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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
A how-to guide for the discovery and prevention of the illegal transfer of money Written for the private sector--where most money laundering takes place--this book clearly explains shows business professionals how to deter, detect, and resolve financial fraud cases internally. It expertly provides an understanding of the mechanisms, tools to detect issues, and action lists to recover hidden funds. * Provides action-oriented material that will show how to deter, detect, and resolve financial fraud cases * Offers an understanding of the mechanisms, tools to detect issues, and action list to recover hidden funds * Covers mechanisms for moving money, identifying risk exposures, and investigating money movement Arming auditors, investigators, and compliance personnel with the guidance that, up until now, has been restricted to criminal investigators, Money Laundering Prevention provides nuts-and-bolts information needed to fully understand the money laundering process.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1: Understanding the Process of Money Laundering
What Is Money Laundering?
Money Laundering Defined
Why Do People Launder Money?
The Money Laundering Cycle
Money Laundering Is a Criminal Business
Money Laundering Is Global
Money Launderers Adapt Technology
The Role of Technology
The Role of Banks
The Role of Nations
Regional Hotspots
The Birth of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Conclusion
Chapter 2: Motivations for Getting Involved
Involvement Is Personal
People Weigh the Odds of Success
Where Do Laundered Funds Come From?
The Impact of Corruption
Why Is Corruption Increasing?
Corruption Always Begins Small
Bribery and Corruption of Your Employees
Bribery and Corruption by Your Employees
Evolution of Government Attitudes
Official Corruption Impacts Individual Corruption
Tax Evasion as a Gateway to Money Laundering
Moving from Taxes to Criminal Activity
The Rise of Regional and Multinational AML Organizations
The Connection between Fraud and Money Laundering
Money Laundering as a Do-It-Yourself Activity
The Service Providers: Bankers, Accountants, and Lawyers
Conclusion
Chapter 3: Mechanisms for Moving Money
Money Laundering Requires Movement through the System
Broken Windows Encourage Other Crimes
Look Local, Think Global
Expanding International Requirements
Financial Havens Are Expanding
Money Laundering Is a Growth Industry
Law Enforcement Gets a Big Boost
Profit Drives Criminal Activity
Structuring the Scheme to Succeed
Why Use a Bank, When You Can Own One?
Learning from the Big Fraud Schemes
Confronting the Inevitable
Balancing Security and Cost
Effective Fraud Prevention Strategies
The Fraud Triangle
Where to Start
Mitigating Improper Behavior
Conclusion
Chapter 4: Going Global
Taking Money around the World
Moving the Money Offshore
Avoiding Detection
Historical Basis for Money Laundering
Role of Private Banking
Enhanced Regulations
The Black Market Peso Exchange
Increasing Cooperation in Regulation
Regional Distinctions
Global Efforts
The Law Enforcement Focus
Conclusion
Chapter 5: Technology and Tomorrow
The Impact of Technology
The Next Phase of Money Laundering
Everything Old Becomes New Again
Being Anybody You Want to Be
Welcome to the Future
So What Is the AML Response?
Evolution of AML Controls
Adjusting to Rapidly Increasing Scale
A Highly Flexible Methodology Results in Processes that Are Difficult to Stop
AML Is a Process, Not a Destination
All Countries' Regulatory Programs Are Not Equal
Technology and Offshore Havens Intersect
The Cost vs. the Benefit
Consider the Pace of Change and Progress
Conclusion
Chapter 6: Discovery and Prevention
Early Warning Is Essential to AML
Proactive Means Active
By the Numbers
Paradigm Shift
Testing Your Own AML Systems
Expanding the Business Comparison
The Regulatory Framework
High-Risk Areas
Money Laundering Meets Terror Financing
Hiding in Plain Sight
Criminalizing the Concealment Activities
Creating Financial Fronts
Keeping the Money Moving
Keeping the Tax Man Happy
Conclusion
Chapter 7: Terror Financing
Terrorists Use Money Laundering Techniques
Similarities and Distinctions
Application of the Methodology to Terror Financing
Global Impact of Financial Crimes
Alternative Laundering Mechanisms
Regulatory Responses
Conclusion
Chapter 8: Identifying Risk Exposures
AML Exposures: Assessing Financial Institution Risk
Language, Culture, and Ethnicity
The Legal Landscape
Geography: Distance Matters
The Goal of the Launderer Is to Hide
The United States Takes a Different Approach
Laundering Groups Seek to Evade Detection
A Fractured Enforcement and Regulatory Picture
The Regulatory Position on Cyber Risks
Simple Fraud, Still Successful
Conclusion
Chapter 9: Investigating Money Movement
Money Laundering Is Now Transnational Organized Crime
Succeeding in the Investigative Process
Government Access to Information
Mining Data for Money Laundering
Some Products Help the Perpetrators
Investigating Virtual Payment Technologies
Looking to the Future Investigative Issues
Putting an Investigative Plan in Motion
People Are Essential to Proof
Finding Money Laundering Abroad
Money Laundering Exposure during the Financial Industry Consolidation
Conclusion
Chapter 10: Reporting and Recovery
Reporting to Law Enforcement
Honest People Act Differently
Anticipating Challenges with Cyber Recoveries
Building Appropriate Controls into Online Payment Systems
Global Coordination on Future Issues
Weighing Access vs. Privacy
Compliance Issues
Putting Recovery Plans into Action
Conclusion
Chapter 11: Conclusion
About the Author
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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e1
Money Laundering Prevention
Deterring, Detecting, and Resolving Financial Fraud
JONATHAN E. TURNER
Copyright © 2011 by Jonathan E. Turner. All rights reserved.
Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.
Published simultaneously in Canada.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600, or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Turner, Jonathan E., 1969–
Money laundering prevention : deterring, detecting, and resolving financial fraud / Jonathan Turner.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-470-87475-2 (hardback); ISBN 978-1-1180-8668-1 (ebk); ISBN 978-1-1180-8669-8 (ebk); ISBN 978-1-1180-8675-9 (ebk)
1. Money laundering—Prevention. I. Title.
HV6768.T88 2011
658.4 '73—dc22
2011007525
This book is dedicated to Kristen, Sarah, and Alex, in appreciation of their love, support, encouragement, and for making everything possible.
Preface
I have always been fascinated by money laundering, particularly its relationship to fraud. While the topic has long been considered the financial twin of narcotics investigations, the lack of broader interest in money laundering on its own never made sense to me. From my perspective, money laundering is the epitome of fraud methodology. It involves the concealed transfer of assets by masking them in the mundane normalcy of financial transactions. In short, the methodology of money laundering exists in every fraud scheme. As a practitioner in the field, it seemed only natural that the evolving anti-money-laundering (AML) tools would be widely recognized and used by fraud investigators and forensic accountants.
Yet nothing could be further from the truth. When I began looking and applying money laundering tests to typical fraud cases, I was often met with confusion. When I suggested that finding the individual benefit could be reversed to find the underlying fraud, I found skepticism. When I used the phrase “money laundering,” I would get “But this is not a drug case” in reply.
In 2005, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) approached me about updating their money laundering course and I leaped at the opportunity. It gave me the chance to reshape the conversation away from narcotics trafficking and toward white collar crime. This shift in perspective was possible, too, given the Patriot Act, which had already pushed AML compliance in the same direction with its emphasis on identifying terror financing. Since that time, I have taught this view of money laundering and its relationship to fraud dozens of times around the world. I have found audiences receptive to the idea that traditional AML tools can be applied, successfully, in white collar crime matters, even when there is no nexus to narcotics trafficking or terror financing. Similarly, the use of anti-fraud tools generates useful results in uncovering and resolving money laundering cases.
Since taking an active role in AML training in late 2005, I have continued to investigate the relationship between fraud and money laundering. In the process, I have become increasingly convinced that the distinctions are superficial and often the result of training perspectives. I have written, lectured, and researched these two dynamically growing fields, finding that the evolving tools for each have direct application to the other.
As fate would have it, I was working on a money laundering case that was structured like a traditional fraud case when Sheck Cho, my editor at John Wiley & Sons, called to see if I was interested in putting my ideas into a book. Soon after, this project was off and running.
As you read the end result—this book—consider where and how these methodologies fit other aspects of your work. If you are a regulator or investigator, an academic or practitioner, you will soon realize that the processes, procedures, and intent of money laundering apply to a much wider range of issues. You will soon be asking yourself why, if these methodologies are so well known, are they still so successful? What is it about money laundering that makes it appeal to such a diverse audience? The assumption that money laundering practices are restricted to drug dealers is not going to stand—and we know what happens when you assume in matters of fraud.
This book endeavors to put money laundering into a modern context. Rather than focusing on accounting transactions or banking regulations, the approach is to discuss the evolving incentives to launder money, the adapting technologies that help hide the movement of funds, and the huge financial gains that can be obtained by providing laundering services.
Beginning with a discussion of the money laundering process, including what it means and how it came about, I seek to explore the inherent challenges between governments and financial institutions. This provides a foundation and context to see the opportunities in any financial institution, or nonfinancial business that provides similar services.
From there, the motivations of individual participants become vital because any defense is only effective if one understands the opposing perspective and intent. Otherwise, despite effort and good intentions, defensive efforts will fail. The challenge in money laundering cases is that the methodologies appeal to a wide range of people, from criminals, such as drug dealers and embezzlers, to political individuals, like terrorists and tax protesters, to ordinary people confronted by greed. Understanding who these people are, what motivates them to cross the line, and how many ways they can become involved gives the interested investigators, regulators, and AML professionals needed insight.
Various illicit drugs are sometimes referred to as “gateway drugs” in that they lead to further and harder drug use—the reward, so to speak. In much the same way, various petty actions can be considered “gateways” to full-blown and creative methods of money laundering that reward the criminal with more liquid assets. The range of available money movement mechanisms is extensive. They do not lend themselves to simple or straightforward controls. And once an individual has successfully moved money through the system, greed can become a powerful force for further and further involvement.
Part of the challenge in investigating money laundering is the international component because all money laundering is an attempt to avoid government rule, regulation, and, very often, taxes. The use of various kinds of entities around the globe provides both protection from discovery and barriers to seizure of the laundered funds. But distance alone is not the driving factor. Differences in government policies and implementation leave gaps, gaps that in some cases are intentionally created because some governments benefit from illicit funds passing through or remaining within their borders. Just as individuals have their motivations, so do governments. While global AML agreements are strengthening, their impact on reducing the actual level of money laundering appears negligible. Thus, despite the growing international consensus that money laundering is a widespread and harmful criminal activity that affects all nations, certain countries continue to see practices and policies that not only allow money laundering, but they actually encourage and enable it.
Technology is impacting this process as well. Like every other aspect of modern life, technology is providing tools that change how funds flow through the financial system. Fifty years ago the primary financial tool was cash, and every country issued and operated on its own currency. If the European Union (EU) model is the future, then we can expect other economic unions, where countries embrace one currency, such as the euro, or simply adopt another country's currency, such as the U.S. dollar, or peg their own to it. Another change that has taken place in the past half century is what is meant by a “financial institution.” Many variations have arisen, as banks cease to be the only choice for moving money. More choices can be found to move money, including purely virtual entities that exist entirely online. Indeed, money laundering, once virtually limited to the use of cash, has adapted along the way and has increased exponentially as the financial world went from checks to credit cards to electronic transfers—which has nearly eliminated the use of cash in general commerce. (Illicit goods are the last bastion of criminal cash transactions.)
So, as opportunity increases, a corresponding pressure is placed on the discovery and prevention aspects. An increasing series of regulations, initiatives, and legal structures have been created to provide tools to stop the free flow of funds through banking institutions. Sometimes these regulations are counterintuitive for financial institutions because their underlying purpose is to facilitate the free flow of funds. Yet as the penalties for compliance failures increase, these institutions are being forced to find what is hidden and prevent future access by criminals. Since nobody expects money laundering to go away, this has created a competitive atmosphere where financial institutions seek to balance their regulatory requirements against their economic best interest while ensuring that their AML programs are, at least, as good as their peers.
The real pressure to make progress against money laundering came after September 11, 2001, when the connection between terror financing and money laundering methodologies was clearly demonstrated to the world. Prior to that, the link was known but not popularly understood. This shift in focus motivated many countries to increase their regulatory framework and enhance the cooperation in tracing illicit payments. Terror financing, while it uses money laundering methods, has a significant difference from white collar crimes and the like—the amounts involved can be much smaller. Where prior AML attention was focused on very large money movements, the emphasis on terror financing requires tools, techniques, and approaches that identify substantially smaller money flows.
This drove AML efforts in a new direction, an intensive look at the policies and procedures that would be required to identify potential risk areas and find exploitable opportunities before either criminals or terrorists would be able use them. The primary result was to push AML responsibilities even further out. What was once a governmental function had, over time, been given over to banks and, eventually, other financial institutions. This risk-based approach has even pushed these responsibilities further on, to the various service providers most likely to be involved in potential laundering transactions. Interestingly, Europe has been the leader in recruiting these other players in the AML process; whereas the United States, the principal driver of most AML efforts, has lagged behind in this innovation.
Understanding that nothing can eliminate the risk, there will always be a need to investigate allegations of improper money movements. Traditionally, this has been a government role, but this responsibility, too, as with the risk policies, has shifted to the private sector steadily over the past 40 years. Much as technology has expanded the definition of a financial institution practically if not legally, the number of organizations now involved in money laundering investigations is growing. Today, launderers attempt to move money through banks, brokerage houses, insurance companies, charities, multinational service companies, and manufacturers—indeed, every kind of organization imaginable. AML is no longer merely a bank security concern. Any professional who deals with financial transactions must now be aware of—and be ready to become involved in—money laundering investigations.
The process ends with the reporting and recovery aspects. Efforts to control money laundering involve a tremendous volume of data aggregation. Where discovered, identified, or even suspected, financial institutions and related entities are required to document and report these activities. The intent is to gather sufficient data so that even if a laundering transaction succeeds, the pattern can be used to stop or intercept the next transaction. The recovery process is focused on making laundering too expensive. By seizing identified illicit funds, governments not only fund their AML efforts, they drive up the cost of this criminal conduct.
By discussing the motivations, objectives, and outcomes, I hope to present you with ideas to consider and practical information you can use. These will be tools to increase the breadth and depth of your own toolkit and enable you to bring more value to the table for your organization. This is why I wrote the book. Please consider the ideas that I present to you. See how they can be implemented in your practice. That said, I would love to know your experiences integrating AML concepts into wider fraud investigations, and how you think anti-fraud concepts can further our work in the AML field. Perhaps what you find out—and what I do—will be the next book. I can be reached at www.linkein.com/jonathaneturner.
Acknowledgments
There is no way to adequately thank all of the people who played a role in the creation of this book because nearly every person I have worked with over my career has been a part of its creation. All of my classmates and students, professors and colleagues, peers and friends, and even the perpetrators I have met through my work—each experience has helped shape me, my career, and this book.
There are some people and organizations that deserve special note. I would like to begin by thanking my business partner, Andy Wilson, for his support, humor, and occasional abuse over the 20 years we have worked together. He is an outstanding fraud investigator, a great business partner, and a true friend.
Next, I must recognize Joe Wells, Jim Ratley, and the entire staff of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners for their unwavering support of our field. I thank them for allowing me to give back some small portion of what I have received from them in the way they have shaped my profession and for everything they have taught me.
I would like to thank the faculty, staff, and students at the Kenan-Flagler School of Business of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill and the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Memphis. The interactions with my colleagues on the faculty, the support of the staff, and the interest of students make working with them both an opportunity to teach and to learn.
I extend my deep appreciation to my clients for allowing me to work with you and your organizations during difficult and highly stressful times.
I would also like to extend my gratitude to Sheck Cho and the entire team at John Wiley & Sons for the patience they have shown with a first book, especially given the constant challenge of my practice, which extended the length of this project. They had faith in me and the book and saw it through to completion.
The following individuals also have my thanks for their assistance during specific times in my professional development: Keith Casey, Sterl Greenhalgh, Pamela Segers, Ralph Anderson, Tommy Barlow, Christi Ellaby, Bill Price, John Shearer, Jerry Harris, Annie Boucher, William Lenahan, Scott Perkins, Meike Olin, Nancy Pasternak, Jean-François Legault, Allan Bachman, Alton Sizemore, Jr., Gerry Zack, Dennis Dycus, Ed Bradbury, Bruce Dean, Joe Dervaes, James Whitaker, Richard Woodford, Martha McVeigh, Peter Callaway, Delena Spann, Bert Lacativo, Robert Blair, Joseph Ford, and Cynthia Cooper.
Finally, and, most important, I must thank my family: my parents and grandparents for making me the person I am, my wife for helping me become the person I want to be, and my children Sarah and Alex for being who they are.
Chapter 1Understanding the Process of Money Laundering
What Is Money Laundering?
People often see money laundering as an exotic process, an objective whose very name evokes some mysterious and nefarious financial crime. In reality, it is one of the most common—and commonly misunderstood—financial activities connected to illicit financial schemes, including fraud, tax evasion, narcotics, human smuggling, corporate fraud, government corruption, and terror financing. The beauty and danger of money laundering is that it touches them all.
Anti-fraud professionals, criminal investigators, tax auditors, government prosecutors, and corporate compliance professionals are all focused on different aspects of these actions, oftentimes missing the larger picture due to an incomplete understanding of what money laundering is, how it works, and who is involved. It is important to understand the meaning, role, and history of this kind of activity to see how it began and evolved to impact a wide range of business functions. Today money laundering is a criminal business, with the emphasis on the business aspect. To merely look at one statute or another, or focus on the criminal elements involved, significantly misses the point. Today the attraction to money laundering is profit—it is a service-oriented business where readily available knowledge can position people to make significant profits with little perceived risk.
This chapter explores the origins and evolution of money laundering, tracing it to the current day, providing the foundation necessary to deter, detect, and document money laundering activities. With this foundation, the role and responsibilities of the money launderer can be explored as well as what makes money laundering so attractive to all kinds of people engaged in criminal activity. Understanding why something is done, as well as how it is accomplished, often provides the best path for defending against it. Simply calling something a “crime” is unlikely to make much of an impact where the financial benefits are often compelling.
Money Laundering Defined
What we now refer to as “money laundering” is popularly said to originate from Mafia ownership of laundries in the United States. Gangs generating illicit cash from extortion, prostitution, gambling, and other enterprises purchased legitimate businesses through which they funneled these illicit goods. True or not, the term stuck and for people seeking to legitimize cash, the laundry analogy is popularly accepted.
The reasons date back to Al Capone. Although reputed to be one of the biggest criminal leaders of his time, he was convicted of simple tax evasion. Seeing what happened to Capone forced gangsters to be more careful with the origin, accounting, and disbursement of their funds, and although the world is no longer the cash-based economy it was in the 1930s, the lessons they learned in trying to avoid criminal prosecution are still used today.
To protect the mob bosses' money from government insight, Meyer Lansky is reputed to have developed the modern money laundering approach. He created a process whereby cash from crimes in the United States was taken to Switzerland and loaned back to entities owned or controlled by the various illegal gangs. The “loan-to-back” concept, which can obscure the real timing of the illicit funds, is still one of the more popular mechanisms for laundering cash. It allows the beneficiary to document, declare, and utilize cash while providing limited recourse for government investigators.
Money laundering has been defined in a variety of ways by a variety of sources. While the definitions used by various regulators, criminal codes, and law enforcement agencies are valid, they and others like them are mostly focused on the criminal aspects, the accounting aspects, or the illicit nature of the actions. For that reason, most are incomplete to a proper understanding of the laundering process. Traditional definitions have focused on the activities involved and are usually divided into three phases: (1) placement, (2) layering, and (3) integration, or some variation on those themes. While action oriented, these definitions also cover a lot of perfectly legitimate activities. Creating an adequate definition is challenging, since the basic roles and actions are often disputed, and the process is global where the lack of common practices and codes of conduct leave room for debate about the meaning of even the word illicit. This book uses a process similar to zero-based budgeting in that each step in the process is built from the ground up, creating a viable definition for the objectives and actions involved in money laundering.
You have to look no further than a criminal trial to see how diligently the standard definitions are disputed, as the prosecution attempts to corral the activities under this title and the defense argues they are merely common business activities. The problem with most standard definitions is that both the prosecution and the defense are correct. Money laundering in the criminal sense involves the use of criminal or illicit funds and assigns criminal liability to otherwise legitimate business practices. Thus the first task in defining money laundering is to recognize that it is a business function. That is, money laundering involves the use of traditional business practices to move funds and the people who engage in this activity are doing so to make money. The mere fact that the activity has been criminalized does not change its underlying nature.
Why Do People Launder Money?
While it is possible given some psychopathic personalities, it is exceedingly rare that anyone gets involved in money laundering because he or she wanted to commit a crime. It is far more likely that the person would get involved because the activity is profitable. Treating the topic as a crime, however, misses the business realities that impact legitimate participants and financial transactions and, eventually, the investigation into the money laundering itself.
As a business activity, money laundering can further be divided among those “self-employed,” who launder funds for their own use, and “service providers,” who provide a commercial service to others. Again, the mere fact that these activities may or may not be legal in the jurisdiction has little bearing on the actions themselves. Thus a more complete definition has to encompass both the personal actions and the professional initiatives.
This leads to the motivations of the actors in money laundering. If the intent is to hide illicit funds, then the transactions will have no or limited legitimate business purposes. Here there is a clearly differentiating action. Where the process serves a legitimate business function, it will take the path of least resistance. In other words, people being people do things in the simplest and most straightforward way to accomplish the task. When laundering illicit funds, however, there is no legitimate business function being served and thus the actions often violate this rule of human nature. Since the aberration is due to the laundering objective, it provides support for an actionable definition of the process.
Thus far the definition includes a business process that provides a means for profit, either on an individual or service provider basis, whereby overly complicated mechanisms are used to mask the infusion of illicit funds into legitimate commerce. But is that complete? Or is there more to understanding exactly what is being done?
To test if there is more, look at the question of the origin of the funds. Are the actions taken related to the underlying illicit nature of the funds? Surprisingly, the answer is no. Tax evaders, spouses seeking to hide parts of the marital estate, corrupt politicians, embezzling employees, and terrorists all use astoundingly similar mechanisms to hide the movement of money.
People looking to hide the movement of funds are interested in two primary things: (1) safety and (2) secrecy. They are looking for mechanisms that will allow them to move the money with minimal risk of loss and keep the knowledge of those movements hidden from perceived adversaries. This is instructive into the thinking and mechanisms chosen.
Consider the lesson of Eliot Spitzer, the former New York governor who was involved in a prostitution ring. His long career as a prosecutor and politician should have given him the knowledge necessary to hide his actions (that is, allegedly paying a prostitute) from the government entities he served. Yet, despite his knowledge of how the government investigations were conducted, his actions fell squarely within their view. Why? Look at what he was trying to do. He was focused on hiding his alleged activities from his wife—she being the perceived adversary. He was not worried about hiding his actions from law enforcement per se because he was not hiding his financial transactions from an investigation. He did not care that he was “Client no. 9”; he cared that his wife did not discover he was “Client no. 9.” Thus the perceived adversary is extremely important in differentiating and defining the money launderer's actions.
When the money launderer identifies the perceived adversary, he can make all kinds of adjustments to the scheme and go undetected for years. This can be seen by looking back at the Barings Bank scandal of the 1990s. Nick Leeson, in his book Rogue Trader describes being caught several times over the course of his unauthorized speculative trading. He recounts how each time he was able to talk his way out of discovery because the people who caught him did not understand what he had done. So the structure of the transactions depends on who the likely discoverer could be and what they are likely to look at or for.
Another fraudster from the 1990s, Walt Pavlo, makes the same point in his published statements. He describes knowing what the auditors would look for and providing them with distractions to keep them away from what he was hiding. In other words, these overly complicated mechanisms described above are not incidental; they are required to conceal the activities from discovery.
The Money Laundering Cycle
The definition of money laundering now needs to expand to encompass a series of actions where the money launderer conceals his actions from a perceived threat—but not from all possible lines of discovery. This leads him to create façades, illusions that can only prevent scrutiny from the perpetrator's chosen direction or perspective.
Further, the actions are not only taken to hide, but they are taken to legitimize. An essential element in the process is the conversion of a wide range of illicit funds, including proceeds of street crime, narcotics trafficking, official corruption, corporate fraud, kickbacks, bribes, and even terror financing into apparently legitimate income. While a small portion of laundered funds are intended to be hidden for some period of time, the eventual purpose will be for the initiator to publicly use the funds. The mechanisms, therefore, must use otherwise legitimate types of transactions, otherwise legitimate entities, and involve otherwise legitimate intermediary purchases to create the appearance of legitimacy. This concept, renting credibility, is often why and how ordinary organizations are involved in money laundering transactions. And since they provide a vital service to the money launderer, they are often compensated for their roles, which is an incentive to ask limited questions or to look the other way entirely.
