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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Political Theory Today
- Sprache: Englisch
In the wake of major terrorist attacks, calls for ever more draconian policies to prevent further outrages are common. Such responses raise the pressing question: is it possible to effectively fight terrorism while respecting democratic values of equality and trust? Examining recent examples of terrorist atrocities - from the murder of Muslims in New Zealand and Jews in Pittsburgh to the Charlie Hebdo attacks - Patti Tamara Lenard considers how democracies should tackle terrorism within the constraints imposed by democratic principles. For many, the tension between liberty and security necessarily means that the only way to protect security is to sacrifice liberty--but Lenard rejects this claim, and instead argues that security's goal should be to keep all citizens equally secure in the face of terrorist threats. Critiquing existing policies, from exile to racial profiling, she outlines what ethical counter-terrorism policies should look like, arguing for strategies that respect equality and thereby maintain trust among diverse communities in democratic states. This erudite guide to how states might ethically fight terrorism will be essential reading for any student or scholar of public affairs, security, counter-terrorism, and democratic governance.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
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CONTENTS
Cover
Front Matter
Introduction
What Is Terrorism?
Outline of the Book
Notes
1 Security, Rights and Equality
What Is Security?
Which Rights Matter?
Democratic Equality and Distributing Security
Notes
2 Punishing Terrorism in Democratic States
Punishment in Democratic States
Just Punishments in Democratic States
Conclusion
Notes
3 Preventing Terrorism
A Security Test
The Right to Free Speech and Prohibiting Extremist Speech
Selecting the Targets of Prevention Policies
No-Exit Policies and the Right to Move
Surveillance and the Right to Privacy
Conclusion
Notes
Concluding Remarks
References
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Patti Tamara Lenard, How Should Democracies Fight Terrorism?
How Should Democracies Fight Terrorism?
Patti Tamara Lenard
polity
Copyright © Patti Tamara Lenard 2020
The right of Patti Tamara Lenard to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2020 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4077-8
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Lenard, Patti Tamara, 1975- author.Title: How should democracies fight terrorism? / Patti Tamara Lenard.Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity Press, 2020. | Series: Political theory today | Includes bibliographical references. | Summary: “Why our democratic values shouldn’t be sacrificed on the altar of national security”-- Provided by publisher.Identifiers: LCCN 2020000160 | ISBN 9781509540754 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509540761 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509540778 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Terrorism--Prevention--Moral and ethical aspects. | Democracy--Moral and ethical aspects.Classification: LCC HV6431 .L456 2020 | DDC 363.325/16--dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020000160
The publisher has used its best endeavors to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Acknowledgments
I began drafting the text that turned into this book while visiting the University of Toronto’s Centre for Ethics in early 2019, and I am very grateful to the welcoming faculty and students there. Margaret Moore and David Miller read early drafts and I am indebted to them for their critical comments. Peter Balint read and offered comments on chapter 3 when I was feeling especially unsatisfied with it. The earliest of my work on questions of security was done in collaboration with my colleague Wesley Wark, who read a late version of the manuscript and offered the critical suggestions that only an expert in national security can do. The original account of the security test was developed in collaboration with Terry Macdonald, in an article published in Perspectives on Politics. Three reviewers for Polity Press, and George Owers and Julia Davies, offered wonderfully helpful comments on the manuscript. Finally, my partner-in-all-things, Jacob Krich, read and commented on the first version of this manuscript, and most of the last, and never (ever) tired of going through each detail of the argument with me. There are no words adequate to thank him for all that he has done, and continues every day to do, for me and the sweet family that we are building together.
Introduction
States around the world are striving to protect their citizens from terrorism. Democratic states have an additional struggle in this task because not only must they protect their citizens from terrorism, they must do so in ways that respect and protect their rights. The challenge of combatting terrorism is complicated, further, by the myriad forms that terrorism takes. Consider the following cases.
In 2016, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) took credit for Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel’s decision to drive a 19-tonne cargo truck into a crowd of people celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France, killing nearly 90 people. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was killed at the scene of the crime, but after-the-fact investigations suggested he had been radicalized online, where he had expressed interest in and sympathy with ISIS violence.
In 2017, Sufiyan Mustafa was stripped of his British citizenship while he was in Syria, and he was denied the right to return to the United Kingdom. He is accused by the British government of fighting with ISIS, a claim that he denies, arguing in fact, that he fought on the side of a group that was being supported with American and British weapons. He claims that he is being tainted by the crimes of his father, Abu Hamza al-Masri, who is serving a life sentence for terrorist crimes in the United States. Mustafa has requested to return to the United Kingdom to make the case in a British court that he is not a terrorist; but, with the revocation of his citizenship, his right to make this case has effectively been extinguished.
In late 2018, a man yelling “All Jews must die” entered a synagogue during Saturday morning Sabbath services, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and shot and killed 11 people. Online, and prior to the shooting, Robert Bowers had posted a series of anti-Semitic comments, directed mainly at the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, accusing it of supporting the movement of irregular migrants into the United States. His online posting history suggests a commitment to far-right extremism, and his comments targeted Jews and African Americans, referring to both groups using a range of common slurs. Similarly, the Australian migrant to New Zealand1 who entered two separate mosques and murdered 51 Muslims in 2019 had posted a manifesto online before undertaking this crime, citing his hatred of immigrants and Muslims; and Patrick Wood Crusius, who entered a Walmart in El Paso, Texas in 2019 and murdered 22 people, had posted a manifesto online citing his hatred of Hispanics, and immigrants more generally, claiming that they were responsible for the dilution of the white race.
These examples showcase two forms of terrorism that are occupying the attention of democratic security authorities: terrorism committed by so-called “far-right extremists,” as in the case of Bowers, Crusius, and the gunman in New Zealand; and terrorism committed in the name of violent religious extremism, as in the case of Lahouaiej-Bouhlel and, allegedly, Mustafa. These two forms of terrorism have much in common, and also much that makes them distinct. This book focuses on how democratic states can be both fair and effective as they combat the threats posed by both types of terrorism.
What Is Terrorism?
Among scholars of terrorism, there is considerable disagreement about how to define terrorist organizations and terrorist actions. Terrorist actors are sometimes states – as was Nazi Germany – or, more often, sub-state organizations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Peonidis 2004, 321). Usually, terrorist organizations have recognizably political objectives, which serve to distinguish terrorist acts from pointless or criminal killing. These political ends can be expansive, including subjugating populations, overthrowing colonial or otherwise oppressive rulers, and destroying unjust economic regimes; or they can be narrow – for example, a demand that prisoners be released. The possession of a recognizably political objective suggests, at least in principle, that a political settlement of some kind can end terrorism.
Crucially, to achieve their objectives, terrorists act by generating fear or anxiety among a population (Scheffler 2006, 6; Townshend 2002, 15). This fear is often generated by carrying out a violent action, especially one that carries with it a “credible threat of repeated attacks” (Steinhoff 2007, 120; Coady 1985).
Finally, terrorism often targets innocent civilians on a relatively random basis, though there are disagreements about what renders a civilian innocent of, or complicit in, whatever harms the terrorists are intending to combat or highlight by their actions (Townshend 2002, 8; Steinhoff 2007, 112–17). There are often exceptions to this latter feature, however – the IRA, for example, has sometimes claimed to aim at restricting its violence to those it believed were actively working on behalf of the British state.
To summarize, for the purposes of this book, terrorist organizations are those that: (1) possess a recognizably political objective, which (2) they attempt to achieve by engaging in actions aimed at inducing widespread anxiety and fear – in particular by (3) perpetrating violence against innocents and credibly threatening to perpetrate more. Skeptical readers might believe that violent religious extremism and far-right extremist violence are not much like terrorism in the past, but in fact, as the rest of this introduction suggests, they meet all of these key requirements.
It is important to distinguish between the stated objectives of terrorist organizations and the tactics they deploy. Terrorist tactics vary considerably, including targeted assassinations, shooting rampages, hostage-taking, planting of bombs in public spaces, driving of trucks into crowded spaces, suicide bombings and hijacking of planes. In some cases, the objectives pursued by terrorists may be recognized as legitimate, even where their tactics are not. When opponents of apartheid in South Africa engaged in “necklacing,” the placing of rubber tires dipped in gasoline around the neck of opponents and setting them on fire, many observers deplored the practice as terrorism, even as they supported the objective of dismantling apartheid. Similarly, many people support the objective of a United Ireland, even as they agree that labelling the IRA “terrorist” is appropriate. In others, it may be that both the objectives and the tactics of terrorists are condemned, as they were in the case of Nazi Germany’s objective to rid Germany (and the world) of Jews.
For the last several decades, and certainly in heightened form since 9/11, the popular image of a terrorist is that of a young Middle Eastern man, like Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who harbors hostility toward the values that define democratic states. The danger he represents – of violent religious extremism, much of it connected to ISIS – has been the focus of much recent terrorism prevention policy-making. The danger posed by far-right extremism, however, is just as significant in democratic states, is growing, and until recently has appeared to be taken less seriously. In the United States, for example, between 2009 and 2018, 73 percent of lethal attacks labelled terrorism were committed by far-right extremists, whereas only 23 percent were committed by violent religious extremists (Serwer 2019). The same is true worldwide, where the crimes committed by far-right extremists far outpace those committed in the name of violent religious extremism (Strickland 2019). Mark Rowley, former head of the London Metropolitan Police’s counter-terrorism unit, stated publicly in 2018 that, in his view, the UK was paying insufficient attention to the growing threat posed by far-right extremism: “I don’t think we’ve woken up to it enough … it’s significant and growing, and what I’ve seen over the last couple of years is a lack of recognition of that” (Busby 2018).
Both violent religious extremism and far-right extremism intend to instill fear, by committing horrific crimes against innocents, in the hopes that the resultant fear and anxiety will undermine the state’s capacities to provide the goods that citizens expect. What differs is only the targets of violence. Far-right extremists are typically targeting minority or disadvantaged groups, including religious, ethnic or cultural minorities, as well as women or sexual minorities. In the case of the New Zealand mosque attacks, or Alexandre Bisonnette’s attacks on a mosque in Quebec, Canada, or in Robert Bowers’ attack on Jews, the intent was to instill fear in members of particular groups – insofar as they are members of identifiable groups – rather than society at large. Religious extremists often target, simply, “infidels,” though sometimes they target individuals or groups who are believed to be more directly responsible for military actions in the Middle East, or for propagating hatred against Muslims. British soldier Lee Rigby was targeted by religious extremists for his participation in British military actions in the Middle East, for example, and Charlie Hebdo employees were targeted for the magazine’s contentious portrayals of the prophet Mohammed, and Islam more generally.
The objectives pursued by far-right extremists and violent religious extremists are sometimes thought to be hard to discern. It is sometimes difficult to identify the political objectives of those carrying out truck attacks or stabbings, and post-crime evaluations often involve sifting through private correspondence and internet activity to identify the possible motives of such terrorist actors. In the case of far-right extremist crimes, the label of “far-right” extremist is applied after the fact, in response to the discovery of (usually online) statements of hatred for minorities whose presence, the perpetrator believed, was diluting or undermining something of alleged importance. In the case of violent religious extremists, objectives are sometimes to cause the withdrawal of western intervention in the Middle East, sometimes to contribute to the construction of an Islamic caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq, and sometimes simply to kill so-called “infidels” in the name of a larger putatively religious objective. Regardless of how the objectives are understood, it is widely agreed that the tactics pursued, by both parties, are recognizably terrorist: they aim to create anxiety and fear among a population by harming innocents, “with the aim of degrading the social order and reducing its capacity to support a flourishing social life” (Scheffler 2006, 6). The intention to create fear
