Islam Under Siege E-Book

Akbar S. Ahmed

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Themes for the 21st Century Series
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 308

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

In this groundbreaking book, Akbar Ahmed, one of the world's leading authorities on Islam, who has worked in the Muslim world but lives in the West, explains what is going wrong in his society by referring to Islamic history and beliefs. Employing theological and anthropological perspectives, he attempts to answer the questions that people in the West are asking about Islam: "Why do they hate us?" "Is Islam compatible with democracy?" "Does Islam subjugate women?" "Does the Quran preach violence?" These important questions are of relevance to Muslims and to non-Muslims alike. Islam Under Siege points out the need for, and provides the route to, the dialogue of civilizations.

September 11, 2001, underlined the role of Islam in our time. In its demographic spread, its political span, and its religious commitment, Islam will be an increasingly forceful presence on the world stage in the twenty-first century. While some scholars predict that there will be a clash of civilizations, others see a need for a dialogue of civilizations.

This book will help students, scholars of politics, sociology, international relations, and cultural studies, and reporters as well as a more general audience interested in some of the most important issues of our time.

Leseprobe

THEMES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Titles in this series

Akbar S. Ahmed, Islam Under Siege

Zygmunt Bauman, Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World

Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences

Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction

Alex Callinicos, Equality

Diane Coyle, Governing the World Economy

Andrew Gamble, Politics and Fate

Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century

Bill Jordan and Franck Duüvell, Migration: The Boundaries of Equality and Justice

James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and its Limits

Ray Pahl, On Friendship

Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy

Islam Under Siege

Living Dangerously in aPost-Honor World

AKBAR S. AHMED

polity

Copyright © Akbar S. Ahmed 2003

The right of Akbar S. Ahmed to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2003 by Polity Press in association with

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Reprinted in 2008

Editorial office:

Polity Press

65 Bridge Street

Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Marketing and production:

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

108 Cowley Road

Oxford OX4 1JF, UK

Distributed in the USA by

Blackwell Publishing Inc.

350 Main Street

Malden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ahmed, Akbar S.

Islam under siege : living dangerously in a post-honor world / Akbar Ahmed.

p. cm. — (Themes for the 21st century)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-7456-2210-1 (hb) — ISBN 978-0-7456-2210-0 (pbk.)

1. Islam—20th century. 2. Islam and world politics. 3. Globalization—Religious aspects—Islam. I. Title. II. Series.

BP161.3 .A35 2003

297’.09’0511—dc21

2002154595

Typeset in 10.5 on 12 Plantin

by SetSystems Ltd, Saffron Walden, Essex

Printed and bound in United States by Odyssey Press Inc., Gonic, New Hampshire

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk

For Larry

in continuation of our discussion about civilizations; and in gratitude for his scholarship and friendship

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction: God’s Gamble

1    Islam Under Siege

i    The Return of Anthropology and the Final Crusade

ii   The Sense of Muslim Siege

2    What is Going Wrong?

i    Is it about Islam or is it Globalization?

ii   A Post-Honor World?

3    Ibn Khaldun and Social Cohesion

i    The Khaldunian Breakdown

ii   The Man in the Iron Cage

4    The Failure of Muslim Leadership

i    Muslim Leaders

ii   Veiled Truth: Women in Islam

5    Searching for a Muslim Ideal: Inclusion

i    Case Study One: The Scholarship of Inclusion

ii   Inclusivists in America: Islam in Toledo, Ohio

6    Searching for a Muslim Ideal: Exclusion

i    Case Study Two: The Scholarship of Exclusion

ii   Exclusivists in America: The Debate in Cleveland, Ohio

7    Toward a Global Paradigm

i    The Challenge for Islam

ii   Questions for our Time

Notes

References

Index

Acknowledgments

Some of the ideas in this book have been developed from lectures, in particular at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, and subsequent articles published in its journal The World Today; from the inaugural address of the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University, Washington DC, which was published in The Middle East Journal (Washington); and from articles published in The Chronicle of Higher Education (Washington), History Today, Ethnic and Racial Studies, the Independent, and the Guardian (London). The aforementioned are gratefully acknowledged. A special thanks to Religion News Service, USA.

I am grateful to the following for their comments: Amineh Ahmed, David Godwin, Louis Goodman, Carole O’Leary, Peter Lewis, James Mittelman, Joe Montville, Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Chris Rojek, Todd Sedmak, and Tamara Sonn. I wish to acknowledge Kathleen Cahill of the Washington Post for her invaluable assistance in helping to edit the book and making suggestions to clarify the issues it raises. As always my wife, Zeenat, inspired me with her commitment to my work, oversaw the writing of the book and helped me in refining my ideas. The book is dedicated to our friend Professor Lawrence Rosen of Princeton University in acknowledgment of his scholarship and friendship.

Akbar S. Ahmed

Introduction: God’s Gamble

“There will be a time when your religion will be like a hot piece of coal in the palm of your hand; you will not be able to hold it.” The Prophet of Islam was gazing into the future while he talked to his followers early in the 7th century in Arabia. “Would this mean there would be very few Muslims?” someone asked later. “No,” replied the Prophet, “They will be large in numbers, more than ever before, but powerless like the foam on the ocean waves.”

After September 11, 2001, the prediction of the Prophet seemed to be coming true. Islam became as hot as a piece of coal for its followers. Yet it had more followers than ever before and they were, for the first time, spread all over the globe. Muslim societies everywhere appeared to be in turmoil and Muslims felt themselves in the dock, accused of belonging to a “terrorist,” “fanatic,” and “extremist” religion. Islam, it seemed, was under siege.

The “war on terrorism” that President George Bush declared after September 11 threatens to stretch into the century; for many Muslims it appears to be a war against Islam. For a Muslim therefore, on both a global and personal level, this is a time of challenge and despair.

As an anthropologist I will try to make sense of a changing, complicated, and dangerous world. I will attempt to explain what is going wrong in the Muslim world; why it is going wrong, and how we, because my explanation involves Muslims and non-Muslims, are to move ahead if we wish for global stability and even harmony in the future.

I will use the methodology of reflexive anthropology and give examples of a personal nature to illustrate a point. I will also raise questions and suggest possible future exploratory directions. I do not pretend to have the answers. A multiplicity of interpretations is possible. Old concepts are being debated or rejected.

Rupture, change, and attempts at religious reform have been evident in Muslim societies over the last two centuries since the advent of Western colonization. Certain technological and economic developments further exacerbate the divisions and debate within society. The ideological frame within which Muslim normative behavior and thought is to be understood is itself being challenged. Muslim normative behavior cannot be understood without the Quran – for Muslims the word of God – and the life of the Prophet; together the two form the Shari’a or the Path.

Muslims everywhere are being forced to reassess and re-examine Islam. Questions are being raised about God and the purpose of creation. There are questions also about the tenets of Islam itself and what its future holds.

God’s gamble

In order to understand our world it is necessary to remember that God does not play dice with the universe. Einstein was right. But in creating human beings and giving them free will God did gamble with history. Seeing the state of affairs in the early 21st century – the widespread poverty, the lack of justice and compassion, the willful depletion of the resources of the planet, the senseless and widespread violence – God may well be regretting human creation now. And we have a good idea of what He had in mind. Through inspired messengers and sacred literature God conveyed the idea to man and woman that they were created in His own image. (Contrary to the widely held stereotype of Islam as a misogynist religion, the Quran addresses and includes both men and women.) The Quran describes man as God’s “deputy” or “vicegerent” (Surah 2: Verse 30).1

God took a gamble by creating human beings. There is a central and cruel tension in the very idea of free will: Man has the capacity to kill and destroy just as easily as to be just and compassionate. This implies a certain confidence on the part of God that human beings would use their learning and instincts to suppress the wild and anarchic impulse of their nature. God wants humans to do good and to avoid evil (Surah 9: Verse 112). He wants justice and balance in human society (Surah 55: Verse 9). What perhaps would disappoint God the most, therefore, are the extreme expressions of violence of which humans are capable, especially now that they have developed their genius to change and control their environment. The marvelous achievements in medicine and communications have not subdued man’s rapacious appetite. Human society is not even prepared to accept that it is busily destroying the planet. Arguments about depriving future generations appear to fall on deaf ears.

God’s vision of Himself in the Quran is also explicit. So while God sees Himself as omnipotent and omnipresent, He also emphasizes justice and compassion. He describes Himself as the God of the universes – note the use of the plural. For us here on earth God makes it clear that for Him there are no artificial divisions within human society based on tribe or color. Geographically, too, there is neither East nor West for Him (Surah 2: Verse 115). He is everywhere and belongs to everyone. God made people into different tribes and nations speaking different languages and living in different cultures: All these are signs of God’s universal compassion and we must learn to appreciate each other (Surah 5: Verse 48, Surah 30: Verse 22, and Surah 49: Verse 13). He even sent messengers like Abraham who are common to several religions – in this case Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Above all, God declared: “There is no compulsion in religion” (Surah 2: Verse 256).

Everything was from God and the more man was in the image of God the closer he was to fulfilling his destiny and becoming God’s “deputy.” It is in this context that the idea of merging with God, which finds historic expression in the Sufi dictum ana al-haqq or “I am God,” can be understood. Although the idea was sacrilegious to the orthodox it was not as far-fetched as it seemed. By God wishing to create divine qualities in man, He was emphasizing the unity and integration of creation itself.2

Of all the attributes developed in human beings, perhaps the greatest is the capacity to make moral choices: Humans are the only species that can turn the other cheek in the face of provocation or speak of peace with others. In their expression of compassion, humans reflect the divine spark that connects them to their maker.

If an angel, skeptical about human beings, were to query God about what humans had achieved in their short history on earth, God could point to His greatest gift to them: creative genius. He could point to the devotion and piety of the Abrahamic prophets; the wisdom of Buddha and Confucius; the building of the pyramids and the Taj Mahal; the human predicament and nobility depicted in the literature of the ages – the Vedas, the Iliad, and the Shakespearean plays; the poetry of Rumi and Ghalib; the discovery of nuclear technology and the marvels of modern science and communications; the inventiveness that allowed humans to fly in the sky, live under water, and walk on the moon. Most of these cases of creativity are invested with moral choices.

Similar moral choices have allowed human beings to use the name of God to wreak violence on others who believed in Him in different ways. Indeed, they were neglectful and cruel even to those who came with His message. Moses returned from Mount Sinai where he had gone to receive God’s message to discover that his followers had created a golden calf and were worshiping it. Jesus was tortured and crucified. The Prophet of Islam may have escaped assassination attempts but three of his four successors – good and pious men – did not. Later, the four men most influential in shaping Islamic law were flogged and imprisoned. One died in jail.

God’s categories of human behavior

In order to become God’s deputy, according to Islam, human beings had to follow two categories of behavior and ensure a balance between them. The first related to rituals and prayers and was primarily designed to create a relationship between man and God. It included the five pillars of Islam: the declaration of belief in God; fasting; praying; paying charity (in cash or in kind); and going on the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime. Although these five pillars required interaction with others they were primarily related to individual action. And they created the conditions to engender the second category of social action.

That second category created, and was embedded in, broader social relations. Of these the most important are adl (justice), ihsan (compassion, kindness and balance), and ilm (knowledge; ilm is the second most used word in the Quran after the name of Allah or God). But adl, justice, was only possible if it was made available in society by judges and rulers. Similarly ihsan, compassion or balance, could only be achieved if others in society believed in it and helped to realize it. The acquisition of ilm, knowledge, although an individual act, was nonetheless only possible if society provided libraries, colleges, and colleagues to enhance it. Even if knowledge was acquired it was difficult to share or develop in repressive societies. Implementing knowledge meant changing society. Justice, compassion, and knowledge had enormous implications for the kind of society God desired. They also created the preconditions for ideal leadership. A leader who believed in them was a good leader.

Together, the two categories provided the conditions that created a just society. The first category rested on a vertical axis and its primary understanding was through the filter of theology; the second on a horizontal axis and its primary filter was that of anthropology. Together, they formed the Islamic ideal. To discover the ideal we thus need a polythetic, not monothetic, analysis of contemporary Muslim society.

Religious systems must balance individual piety with public interaction. What is important for all of us looking for ways to live together in spite of the different religions and races to which we belong is not so much whether believing in one God (as in the Abrahamic faiths) is better than believing in many gods (Hinduism), or even in no god (Buddhism), but of creating a balanced, compassionate, and harmonious society with decent, caring people in it.

The failure to create a just and compassionate society leads people to fall back to ideas of tribal honor and revenge. Divisions in society deepen on the basis of blood and custom. Killing and conflict are encouraged. The honor of the group and – if it is attacked – the need to take revenge become more important than worshiping God in peace and engendering compassion in society.

Why is Islam important?

The 21st century will be the century of Islam. The events of September 11 saw to that. The hijackers of the four American planes killed not only thousands of innocent people. Their terrible act also created one of the greatest paradoxes of the 21st century: Islam, which sees itself as a religion of peace, is now associated with murder and mayhem. Consider Islam today: There are about 1.3 billion Muslims living in 55 states (one, for the time being, nuclear; about one-third of the world’s Muslims live in non-Muslim countries); about 25 million live in the West (including 7 million in the USA and 2 million in the UK); and Muslim nations are indispensable for American foreign policy (of the nine “pivotal” states on which the United States bases its foreign policy, five are Muslim – see Chase et al. 1996). The Muslim world population is one of the fastest growing. And Islam is the one world religion which appears to be on a collision course with the other world religions.

We know that for the first time in history, due to a unique geopolitical conjunction of factors, Islam is in confrontation with all of the major world religions: Judaism in the Middle East, Christianity in the Balkans, Chechnya, Nigeria, Sudan, and sporadically in the Philippines and Indonesia; Hinduism in South Asia, and, after the Taliban blew up the statues in Bamiyan, Buddhism. The Chinese, whose culture represents an amalgam of the philosophy of Confucius, Tao, and Communist ideology, are also on a collision course with Islam in China’s western province.

It is this historic conjunction that both singles out Islam and creates the global argument that the 21st century will be a time of war between Islam and the other world civilizations. Of course, this neat concept is challenged because so many Muslim countries are clearly allied to non-Muslim ones. Besides, so many Muslims now live in non-Muslim nations. But it is true to say that the major world civilizations are experiencing problems in accommodating or even understanding Islam, both within their borders and outside them.

Whatever the economic, political, and sometimes demographic causes of social transformations on this scale, simplistic ideas often capture the imagination and become the filter through which ordinary people understand them. One such idea has now firmly caught the imagination of people across the world – that there is an ongoing clash between Islam and Western civilization. The argument has been stoked by Harvard professors and by European prime ministers, but it has been around for a thousand years. Whether one adheres to the notion of the clash of civilizations, or whether one chooses dialogue, understanding Islam will be key.

Islamophobia – or a generalized hatred or contempt of Islam and its civilization – appears to be widespread and growing. This is the reality on the ground – however grand and noble even the best-written constitutions and charters. The result is pressure on the Muslim family and on social, political, and even moral life. The consequence is anger, confusion, and frustration; acts of violence result. Fitna and shar, chaos and conflict, become common. God’s vision of a just and compassionate human society remains unfulfilled. Understanding Islam thus becomes important.

The consequences of what happens within Muslim society will be felt by societies everywhere. No one is immune from the debates that now rage around Islam. The issues outlined in this book will concern scholars, policy-makers and ordinary citizens.

Misunderstanding Islam

Yet there is so much misunderstanding of Islam. The debate on Islam that is in full cry in the West since September 11 is too often little more than a parading of deep-rooted prejudices. For example, the critics of Islam ask: “If there is such an emphasis on compassion and tolerance in Islam, why is it associated with violence and intolerance toward non-Muslims3 and the poor treatment of women?”4

The answer is that both Muslims and non-Muslims use the Quran selectively. The Quranic verses revealed earlier, for example, Surah 2: Verses 190–4, emphasize peace and reconciliation in comparison to the latter ones like Surah 9: Verse 5. Some activists have argued that this means an abrogation of the earlier verses and therefore advocate aggressive militancy. In fact the verses have to be understood in the social and political context in which they were formed. They must be read both for the particular situation in which they were revealed and the general principle they embody.

Take the first criticism of Islam: that it encourages violence. The actions of the nineteen hijackers had little to do with Islamic theology. Killing a single innocent person is like killing all of humanity, warns the Quran (Surah 5: Verse 32). The Quran clearly preaches tolerance and understanding. Indeed, there is an anthropologically illuminating verse which points to the diversity of races: “O Human Beings! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female and have made you into nations and tribes so that you might come to know one another . . . The noblest of you, in the sight of God, is the best in conduct” (Surah 49: Verse 13).

The idea of a common humanity is central to the Muslim perception of self. By knowing God as Rahman and Rahim, Beneficent and Merciful – the two most frequently repeated of God’s 99 names, those that God Himself has chosen in the Quran by using them to introduce the chapters – Muslims know they must embrace even those who may not belong to their community, religion, or nation. God tells us in the Quran to appreciate the variety He has created in human society: “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colors. Lo! Herein indeed are portents for men of knowledge” (Surah 30: Verse 22).

Verses about fighting Jews and Christians – or Muslims who are considered “hypocrites” – must be understood relative to a specific situation and time frame. What is important for Muslims is to stand up for their rights whoever the aggressor: “Fight against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities,” the Quran tells Muslims (Surah 2: Verse 190). Men like bin Laden cite this verse and the next to justify their violence against Jews and Christians in general and in particular the United States, which represents the two religions for them. They give the impression that God wants Muslims to be in perpetual conflict with Jews and Christians. They are wrong. Not only are these verses taken out of context, as they relate to a specific situation at a certain time in the history of early Islam, but the verses that follow immediately after clearly convey God’s overarching command: “Make peace with them if they want peace; God is Forgiving, Merciful” (Surah 2: Verses 192–3).

Misguided Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the instant experts in the media, are both guilty of this kind of selective use of the holy text to support their arguments. In this case the Muslims would argue that violence against Jews and Christians is allowed; the non-Muslims would point to this line and say it confirms the hatred of Muslims against others. They imply that the idea of fighting against Islam is therefore justified.

The discussion around the number of women a Muslim man may marry suffers from a similar fate (see below chapter 4, section ii, “Veiled Truth: Women in Islam”). Misguided Muslims cite Surah 4: Verse 3 – “Marry as many women as you wish, two or three or four” – to justify having four wives; misguided non-Muslims, to point to Islam’s licentious nature. Both ignore the next line in the same verse, which insists that each wife be treated equally and with “justice” and, as this is not possible, then one wife is the best arrangement.

“Why do they hate us?”

For many – and not only Muslims – there is another side to the age we live in, one that feeds anger. The images of people being killed in Palestine or Kashmir or Chechnya create helplessness and outrage. Directly or indirectly many people blame the United States. To them, the superpower is morally bankrupt and unwilling to halt the suffering in the world or stop its own obsessive consumerism. The United States was hated long before bin Laden forced George Bush to ask the question, “Why do they hate us?”

At the core of the recent animosity toward Islam were the young Muslims prepared to commit suicide for their beliefs. “Why?” the West asked. The answers flooded the media: “They hate us”; “They envy our lifestyle”; “They hate our democracy.” In a country where psychiatrists hold sway in interpreting behavior, where they are consulted like high priests, where one of the most popular television shows, Frasier, features two brothers who are psychiatrists, it was natural that the hijackers’ actions would be cast in psychiatric terms: “envy,” “hatred,” “jealousy.”

Other commentators gave other explanations. The Reverend Jerry Falwell thundered about God’s wrath and blamed homosexuality, abortion, and loose morals in American society. Samuel Huntington was frequently cited and must have smirked with satisfaction as the attacks seemed to confirm what he had said all along about the clash of civilizations between Muslims and the West (1993, 1996). Salman Rushdie gloated that he had been right all along about Islam: “Yes, this is about Islam” (New York Times, November 2, 2001). Francis Fukuyama was on the defensive as his theories of the triumph of capitalism and the end of history (1998)5 lay in the rubble of New York and the Pentagon. History had not ended on September 11; it had been jump-started in new and dangerous directions.6

For people in developing societies the “war on terrorism” is in fact a violent expression of the rapacious, insatiable, and minatory engine of American imperialism:

The Task That Never Ends is America’s perfect war, the perfect vehicle for the endless expansion of American imperialism. In Urdu, the word for profit is fayda. Alqaida means the word, the word of God, the law. So, in India, some of us call the War Against Terror, Al-qaida vs Al-fayda – the Word vs The Profit (no pun intended). For the moment it looks as though Al-fayda will carry the day. But then you never know . . . (“Not Again” by Arundhati Roy in the Guardian, September 27, 2002)

The answers in the media were not only incomplete; they were pushing the debate in the wrong directions. Hate and prejudice substituted for thought and analysis. The social sciences could have provided answers. Yet in all the discussion of suicide attacks, I did not once hear the name of Emile Durkheim, whose seminal work on suicide informs scholarly discussions (Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1966 edition; also see Giddens 1978; for a contemporary overview of Durkheim see Poggi 2000).

Durkheim underlined that traditional explanations of suicide, such as mental disturbance, race, or climate, did not fully explain the act. He argued that suicide was a consequence of a disturbed social order. Moral codes were disrupted in times of change and affected rich and poor, he wrote. The strain led to suicide and abnormal behavior, which he identified as “anomie” (The Division of Labour in Society, 1964 edition). Durkheim was echoing Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya; the word derives from the Arabic root assab which means “to bind” (Dhaouadi 1997: 12). The nearest definitions of asabiyya are “group loyalty,” “social cohesion,” or “social solidarity” (which I discuss below). These two thinkers provide us with a useful central thesis: We need to look for answers in the changing social order; in the sense of social breakdown; the feeling of the loss of honor and dignity. This is what I will do.

Outline of the argument

September 11, 2001, threw up a range of questions about Islam. Does the Quran preach violence? Do Muslims hate Jews and Christians? Are we at the start of a final crusade between Islam and the West? Why is the message of peace and compassion of the world’s religions lost in the din of anger and hatred? How can local cultures retain their sense of identity and dignity in the face of the onslaught of global developments? Is the perception of the loss of honor a consequence of the disintegration of group loyalty or social cohesion in society? Can we identify cause and effect? Is group loyalty, tempered by humanistic compassion, the way forward?

Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding these questions it is not surprising that many of the answers in recent years have been superficial or shoddy. Even the experts can get it wrong. While anthropology can assist us in answering these questions we will also need to rely on other disciplines. But this book is not about anthropology. Nor is it about bin Laden. It is about the world that has created bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network and the world he has helped to create. It is about bin Laden’s religion, Islam, which, by his actions, has been put on a collision course with other world religions. This book, then, is an exercise in mapping the global landscape and pointing out the routes – and dangers – that lie ahead.

I am exploring alternative concepts to postmodernism,7 postemotionalism,8 and posthuman9 to explain our world.I suggest we are entering a “post-honor” world (see chapter 2, section ii, “A Post-Honor World?”).10 I am suggesting we explore the notion of honor and its use in our time as a tool with which to look at our world. We cannot do so without reference to society and its ideas of asabiyya, group loyalty, cohesion, or solidarity. If the definition of honor is changed then we need to examine society to understand why this has happened. I argue that it is a consequence of a new variety of asabiyya which is based in an exaggerated and even obsessive loyalty to the group and which is usually expressed through hostility and often violence toward the other. I call this hyperasabiyya. I am pointing to cause and effect here. However, mine is merely an exploratory effort, suggesting possible future research.

I will argue that the dangerously ambiguous notion of honor – and the even more dangerous idea of the loss of honor – propels men to violence. Simply put, global developments have robbed many people of honor. Rapid global changes are shaking the structures of traditional societies. Groups are forced to dislocate or live with or by other groups. In the process of dislocation they have little patience with the problems of others. They develop intolerance and express it through anger. No society is immune. Even those societies that economists call “developed” fall back to notions of honor and revenge in times of crisis.

By dishonoring others, such people think they are maintaining honor. They are, therefore, challenging traditional notions of honor, which rested in doing good deeds and pursuing noble causes. In times past, chivalry acknowledged courage, compassion, and generosity even if found in the enemy. Women and the weak were given special treatment by honorable men. The pursuit of honor was thus a humanistic goal. Cruelty and tyranny were usually condemned as deviations from the ideal of honor. In contrast many in our time consider it honorable to indulge in acts of violence. What would once have been seen as the deviant appears to be accepted as the norm. Exaggerated tribal and religious loyalties – hyper-asabiyya – disguise acts of violence against the other. But neither tribal custom nor religious ideology requires the senseless violence we witness in our time. The widespread use of honor in this perverted manner suggests we may indeed be living in a world with little honor or no honor or a post-honor world. Hyper-asabiyya is cause and symptom of the post-honor world in which we live.

Let me explain how our world works. Take bin Laden, one of the best-known warriors of the post-honor world – and alas there are many like him and not only in Muslim society as we will see below. Bin Laden identifies excessively with his group as the traditional markers of identity – family, nation, religion – appear under threat. He blames others for their plight – in his case Jews and Christians or Americans, that is citizens of the United States. (In his confused state he fuses religious and national identity.) To correct the situation and reclaim honor he plans to inflict violence on Americans. He does not care if innocent people, including women and children, are killed. He does not even care if Muslims are killed – as indeed they were in the attacks on New York in September 2001.

Bin Laden’s behavior provides us with clues of why men interpret honor to mean violence and how they implement their vision to regain it. Hyper-asabiyya encourages a mutated, twisted, and violent interpretation of honor and creates conditions for post-honor society.

Honor and revenge; this is the male interpretation of social action. It is no coincidence that the dramatis personae on the world stage after September 11 are mainly male – George Bush, Richard Cheney, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld in the United States; Tony Blair in the UK; Vladimir Putin in Russia; Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, Saddam Hussein, and the two Abdullahs (the Hashemite King of Jordan and the Saudi Crown Prince) in the Middle East; Osama bin Laden, Muhammad Umar, the Taliban, and Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan; and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. Nearly all the Americans recognized in the American media as the “heroes” of September 11 – the Mayor of New York, the fire-fighters, and the police officers who died on duty – were male.

To reverse the movement that has brought us into a post-honor world we need to rediscover the dialogue with and understanding of cultures other than our own. We need to emphasize a morality that emphasizes justice and compassion for all.

The problem is that so many traditional definitions – and not only those of honor – are under challenge. We can no longer accept the notion of a world divided between opposing halves – Islam versus the West – as did Muslim activists for most of the 20th century (for example, Maulana Syed Abul Ala Maududi in South Asia and Sayyid Qutb in the Middle East). The emergence of more than 25 million Muslims living in the West, the clashes between Hindus and Muslims in India, and Muslims and other Chinese in China, and the conflict within Muslim society based on ethnicity (the Northern Alliance versus the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example) suggest that such simplistic division is no longer valid.

I will therefore use the terms “Islam” and “the West” as shorthand, but with the caveat that reducing these two highly complex and internally diverse civilizations to such simplistic terms may create more problems than it solves. We will therefore continue to color in gray, however great the compulsion to use black and white.

Besides, the traditional Muslim division of the world has collapsed: What Muslims once saw as the distinction between dar al-harb (the house of war), land of anarchy and disbelief, and dar al-Islam (the house of peace or Islam) in which they could practice their faith and flourish, is no longer valid.11 In the last decades of the 20th century the division became largely irrelevant. Muslims could freely practice their faith and flourish in the United States and elsewhere; meanwhile they were persecuted in Iraq. After September 2001, the distinction disappeared altogether. Muslims everywhere felt under siege. Nowhere was safe. No society was immune to the forces of chaos and anarchy. Violence was routine. The entire world had become dar al-harb.

For help in understanding the struggle taking place within the Muslim world, I shall turn to the work of one of the earliest and most penetrating Muslim social scientists, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). Ibn Khaldun’s theory of asabiyya appears to glorify religious or tribal group loyalty in contradiction to Islam which emphasizes the universal and the compassionate. There is thus an inherent problem for a Muslim group in adopting a parochial position. But what group social cohesion does is to provide stability and continuity in normal times. For minorities too it ensures protection and justice. I will point out how Muslim asabiyya has generally collapsed and how society itself, consequently, has moved away from not only traditional patterns of behavior but also the central features of Islam itself. This has far-reaching implications. I will give examples of the collapse of Islamic leadership and scholarship. I will discuss how Muslims are responding to the crisis, in part by considering the cultural notions of honor and dignity. There is clearly a cultural dimension to our understanding of political and religious issues.

“Fundamentalist,” “terrorist,” and “extremist” – these words have become meaningless for us today. Can we apply terms such as “fundamentalist” without creating more problems than we resolve? Can we use terms created for one religion – in this case Christianity – and apply them to another religion – Islam? Isn’t every Muslim a “fundamentalist” as he or she believes in the “fundamentals” of the Quran? Do not even liberal Muslims believe in the essential divinity of the Quran? But is every Muslim a “fanatic” or “terrorist” or “extremist”? The answer is clearly no. So terms like “fundamentalist” tell us little and those like “terrorist” and “extremist” tell us even less. Their usage only adds to the confusion. I will explore the use of other terms and definitions.

“Exclusivist” and “inclusivist” have the merits of simplicity and clarity. They incorporate notions such as fundamentalist, terrorist, and extremist. Exclusivists create boundaries and believe in hierarchies; inclusivists are those who are prepared to accommodate, to interact with others, and even listen to them and be influenced by them. Inclusivists are those who believe that human civilization is essentially one, however much we are separated by religion, culture, or language. These frames of reference exist in every human society. Many adherents of mainstream religions, for example, are dogmatists who simply do not accept even those who belong to a different sect of the same religion. I believe the real battle in the 21st century will be between the inclusivists and the exclusivists. I am defining these two categories broadly, while aware of the many variations, differences, and changing positions within them.