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While the study of insurgency extends well over 100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small wars of the 19th century and beyond, almost no cross modal analysis - that is, dedicated insurgency form typology identification - has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict - a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East.
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Copyright © 2016 by Robert Bunker
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SUMMARY
OLD AND NEW INSURGENCY FORMS
DEFINING INSURGENCY
TERRORISM AS INSURGENCY I&W
REVIEW OF INSURGENCY TYPOLOGIES
PROPOSED INSURGENCY TYPOLOGY
LEGACY INSURGENCY FORMS
CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY FORMS
EMERGENT AND POTENTIAL INSURGENCY FORMS
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
APPENDIX
ENDNOTES
WHILETHESTUDYOFinsurgencyextendswellover100yearsandhasitsoriginsintheguerrillaandsmallwarsofthe19thcenturyandbeyond,almostnocrossmodalanalysis—thatis,dedicatedinsurgencyformtypologyidentification—hasbeen conducted. UntiltheendoftheColdWar,thestudyofinsurgencyfocusedprimarilyonseparatistandMarxistderivedformswithanemphasisoncounterinsurgencypracticeaimedatthoseformsratherthanonidentifyingwhatdifferencesandinterrelationshipsexisted.Thereasonforthisisthatthedecades-longColdWarstrugglesubsumedmanydiversenationalstrugglesandtensionsintoalargerparadigmofconflict—afree,democratic,andcapitalistWestversusatotalitarian,communist,andcentrallyplannedEast.
WiththeendoftheColdWarandtheresultingideologicalandeconomicimplosionoftheSovietUnion,post-ColdWarinsurgencytypologiesbegantoemergebecauseaneedexistedtounderstandwherethiscomponentofthenewglobalsecurityenvironmentwasheading.Over2decadesofresearchandwritinghavebeenfocusedonthisendeavorbywhatisarelativelysmallnumberofinsurgencypractitionersand/ortheorists.Inaddition,theworksofsomecontemporaryterrorismscholarsarealsorelevanttothistopical area of focus.
Forthismonographtoidentifywhatcanbeconsidered newformsofinsurgencythatare developing,anappreciationforandunderstandingofearlierinsurgencyformsmustalsobearticulated.Withthesethoughtsinmind,thismonographwillinitiallydiscusswhataninsurgencyisandsomeWesternviewpointsonit,describehowterrorismanalysiscanpotentially serveanindicationsandwarnings(I&W)function,providealiteraturereviewofthepost-ColdWarinsurgencytypologiesthatexist,createaproposedinsurgencytypologydividedintolegacy,contemporary, andemergentandpotentialinsurgencyforms,andfinallyprovidestrategicimplicationsforU.S.defensepolicyastheyrelatetoeachoftheseforms.Theworkwillalsoutilizeanumberoftablesfororganizationalpurposesandanendnotessectionforscholarlycitationrequirements.
Pertainingtotheinsurgencyandterrorismliteraturereviewsconductedinthismanuscript,thefollowingterrorismandinsurgencyforms—formname(s),author(s),andyearofpublication—wereanalyzedincreating thefinalforms typology.
1995)
Derivedfromthisanalysis,thefollowinginsurgencyformswiththeirstartingdatesin()havebeenidentifiedaswellasthestrategicimplicationsofeachformforU.S.defensepolicy.
Anarchist(1880s).Generallyviolent,anarchismhasonlybeenviewedasaformofterrorism(Rapoport,2001)becausetheendstatesoughtisgovernmental— evenstate—destruction.Noreplacementgovernmentorseizureofthestateisbeingattemptednorisanyformofsubversionorco-optionofstateinstitutionsortheparallelbuildingofashadowstatetakingplace.Still,O’Neill(2005)designatesthisasaninsurgencyformandtheinsurgencyoutcomeofstate-destructionexistsin alater typology createdby Metz(2012).
Strategicimplications:None.Thislegacyinsurgencyformisananachronismwiththethreatpotentialsdowngradedtothatofsporadicperiodsoflocalunrestbeinggeneratedbyprotestersoutsideofpoliticalconventionsandfinancialsummitsandcharacterizedbyvandalism,aggravatedassault,andarson.ThisissolelyaU.S.domesticlawenforcementissuefocusingonriotcontrol,investigationofcriminalactivities,andlimitedcounterterrorismresponse.NoU.S.militaryresponseisrequired.
Separatist—InternalandExternal (1920s).Thisinsurgencyformencompassesbothseparationfromlocalauthority—suchastheoriginalIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)gainingIrishindependencefromtheUnitedKingdomin1921—andtheseparationfromforeignauthorityastookplaceinnumerousregionsduringthedecolonialperiodaftertheSecondWorldWar.Numeroustheoristshaveidentifiedthisinsurgencyform,rangingfromCable’s(1993)defensivearticulationthroughanumberofothersintoJones’s(2011)separatistandresistancetypes.
Strategicimplications:Limited.ThisinsurgencyformnowtakesplaceonlysporadicallyandtosomeextenthasbeenreplacedbymoretraditionalsecessionballotinitiativesashaveormaybeseeninthefutureastakingplaceinScotland,Catalonia,Flanders,andotherlocales.Still,theinsurgenciesofthe1990sthattookplaceintheformerYugoslaviaandthemore recentsecessionofSouthSudanin2011suggestthislegacyformhasnotfadedaway.ApossibleU.S.military responsemay berequireddepending onthespecificinternational incident taking place.
MaoistPeople’s(1930s).ThemostidentifiableinsurgencyformisderivedfromMaoZedong’sprinciplesfoundinhis1937work,OnGuerrillaWarfare.Thisform,alsoknownas“people’swar,”utilizespeasantarmiesthataredrawnuponforanintegratedandprotractedpolitico-militaryphasestrategyofeventualstatetakeover.Ashadoworproto-stateiscreatedinparalleltothepre-existingonebeingtargetedforelimination.ThisformhasbeenidentifiedbyMetz(1993)aspeople’swar,byBeckett(2001)asrevolutionarywarfare,byO’Neill(2005)asegalitarian,andSchnabelandGunaratna(2006;2015)asideological.
Strategicimplications:None.Thislegacyinsurgencyformisdefunct.NoU.S.militaryresponseisrequired.
UrbanLeft(Late-1960s).Thisinsurgencyformhasbeenidentifiedbyanumberoftheoristsand,aspreviouslymentioned,isacontinuationofearlierMarxistpolitico-militaryconceptswithamoreurbanizedemphasis.Peasantsnolongerfightinthecountrysideorsurroundcities—theirsuccessorsnowengageinterroristtacticalactionswithinthosecities.Metz’s(1993)urbaninsurrection—devoidtheIranianexperience,Beckett’s(2001)urbanandsuperpowerbasedSovietproxycomponent,Rapoport’s(2001)new-left,andSchnabelandGunaratna’s(2006;2015)ideological(whichspanstheearlierMarxistformandthisone)alladdressthisform.
Strategicimplications:Nonetolimited.Thislegacyinsurgencyformappearstobedefunct,therefore,no U.S.militaryresponseisrequired.However,thepromotionofsuchpotentialsbytheBolivarianallianceexistsandcouldbefacilitatedbyRussian,IranianandHezbollah,and/orChinesesupport.Still,ifthisinsurgencyformshouldreappear,theimpactisestimatedtobelimited.ItwouldrequirevaryingU.S.Governmentagencyinvolvementbasedonasituationalresponse.
RadicalIslamist(1979).TheIslamicRevolutioninIranin1979andtheensuing444-dayU.S.Embassyhostagecrisisusheredinanewinsurgencyformderivedfromtheperceptionthatmosqueandstateareinexorablyintertwined.TheradicalIslamistformhastwovariants—oneShiaandtheotherSunnibased—andstemsfromthefactthatIslamneverunderwentahistoricalreformationwhichusheredinsecularpoliticalthoughtandaseparationofthespheresofchurch(ormosque)andstate.ScholarsrecognizingthisinsurgencyformareMetz(1995)reactionary,Rapoport(2001)religiousextremism,Kilcullen(2004)globalizedIslamist,O’Neill(2005)reactionary-traditionalist,andSchnabelandGunaratna (2006;2015) religious.
Strategicimplications:Significant.GroupsinvolvedincludeHezbollah,al-Qaeda,andtheIslamicState.Ofallthepresentlyactiveinsurgencyforms,thisonehasthemostsignificantimpactonU.S.defensepolicyaswitnessedbytheyearsofdeploymentstoAfghanistanandIraqandtheongoingoperationsinSyria,Yemen,andnumerousotherlocales.Thisinsurgencyformrequireseitherfederallawenforcementorthemilitary(typically)asthedesignatedlead.Anallof-governmentapproachisrequiredtomitigateanddefeatthisinsurgencyformwhichpossessesaterrorismcomponent—utilizingbothlargescaleandlone wolfattacks—representingadirectthreattotheU.S.homeland.
LiberalDemocratic(1989).TheremovaloftheBerlinWallinNovember1989,theendofCommunistruleinEasternEuropethereafter,andtheeventualdissolutionoftheSovietUnioninDecember1991markednotonlytheendtotheColdWarbutalsothepowerofpluralistuprisingsasthePolishSolidarityshipyardworkershaveshown.ThatliberaldemocracycouldprovidethebasisforaninsurgencyformhasbeennotedbybothBeckett(2001),astheAmericancomponentoftheColdWarsuperpowerbasedconflict,andalsolaterbyO’Neill(2005),morespecificallywithinhispluralistformdesignation.
Strategicimplications:Mixed(beneficial).ThisinsurgencyformshouldbeviewedasanopportunitytoextenddemocraticvaluesratherthanasanactualorpotentialthreatofsomesorttotheUnitedStatesoritsallies.AvarietyofU.S.Governmentagenciesmayprovideindirectand/ordirectfacilitationofsuchinsurgencies.Theonedownsideofthisinsurgencyformisunintendedsecondandthirdordereffects—forexample,U.S.supporttothe mostlydefunctFree SyrianArmy(FSA)inadvertentlystrengthenedtheIslamicState (IS)byhelping toweakentheAssad regime.
Criminal(Early-2000s).Elementsandcomponentsofthisinsurgencyformhavebeenprojectedandidentifiedbynumerousscholars:Metz’s(1993)commercial,Clapham’s(1998)warlord,Sloan’s(1999)apolitical, Thom’s(1999)economic,Cilliers’s(2000)resourcebased,Tarr’s (2011)resourcecontrol, andMetz’s later(2012)non-political.Ofthesevariousarticulations,Sullivan’s (2008) criminal designation—directly derivedfromMetz’s1993perceptions—has becomethedominantoneasitrelatestotheinsurgent-like activitiesofthegangsand cartelsinMexicoand LatinAmerica.
Strategicimplications:Limitedtomoderate.Typically,thegroupsinvolvedinthisinsurgencyform—ColombianandMexicancartels,CentralAmericangangs,andtheItalianmafia—areviewedasalawenforcementconcern.However,someoftheAfricanwarlordsandthemoreoperationallycapablecartelgroups,suchasLosZetasandCJNG(CárteldeJaliscoNuevaGeneración),haveovermatchcapabilitytoanylawenforcementresponse.FortheUnitedStates,theresponsetothisinsurgencyformrequireseitherfederallawenforcement(typically)orthemilitaryasthedesignatedlead.Anall-of-governmentapproachisrequiredtomitigateanddefeatthisinsurgencyformthatspringsoutofMexicoandisbringingcorruptionintoU.S.borderzonesalongwithsporadicincidentsofnarco-terrorism.
Plutocratic(2008).Ofalloftheinsurgencyformsofferedinthismonograph,thismaybeoneofthemostcontentious.Itspecificallyviewstheriseofglobalizedcapitaldevoidofanytiestothestate—inessence,representativeofanemergingformof21stcenturypostmoderncapitalism—indirectconflictwithearlierformsof20thcenturystatemoderatedcapitalismpromotedbyliberaldemocraticgovernments.Itviewstheriseofstatelessmultinationalcorporations,andtheglobalelites(.001%to1%)theyserveasthemajorstakeholders,asinsiderinsurgentthreatstotheinternationalorder.ThisinsurgentformservesasacorollarytotheprecedingcriminalformandrepresentsanothervarianttoMetz’s(1993) commercialarticulationpostulatedbyBunker(2011).
Strategicimplications:Nonepresently.TheU.S.military hasnocurrentroleintheresponsetotheriseofpredatoryglobalcapitalismandtheemerging“sovereignfree”entitiesengaginginit.Rather,varyinggovernmentalagencieswithalegalisticandeconomicmandatewillberequiredtopromotestatemoderatedcapitalistvaluesandlaws.Federallawenforcementagencieswillbetaskedtosupportsucheffortsastheyrelatetofinancialcrimes,taxavoidance,andrelatedoffenses.
BloodCultist(Emergent).Theexistenceofthistypeofinsurgencyformhasbeenrecognizedbyanumberofscholars(O’Neill,2005;Kaplan,2007;Lauder,2009)primarilywithinthelastdecadeandultimatelyrepresents a fusionof criminality,spirituality,andbarbarism.ItismostrecognizablewithrecentIslamicStateactivityinvolvingmassritualbeheadings,crucifixions,childrape,andrelatedatrocitiesandtheir“endofdays”typeofpursuits.AttributesofthisinsurgencyformcanalsobefoundwiththeLaFamiliaMichoacana(LFM)andLosCaballerosTemplarios(TheKnight’sTemplars)cartelsinMexicowhichengageinChristiancultishbehaviorsandelementsofLosZetasandCarteldelGolfothatareinvolvedinextremeformsofSantaMuerteworshipwhichseeksupernaturalprotection,deathmagicspells,power,andriches.
Strategicimplications:Limitedtomoderate.ThisinsurgencyformcanbeviewedasamutationofeitherradicalIslamand/orrampantcriminality,asfoundinpartsofLatinAmericaandAfrica,intodarkspiritualitybasedon
