Observers and Their Worlds E-Book

Rafael Echeverría

• Herausgeber: JC Sáez Editor
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

In this groundbreaking work, I challenge the metaphysical foundations that have shaped Western thought since ancient Greece. Following Nietzsche's call to question the interpretations of Plato and Aristotle—what I designate as the "metaphysical ontology"—I propose a radical alternative: the ontology of language. For centuries, we have been faithful to metaphysical assumptions that now compromise both our capacity to give meaning to our lives and the ways we relate to others. Western civilization has reached an impasse, and it is imperative that we step back and forge a new path. This work examines the fundamental axes of the observer and demonstrates that human beings are linguistic beings who invent themselves through language. I developed the concept of metaphysical ontology to distinguish the dominant Western tradition from my proposal of a non-metaphysical ontology—one that opens new possibilities for human transformation, learning, and coexistence. This is my invitation to reimagine what it means to be human. —Rafael Echeverría

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© Rafael Echeverria

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ISBN: 978-956-306-210-6 (printed book edition)

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First English edition, Santiago, Chile, December 2025

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To Alicia, for so much

CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

A Note on the Notes

Acknowledgements

INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, TOWARD A NEW DISCOURSE ON THE HUMAN PHENOMENON

1. On the Nature of Knowledge

Transformation of the Paradigm

The Evolution of Knowledge

The Epicycle Mechanism

2. The Notion of a “Basic Paradigm”

The Ontological Crossroads

The Third Path

3. A Brief History of Metaphysics: from Inception to Hegemony

Inception

The Advent of Christianity

4. The Fundamental Core of Metaphysics

Two Orders of Reality

Being and Truth

The Meaning of Human Existence Is Outside of It

Being, Reason, and Truth

Recapitulation

5. Back to History: Modernity and the Terminal Crisis of Metaphysics

Descartes and Bacon

Spinoza

Luther

Feuerbach

Nietzsche

6. The Metaphysical Underpinnings of Our Common Sense

Metaphysics and Nihilism

Existential Nihilism

7. The Affirmation of Life

The Crisis of Meaning

8. The Core Elements of the Ontological Proposal

Human Experience as an Order of Reality

Becoming and Being

Being and Time

The Concept of “Truth”

Soul and Reason in Metaphysics

The Role of Reason in the Ontological Proposal

The “Good Life” and Happiness

The Internal Order

9. From Being to Becoming: The Priority of Action

I. THE DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN ACTION: THE SOAR MODEL

1. The SOAR Model

2. Prioritizing and Valuing Results

3. The Three Indispensable Elements of Human Transcendence

4. The Criterion of Power

5. Results Are Inextricably Linked to the Actions that Produced Them

6. The Visible Determinants of Human Action

Biological Predispositions

Skills Acquisition

Changes in Technology: Tools

Emotional Factors: Motivation

Our Habitualities

7. The Non-Linear Nature of Human Behavior and Learning

8. The Metaphysical Response

9. The Hidden Determinants of Behavior

10. The Observer

11. The System

12. Evaluation: When the Observer Observes the Results

Metaphysical Resignation

Justifying Explanation

13. Learning

First-Order Learning

Second-Order Learning

Transformational Learning

Transformational Learning andMetanoia

II. THE OBSERVER

1. Phenomenology of the Observer

The Way We Observe

Critique on Using Truth as Representation

The Consensus Argument

Truth and Ethics

The Effectiveness Argument

The Alternative Criterion of Power

2. The Affirmation of an External Reality

3. “Our” Truth

4. We Are All Different Observers

5. The First Ontological Principle

6. The Ethical Versus the Conceptual in the Notion of Observer

7. Human Coexistence

8. How Do We Account for the Difference Between Observers?

The Path of History

The Path of Structure

9. The Primary Domains of the Observer

Biology

Corporeality

Emotionality

Emotions and Moods

Language

a.Distinctions

Distinctions Are Distinctive

A Starry Sky

b.Judgments

Judgments Define Us as Observers

Judgments about the World

Judgments and the Structure of Temporality

Judgments about Oneself, about Others, and about Life

c.Narratives

d.A Coherence Structure Based on Domains

III. “LIKE GODS”: JUDGMENTS, ACTION, AND INDIVIDUAL BEING

1. Introduction

2. Judgments and Ways of Being in the Domain of the Observer

3. Judgments and Ways of Being in the Domain of Action

4. Back to Learning

5. First- and Second-Order Learning

6. “Eritis Sicut Dii” or The Prophecy of the Serpent: A Brief Deconstruction of a Biblical Text

Alternative Interpretations

a. The Predominant Sexual Interpretation

b. Heretical Gnostic Interpretations

c. Augustine’s Interpretation and Original Sin

d. Nietzsche’s Interpretation

7. The Strategic Identity Design (SID) Model

a. Evolution and Design

b. Actions, Judgments and Learning: A Working Relationship

c. The Model

Judgments

Actions

Learning Strategies

ADDENDUM I: Further Considerations

Final Considerations on the Environment: The System

1. The State of the System

2. System Trends

3. The Need to Design Political Strategies

ADDENDUM II: SOAR Model Background

IV. THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AND THE HUMAN SOUL

1. Reality, Interpretation, and Narrative: A General Framework

The Interpretive Nature of “Our” Reality

Interpretations and Hermeneutics

A Brief Look at Hermeneutics as a Discipline

Interpretations and Narratives

Narrative and Discourse

Narratives as Dwellings

The Evolution and Circulation of Narratives

The Narrative Domain

One Universe and Many Worlds

The Indifference of Facts: Imaginary Worlds and Inner Worlds

The Nature and Structure of Narratives

Three Types of Narratives

a.The Reporting of Events

b.Literary Fiction

c.Explanations

Types of Explanations

a.Mythological Explanations

b.Metaphysical Explanations

c.Scientific Explanations

2. Toward a Hermeneutics of the Human Soul

Narratives of the ‘I’ or Self

Textuality as the Texture of the Human Soul

Grammar as a Starting Point for Narrative Identity

The Social and Relational Nature of Self-Narratives

Our Autonomy to Develop our Own Narratives is Relative

The Polyphonic Nature of the Self Narrative

The Self Seen as a Literary Construction

Self-Narratives and Autobiographies

Self-Narratives Are Not Arbitrary: The Criterion of Coherence

Personal Crises as Crises of Self-Narratives

The Dialectic of the Human Soul

Person and Shadow

Transformational Learning Processes and Narratives

The Great Challenge: Taking Ownership of Our Identity Narratives

A Final Takeaway: All Narrative Dissolves into the Void

V. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE OBSERVER

1. World: Being-in-the-World

2. Time: Being-in-Time

The Structure of Temporality

Life and Time

Two Modes of Time: Chronos and Kairos

3. The Concern/Desire Dyad

4. The Line between Possibility/Facticity

5. Problems and Solutions

6. Existential Wrenching

7. Expectations

Expectations of the Factual Event

Moral Expectations in the Face of Events

Expectations as Key Factors in Our Joys and Our Sufferings

8. The Interpretive Habituality of the Observer

Habituality and Versatility

Our Interpretive Habituality

9. The Limits of the Human Soul

My Blind Spots

Moral Obstacles

The Line Between Good and Evil

The Excluded Differences

My Anger and My Fears

The Limits of the Soul Perceived from Corporeality

10. The Mysterious and Sacred Nature of the Human Soul

11. Final Warning: The Observer Does Not Exist

VI. THE SYSTEM: A GENERAL STRUCTURE

1. The Systemic Approach to Ascribing Meaning

2. Return to Narratives

3. The Basic Features of Scientific Explanations

a. The Phenomenal Interrelation

b. Replicability

c. Refutability

d. The Generative Power of Scientific Explanations

4. The Assumptions of “Traditional” Scientific Thought

5. The Limits of “Traditional” Scientific Thought

6. The Origins of Systemic Thinking: The Path of History

a. The Option of Dialectics

b. Language and Meaning: Ferdinand de Saussure, the Birth of Modern Linguistics and the Contributions of Hermeneutics

c. Henri Poincaré and the Development of Nonlinear Mathematics

d. Developments in Botany in the Soviet Union

e. Ludwig von Bertalanffy and the General Theory of Systems

f. Norbert Wiener and Cybernetics

g. Wiener and the Macy Conferences

h. The Ramifications of the Systemic Approach

7. Basic Features of the Systemic Approach: The Path of Structure

a. Prioritizing Relationships over Entities

b. Prioritizing Form over Content

c. Interdependence Versus Causality in Situations of Complexity

d. The Perspective of Totality

e. The Notions of Structure and Processes

f. Chaos and the Breakdown of Linearity

g. The Notions of Emergent Properties and Phenomena

h. The Hierarchy of Distinct Phenomenal Domains

i. The Functional Nature of the Notions of System and Component

j. The Acceptance of Multiple Perspectives on the Same Phenomenon

8. What is a System?

VII. THE ONTOLOGICAL VIEW FROM A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

1. The Human Being from a Systemic Perspective

The Mystery of the Human Soul from a Systemic Perspective

The Double Structural Determinant of Human Behavior

a. The Behavior of Every Entity Is Conditioned by Its Structure

b. The Behavior of Every Entity Is Over-Conditioned by the Structures of the Systems to Which It Belongs and in Which It Participates

c. Conditioning and Transformation: The Third Principle of the Ontology of Language

Systems and the Relationships That Shape Them Make Us the Type of Being We Are

Observer and System: Two Fluid and Related Notions

2. Some Implications of Social Systems

Systems Made up of Observers

The Inherently Partial Nature of the Gaze

Complexity, Versatility, and Connectivity

The Relationship of the Social System with its Environment

Formal and Informal Structures

The Integration of the Social System and the Principle of Exclusion

On the Decadence of Social Systems

Final Note on Democracy and the Common Good

VIII. LEARNING

1. Learning in the Current Historical Context

a. The Acceleration of Change in Today’s World

b. The Crisis of the Underpinnings of our Common Sense

2. The Ontological Status of Learning

3. Transformation and Conservation

4. The Meta Competence of Learning to Learn

5. Learning Modalities

a. Learning by Imitation

b. Learning by Teaching

c. The Option of Autonomous Learning

6. Toward a Phenomenology of Learning

7. Then What Does It Mean to Learn?

a. First Approach

b. Second Approach: Broadening the Effectiveness Criterion

8. Learning as a Manifestation of the Ontological Competence of Listening

9. How Can We Become Effective Learners?

The Phenomenon of Cognitive Blindness

10. A Look at Socrates

a. The Declaration of Ignorance

11. Some of the Observer’s Obstacles to Learning

a. Some of the Observer’s Assessments that Block Learning

b. Some of the Observer’s Emotions that Block Learning

Arrogance

Confusion, Bewilderment, and Wonder

Resignation and Boredom

Fear

c. Final Considerations

12. The Importance of Humility as a Basic Stance

13. The Affirmation of Mystery as a Fundamental Dimension of Reality

14. “We, Who Know, Are Unknown to Ourselves”

15. Knowledge and Wisdom: The Relationship with Life

ADDENDUM: ON TEACHING

1. Three Fundamental Premises for the Reconstruction of the Teaching Practice

a. Learning Validates Teaching

b. Learning Translates into the Expansion of the Capacity for Effective Action

c. Recognition of the Conversational Nature of the Teaching-Learning Process

2. Toward a Holistic Conception of Teaching

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This book brings together various topics that, over the years, have been present in the training programs taught by my company, Newfield Consulting.

My students are therefore familiar with them, although I have taken this opportunity to elaborate on certain aspects and introduce others that I never have enough time for in my presentations.

The thematic vector that articulates the various topics is my SOAR model (System, Observer, Action, and Results), which is introduced in the first chapter.

This chapter is preceded by a long introduction in which I share my interpretation of the nature of my proposal, the ontology of language, and its place in the historical development of ideas. Though long, it is, in fact, a synthesis of topics that most likely require a broader treatment. Nevertheless, I believe that the introduction fulfills the goal of “situating” my discourse and demonstrating the relevance I ascribe to it within the current historical context.

This introduction is different from the rest of the text. I point this out because I believe the reader will notice a change, a curious transition, as the book advances. The same difference allows those who are not interested in the introduction to start reading directly from the first chapter since the arguments contained there are not necessary to understand the rest of the book.

A Note on the Notes

Sometimes I have had to add comments in footnotes because they represent a certain deviation from the focus of my argument. Often, however, I have included in these notes some positions that I consider relevant. This leads me to advise readers that, if they are especially interested in gaining a deep understanding of the global discourse on the ontology of language, to pay attention to the footnotes, for they may find ideas in them that are particularly relevant and useful for broadening their understanding of the ontology of language.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to many people, starting with Luz María Edwards for her collaboration. This book is the result of a project that began when I asked Luz María to assist me with the final version. To this end, I had long conversations with her in which I explained to her what I was proposing in the various sections of the book and specified the various topics to be addressed in each section.

To achieve this, I gave her various materials that I had prepared on these topics and shared with her the outlines that I usually used in my presentations. Based on these materials, Luz María prepared drafts for some of the chapters of the book, which I then revised, corrected, expanded and supplemented, to produce their final versions.

As I have said on many other occasions, my proposal originates from the initial meeting with Fernando Flores that took place more than 38 years ago. Beginning in 1988, I worked for two and a half years in two of his companies in California. My encounter with Flores was crucial to my subsequent development, and much of what I have done since is nourished by what I learned during that time. Despite the many and sometimes profound differences I have with Flores, I cannot ignore his influence on my way of thinking and working. Those who are familiar with Flores’ approaches in this regard will recognize his influence as well as some important differences in the treatment of various topics in this text.

Finally, it is important for me to express my special gratitude for the countless contributions of my partner, business associate, and wife, Alicia Pizarro. There is no topic in this book that has not been discussed multiple times with Alicia, just as there are no conversations about these topics in which her perspective has not made valuable contributions that, in turn, improved my original approach. In every case she made a significant contribution. For all this and more, I am immensely grateful.

Rafael Echeverría, PhD, Aventura, FL, USA, November 2024

INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, TOWARD A NEW DISCOURSE ON THE HUMAN PHENOMENON1

My proposal for the ontology of language is part of the challenge posed by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to question the interpretation of the human phenomenon that originated in ancient Greece and later became hegemonic in the Western world. This interpretation is what I call the “metaphysical ontology.” Its founders, Plato and Aristotle, make up the so-called School of Athens, later immortalized in the painting of the same name by the great Renaissance painter Raphael.

The central point of Nietzsche’s message, according to my interpretation, is that the Western world has reached a dead end from which escape is imperative. This could mean retracing one path in order to initiate another. Our belief in metaphysical presuppositions leads us to compromise both our capacity to give meaning to our lives and the modalities of coexistence that we have established with others. For a long time, metaphysics had great strength and usefulness, yet today it shows signs of exhaustion and, according to Nietzsche himself, must be replaced by a very different conception of the human being.

Since Nietzsche’s call to action, many have taken up the challenge to offer an interpretation of the human phenomenon that is different from what metaphysics can offer. I feel myself to be a part of this movement and much of what I propose here is based on the various contributions produced within it. So, what I propose is not something isolated. It is part of what I consider to be one of the most dynamic and interesting philosophical developments of the last century.

Challenging the assumptions that have long guided our view of the world and of ourselves is neither trivial nor easy. In a very tangible way, we ourselves belong to the tradition that we seek to question, and we are not always aware of how much we are trapped by its influence. It is not, therefore, a matter of rebelling against an external agent. This particular rebellion implies something far more wrenching, for it requires us to question ourselves. This is not, therefore, a mere intellectual exercise. It is an exploration of our own depths, a profound questioning of the ways of life we have always known. In accepting this challenge, philosophy and life are thus presented as inseparable domains.

It was about time. Up to now, we have been accustomed to a philosophy that was presented as being totally separate and distinct from our lives; a philosophy that was confined to the academic sphere. Such a philosophy would not dare to find its way onto the streets and come into contact with actual, ordinary men and women, and the things they do. I am convinced that this is coming to an end. Today, philosophy must reconnect with all people, with the free men and women of this world. Philosophy is once again at the service of their lives, and the philosopher sees his role as that of a public servant. Their answers once again fall on the thin line that seems to separate life from death.2

1. On the Nature of Knowledge3

Based on the contributions of two great science theorists of the mid-twentieth century, Gaston Bachelard of France and Thomas Kuhn of the United States, we now recognize that knowledge is not structured in a uniform, homogeneous or linear way. The elements that make up our ways of knowing are not organized as discrete units that can be connected or disconnected at will. According to Bachelard and Kuhn, knowledge is structured in a systematic way, forming a kind of cluster of diverse components that gravitate around certain fundamental premises that attract and contain them. This is what Bachelard calls “modes of knowledge,”4 while Kuhn coined the term “paradigm.” Knowledge is structured in paradigms, systems that are characterized by a strong internal solidarity between their elements, which is weaker or stronger depending on their relationship to the premises that constitute their core or “center.”

These contributions allow us to view the development of knowledge very differently from what we had previously believed. The way in which knowledge develops and transforms now appears in a very different light. We used to think that the transformation of knowledge was a linear, continuous and cumulative process; that knowledge changed progressively over time, following the advances of each new discovery, each new interpretation. Bachelard and Kuhn warn us that this is not the case.

Transformation of the Paradigm

Kuhn, for example, speaks of two types of transformation. The first occurs within what he calls “normal science” and is produced by preserving the foundations of the existing paradigm, that is, the basic premises that form its core. What predominates in “normal science” are quantitative changes that occur linearly and cumulatively, expanding the paradigm itself.

Something quite different happens in the second type of transformation. The changes that have accumulated in the first modality tend to put pressure on the premises that form the core of the paradigm. In periods of “normal science,” the paradigm manages to absorb or dissolve this pressure. However, when the pressure reaches certain limits, what occurs is not a mere quantitative and linear change, but a crisis of the current paradigm and a questioning of its constitutive core. We then enter what Kuhn calls a period of “scientific revolution,” something very different from what happens during the phase of “normal science.” The transformation that now takes place is qualitative in nature. What is being changed is not some aspect of the paradigm, but the paradigm itself. What is at stake during this period is not its expansion, but its survival: the possibility that the paradigm will be transcended and replaced by another.

It is interesting to examine this conception in the light of certain concrete historical experiences. Along with the birth of metaphysical ontology, a particular vision of the universe developed. We find it expressed, for example, in Aristotle’s thinking. This vision is characterized by having a core made up of three basic premises.

The first is that the Earth is the center of the universe. The second is that all other heavenly bodies revolve around it. This privileged place given to the earth was the result of placing human beings in a seat of honor. It was difficult for these thinkers to place themselves in a peripheral position in the universe. Human beings, they believed, had the privilege of occupying its center. This, moreover, seemed to be confirmed by the experiences that all human beings had on a daily basis. During the day, they watched the sun rise at one end of the horizon, move through the rest of the day, and disappear at the other end in the evening. The same thing happened at night with the stars, which appeared to move around the Earth, to the naked eye. Therefore, the facts seemed to confirm the first two premises.

The third premise held that celestial bodies revolved around the Earth in a circular orbit. The circle was considered the most perfect of all geometric shapes, and therefore the only conceivable shape that could result from the perfection of God. This set of premises would form the core of the geocentric paradigm that prevailed in Antiquity, a paradigm that gained total hegemony during the Middle Ages.5

Over time, however, various facts began to accumulate that seemed to call the prevailing paradigm into question. For example, it was observed that some heavenly bodies seemed to move backward in their orbits at certain times. After moving forward, they would move backward. The interesting thing is that despite these observations, they did not question the prevailing paradigm. On the contrary, they tried to explain these facts, without questioning its basic premises.

The resource used was the figure of the “epicycle.” In an attempt to reconcile the new observed facts with the premises of the paradigm, explanations were offered that preserved its coherence. None of these facts led to a revision of the premise that the Earth was the center of the universe. Regarding the premise of circular motion, it was thought that these bodies in a circular orbit around the Earth were additionally making small, equally circular motions on the periphery of their circumferences. It was pointed out that there were therefore two types of circular motion: the proper motion of the cycle of the main orbit, and then various peripheral circular motions. Loops were added to the main circular orbit. With this explanation, the basic premises of the paradigm were saved.

Over time, however, new observations were added that raised suspicions about the validity of these premises. The number of new epicycles added to the traditional interpretation of the universe had grown to 79 epicycles, increasing the complexity of the paradigm and compromising the simplicity of its explanations. Initially, the assumptions seemed unshakable. However, with the accumulation of observations that differed from the original premises, the paradigm reached a breaking point. The explanations became increasingly cumbersome and some difficulties that were not easy to resolve gradually became apparent. Thus began a phase in which conditions were created that tended to lead to a qualitative leap in knowledge, while at the same time challenging the ability of the dominant paradigm to articulate meaning. This is the threshold of what Kuhn calls a “scientific revolution.”

In the example I have chosen, this scientific revolution is brought about by the intervention of three great scientists. The first is Nicolaus Copernicus. He raised the possibility of questioning the first premise and suggested that we consider as an alternative hypothesis that the Earth is the one that revolves around the Sun, while simultaneously rotating on its own axis. Copernicus argued that under this hypothesis we could explain the previous impression that the Sun moved around the Earth. What we saw as a displacement of the sun was now seen as the effect of the Earth’s rotation on its own axis. This new explanation saved the day.

The second major contribution came from Johannes Kepler. Based on the astronomical observations of Tycho Brahe, Kepler showed that the motion of the planets around the sun was not circular. The orbits they described were elliptical. This undermined the third premise of the geocentric paradigm. Taken together, the contributions of Copernicus and Kepler toppled the notion of epicycles. Its explanation was no longer necessary. It was no longer necessary to resort to them to explain what we observed. Appearances were once again rescued. Thus, it was discovered that the apparent regression in the motion of the planets resulted from a distortion of our view, caused by our premises.

When premises change, new explanations emerge that allow reality to be seen in a different way. The same facts now have a completely different meaning. This new picture is captured in a different global vision, later proposed by Isaac Newton. A new paradigm has emerged. Then we can only hope that its own premises will begin to be challenged by new observations, so that this new paradigm in turn will go into crisis and another one will emerge. This will be the later work of Albert Einstein. It is reasonable to assume that the same pattern of scientific transformation will continue to occur in the future.

The Evolution of Knowledge

It seems important to me, however, to broaden the spectrum in which both Bachelard and Kuhn operate. What they show us is not a trivial phenomenon. Their proposals reveal a particular mode of the evolution of knowledge. The first facts that tend to contradict the assumptions on which we operate are usually not enough to make us question those assumptions. We repeatedly resort to additional explanations whose goal is to preserve our original assumptions. We try to save face by protecting our assumptions. Knowledge is very conservative and shows great resistance to the transformation of its original basic premises. Often, no matter what happens to us, or the nature of the critical experiences we face, we tend to cling to our original assumptions, which are often those that trigger the same critical experiences.

Albert Einstein, who questioned the paradigm developed by Newton, warns us that we will not be able to solve certain problems if we are not willing to question the assumptions that led us to create them. Gaston Bachelard insists on the same point when he warns that “a problem without a solution is usually a poorly formulated problem.” Our difficulty in solving it lies in the assumptions contained in the way we formulate it. In other words, the real problem is often found within us. The British scientist Arthur Eddington says the same thing in even more eloquent terms:

“We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own.”6

The phenomenon to which both Bachelard and Kuhn refer is not limited to scientific knowledge. It seems to me that we are dealing with a much broader phenomenon, which reveals a recurring pattern of transformation of individual consciences. What they describe is therefore not exclusive to scientists; in general, human beings proceed in the same way. Although our experiences reveal our inadequacies and even cause us great suffering, we do not usually question the master judgments that determine the way we interpret the facts. Only after an accumulation of critical experiences do we begin to question whether there might be something in our own way of making sense of reality that produces such experiences. Only in very deep crises do we begin to suspect that we may be trapped in a deeply distorted view of a situation. There are even those who never manage to cross such a threshold of self-questioning. It is a strange phenomenon. Our vision usually protects itself, even to our detriment.

The Epicycle Mechanism

Based on the example above, I will call the “epicycle mechanism” the procedure we use when, faced with a crisis, we try to preserve the basic assumptions of our view and develop increasingly false explanations that lead us to radicalize the crisis we find ourselves in, rather than questioning those judgments or assumptions that define our interpretation of the facts.

This conservative tendency of mental processes is supported by the actual functioning of our nervous system. We now know that the neural operations that generate both learning and memory capacity do not depend on specific neurons but correspond to the relationships that certain neurons establish with each other, through the neural circuits that connect them.7

These neural circuits have two important features. First, they are highly plastic, which means that they change with each new experience and that these changes are preserved. Our nervous system is transformed with each of our experiences and is therefore never the same as it was before. Biologically, we are always different. On the other hand, each new change is based on the state of the nervous system up to that moment and therefore refers to the neural circuits that were previously formed. This creates a curious balance between its capacity for transformation and its tendency to build on the past. A change in our basic assumptions of knowledge implies a different layout of our neural circuits. The nervous system, which is highly efficient and economical, first seeks to adapt to the new challenges that result from our experiences by using what has already been built.

The above does not preclude admitting that there is a variable capacity displayed by different individuals to change their most basic knowledge assumptions. This implies two things: that this capacity is not the same in all individuals and, more importantly, that we can influence it. Ultimately, my point is that our ability to engage in deep learning that challenges our fundamental assumptions, is a matter of study. This capacity for learning, in turn, can be developed.

There are undoubtedly a variety of factors that condition our learning capacities: these include, for example, biological factors as well as socio-cultural factors. In fact, as people age this learning capacity tends to be limited in the nervous system itself, as it becomes less flexible. This explains why certain types of creative leaps–which result in important innovations in the field of knowledge–tend to occur when the individuals making them are in early adulthood. This is a fascinating research topic.8

2. The Notion of a “Basic Paradigm”

When I wrote El búho de Minerva (Minerva’s Owl) in the 1980s, I asked myself a question about the notion of paradigm. I wondered if, just as knowledge is organized in a systemic way in paradigms, each of which has a basic core of assumptions around which the rest of its elements gravitate, would something similar not happen in relation to those same paradigms? In other words, would it not be the case that the various paradigms coexisting at a given historical moment would in turn refer to a basic core of premises and assumptions that feed all of them, or at least a good part of them? I wondered then if there might be something we could call a “basic paradigm.” Would it not be possible to postulate a kind of metaparadigm, a paradigm of paradigms? Is there not an apparent fractality in relation to the notion of paradigm?

This is a question that has been with me for a very long time. Over the years, I have gradually articulated an answer to it, postulating that all our particular paradigms refer, in one way or another, to the particular way in which we conceive of reality. Our assumptions about the nature of reality allow us to determine, for example, whether it is knowable or not; they define the nature of our knowledge and, moreover, they specify our modalities of knowledge, indicating where we must go to gain knowledge and how we must do so. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this is only the first superficial layer of these “basic paradigms.”

At a deeper level, I find that our conception of both reality and knowledge itself, in turn, refers to the way we conceive of the human phenomenon, to the underlying interpretation–explicit or implicit–of how we are ourselves. This, I believe, is the true core of our “basic paradigm.”

There are those who might argue that the hierarchy I propose between a more superficial layer and a deeper layer in the “basic paradigm,” between our conception of the character of reality and knowledge on the one hand and the human phenomenon on the other, is meaningless. There are those who might say that the way we interpret the human phenomenon is derived from–and in this sense refers to and is subordinate to–the way we conceive of reality and knowledge. There may even be some who say that the very hierarchy between these two levels of the “basic paradigm” results from a particular choice I have previously made about the character of reality and knowledge. I do not wish to undermine these criticisms. They are worthy of consideration. This requires, however, that I handle this internal division with a certain amount of caution, not to force its internal dividing line excessively. Nevertheless, I will include it because it expresses a preference on my part.

The Ontological Crossroads

In my book Por la senda del pensar ontológico (On the Pathway of Ontological Thought), I argued that it was the ancient Greeks who showed us that, strictly speaking, we can distinguish three very different ways of conceiving of reality.9 These are the three main paths that open out from what I call the ontological crossroads. These three paths are revealed in the different answers that we can give to the question of the foundation or principle of reality. All three were explored by the Greeks.

The first path adheres to the claim that the foundation of the natural reality in which we live is to be found within that same reality, within nature (physis). This was the path followed in Greece by the physical or naturalistic philosophers, who generally belonged to the pre-Socratic period. This preference will later lead to the development of scientific knowledge.

The second path is the one followed by Plato and Aristotle, both influenced by the philosophy of Socrates. This option says that the foundation of natural reality is found outside of it, that natural phenomena point to a transcendent reality, which is found beyond nature. This is what I call the metaphysical option, which points beyond (meta) the natural order (physis). This idea gives prevalence, especially in the case of Plato, and leads to the assumption that natural phenomena refer to an abstract world of universal ideas. Aristotle articulates it clearly, maintaining the need to preserve this division of reality into two orders.10

The Greeks are understood to have explored a third path, which can be understood as different from the two previous ones. Those who best represented this alternative were the Sophists, especially Protagoras and Gorgias. Some might argue–and I agree–that Heraclitus, long before the Sophists, had a certain inclination toward this way. What characterizes this third path is the assumption that the foundation of reality is found neither in nature itself, nor in a domain beyond it. It is the human being who provides a foundation, and therefore the foundation resides in that being. “Man is the measure of all things,” said Protagoras, thereby inaugurating the doctrine that would later be known by the Latin name homo mensura. I call this option the anthropological path.

This third path presents a special aspect that is particularly important in my proposal. The first two, the naturalistic and the metaphysical paths, in one way or another, subscribe to the idea that reality has a basis, a foundation upon which everything that exists rests. Within everything that at first glance appears to make up “reality,” there would be a domain that governs everything and represents the “true reality of that reality.” In one way or another, they postulate the existence of something that makes reality real. The first is only apparent. The second is the real reality, its basis. Their main discrepancy lies in where they place that basis. The third way is open to a very different interpretation. To the extent that it focuses on the human being and avoids placing the order of reality outside of it, reality itself acquires a dimension of externality and allows itself to be conceived of as independent of the human being.

However, when the human being is considered the foundation of reality, this externality is lost and it becomes difficult to propose it as something independent of human beings since they are the ones who now give the status of reality. However, this immediately makes the notion of reality conceived in other ways problematic. Reality ceases to be an external dimension to which human beings must submit. Reality and the interpretation of reality cannot be distinguished from anthropological ontology. The idea of an objective reality, independent of human beings, can no longer be postulated. Reality lives in people’s interpretations and the only reality that they can consider valid is that of their own interpretations. In other words, the concept of reality loses its basis. We enter a fluid world of interpretations.

The idea of a baseless reality has historically frightened people. For many, it is a terrifying notion and they have tried to get away from it, to cling to whatever might give them some support, some minimal sense of security and stability. This is a disturbing idea; it brings us closer to the belief that reality is an abyss–a Greek term meaning bottomless. Human beings have historically fled from this seemingly terrifying idea. The reaction of the metaphysicians against the Sophists in Classical Greece is an adequate expression of the kind of aversion that this idea can generate. This is a subject to which I will return on several occasions.

From the perspective I propose, when faced with the question of the foundation of reality, we have three different options: the path of nature, the metaphysical path and the anthropological path. These constitute the three basic ontological positions. Each of them specifies a different conception of the character of reality. Helmuth Plessner refers to the same trilogy in a friendlier way, calling them the path of the world, the path of God and the path of man.

These three basic ontological positions define the three major stages of history in the West. In Antiquity, a naturalistic ontology prevails which conceives reality on the basis of the natural world. For this to be possible, the ancient view must conceive of the world as animated, magical and enchanted, as revealed to us by its mythology. As we will soon see, the Middle Ages are characterized by the predominance of a metaphysical ontology, centered on the transcendent figure of God, creator of all reality and generator of order. In Modernity, it is man, human beings and their experiences, who will become the obligatory starting point to give meaning to reality and to explain its structure. Whereas in the Middle Ages, meaning was given to man because of God, in Modernity, God is accessed by delving into the human condition. This is the defining feature of a truly modern perspective.11

The Third Path

The reader might sense a certain hesitancy on my part when I speak of the third path, and they wouldn’t be mistaken. I do so with some caution, because it is debatable whether the third path is really a different option from the other two. The problem depends on where we place the human being. For many, the human being belongs to nature (physis) itself and, therefore, this third path would be nothing more than a variant of the first, the naturalistic path. From this perspective, what this way would propose is that we must approach human beings through nature to find in them the foundation we seek. In doing so, we do not leave the path of nature. Heraclitus seemed to lean toward this understanding.

However, although the opposite argument is possible, it is therefore possible to defend this third path as an autonomous path. Thus, it is no less true that, from a historical point of view, we cannot fail to recognize that the naturalistic path and the anthropological path have tended to converge, to coincide, to create interesting intersections, and, on many occasions, even to merge. This has happened at different times and in different ways. At least two milestones are worth mentioning in order to visualize this convergence: the first is the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, developed in the second half of the seventeenth century and which currently is gaining in popularity. Spinoza, from a philosophical point of view, subsumes the human phenomenon within nature and its evolution. We will return to him.

The second milestone is that of Charles Darwin in the mid-nineteenth century, who, from a scientific point of view, repositioned human beings as part of natural evolution. According to these two conceptions, human beings are part of nature. The anthropological path is therefore nothing more than a variant of the naturalistic path.

From these two great contributions, those of Spinoza and Darwin, the subsequent development of Western thought has increasingly deepened the convergence of these two tendencies. This means that today it is very difficult to separate the naturalistic path from the anthropological path, and therefore we are basically faced with two great ontological options: on the one hand, the metaphysical path and, on the other, the naturalistic-anthropological (or anthropological-naturalistic) path.

Nevertheless, I think it important to return to my previous argument, and equally important to emphasize that if we accept the resistance to change normally exhibited by the core premises that make up any paradigm–as pointed out above–we must recognize that this same resistance is much greater when it comes to what I call the “basic paradigm.” The “basic paradigm” is a containment paradigm.12 All other, more specific paradigms are based on it. Its function is precisely to give them stability, which requires that it be the most stable of all paradigms. It is therefore not surprising that its life cycle is far larger than that of any other specific paradigm.

3. A Brief History of Metaphysics: from Inception to Hegemony

I believe we are currently going through a crisis of the metaphysical ontology which emerged twenty-five centuries ago with Parmenides and became increasingly hegemonic in the Western world since it was adopted by Christianity at the end of Antiquity, establishing it as the lifeblood of its theological vision.

However, it is important to look at the conditions of its inception. In any crisis it is usually of interest to examine how that which is in crisis came to be, because that is when many of its assumptions crystallize and other options are discarded. In the post-crisis environment, the latter can provide some guidance. To understand metaphysical ontology, we must return to an important confrontation of ideas that took place around the year 500 BCE.

Inception

At the dawn of the birth of philosophy, the space for philosophical reflection was occupied by the so-called physical philosophers who sought to find the source and foundation of all natural phenomena. Many philosophical contributions had already been made by philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander and Pythagoras.13 In this context, two diametrically opposed propositions emerge.

At the western end of the Greek world, in Elea in southern Italy, Parmenides claims that the foundation of all existence is Being, which is eternal and unchanging. Being has always existed and will always exist. Change is conceived of in this philosophy as an illusion of our senses. At the other end of the Greek world, at its eastern extremity in the city of Ephesus in Asia Minor, the figure of Heraclitus appears and declares the opposite of Parmenides’ belief. He says that everything is in a process of permanent transformation, of incessant change. Everything is an expression of constant becoming. Nothing is stable and Being is but a fleeting moment within becoming. The notion of Being therefore carries with it the illusion of a permanence that does not exist. Heraclitus associates his notion of Becoming with two elements: logos (the word) and fire.

Later, in the center of the Greek world, in Athens, there is the outstanding figure of Socrates, who has the merit of radically changing the direction of philosophical reflection. Socrates established a philosophy of human life. To do this, he was presented with two paths on which to base his philosophy: the paths of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Diogenes Laertius provides us with testimony in which Socrates admires Heraclitus and yet expresses difficulty in fully understanding many of his ideas.14 It is not surprising that Heraclitus was called “The Obscure” in his time. Faced with this crossroads, Socrates chose the path of Parmenides, basing his philosophy on Parmenides’ concept of Being. He thus planted the first metaphysical seed in the interpretation of human phenomena.

However, this seed would only be developed in two philosophies which emerged consecutively. First, in the philosophy of Plato, a disciple of Socrates, and then in the philosophy of Aristotle, a disciple of Plato. They are two different metaphysical variants. The metaphysical proposal of these two philosophers coexisted in their time with other very different philosophical proposals. It cannot be said that it was a current of philosophical thought that was of great importance from the beginning. On the contrary, in the subsequent Hellenistic period, which began after the crisis of the Greek city-state (the polis) following the conquests of Alexander the Great, the most prominent philosophical currents were developed by the Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics and Cynics, who did not allow themselves to be characterized as metaphysicians. Consequently, although they existed in this period, the importance of metaphysical ideas was not predominant.

The Advent of Christianity

The situation was later reversed in the era of the Roman Empire, when Christianity spread to the point that it took control of the Empire during the reign of Emperor Constantine. This event marked a radical departure within the ancient Greco-Roman world. It had been a pagan, polytheistic world, in which a wide variety of gods was believed to exist. This established a multiple perspective as a transcendent reference through which to understand reality.

Christianity proposes something quite different: a monotheistic religion that asserts the existence of a single God and the exclusion of other divinities. Thus, Christianity upholds unity as the transcendent referent of reality. Everything points to a single Being, who proclaims Himself to be the Creator and Ruler of all that exists. During the period of the Roman Republic, which was based on pluralistic principles, Christianity might have found it more difficult to flourish. But with the Empire, which upheld one man with one will as supreme ruler, things were different. The unique and absolute nature of temporal authority created a favorable terrain for the acceptance of a symmetrical and equal situation in which the existence of a transcendent domain could be proposed.

Once Christianity took control of the Roman imperial state, new conditions were created that favored a fusion between Christian theology and the metaphysical approach. There are fundamentally two major moments that account for this convergence. The first is expressed in the theology of Augustine, in the fourth century, based on Platonic philosophy. Later, in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas developed a systematic theological interpretation based on the work of Aristotle.

4. The Fundamental Core of Metaphysics

What does metaphysical ontology say about reality and human beings? What are its basic premises? What is the central core of this “basic paradigm?” As mentioned above, the central core is the idea that the foundation of the reality that we perceive with our senses is outside of that reality, in a domain that transcends it. What we perceive with our senses, according to metaphysics, is nothing but a distorted reality. “True” reality is “beyond” (meta) the phenomena of nature (physis) and beyond the reach of the senses. To reiterate with a religious tone, we can claim that the true foundation of this world is to be found in a world beyond. It is not surprising that the philosophical proposal of the metaphysicians found a great affinity with Christianity.

Two Orders of Reality

Consequently, in a primary approach, metaphysics offers a dual vision of reality insofar as it distinguishes two orders of reality: a first order of reality that is presented as distorted and fictitious, and a second order of reality that must be relied on in order to give meaning to the first. The meaning of this world comes from outside, in a transcendent and metaphysical world. To the extent that the second order of reality subsumes the first, in a second approach, metaphysics tends to adopt a monistic vision. It ends up asserting, with varying degrees of force, that the only true reality, strictly speaking, is that which corresponds to the metaphysical order. In this second version, there is no reality other than metaphysical reality. Everything else, as Plato would say, is nothing but shadows projected from this single reality. Others, such as Aristotle, do not speak of shadows but of appearances. But although he dilutes the dualism, it is still present in the background.

The appearance of things cannot explain how they are, metaphysics tells us. The Being of things, how things really are, is not in the world of appearances, but rather in that different world, where the essence of reality resides: the metaphysical world. Things that in the realm of appearances appear to be changeable, in a state of flux, once we observe them from the perspective of their Being, appear to be stable, unchanging.

From a metaphysical perspective, and following Parmenides to the letter, Being does not change. Being is eternal: it has no moment of birth and no moment of death. This unchanging Being is what gives meaning to change, a Being that shows itself through different appearances, but that has always been there, containing possibilities that the appearances do not reflect. The category of Being becomes a necessary referent to explain change. It does so by denying it. If Being were to change, we would need a new referent to account for the change in it, and so on until we finally arrive at an eternal and unchanging Being. From this perspective, the changing modalities of Being that we may think we have encountered along the way would be nothing more than manifestations of the same appearances.

Nietzsche asks how it can be that we created such an explanation. What led us to it? Specifically, what made Socrates follow Parmenides’ path of Being and reject the alternative path proposed by Heraclitus? And, above all, what made a proposal supported by Parmenides’ path have the power of attraction and the historical influence that it had? Nietzsche’s question is direct; addressing Socrates, he asks: “Socrates, what was your fear?”

This is a question that has always fascinated me. I think it is brilliant and fundamental. What has led us down the path of metaphysics? My own answer is this: what led us down the metaphysical path was, above all, our fear of death. We humans have a hard time accepting the fact that sooner or later we are going to die and that death is the end of what we have been and what we are. The idea that life has an end is frightening to us. The idea that the most essential part of us, what we have known as our soul, is doomed to disappear seems unacceptable to us. We say to ourselves, “This can’t be! There must be some other explanation! There must be some way to escape this fate!” Metaphysics seems to offer us that way out.

Humans find it difficult to accept the idea of their mortality, and this leads them to create the illusory idea that there is a possibility of immortality, that there is a world in which death has been eradicated, a world of which we are a part and into which we can peer if only we could learn how. We now feel more comfortable with this new idea and begin to articulate, around it, new ways of giving meaning to life. All these articulations, however, are ultimately ways of chasing away fear.

Nevertheless, this is not the story that metaphysics proposes. It cannot be. If its secret were to be revealed, its alibi would be invalidated and immediately exposed. Metaphysics is forced to hide the fear that creates it and, in general, to exclude the role that emotions played in its birth. To give us the peace of mind we seek, it is forced to erase its own footprints.15

Based on Parmenides’ notion of Being, metaphysics uses it to give meaning to events. Being guides, governs and makes intelligible the distorted territory of appearances, our immediate reality. The meaning of our everyday reality is thus placed outside of it. As we can see, this is a strange notion of reality, since it contradicts the primary intuition that reality corresponds to the concrete conditions of our existence. No, metaphysics tells us that reality is unreal, that reality is, in fact, found in a very different world that philosophers have uncovered. The world of Being is a world populated by ideas, the ideas of philosophers. Ultimately, Being is nothing but an idea developed through philosophy. Only the power of fear can make us accept something so strange.

Being and Truth

For metaphysics, true reality is different from the reality in which we live. In other words, the transcendent domain postulated by metaphysics, where Being dwells, is also the domain of Truth, since Truth is nothing other than the apprehension of the Being of things. Truth and Being are confused with each other. Being is Truth to the extent that the only true reality is that of Being. But we must go further. Just as everything refers to its own Being, and therefore implies the recognition of multiple beings (one for each thing), all of these in turn refer to the universal and unique Being of which particular beings are merely partial expressions and in which they inevitably participate. In the domain of metaphysics, the government of Oneness reigns. The One prevails over multiplicity. Thus, ultimately, Being is One and One is Truth. I will return to the implications of the idea that Truth is One and only one.

For classical metaphysics, there are four fundamental attributes of Being. The first is presence, which refers to its ability to manifest: Being reveals itself. Truth is the expression that the revelation of Being assumes. The second attribute is oneness: Being is one. The third is permanence: Being does not change; it is fixed and immutable. The fourth and final attribute is eternity: Being has no beginning or end; it has always existed and will always exist. Of all these attributes, I give special importance to that of permanence because, on its basis, historical transformation–becoming–is denied.

The similarity of metaphysics to religious monotheism is not surprising. Likewise, we can understand why the metaphysical proposal had difficulty establishing itself in the pagan world of Antiquity, which conceived of the transcendent realm of the gods as a multiple, diverse, and often even contradictory world. The pagan gods were passionate gods often in conflict with each other. Nevertheless, the emergence of monotheistic Christianity created the conditions for metaphysics to achieve hegemony in the Western world several centuries after its birth.

The Meaning of Human Existence Is Outside of It

This process, establishing the meaning of reality in a different order from that of existential reality, implies an emptying of meaning from existence itself. The meaning of human existence–and ultimately of life–does not reside within it but must be sought outside of itself. This premise is asserted by metaphysics through very different keys. Beyond the fact that the metaphysical ontology implies a convergence of paths as different as Greek and Christian ones, there are keys from Greek and other philosophies that clearly exhibit Christian roots and as can be expected, do not always coincide. To the allegory of the cave proposed by Plato, centered on the Greek notion of truth, Christianity adds a different element: that of human salvation. Faithful to this key, the Gospel of John tells us that Jesus, before being arrested, said:

He who loves his life will lose it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life. (John 12, 25)

One way or another, both sides proclaim contempt for this life through the assertion of an external life and world.

Without this external reference, life loses all meaning. Thus, for metaphysicians, the denial of the order of transcendent reality postulated by them, implies a fall into nihilism, into the domain of nothingness, alien to all value, to all genuine meaning. This would become, for instance, the accusation made by Christianity against those who assume atheistic positions. It accuses them of being nihilists, of being individuals who, by denying God, deny Being and consequently raise Nothingness as a supposed value. And when Nothingness is erected as a value, they argue, strictly speaking there are no values, and everything is permitted.

Nietzsche turns the accusation of nihilism around and directs it against both Christianity and metaphysical philosophy as a philosophical perspective. By denying meaning to life and placing the sovereignty of Being outside of it, metaphysics, Nietzsche argues, has emptied life itself of meaning, turning it into an empire of nothingness. In other words, for metaphysics the meaning of life ultimately resides in death. The metaphysical proposal turns this world and this life–the only one we have–into a territory of “tormented souls” eagerly seeking access to the world of meaning and Being.

Life, from a metaphysical perspective, belongs to a world that increasingly resembles a world of cemeteries. We only gain access to true life after death. For Nietzsche, this represents the most perverse of nihilisms. To overcome it, a complete transmutation of values is needed to liberate them from the territory of death, where they were consigned by metaphysics, and have them return to the territory of life. This implies asserting, above all, the value of life and, on that basis, understanding that the most authentic values are those that serve life itself, not those based on its denial or on contempt for it, which metaphysics does.

So far, I have focused on understanding the metaphysical conception of reality. Hence it necessarily follows that I ask myself what it proposes as the conception of the human being. For metaphysics, human beings participate in this double dimension of reality. They have a body and develop passions, aspects that tie them to the natural phenomenal world, but they also have a second dimension that belongs to the transcendent world of Being: the soul. The latter is a counterpart to the body. While the body is material, the soul is spiritual. It is in the soul that the Being of each individual resides, and it is the soul that manifests itself in multiple ways during the course of life. Everything we do, feel or think reveals our soul and exhibits our particular way of being.

While death affects the body and represents its disintegration, the soul possesses the attributes of Being: it is eternal and immutable. Our soul, metaphysics tells us, is immortal and therefore we do not have to fear death. With death, the soul, having been trapped in the body, is finally freed and ascends to the transcendent world of beyond. Because it is eternal and immutable, the soul does not change. Each person is as he or she is and will remain so forever. This does not necessarily go against the fact that life imposes some changes on us; all change only develops potentialities that were already contained in our being, merely embodying what had always been there. What metaphysics considers impossible is to transcend the limits of our Being. Our Being, our soul, not only constitutes and defines us, it also traps us and holds us captive.

This reasoning is certainly somewhat tautological. Nothing we do in the course of our lives can call it into question. Everything we do reveals, by definition, dimensions of our Being that we may not have previously perceived. No experience can dispute the metaphysical argument and therefore we have no way of proving or refuting its validity. The metaphysical proposal has made itself an armored fortress that is impossible to destroy. Its rational foundation is circular and impenetrable.

Being, Reason, and Truth

By participating in this double world of body and soul, human beings have an attribute that no other species possesses: we are rational beings, with the power to reason. Reason belongs to the higher realm of the spirit, while the body and emotions link us to our animal nature. What is specific to the human being, therefore, what distinguishes us from the rest of living beings, is our rational being. Reason is the attribute par excellence of human beings.

Because we are rational, human beings can access the domain of Being and not only can we grasp the being of things, we also can access the unique, universal and absolute Being itself. When we do so, we simultaneously access Truth. Reason is therefore the real way to access Truth. All other living beings cannot do this.