International Mediation E-Book

Paul F. Diehl

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: War and Conflict in the Modern World
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 316

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

Conflicts in the international system, both among and within states, bring death, destruction, and human misery. Understanding how third parties use mediation to encourage settlements and establish a durable peace among belligerents is vital for managing these conflicts. Among many features, this book empirically examines the history of post-World War II mediation efforts to:

• Chart the historical changes in the types of conflicts that mediation addresses and the links between different mediation efforts across time.
• Explore the roles played by providers of mediation in the international system - namely, individuals, states, and organizations - in managing violent conflicts.
• Gauge the influence of self-interest and altruism as motivating forces that determine which conflicts are mediated and which are ignored.
• Evaluate what we know about the willingness of parties in conflict to accept mediation, when and why it is most effective, and discuss the future challenges facing mediators in the contemporary world.

Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Oslo Accords and Good Friday Agreement to efforts to manage the civil wars in Burundi, Tajikistan, and Bosnia, this book is an indispensable guide to international mediation for students, practitioners, and general readers seeking to understand better how third parties can use mediation to deal with the globe’s trouble spots.

Leseprobe

International Mediation

To:

Jacob Bercovitch (1946–2011)A pioneer in the empirical study of international mediation

International Mediation

J. MICHAEL GREIG AND PAUL F. DIEHL

polity

Copyright © J. Michael Greig and Paul Diehl 2012

The right of J. Michael Greig and Paul Diehl to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2012 by Polity Press

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ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-6144-5

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Contents

Acknowledgements

List of Figures

List of Tables

1

Introduction

2

The Application of Mediation to Violent Conflicts

3

The Providers of Mediation

4

The Success and Failure of Mediation

5

The Connections and Consequences of Individual Mediation Efforts

6

Evolving Challenges for International Mediation

Appendix

References and Suggested Readings

Index

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank David Winters and Louise Knight from Polity Press for their support and encouragement in preparing this book. We are also grateful to Ashly Townsen and Robert Diehl for their research assistance and to Jacob Bercovitch for providing most of the data used in the various analyses reported in the book.

Figures

2.1  

Total Share of Conflicts and Mediation by Decade

3.1  

Share of Mediation Efforts over Time By Provider

3.2  

Share of Total Mediation by Major Powers

3.3  

Single and Multiparty Mediation

3.4  

Balance of Mediator Interests

3.5  

Number of Parties Providing Mediation to a Conflict (Lifetime)

3.6  

Share of Mediation Efforts to Conflicts with Genocide

3.7  

State Interests and Mediation

Tables

2.1  

Frequency of Type of Mediation by Decade

2.2  

Frequency of Mediation, Civil War, and Interstate War by Decade and Region

2.3  

Most Frequently Mediated Conflicts

2.4  

Number of Repeat Mediation Efforts by Same Mediator by Type of Conflict

2.5  

Number of Repeat Mediation Efforts by Same Mediator by Region

2.6  

Number of Different Mediators per Conflict

3.1  

Total Mediation Efforts by Third Party and Decade

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The use of mediation as a tool to manage conflicts is much older than the modern nation-state system itself. During the spring of 209 BC, a group of emissaries from several Greek city-states sought to mediate the First Macedonian War between the Aetolian League and Macedonia, producing a short truce in the conflict. This diplomatic intervention was driven not only by events on the battlefield between the belligerents, but also by the interests of the third parties themselves, each seeking to limit the expansion of Macedonian power and preserve the flow of regional commerce (Eckstein, 2002). Contemporary international mediation takes a similar form, with the diplomatic interventions of third parties into conflicts motivated by a combination of their desire to mitigate violence, establish peace, and protect their own interests. Over the last several decades, high-profile mediation efforts have played a vital role in ending decades-long civil violence in Northern Ireland, terminating the enduring rivalry between Israel and Egypt that previously experienced three major wars, and brokering the settlement of a territorial dispute between Chile and Argentina that brought those two nations to the precipice of war. In this chapter, we will discuss what mediation is, how it is used to manage conflicts in the international system, and how it differs from other conflict management approaches. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of several historic mediation efforts.

What is Mediation?

Mediation is a conflict management tool used widely across a diverse set of contentious cases, running the gamut from divorce settlement talks to labor management negotiations to peace efforts between warring states. Regardless of the type of conflict to which it is applied, the distinguishing feature of mediation is the introduction of an outside or third party into the negotiation process between the disputing sides with, at least partially, the aim of producing a settlement between the two sides. In one definition, Wall and Standifer (Wall et al., 2001: 370) define mediation simply as “assistance to two or more interacting parties by third parties who (usually) have no authority to impose an outcome.” This conceptualization has the key element that mediation is voluntary on the part of disputants as well as the mediator. Yet because mediation is voluntary, it cannot be assured that every disputant will be open to attempting mediation to manage or resolve conflict. It is not uncommon, for example, for governments confronting a rebel insurgency to reject overtures for mediation. The stronger side in interstate disputes often rejects mediation of their conflicts. India, for example, has tended to resist mediation with Pakistan over Kashmir. Major power states also tend to avoid third party assistance in managing their conflicts.

Given this voluntary character, both parties in conflict must conclude that they potentially gain more by accepting mediation than they can expect to gain on their own after rejecting third-party assistance. The benefits from accepting mediation may include an end to the violence and the settlement of the conflict, but may also consist of narrower gains that are unrelated to the achievement of a diplomatic settlement. Disputants may also engage in mediation as a means of preserving their relationship with the third party offering mediation or as a way to buy time until their prospects on the battlefield improve and their ability to impose their preferred settlement on the conflict grows (Richmond, 1998). This alternative motivation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Third-party mediators must be willing to devote time and resources to the effort of managing the conflict. Their motives might be altruistic, but mediators might also have a vested interest in managing a conflict or in a particular outcome. The conditions under which this occurs and which actors are most likely to serve as mediators are discussed in Chapter 3.

The simple structural definition of mediation (a third party among disputants) also emphasizes the formal role that the mediator assumes. As noted below, this can take several different forms, but in all cases the mediator is clearly a player in the conflict management process. In contrast, an actor might serve only in an advisory capacity to one side of a dispute or offer recommendations in a public forum on how the conflict might be managed. The former suggests a role in the conflict itself, but not as a mediator. The latter is not active in the direct conflict management process, even though some of the ideas might ultimately promote a settlement. Mediators have a clear and active role in the conflict management process.

Related mediation definitions emphasize less the formal role of the mediator and more decidedly the process in which the mediator alters the dynamics between the conflicting parties and their bargaining. In this respect, mediation can be described as “a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find themselves” (Zartman, 2008: 155). Bercovitch et al. (1991: 8) describe mediation in similar terms as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.” Here, mediation covers a wide range of third-party activities that extend from simply providing a forum for the parties to negotiate to assisting them in formulating potential settlement terms and in which the mediator uses its influence and resources to leverage an agreement.

The primary weakness of the above definitions is that while they suggest that mediators assist the parties in settling their conflict, they lack a description of how third parties do this. Bercovitch (2002) provides some clarification in elaborating how the presence of the mediator effects change in the conflict by altering the perceptions or the behaviors of the parties. The inclusion of the changes that a mediator encourages between the parties is an important component of the definition of mediation. Because mediators can facilitate settlements between parties in conflict by offering encouragement toward agreement, persuading the reconsideration of viewpoints, offering sanctions and rewards to alter bargaining positions, and developing new ideas for potential settlement terms, the addition of a mediator to a conflict is a significant change to the dynamics of the parties’ interactions.

One extension of the basic definition is to incorporate neutrality, or the political positioning of the mediator vis-à-vis the disputants. Thus, Kochan and Jick (2011: 211) see mediation as a “process in which a neutral party attempts to get the direct participants to reach a voluntary agreement.” A neutral mediator is said to be one that does not favor one side or the other. This goes beyond the mediator’s role as a third party who is not directly involved in the conflict, but extends to the mediator having no strong personal or national interests in how any agreement affects or favors any of the parties to the conflict or indeed the mediator itself. For many mediation efforts, such as the labor negotiations that Kochan and Jick (2011) discuss, a neutral mediator that is trusted by both sides is at the center of the mediation process. The United Nations mediation in the civil war in Tajikistan is a good example of the help that a neutral mediator can bring to the parties in conflict. The disputants were able to trust the United Nations and, in turn, the United Nations was able to improve the lines of communications between the two sides and suggest potential areas of agreement.

Despite the potential importance of neutrality in mediation, it is best that this element not be part of the central definition of mediation, but rather be considered as a potential variable in assessing the success of mediation. Indeed, not all mediation activities are carried out by individuals, groups, states, or organizations that can be regarded as neutral in a given context. For some conflicts in the international system, a neutral third party is not always available. It would be mistaken to ignore such efforts as falling outside mediation, when in fact the conflict management processes and actions are quite similar except for the identity and preferences of the mediator. It is better to assess how neutrality or lack thereof influences the likelihood of settlement, concerns that are the subject of considerable debate and which are addressed in Chapter 4. From that debate and empirical findings, it is evident that neutrality is not a necessary condition for favorable outcomes. Going into its mediation between Israel and Egypt, the United States had a clear bias toward Israel, but the combination of its role as a superpower, its interest in stability in the Middle East, and its ability to both use leverage to encourage an agreement and provide guarantees to both sides made it an attractive mediator, in spite of this bias.

Putting all these elements together and adding several others, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 34–35) summarize the essential characteristics of mediation:

1.  

Mediation is an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict resolution.

2.  

Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider – an individual, a group, or an organization – into a conflict between two or more states or other actors.

3.  

Mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention.

4.  

Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, in order to affect, change, resolve, modify, or influence it in some way. Mediators use personal or structural resources to achieve these objectives.

5.  

Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.

6.  

Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators’ proposals.

7.  

Mediation usually only operates on an

ad hoc

basis.

Forms of Mediation

The term “mediation” is a broad term that, in actuality, encompasses a wide range of third-party activities to manage a conflict. The approach that a third party takes in managing a conflict is dependent upon the conditions faced by the disputants. For some conflicts, the primary impediment to producing a settlement between the parties is information. In these conflicts, simply facilitating the ability of the two sides to sit down and talk may be sufficient to permit them to exchange information on their bargaining positions and goals, overcome misunderstandings, and identify areas of possible agreement. For other conflicts, how the parties see their relationship and the issues in contention are the key barriers to a settlement. In those circumstances, it is necessary for a third party to step in and help the parties to reframe their view of the conflict away from a zero-sum game toward one in which both sides come to believe that they are likely to emerge after a settlement better off than they were under the status quo. In this respect, the mediator assists the disputants in viewing their issues in contention as problems to be jointly solved. For still other conflicts, a third party is necessary to change the bargaining positions of the two sides, making settlement terms, which might initially be seen by the disputants as unacceptable, more palatable by offering rewards for their acceptance or punishments for their rejection.

One way to think about the differences in the forms that mediation takes is to focus upon the level of involvement the third party has in the conduct of the negotiations and the development of proposals to settle the conflict. Fisher (2007) distinguishes between four levels of third-party engagement: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, and power mediation. Conciliation is the lowest level of third-party engagement; a third party focuses upon developing informal communication linkages between the disputants as a means to reduce the level of hostility between the two sides and provides the foundation for further negotiations among them. In this form of mediation, what Pruitt (2000) refers to as “light mediation,” the third party is not directly involved in developing settlement solutions to the conflict or attempting to leverage concessions from the disputants. Instead, conciliation is more likely to involve a third party providing “good offices” among the disputants, simply arranging for a meeting place and time to facilitate discussions, but giving the disputants a free hand in the discussions. The Community of Sant’Egidio, a lay Catholic organization, provided such a forum for the Mozambican government and RENAMO rebels during Mozambique’s civil war, allowing the two sides the opportunity to come together and lay the groundwork for the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords that ended the war.

Consultation involves a more extensive level of mediator involvement in the negotiation process itself. A mediator performing a consultative role uses personal skills and an understanding of conflict management as tools to aid disputants in moving toward a problem-solving focus in dealing with the issues under dispute. In this respect, consultation involves a more direct hand of the third party in the discussions between the two sides. This involvement, however, remains limited with the mediator avoiding efforts to exert control over the discussions, change the bargaining positions of the two sides, or offer them carrots and sticks in favor of providing encouragement to the two sides to think of the common interests that exist between the two sides in ending the conflict. During the negotiation of the Camp David Accords, President Jimmy Carter, who tended to be averse to hard bargaining, generally saw the mediation process as one in which his role was to help the Egyptian and Israeli sides reconsider the issues in dispute between them as a problem which each had a shared interest to resolve rather than one seen in zero-sum terms (Princen, 1991).

In pure mediation, the third party plays a more substantial role in the talks between the disputants, encouraging an agreement not only by attempting to reason with and persuade them, but also by controlling the information flow between the two sides and offering potential settlement terms to the conflict. In this role, the mediator becomes a solution innovator to the conflict, seeking to help the parties not only to recognize areas of common interest, but also to develop terms of settlement for the conflict, and to encourage the disputants to embrace those terms. Unlike consultation, in pure mediation the mediator exerts more extensive control over the talks. A mediator might, for example, limit the range of topics to be conducted in the negotiations in order to increase the chances for their success, excluding some issues from the talks entirely and focusing on others that seem more favorable for agreement or are better tied to the issues under contention. In mediating the Northern Ireland conflict, an ad hoc international body, headed by the US (through George Mitchell) initially limited conflict management efforts to only the “decommissioning” (disarmament) issue, with the hope that an agreement there might be a springboard to a broader settlement.

The most intensive form of mediation is power mediation. In power mediation, the mediator not only controls the issues under discussion and develops potential settlement terms to the conflict, but actively uses its resources to leverage an agreement by the parties. As such, power mediation, what Pruitt (2000) refers to as “heavy mediation” and Zartman (2008) calls “manipulation,” is the most coercive form of third-party diplomatic intervention. In power mediation, the third party can use its resources as both carrots and sticks to entice the disputants toward an agreement. A third party might, for example, sweeten the terms of a potential settlement by offering foreign aid to the disputants. A third party might also push the parties toward an agreement by threatening punishments such as economic sanctions or even military strikes. In this respect, power mediation is distinct from the other three forms of mediation. Conciliation encourages agreement by improving the information flow between the sides while both consultation and pure mediation use the mediator as an additional source of ideas about potential settlement terms. Power mediation is the only form of mediation in which the third party actually changes the bargaining space over the issues between the disputants. As such, power mediation, unlike other forms, can produce a settlement to a conflict when the initial bargaining positions of the two sides have no area of overlap.

American mediation of the Camp David Accords is a good example of power mediation at work. In order to encourage agreement between Israel and Egypt, the United States offered substantial amounts of foreign aid to both Israel and Egypt while also offering security guarantees to assuage Israel’s fears of Egyptian cheating. American mediator Richard Holbrooke’s use of threats during the negotiation of the Dayton Accords during the Bosnian conflict is another example of the use of power mediation. Reaching an impasse in the talks over possession of the town of Brcko in northern Bosnia, Holbrooke threatened the Serbians that the talks would be declared a failure and shut down, and he suggested the potential for renewed NATO bombing of Serbian forces (Holbrooke, 1999). Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic relented on the issue the following day and the talks continued.

Goals of Mediation

Much as mediation can take many different forms, so too can the goals of mediation efforts vary. These goals can range from the narrowest of aims, such as achieving an agreement over a tertiary issue in a conflict, to a full settlement of all the issues in dispute. A third party might, for example, mediate an agreement on prisoner exchanges between two warring states. Achievement of such an agreement positively addresses the prisoner issue between the two sides, yet leaves the fundamental issues in dispute that caused the war unresolved.

A cease-fire is one way in which mediation can assist in successfully managing a conflict. By brokering a cease-fire, a mediator can not only stop the death and destruction caused by the conflict at least temporarily, but can also buy time to reduce the level of hostility between the two sides. In this respect, while a cease-fire does not necessarily end a conflict, it can create a lull in the fighting that is sufficient for the two sides to reconsider their options and potentially transition toward more peaceful means of settling their dispute. Although achieving a cease-fire is often beneficial, the degree to which it improves the relationship between warring parties can vary significantly. In some conflicts, cease-fires break down quickly. As a result, producing a cease-fire that collapses within days, or even hours, is not always a significant contribution to peace. Along these same lines, achievement of a cease-fire does not always indicate momentum toward a broader peace. Warring parties can sometimes sign on for a cease-fire because they see it as a means to gain breathing space that will improve their ability to achieve their goals on the battlefield or exert more leverage over the other side during negotiations (Princen, 1992; Richmond, 1998).

Although a cease-fire can halt, at least temporarily, the violence between warring parties, it leaves the underlying issues in dispute unresolved. In order to achieve a comprehensive peace that is likely to be durable, the parties must not only stop fighting but must also settle their differences that caused the conflict in the first place. Otherwise, there remains a continued risk of flare-ups between the contending sides as each tries to impose a settlement on the disputed issues. For many conflicts, violence is caused by disagreements over a broad range of issues of varying complexity. Under these circumstances, it can be undesirable, if not impossible, to attempt to resolve all of the issues in dispute at once. Instead, a mediator may choose to focus discussions on a particular subset of issues for which agreement is likely to be the easiest or on which tensions between the parties are the lowest in order to facilitate progress in the talks. Under these circumstances, a mediator will pursue the achievement of a series of partial agreements over time, often on procedural or less controversial issues, as a means to build toward a broader settlement of the conflict.

The International Negotiation Network intervened in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in September 1989 with the first simple goal of reaching an agreement on the meeting’s agenda. Subsequently, they reached agreements on rules for subsequent meetings including all of the following: publicity, languages, official records, venue, procedural rules, time/place of next meeting, agenda, and rules for delegations. Sixty days later, they met in Nairobi for the main talks. These talks included agreements on power-sharing between the leadership from both sides and on some territorial and political divisions. The organization specifically designed the first meetings to force the combatants to agree on minor procedural matters before moving on to more difficult issues.

Partial agreements can contribute to the development of a broader peace between the two sides. Partial agreements, by producing settlements of some issues and removing them from the agenda of issues in dispute between the parties, often make future agreements easier by reducing the complexity of those future talks (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Greig and Diehl, 2005; Hopmann, 1996). By providing a basis for disputants to build trust with one another, partial agreements can also create an environment where the disputants use agreements over more minor issues to build momentum toward the settlement of the key issues under dispute (Greig, 2001; 2005; Regan and Stam, 2000; Zubek et al., 1992). The risk, however, is that reducing the number of issues in bargaining can prevent the kind of trade-offs across those issues that might be necessary for a comprehensive settlement (Brams and Taylor, 1996).

Achievement of a full settlement is the most ambitious goal of a mediation effort. In doing so, a full settlement lays the foundation for a sustainable peace between the two sides. Those conflicts in which both settlement and agreement implementation are easiest are unlikely to call for the assistance of a mediator in the first place because the parties are able to negotiate a settlement bilaterally. Those conflicts that do require the assistance of a mediator tend to be the most resistant to settlement and durable peace. In this respect, mediated conflicts, because of the way in which they select themselves for mediation, are at especially high risk of achieving settlements that prove to be short-lived (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006).

The danger of short-lived agreements points to the important distinction between mediation goals and mediation success. One way to think about the success of mediation is by focusing upon the goals of the mediation effort itself. As Kleiboer (1996) argues, gauging mediation success in terms of the goals of the mediation makes it difficult to identify mediation success consistently. It is not always easy to identify the initial goals of the parties that participate in a mediation effort, nor is it always the case that these goals remain constant during the peace process. Even if we can clearly identify these goals, should it be the goals of the mediator or the disputants that matter in determining the success or failure of mediation? What if the goals of the mediator and the disputants are different from one another? In the Suez Crisis, the United States as third party sought international control of the waterway whereas the disputants (Egypt, Israel, UK, and France) sought control themselves or full open access. For these reasons, scholars of mediation often focus upon more objective indicators of its success. Among these objective indicators, there is a clear dichotomy between those that have short-term effects and those that have a long-term impact on a conflict (Beardsley, 2008; Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Greig, 2001). For example, former US President Jimmy Carter helped defuse a nuclear crisis with North Korea in 1994, but that success proved short-lived as the nuclear proliferation and other tensions in that region would repeatedly resurface within the next decade.

A large segment of the scholarly literature (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Svensson, 2007b; Wilkenfeld, et al., 2003) focuses on agreements as the most important indicator of short-term mediation success. The appeal of an agreement as an indicator of short-term success is obvious. Mediated agreements are nearly always prominently reported, making them readily observable. At the same time, a mediated agreement is an objectively observable indicator of progress in the relations between conflict sides (Diehl and Druckman, 2010). Because mediated agreements may not be durable and may not effect changes in the actions of the parties in conflict, other scholars focus on changes in the behavior of the parties during a conflict as an indicator of successful mediation. Some (Dixon, 1996; Rauchhaus, 2006) emphasize the impact of mediation on limiting conflict escalation while others (Regan and Aydin, 2006; Regan and Stam, 2000; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003) envision mediation success in terms of its ability to lessen the duration of an individual, ongoing military conflict. Quinn et al. (2006), for example, focus upon the ability of mediation to reduce tensions between states involved in a crisis.

The second approach to identifying mediation success focuses on the long-term effects of mediation beyond its effects in a single conflict. The logic here is that mediation in its most successful outcomes changes the dynamics of the relationships between the disputants, making them less prone to use violence against one another in the future and more likely to resolve their disputes peacefully. Beardsley (2006) conceptualizes mediation success as an increase in the length of time between crises for a pair of states. In a similar vein, Greig (2001) operationalizes mediation success by looking at the duration between a mediation effort and the next militarized dispute between rival states. Even if violent conflict cannot be prevented, mediation might at least delay its onset. A key weakness of these approaches is that they make it difficult to draw a sharp line between cases of mediation success and mediation failure. Instead, these long-term conceptualizations of mediation success are better suited to thinking of mediation success along a continuum from less successful to more successful.

In the end, just as there is no one-size-fits-all choice for the ways in which third parties mediate conflicts, the same holds true for the goals of an individual mediation effort and the way in which its success or failure is determined. Instead, third parties choose the goals of an individual mediation effort by taking into consideration the characteristics of the disputants, the history of prior conflict management efforts applied to the dispute, and the characteristics of the conflict. In this same way, analysts of mediation must adjust their measures of mediation success to fit the conflicts that they seek to understand and explain. What mediation success means varies from context to context (Bercovitch, 2002).

Mediation according to Stages and Phases of Conflict

The discussion above implies that mediation exists regardless of conflict context and assumes intervention into an ongoing process of bargaining between the disputants. In fact, mediation might occur during several phases of the conflict process and take place before, during, and after outbreaks of violence. Accordingly, the goals and forms of mediation, and their relationship to other conflict management techniques discussed below, might be different.

Roughly, there are four different “phases” of conflict in which mediation might occur: pre-violence, during armed conflict, after a cease-fire, and following a peace agreement (Diehl, 2006). Not all conflicts go through each of these phases, and the process is not unidirectional – that is, a conflict can move from one phase (armed conflict or cease-fire respectively) backward (no violence or armed conflict respectively) as well as forward. Similarly, there are three different “stages” that might be described in terms of the conflict resolution process: “getting to the table,” getting to an agreement, and implementing the agreement respectively (Walter, 2002). Conflict phases and resolution stages intersect and influence the process and strategies of mediation.

Mediation deployment in the pre-armed conflict phase involves a third party participating in conflict management because of the future risk of violence escalation rather than ongoing armed conflict. In this phase, it might be difficult to get parties to the table unless the threat of military action is high, but if the disputants have experienced several wars in the past, they might be more willing to negotiate and perhaps ultimately come to an agreement. Nevertheless, the United Nations provided good offices and attempted mediation in the months leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, but no agreement was reached. There are some advantages to mediation at this stage. If mediation can forestall armed attacks, widespread killing, waves of refugees, and dislocations of the economy, there are clearly benefits to all. At the macro-level, preventing violent conflict may make it easier to promote conflict resolution in the long run, as the increased hatred and mistrust from any war are avoided and the consequences of the armed conflict do not have to be factored into potential settlements.

Intervention during the second conflict phase, while military hostilities are ongoing, modifies the goals for mediation. A cease-fire is most often the immediate goal and longer-term concerns are typically deferred until that has occurred. Just getting the combatants to the table is an important step, but any agreement is likely to be limited. Nevertheless, mediation at this phase of the conflict might be necessary in order to advance the conflict into another phase. Cease-fires were agreed to at multiple junctures of the Bosnia civil war, but many of these broke down before any broader settlement was negotiated. Nevertheless, a cease-fire was negotiated among combatants just prior to the achievement of the Dayton Accords, ending the conflict.

A third phase occurs following a cease-fire, but prior to resolution of the underlying disputes between the hostile parties. One might presume that mediators have already secured decisions by the parties involved at least to halt hostilities, but this does not necessarily mean the disputants are ready to come to the table to negotiate terms of settlement. Thus, a cease-fire might mean that mediators must return to the first stage, even as violence is temporarily halted by a successful diplomatic intervention. Various European Union mediation efforts have attempted to craft a final peace settlement in Cyprus as a long-standing cease-fire monitored by United Nations peacekeeping forces insured that the conflict would not revert back to an earlier conflict phase.

The final phase of conflict occurs after a peace settlement is achieved. Yet this does not mean that the mediator’s job is over, only that the conflict resolution process has entered its third juncture. Although disputants have agreed to terms of a full or partial settlement, there are a variety of concerns and disagreements that will arise over how those terms are implemented and in some cases whether the parties have actually kept their parts of the bargain. Mediators then become concerned with many short-term measures and issues that might undermine the settlement agreement; the clear risk is that the agreement will unravel and the conflict will revert back to phase 2. For example, the United Nations served as a mediator between the combatants following the 1992 peace agreement that ended El Salvador’s civil war and through the 1994 elections to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

Thus, mediation is not unique to a certain phase of conflict, but occurs within many different contexts. Mediation is also not confined to the stage of conflict resolution whose results are most visible, namely when enemies reach a peace agreement. Mediation might be necessary to get those parties bargaining with one another, and might be equally important in facilitating the implementation of an agreement that prevents a return to hostility and armed conflict.

Mediation versus Other Conflict Management Approaches

Mediation is not the only conflict management approach available to actors, but it is sometimes confused with related strategies. Most notably, negotiation and mediation are often used interchangeably. Indeed, they share several procedural elements, including bargaining in formal and semi-formal settings involving key participants in conflict. Yet mediation differs from negotiation in several ways. Clearly, the addition of a third party actor to the bargaining undertaken by the primary conflict actors represents a structural change; this is not merely the addition of another participant, but a qualitatively different approach in that the mediator is not a direct participant in the ongoing dispute. Equally important, as noted above, mediation changes the dynamics of bargaining between the conflict parties, and thus the processes and outcomes of the conflict management attempt are likely to be quite different. In this respect, mediation is best seen not as a special form of negotiation, but as a distinct form of conflict management (Dixon, 1996).

Mediation is not synonymous with other conflict management approaches such as fact-finding (inquiry) or “good offices,” even as it might encompass them in some fashion during the mediation process. Fact-finding is predicated on providing information necessary for the disputants to resolve their conflict. This is not an essential element of mediation, but mediators often serve as formal and informal conduits for information collection and transmission. “Good offices” is only the achievement of bringing the disputing parties together, but includes no role for the third party in the process of bargaining such as recommending solutions or participating in discussions. As referenced above, light mediation can involve this conflict management approach, but it is not limited to this kind of role; mediation frequently comprises a more active role in the conflict management process.

Mediation often involves putting forth recommendations for settlement to the disputants, but this is different from other processes that also offer solutions to the dispute, such as conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication. Similar to some mediation attempts, conciliation involves a third party that offers a recommended solution to the parties involved, who retain control over the outcome by being able to accept or reject that recommendation. Yet the third party acts more as a hearing officer, listening to the facts presented by each side, rather than being part of a bargaining process itself, which is characteristic of a mediator. Thus, a conciliator maintains some distance from the conflicting parties and attempts to craft a solution based on fairness. A mediator is active in the process and might make several suggestions for resolution (or none at all), and these might be based as much on terms that are most likely to be accepted by the parties as on abstract notions of equity.

Arbitration more closely resembles conciliation except that the former includes the third party actually deciding the outcome, as the decision of the arbitrator is binding on the disputants according to prior agreement. In contrast, one of the defining features of mediation is that the parties, not the mediator, retain control over the outcome. Similarly, adjudication is several more steps removed from mediation, in that binding decisions are rendered in formal proceedings with defined rules and confined to disputes that can be resolved by reference to legal standards. The forms and processes of mediation are not so restricted nor is mediation limited to legal concerns; legal rules might be useful to mediators (e.g. drawing an international boundary), but the conflict resolution is not dependent on them nor is the purview of mediation limited to legally based disputes.