Free Will E-Book

Joseph Keim Campbell

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Key Concepts in Philosophy
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 217

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

What is free will? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is free will necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have free will, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything?

These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of free will. Using a range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, arguments, and theories surrounding free will. Beginning with a discussion of fatalism and causal determinism, the book goes on to focus on the metaphysics of moral responsibility, free will skepticism, and skepticism about moral responsibility. Campbell shows that no matter how we look at it, free will is problematic. Thankfully there are a plethora of solutions on offer and the best of these are considered in full in the final chapter on contemporary theories of free will. This includes a rigorous account of libertarianism, compatabilism, and naturalism.

Free Will is the ideal introduction to the topic and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of the concept for contemporary philosophy.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Dedication

Title page

Copyright page

Acknowledgments

1 Free Will

1.1 Why Care about Free Will?

1.2 Free Will and Fatalism

1.3 Time and Truth

1.4 Foreknowledge

1.5 Determinism

Further Reading

Films about Free Will

2 Moral Responsibility

2.1 Moral Responsibility

2.2 Freedom and Epistemic Conditions

2.3 Other Necessary Conditions

2.4 The “Free Will” Crisis

2.5 Moral Responsibility without Free Will

Further Reading

Films about Moral Responsibility

3 The Problem of Free Will

3.1 The First Argument

3.2 The Third Argument

3.3 The Mind Argument

3.4 Free Will Skepticism

Further Reading

4 Moral Responsibility: Incompatibilism and Skepticism

4.1 The Direct Argument

4.2 The Manipulation Argument

4.3 The Ultimacy Argument

Further Reading

5 Free Will Theories

5.1 Libertarianism

5.2 Free Will Skepticism

5.3 Compatibilism

5.4 Alternative Views

5.5 Final Thoughts

Further Reading

References

Index

For my mentor, Keith Lehrer, from whom I am still learning

Copyright © Joseph Keim Campbell 2011

The right of Joseph Keim Campbell to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2011 by Polity Press

Polity Press

65 Bridge Street

Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press

350 Main Street

Malden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4666-4 (hardback)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4667-1 (paperback)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-3741-9 (Single-user ebook)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-3740-2 (Multi-user ebook)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.politybooks.com

Acknowledgments

Thanks to my editor, Emma Hutchinson, for the opportunity to write this book as well as for her guidance and enthusiasm throughout the process. Thanks to my colleagues, especially Michael O’Rourke, David Shier, Harry Silverstein, and Matthew Slater. Thanks to my students, especially Jason Turner. Several papers on these topics were presented at the Washington State University / University of Idaho Philosophy Colloquium series, and I thank my colleagues, graduate students, and other participants for helpful questions and comments. I’ve also benefited from members of the free will community, too many to mention, especially contributors to the Flickers of Freedom and Garden of Forking Paths blogs. In addition, I’ve profited greatly from the writings and kindness of Keith Lehrer, Peter van Inwagen, and John Martin Fischer.

Several reviewers from Polity Press gave helpful comments on my proposal. Scott Sehon, Kevin Timpe, and Manuel Vargas provided extensive, thoughtful comments on complete drafts of the book. I am indebted to each of them. Others who provided helpful comments on previous drafts are Nicole Brunson, Bob Kane, Keith Lehrer, Al Mele, Nathan Nichols, Roxanne Reese, Matthew Slater, Saul Smilansky, Kadri Vihvelin, and V. Alan White. Drafts of the first two chapters were used in several of my metaphysics classes at Washington State University. I thank all of my students, especially those who offered written comments on the first two chapters: Leslie Lambert, Juan Pena, Ross Powell, Ralph Reagan, Jaron Robinson, and Adam Sturdivant.

Last but not least, thanks to my family and friends, especially Delphine and Lake, for their love and support.

1

Free Will

This book considers various problems, arguments, and theories surrounding the concept of free will. We take the approach that problems about free will are best understood in terms of arguments for free will skepticism. Free will skepticism is the claim that no one has free will. It is the denial of the free will thesis: someone has free will. Given our approach, a philosophical problem is a genuine problem only if the underlying skeptical argument is cogent. It is rare that a single argument yields a result accepted by everyone. More often than not, there are various arguments lending different levels of support to related conclusions, together with a multitude of opinions about which arguments are cogent and which arguments are not. Theories try to make sense of it all, that is, they try to provide explanations in light of the overall evidence. We start with problems (Chs 1–2) that lead to arguments (Chs 3–4) and try to sort it out in the end by exploring a spectrum of theories about free will (Ch. 5).

My training is primarily in epistemology, the theory of knowledge. The central problem in that area of philosophy is the problem of epistemological skepticism. How do I know that I have a hand? How do I know that I’m not some handless brain-in-a-vat? As it turns out, these two skeptical problems – epistemological skepticism and free will skepticism – have more in common than one might think. A skeptic is one who has doubts but doubts come in degrees. The has doubts about and in this respect he is like the agnostic who has doubts about God’s existence. The atheist has doubts about God’s existence, too, but they are more extreme than the doubts of the agnostic. The atheist is a , one who denies the existence of something. Free will skepticism is a kind of metaphysical skepticism, doubt reaching the level of denial. My interest in free will is connected with my broader interest in epistemological skepticism and skepticism in general. The main question for me is: Is there a good reason to doubt the existence of free will, and to accept free will skepticism?