NAMA-Land E-Book

Frank Connolly

• Herausgeber: Gill Books
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Seitenzahl: 643

Beschreibung

The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was created in 2009 to contain the spiralling fallout from Ireland's property crisis. Its job as Ireland's 'bad bank' was to act impartially to get the maximum return from the sale of assets for the Irish people and help pay down the state's massive debts. Now, after NAMA has presided over the transfer of €70 billion in assets, the Irish economy is once again beginning to recover. But the basic arithmetic of assets valued and assets sold hides a multitude of sins. Beneath NAMA's veneer of impartiality lies a world built on political patronage and nepotism, rife with conflicts of interest and vulnerable to shocking instances of corruption. Here, and for the first time, bestselling investigative journalist, Frank Connolly, unravels the scandal at the heart of NAMA's mission. Based on exclusive interviews with a wide range of interested parties, NAMA-land is the shocking story of how the sale of public assets conspired to disinherit the Irish people and enrich a new elite. 'Frank Connolly's careful and penetrating investigative research has exposed critical truths about malfeasance in high places and the often ugly workings of political power generally, actions that have caused great harm to the general population.' Noam Chomksy 'Without Frank Connolly we would not know about the scale of corruption that has infected Irish political and business life. He is the best investigative journalist we've had in this country.' Eamon Dunphy

Leseprobe

NAMA - LAND

FRANK CONNOLLY

Gill Books

For Madeleine, our much-loved mother, granny and friend to so many, whose departure left a huge absence in our lives. And for the beautiful twins, Rían and Alannah, whose arrival has brought so much joy in the wake of our loss.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADIAAbu Dhabi Investment AuthorityAIBAllied Irish BankAngloAnglo Irish BankBHCBelfast Harbour CommissionersBNPParibas Banque Nationale de Paris ParibasC&AGComptroller and Auditor GeneralC&WCushman & WakefieldCBECommander of the Order of the British EmpireCBIConfederation of British IndustryCEOchief executive officerCFOchief financial officerCPOcompulsory purchase orderDDDADublin Docklands Development AuthorityDUPDemocratic Unionist PartyEBSEducational Building SocietyECBEuropean Central BankEIREuropean (Access to Information on the Environment) RegulationsEPRAEuropean Public Real Estate AssociationESBElectricity Supply BoardEUEuropean UnionFBIFederal Bureau of InvestigationFOIFreedom of InformationGBFIGarda Bureau of Fraud InvestigationHSBCHong Kong and Shanghai Banking CorporationICAVsIrish Collective Asset-management VehiclesIBRCIrish Bank Resolution CorporationICGLongbow Intermediate Capital Group LongbowIFSCIrish Financial Services CentreIMFInternational Monetary FundIPUTIrish Property Unit TrustIRAIrish Republican ArmyJER PartnersJE Robert CompaniesJLCJefferies LoanCoreJVjoint ventureKKRKohlberg Kravis RobertsLIHAFLocal Infrastructure Housing Activation FundMLAMember of the Legislative AssemblyMREGMack Real Estate GroupMSREFMorgan Stanely Real Estate FundsNAMA ActNational Asset Management Agency Act 2009NAMANational Asset Management AgencyNAMAILNational Asset Management Agency Investment LtdNCANational Crime AgencyNDAnon-disclosure agreementNINorthern IrelandNIACNorthern Ireland Advisory CommitteeNIHENorthern Ireland Housing ExecutiveNPRFNational Pensions Reserve FundNTMANational Treasury Management AgencyNWLNamaWinelakeOPWOffice of Public WorksPACPublic Accounts CommitteePIMCOPacific Investment Management CompanyPRSAProperty Services Regulatory AuthorityPSNIPolice Service of Northern IrelandPwCPricewaterhouseCoopersQIFQualified Investor FundREITReal Estate Investment TrustREOReal Estate OpportunitiesRGSGRock Global Services Group LtdRUCRoyal Ulster ConstabularySDLPSocial Democratic and Labour PartySECSecurities and Exchange CommissionSEMsearch engine marketingSIPOStandards in Public OfficeSIPTUServices Industrial Professional and Technical UnionSPVspecial purpose vehicleTAILTreasury Asian Investments LtdTDTeachta DálaTHTreasury HoldingsTUVTraditional Unionist VoiceUUPUlster Unionist PartyZCMZurich Capital Markets

PREFACE

When I first discussed a follow up to my book Tom Gilmartin: The Man Who Brought Down a Taoiseach (Gill Books 2014), I told Conor Nagle, commissioning editor in Gill Books, that I believed the next big story in Irish political and business life would centre on the disposal of vast quantities of public assets by the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA).

Like many others, I was sceptical of the prospect of its successful recovery of the billions of euro which had been given to the banks to restore their ability to lend and help generate economic growth, as well as of assurances that NAMA would not be a ‘bail-out for developers’. However, I was prepared to give the executives of NAMA the benefit of the doubt when it came to their ability and experience in dealing with the scale of distressed property loans, which were transferred from the banks and which they were being asked to manage and prepare for disposal. It was clearly an immense undertaking and I believed it was fair to give those charged with this huge responsibility an opportunity to prove they were capable and confident of achieving the ambitious targets set by the then Fianna Fáil-led government when the agency was established in late 2009.

When we agreed in late summer of 2016 to try to write the story of NAMA, I was conscious that I would be unable to cover the entirety of the agency’s activities over the past eight years given the scale of its operations. I would have to rely on my own ability to identify key sources and contacts who could help to pull together a narrative that would provide readers with an insight into the work of what has been described as the largest property management and disposal company in the world, and arguably the most secretive.

Among the very first people I contacted was the NAMA communications advisor, but my request for an interview with the senior executives of the agency, Frank Daly and Brendan McDonagh, was declined. Instead, I used the various announcements by NAMA on its website, in public speeches and statements, media interviews and releases, and in the appearance of the agency executives before various Oireachtas committees as a key source. I also had the benefit of the huge media coverage of the agency’s work by Irish newspapers, radio, television and across social media.

Vital assistance was provided by the many public representatives who have taken an interest in the work of NAMA and who investigated its work in the Dáil and at Stormont, including the public accounts and finance committees of the Oireachtas and the finance committee of the Northern Ireland assembly, which were particularly helpful in this regard. I spoke to many of those who are mentioned in the following pages and to others who prefer to remain anonymous. Among the latter are developers who felt constrained by the legal obligations they undertook when they signed non-disclosure agreements with NAMA as a condition of the agreements and settlements they made in respect of their hugely distressed loans, which were transferred to the agency.

Most were unhappy with their treatment by NAMA but were prepared to accept their responsibility for the reckless borrowing that characterised the final years of the so-called Celtic Tiger before the banking system and the economy collapsed. Others were unrepentant, blaming everyone but themselves for the quagmire of debt in which tens of thousands of Irish people found themselves when the recession hit, and the many more who took the brunt of the austerity measures that followed over several years.

Some developers clearly continue to enjoy many, if not all of the luxuries to which they were accustomed in the good times while others are struggling to recover their lost fortunes.

The anonymous NAMA Wine Lake provided interesting insights into the work of NAMA, while transcripts from various court battles involving the agency and numerous debtors in Ireland and other jurisdictions were also instructive. I spoke to a wide range of politicians, journalists, former NAMA staff and advisors, lawyers, estate agents and others with an insight into the work of the agency.

A veritable multi-billion euro industry has grown around the NAMA project with the arrival of global funds with deep pockets, which have swooped on the massive, multi-million-euro portfolios of distressed assets controlled by NAMA across several jurisdictions, including Britain, the US, France and Germany, as well as Ireland.

Asset managers, surveyors, solicitors, valuers, accountancy firms and receivers have made huge profits through their association with the vulture and other investors who have purchased the assets from NAMA at significant discounts. A number of these were associated with NAMA over the years either as direct employees or as consultants and advisors to the agency, a phenomenon which frequently raised questions in parliament and in public discourse over potential conflicts of interest.

There have been arrests and convictions of former NAMA staff while the Project Eagle sale of the Northern Ireland portfolio of assets by the agency to US fund, Cerberus, in 2014 led to allegations of corruption in relation to some agency staff and advisors.

There was always the prospect that the transfer of assets on the scale envisaged by NAMA’s creators would offer an opportunity for self-gain and advancement to some of those involved, but the evidence would now suggest that the agency and its activities has made small and large fortunes for many real estate and other professionals, including a number of its former staff.

Then there are the international investors which purchased the assets in bundles so large and expensive that only a few, mainly US-based funds could afford, and were encouraged to do so by generous incentives provided by the Irish state in recent years. Some of these funds purchased assets at huge discounts before flipping them for significant profit in recent years, while others remain in the property business taking advantage of an acute housing shortage and soaring rents to maximise returns for their shareholders.

Finally, there are the tens of thousands who cannot afford to make the repayments on their mortgages in the wake of the crash and the employment crisis that followed, or to pay the excessive rents sought in a landlord-friendly market while the social housing list tops 100,000 and the homeless crisis continues unabated.

In seeking to cover these various aspects of the NAMA story, I have adopted a chronological approach which commences with the formation of the agency, its leadership and staffing. I have followed the progress or otherwise of some of the largest debtors whose excessive borrowing contributed so greatly to the property bubble and how they fared in their dealings with the agency.

I have tracked the inquiries made at the various Oireachtas committees and, in particular, the work of the Dáil Public Accounts Committee whose report, along with the Stormont inquiry into Project Eagle, helped to provide me with a road map to that complex and fascinating controversy. The thorough ‘value for money’ investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor General in 2016 offered an invaluable insight into the sale.

I have examined the progress of the agency as it moved from the acquisition to the accelerated disposal of its €32 billion distressed loan book and the political decisions and players who influenced its course. As controversies emerged over a number of these sales, there was clearly a resistance by those leading the agency, and the senior politicians and civil servants overseeing its work, to the establishment of an independent inquiry into the activities of NAMA. The details contained in these pages will hopefully be of relevance to the Commission of Investigation that has now been established to examine the Project Eagle sale and purchase, and other important aspects of the agency’s activities.

This could not have been and certainly is not a complete account of the NAMA story. Such a detailed review was impossible in the timescale involved in producing this work, not least because of the commercial secrecy surrounding so much of the agency’s operations and practices. In contrast with my book on Tom Gilmartin and the shocking culture of greed and abuse of power it exposed, involving a litany of illicit payments to corrupt politicians, NAMA-land involves the transfer of billions of euro in public assets in a manner which has, until now, largely avoided detailed scrutiny and control.

I hope this book will provide an insight into what has been one of the most ambitious, and costly, experiments by the Irish state following the economic and financial meltdown that has led to a lost decade of opportunity for the Irish people and which has left a huge debt mountain as its legacy to future generations. My objective has been to establish the facts of this immensely complex and politically sensitive subject, and to explain them in a fair and honest fashion to the reader. I hope I have succeeded and, if not, I bear sole responsibility for any short-comings.

Dublin, September 2017

CONTENTS

Cover

Title Page

Dedication

List of abbreviations

Preface

Introduction

1. Guaranteed Irish

2. City of The Spire

3. Fair Game or Foul

4. Political Arrivals

5. The Vultures Circle

6. The Eagle is Landing

7. Corporate Insiders

8. Winner, Loser, Survivor

9. The Titanic Quarter

10. Checking for Leaks

11. Letters and Defections

12. Comforting the Afflicted

13. The Departure Lounge

14. The Clockwork Cash Machine

15. Turning the Corner

16. Closing the Deal

17. The Three-headed Dog

18. Of Charity and Trusts

19. The Italian Job

20. The Secret Tapes

21. Contrasting Fortunes

22. A Jewel in the Crown

23. The Good Investor

24. The Final Countdown

25. The End Game

Epilogue

Acknowledgements

Copyright

About the author

About Gill Books

INTRODUCTION

In July 2015, the Irish political and corporate world was shocked when Wexford TD Mick Wallace claimed in parliament that a sum of £7 million had been lodged in an offshore bank account in connection with the sale of more than £1.24 billion (€1.5 billion) in publicly owned property assets.

The scandal over the sale of the Northern Ireland portfolio of assets controlled by the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) continues to unfold and has damaged the reputations of leading politicians and business figures on both sides of the Irish border. It is to be investigated by a Commission of Investigation headed by a High Court judge, while many other aspects of NAMA operations have also come under scrutiny.

Over the last few years the largest transfer of property assets from public ownership to private interests in recent times has taken place in this small country on the edge of Europe. A total of €31.8 billion in distressed loans – with an original par value of €74 billion – transferred to NAMA following the banking collapse, have been sold in large bundles which only a handful of global funds can afford.

Hedge funds and other investment managers, many using Irish-registered subsidiaries, are sweating out the assets in order to multiply profits on commercial and residential properties they purchased at massive discounts. Thousands of Irish families and business people have lost homes or remain in permanent default on their mortgages and loans.

The Irish state, through NAMA, has facilitated the disposal of huge tracts of land and properties based on toxic loans which were transferred to the ‘bad bank’ after it was established in 2009. NAMA was set up to restore credit in the economy and to help the banks recover by removing their toxic loan debt. It was intended to sell off the hugely discounted loans over a ten-year period and make the maximum return for the exchequer and the Irish people. It has not worked out as planned.

By seeking to offload the properties as rapidly as possible NAMA may have failed to obtain the best return for the Irish people, and by appointing people to lead the massive property management project who had no experience in the real estate investment business it may have facilitated inappropriate decisions and mismanagement. Many people hired by NAMA have since left the agency to work for companies with a vested interest in the purchase of badly performing loans and debt. The agency is still embroiled in the massive political and financial scandal over the disposal, in 2014, of its Northern Ireland portfolio, Project Eagle, which contributed to the destabilisation and collapse of the power sharing executive at Stormont in early 2017.

The sale of Project Eagle resulted in critical reports from the Comptroller and Auditor General, which audits the NAMA accounts, and from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The Stormont Finance and Personnel Committee held public hearings in 2015 into the £1.2 billion (€1.5 billion) property portfolio sale from an original value of £4.5 billion (€5.1 billion) and heard details of alleged criminal behaviour and corruption at high levels of Northern Irish business and politics and at senior levels within NAMA. Questions have also been raised about other billion-euro sales of public assets by NAMA.

Former employees of the agency have been arrested and charged with leaking confidential information and other offences, while several others have been questioned. One man has been convicted; others are facing charges. Where did it all go wrong? Is it corruption, incompetence or both? How many of the controversial decisions on the disposal of billions of assets under the control of the Irish state are influenced by rich and powerful global funds and their locally connected, vested political and business interests? Why did some property developers get favourable treatment from NAMA while others were forced out of business? Have the interests of the Irish people been served by the manner in which their assets have been sold, at sharp discounts, to some of the richest funds in the world?

This work attempts to address these questions, beginning with the establishment of NAMA in 2009. NAMA-land chronologically examines the political debate surrounding the creation of the ‘bad bank’, the choice of its executive, board and other staff members and the agency’s early work of transferring distressed loans from the main Irish banks. The book tracks the fate of NAMA’s largest debtors, examining how the agency managed and then disposed of their loans. It traces the movement of staff out of the agency, the arrest of some former agency officials and the departure of others to the global funds and other firms swooping on the assets that were sold by NAMA. It also discusses how other firms swooped on the assets that were sold by NAMA. It details the background to the 2014 sale of Project Eagle, NAMA’s Northern Ireland loan book, and looks at the political and business personalities who featured in the subsequent controversy. NAMA-land follows the various inquiries into the purchase and sale of Project Eagle and the extended debates in the Irish parliament over the proposal for a commission of investigation into it and other aspects of NAMA’s activities. Inevitably, as in any project of this scale and complexity, many details will not be covered in this book. However, it will hopefully provide an insight into one of the most significant and far-reaching political and financial experiments in the history of the state, one which will have a profound impact on Irish society and its people for many years to come.

Chapter 1

GUARANTEED IRISH

Brendan McDonagh sat in a corridor in government buildings on Merrion Street where Taoiseach Brian Cowen, Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan, some other cabinet members, senior civil servants, bank executives, accountants, solicitors and other advisors convened on the night of the infamous ‘bank guarantee’ on 29 September 2008. ‘Infamous’ because the outcome of the crisis meetings, which followed the disclosure that Ireland’s main banks were facing insolvency, was the decision to protect depositors for up to £100,000 and, controversially, all lenders, including unsecured bondholders – thus exposing the state to massive multi-billion-euro debts and inevitably forcing it into the arms of an EU Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund (EU/ECB/IMF) bailout programme.

McDonagh, a senior executive with the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA), which is charged with handling the state’s finances and ensuring access to the best bond yields and returns on the international markets, never received an invitation to the discussions that resulted in the bank guarantee, despite his patient vigil into the early hours of 30 September 2008. In the weeks and months that followed he was, however, central to the construction of the ‘bad bank’ established to transfer the distressed borrowings of the financial institutions in order to save what remained of a functioning banking sector. The objective, in particular, was to remove the toxic debt incurred by the main lenders – Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank (AIB), Anglo Irish Bank (‘Anglo’), Irish Nationwide Building Society and Permanent TSB – which were hugely exposed to a property market that had now completely collapsed. The other core objective was to restore liquidity in the banking system in order to allow it to resume its crucial function of lending to commercial and other borrowers as a key motor of the economy.

Most of the developers, builders and other investors who had borrowed freely and frivolously during the boom years were now broke. The value of their remaining assets was only a fraction of the monies which they had borrowed, and which had been lent so recklessly over the previous decade and more. A complete failure of state regulation, combined with an arrogant and greed-fuelled bonus culture in the banking sector, had brought down the entire economy as Ireland suffered the largest financial collapse of any developed country since the 1930s. The insistence by the EU and ECB that the debts owed to other reckless lenders in German, French, British and US financial institutions, including unsecured creditors, must be paid in full added billions to the debt mountain. It also contributed to the problems faced by the crisis-ridden Fianna Fáil-led coalition government with the Green Party as another turbulent new year approached at the end of 2008.

The finance minister, Brian Lenihan, turned to the NTMA to provide advice on how a new ‘bad bank’ could be formed and also consulted economist Dr Peter Bacon, who prepared a report and provided a detailed explanation of the role of NAMA when its birth was announced in early April 2009. At a press briefing in the NTMA offices in Dublin on 8 April, Lenihan unveiled the plan to transfer up to €90 billion of property- and land-related loans from the banks to NAMA, including unimpaired loans. Insisting that the initiative was not a bailout of the banks but of the economy, Lenihan said that it was about ‘ensuring that business and individuals who cannot access credit, can access credit’. Dr Bacon, who had advised the government on land and housing policy during the boom years, added that the creation of the bad bank agency would involve bank shareholders taking considerable pain.

‘We are cleaning the balance sheets of the organisations to ensure the institutions can resume their proper role as motors of credit in the Irish economy,’ he stressed.

Inevitably, the announcement of the plan attracted criticism and scepticism at home and abroad with concerns expressed about the lack of detailed information on the extent of the bad loans, including from some of the developers whose debts were to be transferred to the new agency and for whom there was little public sympathy. However, there was some surprise when the chief executive of the NTMA, Dr Michael Somers, told the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) just weeks later that he had no idea how NAMA would operate. He was concerned at the haste with which the project was conceived, did not believe that the NTMA was the appropriate body to oversee the operation and insisted that it did not have sufficient staff to operate the new agency. Somers also disputed the extent of the state’s exposure. He argued that at the end of 2008 the state’s total gross debt was about €70 billion and it had about €20 billion in cash. The scale of his frustration about the manner in which NAMA was established emerged when it was revealed that Somers had sought to retire, with immediate effect, two months earlier. After 48 years in public service, including 18 as chief executive of the NTMA, Somers said that he was ‘beyond normal retirement age’. In a letter to the finance minister, he wrote that his contract had been due to expire in December 2007 and had been extended by three years, but he was prepared to work ‘in a non-pensionable capacity’ until a successor was found.

His letter of 11 March 2009 came just one week after Lenihan had written to Somers asking him whether the NTMA could ‘take steps to develop contingency plans for the provision of liquidity to the Irish banking system in the event of further liquidity pressures within that system’. Somers’ expression of scepticism was an inauspicious start for the agency but one that did not deter its architects from preparing the necessary legislation, structures and recruitment of staff to take on the mammoth task of rescuing the banks and restoring some normality to the property market.

Born in Killorglin, County Kerry, Brendan McDonagh had worked as an accountant with the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) before he joined the NTMA in 1994. He became its financial controller four years later. In 2002, he was appointed as the agency’s director of finance, technology and risk and was serving in that role when the challenge posed by the massive banking debt landed on his desk. With a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Management from the Dublin Institute of Technology, and having trained as a chartered accountant, the 41-year-old became managing director (later chief executive officer) of NAMA, which was soon to become the largest property management and disposal company in the world.

McDonagh, by his own admission, had never previously been involved in property development or finance, but he was charged with acquiring some €77 billion in distressed assets (discounted to €34 billion) and selling them off in a manner that yielded the highest return to the near-bankrupt state. These were best estimates as the real figures could only be confirmed on completion of detailed valuation of the loans. It was an awesome task and required McDonagh to surround himself with the best available talent, including many who were now struggling to find lucrative employment in the wake of a crash that had decimated the property and construction industry. That crash had affected members of an industry – including big developers, architects, surveyors, engineers, estate agents, auctioneers and valuers as well as the hundreds of thousands of people employed by building contractors, such as labourers, carpenters, electricians, plasterers and bricklayers – that made up the country’s biggest employment sector during the good years and was a lucrative source of revenue for successive political administrations.

With Somers on his way out the door, McDonagh took much of the responsibility for the required preparations. He brought in a team of advisors, among them the estate agent John Mulcahy. Mulcahy had spent several years as a member of the property advisory committee of the National Pension Reserve Fund (another subsidiary of the NTMA), and had long experience of the Irish real estate market in his capacity as senior partner with Jones Lang LaSalle – one of the many auctioneers that prospered during the property bubble when house, apartment and office prices soared. Now he was to assist with acquiring, managing and disposing of many of the distressed assets moving to NAMA.

Also involved in the early days of NAMA was John Corrigan, who replaced Somers as chief executive of the NTMA in December 2009, just weeks after the legislation conferring immense powers on the new agency was narrowly passed in the Dáil. Operating under the direction of the NTMA, their task was to manage the loans and ensure that the original borrower repaid them or, if not, put the loans on the market or hold them until property prices began to recover. Optimising the return to the exchequer was the most important, if difficult, challenge. Soon the small NAMA team was facing challenges from banks who complained that the loans were being undervalued, and developers who believed they were being scapegoated by the process. There was also political criticism as the National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (the ‘NAMA Act’), conferring extraordinary and unprecedented powers on the new agency, made its way through parliament.

Unveiling the draft legislation in July 2009 just before the summer recess of the Oireachtas, finance minister Brian Lenihan recounted the background to the establishment of the new agency, in particular the need to restore the banking system.

We must address the health and stability of our banking system – to ensure that the credit required by the economy is provided and that people’s savings are protected.

There is nothing in the proposed Bill that will provide a ‘bail-out’ for borrowers, whether builders, developers or otherwise. Anyone who owes money before NAMA continues to owe it, and is expected to repay the full amount of the debt.

The Government has decided to adopt the proposed approach based on the advice it has received domestically, the advice of institutions such as the IMF, and also the example of other countries taking similar steps. The Government is convinced this response will ensure the safety, stability and capacity of the Irish banking system, all of which are key to supporting our economy.

Notwithstanding his assurances, the public and political debate which ensued revealed a deep scepticism about the project, not least given that its proponents were widely blamed for the policy and regulatory failures which caused the banking collapse in the first place. When he announced, on the resumption of parliament in September, the details of how NAMA would pay some €54 billion to the banks for distressed property loans with a face value of €77 billion, the reaction was even more hostile, with opposition parties and other prominent commentators expressing deep concern at the long-term implications of such a massive transfer of debt onto future generations of the Irish people.

While Lenihan assured the Dáil that the state would pay on average 30 per cent less than the face value of the bank loans, other experts claimed that AIB and Bank of Ireland would emerge with a significantly lower discount. Either way, the scale of the operation would involve NAMA purchasing an enormous €28 billion in loans from Anglo Irish Bank, €24 billion from AIB, €16 billion from Bank of Ireland, €8 billion from Irish Nationwide and €1 billion from the Educational Building Society (EBS).

The minister estimated the current market value of the loans to be €47 billion, representing an over-payment of €7 billion (to bring the amount up to €54 billion), which he described as an allowance to cover the long-term economic value of the assets. He claimed that NAMA would only require an increase in property prices of less than 10 per cent from current levels over 10 years to break even if property prices were still 45 per cent below what their value had been in late 2006.

The Oireachtas debate on the NAMA Act, which coincided with the run-in to the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, placed severe strains on the coalition government. The Green Party sought assurances and amendments from Fianna Fáil to satisfy its members that the government was not engaged, as Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny contended, in a ‘daylight mugging’ of the Irish people. Kenny complained that the government had ‘been led by the nose by the banks and developers down this corridor of NAMA, and they have shifted a burden of €54 billion on to the backs of the Irish taxpayer’. Labour Party leader Eamon Gilmore called for a temporary nationalisation of the banks as an alternative to NAMA, saying:

Fianna Fáil fuelled a splurge of speculation and a property bubble in this country. They drove up the price of development land and they tax-incentivised a speculative property boom that was unsustainable. How did this Fianna Fáil Government turn around a good economy which was built on the back of the hard work of the very people who were buying those houses and turn it into the kind of economic depression we have now?

Gilmore told one of the several protests against government austerity measures outside Leinster House that the banking system had to be reformed in the interests of the public and not the developers, and the answer was not NAMA but a temporary nationalisation of the banks.

Inside the House, Gilmore’s finance spokesperson Joan Burton asked whether the Irish people could trust Fianna Fáil and the minister for finance to head up what she described as ‘the largest property firm on the planet’.

Like one of the characters in Alice in Wonderland, this legislation requires the public to believe six impossible things before breakfast, all of which come down to a question of trust.

Do we trust Fianna Fáil not to bail out the bankers and the borrowers? Do we trust the Minister who claimed that the blanket guarantee he introduced for the financial institutions last September would be the cheapest bank rescue in the world? Do we trust a Taoiseach who pleaded that Ireland’s economic fundamentals were sound when it was plain to see we were teetering on the brink of disaster? Do we trust a Government that inflated a property bubble, ignored all advice to curtail property-based tax incentives and buried its head in the sand when the house of cards collapsed?

Sinn Féin called for a referendum on what its Dáil leader Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin described as ‘this rotten Bill’. He said that a general election should be called to test public confidence in the government’s strategy to deal with the fall-out from the financial crisis which had already resulted in a series of unpopular emergency budgets. His Dáil colleague Martin Ferris described NAMA as ‘a bailout for the greediest and the most corrupt in Irish society: the bankers and the speculators whose boundless avarice has devastated the economy’. He said the government was robbing this generation and the next one after that, too.

Sinn Féin has been calling all summer for a referendum on NAMA. You cannot put through a bill of this magnitude without asking the majority of people on the island if they support it. We all know why Fianna Fáil will not support a referendum: they know that asking people to vote Yes to NAMA is akin to asking turkeys to vote for Christmas.

The government was determined to push ahead and had only to surmount some internal dissension among its Green partners to ensure that the legislation would be passed in an October vote which took place just weeks after the Lisbon Treaty was endorsed. Its ‘bad bank’ proposal was supported by leading national and international finance and business interests, including some of the developers whose loans would soon be under the control of the new agency.

There were mixed messages from the Northern Ireland power sharing executive, with finance minister Sammy Wilson and enterprise minister Arlene Foster, both of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), expressing their concern about the potentially negative impact of NAMA on the local economy. The Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, expressed fears of a ‘fire sale’ of toxic Northern assets worth nearly €5 billion. McGuinness said the handling of the €4.8 billion of local assets, equivalent to one-quarter of the output of the North’s economy, had considerable implications.

The cross-jurisdictional implications are significant in the absence of statements on the discount to be applied to the Irish bank loans and the precise length of time that NAMA will operate. A longer lifespan and larger discount would allow NAMA to pursue loans less aggressively as a short lifespan and small discount would appear to be disadvantageous from our viewpoint.

Trinity economist Brian Lucey, responding to academic support for NAMA from government advisor Alan Ahearne, said the project involved ‘a conscious decision to use taxpayers’ money to overpay banks for their toxic assets, thereby transferring billions of euro from the taxpayers to bank shareholders’.

On the eve of the Dáil vote, and with the Green Party onside with its Fianna Fáil partners, the NAMA enthusiasts received unwelcome and unexpected criticism from Nobel Prize-winning US economist Joseph Stiglitz. Speaking during a visit to Dublin, Stiglitz accused the government of ‘squandering’ public money: ‘The Irish Government is squandering large amounts of money to bail out banks. There’s a sort of a view that there’s no alternative.’ Stiglitz claimed that view was ‘nonsense’: ‘The rule of capitalism says that when firms can’t pay what they owe, they go bankrupt. It’s a massive transfer of money from the public to bankers.’

The Columbia University professor argued that overpaying for loans was ‘criminal’, and NAMA was likely to ‘burden this generation for 25–50 years or more. I am very uncomfortable with a government with such a minority support making such a decision.’

He said that the view that there was no alternative was ‘just wrong’: ‘There is an alternative. Play by the rules of capitalism – if you can’t pay back your debt, shareholders and bondholders lose.’ Stiglitz claimed that ‘countries which allow banks to go under by following the ordinary rules of capitalism have done fine. The US has let 100 banks go this year alone, as did Sweden and Norway in their crises.’

In contrast, the Irish bank bailout

is a simple transfer from taxpayers to bondholders, and it will saddle generations to come. The only thing that might give you solace is that, as chief economist of the World Bank, we see this type of thing happening in banana republics all over the world. Whenever a banking crisis happens, the financial sector uses the turmoil as a mechanism to transfer wealth from the general population to themselves. I’ve been very disappointed to see that it has happened, not only in banana republics, but in advanced industrialised countries.

Stiglitz’s intervention prompted Fine Gael finance spokesperson Richard Bruton to repeat his party’s call for an alternative approach to the bank debt transfer.

The approach outlined by Professor Stiglitz leaves the risk and responsibility for working out toxic developer loans with the bankers who made them, and the investors who funded them, while also ensuring that a cleansed and healthy banking system is ready to restart lending. There is still an opportunity to ditch the massive NAMA gamble and adopt Fine Gael’s safer and more effective solution to fixing the banks by setting up a National Recovery Bank.

Ignoring the warnings from home and abroad, the government, with its slim Dáil majority, succeeded in getting the National Asset Management Agency Bill (2009) through on 15 October 2009, by 77 votes to 73, following a debate which involved an exhausting all-night sitting of the House.

Attorney General Paul Gallagher and his staff, with input from the Revenue Commissioners, assisted the parliamentary drafting necessary to protect the legislation from any future court challenge or the possibility of the Bill being referred to the Council of State by the president, as recommended by opposition parties, or the Supreme Court. President Mary McAleese, however, signed the Bill into law on 22 November 2009 without any such referral. Meanwhile, developer Paddy McKillen was already engaging in a High Court challenge against any transfer of his assets to NAMA, which was inevitably heading for the Supreme Court for adjudication.

Behind the scenes, the now acting managing director of NAMA, Brendan McDonagh, and his small team had been preparing the foundations for the new agency at the offices of the NTMA on Grand Canal Street in Dublin 2, in a building still owned by one of its subsequent clients and largest debtors, Johnny Ronan of Treasury Holdings. Along with John Corrigan, co-director of the NTMA, and two of its senior executives, legal advisor Aideen O’Reilly and deputy director Sean Ó Faoláin, an external group of senior finance department officials were involved in the policy steering group. They included Kevin Cardiff, Anne Nolan and William Beausang, all of whom had extensive tax and financial services expertise and they assisted with the unprecedented task of creating a durable structure to take over, manage and dispose of the largest single distressed property portfolio of any developed country in the wake of the 2008 crisis, or indeed for many decades.

External advisors included a team from leading solicitors firm Arthur Cox, led by managing director Padraig O’Riordain, accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and a London-based group from HSBC Investment Bank headed by Matt Webster, who provided expertise on the valuing of the loans to be transferred from the five banking institutions coming under the NAMA umbrella.

Within weeks of the legislation being passed NAMA had a chairman leading a nine-member board which was to oversee the complex operation. Former head of the Revenue Commissioners Frank Daly was appointed chairman for a five-year term on 22 December 2009. On the same day, he resigned from his position as public interest director of Anglo Irish Bank, which he had occupied for one year. Daly served as chairman of the Revenue Commissioners from 2002 until 2009. He first joined the Revenue in 1963 and had acted as a commissioner since 1996. During 2008 he also chaired the Commission on Taxation which reported in September 2009, just weeks after the draft legislation establishing NAMA was unveiled. Daly was an uncontroversial appointment and his experience in Revenue and more recently with Anglo Irish Bank, the largest distressed loan book coming into NAMA, was seen as providing solid expertise to the new board. Born in the seaside village of Abbeyside in Waterford in 1945, he was the son of a postman, while his mother’s family were described in one profile as ‘seafarers’. The Irish Times heard Daly describe his childhood as framed by activities on the beach, and he had been active in the scouts. He trained to be a teacher for three months before taking a job with customs and excise, which led to a public service career spanning six decades. His five-year term with NAMA was scheduled to end in December 2014, when he would turn 69.

Another potential nominee for the position of chairman, Michael McDowell, the former Minister for Justice, Progressive Democrat leader and Tánaiste in the Fianna Fáil-led government before he and most of his party colleagues lost their seats in their disastrous general election performance in 2007, would, if chosen, inevitably have raised political and media eyebrows. According to senior government sources at the time, McDowell’s nomination by Brian Lenihan was rejected by Taoiseach Brian Cowen. Cowen was said to be dumbfounded when the finance minister proposed McDowell for the position and reacted with his familiar abrasiveness to the notion that he should support the nomination of the former politician and justice minister who had made such a significant contribution to the decline in popularity of the previous administration. McDowell had ingloriously resigned as leader of the Progressive Democrats, and from politics, when he failed to get elected in the 2007 general election and while many of his party colleagues were still on the battlefield and desperately struggling to hang on to their Dáil seats.

The board of NAMA, announced during Christmas week on 22 December 2009, attracted little or no media attention and the appointment of experienced financial consultants and accountants Éilish Finan, Michael Connolly, Peter Stewart and Brian McEnery to join Daly, McDonagh and Corrigan, now chief executive of the NTMA, disturbed no one’s sleep. The choice of former county manager with Fingal County Council, William Soffe, may have prompted some queries, given the controversial history of the planning system in Dublin, but he had served on the Commission on Taxation with Daly and presumably already enjoyed a friendly and non-contentious relationship with the incoming chairman. The appointment of a leading International Monetary Fund (IMF) executive and US national, Stephen Seelig, to the board of NAMA did invite some comment, given his role as mission chief for the IMF in Estonia and Georgia and his work on debt restructuring in countries including Ireland and Uruguay over the years. His appointment did not come into effect for some months due to his outstanding commitments with the IMF, and he came on board initially in an advisory capacity.

If the board members did not exactly distract the commentariat from its end of year festivities, the appointment of the various heads of division six weeks later, in February 2010, did not go unnoticed by the growing number of people in the various professions with a potential interest in the work of NAMA, as well as some in the media.

Topping that list was the new head of portfolio management, John Mulcahy, who had already been on secondment from Jones Lang LaSalle on an interim basis with the agency since June 2009 and thus was among those most familiar with its origins, structures and strategies. Ronnie Hanna, a former senior executive with Ulster Bank and a graduate of Queens University in Belfast, was made head of credit and risk, while Aideen O’Reilly became head of legal and tax affairs – a reflection of the work she was already doing with the new agency and previously with the NTMA and its associated bodies, the State Claims Agency and the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF). Another NTMA staffer, Sean Ó Faoláin, was made head of business services.

While ownership of the distressed loans was to be transferred to NAMA, which had ultimate control over key credit decisions, the banks would continue to manage them on behalf of the agency, and each of the five finance houses was to establish a specialised division to assess and value the loans to be transferred. However, the largest borrowers – up to 150 with assets which had been valued in billions at the height of the property bubble and a veritable who’s who of the country’s leading property developers during the boom years – were to have their portfolios of distressed assets managed directly by NAMA.

Expertise was sought from people with direct experience in the property industry and almost two thousand people sent in CVs based on their work as surveyors, architects, engineers and valuers during the good years, many of whom had now lost their jobs, for no more than 80–100 positions advertised by the new agency. Experts on loan valuations, with associated actuarial skills in securities and derivatives, interest swaps and other banking arrangements, were required. A panel of property valuation experts, with external assistance drawn from existing real estate companies, was also engaged during the recruitment process and the early bedding-in of the agency.

Inevitably, given his role as head of portfolio management and responsibility for negotiating with banks on the value of the loans to be transferred to NAMA and the timescale involved, John Mulcahy was the focus of both public and not-so-public attention; he had been among those professionals who had wrongly forecast a soft landing for the Irish economy before the 2008 crash. His role in pumping the property market in his capacity as managing director and chairman in Ireland of international real estate agents Jones Lang LaSalle was raised when he accompanied Lenihan and McDonagh for one of their regular briefings before the Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service in late August 2009. At this time, Mulcahy was on secondment to assist with the preparation of the valuation methodology to be employed by NAMA in assessing the value of distressed bank loans. At the hearing, Mulcahy stated:

With regard to my experience, I am a chartered surveyor and have been in practice for 39 years. I do not know if longevity is a measure of success. I am chairman of Jones Lang LaSalle, although resigned at the moment. I have been seconded into NAMA in a personal capacity and have nothing to do with Jones Lang LaSalle at the moment. I have spent my working life mainly advising pension funds and others on investment in property. On the question of whether I called the market, while my natural humility gets in the way, I have been a bear for the past four years.

In fact, Mulcahy had been anything but a ‘bear’, for as recently as July 2007 he had observed that office take-up in the Republic was 10 per cent higher in the first six months of that year than in the same period the previous year. ‘The prospects for the second half of 2007 and for next year looks [sic] equally promising, with a number of major space users … seeking proposals for suitable office accommodation,’ he said, although he did warn of ‘price corrections’ in the residential market.

In 2008, he had warned that the economic downturn had taken the ‘froth’ off the commercial property market – a description which could be characterised as an understatement given the shock that had already hit the financial system since the St Patrick’s Day collapse of Anglo shares and the solvency crisis that led to the infamous bank guarantee later in the year.

But Mulcahy had reason to err on the optimistic side given his role in some of the largest property transactions before the crash, including as advisor to South Wharf PLC in its sale of the Irish Glass Bottle site in the Ringsend area of Dublin for €412 million in October 2006. The purchase of the site by a consortium which included property developer Bernard McNamara, financier Derek Quinlan and the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA) proved a commercial disaster and contributed to the ultimate dismantlement of the state-run DDDA. Among its board members at the time was Seán FitzPatrick, chairman and former chief executive of Anglo, whose alleged conflict of interest in this and other land disposals by the DDDA led to a series of inquiries.

If NAMA wanted insider knowledge of the property game in Dublin, Mulcahy, a sixty-year-old chartered surveyor, certainly had form. He had rubbed shoulders with many of the leading businessmen and bankers who drove the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’, including the likes of Larry Goodman and Sean Dunne, as well as acting for the agency in charge of state property, the Office of Public Works (OPW). He had also witnessed slumps in the market over the decades and was involved with major development companies, including British Land, in the construction of the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in the 1980s. He had for some years been an advisor on property to the NPRF and was familiar with a number of its senior personnel who helped to establish NAMA.

Following Mulcahy’s appearance before the Oireachtas Committee, the Department of Finance defended his appointment on the basis that he would not be involved in the valuation of individual lands or properties. That would be handled by a panel of valuation companies, chosen by public tender. This panel, which invariably included real estate companies and surveyors, including Jones Lang LaSalle and other auctioneers, would use a template for valuation methodology devised by Mulcahy and others, the department said.

The choice of Mulcahy, it said, ‘reflected his expertise in valuation’ and the need to hire somebody with an understanding of the overall market.

In early May 2010, NAMA announced another set of executive appointments while confirming that it had completed the transfer of the first set of loans from Anglo at a discount of 55 per cent, bringing the total transferred to date from all five banking institutions under its remit to €7.7 billion, an overall discount of 50 per cent.

A graduate of Loughborough University and employee of Goldman Sachs and more recently Ernst & Young accountants in London, Graham Emmett was appointed head of lending, while Dublin City University graduate and former AIB trading executive Frank O’Connor was confirmed as head of treasury at the agency. Kevin Nowlan, a chartered surveyor who previously worked for AIB and Treasury Holdings, also joined NAMA in 2010 from his family property consultancy firm, WK Nowlan. WK Nowlan separately provided consultancy services to NAMA. Emmett was given responsibility for handling the distressed assets of Sean Dunne, one of the agency’s largest debtors.

Financier Selina Dicker joined NAMA as head of lending and corporate finance, having previously worked on international real estate buyouts with global investors Rothschild and, more recently, Capmark.

The announcement on 13 May 2010 of a Northern Ireland Advisory Committee (NIAC) of NAMA inevitably received more attention north of the border, where the appointments of Frank Cushnahan and Brian Rowntree, from Belfast, received mixed reviews, given their sometimes controversial roles at senior levels in the public service. Rowntree had served as chairman of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive since May 2004, while Cushnahan was a senior figure in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister of the Northern Ireland power sharing executive. The brief announcement by NAMA noted that Cushnahan was

Chairman of the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel Ministerial Panel of the Performance and Evaluation Delivery Unit; Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister and Non-Executive Board Member of the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister.

It also confirmed that the NIAC would be chaired by NAMA board member Peter Stewart and would include his colleagues Brian McEnery, Éilish Finan and the NAMA head of credit and risk, Ronnie Hanna.

Within weeks of his appointment to the NIAC, Cushnahan invited Frank Daly to join the board of a company on which the Belfast man served as a director. Daly was registered as a director of Ciorani Ltd, a company associated with the Catholic Redemptorist religious order, in June 2010. The Redemptorists owned substantial lands across the country, including in Belfast and Dublin, and had been advised by Cushnahan in a number of their commercial transactions over a period of years.

That the chairman of NAMA had joined the board of a company made up in the main of members of the religious order was unusual, but the development went unnoticed at the time of his appointment. Cushnahan had a long history in business in the North that saw him perform as a management and financial consultant and board member of companies and agencies across both private and public sectors. He was equally comfortable advising the Catholic Redemptorists and providing his services to the Free Presbyterians, the DUP and others in the unionist community. In a deeply politically divided society, Cushnahan was able to cross the boundaries in a business community united in its pursuit of wealth. He had invited Daly to join him on the board of Ciorani, although the NAMA chairman never disclosed his reasons for accepting the offer, referring to it as a private matter.

Chapter 2

CITY OF THE SPIRE

For a small country on the edge of Europe, Ireland has produced more than its fair share of globetrotting developers. The household names and masters of the universe in the property game during the boom years from the mid-1990s included Johnny Ronan and Richard Barrett of Treasury Holdings, Sean Mulryan of Ballymore Homes, Gerry Barrett, Paddy McKillen, Michael O’Flynn, David Daly, the Cosgrave brothers, Paddy Kelly, Liam Carroll and Sean Dunne, many of whom had expanded from their Irish core investments to places like London, New York, China, South Africa, the Czech Republic and the Caribbean in pursuit of even greater riches. Backing them were the Irish banks who were on a lending spree they thought would never end and with loan books that would have been unimaginable just a decade earlier. By December 2005, Anglo Irish Bank was exposed to no less than €6.4 billion in drawn loans to its 20 top borrowers.

For the sheer scale of his ambition, however, none could surpass the vision of Garrett Kelleher, of Shelbourne Development, to build the tallest building in the US. At 2,000 feet, with an estimated total cost of €2.1 billion, and designed by the globally renowned Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava, the foundation work and a seven-storey underground car park for the Chicago Spire commenced in May 2007. Located on a peninsula at the estuary of the Chicago River into Lake Michigan, and to include a People’s Park in honour of the City’s founder Jean Baptiste Point du Sable, the Spire would be the tallest residential building in the world and would put Chicago, the home of modern architecture, back at the forefront of cities boasting contemporary ‘supertall’ buildings.

Finance for the purchase of 2.2 acres of the seven-acre development site came from Anglo Irish Bank in Boston, which opened a Chicago office in July 2006. Anglo funded $54 million of the acquisition cost while Shelbourne and Kelleher invested over $200 million from their own resources during the two-year life span of the project.

Kelleher, who moved back to Chicago from Dublin after he bought the site in July 2006, had spent his younger years in the Windy City where, as an immigrant, he built up a successful contracting and residential loft development business in the 1980s and 1990s and where his first two children were born. He returned to Dublin in 1996 with his wife, Maeve, to try his hand at property development in Dublin. One of Kelleher’s first developments in 1996 was the assemblage of a site on Parnell Street and Moore Street where he ultimately built a hotel and shopping centre following protracted litigation from the adjoining developers, Treasury Holdings.

It was not long before he came up against the culture of obstruction that infected planning in the city and was forced into expensive and time-consuming court action and other delays in order to achieve his development plans. Kelleher managed to assemble a strong team of professionals over the next few years and focused primarily on complex and strategic city centre development sites over the following decade.

After successfully emerging from a bitter battle with Keelgrove Ltd (a company owned by Treasury Holdings principals Johnny Ronan and Richard Barrett) over his plans to develop the hotel in Parnell Street, Kelleher went on to acquire properties at Burgh Quay, Aston Quay, Eden Quay, Sackville Place, O’Connell Street, Cathal Brugha Street, Parnell Street, Dawson Street, Tara Street, Poolbeg Street and Townsend Street, among others, in Dublin city centre. They included Apollo House and adjoining properties close to Tara Street. He had also acquired lands in Ranelagh and the former Cable and Wireless headquarters in Tallaght in west Dublin. Kelleher also developed a major residential and retail complex opposite The Square in Tallaght and completed a major office block on St Stephen’s Green. By early 2004, Kelleher had become a major player in the city’s property market and had purchased a number of prime office buildings in central Brussels and Paris. He had walked away from the £240 million purchase of the Richard Rogers-designed Lloyd’s of London in the British capital because of structural defects.

In discussions with the OPW, which owned Hawkins House, where the Department of Health was located, Kelleher outlined his vision for a 600,000 square foot scheme on the adjoining lands, including office and residential development and a large plaza, with underground pedestrian links to the nearby DART station at Tara Street and the planned Luas link between the existing red and green lines to south and west Dublin, respectively.

Large corporates, including Bank of Ireland, Arthur Cox and KPMG, had been seeking proposals to replace their then redundant premises and were approached as prospective tenants in the rejuvenated quarter while the Department of Health would move to new offices following the demolition of the sick Hawkins House building. For some years, Kelleher discussed the scheme with the OPW property executive, David Byers. John Mulcahy, then managing partner at Jones Lang LaSalle’s Dublin office, advised the OPW on the proposal.

With several banks, including Anglo Irish, Ulster Bank and Bank of Scotland Ireland, and other funders offering to finance this and other planned schemes in Dublin, and his Chicago project at the early design and planning stage, Kelleher was on the cusp of a major breakthrough as a global property player. He had put much of his own money into the Spire and by late 2007 had refinanced his various Dublin assets with an assortment of lenders.