. Debris-clogged catch basins blocked water from entering drainage canals. Streams in the streets grew to torrents. “It looked,” Realtor Harry Latter observed as he tried to get home, “as if the river had broken in New Orleans.”
A train crashed into a car in the blinding rain, killing two people. Thousands of creosoted wooden paving blocks swelled, buckled roadways, broke free, and floated away. Cars stalled as water seeped under their radiators and drenched wires. Lifeless autos blocked streetcar tracks. Work crews braved the storm to encircle them with cables and tow them. Streetcar lines shut down, leaving people stranded beneath the clattering rooftops of homes, churches, and public places.
At City Park, the sudden deluge brought baseball, tennis, and golf games to a halt and drove crowds of people into a bandstand for shelter. A musician took the stage to entertain them, but the storm only grew more intense and the festival had to be postponed.
Lightning danced across the darkening sky above the peristylium in place of May fete fireworks. At around eight p.m., a bolt struck near the Telephone Exchange Building, throwing around 1,300 lines out of commission. Water backed up into the tubes that surrounded intercity telegraph wires as they ran through flooded manholes.
On the grounds of Southern Baptist Hospital, thigh-level water smothered the new gardens. Even high-riding cars parked nearby on Napoleon and Magnolia Streets were bathed to within several inches of their seats.
Inside, water poured into the basement, quickly rising to a height suitable for baptismal immersion. Medical records, groceries, drugs, instruments, linen, and the hospital’s main stove and dining room tables were submerged. Louis Bristow and other doctors waded into water filled with floating chairs. They reached for airtight containers and handed them up to be sorted by nurses.
The lights stayed on, but the elevators stopped working. About a hundred visitors and nonstaff nurses were also stranded at Baptist for the night. They picked up phone receivers and tried to dial loved ones but couldn’t make a connection.
Firemen were called to tap the hospital’s basement with their pumping engines. At five thirty the next morning, they were finally able to draw floodwater into the storm sewers faster than the basement was refilling. Employees and student nurses gathered in the small diet kitchens on each floor and filled patient trays with improvised meals, presumably from the Frigidaires. NOPSI, which also operated the city’s stalled streetcar lines, came quickly to Baptist to replace its gas-powered kitchen.
Hundreds of unprotected cases of drugs and supplies had been destroyed. Of all the city’s businesses, the new hospital was thought to have sustained the greatest losses, with initial estimates ranging from $40,000 to $60,000 in damage (between $525,000 and $800,000 in 2013 dollars).
Superintendent Louis Bristow sought to reassure the public. He told the New Orleans Item that each floor of the hospital had enough drugs and supplies to run normally for several weeks or until replacement supplies could be bought. “We are operating as usual,” he said. “There was no suffering to any of the patients. Our staff met the emergency in splendid fashion.”
More than nine inches of rain fell between midafternoon Sunday and midafternoon Monday. The storm had produced the greatest one-hour rainfall totals in the Weather Bureau’s fifty-five years of record keeping in New Orleans—nearly three inches—and depending on where in the city the rainfall was measured, the heaviest or second heaviest twenty-four-hour rainfall. The city’s drainage system had extruded more than six billion gallons of water into Lakes Pontchartrain and Borgne, the grandest performance in its history. Yet it had failed to keep pace with the storm, and recriminations followed. Thousands of flood-affected residents phoned complaints to authorities. An association representing the worst-hit district demanded an investigation of all responsible officials, contractors, and employees, down to the crews at the drainage pumping stations.
After the storm, the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans— which built, maintained, and operated the drainage system—took a drubbing from New Orleans’s new mayor, Arthur O’Keefe, for failing to keep its drains and catch basins free of debris. Board officials fought back, blaming the city for failing to keep the streets swept, the public for “carelessly throwing trash in the streets,” and Mother Nature for launching lightning bolts at power lines that supplied some of its pumps.
The board’s longtime general superintendent, George G. Earl, had warned for a decade that the system simply wasn’t capable of handling that much rain. Without funding to complete a planned expansion, flooding in the lower parts of the city was inevitable, yet residents professed shock when this occurred. “It is only when service fails that any thought is given to the provision of means for improving it,” Earl lamented. The neighborhood along Napoleon Avenue near Southern Baptist Hospital was his main exhibit. Like any good politician, he seized the moment to reiterate his call for more funds.
Bonds would be needed to finance drainage system improvements, but increasing the city’s bonded debt ceiling would require, by law, additional taxes and approval from the state legislature. The city’s Item and Morning Tribune newspapers urged authorities to allow the city to borrow the funds. “An old and a finished city may well stand still, pay off its debts, stop borrowing and rock along. New Orleans, in the midst of vast private development projects, attracting the attention of the nation and of the world, must provide herself with needed funds and go ahead.”
An article summarized the sentiments of prominent city businessmen: “Something must be done, and durned quick.” Charles Roth, president of the New Orleans Real Estate Agents’ Association, was willing to see the city bonded for any amount, even $50 million if that’s what it took to get New Orleans “out of the water and mud,” he said. “The damage caused by these deluges to our homes and streets, to our business enterprises and our utilities, costs us many times more than the corrective measures would come to.”
Realtor Harry Latter agreed. “All this has a very harmful influence upon real estate values, and that is the basis of all wealth.”
Superintendent Earl presented several options to ensure against flooding. With around half a million dollars, the Sewerage and Water Board could improve pumping. Three million dollars could widen canals. “How much does the public wish to invest?” he asked. “That is the real question to be decided.” The work would be done quickly “in the order in which it will do the greatest amount of good to the greatest number of people.”
Earl aimed to improve the city’s ability to handle moderate storms. He argued it would be “physically and financially impracticable” to prevent flooding in the worst deluges, “for barely in the city’s history have such storms developed.” Another expert estimated that to handle a storm as intense as that Sunday’s would require eight times the current pumping equipment and eight times the outflow canal capacity. “There probably is not a taxpayer in New Orleans who would favor” the idea, he told a reporter.
Enthusiasm for the drainage work quickly waned. By the end of the year, taxpayers had not yet approved even the less ambitious options Earl had presented. No bond was issued. The Sewerage and Water Board’s construction expenditures in 1926 were nearly identical to what they had been in 1925. Earl vented his frustration in his end-of-year report. “The general situation remains unchanged,” he wrote, not “in any degree modified by the fact that recent events have happened.”
The following spring, storms in the upper Midwest sent a great surge of water down the Mississippi toward the Gulf and New Orleans. The floodwater wiped out cities and towns as it went. In advance of its arrival, authorities attempted to reassure New Orleanians that the city’s defenses were strong enough to save them from a looming catastrophe. Panic would be bad for business.
A storm hit on Easter weekend, days before the river’s predicted rise. In less than twenty-four hours, 14.01 inches of rain fell. It was the greatest total twenty-four-hour rainfall in more than half a century of record keeping—nearly a quarter of the rainfall for a typical year. Only once in the eight decades that followed would daily rainfall surpass April 16, 1927, in New Orleans.
Streets again filled with water, and the city’s drainage pumping stations struggled to keep pace. As the storm intensified around midnight, a lightning strike knocked down a 13,000-volt high-tension power line belonging to NOPSI where it crossed the main feeder wires for the Sewerage and Water Board’s system. The resulting spark caused a short circuit that crippled the switching system of the drainage plant, damaged a submarine cable distributing electricity, and burned out one of the two 6,000 kW generators powering the city’s entire drainage and sewage systems as well as the high-lift water pumps that provided reserves to the fire department. The wires were quickly repaired, but the generator coils would take weeks to replace. That left a patched-up power line and one-half of the normal power supply to dispatch the most intense rainfall ever recorded in New Orleans.
The next morning, the mayor and city authorities set out for the site of the power-line accident to demand that NOPSI supply additional power to the drainage system’s plant. But the two power systems operated on different frequencies—one at 25 Hz and one at 60 Hz—and, due to the lack of an appropriate transformer, no transfer was possible. The engine of the mayor’s car failed in the rising water as he tried to leave. Marooned, he had to await assistance.
Across the city, hundreds of cars were similarly trapped, and nearly all streetcar lines had halted operations. While floodwaters gradually receded in some areas, in others they rose again as Lake Pontchartrain overtopped levees and spilled out of drainage canals that cut through the city.
Water flowed up to the stages of the city’s theaters, covered cemeteries, inundated stores, and stalled fire engines racing to respond to emergencies. City dwellers called police for help when water awakened them in their beds. Alarmed residents of one neighborhood fired gunshots into the air to attract attention. An armed band of robbers hit a series of abandoned homes by boat. Calls from “anxious mothers” poured into the Times-Picayune newspaper with “harrowing tales of suffering from lack of food and milk for children.” The mayor sent police reserves to commandeer boats and deliver aid, but they were overtaxed by the number of people in need of assistance. The newspaper declared “virtually a complete failure of city authorities to provide relief,” a charge the new mayor called “so manifestly untrue and unfair as to hardly need official notice.” He cast the blame, as he had the previous year, on the Sewerage and Water Board, whose chief engineer declared that the flooded streets were due “principally to an act of God.”
City leaders refused relief offered by the Red Cross and National Guard, arguing it was unnecessary and that accepting it would give the city “a black eye before the nation.” Impromptu ferry captains shuttled people around town in flat-bottomed pirogues. Mothers pinned up their girls’ dresses and rolled their boys’ trousers and let them wade. On Sunday, a matriarch hiked up her skirt and led her family on an Easter stroll through shin-high water as a newspaper photographer snapped a picture of them. A six-foot-long alligator swimming down a street was captured and sent to the Audubon Park Zoo.
Again came calls for action. The homeowners’ association of the hard-hit Lakeview District demanded that the levees be raised and the drainage system strengthened so that “the ‘hand of God’ will not be blamed as often for what the hand of man has neglected to do.” It called on city authorities to use their charter rights to issue emergency bonds for the work rather than await approval of a larger refinancing plan. A Times-Picayune editorial backed the plan: “We believe the people of New Orleans stand ready to pay whatever sum may be needed for reasonably adequate and efficient protection against these temporary but costly flood nuisances.”
Superintendent Earl agreed. He called for an increase in the city’s debt limit from 4 percent to 5 percent of its assessed value (a negligible change when compared with the 35 percent limit in effect at the time of Katrina). Earl also called for higher and stronger levees. His board had no responsibility for the city’s levee system, but levee failures affected his ability to drain the city. He also foresaw the rapid growth of New Orleans, as transportation companies increasingly used America’s interior waterways. He feared that as the city expanded and land that accepted Lake Pontchartrain’s occasional overflow was walled off with levees, the water level in the lake would rise.
Municipal employees spent days after the storm cleaning up debris, digging drainage ditches, picking up animal carcasses, and spraying pools of standing water with disinfectant. In much of the city, the flooding was shallow and short-lived, as the half-powered pumps gained traction.
In the area around Baptist Hospital, as well as Lakeview in the north and Gentilly in the east, the water rose for a longer time and reached a higher point than anywhere else in the city. Along Napoleon Avenue, the water rose to six feet and flooded the first floors of homes. The basement of Baptist filled with eight feet of water. For the second time in the hospital’s short history, its operations were disrupted by flooding.
The swell of water from the upper Mississippi reached Louisiana two weeks after the Good Friday storm. On orders from the State of Louisiana, workers dynamited a levee below New Orleans to relieve pressure on the levees protecting the city, sacrificing the Parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines to save New Orleans at the behest of the city’s business elite, who then failed to deliver promised restitution. This launched a grudge that would persist into the next century. The Mississippi River floods of 1927 led to one of the most expensive peacetime legislative initiatives of its time, the 1928 Flood Control Act. It tasked the Army Corps of Engineers with improving the levee and flood-control systems of the lower Mississippi River, giving the federal government full responsibility for the river, and granting the Corps immunity from liability for damage that might result from its work. Decades later, the Corps became more involved in flood protection projects for the city of New Orleans itself, including the drainage canals leading to Lake Pontchartrain.
Over the years and decades following the 1927 storm, the Sewerage and Water Board obtained funds to improve the New Orleans drainage system. One of its engineers designed the world’s largest pump, and fourteen of them were custom-made for the city. Drainage capacity had nearly quadrupled by the end of the twentieth century to more than 45,000 cubic feet per second.
Still, the area around Baptist Hospital in the Freret neighborhood remained the site of some of the worst flooding. The city failed to get a handle on it. Staff had to develop their own coping mechanisms. In the first years of the twenty-first century, workers knew a moderate storm could fill the streets around Memorial Medical Center with enough water that they would have to park their cars a block or so away on “neutral ground”—the high berms between lanes. Hospital maintenance men would put on waders and pull colleagues to work in a battered metal fishing boat kept suspended from the ceiling in the parking garage basement. Equipment, supplies, food, records, and linens were again stored in the basement. Many Memorial employees had long ago stopped seeing water as a significant threat.
CHAPTER 2
BEFORE THE STORMSATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005
GINA ISBELL PULLED a white scrub shirt and navy-blue pants over her ample frame. The forty-year-old registered nurse had received a worrisome call at home from her boss that morning. Hurricane Katrina, revving in the Gulf of Mexico, had strengthened overnight and now had a good chance of steering into southeast Louisiana. A hurricane watch covered a wide swath of coastline. Katrina’s strength was rated Category Three on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, projected to grow to a fearsome Four or even a catastrophic Five. Meteorologists predicted landfall on Monday, with hurricane conditions possible by Sunday night.
Isbell’s home, her family, and her hospital were in St. Bernard Parish. LifeCare, the specialized hospital where Isbell served as nursing director, occupied a single-story building there in Chalmette on Virtue Street. The question was whether to move the patients somewhere safer, just in case. The risks of transporting very sick patients for a false alarm had to be weighed against the risk that floodwaters could rise over the rooftop if the forecasts were accurate.
St. Bernard had been slowly rebuilt after its surrender to spare New Orleans from the 1927 floods, but a series of subsequent calamities kept residents uneasy whenever weather disasters threatened. Many remembered the levee breaks, devastating flooding, and pumping-system failure that followed the Category Three Hurricane Betsy in 1965. St. Bernard residents had little faith that their officials or their levees would protect them.
It seemed wise to move the patients. Waiting for more certainty in the forecast would leave less time for action and make it harder to secure ambulances.
LifeCare had two other campuses in the area, including a leased space on a high floor of Memorial Medical Center that offered heady views of the city. This “hospital within a hospital” provided long-term treatment to very sick, often elderly and debilitated patients. Many of them were dependent on mechanical ventilators and underwent rehabilitation at LifeCare with the goal of breathing on their own and returning home or to nursing facilities; LifeCare was not a hospice. It had its own administrators, nurses, pharmacists, and supply chain. The staff still called the location “LifeCare Baptist” even though Tenet Healthcare Corporation had bought Baptist Hospital and changed its name to Memorial ten years earlier. Most of the St. Bernard patients, LifeCare’s leaders decided, would be moved there, and the remaining few to another nearby hospital.
Isbell called up the nurses she’d assigned to the “A” team at the start of hurricane season. They would join her at LifeCare Baptist during the storm and the “B” team would come to replace them after the storm had passed. The “A”s Isbell chose were strong nurses, team players, the ones she would want by her side at a stressful time. They had volunteered for the assignment. Working at an unfamiliar hospital would only add to the challenge.
Isbell had a passion for taking care of those whose long lists of medical problems put off some other health professionals. It took until nightfall to transfer nineteen of them to the Baptist campus. A twentieth died en route.
The patients traveled in clusters, up to four to an ambulance, because ambulances were already in short supply. They went with their own medicines, which the pharmacist prepared for them. Paraplegic patient Emmett Everett, who weighed 380 pounds, went from, and was resettled on, his own “Big Boy” bed.
The elevator doors opened on the seventh floor to face a wall adorned with the LifeCare philosophy.
LIFECAREHOSPITAL
restoring hope
instilling desire
rebuilding confidence
LifeCare occupied three long hallways on the seventh floor of Memorial Medical Center—north, west, and south. The corridor to the east was devoted to Memorial’s marketing department. Isbell wove back and forth between patient rooms and nursing stations, ensuring her charges were registered and properly situated. When she exerted herself like this her round cheeks flushed a pretty pink. A phone call came in for her, but she was too busy to take it. Instead she passed a message to the caller, the daughter of one of her favorites, ninety-year-old Alice Hutzler. Hutzler had been wheeled into Room 7305, a spacious room on the west-side hallway with two televisions, a clock, and three roommates, including Rose Savoie, another elderly lady. Isbell knew Hutzler from repeated stays and fondly called her “Miss Alice.” To Isbell, Miss Alice looked perky, even with the stress of the move. “Perky” was relative. Hutzler suffered from heart disease, diabetes, dementia, and a stroke that had left her partially paralyzed. Now she was recovering from pneumonia and bedsores contracted at a nursing home. The fact that she would likely survive to make it back there meant, Isbell knew, a great deal to her attentive, loving family. Isbell passed a reassuring message to Hutzler’s daughter: “Tell her she’s here, and I’m going to take very good care of her.”
That night, LifeCare appeared to have made the right bet by moving patients out of the single-story hospital in St. Bernard Parish. The National Weather Service upgraded its hurricane watch for New Orleans to a warning delivered in an eerie all-caps bulletin, a format designed for the archaic Teletype: “THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE AN INTENSE AND DANGEROUS HURRICANE HEADING TOWARD THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST … AND THIS HAS TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.” Heavy rains were expected to begin in twenty-four hours.
CHAPTER 3
DAY ONESUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005
ON SUNDAY MORNING, Katrina’s huge, Technicolor swirl filled the Gulf of Mexico on television screens throughout Memorial Medical Center. The Category Five storm packed the greatest intensity on the Saffir-Simpson scale. Dire forecasts shocked even the most seasoned hands. “MOST OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR WEEKS … PERHAPS LONGER,” THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE’S NEW ORLEANS OFFICE WARNED. KATRINA WAS “A MOST POWERFUL HURRICANE WITH UNPRECEDENTED STRENGTH,” CERTAIN TO STRIKE WITHIN TWELVE TO TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. “AT LEAST ONE HALF OF WELL CONSTRUCTED HOMES WILL HAVE ROOF AND WALL FAILURE. ALL GABLED ROOFS WILL FAIL … LEAVING THOSE HOMES SEVERELY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED. […] POWER OUT-AGES WILL LAST FOR WEEKS … AS MOST POWER POLES WILL BE DOWN AND TRANSFORMERS DESTROYED. WATER SHORTAGES WILL MAKE HUMAN SUFFERING INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.”
Local leaders appeared on-screen to tell residents they needed to leave and leave now. The grim-faced president of a parish near New Orleans warned those who intended to stay to buy an ax, pick, or hammer so they could hack their way to their rooftops and not die in their attics like many Hurricane Betsy unfortunates had. He told them to “remember the old ways” and fill their upstairs bathtubs with water; after the storm that would be the only source for drinking, bathing, and flushing toilets.
