Frontline Afghanistan E-Book

Mike Ryan

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 217

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Beschreibung

In the nine years since the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan has rarely been out of the news. Over a thousand coalition military fatalities have been reported, and many times that number of Afghan civilians. The country is in the process of rebuilding, and yet the fighting continues. Following the success of his previous book, Battlefield Afghanistan, Mike Ryan looks at the state of this war-ravaged nation as Barack Obama finally decides to escalate America's military presence. He considers the current role of coalition troops and the progress being made, or not being made – more than 100 British troops died in Afghanistan in 2009, the highest death toll for any year since the mission began in October 2001 – things are getting worse, not better. The author has unrivalled access not only to commanding officers, but also to the 'boots on the ground'. With more than 200 colour photographs and analysis of the situation from those actually doing the fighting, Frontline Afghanistan may help the reader to make up his or her mind about the legitimacy of the conflict and the possible way forward.

Leseprobe

FRONTLINEAFGHANISTAN

FRONTLINEAFGHANISTAN

THE DEVIL’S PLAYGROUND

MIKE RYAN

This book is dedicated to all the brave men and women of our armed forces and those of our NATO allies, as they battle for the freedom and liberty of the Afghan people in order to release both them and us from the bloody threat of terrorism.

First published 2010 by Spellmount

Spellmount is an imprint ofThe History PressThe Mill, Brimscombe PortStroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved© Mike Ryan, 2010, 2013

The right of Mike Ryan to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUBISBN 978 0 7509 5264 4

Original typesetting by The History Press

CONTENTS

Author’s Appeal

Acknowledgements

Author’s Note

Introduction

I

The Crucible of Terrorism

II

Wild Frontiers

III

Learning From the Bears

IV

Dodging the Golden BB

V

Bullet Magnets

VI

The Reapers

VII

The Golden Hour

VIII

The Devil’s Playground

IX

Combat Sitrep

X

Final Thoughts

XI

The Fallen

Military Fatalities by Country

Abbreviations

Afterword by Myrdal Mya

AUTHOR’S APPEAL

At the time of writing this book British casualties in Afghanistan are running at almost one a day, and like many statistics this does not tell the full story, nor indeed show the tragedy that is behind each and every fatality or injury. Those with superficial wounds are often back in action within days of being injured, for others that is sadly not the case. I am of course referring to all those who have been seriously wounded and whose injuries are so severe that they will not return to normal life quickly – if at all.

Their plight is particularly hard to come to terms with, as by nature they are young and fit individuals who were, prior to being wounded, physically and mentally ready for almost anything. They are as you can imagine extremely brave people, whose only wish is to put their lives back together so that they can go on living a useful and fulfilling life without being a burden on society. And they need our help to do this.

Whilst our medical and rehabilitation care is truly excellent, it is what happens beyond this stage of recovery that needs more support – and this is where you can help.

The following charities and organisations do fantastic work with our service personnel and their families, and I am sure that they would be extremely grateful for any help or donation that you can give.

www.helpforheroes.org.uk

www.ssafa.org.uk

www.armybenfund.org

www.blesma.org

Thank you for your kindness.

Mike Ryan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following individuals, organisations and companies for their kind help in supporting me with the research and production of this book. Shaun Barrington of The History Press for his enthusiasm and support, Peter Robinson MA, John Ryan, Jackhammer, RMAS, BCMH, UK MoD, US DoD, Australian DoD, Canadian DoD, Avpro Aerospace and all the soldiers and aircrew who kindly donated their time to tell their stories.

Also special thanks to my good friend Myrdal Mya for his thoughts on Afghanistan’s future. Thanks also to my wife Fiona, and children, Isabella, Angelina and Jamie for their patience and understanding during my various times away from home interviewing and researching.

Author’s Note

Please note for operational security (OPSEC) reasons, certain tactical, technical and operational procedural details have either been changed or omitted in order to protect the security and welfare of both our armed forces and those of our allies operating in Afghanistan, as military operations in this region of the world are likely to be ongoing for many years to come.

INTRODUCTION

Four years ago, I wrote a book called Battlefield Afghanistan. It was at the time of its publication the only book on the market that told the real story of what was going in that troubled country at the height of the bloody summer of 2006, as British soldiers fought contact after contact against their tenacious enemy, the Taliban. Why this should have been the case is puzzling as there were certainly enough journalists and commentators to tell the story, and yet they did not. Perhaps the lure of covering the war in Iraq was stronger; or could it have been that the war had been so played down that most thought we had won it and everyone had gone home?

I too would have been lulled into a false sense of what was happening in Afghanistan were it not for one thing. I knew many soldiers who were serving out there, and their harrowing accounts made me realise that all was not well and that there was a story to be told. I of course was not alone in these sentiments, as a number of senior officers in the British Army also felt that the real story of what was going on in Afghanistan needed to be told, and told quickly as the situation in some areas of the British controlled AOP (area of operations) was nearing meltdown.

When writing Battlefield Afghanistan, I decided from the outset not just to cover the war stories, as I anticipated many books appearing eventually that would either cover major military operations in some detail or alternatively the actions of specific units involved in them. Instead, I decided to make my book more of a tactical guide – aimed in part at soldiers about to go out on operations in Afghanistan who prior to their deployment knew either little or nothing about the long and complicated history of the country they were about to fight in.

You would have thought that their pre-deployment work-up training would have given them the information that they needed, but that was not always the case. At the present time, there are a number of NATO forces that have that book on reading lists for all soldiers before they deploy. As flattering as all of this is to me, the story in Afghanistan has of course moved on, and with very tragic consequences – as the casualty rate in Afghanistan is now higher than that experienced at the height of Operation Telic in Iraq. 37 British troops were KIA during the 2009 summer Parliamentary recess alone.

I sadly anticipated that this would eventually be the case, and predicted it in my conclusion. Afghanistan today has effectively become the Devil’s Playground, a place where conflict has no apparent end and where there are no visible signs of change to justify us pursuing the current strategy – it is not working, and is indeed tearing our NATO forces apart as they continually debate the best way forward.

For some military commanders, the situation has become intolerable as they feel they are fighting not just the Taliban, but their own political masters as well – as they plead their respective cases for more manpower and equipment to help in either the pacification or destruction of the enemy. Three years on, the Taliban now occupy more Afghan territory than they did in 2006, have more fighters – and more alarmingly – they seem to be gaining the upper hand in the psychological element of the conflict: the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. A key critical requirement.

There is also the matter of the equipment we field in Afghanistan. Have we got the right force balance, or is it overkill? Are we deploying unsuitable vehicles and weapons in our fight against the Taliban, or is it simply that the environment is just too demanding for them?

Perhaps we need to revisit previous conflicts and examine them like never before to see what lessons we could learn – and how they could be implemented in our Afghan master plan – to bring about a decisive outcome. Could it be that a previous strategy used elsewhere is our solution to this conflict? Sorting out Afghanistan’s long list of issues – not to mention defeating the Taliban – is going to be a monumental task. Assuming that we can bring about such a miracle, will that be the end of the War on Terror? Sadly I fear not – as Yemen is already being viewed as Al-Qaeda’s new Murder Inc HQ and no doubt, at some point in the future we are going to have to cross swords in this land also – whether we like it or not.

But before we get ahead of ourselves, we need to look at how the West and Pakistan are going to go about defeating Al-Qaeda’s praetorian guard, the Taliban – the new masters of guerrilla warfare – who now reside in their own self-created Islamic Republic in Waziristan, Pakistan’s own backyard. What do our Pakistani allies feel about this situation, and the long term implications for them? More importantly, what are they going to do about it? I hope there are some answers in The Devil’s Playground.

Within NATO itself, the jury is well and truly out as to what is the best strategy to pursue in Afghanistan against the Taliban. However, the thoughts of each member of the ISAF Alliance are fairly academic: the US calls the shots in this war. But the Americans themselves are divided in their opinion as to what direction to take.

On one side is General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of International Forces in Afghanistan advocating a surge of 45,000 troops into the conflict as a means of dominating and shaping the ground in NATO’s favour, a tactic previously used successfully in Iraq by General Petraeus as a means of suffocating the insurgency that was causing so much loss of life prior to its implementation.

On the other hand, in the White House there are those who want a more ‘detached’ conflict, with more use of unmanned aircraft and special forces and a vastly reduced direct role for ISAF. Meaning the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) would have to step up to the plate like never before. The man who has the unenviable job of ultimately deciding what strategy to follow is of course Barack Obama. And as if the military conundrum isn’t already complicated enough, he also has to factor in the concerns raised by the fraudulent 2009 Afghan Presidential elections.

I

THE CRUCIBLE OF TERRORISM

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown described Afghanistan while on a visit there in April 2009, as ‘a crucible for terrorism’ responsible for fostering up to three-quarters of terror plots faced by the UK. It is a statistic that he and his Cabinet often repeat. This was his first return visit to Afghanistan following a decision to send more British troops into the country after the NATO summit held the previous month. His thoughts echoed those of Obama, who also viewed the Afghanistan–Pakistan border as central to future operations in the region.

There is however one key difference. Gordon Brown is pretty sold on the idea that the British are in this for the long haul, whereas President Obama – well, he’s not so sure. The US Congress are starting to feel this. As one recently said ‘George Bush fought the wrong war, whereas Barack Obama won’t fight the right war.’ He meant that Obama would not commit the requisite military resources and assets needed in Afghanistan to prevail. For America’s staunchest ally – Britain – this is concerning as we are the second biggest military player in Afghanistan at this time. Why President Obama is holding back is obviously the subject of much conjecture. However one thing that we can be sure of is that his confidence in the Afghan government is absolutely at rock bottom – so things can only go up.

As for the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown really has to fight the good fight, as the UK now has more Al-Qaeda activists and supporters living within the country than there are in the United States and indeed in the whole of Europe. The only way out is to defeat the Al-Qaeda ideology and everything it stands for. Britain is not alone in this situation either, as Pakistan has more Al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters living in and operating from its backyard than anyone. Hence the importance of Mr Brown’s 2009 visit.

Meeting Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari he said ‘There is a crucible of terrorism in the mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our approach to those countries is different but must be complementary.

Our strategy for dealing with this breeding ground of terrorism will mean more security on the streets of Britain.’ He also told the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai while on the same tour: ‘I come here as a friend of Afghanistan, wanting to continue to work with you in the best ways we can to strengthen the democracy of Afghanistan, to give support to the Afghan people, social, economic and political … help for the future and to join the work of eradicating terrorism from this area and, of course, from the borders of Pakistan as well.’ His whirlwind tour was designed to reaffirm the UK’s commitment to Afghanistan – following his announcement that an additional 900 extra troops along with £15m of aid was being provided as a means of supporting the 2009 Afghan elections. Had he known the disastrous outcome of these elections in advance, he may well have thought twice about this aid.

While on his visit he confirmed that the UK’s £655m four-year aid package to Pakistan was being adjusted – with half of this vast sum being sent to support the country’s troubled northern provinces – those areas often seen as the Taliban’s main base of operations. He also expressed a desire to see more police being recruited in Afghanistan as their numbers are not enough to support the Afghan National Army, which itself is expanding from 75,000 to 134,000 personnel in the not too distant future. That makes it bigger than the British Army. Mr Brown continued:

There is a chain of terrorism that goes from here round to the streets of Britain. That’s why it’s absolutely important that, while we have made progress on Afghan elections, democratic government, 6 million children in education, hospitals as well as roads and infrastructure for the people of Afghanistan, that we defeat international terrorism and hold it back from here in Lashkar Gar, here in Helmand province, but also on the other side of the border in Pakistan. I think it is right that we support an exercise by more than 40 countries who maintain democracy in Afghanistan against the Taliban and against the possibility of Al-Qaeda. I think it is very important that we work with the Pakistan government in countering terrorism.

We know that three-quarters of the terrorist activities that happen in Britain arise from the areas around here. Therefore, the safety of people on the streets of Britain is immediately being safeguarded by the action being taken here.

This we should remember was one of the most important periods in Afghan history prior to their flawed elections – as all sides wanted to reaffirm their position, expectations and commitment to the country’s future.

There were however a number of issues that needed ironing out, one of the most controversial arising out of the introduction of Sharia family law in Afghanistan – which would have legalised rape within marriage. President Karzai, realising how sensitive this issue was, agreed to a review: ‘I assure you that the law in Afghanistan will be completely in harmony with the constitution of Afghanistan and the human rights that we have (in our constitution) and with the principle of international treaties. I can tell you with confidence that the law is under review. Amendments will take place.’ Ironically no sooner had he made this statement, it was discovered that there was another Afghan law that permitted the starvation of wives, if they refused their husbands sex. At this present time this law is also under review.

Gordon Brown at the start of his meeting with the Afghan president made a formal apology for the distress caused by civilian casualties. Speaking of this, he said ‘Every life lost is a tragedy. Every civilian life lost is one too many. We are committed to avoiding civilian casualties by ensuring that our troops are trained and equipped.’ He was of course referring to the unacceptable civilian casualties that had resulted from either poor targeting procedures or the over-reliance on air assets such as UAVs, perhaps over-used as a means of taking the fight to the Taliban, rather than engaging them with ground forces. Recently it was claimed in the United States that since 2006, only 14 mid level Al-Qaeda commanders have been killed by the many thousands of UAVs and armed drones that roam Afghanistan’s skies every year – while at the same time they have allegedly killed according to Afghan sources some 700 civilians. That’s a hit rate of 2 per cent on 98 per cent collateral. The US Department of Defense, however, utterly refutes these figures.

One thing nobody disputes is the fact that innocent civilians are being killed – and that must stop. In fairness to the British soldiers deployed in Helmand, they had at the time of Brown’s speech already made a conscious effort to minimise their use of close air support – whereas with the US forces it was still very much a case of achieving objectives by overwhelming use of firepower. This of course at times led to a degree of resentment and frustration with the US policy, as British lives were being put on the line as a matter of routine so as to minimise Afghan casualties – whereas for Uncle Sam it was very much business as usual. The restraint of air power use by the British over a period of time led to Afghan confidence in them growing – as they could clearly see that they were deliberately putting their own soldiers’ lives at greater risk.

Just as everyone felt that we were turning a corner in winning over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, someone would drop a bomb carelessly, causing civilian casualties – and all that hard work would have been for nothing. The US have now accepted that much more effort must be put into avoiding civilian casualties – as every family that suffers a loss provides potential recruits for the Taliban. The Taliban are also exploiting Afghanistan’s weak government and are making much mileage from the issue. Even President Karzai admitted that his government was weak:

The Afghan government does not have the abilities that other governments have. Had we been a fully capable state with the means and tools of governance in our hands, the troops of the rest of the world would not be here. You would not have given us the billions of dollars that you given us.

He is of course right about this, but the Afghan government really only have themselves to blame, as they have made little effort to sort out corruption and fraud within their ranks.

The greatest example of corruption currently being touted around Afghanistan at the time of writing (aside from those identified during the summer elections) concerns President Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, whose name has constantly been linked to drug trafficking. And yet the President and his western backers seemingly do nothing to address the problem. It would seem that part of the reason why a blind eye has been turned to some of his alleged activities is that Ahmed Karzai has been on the payroll of the CIA’s SOG (Special Operations Group) for some eight years – giving him a lifetime get-out-of-jail card for services rendered. His role apparently has been to recruit a paramilitary force that operates in conjunction with the CIA in and around the Kandahar area. Known as the Kandahar Strike Force, this unit ironically operates out of the former home of the Taliban’s founder, Mohammed Omar – which really must wind up the local branch of the Taliban. Maybe that’s the idea! When a member of the CIA was asked recently to comment upon Ahmed Karzai’s activities with them he said ‘Virtually every significant Afghan figure has had brushes with the drug trade … If you are looking for Mother Teresa she doesn’t live in Afghanistan.’ Nor it seems does Mr Osama Bin Laden – Al Qaeda’s leader.

Such situations of course illustrate just how complex and difficult everything is in Afghanistan in terms of getting anything done – there always seems to be a price for it one way or another. This of course does not make life easy for NATO and its soldiers as they go about their daily business of trying to bring stability to Afghanistan, often in the face of corruption that is beyond their control. NATO operates on a four-point doctrine that was launched in 2007 consisting of ‘Afghan-isation’, localisation, civilianisation, and reconciliation. All very interesting, but until the Taliban is defeated in Afghanistan, nothing major in the way of reconstruction, civilianisation or reconciliation is going to happen. Period. And the idea that we are going to see a democracy in Afghanistan that mirrors ours in the west any time soon is risible.

The buzz word at this present time in Afghanistan is reconstruction – via our PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams). All very laudable, but how can our military support local civilians in their efforts to stop growing opium poppy when it pays so well compared to what we have to offer as an alternative? The reconstruction of Afghanistan is of course highly important – as the West wants to show both the Afghans and indeed itself that tangible progress is being made. But in the current high threat environment that passes for daily life in Afghanistan this is extremely difficult. How can you possibly have workers trying to build new schools and hospitals when they are being either murdered or intimidated on a daily basis because there is no guaranteed regular protection for them – either from foreigners or their fellow countrymen in the Afghan Police and Army? Until there is, we cannot expect to see all Afghans displaying unflinching loyalty to the outsiders – and when deep down they are wondering how long will it be before they all walk – leaving them to a fate that doesn’t really bear thinking about. This Afghan uncertainty has two main sources.

Firstly, there are a number of NATO members operating in Afghanistan at present that are seriously looking at withdrawing their forces from direct combat operations. They no longer wish their forces to be exposed to danger for a cause that, although not hopeless, seems to show no sign of improving in the short term. Secondly, there are simply not enough NATO boots on the ground to dominate and until there are, NATO cannot shape the battlefield that is Afghanistan in its favour. The Afghans see this all the time, when our forces are in their village one day promising them the earth, while the next day it’s the Taliban giving them a gypsies’ warning as to the consequences of cooperating with the infidel. Indeed compared to 2002, they now hold less ground than the Taliban, who have more influence over the Afghan people in certain areas – and NATO is taking far more casualties than it did back then. So what has gone wrong?

In my opinion NATO took its eyes off the ball in Afghanistan after 2002, and it is only recently that it has started to focus again on what needs to be done to defeat the Taliban once and for all. The people of Afghanistan only understand what they see, and not what is said.

II

WILD FRONTIERS

It is my belief that Afghanistan’s long term peace and prosperity prospects could be substantially improved if the Taliban could be denied permanently the ability to recruit, train and operate freely from their neighbour, Pakistan. In very recent history, such an outcome would have seemed unlikely as Pakistan – the creators of the Taliban – had a vested interest in supporting them. Instability in Afghanistan was clearly seen as being good for Pakistan.

Today however there has been a seismic shift in the attitude of the Pakistani government as they are just as likely to be victims of the Taliban as their Afghan neighbours. Essentially, if you keep wild dogs in your back-yard sooner or later they are going to turn on you. And that is exactly what has happened in Pakistan.

Some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces (PAF) and the ISI operated a relatively open border policy, which allowed the Taliban to go into Afghanistan and carry out hit and run operations against British soldiers in Helmand – the mindset of these misguided individuals being that, if the Taliban had free movement from one area to another they were going to be far less likely to turn on the people offering them a safe haven. How wrong they were. This situation caused immense frustration in the West, and led to pressure being put on Pakistan’s then President, General Pervez Musharaff, to close the border and then take effective action against the Taliban who were hiding out in Waziristan.