Fromelles 1916 E-Book

Paul Cobb

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

At Fromelles in July 1916 two divisions – one British and one Australian – within a few weeks of arriving in France – went into action for the first time. Their task was to prevent the Germans from moving troops to the Somme where a major British offensive was in progress, but the attack on 19/20 July was a disaster with nearly 7,000 casualties in a few hours. This account explores this battle which for many epitomises the futility of the Great War. In those few hours many heroic deeds were done but the battle caused a souring of Anglo-Australian relationships and truly was a baptism of fire for these British and Australian troops. This is their history. In a new section, Paul Cobb explores the recent discovery in 2008/09 of a mass war grave on the battlefield and includes details of the findings of the archaeological dig, the recovery of 250 bodies and the creation of a new military cemetery.

Leseprobe

To the memory of Randall King

28.6.1956–13.3.2002

Acknowledgements

In addition to a special word of thanks to my wife Tessa, who typed much of the manuscript, sincere thanks are offered to the following who willingly contributed family papers, photographs, stories and other material in the course of my researching this book:

Arthur Millwood (Pte F.W. Millwood 30 Btn); Barbara Robertson (Pte B.J. Watson 57 Btn); Bea Burke (Sgt M. Burke 29 Btn); Bill Townsend (Pte P.W. Townsend 54 Btn); Bob and Edna Levy (Sgt G. Downer 1 Btn); Col Terry Cave CBE; Bob and Gwen Cleworth (Pte J. Cleworth 29 Btn); Bob Antrobus (W. and A. Antrobus 29 Btn); Bob Clark (Pte W.J. Clark and Pte R. Clark 54 Btn); Brian Dyer (Pte Thomas Keeling 30 Btn); Bruce Cobb (Gnr Ormuz Cobb 113 Bty AFA); Bruce Lees (Lt J. Benson DCM 32 Btn); Cleve Page (Sgt Page 14 FC); Col John Healy; Dave Joseph (Pte J. Joseph 31 Btn); David and Helen Harris (Lt W.D. Harris MC 54 Btn); Delma Rich (Sgt F. Field 30 Btn); Diana Cousens (Col Cass); Dorothy and Mervyn Dunk (Pte K. Dunk 32 Btn); Elizabeth Morey (NZ units); Elizabeth Whiteside (Pte T.C. Whiteside 59 Btn); Elsie Teede (Pte J. Inglis 32 Btn); Erma O’Donnell and Elaine Tallais (Lt Gunter 54 Btn); Frank Thexton and Betty Shepherd (Thexton family); Fred Allen (Spr F. Sainty 14 FC); Geoff Flowers (Pte F. Flowers 60 Btn); Geoff Luck (Pte W. and Pte E. Plater 54 Btn and Pte R. Plater 5 MG Btn); Glenville Mitchelson (Sgt J.G. Shepherd 30 Btn); Gordon Rae; Grant Lee (Pte J. Lee 32 Btn); Joe Walker (Pte W. Landy 58 Btn); John and Hazel Watters (Spr A. Findlay 14 FC); John Battersby; Len Carter (Pte H. Carter 54 Btn); Len Western (Pte L.C. Western 59 Btn); Lt Col Paul Simidas; Major Bruce Munchenberg AO; Major Lawrie Hindmarsh (artillery material); Maree Hahn (Pte C.A. Barr 59 Btn and Pte R.A. Wallis 59 Btn); Necia Forster (Pte H. Hollingsworth 5 Div Signal Coy); Neville Kidd (Major R. Harrison 54 Btn); Pam Goesch (Bert Bishop papers); Peter Jones; Peter Smith (Pte G.W. Smith 55 Btn); Randall and Cheryl King (Pte C. King and Pte W.S. Outlaw 53 Btn); Ray and Ruth Hopkins (Capt C.B. Hopkins 14 LTMB); Robert Gray (Col H. Pope CB); Ron Hansard (Pte Robert Fulton 53 Btn); Ron James (Pte A.H. James 30 Btn); Ross St. Claire (54 Btn information); Roy Hewitt (Pte G. Eamans 53 Btn); Stan and Alma Evans (Pte S. Evans 30 Btn); Steve Knight; Stewart Smith (Pte A.E. Smith 53 Btn); Ted Ecclestone (Pte W.C. Ecclestone 59 Btn); Thelma Denny (Pte J.V. Ross 8 MGC and Pte J. Cairns 53 Btn); Thomas Welch (Pte A. Welsh 31 Btn); Tony Spagnola;Trish Lesina (Gnr W. Webb 5 AFAB); Richard Jeffs (OBLI); Lin Collier (maps); the staff of the AWM Research Centre; and finally to Martial Delebarre of Fromelles, who has done so much to commemorate the events of 19–20 July 1916.

Contents

Title Page

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Foreword by Col Terry Cave CBE

1 Lawyers, Bakers and Drapers

2 An Adequate Supply of Guns

3 Into a Stream of Lead

4 Sending Fritz Iron Rations

5 Annihilating Fire

6 I’ll be Alright

7 Some Ghastly Sights

8 Twisted Heap of Khaki

9 Destruction and Havoc

10 Conspicuous Gallantry

11 The Final Stages

12 A Fearful Price

13 Casualties

14 Captivity

15 First View of Heaven

16 Bitter Legacy

17 Better Than I Expected

18 The Dismissal of Harold Pope

19 Remembering

20 A Remarkable Sequel

Appendix A: Order of Battle

Appendix B: Artillery Details

Maps

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Notes

List of Illustrations

Index

Plate Section

About the Author

Copyright

Introduction

Ask any person in the street to name a few places associated with the Great War of 1914–1918 and the answers, if any, are likely to be ‘the Somme’ or ‘Passchendaele’. This is not at all surprising since, for so many people, these stereotyped, muddy foreign fields represent common belief of what the First World War was actually about.

In July 1916, while the Battle of the Somme was raging in Picardy, there was just such a battle that would fit this popular image of a First World War battle. The generals behind the lines planned an impossible task for the troops, the rain fell on a battlefield pitted with shell holes, the infantry climbed out of their trenches and advanced against enemy machine guns before the whole affair ended in a bloodbath with no new ground captured.

To describe the attack at Fromelles on 19 July 1916 in these terms would be to adopt a simplistic view, but elements of it are not so far from the truth. In 1915 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking had been an influential figure in a remarkably similar attack on Aubers Ridge which had been repulsed at great cost. A year later he was to try again but this time his troops would be two new divisions, one fresh from England and the other from Egypt where it had been put together with a mix of veterans of the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign and enthusiastic volunteers sent out from Australia after a few weeks’ training. Their objective on 19 July would be to attempt to deter the Germans from transferring resources to the Somme, where the joint Anglo-French offensive had been underway for a fortnight.

The battlefield was indeed damaged by shellfire, but in addition it was low-lying land typical of the wet Flanders plain and, of course, gunfire had destroyed the drainage ditches that are such a common feature of this area. The enemy lines, however, were not as damaged as might have been expected despite the best efforts of the array of artillery brought forward to prepare the ground for the infantry. That day the enemy were well prepared and well organised.

What unfolded in the fields below the village of Fromelles was to be a remarkable story of blundering in the planning process but immense gallantry by troops largely inexperienced in battle. The legacy of the day remained, shown in the disparaging names given to certain generals and the tag ‘a 19 July man’ to men who survived this ordeal. It left a very bitter taste, but the entire tragedy of that day has until now been overshadowed by the much better-known fighting at Pozieres which started a couple of days later and which was a significant part of the Somme offensive.

This account will help visitors to the area to understand why there are so many graves with identical dates, why there is a memorial bearing the names of 1,299 missing soldiers, and why ‘Fleurbaix’ and ‘19 July’ meant so much to that generation. It will help modern generations understand the experience of hundreds of volunteers who willingly left their homes to assist the ‘mother country’. It will also provide a clear understanding of why commemoration of the battle is so strong in the locality so many years later and, in this second edition, will summarise the remarkable work undertaken by the British and Australian Governments and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to recover the bodies from the mass grave at Pheasant Wood and to create the new Fromelles (Pheasant Wood) Military Cemetery.

Foreword by Col Terry Cave CBE

As I write this we are in the first few days of 2006, the year that is the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of the Somme. Undoubtedly there will be, on 1 July, services commemorating the opening day of the British offensive. In the following months there will be many visits and pilgrimages made to various parts of the battlefield, but I wonder how many will remember Fromelles! The Australians will, for sure, for there is a small memorial park near the VC Corner cemetery commemorating a disastrous attack on Fromelles by their 5 Division, in concert with the British 61 (2 South Midland) Division, on 19–20 July 1916, an attack that resulted in some 7,080 casualties of which just over 5,500 were Australian. Although Fromelles is well to the north of the Somme battlefield, the aim of the attack was to ‘fix’ the German forces in their sector and dissuade them from sending reinforcements down to the Somme. Despite the bravery of the attacking troops the operation failed to achieve its aim. But the fact is that it was a battle that need not, should not have been fought, the result of hasty planning involving two divisions that had just arrived in France, divisions which, in the words of the Official History, ‘lacked experience and training in offensive trench warfare’.

‘Yesterday evening, south of Armentieres, we carried out some important raids on a front of two miles in which Australian troops took part. About 140 German prisoners were captured.’ Thus GHQ’s official communiqué of 20 July 1916 described the battle. This bland announcement, which reflected GHQ policy at the time of concealing unpleasant news from the British public (it certainly didn’t fool the Germans), angered the Australian troops who had fought in an action in which their division had suffered the highest casualty figure sustained by any BEF division throughout the whole war in a single day’s action, other than the 6,380 of the 34 Division on 1 July. Nor did it go down well back in Australia when the true facts emerged; there were many who regarded all GHQ communiqués thereafter with a deal of scepticism. To Australians this attack was a significant event, the first major operation on the Western Front involving their troops; their official historian, Bean, devoted 120 pages to it, the British official historian, Edmonds, only fifteen. In the welter of the Somme battles in progress to the south, Fromelles has slipped from the British consciousness and has become a forgotten, overlooked battle – until now. With this book, which has taken up years of research, Paul Cobb has provided a comprehensive, detailed account of the battle in which he has made good use of official documents, correspondence, letters, war diaries, casualty returns and much more, as the lengthy bibliography reveals. We also have a report on the contentious dismissal of Harold Pope, one of the Australian brigade commanders, by his divisional commander – not on the usual grounds of incompetence but, and this is surely unique, on grounds of alleged drunkenness, and on his fight to clear his name.

If you visit VC Corner cemetery today, a cemetery with no headstones but two mass graves and with a wall at the rear on which are inscribed the names of the 1,299 Australian dead with no known graves, you can look across the flat fields on which they died and where, when Bean visited the scene in November 1918, the remains of many attackers still lay in No Man’s Land. This is their story and this is a tribute to their memory.

Terry Cave

WorthingJanuary 2006

1

Lawyers, Bakers and Drapers

In early 1916 French army commanders urged the British High Command to launch an offensive to ease the burden on their sector of the Western Front. The location selected was the front occupied by the British Fourth Army. Weeks of intense preparation culminated in the Battle of the Somme – a ‘big push’ that would last 143 days. The first day, 1 July 1916, resulted in some 60,000 casualties sustained within a few hours of the infantry attack commencing. The next couple of weeks proved to be marginally more successful but to impede German resistance it was necessary to stop redeployment of resources from further north, in particular the Lille–Lens area.

A number of trench raids had been carried out in other sectors but an instruction was sent to the commanders of the First, Second and Third Armies to renew their efforts so that German units on their front might remain in position. An additional requirement was that the artillery should be economical with ammunition to ensure that the main offensive on the Somme would not be deprived of sufficient firepower.

The manpower supply on the Western Front would now also be improved. In Egypt, after withdrawal from Gallipoli, two Australian divisions had been divided and strengthened to make four divisions and another, the 3 Division,1 had been formed in Australia. Sailing to Marseilles from late March 1916 onwards, these troops had made the long journey by train to northern France and were now ready to take part in offensive operations.

Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British forces on the Western Front, had also ordered the other army commanders to draw up plans for more substantial attacks in case the Germans were overwhelmed on the Somme. An optimistic appraisal of the Somme offensive was provided on 12 July by Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell,2 Haig’s Chief of Staff, who stated that ‘steady progress is being made’, though he did acknowledge that ‘heavy rains, and consequent difficulties of ground, in addition to the strength and depth of the enemy’s defences, have rendered rapid progress impossible and have enabled the enemy to gain time to recover from his first confusion and disorganisation – which were considerable’.3 Kiggell was ‘confident of breaking through … in the near future and inflicting a heavy defeat’.

General Sir Herbert Plumer, the very capable GOC Second Army, had made the requirement for seeking suitable locations for offensive action quite clear to his corps commanders on 3 July, but repeated it two days later when it was learned that the 13 Jager Battalion had been moved to the Somme vacating their position in the line opposite II Anzac Corps. Until now this corps had consisted of the New Zealand Division, and the 4 and the 5 Australian Divisions, the latter having only very recently arrived in northern France. Lt-Gen Sir Alexander Godley, the corps commander, now lost the 4 Australian Division, which was being sent to the Somme in readiness for the fighting around Pozieres.

More raids gallantly executed by the New Zealand troops were believed to have had negligible effect. Action on a far larger scale where enemy reserves were limited thus appeared to be the only real opportunity to meet Haig’s requirements. Plumer’s Second Army discounted an attack in the Messines Ridge area – this sector’s turn would come in a spectacular way in June 1917 – or Ypres, where circumstances were not yet suited to an attack on the scale required by Haig. At the southernmost extremity of the Second Army, where it had joined the First Army at a point in the low-lying fields below the village of Fromelles, the Germans held their front line far more lightly than elsewhere on this army’s front. The source of this plan, according to Australian historian Charles Bean writing in Reveille4 in June 1931, was General Sir Richard Haking,5 GOC XI Corps, who had ‘suggested to his Army Commander that there existed on his front a prominent German salient, the “Sugar Loaf” near Fromelles, which offered, in his opinion, a favourable chance of capture’. Haking’s view does not take into account the events in May 1915.

This very location below Aubers Ridge, in May 1915, had witnessed a singularly unsuccessful attack, a pincer movement on the enemy line, at the same time as the French attacked in the Vimy Ridge area. It was a disaster and cost three divisions some ten thousand casualties. Haking’s new scheme, proposed to General Monro, was for a joint Second and First Army breakthrough in the Aubers Ridge area. With so many divisions committed to the Somme offensive, Haig’s divisions to undertake any operation on Aubers Ridge were likely to include troops new to the Western Front. The two destined to carry out Haking’s plan were the 61 (2 South Midland) Division and the 5 Australian Division.

The first of these, the 61 Division,6 was a second-line or reserve division that did not exist until 31 August 1914. While the formation was based in Northampton it was part of First Army, Central Force; in April 1915 the 1 (South Midland) Division, the corresponding first-line imperial service unit, left Chelmsford bound for France, and so the 2 (South Midland) Division moved to Essex as part of Third Army, Central Force. In February/March 1916 the division moved to Salisbury Plain and preparations for warfare in France and Flanders intensified. Their GOC, Major-General Colin Mackenzie, was appointed on 4 February 1916, Brigadier-General A.F. Gordon of 182 Brigade on 13 February, followed by Brig-Gen C.G. Stewart (183 Brigade) and Brig-Gen C.H.P. Carter (184 Brigade) on 3 and 7 May 1916 respectively.

The battalions within the division recruited from an area of England around Birmingham, the Malverns, the Cotswolds and the Chilterns. For example, 2/5 Btn, Gloucestershire Regiment was formed in early September 1914 as a second-line battalion of 1/5 Gloucesters by Lt Col the Hon A.B. Bathurst and was designated as a Home Service Battalion. Like so many new units, membership overwhelmed the supply of uniforms and for a while its recruits wore a square of white silk inscribed ‘2/5th Glosters’ to indicate that a man had joined up. Recruits came from a variety of backgrounds; 2/5 Gloucesters claimed that its personnel included ‘members of Parliament, lawyers, bakers, accountants, drapers, musicians, conjurers, butchers, sugar magnates, farm labourers and artisans of every sort’.7 Similarly, 2/8 Royal Warwicks recorded that a large number of their new soldiers came from Saltley College and from Birmingham Tramways.8

On 24 May the division left for France from Southampton aboard HMT 861, landing the following day at Le Havre. The Laventie sector was to provide their first taste of the front line in France and Flanders; eight casualties in the first week was a mere hint of things to come. Laventie, the main base of 61 Division at this time, was described by Major Christie-Miller as ‘not a wholly wrecked town but had been a good deal knocked about. The church had been demolished and a convent or school adjoining it with a good many buildings but there was quite a sprinkling of fairly complete houses.’9

While Mackenzie’s division was preparing for the Western Front the formation of the 5 Australian Division was also underway, not in their home territory but midway to Europe, in Egypt.

With the evacuation from the Gallipoli peninsula completed the AIF could now concentrate upon its recuperation and expansion in Egypt. The 1 and 2 Divisions and 4 Infantry Brigade had returned from the Dardanelles, and in Egypt they joined the 8 Bde plus several thousand reinforcements. These fresh troops, mainly infantry and Light Horsemen, were to expand the two existing divisions into four, the two new ones being numbered 4 and 5 Divisions; the 3 Division was already being created in Australia. As well as the infantry battalions, other parts of the division were also formed including the artillery, the engineers, medical services and transport. A commander was on his way from Australia, Major-General the Hon James Whiteside McCay.

Despite the attractions of foreign parts, for some Egypt was a desolate spot. Robert Fulton, now in 53 Btn, wrote to his sister: ‘we are in a very lonely part of the globe at present. We are in the trenches in Egypt, defending the canal. It does not take much defending either, I have not seen a Turk yet, and I don’t think we are very likely to either’. With the urgent need for troops on the Western Front, the transfer started of a substantial part of the Australian Imperial Force from Egypt to France. The long transfer from the desert to the green fields of Picardy started with a train journey, a 150-mile trip from Moascar to Alexandria taking at least eight hours. The majority of the 5 Division left Egypt between 16 and 23 June 1916; some of the ships put in at Malta, but all eventually arrived in Marseilles where the troops disembarked wearing their new uniforms designed for cooler climates.

From Marseilles it would require about thirty trains to move the men and a couple of dozen to transport the equipment to their destination many miles to the north. Paris was 530 miles away and the railhead at Hazebrouck was a further 150 miles. The scenery along the way contrasted vividly not just with the deserts of Egypt but also with some of the more barren parts of Australia. The 53 Btn, known as ‘The Whale Oil Guards’, had their journey recorded by the Roman Catholic Chaplain Fr J.J. Kennedy, who wrote:

…our eyes feasted on the loveliness … beautifully cultivated farms, magnificent chateaus, serpentine rivers, castled crags, gray old towns with their old-time cathedrals and abbeys, picture succeeded picture and out-rivalled it in beauty … the towns … were old and historic; Avignon, once the refuge of exiled Popes, Tresancon, Orange, and many other places of interest. Everywhere along the way the people cheered us and blessed us.10

The 8 Brigade eventually detrained at Morbeque on 26 June, the 14 at Thiennes four days later and the 15 Brigade at Steenbecque on 27 June. McCay’s division was now located close to Mackenzie’s, and as Haking’s plan to relieve the troops fighting on the Somme gathered momentum, the severest of tests approached.

2

An Adequate Supply of Guns

On 8 July at a conference of his corps commanders, Sir Charles Monro (Army Commander) stated that the battle of the Somme was ‘progressing favourably’1 but an operation was required on the front held by the First and Second Armies near Laventie. Monro instructed Haking to develop his plans on the understanding that his corps would go into action in conjunction with one division from the neighbouring Second Army as well as some additional artillery. On this same day the 4 Australian Division was instructed to move south to the Somme but was ordered to leave behind its artillery. At this time Haking’s XI Corps was holding the line from south-west of Cambrin (south of the La Bassée Canal) to Laventie, the point where the First and Second Armies joined. If the attack was to go ahead, it presented the possibility that Haking could lose the same battle twice.

Considering the lack of success of British attacks on the Western Front in 1915 and thus far in 1916, Haking’s enhanced plan, that he put to Monro the following day, was ambitious. His scheme was intended to capture a section of the Aubers–Fromelles ridge a mile or so behind the German front line from which the British had withdrawn in late October 1914; the attack would be a two-division assault on a front of 4,200 yards. Monro rejected it. According to Brig-Gen Harold Elliott (OC 15 Bde)2 in an address to the RSSILA,3 ‘Monro, however, turned down this proposal in favour of an attack in the Vimy Ridge Sector, later carried out by the Canadians, as being more likely to be of use to Haig, being much nearer the Somme’.

Circumstances soon caused the resurrection of a variation of Haking’s plan. Progress in capturing enemy-held territory on the Somme had been slower than expected and a number of German battalions had arrived on the Somme from the Lille area. The General Staff was of the opinion that an ‘artillery demonstration’ for a period of some three days on a front of 15,000 yards on the First and Second Army fronts would convince the Germans that a significant offensive was about to be launched.

On 13 July Monro informed Haking that the GOC Second Army would place a division at the disposal of the First Army for an offensive operation in the Picantin area on the boundary of the two armies. A senior officers’ conference took place that day at Chocques. In attendance were Haig’s deputy chief of the general staff, Major-General Sir R.H.K. Butler, accompanied by Major H. Howard, Major-General Sir G. Barrow and Major-General C. Harington,4 chiefs-of-staff of the First and Second Armies respectively, as well as the army commander Sir Charles Monro and Colonel Wilson of GHQ First Army. It was agreed that each army could provide not only sufficient artillery for a demonstration but also three divisions, two from the First Army and one from the Second Army, for infantry participation in a scheme based upon Haking’s plan. Haking would be in charge of the whole operation.

Butler then met Sir Herbert Plumer at La Motte-au-Bois (II Anzac Corps HQ) at 4.30p.m. where Plumer expressed his overall approval of the scheme. A further conference5 was held attended by Plumer, Godley, Harington, Franks,6 Gwynn,7 Howard and Butler to discuss some of the detail. It was agreed that the divisional artillery of five to six divisions was to be collected at the junction of First and Second Armies; wire cutting would commence on the morning of 14 July with whatever guns were available and others would join the bombardment once they had moved into position; and the infantry attack was to take place about 17 July ‘with a view to seizing and holding the German front system of trenches’.8

A First Army order (No. 100) issued on the 15 July confirmed the overall purpose of the action:

…to prevent the enemy from moving troops southwards to take part in the main battle. For this purpose the preliminary operations, so far as it is possible, will give the impression of an impending offensive operation on a large scale, and the bombardment which commenced on the morning of the 14th inst. will be continued with increasing intensity up till the moment of the assault.9

As well as the troops moving into the front trenches on 12 July, Major-General McCay10 was also taking over the accommodation occupied by his predecessor in a chateau in Sailly-sur-la-Lys a short distance behind the front line. On the morning of the 13 July11 he travelled to La Motte-au-Bois to be informed that no sooner had they settled into their new positions than his division was to be placed on loan to Haking’s XI Corps of the First Army. McCay seemed pleased that his division, so recently arrived in France, was about to become the first Australian division to participate in a significant action on the Western Front.

McCay was given details of the plan for an attack on enemy lines in fulfilment of Haig’s instructions. The plan at this stage was to assault and capture approximately 6,000 yards of the enemy’s front line lying below the northern slopes of Aubers Ridge; the north-easternmost point was opposite the site of a religious settlement (now identified by a monument by the side of the lane) marked as ‘La Boutillerie’ on trench maps, while the extreme right of the proposed battlefield was to be the country lane running between the hamlets of Fauquissart, on the British side of the line, and Trivelet on the German side.

Initially three divisions were allocated for the attack. The 5 Australian Division and the British 61 (2 South Midland) Division were to be joined by the British 31 Division; the latter occupied the section of line from La Cordonnerie, to the right of the Australians, to a point opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient, located on the left of the 61 Division. This operation was deemed within the capability of all three divisions but none were believed to be of sufficient strength or capability to be sent into action on the Somme. The Australians were freshly arrived from Egypt, the 31 Division had already received a mauling on the Somme, and the 61 Division was a recently arrived second-line Territorial division which had already lost a number of its men through transfers to other divisions.

At this juncture the chosen day was 17 July, but no sooner had McCay been informed of this than Haking discovered to his dismay that only two divisions’ worth of artillery (4 and 5 Australian Divisions) had been allocated to him by the Second Army rather than the three he was expecting. Three further factors compounded his predicament: the shortcomings in training and battle experience of the Australian gunners, the fact that the 5 Australian Division had no trained 2-inch mortar personnel, and a much reduced supply of shells. Consequently, the front was reduced to a section running from the Fauquissart–Trivelet road to Delangre Farm. This narrowing of the front appears to be the basis of the corps commander’s opinion that he had adequate artillery.

The width of the battlefield was now about 3,500 yards, and with the 39 Division taking over from La Bassée Canal to Oxford Street (map reference S.5.c.5.4), the pivot of the attack was now to be a point opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient. The 5 Australian Division would occupy from this point to La Cordonnerie Farm on their left, and the 61 Division would adjoin the Australians opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient and extend to their right to the Fauquissart–Trivelet road. Consequently, the 31 Division was to be pulled out of the line and transferred to the right of the 61 Division. Further changes were necessary to the left of the Australians in response to their sideways move towards the Sugar Loaf Salient, filling part of the ground previously occupied by the 31 Division. On their left was the New Zealand Division, which moved its right-hand boundary towards the Australians. To fill the remaining gap between the New Zealand and Australian units the British 60 Brigade (20 Division) was transferred from the Ypres Salient for the duration of the attack, though this brigade would take no part in the action apart from providing covering fire.

On 14 July the order was issued12 allocating Australian artillery for the forthcoming battle. Further instructions followed in Corps Order No. 57, which detailed more artillery dispositions as well as the programme for each day leading up to 17 July when the attack should have gone ahead. So far as the threat of return fire of German guns was concerned, any known battery positions were to be shelled prior to the infantry attacking and during the battle. However, the intended three-day bombardment further south as far as the Hohenzollern Redoubt was reduced to selected targets in the 39 Division area.

Co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was also specified. So that the position of the infantry could be plotted on maps, attacking troops’ positions in the enemy’s trenches were to be notified to the RFC by means of flashing mirrors and flares one hour after the assault and thereafter at hourly intervals during daylight. Made available for the battle were 10 Squadron, 1 Bde RFC and 16 Squadron, 2 Bde for ‘tactical reconnaissance, artillery work, liaison, photography and local protection of Corps machines’.13 The 10 Wing RFC was also to provide an offensive patrol from 4.15a.m. until dark each day during the build-up and during the battle itself, around Illies and Beaucamps behind the German lines. This same wing was also to provide one aeroplane with a full plate camera and supply photographs for a Photographic Section RFC stationed at XI Corps Advanced HQ. Finally, No. 10 Kite Balloon Section was brought into the rear area for observation purposes.

Communications were to play a significant part in the battle. The Australian signal company had arrived in Marseilles on 25 June and by 30 June was in Blaringhem in northern France. As early as 4 July Capt R.A. Stanley and four men reported to Croix du Bac to open a signals office; on 12 July they moved to Sailly-sur-la-Lys, taking over the signals office vacated by the 4 Australian Division. Their preparations14 continued over the next couple of days as provision and testing of cables to new positions progressed along with the installation of jamming sets and arrangements for a carrier pigeon service.

The difficult reorganisation of the various units holding the front line and the relief by fresh troops were exacerbated on the night of 14/15 July by two unwelcome intrusions. At 9p.m. on 14 July the 61 Division released a cloud of gas, which drifted across and along the German front line but then continued in an arc into the face of 60 Bde causing a number of casualties – as did shelling by the Germans in retaliation. On 18 and 19 June, 1,500 gas cylinders had been brought into the trenches; this gas was supposed to be released in the Neuve Chapelle and Fauquissart sectors on 15 July whilst the relief of battalions took place, but between 16 and 19 July every available 61 Division soldier not detailed for the assault was employed in removing these cylinders. By the time the assault finally went ahead on 19 July, only 470 cylinders had been removed, the men being too tired to remove any more.

Brig-Gen Elliott listed, in his 1931 paper to the RSSILA in Canberra, the retention of gas cylinders in the front line as one of the ‘blunders’ of the battle. Ellis noted in the divisional history15 that ‘it was imperative … that these should be removed before any heavy enemy artillery action occurred, and this work entailed a severe strain on their infantry working parties as well as occasioning considerable congestion in the saps leading to the front line’. Fortunately no cylinders were damaged during the battle, though one gas-related incident did occur on the day before the battle when the German gunners dropped ‘several HE shells in our front line … one onto a gas cylinder in A Coy which of course burst and with an enfilade wind spread gas down the line instantly causing between 70 and 80 casualties including one officer, Lt Pitcher, and some of our best NCOs. In addition Capt Church and CSM Arthur Brown got a slight dose but did not report sick.’16 Both men became casualties in the battle.

The second inopportune incident for the British proved a most fruitful excursion for the 21 Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment. At 9.15p.m. the real purpose of the retaliatory bombardment became clearer as it moved to the left of the intended front of the attack around Cellar Farm, where the line was held by the 58 Btn waiting to be relieved by the 6 Btn Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (OBLI). This position, along with Mine Avenue and Cellar Farm Avenue plus communication trenches and breastworks in the front line, received a very heavy pounding causing extensive damage. In conjunction with this bombardment, a raiding party led by a Leutnant Harder caused heavy casualties when it entered the Australian trenches, which were more heavily populated than usual due to the relief of the Australians. The OBLI lost ten men killed and a further nineteen wounded, light losses compared with the Australians who had forty-two killed, 118 wounded and a further four missing.

The timing was ideal for the Germans as, apart from capturing a Lewis gun and inflicting so many casualties, they learnt that the 5 Australian Division was now in the line in place of the 1 Australian Division; the departure of the 4 Australian Division had not been detected by the enemy. The price paid by the Bavarians was ten killed and twenty-two wounded. Even though they interrogated prisoners taken in the raid it appears unlikely that the Germans knew that an attack was imminent, and it was the start of the British artillery’s registration on German targets and wire-cutting on 16 July that alerted German staff officers to the possibility that some offensive action might be about to start. From their vantage points on Aubers Ridge the Germans had also observed newly positioned field guns just behind the British front line. German opinion varied over the motive for the increased gunfire, some thinking that it was simply in response to the German trench raid, others believing that an infantry assault on the Sugar Loaf Salient was likely.

Doubts over the soundness of Haking’s plan were further fuelled by a visit to 15 Bde’s sector by Major Howard, one of Haig’s staff, on 14 July. Elliott did not hesitate to show Howard the 400-yard-wide stretch of No Man’s Land opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient over which his troops would have to advance. Howard concluded that the proposed attack was destined to be another appalling disaster and presented his report to Haig and Harington. On 15 July they approved the plans for the attack, but noted on Howard’s report ‘except that infantry should not be sent in unless an adequate supply of guns and ammunition for counter-battery work is provided’. This comment was noted by General Butler, who met the commanders of First and Second Armies and their chiefs of staff at Chocques on 16 July. Butler put the commander’s position on adequacy of resources to paper in a secret memo17 dated 17 July, in which he stated that the operation would proceed ‘provided as always that General Sir Charles Monro is satisfied that the conditions are favourable, and that the resources at his disposal, including ammunition, are adequate for both the preparation and execution of the enterprise’.

Haking stated that he considered that the available ammunition and other resources at his disposal were sufficient to enable the operation to succeed; Monro also expressed his satisfaction that Haking’s plan should proceed. In addition, Butler indicated that information on the redeployment of German units gained by GHQ suggested that the need for the operation to commence on the 17 July was no longer so rigid. Even with Monro’s support it was suggested at this conference that the attack could be postponed or even cancelled. The British Official History18 states that Butler informed Generals Monro, Plumer and Haking that ‘there was now no urgent need for the XI Corps operation: Sir Douglas Haig did not wish the attack to take place at all unless the commanders on the spot were satisfied that their resources were, in every way, adequate’. However, the ‘Commanders present were unanimously against a postponement. The troops were worked up to it, were ready and anxious to do it’; moreover, it would damage the confidence of the troops if the operation was cancelled. Haking ‘was in particular most emphatic on this point’. It was agreed that the attack would continue but, even if the opportunity arose, ‘it was not the intention to embark in any more extended operations however inviting’.19 Notwithstanding any reservations expressed at First Army HQ, times were agreed for the commencement of the final bombardment – 4a.m. on 17 July – and the infantry assault – 11a.m.

During the afternoon of 16 July another factor emerged to burden operations – the rain – and the prospects did not look at all favourable for the coming 24 hours. The weather reports20 for 17 and 18 July were similar, but locally around Fromelles the mist hung over the battlefield preventing the observation of the fall of shells. For 19 July, the weather was recorded as being ‘fair generally … misty especially at night … cold at night’.21

The first casualty of the weather was to be the artillery, which needed to observe the bursting of their shells as part of the process of registering their guns on selected targets. Butler was acutely aware of the weather’s potential to hinder this preparatory work, and so he returned to Chocques in order to gain information to make a more informed judgement. Monro was not present, but it was made clear to Lt Col S.H. Wilson (Monro’s GSO1 – Operations) by Butler that the army commander had full discretion either to cancel or to postpone the attack for reasons of the weather or any other cause. Haig was informed of Butler’s statement and gave his approval to this action by the deputy chief of his staff.

Following the postponement of the attack, Haking wrote to the troops of the two divisions informing them of the reasons for the delay:

As you know we were going to have a fight on Monday, but the weather was so thick that our Artillery could not see well enough to produce the very accurate shooting we require for the success of our plan. So I had to put it off, and GHQ said to do it as soon as you can. I then fixed ‘zero’ for Wednesday, and I know you will do your best, for the sake of our lads who are fighting hard down south.22

Despite these setbacks, Haking remained confident that the afternoon of 16 July and the following morning would be adequate time for registration and practice before the battle itself got underway. Furthermore, at a conference that day he told his divisional commanders the ‘the narrow depth of the attack should make it possible, with the ammunition available, to reduce the defenders to a state of collapse before the assault’. The rain that afternoon did not abate and the hour designated for the start of the final seven hours’ bombardment approached. By 4a.m. the following morning the rain had eased, but heavy mist lingered over the fields delaying this bombardment for four hours. Subsequently, when conditions had still not improved, another postponement of three hours was agreed. At 8.30a.m. on 17 July Haking sent a despatch which appears to contradict some of the assurances he had been giving to his senior officers and shows that he knew about some of the deficiencies among the gunners and infantry. He commenced by saying that ‘it is with great reluctance that I am compelled to advise the postponement… owing to weather conditions’, continuing, some of the heavy artillery batteries that were sent to me have never fired out here before’. He alleged also that the infantry ‘are not fully trained’ and ‘do not appear to be very anxious for the attack to be delivered’. For General Monro, on the other hand, cancellation of Haking’s entire scheme seemed to be the preferred course of action.23 Haking also pressed Monro to inform him whether he wanted the same timetable to be implemented the following day using the same troops, stating that this would ‘minimise any loss of morale’. In addition, at 6a.m. on 17 July, advanced XI Corps HQ opened at Sailly-sur-la-Lys – a sign that Haking was not realistically expecting a postponement or cancellation.

Monro agreed to delay the assault until at least 19 July, and even this date would be dependent upon more favourable weather conditions prevailing. The opportunity was taken by the Australian division to return one of the battalions assigned for the assault per brigade to billets in the rear area, and to place the other assaulting battalion in the reserve lines. At the same time Lt Col A. Jackson (58 Btn) departed and was succeeded by Major C.A. Denehy, formerly of 57 Btn.

Fortunately for the gunners the improvement in the weather continued, enabling them to obtain the range of the enemy’s positions, but their frustration had been noted in the war diary – ‘fire totally unobserved owing to fog’.24 A clue to the difficulties facing the gunners is given in Major Christie-Miller’s papers25 in which he comments that ‘the OPs on Rue Tilleloy were heavily pounded by the enemy on 18th and more especially on 19th and that any fire control depending on these must have been far from efficient. The gunner officers who flocked to these OPs suffered heavy casualties. The wires in working order must have been few and far between.’

In the front line, troops completed stocking engineer’s stores, delivering ammunition and bombs, as well as having a meal and snatching a few hours’ sleep when the opportunity presented itself. The final seven-hour pre-assault bombardment that had been delayed by the adverse weather conditions was ordered to commence. This time Haking fixed the start time at 11a.m. on 19 July; the infantry would assault that evening at 6p.m.

3

Into a Stream of Lead

The area of the Fromelles battlefield was very flat from the left-hand point of the proposed attack across to the extreme right, for some distance behind the British lines, and for 600 yards behind the German line until the ground started to rise towards the ridge. It was also criss-crossed by drainage ditches, made necessary by the high water table in these low-lying fields. Along the sides of some of the ditches remained rows of willow trees, or in some cases their shell-shattered stumps. The prominent feature of the immediate battle area was the Layes Brook, the main drainage channel running from south-west to north-east, bisecting both the British and German front lines near the Sugar Loaf Salient; today it can be easily identified a few yards to the north of VC Corner.1 The origin of the name ‘Sugar Loaf’ itself cannot be ascertained, but was probably bestowed upon the remains of a farm building, long destroyed, which had left a white smudge on the fields. Behind the German lines, gentle slopes led to the top of Aubers Ridge 500 yards beyond. Although only 30 feet above the battle area, in Great War terms this was a significant piece of high ground offering views across the British front and rear areas. The facility was enhanced even further by observation posts, such as the one constructed inside Fromelles church tower and another which can still be seen today in the main street of Aubers.

The tower in Fromelles was visited by Brig-Gen H.E. Elliott (OC 15 Brigade) in 1918. He wrote that it

had been turned into a solid cube of concrete, except for a stair so narrow that only with difficulty could a normally built man ascend it. At its head near the ridge pole it terminated in a loophole for an observer, who, with a telescope could, with perfect safety to himself, count every sentry in our lines. He also had an extensive view across our back areas, and could at once detect any preparation for attack.2

In view of the high water table, digging trenches was a fruitless exercise. Consequently both sides had constructed thick breastworks of earth, timber and the ubiquitous sandbag. 4473 Pte W.H. Downing,3 serving with 57 Btn, noted in To the Last Ridge:

…there were no trenches, but solid breast-works of beaten sandbags revetted with iron and timber, fortified with concrete slabs or ‘bursters’. These were from 20 to 30 feet thick, and seven to ten feet high. There was no parados. A fire step was in every bay and a sand-bag block-house used as a dugout.

Loopholes were provided for sentries keeping a watchful eye for activity in opposing lines. As well as positions for machine guns created in each front line there were provided, especially in the case of the Germans, well-concealed positions for snipers attentive to any soldier who might either recklessly or unwittingly expose himself to this unseen peril. The British official historian, Capt Wilfred Miles, noted, ‘as little fighting had taken place in the region for the past fourteen months, the Germans had had ample opportunity to strengthen their breastworks defences, which now included many machine-gun emplacements constructed of concrete, well sited and concealed’.4

As the British desire in 1914–1918 was to be on the offensive and to move the front line forward, positions were regarded as short-term accommodation and therefore often lacked substantial shelters, though there were plenty of dugouts of various standards along the front. The Germans, on the other hand, had dug in with the purpose of holding their front line, usually on higher ground, until such time as the Russians had been defeated on the Eastern Front and resources could be transferred to the west in readiness for an offensive on a large scale that would push the Allies back to the sea and force them to capitulate. In order to hold the front line with relatively few men, to defend it in depth and to enable a reasonably comfortable existence in these inhospitable conditions, a number of dugouts had been prepared, supported by prefabricated timber structures. These were later augmented by concrete blockhouses, many of which may be seen nowadays on the battlefield. Pumping systems were installed to remove surplus water, electric power was provided for lighting and there are accounts of some dugouts being equipped with home comforts such as wallpaper and beds! As with the deep chalk dugouts on the Somme, these shelters offered reasonable protection from British bombardments, after which the German troops would emerge ready to resist an enemy attack.

By July 1916 the German expertise in the use of concrete had already been put to good use in the Aubers Ridge area,5 but the concreted works that existed at the time of the assault appear to have been limited mainly to platforms for trench mortars and roofs for dugouts; one or two more substantial structures did exist further back, however.6 The 8 Brigade’s summary of the battle noted the ‘trench mortars on concrete pods behind the island traverses in excavations in the parados. One very large mortar on a concrete platform; all these were destroyed’.7

At intervals along the breastworks were sally ports to allow access to and egress from No Man’s Land for attacking troops or trench raiding parties. Beyond the breastworks were stretches of barbed wire wound around screw pickets and tossed into inextricable webs by shell fire. Amongst the wire and on into No Man’s Land were uncultivated crops and long grass in fields pitted by shell craters, all of which provided useful cover for nocturnal raiding or listening activity; also lying amongst this agricultural detritus was the further debris of war such as items of equipment and human remains, in particular from the May 1915 attack. Downing noted this latter feature: ‘graves of Englishmen lay everywhere; the dates on the little crosses had almost faded since “December 1914”, “February”, “May”, “October 1915”. Most of the graves were nameless’.8

Trailing back from the British front line were communication trenches constructed alongside hedgerows and farm tracks, utilising ruined farm buildings. These routes, also prone to flooding, were necessary for the movement to the front line of stores, weapons, ammunition, men and the vast array of material necessary for the conduct of war. In the return direction came troops collecting further loads to be brought forward, soldiers relieved from front-line duty making their way to the rear for a welcome break and wounded and dead being evacuated. Light railways brought ordnance as far forward as possible before transfer to waiting troops. In the line occupied by the Australians, for example, there were five communication trenches. In the 8 Bde sector there was Cellar Farm Avenue, which was passable, and Mine Avenue, which was impassable due to being partly blocked by mud and flood water. Similarly, Brompton Avenue in the 14 Bde sector was also flooded along part of its length but was of some use. This was the sole communication trench in this brigade’s sector and would create a serious impediment when troops moved forward in readiness for the assault. On the Australian right, Elliott’s men had the benefit of the serviceable trenches of Pinney’s Avenue and VC Avenue.

No Man’s Land varied from 100 yards on the extreme left to a maximum width of 400 yards opposite the Sugar Loaf Salient narrowing again to 200 yards on the right of the sector occupied by the 61 Division. The ‘salient’ opposite the junction of the 61 Division and the 5 Australian Division, the Sugar Loaf Salient, and the adjacent area certainly had the potential to create considerable difficulties for the attacking troops – so much so that a detailed description9 was made by Capt S.B. Pope (II Anzac Corps) in preparation for Haking’s attack. The issue of the width of No Man’s Land was recalled by ‘Pompey’ Elliott in 1926 when he wrote to Charles Bean, commenting most favourably on Bean’s draft chapter on the attack at Fromelles and in particular the part played by 15 Brigade. Elliott referred to a booklet prepared by the French staff and issued to AIF officers on arrival in France and Flanders, summarising their experiences of trench warfare to date. According to Elliott, ‘one of the axioms… was that such an attack could not possibly succeed if the enemy’s front trench was distant more than 200 yards from the “hop off”’. He continues by saying that this principle had occurred to him too, but that owing to his ‘loyalty to the higher command… I had to carefully conceal my feelings and even my thoughts on the subject’.10 However, the width of No Man’s Land to be crossed by the infantry emphasised the utmost importance of a satisfactory artillery bombardment in order to minimise the dire effect of well-placed German machine guns. Secondly, a salutary lesson had been learned from the bloody experience of British battalions on 1 July 1916 on the Somme, when the interval between the bombardment ceasing and the arrival of British troops on the German wire had been sufficient for German troops to leave the sanctuary of their dugouts and man their parapets with devastating effect. To overcome this severe threat to success, Haking impressed three things on the officers present at the 16 July conference:11

1. To keep the artillery fire on the wire and parapets of the enemy and not over them. The zone of attack was narrow in depth and with the ammunition available the artillery should be able to reduce the defenders to a state of collapse before the infantry assault took place.

2. The assaulting infantry, both the charging line and the support line, to be deployed in No Man’s Land in time to rush forward at the exact moment fixed for the assault.

3. The vast importance of impressing on the men that they must rush forward together immediately the officers gave the signal.