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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Ever since the Industrial Revolution energy has been a key driver of world politics. From the oil crises of the 1970s to today's rapid expansion of renewable energy sources, every shift in global energy patterns has important repercussions for international relations. In this new book, Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin Sovacool uncover the intricate ways in which our energy systems have shaped global outcomes in four key areas of world politics: security, the economy, the environment and global justice. Moving beyond the narrow geopolitical focus that has dominated much of the discussion on global energy politics, they also deftly trace the connections between energy, environmental politics, and community activism. The authors argue that we are on the cusp of a global energy shift that promises to be no less transformative for the pursuit of wealth and power in world politics than the historical shifts from wood to coal and from coal to oil. This ongoing energy transformation will not only upend the global balance of power; it could also fundamentally transfer political authority away from the nation state, empowering citizens, regions and local communities. Global Energy Politics will be an essential resource for students of the social sciences grappling with the major energy issues of our times.
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Contents
Cover
Front Matter
Foreword
Preface
About the Authors
1 Introduction: Systems, frames, and transitions
A critical juncture in energy politics
The scope and approach of this book
The science of energy
A systems perspective on energy
Contested frames
Plan of the book
Notes
2 The history and functioning of energy markets
Oil and the internationalization of the energy sector
The incomplete globalization of gas markets
Other fuel markets: Coal and uranium
International trade aspects of renewable energy
Conclusion
Notes
Part I: World politics through an energy prism
3 Energy and security: Fueling geopolitics and war?
Energy statecraft
Resource wars and military conflict
Nuclear proliferation
Geopolitics of the energy transition
Conclusion
Notes
4 Energy and the economy: Powering growth and prosperity?
Energy and the world economy
The energy industry
Oil-exporting countries and the resource curse
Conclusion
Notes
5 Energy and the environment: Wrecking the planet?
The environmental impacts of energy
Are we running out of fossil fuels?
Global climate governance
Conclusion
Notes
6 Energy and justice: Equitable and fair?
Energy deprivation
Energy, democracy, and human rights
Activists, social movements, and fossil fuels
Conclusion
Notes
Part II: Governing the energy transition
7 Energy technologies and innovation
The nature of technological innovation
Demand-side options
Low-carbon energy supply options
Socio-technical barriers to change
Energy transitions and transformations: Fast or slow?
Conclusion
Notes
8 National and regional energy policy
Characterizing national energy governance
Energy policy in selected countries
Conclusion
Notes
9 Global energy governance
The goals of global energy governance
Multilateral energy governance
Transnational energy governance
Conclusion
Notes
10 Conclusions: Contested energy futures
The future politics of energy are interdependent
The future politics of energy are interconnected
The future politics of energy are contested
The future politics of energy are uncertain
Notes
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Figures
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the modern energy system
Figure 1.2 The three-way relationship between energy, international, and domestic politics
Figure 1.3 Anatomy of the global energy system
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 The break-up of Standard Oil and its legacy
Figure 2.2 Global oil prices and major political events, 1970–2017 (in $2017)
Figure 2.3 Oil price volatility and major events, 2000–2019
Figure 2.4 Yearly crude oil production of selected countries (mb/d, 1973–2018)
Figure 2.5 Evolution of international gas trade, 1970–2017
Figure 2.6 Europe’s major gas pipelines ties to Russia
Figure 2.7 World coal consumption, 1965–2018
Figure 2.8 Key players in global coal consumption and production (2017)
Figure 2.9 Regional distribution of nuclear power plants
Figure 2.10 Renewable power generation costs, 2010–2018
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Major maritime oil flows and chokepoints
Figure 3.2 Estimated global nuclear weapons arsenal, 2019
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1 Average technical lifespan of energy-related capital stock
Figure 4.2 Fossil fuel rents as a percentage of GDP (average 2007–2016)
Figure 4.3 The shifting geography of global energy demand
Figure 4.4 Share of fossil fuel imports in all merchandise imports (average 2012–2017)
Figure 4.5 Comparing global subsidies for fossil fuels and renewables
Figure 4.6 Top 15 national oil companies by oil and gas production
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1 CO
2
emissions for selected countries since 1990
Figure 5.2 The Keeling curve
Figure 5.3 Impacts of 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming
Figure 5.4 Trends in US and global oil production
Figure 5.5 How much oil is unburnable in a 2°C scenario before 2050?
Figure 5.6 Share of global CO
2
emissions under binding Kyoto targets
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1 The global scale of energy poverty, 2017
Figure 6.2 The population served by off-grid renewable energy solutions, worldwide
Figure 6.3 Legacies of energy injustice in Azerbaijan and Eastern Europe
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Currently available and state-of-the-art low-carbon energy systems
Figure 7.2 Avoided primary energy demand and carbon emissions from energy efficiency improv…
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 Key goals in global energy governance
Figure 9.2 OPEC’s membership, 2019
Figure 9.3 OPEC’s quotas versus actual production, 1982–2019
Figure 9.4 The IEA’s shrinking share of world energy demand
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1 Primary energy sources and energy carriers
Table 1.2 Frames and worldviews in global energy politics 2.1
Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Major oil reserve holders, producers and exporters (2017)
Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Causal pathways between oil and international conflict
Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Key economic indicators of top 20 oil exporters
Chapter 5
Table 5.1 Selected national targets for the Paris Agreement
Chapter 7
Table 7.1 Attributes of conventional and advanced biofuels
Table 7.2 Commercially available and technically feasible CCS options
Chapter 8
Table 8.1 Energy in ministerial portfolios across selected countries
Table 8.2 Descriptive economic, demographic, and energy statistics for the selected countr…
Chapter 9
Table 9.1 Key institutions in global energy governance
Table 9.2 GECF members and key statistics
Table 9.3 Key energy and climate-related documents adopted by the G20
Chapter 10
Table 10.1 Frames, objective, and visions for global energy politics
List of Boxes
Chapter 2
Box 2.1 What is the difference between LNG, LPG and CNG?
Box 2.2 The controversial technique of shale gas hydraulic “fracking”
Chapter 3
Box 3.1 History of the oil sanctions against Iran
Box 3.2 Natural gas pricing and the Russo–Ukrainian “gas wars”
Chapter 5
Box 5.1 Peak oil demand
Box 5.2 Negative emissions and geoengineering: Viable options?
Chapter 6
Box 6.1 How off-grid renewable energy solutions empower the poor
Chapter 8
Box 8.1 The European Emissions Trading System
Chapter 9
Box 9.1 Text of Sustainable Development Goal number 7
Guide
Cover
Contents
Begin Reading
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Global Energy Politics
Thijs Van de GraafBenjamin K. Sovacool
polity
Copyright © Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin K. Sovacool 2020
The right of Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin K. Sovacool to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2020 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3051-9
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Graaf,Thijs van de, author. | Sovacool, Benjamin K., author.Title: Global energy politics / Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin K. Sovacool.Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Van De Graaf and Sovacool uncover the intricate ways in which our energy systems have shaped global outcomes in areas of world politics”-- Provided by publisher.Identifiers: LCCN 2019038076 (print) | LCCN 2019038077 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509530489 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509530496 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509530519 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Energy policy. | Energy development--Political aspects. | Energy conservation--Political aspects. | Energy industries--Political aspects.Classification: LCC HD9502.A2 G678 2020 (print) | LCC HD9502.A2 (ebook) | DDC 333.79--dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019038076LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019038077
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Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Foreword
We are living in an age of unprecedented global change, which is affecting all facets of our societies. Digital technologies are disrupting existing economic and social structures, established political and trade systems are under pressure, and extreme weather conditions are a regular reminder of the perils of climate change for our planet.
Similar forces are also reshaping the energy sector. As Director-General of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) from 2011 to 2019, I have had the privilege to witness first-hand this ongoing energy transformation. In less than a decade, renewable energy has moved from the fringes to the center stage of the global energy landscape, thanks to supportive policy frameworks, technological innovation, and rapidly decreasing costs. In 2018, a recordbreaking 171 GW of renewable energy capacity were added globally, led by emerging and developing economies, making it the seventh consecutive year in which additional power generation capacity from renewables outpaced conventional sources. A third of global power capacity is now based on renewables.
Few would have envisioned such remarkable progress just some years ago. We are truly in the midst of revolutionary transformations in our global energy system. The change is driven by the compelling business case for renewables. According to IRENA’s analysis, in 2020, all currently available mainstream renewable energy technologies will be cost-competitive with fossil fuels in most parts of the world. This is a momentous change, especially if you consider that countries taking full advantage of their renewables’ potential will also benefit from a host of socioeconomic benefits, including lower carbon emissions, cleaner air, and more sustainable job growth.
Renewable energy deployment needs to grow even faster, however, to ensure that we can achieve the global climate objectives and the Sustainable Development Goals. The latest special report of the International Panel on Climate Change on Global Warming of 1.5°C has shown that half a degree makes a world of difference and that there is really only one temperature goal toward which we should orient ourselves. Exceeding the ceiling of 1.5°C would lead to intolerable loss of biodiversity, destruction of infrastructure, and many more people exposed to life-threatening conditions such as extreme heat. IRENA’s analysis has shown that renewables and energy efficiency combined provide the most cost-effective pathway to achieve 90% of energy-related reductions required to meet the well below 2°C objective of the Paris Agreement.
As someone who comes from a developing country, Kenya, the plight of energy poverty, which affects billions of people, is very dear to my heart. I believe that the energy transformation offers an opportunity to shift the global development paradigm from one of scarcity, inequality, and competition to one of shared prosperity – in our lifetimes. That is an opportunity we must rally behind by adopting strong policies, mobilizing capital, and driving innovation across the energy system.
In my capacity as head of IRENA, it became clear to me that the energy transformation involves more than the transition from one energy source to another. It also entails the transformation of the geopolitical landscape with profound implications for societies and economies. It is about giving jobs to the millions of young people in emerging and developing economies, generating prosperity at large in an age of austerity, and the reconfiguration of international relations. That is why, in 2018, I took the initiative to set up the Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation as an independent body to look further into the wider ramifications of the energy shift for global wealth and stability.
Its final report, which was presented to IRENA’s 160 member states at the General Assembly in January 2019, is a first foray to chart the new geopolitical world emerging from the energy transformation driven by renewables. It lays out how the energy transformation will reshape relations between states and will change the global distribution of power. As countries increasingly develop renewables at home and integrate their grids with those of neighboring countries, they will achieve greater energy independence. Fossil-fuel importing countries will improve their trade balance and enjoy significant macroeconomic benefits. Countries that lead in clean technology innovation stand to gain from the global energy transformation. There will be a diffusion of power and new actors will become more prominent. As renewables decentralize and democratize energy systems, citizens, cities, and regions will become increasingly important players in the new energy landscape.
Certainly, the energy transformation brings new risks related to cybersecurity, new dependencies on critical materials, and socio-economic dislocation in certain countries and sectors. The energy transition might be more of a bumpy ride than a smooth sailing. But, as the report found, overall the benefits of the energy transformation will outweigh the challenges, provided that the right policies and strategies are developed to mitigate the risks. This applies particularly to fossil-fuel exporters. The need for them to diversify their economy offers a huge opportunity to enhance long-term growth, create new jobs, and bring about a more productive future.
In a complex and rapidly changing energy landscape, a comprehensive overview of the global politics of energy such as this one is particularly welcome. I am delighted to recommend this insightful book by Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin Sovacool, who skillfully connect the dots between energy markets, geopolitics, the environment, and local activism across a range of energy technologies and sectors. For anyone who wants to understand the complexities and depth of the global energy challenge, Global Energy Politics is essential reading.
Adnan Z. Amin, former Director-General of the InternationalRenewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
Preface
As we are finishing this book manuscript, in the summer of 2019, energy and climate issues are again capturing global headlines. Oil tankers are being seized in the Strait of Hormuz, where tensions have been rising since the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran. A heatwave that shattered records in Europe moved to Greenland, where it triggered massive ice melt as well as forest fires. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the UK is reported to generate more electricity from zero-carbon sources than from fossil fuels. The Welsh and UK Parliaments also declared a “climate emergency” over the summer. The United States Congress is taking steps to adopt a Bill that sanctions companies that help to build new gas pipelines from Russia to Europe. These few examples show how the energy and climate conundrum is one of the key undercurrents of world politics in the twenty-first century.
This book aims to introduce readers to the global politics of energy, at a time of momentous changes in both the energy system and global geopolitics. Before embarking on our journey, we would like to thank a number of people. At Polity, we are grateful for the trust and support of Louise Knight, Inès Boxman, and Sophie Wright. We thank Mathieu Blondeel and Moniek de Jong for their assistance with several sections and graphs, as well as Kingsmill Bond for commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript. Both of the authors thank their wonderful families for their continued support, and incredible patience. Last but not least, Thijs Van de Graaf wishes to commend the past and present students that follow his course ‘Global Energy Politics’. These students’ curiosity, questions and critical reflections have made enormous contributions to his thinking on the subject, and have helped to shape this book from its early conception to its final form.
Thijs Van de Graaf & Benjamin K. Sovacool August 2019
About the Authors
Thijs Van de Graaf is Associate Professor of International Politics at Ghent University, Belgium. He is also a non-resident fellow with the Payne Institute, Colorado School of Mines, and with the Initiative for Sustainable Energy Policy (ISEP) at Johns Hopkins University. He was the lead drafter of the report ‘A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation’ (2019), commissioned by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). His recent books include The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy (Palgrave, 2016), The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance (Palgrave, 2013), and Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar World (Ashgate/Routledge, 2010).
Benjamin K. Sovacool is Professor of Energy Policy at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex Business School, United Kingdom. He is also Director of the Center for Energy Technologies and Professor of Business and Social Sciences in the Department of Business Development and Technology at Aarhus University, Denmark. He is a Lead Author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), due to be published in 2022, and an Advisor on Energy to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation in Brussels, Belgium. With much coverage of his work in the international news media, he is one of the most highly cited global researchers on issues bearing on controversies in energy and climate policy.
1Introduction: Systems, frames, and transitions
Energy is central to almost all areas of modern human activity. The computer on which we are typing this text, the smartphone in your pocket, and the heating in your home all depend on the availability of sufficient and affordable supplies of energy.1 Access to energy services is often taken for granted in affluent countries. Yet, almost a billion people in the world do not have access to electricity in their homes, while many more suffer from supply that is of poor quality.2 These people experience on a daily basis what it means to have no or insufficient access to mobility, lighting, refrigeration, or telecommunication. In very simple terms, many of these people have never watched a television show, let alone streamed Netflix; they have never had a hot shower, let alone stayed in a modern hotel; they may never have had a cold beer, let alone refrigeration for vaccines. Moreover, energy is the single largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, resulting in climate change that, if left unchecked, could devastate our planet.
Energy does not just affect our personal daily lives and our natural ecosystems. It also profoundly shapes our wider societies, economies, and politics – and it has done so throughout history, from pre-agricultural foraging societies through today’s fossil fuel-driven civilization.3 Few people realize the extent to which the wealth of nations, the fate of political leaders, and international relations more broadly are shaped by the way we produce and consume energy. Energy is not just another commodity: it is a strategic good for the survival of regimes, a critical input factor for the world economy that can shift large swaths of wealth around, a massive source of pollution, and a major cause of social goods and evils. These attributes make energy a key driver of the pursuit of wealth and power in world politics.
The upshot is that energy questions are deeply political and yield distributional consequences. They create winners and losers. That is why the global energy challenge of ensuring secure, sustainable and affordable access to energy for all is not susceptible to resolution by the “hard” or “objective” disciplines of physics, mathematics, economics, and engineering. Such an approach fails to grasp the political stakes and tradeoffs involved in energy trade and decision-making, from the global all the way to the local and even individual level. Energy discussions are often reduced to technical issues and matters of cost but, at their core, they involve political and moral choices about the kind of society we want to live in.
Even so, scholars of international relations (IR) and social scientists more generally have long overlooked energy issues.4 To the extent that global energy politics is addressed at all by IR scholars, it is mostly framed through geopolitical lenses, and it focuses almost exclusively on oil and gas.5 The concept of “energy security,” in particular, has become something of a cottage industry, spawning a voluminous body of work.6 Recently, a small number of studies have sought to counter this security focus by adopting perspectives rooted in public policy,7 governance,8 and international political economy.9 Unfortunately, however, there has been little effort to integrate these various dimensions into a single framework.
The goal of this book is to provide an overview of the main concepts and approaches in the study of “global energy politics,” which we define as the struggle over who gets what, when, and how in energy use and production from an international perspective. The book introduces a novel framework to interpret global energy politics, based on a socio-technical system approach and contested frames. Socio-technical systems refers to a broad conceptualization of the infrastructures in place to deliver energy services, not just as the resources and technologies themselves, but also as a set of user practices, cultural meanings, institutions, and supply networks. It goes much beyond narrow views of energy security as the secure supplies of oil and natural gas, and it illustrates how the politics of coal is different than that of oil or renewable energy. Contested frames refers to different stakeholder views surrounding different energy systems: neo-mercantilism, market liberalism, environmentalism, and egalitarianism. Each reflects different ideologies, world views, value-systems, and hard-nosed interests.
Key questions that we will address include: How can we ensure that all people have reliable and affordable access to sufficient energy for their needs? When and how will states cooperate to mitigate energy-related emissions of greenhouse gases? In what ways can energy be used as a foreign policy tool to coerce other countries? What does it mean to make a “just transition” to low-carbon energy sources and how could it affect energy democracy and local politics?
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the modern energy system
Source: Compiled with data from Smil, V. (2017) Energy Transitions: Global andNational Perspectives. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, Appendix A.
A critical juncture in energy politics
The story of the modern energy system over the past two centuries is primarily one of rapidly increasing use of fossil fuels – that is, oil, coal, and natural gas (see figure 1.1). During the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, coal gradually replaced wood and biomass. Coal was itself overtaken by oil after World War II as the world’s dominant energy source. Natural gas use has also increased globally, but as of now, oil still reigns supreme. Fossil fuels today still supply around 80 percent of worldwide primary energy consumption. Renewables are among the fastest-growing energy sources in recent years, but since they start from a very low base, it takes considerable time for them to make a mark on the global energy mix. It is well worth noting that the energy shifts in figure 1.1 represent energy additions rather than energy transitions. For example, even if coal has lost market share relative to oil and gas in the latter half of the twentieth century, it has still continued to grow in absolute terms.10
The fossil fuel era has produced great wealth as well as advancements in convenience, comfort, and cleanliness.11 It has sustained a sevenfold increase in population growth – to more than 7 billion people – and a seventyfold increase in global production over the last 200 years. By this measure, the “average” inhabitant of planet earth is today more than 11 times better off than in 1820.12 Exploiting fossil fuels has set off an energy bonanza, transforming human societies and cultural values, making them in a way more democratic and less violent.13 These trends – energy consumption, population growth, increase in wealth, and others – accelerated after World War II.14 Today, we are also witnessing the growing imprint of this “great acceleration” on our environment, and the possibility that our economy is transgressing the “planetary boundaries” that provide a “safe operating space for humanity,” threatening the functioning of ecosystems and triggering destructive climate change.15
Fossil fuels have several advantages which make them attractive energy sources: they have high energy densities (particularly oil), are easy to store and transport (particularly coal and oil), and they are versatile in their applications (natural gas, for instance, is used for cooking, heating, power generation, mobility, and as a chemical feedstock). They are also relatively cheap, but often that is because their full environmental and health impacts are not well reflected in their price. Fossil fuels are not just polluting, they are also stored in finite reserves that are geographically concentrated, raising energy security concerns for countries that rely on imports.
Today, we are on the cusp of four major transformations in global energy politics, transformations that will not just disrupt the way we produce and consume energy, but will also likely transform our economies, societies, and political systems along the way. The aftershocks of these energy transformations will be felt in corporate boardrooms, political cabinets, and individual households. These changes have important implications for how we study and define the global politics of energy. For decades, global energy politics has been synonymous with the struggle for oil, the power game between oil-rich countries, private oil companies, and Western consumer countries. Such a narrow focus is no longer tenable in light of the four tectonic shifts that are afoot in the global energy system.
First, climate change, if unfettered, is posing an existential threat to life as we know it on our planet. Numerous reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have demonstrated the urgent need to decarbonize the global economy, and they have become more alarming about the calamitous consequences for our ecosystems if we fail to heed its warnings. Climate change is blamed on many human activities, including agriculture and deforestation (which is called “land-use change” in IPCC speak), but by far the main culprit is our massive burning of fossil fuels. Fossil fuels account for 80 percent of worldwide primary energy but they also account for around 80 percent of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and the energy sector is also a key source of other greenhouse gases such as methane (CH4). So, to fix climate change we need to change the way we produce and consume energy. Climate change is mostly an energy problem.
Second, the rise of China has sent shockwaves through world energy markets. The sheer size of China’s energy demand, and its key position in global value chains of critical energy resources and technologies, have made the country a category in its own right. It is by far the world’s largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas emitter, and it has also emerged as the biggest producer of renewable technologies such as solar panels and electric vehicles. Depending on which statistics you rely on, China is the world’s largest energy consumer, the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, fifth largest producer of oil, seventh largest producer of natural gas, and the largest miner of coal.16 Over the past five years, over 65 million new jobs were created in the Chinese economy.17 The country now leads the world in markets for automobiles, steel, cement, glass, housing, power plants, renewable energy, highways, rail systems, and airports.18 The future of our energy system therefore hinges to a large extent on decisions made in Beijing. China sets the shape of the market. China represents a larger category of populous, emerging economies like India, Brazil, and Indonesia, who are becoming important engines of global energy demand growth. It is clear that, like in the world economy in general, the center of gravity in global energy politics is shifting from West to East.
Third, we are on the verge of a major transition to renewable energy, thanks to technological advances and dramatic falls in cost. The rapid growth of solar and wind power, in particular, over the past decade has surprised even the most optimistic industry players and observers. The shift from fossil fuels to renewables is not just a shift from one fuel to another, as there are important differences between the two. While fossil fuels are geographically concentrated stocks of energy, renewable energy sources like wind, water, and sun are ubiquitous flows of energy; they are available in one form or another in most countries and they cannot be exhausted. Moreover, renewables can be deployed at almost any scale and lend themselves better to decentralized forms of energy production and consumption. Modern renewables, finally, have nearly zero marginal costs, and some of them, like solar and wind, enjoy cost reductions of more than 20 percent for every doubling of capacity.19 The shift to renewables thus involves a deep transformation of energy systems which is likely to affect global trade patterns, blur the distinction between producers and consumers, and create new patterns of political authority along the decentralized deployment of renewable technologies.
Fourth, the low-carbon transition will have to happen simultaneously to a major push to eradicate energy poverty. Large parts of the world’s population, notably in Africa and India, still do not have access to electricity or clean cooking facilities. Bringing energy services to billions of households and companies in the developing world is a moral imperative that is often overlooked in standard accounts of global energy security. It is embodied in universal energy access via initiatives such as Sustainable Energy for All and the Sustainable Development Goal 7.
The scope and approach of this book
Against the backdrop of these tectonic shifts and looming challenges in the global energy system, our goal is to engage a three-way relationship between: (1) the world energy system, characterized by the four major transformations outlined above; (2) relations between countries; and (3) domestic energy politics and governance (see figure 1.2). We will thus examine how shifting patterns of energy consumption and production affect relations between countries and domestic politics in energy-producing and -consuming countries, but also explore how domestic energy politics affects relations between countries and how both international relations (IR) concerns and domestic energy politics are shaping energy production and consumption patterns.
As previously indicated, IR scholars have long overlooked energy issues. The oil crises of the 1970s generated some attention to the issue of oil security and energy markets, and the recent turmoil in global oil markets revived that attention. However, there is a more troubling void in terms of analytical frameworks to analyze global energy politics. Much of the extant writings on energy from an IR perspective have adopted a narrow geopolitical lens that corresponds largely to realist and neo-realist thinking. They focus mostly on oil and gas, and regard these fuels as a currency for power or a source of vulnerability. States and their national energy companies are seen as the most pivotal players and international energy transactions are portrayed as zero-sum exchanges.
Figure 1.2 The three-way relationship between energy, international, and domestic politics
Source: Authors.
Our analytical approach differs from that mainstream view in two ways. First, rather than limiting ourselves to the supply of just oil and gas, we adopt a much broader, socio-technical systems perspective on energy. The energy system, in our conceptualization, comprises not just the supply infrastructure, but also the demand infrastructure and the social contexts in which these supply and demand infrastructures are embedded. We focus not just on oil and gas, or even primary resources, but also on prime movers (e.g., household appliances, cars), the built environment (e.g., insulation of buildings), and the political and cultural elements that shape our energy behavior. This constellation of energy systems is what makes “energy” distinct from other political spheres (e.g., “global food politics” or “international relations” in general). It even makes it “unique” compared to other pressing global governance challenges such as health or trade.20
Second, we argue that this energy system, broadly conceived, can be seen through four archetypical frames. Each frame – a guiding worldview – comes with a different problem definition, diagnosis of the causes, and suggested remedy. The mainstream, realist-inspired view of oil and gas trade as zero-sum relations corresponds to the frame of neo-mercantilism. This frame can be complemented with three others: market liberalism, environmentalism, and social justice. Before addressing both pillars of our analytical approach, however, we present a short primer on the nuts and bolts of the physics of energy in the next section.
The science of energy
It is impossible to fully understand the global politics of energy from the perspective of any single scientific discipline. In reality, one needs to understand a little bit of geology, physics, economics, law, political science, and other disciplines. Getting to grips with some of the basic energy concepts and units, as well as the basic science of climate change, is essential for anyone who wants to meaningfully engage in energy studies. This section therefore offers an introduction to the key terminology commonly used to discuss energy systems. We will discuss the basics of climate science in chapter 5. We have taken care to explain the basic lexicon of energy concepts and units in accessible, non-specialist terms.
Let us begin with the term “energy” itself. When thinking of energy, most people probably think of oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity – in short, something for which they get a bill at the end of the month or when they fill up their car. From a hard science perspective, however, energy is much broader than that.21 The word “energy” derives from the ancient Greek word energeia, a term coined by philosopher Aristotle, which literally means “activity in work.” It describes the process of producing change (of motion, temperature, composition) in an affected system (an organism, a machine, the planet).22 Those processes include things as different as muscle power of humans and animals, wind blowing through sails, or burning oil to warm one’s home.23
These examples show that energy comes in many forms. Its most commonly encountered forms are heat (thermal energy), motion (kinetic or mechanical energy), light (electromagnetic energy), and the chemical energy of fuels and food. Energy can be converted from one form into another. For example, the sun sends out electromagnetic energy (light), which is converted by plants into stored chemical energy (sugar). Some of these plants are consumed by animals and converted into mechanical energy (the horses that pull a wagon). In other cases, the energy remains stored in the plant for thousands of years, eventually becoming a fossil fuel (coal, oil, or gas) that might be converted into thermal energy through combustion.
No energy is lost, or disappears, as energy is converted from one form to another. This principle comes from the first law of thermodynamics, the “law of conservation,” which says that the total amount of energy in the universe remains constant. Energy cannot be created or destroyed; it can only be converted from one form to another. A physicist would thus never use the words energy “consumption” or “production,” yet these terms are commonly used by laypersons and energy experts alike and in this book, too, we will stick to the conventional terminology.
Although energy is always conserved across conversions from one form to another, it becomes less useful. This is the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy, which says that there is a natural tendency for things to degenerate into increasing disorder. Imagine you wake up in the morning and start baking an omelet only to realize you want oatmeal instead. You cannot put the broken eggs back into their original shells. That is the principle of entropy. In closed systems, things go from low entropy (more order) to high entropy (more disorder) – never the opposite. A simple way to grasp the meaning of entropy is to say that all processes of change (or conversion) are irreversible. A lump of coal is a highly ordered (low entropy) form of energy. When combusted, it produces heat, a dispersed (high entropy) form of energy. The sequence is irreversible: the heat and gases that are released during the burning of coal cannot ever be reconstituted as a lump of coal.24 All exchanges of energy are subject to inefficiencies, such as friction or heat losses, which increase the entropy of the system. Thus, the efficiency of any energy conversion process will always be less than 100 percent. One vital corollary of this fundamental truth is that energy, when wasted, cannot be used for its intended purpose. Thus, energy lost as waste-heat in an old-fashioned incandescent light bulb cannot be used by real people (“end use customers”) for desired goals such as light, motive power, or cooling. A car that has run out of gas will not run again until you walk 10 miles to a gas station and return with petrol to refuel the car.
These two laws are incredibly important for comprehending how our global energy system works.25 Some even go as far as to say that the laws of thermodynamics condition our economic and political systems and determine the rise and fall of civilizations.26 As chemist and Nobel laureate Fredrick Soddy wrote in 1911, the laws of thermodynamics:
control, in the last resort, the rise or fall of political systems, the freedom or bondage of nations, the movements of commerce and industry, the origin of wealth and poverty, and the general physical welfare of the race.27
According to the international system of units, or metric system, the basic unit of energy is the joule (J), named after the English physicist James Prescott Joule, whose work led to the development of the first law of thermodynamics. One joule represents the work done by a force of one Newton traveling over a distance of one meter. Joule is not a very convenient metric for expressing the total energy use in many practical applications, such as when calculating the monthly utility bill, since it gives you very large numbers. Therefore, other metrics are more commonly used, such as the calorie, the British thermal unit (BTU), the kilowatt-hour (kWh), and tons of oil equivalent (toe). A calorie is defined as the energy required to raise the temperature of 1 gram of water 1 degree Centigrade. Data can be easily converted from one metric into the other. For example, 1 calorie is equivalent to 4.186 joule.28
While it is easy to convert one metric into another, this does not imply that all forms of energy are equivalent and interchangeable. As the second law of thermodynamics has taught us, energy can be converted from one form to another, but conversion entails losses. Fossil fuel-powered power plants, for example, transform chemical energy into electrical energy with an efficiency of 40 percent or so. That is why some statistics of energy production and consumption introduce multipliers when all the different forms of energy are put in the same units. Electricity from hydropower, for example, is typically rated as being worth 2.5 times more than the chemical energy in oil. In other words, 1 kWh of hydroelectricity equals 2.5 kWh of oil. The reason is that if you put that much oil in a standard thermal power station, it would deliver about 40 percent of 2.5 kWh, which is 1 kWh of electricity.29
The electricity industry uses its own vocabulary, which is worth discussing as it allows us to make a distinction between power and energy, two concepts that are often conflated. The metric unit of power is the watt (W), after the Scottish engineer James Watt, who helped to develop the steam engine in the late eighteenth century. One watt is equal to one joule per second. Note that the definition of power includes time: a 100-watt incandescent light bulb uses 100 joules of energy every second. The higher the wattage, the brighter the light, but also the more energy it uses. These distinctions of scale have an importance that is far greater than their simple differences in appearance when printed out on a page. For example, a measurement in watts would be typical for quantifying the energy use of a household appliance, such a 100 W incandescent light bulb. A measurement in kilowatts (kW) might most often be used to describe the instantaneous peak demand of an entire household. A measure of some level of megawatts (MW) would be typical for the total instantaneous demand of a neighborhood or a small town of a few thousand households (or for describing the output of a “small” power plant, sized and built to serve that scale). Discussions of gigawatts (GW) (each GW being a thousand MW) would be usual if describing the instantaneous cumulative power needs of large cites or provinces or states made up of millions of households. And, at a level a thousand-fold larger, a discussion of terawatts (TW) would be appropriate for describing the “single-moment” needs of a highly developed continent such as North America or Europe.30
Power is about the rate with which we use or produce energy, but to say something about the total amount of electricity we use or produce, we have to switch metrics. Electrical energy is typically expressed in a watt-hour and its multiples: kilowatt-hours (kWh), megawatt-hours (MWh), gigawatt-hours (GWh), and terawatt-hours (TWh), each one being a thousand-fold larger than the one before. Talking about a gigawatt-hour of energy use does not imply the energy was used in one hour. You could use a gigawatt-hour of energy by switching on one million toasters with a capacity of 1,000 W for one hour, or by switching on 1,000 toasters for 1,000 hours.31 This distinction is often framed as one between the installed capacity of a system (measured in W) and the energy it generates over time (measured in Wh).
These two metrics allow us to describe the difference between two windmills, each with a capacity of 1 MW, but a utilization rate of 10 percent versus 30 percent. The difference in utilization rates could be due to the fact that one windmill is located in a place where there are more consistent winds than the other one. In that situation, both windmills have the same capacity (or power) but one generates three times as much energy throughout the year as the other.
To conclude this section, it is important to make a distinction between primary energy sources and fuels, which are available in nature, and energy carriers, which have to be produced. For example, crude oil can be found in nature but has to be processed in refineries to produce fuel products such as gasoline and diesel. Electricity and hydrogen are also energy carriers that have to be produced from other, primary energy sources. Note that some primary energy sources are renewable, which means that they cannot be exhausted, while others are non-renewable. Fossil fuels are classified as non-renewable energy sources because the time required to form them through natural processes is measured in the tens of millions of years. At our current rate of use, existing stocks of fossil fuels are being depleted much quicker than they can be replenished through natural processes. In contrast, photovoltaic solar panels rely on sunlight, which is not depleting and will still be available in thousands of years regardless of how much we “consume” of it now. Table 1.1 gives a more complete overview of these primary sources and carriers.
Table 1.1 Primary energy sources and energy carriers
Source: Authors.
A systems perspective on energy
The book encourages students to engage in “systems thinking.” In its most abstract conceptualization, a systems approach is about identifying the interactions between elements of a whole system to better comprehend, and perhaps change, the system itself.32 Without such a systemic focus, critical components and synergies could be missed, distorting our view of system properties and obscuring implications for efficiency or sustainability.33 A systems approach must tackle multiple objectives as “a process through which the interconnections between subsystems and system are actively considered.”34
With this goal in mind, we conceptualize energy as a “socio-technical system” – comprising not just the energy sources and technologies, but also user practices, cultural meanings, infrastructure, and supply networks. The energy system cuts across other systems such as electricity, transport, buildings, industry, and agriculture, to name a few. A systems approach involves identifying the characteristics of the system in question – its elements, interconnections, and overall function – and examining the interactions between them. To give readers a useful background that will help them navigate the rest of the book, we will break down this complex “system of systems” into three layers: the supply infrastructure, the demand infrastructure, and the social infrastructure.
The first layer, the supply infrastructure, includes the primary and secondary energy resources as well the systems of conversion and transportation. It encompasses the mining of coal and the extraction of crude oil and natural gas, as well as (occasionally) the mining and processing of uranium. The extractive industries also provide the material inputs – copper, rare earth elements, alumina, and others – needed to manufacture power plants, cars, transmission lines, and other electronic devices, something we call “critical materials.” The supply infrastructure also involves the networks of power plants, oil and gas refineries and petrol stations, and other infrastructures that convert primary resources – including fossil fuels as well as alternatives – into energy carriers such as electricity, heat, mechanical energy, or liquid fuel. Delivery infrastructure such as pipelines, tankers, and electric transmission and distribution lines are also part of the supply infrastructure.
Standard accounts of energy security often stop here and restrict their focus to the supply infrastructure. The International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, defines energy security as the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”35 This brings into attention the oil fields, coal mines, solar farms, power plants, refineries, tankers, pipelines, the electric grid – in short, the hardware of the supply infrastructure. It could lead one to believe that making an energy transition is simply about switching from one energy source to another – say, closing down a coal-fired power plant and replacing it with windmills and solar panels.
The concept of “energy services” is helpful in broadening the perspective. Strictly speaking, there is no demand for energy. People are not interested in buying a barrel of crude oil, a ton of coal, or a cubic meter of natural gas. Instead, they want the services that energy can deliver such as mobility, lighting, refrigeration of food and medicines, heating of homes, cooking food, information and communication, and others – hence, the importance of end-use technologies or the so-called “prime movers” such as cars and their combustion engines, lamps, electric appliances and furnaces. This leads us to consider another layer beyond the supply infrastructure.
The demand infrastructure encompasses those end-use prime movers and the built environment, as well as patterns of energy consumption, use, or practice. Prime movers are the technology that converts primary and secondary fuels into useful and usable energy services. Without prime movers, all of the dazzling technological advances human civilization has made over the past millennia would remain nothing more than unrealized concepts. Human muscles are the classic prime movers; those muscles enabled us to hunt, gather, and farm. The first mechanical prime movers were simple sails, water wheels, and windmills; the Industrial Revolution had its steam engines and turbines; the modern area has internal combustion engines, jet turbines, compact florescent light bulbs, and household electric appliances. Yet, the demand infrastructure is larger and also comprises the way we raise buildings, how we design and integrate cars, how we organize freight corridors in our economies, how we build and design cities, and how we are able to communicate with our appliances through IT.
Expanding the horizon to include the demand infrastructure leads to conclusions that might be surprising for those with an interest in the geopolitics of energy. In press reports and public debates, discussions on the geopolitics of oil and gas typically revolve around things such as pipelines, “chokepoints” on tanker routes, and access to oil fields. This is short-sighted, as the following quote by Walt Patterson illustrates:
Key competitors for ExxonMobil are not Shell nor BP but Honda and Volkswagen. Competitors for Gazprom are Europe’s manufacturers and installers of thermal insulation. Competitors for EdF and E.On are the manufacturers of compact fluorescent and LED lamps.36
Would you have thought that the insulation of buildings is the best line of defense against Russia’s alleged “gas weapon”?
Bringing in the demand infrastructure also has implications for how we define an “energy transition.” It is no longer just about scrapping a coal-fired plant here, and erecting a windmill there. The whole demand infrastructure needs to be in the picture too. From a consumers’ perspective, it might not seem to make much of a difference to switch from a petrol car to an electric one, especially if the latter reaches cost parity and driving ranges comparable to a petrol car. And yet, an electric vehicle that runs on a battery has a whole different supply chain than a petrol car with an internal combustion engine. Similarly, scrapping a coal-fired power plant and replacing it with windmills disrupts the traditional business model of the utility – something that the German utility companies RWE and E.ON have learned the hard way over the past couple of years. In short, an energy transition brings about changes on both the supply and the demand side.
Third, the social infrastructure captures the less tangible aspects of our energy systems. It can refer to our economic growth models, standards of living, tax rules and interest rates. It encompasses the laws, rules, and regulations that bear on our energy production and use. It covers our habits, norms, cultures, and values which all shape our energy systems in ways that are often overlooked. Things like mobility patterns, driver preferences, lifestyles, and routines.
Figure 1.3 schematically summarizes this three-tiered view of the energy system. It captures both the hardware of the system on the supply and demand side, as well as the software – that is the norms, cultures, and rules that pervade the energy system.
Contested frames
As a second distinctive feature, rather than confining the analysis to one disciplinary box – say, political science theories or economic models – this book builds an analytical framework that combines the tools and insights of political science, economics, development studies, environmental studies, political geography, and sociology. The framework is based on four archetypical “frames” through which energy is most often depicted: neo-mercantilism, market liberalism, environmentalism, and egalitarianism (see table 1.2). These frames are implicitly mentioned within every chapter, and we come back to them explicitly in the Conclusion.
In the broadest sense, a frame is simply a way of organizing experience.37 Lakoff defines frames as “mental structures that shape … the way we see the world, the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome.”38 For Benford and Snow, framing is about actively constructing meaning, denoting “an active, processual phenomenon plies agency and contention at the level of reality construction.”39 Frames allow a social reality to be constructed or challenged; it is not merely language or words, but a reality for how actors and objects are made meaningful, and then naturalized.40 Furthermore, frames not only compete for public attention or “consumption”; they also compete in “framing contests” where “different social actors construct rival understandings of contested social phenomena and seek to mobilize support for their preferred ‘frame’ over rival ‘counter-frames’.”41
Figure 1.3 Anatomy of the global energy system
Source: Authors.
Our own analytical framework is essentially constructivist and serves to capture the complexity and diversity of individual views on global energy issues. Each frame has a different take on what is happening, what is causing it, and what can be done in the world of energy. They incorporate foundational assumptions about how the world of energy works. These frames largely structure the first part of the book.
The first frame, neo-mercantilism, assumes that states are key actors, aiming to maximize their power and autonomy. Energy is considered a strategic good, vital for national security and prosperity. It can be a source of power for those that have it or a source of vulnerability for those that lack it. The national interest of states revolves around securing supplies of energy, particularly fossil fuels, whose reserves are geographically concentrated. States and strategic planners worry mostly about availability of and access to such scarce reserves, which results in a geopolitical power game between net energy exporters and importers. States often deploy strategies of energy statecraft, that is, using energy as a tool in foreign policy. Sometimes this geopolitical bickering results in conflict. This frame is akin to the realist school of thought in international relations.
Table 1.2 Frames and worldviews in global energy politics
Source: Van de Graaf, T. & Zelli, F. (2016). Actors, institutions and frames in global energy politics. In The Palgrave handbook of the international political economy of energy (pp. 47–71). Palgrave Macmillan, London, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
The second frame, market liberalism, looks at other actors beyond the state, including firms, non-state actors and international organizations. It essentially sees energy as a commodity just like any other. Cross-border energy trade creates interdependencies, which lower the risk of conflict, and brings benefits to all. Attempts to weaponize energy trade are rare and ultimately self-defeating, as most international energy transactions take place within a framework of wellestablished markets and institutions. Market regulation trumps energy statecraft. This frame stresses the dimension of “affordability,” which means not only low prices for energy consumers but also stable prices to increase planning and investment security for energy producers. What is also often espoused within this frame is the belief that technological innovation progresses and continually improves the lives of people.
The third frame, environmentalism, puts the value of environmental sustainability front and center, referring to both the protection of the natural environment and preventing the full depletion of non-renewable energy sources by making a timely switch to renewable and other low-carbon energy sources. Mainstream environmentalism believes that environmental protection does not require fundamental changes in the political and economic structures of modern society, whereas a more radical variant sees the capitalist model of economic growth as a major cause of environmental stress. This can involve not only climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, but changes in land use, impacts on water availability and quality, radioactivity, and the spread of toxic flows of pollution.
The fourth frame, egalitarianism, puts the spotlight on equity, equality, and justice. In the Marxist variant, energy resources are exploited for the advancement of capitalist classes. Western states and multinational enterprises have close bonds with local elites in resource-rich countries and the wars in the Middle East reflect the need of capitalist states to access petroleum. The key global energy challenge in this perspective is the massive inequality embedded in our energy system, with the average American consuming much more than the average Nigerian, and many communities and poor countries effectively deprived of access to even the most basic energy services. This frame stresses respect for human rights and dignity in relation to both individuals and social groups, and it looks at the costs for workers and disenfranchised communities of both the current energy system, and any future energy transition.
Plan of the book
Having laid out the scope and approach of the book, the next chapter traces the political history of energy and explains the functioning of the global energy system.
The remainder of the book then proceeds in two parts. The first part discusses the implications of our fossil-fuel based energy system on four key areas of international relations: security, the economy, the environment, and global justice. We show that energy is a prism through which these broader issues refract. It is entangled with other major topics such as climate change, development, and foreign policy.
The second part examines ongoing and future changes in the global energy system. It examines technological options to move away from fossil and nuclear fuels, and the socio-technical barriers to their widespread adoption. In addition, this part looks at how energy is governed nationally (in key consumer and producer countries) and internationally (in multilateral fora).
At the end of the book, in our Conclusion, we put forward four conjectures about the future of energy. These suppose that the future politics of energy will be interdependent, interconnected, contested, and uncertain. No country has the privilege of becoming disentangled from global energy interdependencies for fuel, technology, knowledge, or even the consequences of actions or crises in other countries. Energy remains a complex issue that is intertwined with other important social and political issues including employment, environmental sustainability, fiscal policy, and public health. Because energy issues involve producers vs. consumers, importers vs. exporters, rich countries vs. poor countries, and local vs. national and even transnational interests, it will remain a key site of contestation and disagreement. Finally, the transformation currently ongoing in the energy sector has such a degree of complexity and rapid change that it is inherently unpredictable. Herein lies perhaps the most intriguing aspect of global energy politics: despite so much being at stake, the future is truly dependent on the choices we will collectively make within the next few decades. The future is myopic, but also mutable and thus potentially munificent.
Notes
1.
These examples are taken from Andrew Judge’s syllabus for the course ‘Global Energy Politics’, 2017–2018, University of Glasgow.
2.
