Hollywood in the Information Age E-Book

Janet Wasko

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 572

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

This is a major new assessment of the American movie industry in the 1990's, focusing on the development of new communication technologies such as cable and home video and examining their impact on the production and distribution of motion pictures.

Leseprobe

Hollywood in the Information Age

Passion Pit Puddles Mud and debris frame a deserted drive-in located near Springfield, Oregon. The dramatic decline of drive-ins (once known as “passion pits”) has been generally attributed to the popularity of videocassettes, although some operations in warmer climates have survived by adding more screens. In 1991, there were 908 drive-ins operating in the USA. Photograph by Carlos R. Calderon

HOLLYWOOD INTHE INFORMATION AGE

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Beyond the Silver Screen

Janet Wasko

Polity Press

Copyright © Janet Wasko 1994

The right of Janet Wasko to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 1994 by Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers.

Reprinted 2004

Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press350 Main StreetMalden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, by lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

ISBN: 978-0-7456-6902-1 (Multi-user ebook)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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For Carlos & Scruffy Joe

Contents

List of Plates

Acknowledgements

  1   Introduction: Hollywood and the Culture Industry

  2   The Way We Were: An Historical Look at Hollywood and Technology

  3   Film Production in the Information Age

  4   The Big Boys: The Hollywood Majors

  5   The Wired Nation and the Electronic Superhighway: Cable Television, Pay Cable, Pay-Per-View and Beyond

  6   Talkin’ ‘Bout a Revolution: Home Video

  7   The Silver Screen: Theatrical Exhibition in the Information Age

  8   Hollywood Meets Madison Ave.: The Commercialization of US Films

  9   Around the World in Nanoseconds: International Markets for Filmed Entertainment

10   Hooray for Hollywood: Moving into the 21st Century

Notes

Index

List of Plates

Frontispiece Passion Pit Puddles   Photograph by Carlos R. Calderon

Plate 1 The Rebel with a Cause   Photograph by Carlos R. Calderon

Plate 2 High-Tech Dishes   Photograph by Carlos R. Calderon

Plate 3 The Leader of the Pack   Photograph by Carlos R. Calderon

Plate 4 The End of an Era   Photograph by Mark Walters and Gary Cohn

Acknowledgements

Some sections of the book are based on previously published material.

Some of the issues considered in chapter 3 were presented (with Thomas Maher) as “Hollywood Silicon: The Advent of Post-industrial Filmmaking,” University Film and Video Association, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, August 1985.

The discussion in the section “Setting the Scene” in chapter 5 is based on the article “New Methods of Measuring Media Concentration” in Vincent Mosco, ed., Policy Research in Telecommunications, Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing, 1984.

A version of the section of chapter 5 entitled “The US Cable System in the Nineties” was previously published in Andrew Calabrese and Janet Wasko, “All Wired Up and No Place to Go: The Search for Public Space in US Cable Development,” Gazette 49, 1992, pp. 121–51.

Chapter 8 represents a version of Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips and Chris Purdie, “Hollywood Meets Madison Ave.: The Commercialization of US Films,” Media, Culture and Society 15, no. 2, April 1993,

Chapter 9 is based on a paper presented at the Political Economy section of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, August 1990, in Bled, Slovenia, and later published as “Hollywood, New Technologies and Europe 1992,” Telematics and Informatics 8, no. 2, 1991.

Many people contributed to this book in many ways.

My thanks to Mark Phillips, Chris Purdie, Tom Maher, and Andrew Calabrese for their collaboration on some of the material used on product placements and tie-ins, film production and cable television. Research assistance for different pieces of the study also came from Victor Muniz, Suzanne Julber, Scott Hampton, Alice Slaughter, Marc Jaffe, Denise Wallace, and Wendy Barbour. Special thanks to Thomas Guback, Vincent Mosco, and Eileen Meehan for their insightful and helpful comments, as well as the continuing inspiration that their own work provides. More thanks to Susan Davis, Dan Schiller, Deanna Robinson, and Bill Willingham, who also read versions of the manuscript, and to Sean Axmaker for his insights on the home video business.

The Directors Guild of America (especially Selise Eiseman) provided support to attend their Educators Workshop in August 1991, giving me the opportunity to confront Hollywood insiders on their own turf. Funds from the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon allowed me to attend the National Association for Television Programming Executives (NATPE) convention, January 1993, in San Francisco, California, where I was able to observe the buying and selling of entertainment programming first hand.

The people at Polity Press have been a joy to work with. Everyone has been extremely patient and quite professional, but a special thanks to John Thompson who supported the book from the beginning.

Finally, Carlos Calderon not only deserves credit for most of the photo work, but for providing a huge measure of inspiration and vital support which made it possible to ultimately finish this project.

1

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Introduction: Hollywood and the Culture Industry

The Entertainment Age

Over the last decade or so there have been dramatic changes in the technologies employed for the production and distribution of entertainment and information. Computer systems have been introduced in a wide range of situations, from factories to offices to homes. New communication channels, such as cable television, home video, and satellite systems, are in use in most of the USA and much of rest of the world. Other developments, such as high-definition television (HDTV), direct-broadcast satellite systems, fiber-optics systems (or “electronic superhighways”), etc., are promised in the near future.

The confluence of these technological developments – the number and variety of technological devices and processes introduced or employed at one time – is perhaps unprecedented, and has prompted discussion and analysis of a new age: the information age.

An information society has been claimed by many to be more dependent on information and service industries, and thus organized and characterized fundamentally differently from previous eras. It is further argued that information has become a commodity – bought, sold and traded in marketplace situations.

Yet, in many ways, the notion of an information age is inherently problematic, and rather than embracing the concept, this study serves to challenge it on several fronts.

First, the myriad of technological changes that have prompted discussions of a new age of information has been introduced into societies which remain fundamentally the same. In other words, there is as much continuity as change in our “new” age. This fundamental concept is at the heart of this study, which provides an example by looking closely at one sector of our society – the entertainment business – to examine the extent of the change or continuity that has accompanied these technological developments.

Second, it might be noted that many of the new technologies associated with an information age have been introduced and employed for leisure-time activities or entertainment. In other words, many of the information technologies have been promoted for their entertainment components, and it would seem that people’s everyday lives are influenced as much, if not more, by these entertainment and leisure-time activities as by new or enhanced information channels.

Although it could be argued that entertainment is as characteristic of this age as information, we have heard little about a new entertainment age. And, come to think of it, both information and entertainment have existed in other historical periods, so why a new age at all?

Still, it is interesting to consider why discussions of an information age frequently neglect analysis of the entertainment component of information technologies.

One explanation is that the business of entertainment is often not considered serious business by economists and other proponents of an information age. More often emphasis is placed on business and military applications of information technologies, such as telecommunications and computers, rather than on consumer communications products, such as home video and cable, that merely provide diversion.

On the other hand, technological components or economic characteristics of entertainment are less important to many media scholars or cultural analysts, who are more interested in studying entertainment products as texts or measuring audiences or the effects of entertainment messages, thus missing the possible connections to fundamental components of this (supposedly) new technological era.

Revenues from the media /entertainment business may not compare to other “information age” industries and other sectors of the economy. For instance, Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys for 1993 reported domestic sales for the electronics and computer sector at over $287 billion in 1991. The film industry’s domestic box office revenues for the same year were a mere $4.8 billion. Comparisons also might be made with the aerospace industry’s total sales, reported at $134 billion in 1990, and the chemical industry’s sales of nearly $300 billion in 1991. These sectors easily dwarf the revenues of the entire media and entertainment sector, as indicated in table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Domestic filmed entertainment revenues, 1986 and 1991

Source: Veronis, Suhler & Associates, Motion Picture Association of America, McCann-Erickson, Wilkofsky Gruen Associates. From: Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, 11 March 1993, p. L17.

Nevertheless, the media/entertainment industry has grown considerably during the last few decades, and increasingly attracts the attention of financiers, investors and companies outside the traditional entertainment world. New technologies introduced by some of these companies, plus the integration of media and information systems, continue to expand the markets for entertainment commodities.

Furthermore, these media industries distribute important ideological and cultural products, with significance for the representation and reproduction of social norms and values. It would seem, therefore, that economic and technological developments in these industries would be not only of passing interest, but crucial in understanding the cultural role of these media and communication products.

Beyond the Silver Screen

At the heart of the entertainment business in the USA (and, indeed, much of the rest of the world) is a set of corporations commonly referred to as Hollywood. At one time, these companies were primarily involved in the production and distribution of motion pictures in the USA and abroad. Many still think of Hollywood in these terms.

However, films are seen today in many places other than theaters: most often, in people’s homes on television monitors, via over-the-air television stations, networks, cable and pay-cable channels, or home video systems; but also in airplanes, hospitals, schools, universities, prisons, even in dentists’ chairs. Popular films often initiate or continue an endless chain of other cultural products. A film concept or character often leads to a TV show, with possible spin-offs, video games, and records. Merchandising efforts also include toys, games, T-shirts, trading cards, soap products, cereals, theme park rides, coloring books, magazines, how-the-movie-was-made books, etc.

The major Hollywood corporations are transnational conglomerates, often involved in all of these activities. Thus it becomes increasingly more difficult to distinguish the film industry from other media or entertainment industries. Indeed, Hollywood – or those corporations collectively referred to as Hollywood – can be considered one of the focal points of the culture industry, to recall a term popularized by the Frankfurt School, and no longer as merely involved in the traditional production, distribution, and exhibition of movies. Thanks to technological developments, commercial motivations, and globalization trends, Hollywood has moved … beyond the silver screen.

From Production to Exhibition: Promises and Myths

New technologies introduced since the 1970s have influenced the way that motion pictures are produced, distributed and exhibited. Some claim that the adoption of new techniques, especially in the area of production, has been relatively slow, thus reinforcing Hollywood’s reputation as technologically backward.

Nevertheless, there have been important changes in the structure and policies of traditional Hollywood activities. New computer and video techniques are employed in the production of motion pictures, providing new possibilities for manipulating sounds and images. Distribution channels have expanded, with the proliferation of cable systems, home video, and satellite technology. And exhibitors are increasingly being forced to consider new projection systems or distribution methods, such as HDTV.

These technological developments have been, as historically media technology has been, accompanied by predictions and promises, in this case for filmmakers, the film industry and movie audiences. Three main promises can be identified: (1) more competition, (2) increased industrial conflict, and (3) more diversity and access.

First, more opportunities for independent production, or in other words, more competition, has been anticipated for the film business, with independent production sources proliferating. Consequently, the new technologies have prompted claims that there will be intense industrial rivalries and conflicts, as the film industry battles with the television industry and both confront the cable industry, etc. The third, and possibly more prevalent, prediction pertains to the availability of cultural products. Better quality and more spectacular films have been promised through the “magic” of new production technologies. And consumers have been promised more convenient access and more consumer choice or program diversity. Thus, with more information and entertainment, a better informed, more educated, and happier public is portrayed.

Through a series of questions and careful analysis, however, these promises become merely myths. We might ask, for instance, what the latest technologies have actually changed about the production and distribution of motion pictures, the traditional foundation of Hollywood entertainment? Have the structures and policies of corporate Hollywood actually changed? In other words, is discontinuity or change the only operating principle applicable in this entertainment or information age, or is there also a good deal of continuity observable in the industry’s structure and strategies? To answer these questions, technological change in Hollywood, as in other areas of the communications sector, must be analyzed historically.

Other important questions relate to who is in control of technological development, or in other words, how are decisions being made about what new technologies will be innovated and introduced, and what products will be delivered via these new technologies? How are changes in the production and distribution of film related to other media products? And, finally, is the public offered more choice and better quality entertainment, or just more of the same?

To answer these questions and more fully understand these developments, this book will present a political economic analysis of Hollywood and the latest technologies. It presents a survey of the newest technological developments since the 1970s in the traditional production, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures. It is essential to look beyond the technologies themselves, however, and consider how Hollywood has reacted and adapted to more general economic and political changes.

The main points delineated throughout this book are:

1 The major Hollywood companies have been interested and involved historically in a variety of media and other commodity forms beyond film.

2 Hollywood as an industry means more than film production, distribution and exhibition; it also has incorporated promotion, merchandising, theme parks, and other media forms, such as television, cable, home video, etc. In other words, Hollywood does not merely represent the film industry, but crosses over traditional industrial boundaries and engages in transindustrial activities.

3 The changes and continuity in Hollywood must be understood in light of general economic and political contexts, i.e. deregulation of media sectors such as cable, privatization and commercialization tendencies in global markets, etc.

4 Hollywood’s relationship to new technologies must be seen in light of these other contexts.

Chapter 2 will consider historical treatments of Hollywood and technology, with a brief discussion of specific periods of technological development in film history. Chapter 3 presents an overview of some of the technological developments in the production of motion pictures, while chapter 4 details the activities of the dominant Hollywood corporations that link film production with distribution. Major outlets for the distribution of Hollywood products are considered in the following chapters: cable (chapter 5), home video (chapter 6), and theatrical exhibition (chapter 7). Hollywood’s marketing and merchandising strategies are detailed in chapter 8, while global activities are outlined in chapter 9. Based on these discussions, conclusions will be offered in chapter 10.

2

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The Way We Were: An Historical Look at Hollywood and Technology

Hollywood and technology? How about Charlie Chaplin’s assembly line in Modern Times, Hal, the misbehaving computer in 2001, or R2D2 and Robocop? While Hollywood has produced these vivid and memorable depictions of future technologies, there is more to this relationship than the images that appear on the silver screen. After all, film is technology and the motion picture industry has exploited technological developments throughout its history.

But recently such developments have come under more intense scrutiny as new distribution outlets, such as cable, pay cable, and videocassettes and discs, have challenged the traditional distribution outlets of theaters and over-the-air television. Interestingly, the attention directed at film technologies has churned up some myths that have long been associated with the US film industry. An example is the following statement by George Mair in his recent book on Home Box Office (HBO):

Hollywood has never grasped the importance of new technology. It fought against the talkies, against color, against radio, against television, against cable TV, and, most recently, against the videocassette and home video. Hollywood ended up profiting from all of these new technologies, but only after it tried unsuccessfully to kill them. Hollywood always views a new way of doing things as a threat, instead of as an opportunity.1

Mair is not alone in this opinion, as evidenced by the following comments by Jack Valenti, head of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA):

Major technical developments in the audiovisual field generally make their initial appearance as esoteric laboratory curiosities, innocuous and benign. But many rapidly metamorphose from cute chicks to voracious vultures. To survive and prosper, our industry has had to develop not only coping skills, but more important, the ability to anticipate and manage change. This has not always been the situation.2

Mair and Valenti are echoing the received history of Hollywood’s technophobia.3 Historians have repeatedly reported the reluctance of US film companies to anticipate and accept new technological innovations, from the introduction of sound film to the home video “revolution.” This chapter will explore the challenges to this myth represented by more recent work on the history of film technology, but argue that there are still some problems with these newer approaches.

The Myth of Hollywood’s Technophobia

First, it might be noted that the image of Hollywood as technologically backward does not seem to apply to technological development within the film industry itself, i.e. lighting, cameras, film stock, etc.4 Film histories abound with detailed accounts of developments in these areas, with praise heaped on Hollywood producers for a wide range of special effects techniques.

However, major technological changes outside the traditional parameters of motion pictures have been labeled by many as beyond Hollywood’s vision. Specifically, some historians have observed that the introduction of important new communication media, such was radio, television, and more recent video technologies, have been only reluctantly accepted by the film industry. The studios are even accused of resisting sound film, which was introduced by forces mostly outside the industry.

But how was it possible that these large, profit-seeking film corporations were as myopic as reported in these histories? Could they have been unaware of the competitive threat posed by these new media, and uninterested in the profit potential or promotional possibilities represented by these new technologies?

A good deal of evidence in recent historical accounts leads us to believe that they were not. Furthermore, this recent research indicates that there were a variety of reasons why the industry was not always successful in initially dominating or controlling these new technologies, but there was nearly always great interest in the possibilities of exploiting them and some successful efforts to do so. A brief look at the introduction of sound film, radio and television will illustrate the point.

Sound film While the introduction of “talkies” in the late 1920s was a technological achievement eventually utilized within the parameters of the film industry itself, there have been claims that the industry resisted the initial innovation of sound film. One of the reasons for this interpretation may have been the fact that the technology needed to integrate sound and pictures was developed by companies outside the industry, primarily AT&T and RCA. But, in many ways, this was not unlike other technological developments for the early film industry. As Janet Staiger notes,

Although the major film studios claimed to have their own “research departments,” most were small-scale design and machine shops. No studio could afford the research facilities of a General Electric, a Union Carbide, or a Western Electric…. The most basic and significant research was performed by the manufacturers and suppliers of materials and equipment. In an important sense, Hollywood filmmaking only became a modern industry when it joined forces with corporate research.5

Although the larger studios (Paramount and Loew’s) initially may have resisted the move to sound film, there was a deliberate and coordinated effort to adopt the new technology after smaller companies in the industry had proven its viability by introducing sound features and newsreels around 1927–8.6

At least two smaller Hollywood firms were involved with the innovation of sound at the technological level. Warner joined AT&T’s efforts in 1925, producing vaudeville shorts for the Vitaphone system. Meanwhile, the Fox Film Corporation had formed a subsidiary to exploit the Case sound system, using it to release Movietone newsreels beginning in 1927. Both companies enthusiastically pursued sound film and were able to rise to the ranks of the majors because of their success.

When these two companies had proven the viability of the new sound systems, the other studios quickly adopted one of them (AT&T’s). As Douglas Gomery notes, “once the decision was made, the actual switchover occurred rapidly and smoothly.”7 And they were not disappointed – substantial and immediate profits were gleaned by the major companies from the transition to talkies.

So, while the largest firms in the industry may have hesitated at first, their strategy ultimately paid off. Other Hollywood companies did not appear to resist the new technology at all, and actually played important roles in its innovation, thus challenging the myth that Hollywood had resisted the transition to sound.

Radio Interesting by-products of the development of sound film were the corporate links forged between the radio and film industries. Besides the previously mentioned alliance between Warners and AT&T, the phone company formed a subsidiary (ERPI) to deal exclusively with its film activities.8 Meanwhile, RCA became directly involved in the film industry through its formation of RKO in 1928 and through its intimate ties with the fully integrated studio until the 1940s.9

Nevertheless, there is a long-standing myth that Hollywood and the radio industry had nothing to do with each other. For instance, in his classic history of radio, Erik Barnouw states uncategorically that Hollywood ignored radio until the 1930s.10 As Michelle Hilmes observes, most other film and broadcasting historians either agree with Barnouw or refer to radio only in terms of its threat to film.11

In addition to the previously mentioned corporate ties, there were numerous examples of radio aficionados among studio executives. Samuel Rothapfel (“Roxy”) was an early radio enthusiast, organizing live broadcasts as well as writing about the future of broadcasting. The Warner brothers also were involved with broadcasting and set up radio stations in Los Angeles and New York. Harry Warner even proposed a radio network to publicize Hollywood films.12

Meanwhile, other film companies participated in the radio boom, including experiments with the transmission of pictures via radio, thus also challenging the myth that the film industry was not interested in television until it was too late. In the late 1920s, Paramount Pictures and MGM announced radio chains. Although neither studio followed through with their plans, it seemed clear that a move towards diversifying corporate activities was clearly the aim. Paramount later became involved with the formation of the CBS network (but ultimately withdrew), and MGM briefly experimented with radio programs called “teleshorts,” based on the studio’s recently released films. Hollywood’s interest in radio reached its peak in 1927. Hilmes explains: “Although the 1930s and 1940s would bring heavy Hollywood involvement in production for the radio networks, after 1927–28, Hollywood potential for actual ‘control’ of the medium diminished rapidly.”13

Recent historical accounts have speculated that the demise of these activities was due to the impending introduction of sound, radio’s potential threat to exhibitors, the precarious financial standing of the companies involved, and the Federal Trade Commission’s suit charging the film industry with unfair methods of competition.14 Thus, Hollywood retreated to the role of talent and program supplier, developing a symbiotic relationship with the radio industry. Even the ban in 1932 (when the studios prevented their contract talent from working for radio), although cited by historians as evidence that the two industries were bitter rivals, was actually only a partial arrangement, not universally supported, and lasted only about nine months. Meanwhile, Hollywood was actively involved in radio programming through the supply of variety, dramatic and gossip shows, in addition to radio adaptations of movies.15

Radio also contributed to film activities, as radio personalities became film stars and radio programs inspired motion pictures during the thirties and forties. An obvious example was Orson Welles’ activities in both film and radio, but other radio/film stars, such as George Burns, Gracie Allen, Bing Crosby, Bob Hope, Rudi Vallee and Eddie Cantor, also come to mind.

Thus, it is clear that the film industry was not a stranger to radio (and vice versa) throughout this historical period. And while it certainly was the case that Hollywood was not able to dominate the industry in its formative years for a variety of specific historical reasons, there were definite attempts to exploit the new technology in one way or another.

Television A similar misconception exists for Hollywood’s involvement in early television development. The heads of the major studios are often seen as resistant to the possibility that television would offer a real threat to their business.16 It is typically assumed that Hollywood executives dug their heads in the sand, wishing that television would go away, until it was clear that they had to compete with the new medium in order to survive.

Yet, there is strong historical evidence that film companies were involved much earlier in television’s evolution. As previously mentioned, some of the studio executives demonstrated interest in television experiments as early as the 1920s. Later, in the thirties there was much discussion of the industry’s preparation for the new medium. In 1938 the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences requested its Research Council to study the film industry’s preparation for the inevitable introduction of television, while numerous articles discussed the subject.17 Around the same time, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA), the industry’s trade association, also investigated the role of the film industry in the forthcoming television business.18

Meanwhile, concrete evidence of such interest is represented by Paramount’s purchase of half ownership of DuMont (including the DuMont Laboratories, where much television experimentation was carried out) in 1938.19 In addition to the stations owned by Dumont, Paramount itself received licenses for two television stations (KTLA in Los Angeles and WBKB in Chicago), although the studio had applied for 13 licenses from 1940 to 1948. Other studios, including MGM, Warners, Disney and Twentieth Century Fox, actively vied for early TV stations.20

But film companies also were involved in attempts to introduce alternative television systems, i.e. not supported by commercial sponsorship. Paramount invested in theater television as early as 1941, using an intermediary film system produced by Scophony (owned by Paramount). Twentieth Century Fox became involved with a similar system through General Precision Laboratories, as well as purchasing the rights to the Eidophor system in 1949. These systems competed with RCA’s direct transmission process and enjoyed some success until around 1953, when home television’s rapid growth overwhelmed plans for further theater TV development. The systems also suffered from problems with transmission, intensified by lack of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) support, as well as with other details, and these seemed to doom theater television by 1953.21

Meanwhile, experiments were conducted with subscription or pay television. And, interestingly, Hollywood (in the broadest sense) was involved in both the initiation of and opposition to some of these early efforts, despite the claim that the film industry ignored developments in this area.

From about 1949, several companies actively experimented with pay television. One of these companies was Telemeter, a cable system which eventually offered three channels using a scrambled broadcast signal. Films were viewed by placing coins in a box on a television set, which then descrambled the picture. Paramount Pictures owned 50 percent of Telemeter.

Another system was developed by Matthew Fox, “an entrepreneur with a long history of involvement with the movie industry.”22 Fox also received the help of IBM to develop a system called Subscribervision, which used a punch card and scrambled broadcast signals. RKO General became involved with this system when WOR-TV was given permission to test the Subscribervision system in 1950.

While these various systems were tested during the early 1950s, Telemeter attracted the most attention in 1953, when the company provided a community antenna system, plus special programs for extra fees, to homes in Palm Springs, California. While some of the theater owners cooperated with the experiment, others fought it, charging Paramount-Telemeter with violation of the recent antitrust suit against the majors. While Telemeter claimed to be a success with over 2,500 subscribers, the system apparently buckled under the threat of governmental restriction.

Meanwhile, another system operated by Southwestern Bell Telephone and Jerrold Electronics was drawing attention with its pay-TV experiment in a small town in Oklahoma. The local theater chain was part of the project, thus avoiding one source of opposition. While the experiment received a good deal of press attention, the service apparently was charging too much and encountered problems with costly telephone lines, thus came to a close in 1958.23

Opposition to pay-TV came from the theater sector of the film industry, as well as broadcasters and other groups. Ironically, it pitted Paramount Pictures (with its Telemeter experiment in Palm Springs) against United Paramount Theaters, which had recently been divested from Paramount and merged with ABC Television in 1953.

While various experiments were carried out in the early 1960s, broadcast and theater forces lobbied extensively to defeat pay television. A state-wide referendum in California in 1964 was directed against a system called Subscription Television, initiated by Pat Weaver, former president of NBC.24 Although the referendum was eventually declared unconstitutional, the extensive publicity around the ballot measure and its success seemed to seal the fate of pay television, at least during this period in history.

Indeed, most of the experiments in pay television seemed to have failed by 1965. Hilmes argues that the decline of these systems was due to the FCC’s support of the existing broadcast system, as well as the recent attention the film industry had received from the Department of Justice in the Paramount decrees and other cases.25

It also might be noted that the Hollywood companies moved in the wrong direction with their subscription experiments. It seems that it was just too early for pay systems that did not offer a regular schedule of special programming for which audiences felt it was worth paying an extra fee. For whatever reason, the Hollywood companies failed or gave up and their interests shifted to other profitable endeavors. (For more on Hollywood’s involvement in cable TV, see chapter 5.)

While the film industry failed in its opportunities to dominate the television industry, it is important to at least set the record straight as to the efforts by Hollywood to attempt such involvement and to again acknowledge the interaction of these two industries. As Hilmes concludes,

Opposition from exhibitors and from established broadcast interests, backed by FCC protectionism and the lack of alternative distribution systems, would once again block film industry plans to move into television broadcasting in a substantial way. And again, as in the case of radio, broadcasting and film interests would establish a system of accommodations by which Hollywood’s influence over the forms and structures of broadcasting would become stronger than ever before.26

In summary, then, it might be possible to conclude that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, the film industry has been interested and actively involved in technological developments pertaining to new distribution and promotional outlets for their products.27 However, because of specific historical factors in each case – sometimes incorrect decisions about the future of the technology concerned; at other times, lack of support from regulatory agencies – Hollywood did not initially succeed in dominating these new profit arenas. Yet ultimately, the film industry was able to capitalize on their successful innovation.

The Problems of Technological Histories of Film

Why has the Hollywood technophobia myth been perpetuated? One basic problem has been access to accurate and relevant evidence. The problems of documenting film technology’s history are similar to those of studying its economic activities. Corporate decision-making often is veiled in secrecy, which only frustrates historical inquiry. Add to that the chronic problem of finding good, accurate information about the film industry. Morris Ernst was not the first or the last to complain about Hollywood’s “infantile skittishness in respect to statistics.”28 Meanwhile, it is not surprising that historical myths are built and perpetuated around the business of Hollywood. Indeed, the industry seems to thrive on them.

However, with the growth of the academic study of film and especially more attention to film history and economics, some of the age-old Hollywood myths have been challenged. A brief look at the various ways that film technology has been studied may be instructive at this point.

Numerous film scholars have delineated approaches to the study of film history, in general, and film technology, in particular. Similar to other technological histories, many accounts of film technology have traditionally focused on inventors and inventions. Edward Branigan describes an “adventure” version of film history, while Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery refer to the more familiar “great men” theory of history.29 Meanwhile, Eileen Meehan refers more generally to an instrumental approach to media history, which emphasizes individuals.30

A technological preoccupation also has been prevalent in film history, as in communication history in general. Branigan refers to technological histories of film, while others have discussed technological determinism applied to cinema.31 A similar approach is identified by Stephen Neale, who describes simple chronological histories or “one technology after another”: “There are no real determinations on this process. Aesthetic, economic, legal or political facts and factors will from time to time be acknowledged and discussed. But they will tend to be accounted for in piecemeal fashion and at a purely local level, thus in effect depriving them of any general, systematic significance.”32

While these approaches have been appropriately critiqued, other types of historical analysis have developed within film studies. While these new historical approaches are not without their own limitations, they offer some welcome relief from the previous great man and technological determinist versions of film history.

Film scholars have finally taken seriously the charges that cinema history has typically neglected economic factors and the industrial nature of Hollywood filmmaking. An industrial model has been introduced, exploring the invention, innovation, and diffusion of technologies and emphasizing management decision-making and cost-reduction strategies. This approach draws on the industrial organization model in economics, as a branch of neoclassical economic theory. While the approach has been promoted most strongly by Douglas Gomery, other film scholars have accepted and implemented an industrial model.33

The managerial emphasis of such industrial analyses provides interesting insight into how technologies have been introduced, often supplying important primary documentation. The approach also traces the uneven development of the film industry, documenting the inevitable concentration and monopolistic tendencies inherent in a market system of film production and distribution. Yet, the answer to these problems, implied if not overtly stated in much industrial/management analysis, is to simply fix the system – eliminate excesses and monopolistic tendencies, and everything will be fine. In other words, there is a strong reliance on the neoclassical conceptualization of corporate behavior, which underestimates power relations and emphasizes rational management decisions geared to maximizing profits and reducing costs. While these are certainly motivations for corporate behavior, there are other motivations as well. As Geoff Hodgson observes, “the firm is an institution of power, rather than one that survives due to its cost-cutting efficiency.”34 Generally, then, the industrial model uncritically accepts a corporate model as the dominant form of filmmaking activity.

A closely related treatment of the film industry is represented in the work of Michael Storper and Susan Christopherson, who use an historical overview of the film industry to support a theory of flexible specialization.35 From their base in urban planning, but drawing again on neoclassical economics, the authors argue that the film industry has been restructured from the integrated, mass-production studio system of the thirties and forties (a Fordist model) to a disintegrated and flexible system based on independent and specialized production (a post-Fordist model). Thus the film industry provides an example of flexible specialization’s viability for other industrial sectors to emulate.

Storper and Christopherson describe some important changes in the “entertainment industrial complex” that is the US film industry of the late 20th century. Yet, their analysis is severely handicapped by their emphasis on the production sector, neglecting the key roles played by distribution, exhibition and financing. As Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins point out in their critique of Storper and Christopherson, “For them, the major transformation in the American film industry is centered around the reorganization of production, and, more particularly, around the changing relationship between technical and social divisions of labor in production. It is as if the Hollywood industrial story begins and ends with the production of films.”36

As with the industrial model mentioned previously, the flexible specialization thesis relies on a characterization of corporate behavior based primarily on rational decision-making and cost reduction. Thus, Storper and Christopherson actually misread the dynamics of Hollywood, misrepresenting the autonomy and flexibility of independent production, and underestimating the power and domination of the Hollywood majors. And, as we shall see, rather than disintegration, the US film industry has experienced a process of re-integration in the late eighties and early nineties.

Another recent approach to film technology has been referred to as an ideological model, emphasizing economic and ideological analysis. This approach has been most often associated with the work of Jean-Louis Comolli, who concluded in his influential essay in Cahiers du Cinéma in 1971, “It is to the mutual reinforcement of an ideological demand (‘to see life as it is’) and an economic demand (to make it a source of profit) that cinema owes its being.”37 In other words, Comolli insists on linking technology with economics, which is thus linked with ideology. This model has been scrutinized and discussed during the last decade in film studies and found by many film scholars to be an improvement on previously mentioned historical models.38 However, little or any actual historical analysis has accompanied the theoretical debates. In addition, it might be argued that the level of abstraction represented by some of these discussions often serves to mystify, rather than inform, the history of film.39

While Comolli’s work is identified as “an avowedly Marxist perspective,”40 a more recent attempt to use Marxist terminology in the analysis of film technology is the exhaustive (and exhausting) study of classical Hollywood cinema by David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson.41 Their discussion of the activity surrounding the introduction and evolution of film technology covers territory often neglected by other historians, especially the role of engineers, trade associations, and other institutions in technological development. Yet, the primary and overarching concern of the book’s authors is the role of technology in film style. For instance, they frame their section on technology with the following question: “How can we explain technological change in Hollywood in relation to the classical style of filmmaking and the Hollywood mode of production?”42

The use of the Marxist terminology by Bordwell et al. has an interesting twist, as well. While they insist on employing terms such as “mode of production,” etc., the scope of analysis defies such use. In a rather stinging critique of these authors, Andrew Britton observes that

they suffer (as Hollywood histories generally do) from the author’s assumption that it is possible to extrapolate the object “Hollywood” from the social history of 20th century American capitalism as a whole…. she [Staiger] treats “The Hollywood mode of production” and its development as if this mode were a thing in itself which can be studied independently of the culture within which the development took place … Ms. Staiger derives no more from her excursion through Hilferding, Mandel and Sweezy than “new methods for analyzing the film industry”: the wider world is acknowledged to exist, but it only confirms the autonomy of the object which has been detached from it.43

The study is preoccupied again with film analysis, as though a study of the industry and its technological development is only important to the extent that it contributes to the close examination of film texts. While this is definitely an important contribution to film history, there may be other implications and consequences that are neglected by turning such analysis back on stylistic or textual readings, rather than outwards toward the rest of society. In addition, by focusing primarily on the production process, the important role of distribution is diminished. In other words, there are no real challenges to the actual power structure of the industry, and thus, ultimately, despite the radical rhetoric, the study offers little in the way of a truly critical approach to its subject.

Conclusions: Challenging the Future through the Past

While the newer versions of film technology challenge some of the old Hollywood myths and present useful, important historical insights, there are still limitations to their contribution to critical historical inquiry.

Studying film for film’s sake A good portion of the academic study of film typically has been insular and self-contained, with little regard to interrelationships between media or media and social context.44 Hilmes, for instance, has argued for the need to analyze the film and broadcasting industries “in a new light”:

For various reasons having to do both with differentiation in product and organization maintained by the institutions themselves, and with the reception accorded them in the academic institution, film and broadcasting have been traditionally regarded as inherently separate, having little to do with each other except in discrete and unusual circumstances. Most accepted historical accounts on both sides of the topic routinely ignore any overlap between the two industries, particularly during the early period of network radio.45

Despite the competition within and between industries, the radio, television, electronics and film industries historically have been intertwined, often working collectively. It seems undeniable that the media business has increasingly become even more concentrated and unified. Corporate mergers and diversification activities have dramatically intensified this trend. But the fragmentation of academic analysis further perpetuates the myth of separation within the media/entertainment industry. While such academic segmentation is breaking down in some ways (the addition of television studies to film programs, academic journals and organizations), there is still much work to be done accounting for the interrelationships between media, as well as other forms of popular culture, as well as setting the entire consciousness industry in its overall social context.

The romance of Hollywood By accepting the myths or concentrating primarily on aesthetic aspects of film technology, corporate influences on film activities, as well as the actual power structure of the industry, can be obscured. In addition, the emphasis on production technologies skews analysis away from important changes in distribution which have implications for the way that people experience film and the relationship of the industry with other social institutions.

While executives cannot always predict the future or act wisely in light of it, corporate imperatives have guided the film industry from its inception. The image of the typical Hollywood mogul has sometimes been exempt from the usual characteristics of the ruthless, calculating corporate executive. After all, these men were creating dreams, and Hollywood, after all, is a unique industry. Although the image of the studio mogul responding only to the seat of his pants may be part of the legacy of Hollywood, recent histories have challenged such myths in light of more careful, less romantic historical inquiry. But it might be argued that there is still a preoccupation with aesthetic and stylistic factors, thus obscuring the social consequences of technology developed according to a corporate imperative.

Status quo film history, or the way we were In most of these recent histories, there is an acceptance of the Hollywood model as inevitable (i.e. film production/distribution and technological development guided by a profit motive). It may be useful to remember that the history of film technology, like any other history, has been influenced by the visions of the people who have written it. Along these same lines, a group of historians from MARHO, the Radical Historians’ Organization, has noted that “We live in a society whose past is given to us in images that assert the inevitability of the way things are.”46 The new histories of film technology, then, may represent different approaches to film history, but their visions still basically support “the ways things are.” Thus, by accepting the “the way we were,” we may be undermining the possibility of different futures.

But, before we venture into the future, the task at hand is to understand Hollywood in the present. To do this, this study argues that we must:

1 seek to discover the actual history of the film industry and its relationship to other institutions, rather than merely accepting the received myths;

2 study the film industry in its entirety, production through exhibition, as well as how it relates, interacts and sometimes merges with other media and consumer activities;

3 analyze changes in film within its actual social context or, in other words, within corporate structures of power and control;

4 study technological development in the film industry, as in other arenas, as determined and changeable, not as determining and inevitable.

While this book does not direct its attention to ideological readings of texts, nor explore audience members’ reactions or resistance to the products of the culture industry, the analysis is deliberately focused on assessing the industrial context in which a good deal of American popular culture is produced and distributed.47 The proliferation of these products, both in the USA and other countries around the world, would seem to argue for this type of analysis as a base for further studies which may then incorporate these other relevant factors.

The next chapter will examine some recent technological changes in production activities, and that is followed by some snapshots of the companies that dominate Hollywood – the major production/distribution corporations.

3

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Film Production in the Information Age

The US film industry has continuously integrated new technological changes into the filmmaking process. While some changes are obvious to audiences, others go unnoticed but have profound effects on the production process.

Over the last few decades, many of these developments have been aimed at resisting the move to video. While video has yet to replace film as the medium of distribution for theatrical presentation, the use of video technology contributes in many ways to the production process. And, as in other areas of life in the 1990s, computers are used during the pre-production, production and post-production of Hollywood motion pictures. This chapter will focus on changes in the production sector primarily related to video and computers (see table 3.1).

Pre-production

Even before a Hollywood film script is written, marketing research sometimes takes place to estimate audience interest in a film idea. Thus, as in other consumer markets, computerized marketing surveys are used more often these days in Hollywood to make decisions about the viability of film projects.

Computers also play a role in script preparation, as screen writers employ various software programs, such as Power Scriptor, Scriptor, Movie Master, Scriptware, or Final Draft to assist in formatting scripts, etc. Software for the preparation of story boards also is available, as are computerized story boards which make it possible to visualize a scene while writing a script or before shooting begins. Other programs make it possible to visualize space to be used in a film, thus making it possible to design and light sets, block shots, plan camera moves, etc. Such programs allow more careful planning for difficult shots, such as those filmed underwater, explosions, etc. An example is the Virtus Walkthrough program, which was used in planning for the film The Abyss.1

Table 3.1 Examples of video and computer applications in the film production sector

Production control has been simplified with software packages, such as Associate Producer, Movie Magic Budgeting and Scheduling, Filmworks Scheduling & Budgeting, Turbo, and The Remarkable Film and Video System, which assist film producers in planning budgets and coordinating production schedules. Computers also are employed for a wide variety of production activities, such as payroll, budgeting, financial records on daily production costs, etc.2 Casting also has been affected by computer and video developments, as actors and actresses are able to find out about potential jobs through computerized casting networks, and then present casting directors with video audition tapes or video résumés. In addition, talent agencies, such as William Morris Agency Inc., are using computer networks and databases to store and access information about talent availability and other information.3 Even the process of scouting locations has been influenced by video, as distant sites can be considered for scenes without additional travel expenses.

Studios and the corporations that own them have been affected by new computer technologies and telecommunications systems. Generally, such information systems are similar to those of other corporate sites, although special needs may exist to service the diversity of activities taking place (everything from the sale of clothing to film production to theme park rides), as well as the customized management structure of each corporation.4

Production

Film versus video While it has been rumored for nearly two decades, the electronic process of video has yet to replace the chemically based process of film for the production of feature films and dramatic television programs. Some of the resistance has to do with traditional “film people” simply refusing to change. But other reasons have to do with technical differences and economic advantages.

Traditionally, video has most often used several cameras, while cinema typically uses only one, thus lighting effects are more carefully controlled on a shot-by-shot basis. In addition, video has been plagued by technical problems with more “down time” waiting for electronics, as well as presenting storage problems (video disintegrates faster than film negative and video systems change quickly).5

Shooting logistics often favor the portability of film. As an example, a video engineer referred to the problems of shooting video from a helicopter. Charles Eidsvik has even suggested that some technical changes in film production technologies have been made to enhance film’s advantages for on-location shooting, thus ensuring film’s role as the dominant shooting medium.6 These new developments include faster film stocks for shooting in low-light situations, faster and sharper lenses, and more efficient lighting equipment, as well as more portable and flexible cameras and mounts (such as the Steadicam, Skycam and Louma Crane) and improved sound technology which allows unwanted location sounds to be electronically replaced in post-production.7

Yet the most often cited difference between film and video is the quality of the image. Specifically, film offers better resolution and dynamic range (or a better contrast ratio). In 1984, an Eastman Kodak executive explained, “There is no technology on the horizon capable of making video-taped images look like filmed images.”8 While some experts argue that HDTV (high definition TV) quality is close, video’s technical limitations also have been pinned to problems with video monitors, which cannot reproduce the texture of film. The conclusion of a video engineer in 1991 was that “you still cannot make film on television look like a print.”9

Video experimentation Over the last decade, several directors have experimented with different’ video processes. Harlow was shot in 1965 using a system called Electronovision, but with less than satisfactory results. Since then, several other films have been shot in video. For instance, a system called Image Vision has been used to tape concerts utilizing a video process with increased resolution. The tape is then converted to film for editing and theatrical release. (Examples include Monty Python Live at the Hollywood Bowl and Richard Pryor in Concert.)10

A few directors have experimented extensively with electronic filmmaking, including Michelangelo Antonioni and Francis Ford Coppola.11 Coppola developed new technological innovations at his Zoetrope Studio, creating such novelties as a video storyboard and congruent edit system which was used, for instance, in the production of One From the Heart.12

Higher qualify video Recently the hopes for video have focused on high definition television (HDTV), which involves high resolution video images (1,125 lines, for most HDTV systems, versus the US current standard of 525 lines) at a similar aspect ratio to film (1.78:1, rather than TV’s current 1.33:1), with enhanced color fidelity and range, and digital sound. There is no doubt that HDTV would improve the technical quality of current television systems, yet there are still questions about which standards are to be adopted and how systems will be implemented, as well as whether or not HDTV is an essential technology, for television or film.

While HDTV systems have been on the drawing board for over a decade, the larger picture involves far more than just the film industry. HDTV may be used with computers in a wide variety of industrial and military settings, as well as its various applications in the communications industry. Consequently, the Electronics Industry Association has estimated that the market generated by HDTV will exceed $150 billion during the 1990s and into the next century. Peripheral products will add another estimated $400 billion.13 Thus, the stakes are high to control the new technology, pitting nations, international organizations, industries, and corporations against each other.

While the battle over standards continued in the early nineties, “Hollywood and the major networks have sat on the sidelines, waiting for all the technical stuff to be resolved.”14 Japan started broadcasting HDTV signals via satellite in 1991, using the 1,125-line system, which also has been adopted in Europe and approved by the SMPTE (the Society for Motion Picture and Television Engineers). Meanwhile, in early 1993 the USA had still not completed a five-year process of considering different standards, including digital HDTV systems which are thought to be superior because of the ability of interact with computers.15

Though home HDTV systems are distinct possibilities, the process may be utilized first in motion picture production and, possibly, exhibition. There are already examples of television programs and films shot in HDTV and transferred to film for exhibition. For example, in 1991 Viacom shot the TV movie Perry Mason in high definition, while Columbia Pictures’ production of Hook used Sony’s high definition video for eventual transfer to film.16 In light of Sony’s ownership of Columbia (see chapter 4), there may be more examples at the studio in the future. Sony has been working on HDTV since 1981, developing cameras, projectors, transfer equipment, etc. Not too surprisingly, Sony’s High Definition System (HDVS) Center is located on the Sony/Columbia lot in Culver City, where the technology has been used primarily for commercials, titles, animation, and computer graphics.17 Brian Winston points out, however, that even though Sony has targeted the production community, the company backed an analog rather than a digital system, thus offering “the wrong solution to the wrong problem at the wrong time.”18

Several other Japanese electronic companies are promoting HDTV, including Matsushita, the owner of Universal Pictures (see chapter 4). Although they saw Hollywood as an ideal proving ground for the potential of high definition video, they have encountered a good deal of resistance, as well as increased competition from film suppliers. Harry Mathias, a cinematographer and HDTV expert, claims that high definition video “is desperately trying to solve a need in the motion picture industry that simply doesn’t exist.”19 In response to the HDTV challenge, 35 mm color film technology, the industry standard for six decades, has advanced significantly in recent years, giving movie makers considerably more flexibility in creating visual images. Competitive pressure from the Japanese high definition video systems has also led the Eastman Kodak Company, the leading supplier of film to Hollywood, and other companies to develop sophisticated new editing and special effects capabilities.20

HDTV has still received praise for the creation of composite images and special effects, saving time and money as well as providing creative flexibility.21 Recognizing that movie makers are not rushing to dump the 35 mm standard, the proponents of the new technology are concentrating for now on HDTV’s advantages as a tool for special effects and editing. A few small companies in New York, such as Rebo High Definition Studios and Captain of America, Inc., have taken advantage of these attributes, shooting high definition productions for commercial clients and building libraries for future use when the new technology finally takes hold.22

But the real revolution for Hollywood companies may come with HDTV “films” distributed directly to HDTV-equipped theaters or homes, which will mean serious changes in film distribution. While relatively few in Hollywood (except those involved with the Japanese electronic companies) displayed interest in the new process at the beginning of the nineties, predictions are that “Tinseltown will eventually play the HDTV game.” (Future possibilities involving HDTV exhibition will be discussed in chapter 7.)

“The Smell of the sprocket holes”23 In spite of these new video developments, many film workers and technicians stubbornly cling to “the film look,” arguing that it will never be replaced by video.24 For instance, many filmmakers say that “for all the crystal clarity of the images it produces, high-definition video cannot come close to film’s ability to capture the moods, the richness of color, the contrasts and shadings that collectively give a story visual life.”25

Ultimately, video may be accepted as the standard medium by the Hollywood production community, although some observers argue that this will not happen automatically as the quality improves, but when the cost of video production and equipment comes down. As an industry insider has noted, “The impetus to kill film is the dollar.”26

It has been suggested, however, that film’s superior quality has been deliberately mystified by the industry. As Eidsvik notes, “Driven by the nightmare of hearing the phrase ‘we could just as well have done it on tape,’ the film community made its internal power accommodations and promoted its mystique of quality in order to survive in the higher budget ends of the industry.”27 Winston makes a similar argument: HDTV’s potential to cut costs may not be necessarily persuasive, in that “Hollywood has used technology, either because of its complexity or its cost or both, to limit competition by creating barriers to entry.”28