TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I. ON HEBREW MYTHOLOGY.
CHAPTER II. SOURCES OF HEBREW MYTHOLOGY.
CHAPTER III. THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING HEBREW MYTHS.
CHAPTER IV. NOMADISM AND AGRICULTURE.
CHAPTER V. THE MOST PROMINENT FIGURES IN HEBREW MYTHOLOGY.
CHAPTER VI. THE MYTH OF CIVILISATION AND THE FIRST SHAPING OF HEBREW RELIGION.
CHAPTER VII. INFLUENCE OF THE AWAKING NATIONAL IDEA ON THE TRANSFORMATIONOF THE HEBREW MYTH.
CHAPTER VIII. COMMENCEMENT OF MONOTHEISM AND THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE MYTHS.
CHAPTER IX. PROPHETISM AND THE JAHVEH-RELIGION.
CHAPTER X. THE HEBREW MYTH IN THE BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX. TWO ESSAYS BY H. STEINTHAL.
INTRODUCTION.
The
following sheets make no claim to present a
system
of Hebrew Mythology. I have left out much that would necessarily be
included in a system, and confined myself to a limited portion of
what can be proved to be the matter of the Hebrew myths. Even within
the actual domain of my labours, I was not anxious to subject the
extant narratives in all their minutest features to mythological
analysis. The application of the certain results of the science of
Mythology in general to a domain hitherto almost ignored with
reference to this subject, could only be accomplished by some
self-limitation on the part of the author; and my immediate task was
only to show that Semitism in general, and Hebrew in particular,
could not be exceptions to the laws of mythological enquiry
established on the basis of psychology and the science of language,
and that it is possible from Semitism itself, on psychological and
philological principles, to construct a scientific Semitic Mythology.By
blindly tracing out copious matters of detail, the investigator of
myths is very easily and unconsciously seduced to the slippery ground
of improbabilities; and therefore I preferred, in the first instance,
to enlarge only on subjects on which I was confident of being able to
present what was self-evident, and in these only, so to speak, to
reveal the first cellular formations, from which later growths were
produced, and to leave the analysis of the entire substance, and of
the separate elements which complete the conception of the mythical
figures, to a future time, when the science will have gained a firmer
footing even on the Semitic domain, and will have less distrust and
misunderstanding to contend against. I am myself responsible for this
limitation of the subject, in the service of which, encouraged by
kind friends, I resolved to publish the following pages. In
mythological affairs I acknowledge myself a pupil of the school
established on the Aryan domain by Ad. Kuhn and Max Müller. Only in
certain points, which, however, occasionally touch upon first
principles, I have been compelled to differ from the masters of
Comparative Mythology. It may be boldly asserted that, especially
through Max Müller’s literary labours, Comparative Mythology and
the Science of Religion have been added to those chapters of human
knowledge with which certain borderlands of science cannot dispense,
and which can claim to have become an essential portion of general
culture.[2]
This conviction must excuse frequent copiousness of exposition, which
I have adopted knowingly and intentionally. I have had in my eye not
only the small circle of professional mythologists on the Aryan and
other domains, but also the larger circle of educated readers who
will be interested in learning how the results of Comparative
Mythology shape themselves when applied to Semitic nations. But, on
the other hand, I must crave the indulgence of the latter readers, if
I have not always succeeded (especially in the fifth chapter) in
making my meaning as intelligible as I could wish. For it is a fact
that the Semitic still remains further removed from the mind of
educated society than the Aryan, which, through the study of
classical antiquity, has so ensnared us from our school-days with its
irresistible charms, that it can never cease to determine the
direction of our thought and action. Therefore I have had resort to
foreign examples, sometimes non-Semitic instances from antiquity,
sometimes instances from modern poets, for illustrations of
particular assertions, which otherwise would appear improbable, but
could thus be brought nearer to the understanding. From the figures
used by poets the wealth and variety of the mythical apperception of
the primeval man is truly elucidated. Here and there I have also
permitted myself to make reference to Hungarian idioms, which was
very natural, as I originally composed this book in my Hungarian
mother-tongue for the purpose of University lectures, and then
translated it myself into German. Some parts of these essays have
been already published in Hungarian, in a different connexion and
with special reference to linguistic results, in the first and second
parts of Vol. XII. of the
Nyelvtudományi Közlemények
(Philological Essays), edited by Paul Hunfalvy for the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.In
adducing Aryan parallels, I am very far from thinking that where the
Hebrew exhibits a striking similarity to something Aryan it has
borrowed from the latter, or that, as a recent scholar tried to make
out, the Hebrews themselves were originally Aryans, who afterwards
took a Semitic language and preserved their Aryan habits of thought.
I start from the conviction that the Myth is something universal,
that the faculty of forming it cannot
a priori
be denied to any race as such, and that the coincidence of mythical
ideas and modes of expression is the result of the uniformity of the
psychological process which is the foundation of the creation of
myths in all races; and this very uniformity of mythical ideas may
consequently serve to psychologists as an argument for the thesis of
the psychological uniformity of all races.[3]
‘Where no historical transference of myths can be proved,’ says
Bastian very justly,[4]
‘the uniformity must be referred to the organic law of the growth
of the mind, which will everywhere put forth similar products,
corresponding and alike, but variously modified by surrounding
influences.’ The oldest history of paleography exhibits on the
ideographic and figurative stage the most striking similarities in
the modes of apperception belonging to nations of the most various
races. Lenormant says: ‘Nous pourrions faire voir, si nous voulions
nous laisser aller à la tentation d’entreprendre un petit traité
de l’écriture symbolique chez les différents peuples, comment
certaines métaphores naturelles ont été conçues spontanément par
plusieurs races diverses sans communication les unes avec les autres,
et comment, par suite, le même symbole se retrouve avec le même
sens dans plusieurs systèmes d’origine tout-à-fait indépendante.
L’exemple le plus frappant peut-être de ce genre est celui du
symbole de l’abeille, qui, ainsi que nous venons de le dire,
signifie Roi dans les hiéroglyphes égyptiens, et se reconnaît
encore clairement dans le type le plus ancien de l’idéogramme doué
du même sens dans le cunéiforme anarien.’[5]
The same lesson is taught by Prehistoric Archeology, the comparative
study of which among the various races would present very instructive
examples. In our museums we see identical implements used by men of
the most various races at the same primitive stage of
civilisation,[6]
yet in this case the idea of one having borrowed from another enters
no one’s head. Why should we be surprised at meeting with the very
same phenomenon in Comparative Mythology?The
uniformity of the Hebrew myths with those of nations belonging to
other races only becomes an obvious fact when we apply the method of
modern mythological enquiry to Semitic stories. But, even without the
help of this method, the mere outside of the Hebrew stories attracted
the attention of many enquirers. It occasionally gave rise to the
absurdest aberrations, which even now shoot out into a fresh crop of
mischief. One answer, of course, was always at hand—that Greek and
Egyptian narratives and ‘theogonies’ were bad translations or
‘diluted’ versions of the Hebrew; or else, as it has often been
attempted in recent times to prove, the Egyptian was the original,
from which everything else had flowed. The eighteenth century was
especially rich in literary productions of the first species,
following the lead of Gerhard Johann Voss, Huet,[7]
Bochart, and others whose labours had prepared the way. G. Croesius
published at Dort, in 1704, ‘Ὅμηρος Ἑβραῖος, sive
Historia Hebraeorum ab Homero Hebraicis nominibus ac sententiis
conscripta in Odyssea et Iliade,’ and V.G. Herklitz at Leipzig two
years later, 1706, ‘Quod Hercules idem sit ac Josua.’ At
Amsterdam a book was published in 1721 entitled ‘Parallela τῆς
χρονολογίας et Historiae Sacrae,’ having the same
object; and in 1730 a book in two volumes, of similar tendency, by
Guillaume de Lavaur, an
avocat,
was published at Paris in French, and translated into German by
Johann Daniel Heyden (Leipzig, 1745).[8]
But it was reserved for the end of the century to produce the most
curious specimen, in the work entitled ‘Histoire véritable des
Temps Fabuleux: ouvrage qui, en dévoilant le vrai que les histoires
fabuleuses ont travesti et altéré, sert à éclaircir les
antiquités des peuples et surtout à venger l’histoire sainte,’
by the Abbé Guérin du Rocher. I have not seen the original edition
of this work, but have consulted a later edition prepared by the Abbé
Chapelle, an admirer of the author (Paris and Besançon, 1824), in
five volumes, of which the first three contain the original work, and
the fourth and fifth are taken up by the editor with a recapitulation
of principles and a defence against the attacks of antagonists, who
count among their number such men as Voltaire, De la Harpe, De
Guignes, Du Voisin, Dinouart, and Anquetil du Perron. The author
undertook to prove that the entire ancient history of the Egyptians
and other nations is only a repetition of Biblical narratives: that
thus what is related of Bothyris, Orpheus, Menes, Sesostris, and
others, is identical with the Biblical history of Abraham, Jacob,
Lot, Noah, and others; even the Egyptian Thebes is not a city, but
Noah’s ark. The influence which this sensational book exercised on
the learning of the period is very characteristic of the times. Dr.
Asselini, vicar of the diocese of Paris, who had to pass judgment on
it for the censorship (1779), regards it as a vindication of the
Bible. The Sorbonne appropriated Guérin’s theorems, and made them
the subject of theses for graduation. The King of Poland read the
work through, and sent his compliments to the author. The French
government accorded the Abbé an annual pension of 1,200 livres. One
reviewer compares Guérin’s discoveries to those of Columbus and
Newton; and a poetical panegyrist sees in them a French counterpoise
to the superiority in science then possessed by England in virtue of
discoveries of the first rank in physical science. He says—Fière
et docte Albion, qui dans un coin des mersPrétends
aux premier rang de la littérature,Pour
avoir à vos yeux dévoilé l’universEt
le vrai plan de la nature,De
tes discours hautains rabaisse enfin le ton;La
France, ta rivale, va égaler ta gloire.Ce
que pour la physique a fait le grand Newton,Du
Rocher l’a fait pour l’histoire.But
even on the very threshold of the second part of our century, in
1849, a systematic argument was conducted, to show that Livy had read
the Bible, and based his description of T. Manlius Torquatus’
battle with the Gauls on that of David and his battle with the
Philistine giant; and twenty-two similarities between the respective
stories had to do duty as demonstrations.[9]
The unscientific mode of regarding these subjects prevailing up to
the most recent time has not yet ceased to generate absurdities.We
see old-fashioned absurdities still finding a way to the general
reading public by means of encyclopedias, as in a ‘Dictionary of
the Mythology of all Nations,’ of which a third edition was
recently published.[10]
This work in its new form comes before the public with a touching
delivery against modern physical science by way of introduction. Here
we read under
Abraham,
‘Some scholars are inclined to make this celebrated Patriarch of
the Jewish nation either the god Brahma himself or a Brahman who was
obliged to leave India in the contest between the worshippers of Siva
and those of Brahma.
In truth, there is much that might lead to such a conjecture.
In Sanskrit the word ‘earth’ is often expressed by
Brahm
or
Abrahm.
Abraham’s wife was named Sarah; Brahma’s wife was Sara
(Sarasvati)’ etc. But sins of a different kind also are committed
up to the present day. The Hebrews are said to have borrowed their
myths from foreign parts. It is not only by Voltaire and men of his
age and spirit that this assumption is made. It is expressed in a
recent article by a learned German investigator intended for the
widest circulation. Sepp writes, 'No nation has been so clever as the
Hebrews in appropriating to themselves the property of others, both
intellectual and material. What can we say to the fact that the sun’s
standing still at Joshua’s bidding, with the purpose of enabling
the Hebrews to complete the slaughter of the Amalekites, is
directly borrowed from Homer
(Il.
ii. 412), where the poetical hyperbole ‘Let not the sun go down, O
Zeus,’ etc., is put into the mouth of Agamemnon?... To be brief,
the popular hero Samson has had the Twelve Labours of the Lybian
Herakles transferred to him, and bears the doors, as Sandon or
Melkart the pillars of the world, on his shoulders.'[11]
The reader will agree with me in regarding it as superfluous at the
present day to attempt a serious refutation of the hypothesis of
borrowing,
which assails the originality of the most primitive mythological
ideas known to the nation under review. But it is impossible to evade
the obligation to find an explanation of the manifold coincidences
exhibited in the independently produced myths of nations belonging to
quite different races. Under the new method of mythological enquiry
this obligation is doubly pressing; for the coincidences appear yet
more surprising, and occupy a more extensive sphere when the myths
are considered analytically by the light of the new method, and from
a linguistic point of view. Only then does the identity become
psychologically important. And then it can in my view be explained
only by the rejection of the prejudice that there are unmythological
races, or at least one race incapable of forming any myths—the
Semitic. If the Myth is a form of life of the human mind
psychologically necessary at a certain stage of growth, then the
intellectual life of every individual, nation, and race must pass
through it. ‘The tendency of modern enquiry is more and more toward
the conclusion that if law is anywhere, it is everywhere,’ as Tylor
maintains.[12]
This means, applied to the present question, that if the formation of
myths is a natural law of the ψυχή (mind) at a certain stage, it
must necessarily occur everywhere where there is a beginning of
intellectual life, unless we could speak of whole races or tribes as
psychologically pathologic,[13]
and make the whole Semitic race thus pathologic on account of its
alleged incapacity to form myths—which would, after all, be rather
a curious proceeding. No doubt we often read in ethnological works of
nations without a trace of Mythology. But we ought not to forget
either that such informants understand by Mythology only complicated
stories and fables, which in my view represent the more advanced
stage of mythic development, or that they identify Mythology with
heathen religious ideas, and confound absence of religion or atheism
with want of myths. So, e.g., Sir John Lubbock says, quoting
Sibree,[14]
‘Even in Madagascar, according to a good authority, “there is
nothing corresponding to a Mythology,
or any fables of gods or goddesses,
amongst the Malagasy;”’ but this want of stories of gods and
goddesses is very far from demonstrating the absence of myths of all
and every sort.It
would be worth while in this connexion to pursue a thought raised by
Schelling, with the aid of the present more advanced ideas on the
psychology of nations. According to Schelling,[15]
a nation becomes a nation through community of consciousness between
the individuals; and this community has its foundation in a common
view of the world, and this again in Mythology. Consequently in
Schelling’s system absence of Mythology can only occur in circles
of men in which nationality is as yet unformed, and the necessary
community undeveloped. But to Schelling ‘it appears impossible,
because inconceivable, that a
Nation should be without Mythology.’
However the question may stand with reference to savage tribes,
modern science cannot possibly support the old thesis concerning the
Semitic Hebrews of their incapacity for Mythology.Guided
by this conviction, I lay down at starting the necessity of
subjecting the material of the Hebrew myths to the same psychological
and linguistic analysis which has contributed so much light to the
consideration of the beginnings of intellectual life in the Aryan
race.I
do not conceal from myself that the acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of this method for Semitic things may be exposed to many attacks. For
even on Aryan ground the results which the school of Kuhn and Max
Müller have brought to light do not enjoy that general acceptation
which ought to reward such sound investigations—investigations,
moreover, the basis of which is being constantly extended by later
writers such as G.W. Cox and De Gubernatis. Both in Germany and in
England this school has notable adversaries. I do not speak of Julius
Braun, who, in his
Naturgeschichte der Sage
(Natural History of Legend), thought to undermine the solid
substratum of Comparative Mythology by extending to the domain of
mythology the consequences of his theory of the history of art and of
Röthe’s assumptions, and by fetching from Egypt the
foundation-stone on which to construct a Science of Mythology—an
attempt which turned out most unfortunate, especially in etymology.
But some worthy partisans of the study of classical literature refuse
to receive the results of the science of Comparative Mythology. One
of these is K. Lehrs;[16]
another is the latest German editor of Hesiod, who objects to the
modern science of Mythology that it ignores historical and
philological criticism and seizes upon every passage of an author
that suits its theory, without regard to its value and
genuineness.[17]
Among the English scholars it is no less a writer than Fergusson who
declares, ‘So far as I am capable of understanding it, it appears
to me that the ancient Solar Myth of Messrs. Max Müller and Cox is
very like mere modern moonshine.’[18]
And Mr. George Smith, the renowned pioneer of the ancient Assyrian
literature, seems not to have much confidence in the latest method of
mythological investigation; for he says in his latest book,[19]
‘The early poems and stories of almost every nation are by some
writers resolved into elaborate descriptions of natural phenomena;
and in some cases, if that were true, the myth would have taken to
create it a genius as great as that of the philosophers who explain
it.’ So that the so-called ‘Solar theory’ is far from being
generally adopted even on the domain where it was first brought out
and has been most firmly established. But the adherents of the school
of Max Müller may take comfort from the consideration that the
accusations made against them hit only those who have ridden the
theory too hard, since, as Tylor says, no allegory, no nursery-rhyme,
is safe from the speculations of some fanatical mythological
theoriser. ‘Much abused’ is a correct epithet used of the Solar
theory by a learned English Assyriologist, himself a friend of
it.[20]
If, then, on Aryan ground the legitimacy of the new method is not
undisputed, how will it be on Semitic, and especially on Hebrew
ground, which a prejudice prevalent far and wide has decided to be
occupied by a race and a nation with no mythology at all?
Nevertheless, I hope I have kept myself free from abuse and
extravagance in these essays. I have endeavoured sedulously to avoid
whatever, on the Aryan domain, aroused the distrust of the
hesitating, by showing no anxiety to gain immediate command of the
whole extent of the mythological field. The essential point at the
commencement of these matters is not the elucidation of all the
minute details, but rather the solution of the general questions that
arise, and the accurate laying down of a sound method of
investigation. What I have brought forward I wish to be regarded as a
collection of examples of the application of the method.The
reader will observe that I have given to the conception of the myth a
narrower scope than is usually done. I believe it necessary to
separate it strictly from the conception of religion, and especially
to exclude from the sphere of primitive mythology the questions of
Cosmogony and Ethics (the origin of Evil). The latter point was of
especial importance in reference to the Hebrew Myth, since, as I show
in the last chapter, the solution of these questions by the Hebrews
was produced in the later period of civilisation and from a foreign
impulse. There is an immense difference between the ancient mythical
view of the origin of nature and that later cosmogonic system. So
long as mythical ideas are still living in the mind, though under an
altered form, when the times are ripe for cosmogonic speculations, a
cosmogony appears as a stage of development of the ancient myth. But
when the myth has utterly vanished from consciousness, then the mind
is ready to receive foreign cosmogonic ideas, which can be fitted
into the frame of its religious thought and accommodated to its
religious views. This was the case with the Hebrews; and hence it
will be understood why I have not treated as Hebrew mythical matter
the Cosmogony of Genesis, which, moreover, according to all
appearance, is to be regarded rather as a mere literary creation than
as a view of the origin of things emanating directly from the mind of
the people.It
appeared desirable to give a few chapters to show what I imagined the
course of development of the primitive myths to have been, before
they attained the form in which they are presented to us in
literature. The mythological question is indeed quite distinct from
that concerning the history of literature, and there is only a
distant connexion between the two. The purpose of the following pages
is, strictly speaking, attained where that of the literary history of
the Canon commences; and I would gladly have kept aloof from the
literary question, which cannot yet be regarded as even nearly
settled. But when I included in my task the description of the
further course of development of the myth, it was obviously
impossible to stand so entirely aloof. I have on many points deviated
from the current views, without being able either to enter into so
complete a justification of the deviation as is generally reasonably
expected, and the importance and scope of the subject would demand,
or to refer to all the suggestive and original works contributed,
especially by Germany and Holland, to the elucidation of the problems
in question. For this point, which is only accessory to the real
subject of my work, would require to be treated in a separate
monograph, which it was not my intention to give. On the other hand,
it was impossible to leave these questions quite on one side. On the
Pentateuch question I start from the principles of Graf, which at
first were adopted solely by the learned Professor Kuenen of Leyden,
but have recently found zealous promoters also in England[21]
and Germany—in the latter country especially in the works of Kayser
(Strasburg, 1874), and Duhm (Bonn, 1875).[22]
Nevertheless, the section on Jahveism and Prophetism has turned out
more lengthy than considerations of symmetry would sanction. I must
confess that my personal sympathy with and affection for this portion
of the history of religion places me too close to it to allow me,
when once brought face to face with it, to impose on my pen a reserve
which perhaps is desirable for the sake of equilibrium. All this
obliges me to count on the kind indulgence of my readers for the
second portion, which may be termed the historical.It
remains to say a few words about previous works of the same
character. Some earlier writings there are on Hebrew Mythology. But
it needs not to be specially insisted on that Nork’s muddle-headed
works, such as his ‘Biblical Mythology of the Old and New
Testament,’ his ‘Etymological-symbolical-mythological Cyclopedia
for Biblical Students, Archeologists, and Artists,’[23]
and other books of his, and similar attempts by others,[24]
which have tended to discredit the school of Creuzer rather than to
gain lasting adherents to it, do not deserve to be regarded as
anything but passing aberrations. Braun’s ‘Natural History of
Legend: Reference of all Religious Ideas, Legends, and Systems to
their Common Stock and Ultimate Root’[25]
maintains a more serious and dignified tone, but is a kind of
anachronism built on an antiquated theory, and not happier in its
etymological identifications and derivations than Nork’s writings.
I think that no branch of the science of History and Civilisation can
be advanced to satisfactory results when the following thesis is laid
down as an axiom: ‘It is a fundamental law of the nature of the
human mind never to invent anything as long as it is possible to
copy’—which is the starting-point of Braun's studies. It would be
quite as difficult to rest satisfied at the present day with the
method which Buttmann follows in treating of Hebrew Mythology.There
are many smaller excursus by Biblical expositors and historians, who
set out from the standpoint of the earlier views on the relation of
the Myth to the Legend, and more frequently from the exegetical point
of view. Among these ought especially to be named Ewald’s section
on the subject in the first volume of his ‘History of Israel,’
Tuch’s short treatise ‘Legend and Myth’ in the general
introduction to his Commentary on Genesis, as well as several
dissertations by the indefatigable Nöldeke in his ‘Untersuchungen’
(Investigations) and elsewhere. It is obvious that these
performances, though in every sense noteworthy and of permanent
value, could not draw into their sphere of observation those
preliminary questions which in the subsequent investigations of Kuhn
and Max Müller removed to a greater distance the goal of
mythological enquiry. Steinthal, who did so much for the
psychological basis of the new tendency of mythological science, was
the first to merit the praise of making Comparative Mythology
fruitful on Hebrew ground. His dissertations on the Story of
Prometheus and the Story of Samson[26]
showed for the first time, and on a large scale, how the matter of
the Hebrew legends yields to mythological analysis. I would on this
occasion beg the reader to have the kindness to read these
pioneer-articles of Steinthal’s, to complete the matter left
undiscussed in my work, as I considered it superfluous repetition to
work up a second time what was sufficiently expounded there.
Steinthal must consequently be regarded as the founder of
mythological science on Hebrew ground. He has again recently given
some suggestive hints on this subject in a short article, in which he
again defends the capacity of the Semitic race to form myths.[27]
It is only to be regretted that the commencement made by Steinthal in
this science has not been followed up for more than fifteen
years.[28]
Steinthal’s two dissertations gave me the first impulse to the
composition of this work; and my purpose was confirmed by the words
of the ingenious Italian Angelo de Gubernatis, who, in his
‘Zoological Mythology’ (which appeared at the very time when I
was maturing my purpose of putting together into one work this series
of essays originally written as lectures), eloquently designates the
subject of my researches the next problem of Comparative
Mythology.[29]
The words in which he recommends the study of Hebrew Mythology in the
spirit of the new method seem to me very striking. It is my earnest
conviction that not only the interests of learning, but also
preeminently the religious life of the present age make it important
to gain for this subject an acknowledged position in learned
literature. For he who feels the true meaning of religion must
welcome these studies as a step in advance towards the highest ideal
of religion, towards Monotheism pure and unsullied by anything coarse
or pagan, which is independent of legends and traditions of race, and
has its centre, its exclusive element of life, and its impulse
towards never-resting enquiry and self-perfection, in aspiration
after the single living Source of all truth and morality. I am
convinced that every step which we take towards a correct
appreciation of the Mythical brings us nearer to that centre. The
confusion of the Mythical with the Religious makes religious life
centrifugal; it is the duty of the progressive tendency on this
domain to confirm a centripetal tendency.[30]
The recognition of this relation between pure Monotheism and the
oldest historical portion of the Biblical literature does not date
from yesterday or to-day; the most ideal representative of Hebrew
Monotheism, in whom Jahveism as an harmonious conception of the
universe attained its climax, the Prophet of the Captivity himself,
described this relation in clear terms (Is. LXIII. 16; see
infra,
p.
229).But
while, on the one hand, the investigation of Hebrew myths gives a
stimulus to religious thought to advance in the direction of a
Monotheism purified from all dross; on the other, the employment of
the method offered to the Hebrew stories by Comparative Mythology in
its latest stage, paves the way for a more serious treatment of the
old Biblical stories. It cannot be denied that there is no little
frivolity in the idea that those stories were invented at a certain
time, no matter whether
bona
or
mala fide,
by persons guided by some interest, or affected by some leaning, of
their own. It is no more satisfactory to be told that the stories
were not
invented,
but
sprang up
naturally, and then to find that no answer is forthcoming to the
question,
How
that could be? The modern science of Comparative Mythology has washed
the teachers of the human race clean of the suspicion of
mystification and deceptive principles. The origination of the
stories is, at the outset, claimed for an antiquity higher than even
the most orthodox apologists could ever exhibit. Now for the first
time we can learn to appreciate them as spontaneous acts of the human
mind; we perceive that they arose through the same psychological
process which gave us language also; that, like language itself, they
were the very oldest manifestation of activity of the mind, and burst
forth from it φύσει not θέσει, at the very threshold of
its history; and subsequently transformed and developed themselves
again quite spontaneously, on the attainment of a higher stage of
civilisation, by processes of national psychology, and most certainly
not by the cunning ingenuity and the worldly wisdom of certain
leading classes.Last
year Dr. Martin Schultze announced a ‘Mythology of the Hebrews in
its connexion with those of the Indogermans and of the Egyptians’[31]
as about to appear. The method followed by the author in a
preliminary specimen[32]
was not such as to induce me to delay the publication of my work and
wait for his, even though he promised to give a complete system,
which was not my intention.[33]
My manuscript was already in the publishers’ hands, when the papers
announced the publication of a learned book by Dr. Grill, ‘The
Patriarchs of Mankind: a contribution towards the establishment of a
Science of Hebrew Archeology;’[34]
and more than ten sheets were printed before I could gather, from a
review of it in the
Jenaer Literaturzeitung,
in how close a connexion it stood to the subject of my book; for from
the title alone I was not likely to suspect anything on Mythology. I
cannot pretend to explain in a few lines my opinion of so large a
book as Dr. Grill’s. But as he starts with the assumption of the
impossibility of a Semitic Mythology, and endeavours to establish the
view that the Hebrew Myth is that of an Indogermanic people, that the
Hebrews were Indogermans, and that the Hebrew mythological proper
names can find an etymology only in Sanskrit, I have great pleasure
in referring him to p.
25
and to Chapter
V.
of my book, where he may convince himself that no very daring
etymological leaps nor arbitrary assumptions of phonological laws of
transformation are necessary to explain the Hebrew mythological
figures and their appellations from the Semitic languages themselves.
It must, no doubt, be admitted that in some cases—but the
minority—the formation of the proper names used in Mythology is not
quite in accordance with grammatical analogy. I account for this by
the peculiar feature of the Semitic languages, that an appellative on
becoming a proper name often takes a peculiar form, differing in some
respect from that of the original appellative: ‘al-ʿadl
li-l-ʿalamîyyâ,’ as the Arabian grammarians say.[35]
There will always be
cruces.
Is it possible to indicate a satisfactory etymon for every proper
name of the Greek mythology? and if not, ought we on that account to
explain the Greek out of Semitic, whenever a case occurs which tempts
us to do so, as our learned ancestors did?[36]
For transformation is always easy to find; since etymology is allowed
to be a science in which the consonants go for but little, and the
vowels have nothing at all to say for themselves! It certainly seems
a pity to waste ingenuity in trying to banish out of the Semitic
stock names which sound Semitic and can be recognised as such without
the employment of any law of transformation at all, like Yiphtâch
(Jephthah), Nôach (Noah), and Debhôrâ (Deborah), and in dissolving
by Sanskrit solvents the Hebrew impress of a word like Yehôshûaʿ
(Joshua), produced by Jahveism out of the original Hôshêaʿ, and
not even mythical at all, in order to make it into a ‘Dog of
Heaven,’ instead of ‘He has holpen’ or ‘enlarged [the
people’s possessions],’ i.e. ‘The Helper.’[37]
Pinechas (Phinehas), no doubt, is a word that might drive the
etymologist to despair. But there is far more intrinsic probability
in Lauth’s Egyptian interpretation[38]
than in Grill’s Sanskrit
tour de force,
especially considering that Egyptian proper names cannot be explained
away out of the Old Testament, and have in history a positive reason
for existence. Then why hover in the dream-land of a prehistoric
connexion with the Aryans?When
the Arabian traditionary stories are once subjected to etymological
treatment, it will appear how far Semitism is from utter deficiency
of Mythology. In certain instances I have taken occasion to
demonstrate this with reference to Arabian tradition in the course of
this work (e.g. p.
182
et seq.,
p.
334
et seq.).
In other cases no reference to the etymological meaning of the proper
names is required to recognise true Arabian myths. Instances are
found especially in the stories about the constellations. Al-Meydânî
informs us that ‘the old Arabs say that the star al-Dabarân wooed
the Pleiades, but the latter constellation would have nothing to do
with the suitor, turned obstinately away from him, and said to the
Moon, ‘What must I do with that poor devil, who has no estate at
all?’ Then al-Dabarân gathered together his Ḳilâṣ (a
constellation in the neighbourhood of al-Dabarân), and thus gained
possession of an estate. And now he is constantly following after the
Pleiades, driving the Ḳilâṣ before him as a
wedding-present.’[39]
‘The constellation Capricorn killed the Bear (naʿsh), and
therefore the daughters of the latter (binât naʿsh) encircle him,
seeking vengeance for their slain father.’ ‘Suheyl gave the
female star al-Jauzâ a blow; the latter returned it and threw him
down where he now lies; but he then took his sword and cut his
adversary in pieces.’ ‘The southern Sirius (al-Shiʿra
al-yamânîyyâ) was walking with her sister the northern Sirius
(al-Shiʿra al-shâmîyyâ); the latter parted company and crossed
the Milky Way, whence her name (al-Shiʿra al-ʿabûr). Her sister,
seeing this, began to weep for the separation, and her eyes dropped
tears; therefore she is called the Wet-eyed (al-ġumeyṣâ).’[40]
The existence of similar Hebrew myths may be inferred from the names
of constellations in the Book of Job (XXXVIII. 31, 32), especially
from the Fool (kesîl, Orion) bound to heaven.[41]
Are not these genuine Nomads’ myths, produced through contemplation
of the constellations and their relations to one another?In
conclusion, I must observe that in many passages, especially of the
later chapters, a fuller citation of literary apparatus would have
been desirable. The want of this is to be ascribed in part to the
peculiar design of the book, and in part to the deficiency of aid
from libraries for the exegetical department in my dwelling-place.MYTHOLOGY
AMONG THE HEBREWS.