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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Serie: Wiley Finance Series
- Sprache: Englisch
An accessible text that provides managers with a well-rounded economic awareness
Successful managers possess an understanding of economic and market principles as they relate to business itself. Markets for Managers presents managerial economics in a casual, accessible format that will help management professionals take economic realities into account when running their companies or divisions. The book takes a global perspective while covering the full range of micro- and macroeconomic principles that managers around the world need to know. Complete with online resources that include further reading and a YouTube playlist, this guide puts business management practice within its economic context to produce a practical tool for managers.
By understanding market operation and what might cause market failure, management professionals can lead companies that respond to market pressures and align operating strategies with economic realities. Monetary and fiscal policies affect businesses of all sizes, and in Markets for Managers, business leaders can learn how to read the ever-shifting fiscal landscape.
- Delivers market information tailored to managers and the managerial decision-making process
- Comprehensively explains macro- and microeconomic ideas in language that's accessible
- Provides concrete suggestions for utilizing market knowledge to improve internal operations and align incentives
- Helps managers build a global view of business for optimal decision making
The practical format of Markets for Managers is perfect for professionals and students who want to gain an applied perspective on today's most pressing economic issues.
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For other titles in the Wiley Finance series, please see www.wiley.com/finance
Markets for Managers
A Managerial Economics Primer
ANTHONY J. EVANS
This edition first published 2014 ©; 2014 Anthony J. Evans
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Evans, Anthony John, 1981– Markets for managers : a managerial economics primer / Anthony J. Evans. pages cm. – (The Wiley finance series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-118-86796-9 (hardback) 1. Managerial economics. I. Title.
HD30.22.E84 2014 338.5024′658–dc23
2014022437
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-118-86796-9 (hardback/paperback) ISBN 978-1-118-86794-5 (ebk) ISBN 978-1-118-86795-2 (ebk) ISBN 978-1-118-86793-8 (ebk)
Cover design by Wiley Cover image: Image #150258983 Abstract image made of interlocking triangles in yellow, orange and brown. © Shutterstock.
Contents
Preface
Introduction
Notes
CHAPTER 1 Incentives Matter
1.1 Managerial individualism
1.2 Demand Curves
1.3 Elasticity
Notes
CHAPTER 2 Cost and Choice
2.1 Opportunity Cost
2.2 Diminishing Marginal Returns
2.3 The Planning Horizon
2.4 Cost vs. Waste
Notes
CHAPTER 3 Market Exchange
3.1 Market Equilibrium
3.2 Comparative Statics
3.3 Information Economics
Notes
CHAPTER 4 Prices and Economic Calculation
4.1 Entrepreneurship
4.2 The Firm
4.3 Price Discrimination
4.4 The Knowledge Problem
4.5 Internal Markets
Notes
CHAPTER 5 Competition and the Market Process
5.1 Market Concentration
5.2 Collusion
5.3 Market Contestability
5.4 Monopoly Power
Notes
CHAPTER 6 Capital Theory and Recalculation
6.1 Microclimate
6.2 Unemployment
6.3 Recalculation
Notes
CHAPTER 7 Public Finance
7.1 Taxation
7.2 Bonds
7.3 Banking
7.4 Saving
7.5 Real Business Cycles
7.6 National Income Accounting
Notes
CHAPTER 8 Monetary Theory
8.1 Inflation
8.2 Monetary Policy
8.3 Monetary Regimes
8.4 Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Notes
CHAPTER 9 Fiscal Policy
9.1 The Great Depression
9.2 Fiscal Stimulus
9.3 Expansionary Fiscal Contractions
9.4 Confidence
9.5 Laissez-faire
9.6 The Phillips Curve
Notes
CHAPTER 10 International Economics
10.1 Globalisation and Trade Theory
10.2 Balance of Payments
10.3 Foreign Exchange Markets
10.4 Currency Regimes
Notes
CHAPTER 11 Behavioural Economics
11.1 Behavioural Anomalies
11.2 Market Efficiency
Notes
CHAPTER 12 Global Prosperity
12.1 Growth Theory
12.2 Happiness
12.3 Economic Freedom
12.4 Public Choice Theory
12.5 Transition Economics
Notes
Bibliography
Authored books, articles, working papers, speeches and blogs
Economist articles
Unauthored and miscellaneous
Interviews
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1
Chapter 7
Table 7.1
Chapter 8
Table 8.1
Table 8.2
Chapter 10
Table 10.1
Table 10.2
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Preface
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Preface
I have been fortunate to learn economics from some of the best teachers in the world. When I first stepped into a classroom to teach, in 2006, I felt overwhelmed by the task of condensing so much of the wonder of economics into such a short space of time. I still do.
This book originates from the lecture notes I've used in the classroom. It reflects the courses I've followed (in particular those of Malcolm Walter, Arthur Thomas, Peter Boettke and Jeffrey Rogers Hummel), and textbooks I've read. Although I've tried to provide extensive references I am probably guilty of oversight. I don't claim any originality or expert skills at synthesis. I have utilised lots of quotes and links to emphasise that I see myself as a guide, rather than a guru. Most books aimed at time poor professionals have an easy to communicate (i.e. simple) central idea that is presented in a counterintuitive way with well-written anecdotes. This book takes a step back. It is for people who enjoy ‘pop economics’, but want something more substantial. It fills in some of the holes, and stretches out a broad and serious look at the discipline of economics.
I cannot hope to replicate the content and delivery of a Managerial Economics course in book form. What I have tried to do is provide a substitute for the passive element of a formal MBA. If you want an overview of key concepts, embedded in examples, then this book is enough. But to really understand the material you need to discuss it, and apply it. These are the activities I like to spend class time doing, and they cannot be replicated on the page. New technologies are making learning cheaper, and with fewer barriers, and I hope this book can play a role, but only as a complement to other sources of information and other methods of learning.
I wish to offer special thanks to the following for commenting on early versions of the text: Toby Baxendale, Tom Clougherty, Othman Cole, Lana Dojčinović, Colleen Haight, David Howden, Stephen Lai, Benjamin Powell, Randolph Quirk, David Skarbek, Robert Thorpe, Terence Tse, Wolf von Laer and Nikolai Wenzel.
In October 2013 I made a visit to Washington DC for a manuscript workshop, and appreciate the time and help of Paul Dragos Aligica, T. Clark Durant, Matthew Mitchell, Nick Schandler, Ionut Sterpan and Vlad Tarko. In particular, Nick has accompanied this book from its earliest inception all the way through spotting typos on the final draft.
In November 2013 I held a manuscript focus group in London, and received exceedingly useful comments and feedback from Sam Bowman, Anton Howes, Robert C. Miller and Ben Southwood. It was held under the auspices of a Kaleidic Economics quarterly meeting and I thank all of the members for their collegiate backing.
I also want to acknowledge the support and advice provided by my friends and family. This book has required periods of fixation and I could not have done that without Faith. As a student, I thought of myself as a vorticist economist, writer and coach. But being a son, husband and father is my arcadia.
Finally, the primary motivation for writing this book is to provide a resource for my students. It is to them that I dedicate this work.
Introduction
‘Managers can't just employ economists, they must become economists.’
—Shlomo Maital1
Imagine that it is 1910 and you are presented with the following list of problems:2
To build and maintain roads adequate for use of conveyances, their operators and passengers.
To transport physically a person from Manchester to Washington DC in around 8 hours.
To convey instantly the visual replica of an action, such as a football match, to devices that people can fit in their pocket.
To find a way for women to be able to have sex without having children, or to have children without having sex.
To increase the average span of life by 30 years.
Put in this way, doesn't the first item seem easiest? And indeed this is the one that governments were committed to achieving. But with dubious success. In comparison, as John Sparks said, ‘the other problems would have seemed fantastic and quite likely would have been rejected as the figments of someone's wild imagination.’ And yet all of those have been accomplished. We barely give them a second thought.
This isn't to ignore the role that government plays in the medical and engineering achievements of modernity, but it is telling that the greatest achievements tend to stem from the creativity and tenacity of free individuals. Not from central planning, but from decentralised experimentation. This book will provide the economic ammunition for the argument that great things happen when people are free to try. Managerial Economics helps us to understand the policy framework that is required for this to happen, and the toolkit that can then be used to create genuine value. I hope to engender a profound respect for the use of markets as a means to solve complex social issues.
If this book has a unifying theme it is that markets are incredible. We use them every day, and largely take them for granted. The poetry of economics is to marvel at the mundane. This book helps you to see markets in a new light. To appreciate how they operate, and to reflect on their results. We are totally familiar with markets, but they are remarkable accomplishments of human interaction. Indeed the science of economics is to make the mundane intelligible. To use the economic way of thinking to discover the strengths of markets and the conditions that are needed for them to work. This book will help you to understand how markets function and how they impact managerial decision making. But we will also go beyond this. We will see how managers can use markets as a management tool – both in terms of internalising the insights into their daily actions, and in terms of adopting processes that can be applied across the organisation. I want to show you how markets generate social prosperity, but also how managers can use markets – and the principles on which they rest – to generate value.
By covering the key foundations of economic analysis we can apply them to specific concepts such as economic value added (EVA), price discrimination and value-based pricing. But the aim is to keep an eye on the bigger picture – biographies of famous economists, the seminal books and articles, and key moments in economic history. We will look at how examples of market failure, such as monopolies, asymmetric information and behavioural anomalies, are well understood by economists and can in fact strengthen the case for markets. My own predisposition will shine through and it will be obvious that I want to evangelise, as well as explain markets. But the reason I weigh in on key debates is in an effort to help the reader weigh up both sides. I wish to present arguments that I find compelling, alongside a charitable interpretation of those I don't. Ultimately I have enough respect for you as reader to make up your own mind. I wrote this book to act as an input in your decision making. Don't take my word for it. Consider markets.
NOTES
1
. Maital, S. (2011)
Executive Economics
:
Ten Essential Tools for Managers
, Free Press, p. 5.
2
. Based on Sparks, J.C. (1977) If men were free to try,
The Freeman
, 1 February. UK life expectancy figures from ‘Chapter 4: Mortality, 2010-based NPP Reference Volume’ Office for National Statistics, 29 March 2012 [
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_253938.pdf
, accessed 7 October 2013].
CHAPTER 1Incentives Matter
‘The theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable in policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of mind, a technique of thinking which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions.’
—John Maynard Keynes1
In early 1998, day care centres around Haifa, in Israel, had a problem. It was a problem common to many of us who have looked after children for a living: late parents.2 After a long day being responsible for other people's children, by 4pm the teachers were ready to go home. And they weren't being paid for staying any longer. But invariably some parents would be late, and someone would have to stay behind and wait with the child. But one day some social scientists turned up (or rather, sent their research assistants) and made a suggestion: why not fine the parents for being late? It is a solution any economist would give.
Over the next few weeks things carried on as normal, as the researchers gathered data before making any changes. Then, they adopted a policy where any parent who was more than 10 minutes late would pay a $3 fine. But instead of reducing lateness, the number of late pickups more than doubled. The incentive backfired.
As an economist, I've heard this example a lot. It's often used to show economists that assuming people's behaviour can be manipulated with financial incentives is naïve and narrow minded. Indeed there is some truth to this. Just because originally there was no fine doesn't mean that there was no incentive to be on time. The social norm is to be on time, and late parents probably felt guilty. Once the arrangement moved from the social to a financial realm, parents realised they could ‘buy’ the right to be late. Indeed they weren't just buying the right to be late, but also the ability to not feel guilty about it. In fact, maybe the lesson of the day care experiment is not that economists overstate their subject matter, but that non-economists understate it. After all, the average monthly cost was about $380. A good economist would suggest that the fine was set at a price that was too low! If the goal was to reduce lateness, raise the fine. And even more importantly, discovering the point at which the fine has an effect will help the day care centre to know just how valuable the parents consider their time to be. This whole experiment might help them to discover which opening hours best suit their customers. Clearly the parents are willing to pay the teachers to stay later. Far from demonstrating the failure of markets, this example is like a cursory foray into their magic.
We tend to think that economics is the study of the economy, and indeed this is an important application. But economics isn't a subject matter; it's a way of thinking. The essence of the economic way of thinking is to understand how incentives and institutions affect people's behaviour. In terms of management, economics can give us important clues about why behaviour may be generating bad outcomes. Understanding concepts such as opportunity cost, price elasticity and price discrimination are tools that managers can use to improve a company's performance. But economics does more than this. It provides us with a way of thinking about human action. Economics is the study of society, and the tools with which we understand social behaviour are of direct relevance to management.
1.1 MANAGERIAL INDIVIDUALISM
In their excellent textbook Managerial Economics, Luke Froeb and Brian McCann offer the following guide to decision making: when you see an outcome that you deem to be undesirable, ask yourself three questions:3
Who made the bad decision?
Did they have the information they needed?
Did they have the right incentives?
All too often the first question isn't even asked, and failure is put down to some collective problem that is ill defined and impossible to alter. The main insight of managerial economics is to focus on the information and incentive mechanisms that help guide decision making. If you do not even know who is making the bad decision, there's little hope of finding out why they did so. This book intends to explore the information channels and incentive mechanisms that create value. It will focus on how markets can be utilised to help solve these problems.
The reason why economists make individual choice the centre of analysis is because we posit that only individuals choose.4 This is not the same thing as saying that only individuals matter, or that ‘society’ is nothing more than a group of individuals. It stems from a concept called ‘methodological individualism’, which Jon Elster defines as ‘the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals – their properties, goals and beliefs’.5 We can talk about how ‘Heinz have decided to build a new factory’ but according to methodological individualism the literal interpretation that the company itself made the decision is false. Families, businesses and nations might have common interests and work together to achieve shared goals, but it is only as individuals that we make decisions. This doesn't imply that social phenomena aren't important. On the contrary, it is precisely because we wish to understand social phenomena that we see it through the lens of individual choice. We need to understand the preferences and constraints of individual members, to see how collective decisions get made, because social entities are the result of individual action.
This is why the first question – identifying the decision maker – is so important. It is only then that we can look into the circumstances in which the decision was made and what their objectives were. Economics helps to reveal the information and incentive systems within which we operate. The crucial point is that although these institutions influence our choices, we also have choices about how to shape them. In short there's a feedback mechanism between individuals and institutions, but with us in the driving seat. Institutions are, as John Commons defines them, ‘collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action’.6
In this book we will make two key behavioural assumptions:
The rationality assumption – incentives affect behaviour (at the margin)
The idea that incentives matter seems obvious but is often counterintuitive. My brother-in-law enjoys adventure and on a recent skiing trip realised that he was travelling faster than 30mph. My parents were worried that he might hurt himself if he crashed, so they bought him a helmet. Guess what? The next day he promptly reached 58mph! All safety equipment has a curious potential to backfire, because it alters your incentives to take risks. Although helmets mean that you are less likely to be injured if you have an accident, they also affect the probability of having an accident in the first place. In the case of skiing a helmet reduces the cost of an accident. All else being equal, this makes you more willing to risk having one. This may not be a large effect, and perhaps if you wore a helmet you'd think that you'd be just as careful as without. But the helmet is incentivising you to be more reckless, not less. Not only this, but it can affect other people's behaviour. If you wear a helmet you also reduce the cost to other people of them crashing into you. At the margin, it could lead to more accidents.7
Think of the difference between Rugby and American Football. Both are similar sports but one key difference is that the players of the latter wear helmets. Which one do you think has the most neck and spinal injuries? The obvious answer would be Rugby, because they don't wear hard protection.8 But because of this they face a higher cost of putting their head into a dangerous situation. Maybe they are less likely to enter tackles headfirst? Indeed not only do American Footballers face a higher rate of neck and head injuries, there are calls by some to ban helmets for this very reason.9 A 2013 book on the subject claimed that in 1999 the NFL paid compensation to retired players after accepting they had suffered brain damage.10 Since the year 2000 neurosurgeons have been warning the league that the sport was causing depression, dementia and brain damage.11
The self-interest assumption – people pursue their own self-interest
Again, to economists this assumption is self-evident and trivial. Maybe we don't really know what other people's interests are. Either way, we put our own interests ahead of the interests of others. This does not imply that we are narrowly selfish. It doesn't mean that we're motivated by material possessions, or monetary gains. The welfare of your children, or colleagues, may be your primary goal. Your self-interest may well be altruistic. But it's what drives your economic decision making. As Gary Becker said,
I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behaviour is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences. Individuals maximise welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.12
The implications of these assumptions are crucial to management. Forget trying to ‘motivate’ people. Forget about coaching. The goal of management is really quite simple – to change behaviour you need to change what is in people's self-interest to pursue. You need to change incentives. Achieving that goal is where it gets difficult.
It may well be the case that some people are narrowly selfish, but acknowledging that people respond predictably to incentives does not condone any behaviour that results from it. These assumptions are merely devices to make the world around us more intelligible. Indeed we can make a distinction between positive and normative analysis. Economists are often guilty of slipping between the two, and it's important to try to keep them separate. Positive analysis refers to what is. For example the claim that ‘wearing helmets can increase the number of accidents’ is a positive statement. Normative analysis refers to what ought to be. If I told you that ‘people shouldn't wear helmets’ I'd be making a normative statement. The proper role of the economist is to limit themselves to making positive claims about society. Having said this, positive claims only take us so far. Indeed the reason many of us engage in economic analysis is not only to understand the world, but to try to make it a better place. So normative analysis is important as well. The point is that when we move from positive to normative we introduce ethical and moral opinions. Traditionally economists were also moral philosophers, and we shouldn't shy away from ethical questions. The key point is that economists have no specialist claims when it comes to moral questions. Therefore our main function is to provide the positive analysis that helps to inform other people's moral decisions. Indeed we need to be really careful about calling things ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The limits of economics are that we cannot make such judgements. But what we can do is point out a logical framework that – when combined with other disciplines – helps us to do so.
The danger is that economists slip in their normative analysis (i.e. their opinions) under the gravitas of their expertise.13
To get around this problem, the role of economist in public policy discussion, and the role of managerial economist when consulting, is to leave their own ethical opinions at the door. Instead, they should(!) engage in positive analysis that takes the policy goals of the policy maker or manager as given. In other words, it is not for the economist to say that minimum wages are good or bad. But we can tell you what the effects might be and leave it for you to decide if this is consistent with your goals. Therefore before we can even ask ‘who made the bad decision?’ we need to be clear about who is deeming it to be ‘bad’. You? Or the person that makes the decision?14
What I mean by ‘managerial individualism’ is the idea that all corporate phenomena emerge from the actions and interactions of individual employees who are making choices in response to expected additional costs and benefits, as they perceive them. This last point is critical, because incentives are not an objective fact but a subjective interpretation.15 We act when the expected marginal benefits exceed the expected marginal costs. One of the biggest misconceptions about economists is that when we talk about ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ we're referring to a monetary value. But there is nothing financial about saying people respond to incentives.
A famous example is the idea that when you pay people to donate blood (as opposed to relying on voluntary donations) people donate less.16 This seems to be a serious blow to the economist's claim that ‘incentives matter’. But the mechanism is that financial rewards interfere with the positive feeling that comes from believing that you are doing a good deed. In which case the problem isn't that incentives don't matter, it's that the type of incentive matters a lot. Plenty of evidence suggests that offering money for the completion of tasks can reduce performance. Not only because it reduces intrinsic motivations, but also because it can encourage free riding,17 cause people to choke under pressure,18 or even because workers don't believe it is credible.19 I remember once being told about a ‘generous incentive package’ but the conditions under which it applied were completely out of touch with my realistic targets. I lost confidence in my manager, and my performance fell.
Few of us are primarily motivated by money. The reason economists have a tendency to focus on money is simply because we are all motivated by it to some extent. Imagine offering your employees that reach specific targets a choice between the following ‘rewards’
Time off
Social recognition and praise
Cash
Promotion/higher status
We don't need to claim that everyone would prefer cash. It's quite possible that some people will be more motivated by other items on the list (and indeed my own impression is that time off is the best motivational device of all). The job of a manager is to understand what motivates your employees, and chucking a £5 note at them is probably less appreciated than positive and constructive feedback. But it is difficult to know what truly motivates people, and the fact people are motivated by different things makes this even harder. In terms of incentives, money is indeed a lowest common denominator, but that's exactly why it is so useful.
The rest of this chapter focuses on consumer theory. When we wish to understand public policy, the decision maker is the politician. To understand management, the decision marker is the manager. To understand consumer theory, we need to focus on the consumer.
The consumer is central to economic analysis, because of consumer sovereignty. This is sometimes referred to ‘consumer is king’, which might be a useful phrase for salespeople but is meaningless jargon. It implies that firms should bend over backwards to satisfy the whims of their customers, and if you believe that a market economy will deliver this then you'll be disappointed. What consumer sovereignty means is that in a market economy, it is consumers who, as a group, decide upon how resources are managed. The ‘economic problem’ is deciding what is to be produced, how it will be produced and who it will be produced for. In a centrally planned economy it is state bureaucrats who decide. In a market economy it is consumers.
1.2 DEMAND CURVES
The starting point of economic analysis is that people place different valuations on the same things. Although this seems fairly obvious, it's a relatively new insight. For economists prior to the late nineteenth century ‘value’ was an inherent property of a good – it was something that could be determined independently of the person doing the ‘determining’. Indeed even now when you ask people what drives ‘value’ you will notice that they fall back on old myths. One is that value stems from labour, the other is that it stems from scarcity. A simple counter example can destroy each of them.
Myth 1: Value stems from labour hours
It may seem churlish for me to demolish the foundation of pre-twentieth century economic thought (and indeed drive a stake through the heart of Marxism) with a single paragraph, but the amount of labour hours put into the production of goods and services does not determine their final value. Whether I've spent 3 months of hard toil crafting this chapter or rattled it up over a few cans of Natty Ice has no bearing on whether it is of value to you.
This may seem odd, because it's common in many industries for the price of something to reflect the amount of time it took to make. For example I pay my accountant based on how long it takes to prepare my tax return. But this is only because I'm using time as a proxy for his cost. And this is independent of the value being created. I'm only willing to pay him for his time because I deem the value he creates to be worth more. There is evidence that more firms are trying to look at value directly. In April 2009 Coca-Cola announced that they would start paying the advertising agents they hire based on specific results achieved rather than hours worked. This is known as ‘value-based’ compensation, and Proctor and Gamble are another large firm to move away from paying based on labour hours and towards paying based on performance.20 When we focus on value it is output that matters, not inputs.
Myth 2: Value stems from scarcity
The notion that value stems from scarcity is both totally wrong and obviously correct. It is wrong in the sense that we only value things that serve a purpose. Counter examples help to explain this. Brain tumours are (thankfully) quite rare. They are scarce. But that doesn't make them highly valuable. It is true that scarcity can influence the price of a good, but that is because it affects the costs (and therefore the supply curve). But this chapter is referring to value – the demand curve. Indeed by definition any economic good is a scarce good. It is obviously correct that for a good to be valuable it must be scarce, but that's only because if it wasn't scarce it wouldn't be an economic good. Air isn't scarce, therefore it isn't a good. Scarcity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to determine something's value. In economics it's a fact of life. It's taken as a given. To explain the source of value we need to look elsewhere.
So if labour hours and scarcity don't explain value, what does? Value is subjective and stems from the alleviation of pressing needs. As long as we accept that we live in a world of scarcity, all economic decisions involve tradeoffs. The term ‘need’ is therefore a little misleading. We have a long list of pressing needs and there's always going to be a point at which you'd switch to satisfying other ones. For example we tend to think that basic human needs include shelter, or indeed electricity. But we only ‘need’ electricity in an abstract sense. If we ‘needed’ electricity we wouldn't see people reducing their usage when the cost increases. In every economic decision, we exercise choice. If electricity becomes more expensive we conserve more (for example by switching off lights when not in use), or use alternatives (which could be as simple as an extra layer of clothing). Everyone, no matter how poor, will be willing to give up some of one good if they're offered enough of other goods. Even in extreme situations people engage in tradeoffs based on their own interpretation of what constitutes their interests. You and I may rank food as being a basic need that we cannot do without. But across the world there are people going hungry because they have prioritised other needs. There's no universal hierarchy of needs that we all subscribe to. Life is about tradeoffs, not absolutisms. We have an infinite list of pressing needs, but only finite means with which to satisfy them. Therefore we rank-order our preferences and apply successive units of our budget to acquire the less and less urgent desires. Because we live in a world of scarcity, we satisfy our most pressing needs first.
So it is the alleviation of pressing needs that we ‘value’, not the ‘commodities’ themselves. This is what we mean by subjective, as opposed to objective, value. ‘Goods’ are simply the things that alleviate our pressing needs, and there is nothing inherently valuable about them. Indeed the distinction between tangible products and intangible services is somewhat false, because the only thing we value is the service of satisfying our pressing needs. As Steven Horwitz says, ‘physical goods are only means to the fulfilling of various subjectively valued ends, so a good does not need to provide physically observable services to be valuable.’21 Or, as James Bryant Quinn put it so succinctly,
Products are a happy way of capturing services.22
The lesson for management is to lead on benefits (i.e. how a product helps to satisfy the customer's pressing needs) rather than features (i.e. a description of the physical product). The value of the product derives from the service being provided, not the product itself.
It's important to see that this isn't economists imposing their value system on others, it's economists arguing that we all have our own personal value system and that economics helps to draw them together. Economists are essentially blasé about what something is worth. As Publilius Syrus, put it in the first century BC ‘a thing is worth whatever a buyer will pay for it’. End of discussion! Those lengthy arguments in the pub about whether Fernando Torres is worth £50m are resolved by the economist's glib yet correct answer that if someone is willing to pay that much, he apparently is. We can disagree on whether we think he's worth that, but economics allows us to transcend arguments about personal taste to reflect those tastes in a non-arbitrary manner. The fact someone was willing to pay £50m tells us something useful.
The first law of demand states that price and quantity demanded are inversely related. This is because as the consumption of a good increases, the satisfaction derived from consuming more of the good (per unit of time) will eventually decline. The technical term for this phenomenon is the law of diminishing marginal utility (DMU). The term ‘utility’ just means our subjectively determined benefits. The greater the quantity of the good we consume, the greater we expect our total utility to be. But additional units can only be put to less valuable uses, so marginal utility must fall. We can use pizza as an example. Over a particular range the more slices of pizza we eat the happier we feel. As the quantity consumed rises so does total utility. But the first slice tastes better than the second. And the third slice brings even less pleasure. Marginal utility declines. The term ‘satiation’ refers to the point at which marginal utility becomes zero, and total utility stops increasing. If you consume more than this point marginal utility is negative, and you become less and less happy. The common term for this is ‘vomiting’. When marginal utility becomes negative you would be willing to pay money not to consume additional units. Pizza is no longer a good, it becomes a ‘bad’. DMU is a simple, but powerful concept. It states that the more you have of something, the less you value additional units. The rate of DMU will be different for different goods, and we would expect DMU to be more pronounced for perishable or sickly goods. Since you can store toilet roll you would probably be willing to pay a similar amount of money for a sixth roll as for the first. Therefore non-perishable (i.e. durable) goods tend to have a low rate of DMU. Conversely, I once bought a roast chicken from a supermarket at 8pm and was offered a second one for just 50p. But even though I had paid £5 for the first one another wasn't much use to me. The man behind the deli counter thought it was a bargain. I thought it was worthless. MU diminished rapidly. Similarly, you might be willing to treat yourself and pay £10 for a slice of rich chocolate torte in a fancy restaurant, but are unlikely to want to pay the same amount for another one.
Ultimately our consumption choices are all relative – they depend on a relative comparison between the marginal utility and the price. More formally, consumers maximise their total utility when the final dollar spent on every good purchased provides the same marginal utility per dollar spent.23 In other words, if we're choosing between beer and pizza and a beer costs twice as much, we'd purchase both items such that the marginal utility of the last beer is exactly twice as high as the marginal utility of the last slice of pizza. This is an equilibrium condition, because if it doesn't hold there's an incentive to change behaviour. For example, if the price of pizza rises for some reason then the ratio of marginal utility of pizza to the price of pizza will be lower than the ratio of marginal utility of beer to the price of beer. This means that you're gaining more marginal utility per pound spent from beer, implying that you should reallocate some of your budget from pizza to beer. If you do so, and your consumption of beer increases, the marginal utility will fall. Ultimately you will keep drinking until the two ratios are equal once more.
The concept of marginal value was a breakthrough in economic thought because it solved a perennial mystery: why are people willing to pay more for diamonds than they are for water? As Adam Smith himself put it,
Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce anything … A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.24
We've mentioned already that value stems from the ability to satisfy our pressing needs. We all recognise that water is essential for life and that by contrast diamonds are largely decorative.25 Surely survival is a more pressing need than a nice piece of jewellery? And yet people save up for months to buy an engagement ring. It's tempting to explain this paradox by saying that diamonds are scarcer, but scarcity isn't enough. Lots of things are ‘scarce’ but if they don't fulfil our needs they're not valuable. The solution lies in the fact that we always act on the margin. In other words we're never asked to choose between ‘water’ and ‘diamonds’. Rather, we choose been additional units of water and additional units of diamonds. We don't buy the concept of diamonds, we buy some amount more than we currently own. Therefore the value we place on goods comes from the needs that are satisfied by additional units. Because most of us consume a lot of water, additional units of water would only be put to satisfy minor needs. By contrast most people don't have many diamonds at all, so additional diamonds are highly sought after. There are diminishing marginal returns to both, but at any moment in time we're higher up the scale when it comes to diamonds. Our willingness to pay is based on marginal value, and not some intrinsic property contained within the good.
Economics textbooks tend to define the demand curve as the relationship between price and quantity – i.e. that as the price of a good falls we wish to purchase, have, use or consume more of it. This is true. But the underlying reason that demand curves slope downwards is because the more we have of a good the less we value additional units.
The fact that demand curves slope downwards helps to explain the concept of consumer surplus. This is defined as the difference between what you do pay for a good or service (i.e. the price) and the maximum that you would have been willing to pay. It makes sense to say that we'd only ever buy something if it's worth more to us than the price we pay, but this has a nice outcome that is worth dwelling on. Every purchase that we make delivers consumer surplus. When I paid £380,000 for my house it seemed like an awful lot of money, and I was pretty certain that the person who sold it would have accepted quite a bit less. But I also knew that I would have happily paid over £400,000. That difference constitutes my consumer surplus. In one famous example people were asked how much access to the internet was worth to them.26 When you think about it, so much of our utility comes from consumer surplus. People often criticise companies that charge prices that are higher than the cost of production (i.e. for making ‘excessive’ profits), but the other side of the coin is that consumers are always paying a price less than they value the good (‘excessive’ utility?).
One of the most common complaints about demand curves is that they oversimplify reality, but this is actually their primary strength. It's important here to underline the fact that demand curves only show the relationship between price and quantity. If any other variable changes, the demand curve will shift. In reality, of course, such change is ubiquitous. But that doesn't make demand curves irrelevant; it just means we have to be careful how much we can attribute to them.
The language we tend to use is that changes in price will affect quantity demanded (i.e. a movement along a demand curve). Changes in any variable other than price will affect demand (i.e. cause a shift in the entire demand curve). Examples of non-price factors that will cause a demand curve to shift include:
Income
The price of related goods
The number of consumers
Expectations about future price movements
Changes in preferences.
If any of the above changes, our original demand curve becomes outdated.
We can split a price change into two underlying effects – if the price of a good falls there are two reasons why we'd consume more:
Substitution effect – we can switch consumption from other goods
If the price of a good falls it becomes cheaper relative to other goods, therefore we consume more of it (we substitute or ‘switch’ from the relatively expensive to the relatively cheap). This demonstrates why relative prices matter.
Income effect – we can afford more
If the price of a good falls our real income rises (we now have more income available for consumption) and so we can afford to consume more. Note that unlike the substitution effect (which is always negative) the income effect is ambiguous. More income may mean we wish to consume more of a good, but it may mean we wish to consume less.
A decent microeconomics course will make it clear that the first law of demand doesn't imply that people always respond to price changes, just that there is a possible price change that will create a change in behaviour. This helps us to deal with some common (but misguided) criticisms of the first law of demand.
Is there a little whore in all of us?
Many people are uncomfortable with the implication that everything has a price. When Kerry Packer was bidding for the voting rights to screen ICC Cricket, he famously said ‘There's a little bit of the whore in all of us, gentlemen. What's your price?’27 I do think that this is a valid assumption to make about human behaviour, and the problem isn't that it's inaccurate, it's that it is regrettable. Non-economists might accept that in practice people do respond to incentives, but such incentives elicit socially harmful outcomes. I don't see it this way, because the assumption is simply saying that people will be at the table and since this will always expand the menu of choices, it's an improvement (or what economists refer to as a Pareto Gain). It just means that we're all influenced by price to some degree. If someone inherits their mother's house, they might claim that it has infinite value to them. The self-interest assumption says that there is a price at which they'd sell it. Why? Because the consumer has many competing preferences, and in a world of scarcity we make tradeoffs. Hence selling the house – at the right price – might make enough money to pay for the kids to go to university. Suddenly it's not a choice between mum's old house vs. not mum's old house; it's the house vs. an education. Regardless of whether it's sold or not (quite possibly its value is so very high there isn't an amount of alternative goods that can bid it away), surely it's selfish not to consider selling? If there's the slightest shred of altruism within your own preferences, there must be a possible price that would get you to sell. All economists are saying is that people will come to the table: nothing is off limits, we're all open to negotiation. And therefore this is welfare-enhancing, by expanding our menu of choice.
Luxury goods
A common response is that if prices signal quality, a luxury brand would fear that a reduction in price would signal a reduction in quality and therefore create a fall in quantity demanded. This seems intuitively plausible, but does it undermine the first law of demand? No, because it confuses a change in demand with a change in quantity demanded. If a company drastically alters its reputation, it's created a different product. The first law of demand (as represented on a demand curve) applies to the relationship between price and quantity demanded, for a given product. Therefore any other events (any non-price events) are exogenous and represent a shift in the curve. It may be true that Skoda has raised the price of their cars since the 1990s and more people have bought them. But both of these stem from a shift in the demand curve, and not a movement along it. It's possible that the quality of a Skoda has remained constant throughout (but it's worth considering whether this is likely, and if not why not) and the rise in demand is purely due to a price hike and its corresponding quality signal. But this is an abstract point and rests on an assumption that price is used as an accurate indication of quality. If the consumer knows the quality of the product, there's no reason why a rise in price would lead to a rise in quantity demanded. For any given Skoda, if the price rises you're less likely to wish to buy one. For Skoda cars as a whole, an increase in price might alter the type of product it is, if consumers don't know the quality. But this simply means that tastes have changed, and therefore the curve has shifted. ‘Luxury goods’ behave the same way as any other.
It is also worth recognising that although consumers may believe that high prices signal high quality, the opposite may also hold. Restaurants that have lower prices may generate large queues, which signals high quality to potential customers. In addition, Tyler Cowen suggests a link between the cheapness of ethnic food and the quality. He argues that in many neighbourhoods the immigrant population are more likely to frequent cheap restaurants, and this requires them to be authentic. If you want high quality Chinese food you want to find a restaurant were local Chinese people eat.28
Giffen goods
A ‘Giffen good’ is, by definition, a good where the income effect dominates the substitution effect. In other words it constitutes so much of your shopping basket that price changes have a massive effect on your real income. So if it's highly ‘inferior’ (i.e. demand falls as income rises) a fall in price can induce a rise in quantity demanded. But again changes in real income mean that the demand curve has shifted. And if it shifts, the self-interest assumption hasn't been violated. This provides the theoretical support for the empirical fact that Giffen goods are so hard to find.29
So all three of these theoretical objections to the law of demand fail to hold, and I think there are three reasons why people assert them:
Forgetting the ‘ceteris paribus’ condition
This is a Latin term that roughly means ‘all else equal’. The real world is complex with many changes occurring at the same time. When we make a theoretical statement such as ‘if price falls quantity demanded will rise’ it rests on a number of assumptions – and the point of this chapter is to explain what they are. But perhaps the biggest assumption is that this is the only effect we are considering. In the real world many other events will coincide with a price cut. There may be a recession, a competitor could cut their prices, a hurricane could destroy your supply chain in the night. The term ‘ceteris paribus’ is simply a quick way of saying ‘assuming that there's no recession, competitors’ prices remain unchanged, there's no adverse weather conditions, etc.'. You may think that this severely weakens the applicability of a theoretical statement, and that's true. Economics cannot make perfect predictions. But it does mean that you have to be very careful about using real events to ‘prove’ or ‘disprove’ economic theory. We cannot say that quantity demanded will always go up after a price cut. But we can say that it will be higher than it would have been without one. Ceteris paribus.
A misunderstanding of the nature of theory
A theoretical premise is not refutable by evidence – it can only be refuted by better theory. Therefore if we define a normal good as one where demand rises if income rises, and then label coffee a normal good, evidence (hypothetical or otherwise) that a rise in income leads to a fall in demand for coffee is irrelevant. In that case, coffee isn't a normal good. It doesn't mean that normal goods don't exist. Consider the three primary colours of red, blue and yellow. In real life we never see these three colours on their own, since we're always viewing some combination of them. Evidence of a green object doesn't mean that blue and yellow don't exist; it just means they're not always observable and fixed.
Confusion between prices and revenues
A firm isn't interested in charging as high a price as possible – revenues are what matter. A simple monopolist's cost structure will show that even if she had enough market power to triple her price, this would lead to an increase in costs and probably reduce profits. Therefore it's wrong to apply the laws of demand to firm behaviour, because the laws of demand focus on how consumers respond to prices. However firms don't care about prices, only revenue (and how revenue and cost correspond to generate profit). In fact, it's likely that a monopolist would increase profit by lowering prices (depending on the elasticity of the demand curves).
1.3 ELASTICITY
DMU tells us that demand curves will always slope downwards. But even though all demand curves slope downwards, they will do so to different degrees. The elasticity of an economic variable refers to its responsiveness to changes. Therefore the price elasticity refers to the response of quantity demanded to changes in price, and reflects the slope of the demand curve. There are several ways to calculate the price elasticity of demand, but generally speaking we can divide the percentage change in quantity demanded by the percentage change in price. This will give us a negative number (due to the first law of demand) and reflect the extent of the responsiveness. If the elasticity is greater than 1 (i.e. changes in price lead to an even bigger change in quantity demanded) we can label it an ‘elastic’ good. If the elasticity is between 0 and 1 (i.e. the change in price is proportionally bigger than the resulting change in quantity demanded) then it is ‘inelastic’.
For example, if Honda raised the price of a CR-V by 10% there would probably be a large fall in quantity demanded as people switched to similar cars from other companies. Let's imagine they sell 20% fewer cars as a result. In this case we can say that the price elasticity of demand is −2. If all SUV manufacturers raised their prices, we'd expect a less pronounced impact on demand. Maybe it would only fall by 5%. In which case we could say that the SUV market as a whole has a price elasticity of −0.5. The slope of the demand curve is only an indicator of the elasticity, and different sections of the demand curve will have different slopes. But generally speaking:
An elastic demand curve is very flat (small changes in price lead to large changes in quantity demanded)
An inelastic demand curve will be very steep (even a large change in price has a small effect on quantity demanded).
Many factors will influence the price elasticity, but we can list some of the main ones:
Substitutes
The reason we'd expect the demand for Honda CR-Vs to be reasonably price elastic is because it's a competitive market with plenty of close substitutes. This means it's relatively easy for the substitution effect to kick in. But we can make two important points about substitutes. Firstly, substitutes are subjectively determined. In the same way that value is subjective, what constitutes a substitute is too. If I have fond memories of a previous Honda that I owned I will be less sensitive to price changes than someone who has never driven one before. In the example above I then talked about the entire SUV market. But maybe you would be happy with a large saloon instead. Whilst substitutes are subjectively determined, they are also degrees of substitutability. We can put these into four categories. Think of them as having the product at the core of expanding concentric circles, with broader and broader degrees of substitutability.
Product form – are goods that have the same features (i.e. they ‘look’ the same). In our example this might be different Honda dealers, or possibly Ford Kas, Toyota Rav 4s or a VW Tiguan.
Product category – these only have similar features and could even be thought of as the entire industry. We might add Volvo XC60s, Audi Q5 or Mercedes M class.
Generic – are goods that fulfil the same customer needs, and are to be interpreted more broadly. To some extent other modes of transport can be considered a substitute for buying a car
Budget – this reflects the fact that all goods and services are competing for the consumer's income.
Share of total budget
If your spending on a certain good constitutes a small part of your budget, you're unlikely to care much about price changes. Things like matches, toothpicks or salt are items we spend very little on over the course of a year, and even if the price doubled you might not even notice.
Search costs
The greater the hassle of finding alternatives the less responsive your demand will be to price changes. The internet has made searching far cheaper than previously and makes it easier to compare prices from different sellers. This makes demand more responsive to price changes
This all sounds quite abstract and we need to look at some direct managerial implications. The problem is that it's very hard in the real world to calculate the price elasticity of goods that you sell. But this makes it all the more important to develop an intuitive understanding of the factors that influence elasticity. The reason for this is because elasticity will determine the effect that a change in price has on total revenue. Total revenue is simply price multiplied by quantity. And we know from the first law of demand that there's an inverse relationship between the two. So if you lower prices, then you should expect to sell more. But there are two outcomes here. On the one hand you will be receiving less money per unit sold. But on the other hand you'll sell more units. It is the elasticity that will tell us which effect dominates.
If the good is elastic, then demand is highly responsive to changes in price. Therefore the additional units sold compensate for the fact that you're selling them at a lower price. Total revenue will go up. But if prices are increased, the opposite effect occurs and total revenue falls. Do not raise prices for elastic products!
If the good is inelastic, then demand is going to be less responsive. In this case a price cut will not lead to a large increase in sales and so total revenue falls. For inelastic goods you generally want to raise prices, because the additional revenue per item offsets the small fall in quantity demanded. An understanding of elasticity is crucial for any basic pricing strategy.
The 2nd law of demand
