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Korea is one of the critical flashpoints in the world today. News of North Korea's recent nuclear tests, conducted in defiance of international pressure, drew widespread condemnation and raised serious concerns about the threat now posed to regional and international security by the regime of North Korea's dear leader Kim Jong-Il.
This book penetrates the veil surrounding the conflict on the Korean peninsula and North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes. It provides a thorough historical analysis of relations between the two Koreas since the Korean War, which traces both North Korea's path to economic ruin and South Korea's transition from struggling dictatorship to vibrant democracy.
As well as examining the political and economic development of North and South Korea at the domestic level, the book goes on to explore regional relations with Russia, China and Japan and, most importantly, America's dealings with Korea and its negotiations with North Korea, in particular. It concludes with an analysis of North Korea's current nuclear programme and its likely impact on international security in the 21st century.
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Seitenzahl: 374
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013
KOREA ————
HOT SPOTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Published
Christoph Bluth, Korea
Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine – 2nd edition
Amalendu Misra, Afghanistan
Gareth Stansfield, Iraq
Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland
KOREA ————
CHRISTOPH BLUTH
polity
Copyright © Christoph Bluth 2008
The right of Christoph Bluth to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2008 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
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Malden, MA 02148, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-07456-5771-4
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Typeset in 10.5 on 12 pt Sabon
by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester
Printed and bound in India by Replika Press PVT Ltd, Kundli, India
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Contents ————
Foreword (The Honorable Jin Park, Ph.D.)
Acknowledgements
Chronology
Map
1 The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
2 Korea: A Nation Divided
3 North Korea after the Korean War: The Long March to Ruin
4 South Korea after the Korean War: From Struggling Dictatorship to Vibrant Democracy
5 US–North Korean Relations and the First Nuclear Crisis
6 The ‘Sunshine Policy’: South Korean National Security Policy in a New Era
7 Renewed Confrontation and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis
8 The Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula
9 Understanding the Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula
References
Index
Foreword ————
When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, the world was reminded once again of the dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula. This action, which was roundly condemned by the international community, destroyed many illusions about the alleged achievements of diplomacy and the inter-Korean dialogue.
The dangers of the military conflict on the Korean peninsula are obvious for the world to see. North Korea has an army of 1.1 million troops, 70 per cent of which is deployed within 100 km of the demilitarized zone that has separated the two Korean states since the end of the Korean war. It has deployed thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, hundreds of ballistic missiles and a significant number of chemical weapons. On the other side of the DMZ, referred to by former US President Bill Clinton as ‘the scariest place on earth’, forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea are deployed to counter any North Korean attack. According to the American specialist Michael O’Hanlon, the area between the South Korean capital Seoul and the North Korean capital Pyongyang has a higher concentration of military firepower than central Europe during the Cold War. The armed forces of North Korea are not configured for defence, but for offence, meaning that if a conflict should start armoured columns will immediately move south and Seoul will come under heavy artillery bombardment. In this context, North Korea’s growing ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities appear to raise the military threat to a new level.
But how are we to understand the nature of this threat? In the popular literature, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is often portrayed as an irrational dictator ruling over an isolated ‘hermit kingdom’ and out of touch with the outside world. Of course this image is a caricature. In the Republic of Korea, there is a palpable division within society about how to understand and deal with North Korea. The traditional position of the political and military elite in South Korea has been defined by a staunch rejection of communism and the portrayal of North Korea as the enemy that must be deterred by the security cooperation with the United States. North Korean belligerence was explained as based on the desire by the Pyongyang regime to unite the Korean peninsula on Northern terms and extend communist rule over all of the Korean people. The alliance with the United States was essential to safeguard the security of free Korean people. Although in the decades following the Korean War this view found broad acceptance within South Korean society, there was growing opposition to the authoritarian government and a desire for social change and the movement towards democracy. Some of the younger generation who did not witness the devastating Korean War (1950–3) and who were involved or witnessed the struggle for democracy in the South have a more benign view of North Korea. They are yearning for unification of the divided nation and believe that interference from outside powers is prolonging the division. Such views were reinforced by President Kim Dae-jung’s so-called ‘sunshine policy’ of engaging the North Korean regime with political dialogue, economic assistance and joint economic projects. His successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, inherited the same policy line under the banner of ‘peace and prosperity’ policy towards North Korea. But the nuclear test in October 2006 represents the culmination of trends in relations with North Korea that have raised grave doubts about the results of these policies. Thus President Roh has been criticized for continuously meeting North Korea’s demands for aid without any concessions from North Korea’s leaders. Moreover, the Roh government has allowed relations with the United States to drift apart. For example, it proposed that the Republic of Korea should assume the role of ‘balancer’ between major powers in Asia, suggesting an almost neutral position in regional security. For a small country like South Korea which is at the frontline of a major geopolitical confrontation, that is simply not a feasible position to adopt. Even more controversial is the transfer of ‘wartime command’ from the United States to the Republic of Korea. Previously in the event of war, South Korean armed forces would have been under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) led by the commander of US forces under the aegis of the United Nations. In the future South Korea will be responsible for securing the armistice, raising doubts about the extent of support from the United States.
At the time of writing, the situation on the Korean peninsula has entered a new and particularly uncertain phase. The North Korean state has reached a point where it is politically, socially and economically bankrupt. The regime cannot guarantee minimal food provision for its people, its industry is largely idle and it relies on food and energy supplies from other countries. It uses its military and especially its weapons of mass destruction programmes to extort economic support and political concessions. In short, the apparent stability on the Korean peninsula is fragile. The sudden collapse of the North Korean state or the outbreak of military hostilities could have catastrophic consequences for the Korean people north and south and would affect the security of the entire region.
The situation on the Korean peninsula is complex and often misunderstood. North Korea is a very secretive and isolated country, and there is much that is unknown about its internal politics and decision-making processes. At the same time, an understanding of the factors that drive North Korean foreign policy behaviour is crucial. It is therefore very important that scholars, students, policymakers and the general public develop a deep understanding of the crisis on the Korean peninsula which is steeped in the knowledge of the history of the two Koreas since their division and an appreciation of their development into the post-Cold War era. It is for this reason that I welcome this book, which provides an excellent background on the security dilemma in Korea and makes a vital contribution to the international dialogue on the future of the Korean peninsula.
Acknowledgements ————
The author benefited from the help, support and advice of many institutions and people during the writing of this book. The Korea Institute for Defence Analyses (KIDA) under the directorship of Dr Hwang Dong-joon awarded me the so far unique honour of being the only non-American non-military visiting research fellow so far in 2005. I owe a great deal to the expertise and friendship of my colleagues at KIDA, especially Kim Chang-su, Kim Tae-woo, Hwang Jae-ho and Nam Man-kwon. During my period as Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Yonsei University in 2005, I benefited especially from advice from Kim Woo-sang and Moon Chung-in. The support and friendship of Dr Park Jin, member of the National Assembly, made an essential contribution to my work in Korea. Daniel Pinkston and William Potter from the Monterey Institute of International Studies gave me the opportunity to present the preliminary results of my research and have been a source of advice and encouragement. Others who shared their expertise with me include Professor Choi Jung-hul (National Defense University Seoul), Choi Soung-ah (Korea Herald), Brendan Howe (Ewha Women’s University), Kim Hannah, Lee Shin-wha (Korea University), Park Chan-bong (Unification Ministry), Gary Samore (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Scott Snyder (Asia Foundation), Seo Hyun-jin (Korea Herald), James Strohmaier (Pusan National University), Adam Ward (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Yoon Young-kwan (Foreign Minister, now at Seoul National University) and Yu Yong-weon (Chosun Ilbo). The opportunity for exchanges with North Korean diplomats, including Ambassador Ri Yong-ho, Thae Yong-ho, Hwang Ik-hwan and Kim Chun-guk (Director of the European Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang) enabled me to get a first-hand view of the North Korean perspective. The advice, encouragement and friendship of Kim Hyun-sook was invaluable. My old friend, Chun Hong-chan from Pusan National University, acted as my mentor during my first research trip to Korea. Park Min-hyoung checked the Korean transliteration in conformity with the new government-approved spelling (although the traditional spelling of some names has been retained). I am also grateful for the support of the British Academy in conducting fieldwork in the Republic of Korea. All errors and omissions in the book are of course my responsibility alone.
Chronology ————
1945
February 8
Yalta Conference between the Allies of World War II
July 26
Potsdam Conference. An agreement is made to divide the Korean peninsula into zones of Soviet and US operation along the 41st parallel
August 15
Japan surrenders and Korea is liberated
August 26
Soviet armed forces enter northern Korea
September 8
US troops arrive in southern Korea
1948
May 31
After elections in the south of Korea, a National Assembly is formally established with Rhee Syngman as chairman
July 17
The National Assembly adopts a constitution for the Republic of Korea. Rhee Syngman is elected President and the ROK is recognized by the United States
August 15
The Republic of Korea takes over the government of South Korea from the US military government
September 9
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is established under Kim Il-sung
December 12
The UN recognizes the Republic of Korea as the sole legal government of Korea
1950
June 25
North Korean forces invade South Korea
July 8
General MacArthur is appointed UN commander-in-chief
September 15
UN forces land at Inchon
October 14
Chinese troops enter North Korea
1951
January 4
Chinese and North Korean forces capture the capital of the ROK (Seoul)
March 15
The UN forces retake Seoul
1953
July 27
The armistice agreement signed by the US (on behalf of the UN), North Korea and China. Rhee refuses to sign
1960
April
After student protests Rhee Syngman is forced to resign and leave the country
1961
May 16
Major General Park Chung-hee seizes power in a military coup
1965
June
South Korea signs normalization treaty with Japan
1968
January 23
The US ‘spy ship’ Pueblo is seized by the North Korean navy in international waters off the eastern coast of the DPRK. The crew is released one year later
1973
June 8
Opposition leader Kim Dae-jung is kidnapped by agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in Tokyo. He is kept under house arrest in Seoul
1979
October 26
Park Chung-hee is assassinated by the head of the KCIA. Major General Chun Doo-hwan takes control of the government
1980
May 18
Gwangju massacre. After mass protests, the armed forces kill 240 people. For the period of Chun Doo-hwan’s administration, the incident is officially regarded as a rebellion inspired by Communists, but after civil rule the protests receive recognition as an effort to restore democracy from military rule
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