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- Herausgeber: Ithaca Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
After half a century of animosity and wars, Jordan and Israel succeeded in reaching a peace treaty through bilateral negotiations under the Middle East peace process that was initiated and sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, later the Russian Federation. This book is an account written by the Prime Minister of Jordan who signed the Peace Treaty, a senior minister in his cabinet at the time, and a minister who served later in the cabinet. All three authors had been instrumental in peace-making as Dr Majali headed the Jordan delegation, and Anani and Haddadin worked with him as senior members of the delegation. The three were effective in following up with the implementation of the Peace Treaty. This book reveals previously unwritten episodes of peace-making as the authors lived them from within. The hardships of representing the Palestinians before the Palestine Liberation Organization exchanged formal recognition with the State of Israel, the difficulties of negotiations with Israel, of coordination with the other Arab parties, and in defending the peace-making against the domestic opposition are told in detail. The mutual moves for confidence building, and the triumph of arriving at an agreement in which both adversaries were winners are experiences that the authors tell in a candid and thorough fashion. Their work is a much needed reference on the Middle East peace process in both its bilateral and multilateral conferences.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014
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Peacemaking
The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty
Abdul Salam A. Majali, Jawad A. Anani and Munther J. Haddadin
With a Foreword by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan
Contents
Foreword by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan
Preface by David L. Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma
Authors’ Preface
Introduction
1 A Call to Peace
Notes
2 Pre-Talk Talks/Sofa Diplomacy
Notes
3 Issues of Representation
4 Jordanians’ Attitudes to Peace
5 Visions and Revisions
Notes
6 Developments in the Round
7 Multilaterals
Notes
8 The Process Survives
9 The Common Agenda
10 More PLO Involvement
11 Ninth, Tenth, Oslo, Eleventh
Notes
12 The Process Accelerates
Note
13 Implementation
Notes
14 The Peace Treaty
Note
15 Implementation Overview
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 LETTER OF INVITATION TO THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
APPENDIX 2 FIRST PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON AGENDA
APPENDIX 3 THE COMMON AGENDA
APPENDIX 4 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL
LIST OF ANNEXES, APPENDICES AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS
Notes
Foreword by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan
As Chairman of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Peace Studies of the International Programs Center of the University of Oklahoma, it has been a pleasure for me to work with President David L. Boren to promote knowledge and understanding of the Middle East as a means for peacemaking and peace-building.
This volume is one of a number of books focusing on the Middle East and associated with the University of Oklahoma Press with which I have been directly involved.
With that in mind, I commend to readers this latest publication: Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty. The authors present historical testimony on one of the most important chapters in the history of Middle East peace negotiations during the twentieth century.
Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty describes one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under His Late Majesty King Hussein. His Late Majesty earned global recognition and respect for the positive role he played during the second half of the twentieth century in promoting a Middle East settlement based on a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in our region.
Israel has had eleven prime ministers since its establishment in 1948. The Hussein epoch was concurrent with all of them, except the last two. When my late brother assumed office, Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, was still in office. Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister during the forty-seven years of Hussein’s reign. No wonder that no other world leader understood Israeli politics and the Middle East peace process as he did.
For thirty-four years (1965–1999) I stood, as Crown Prince, by the side of my late brother and supported all his efforts, including the enduring search for peace and justice.
It was George H. W. Bush, the eighth United States President during Hussein’s reign, who finally convened in Madrid the international peace conference for which King Hussein had continuously called as a necessary first step to Arab-Israeli peace.
Together with my late brother we worked in partnership with successive U.S. administrations from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton to achieve the required breakthrough.
The authors of this book were direct participants in the negotiations that culminated in the 1994 treaty conducted within the framework established by the Madrid Conference for bilateral and multilateral talks.
Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty is first of all a detailed first-hand account of Jordan’s bilateral and multilateral negotiations. It also covers the Palestinians’ participation in the peace process as part of a joint delegation with Jordan. Jordanian efforts to coordinate with other Arab delegations to the peace process are also described. Attention is paid to the Jordanian internal debate over negotiations with the Israelis.
The book contains valuable and interesting material not available anywhere else and is written with humour and an engaging style. I am confident that it will contribute to a better knowledge and understanding of the Middle East, which is the key objective of the Center for Peace Studies of the International Programs Center of the University of Oklahoma.
Preface by David L. Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma
I am honored and pleased to join with His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal in providing information to the readers of Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty. His Royal Highness is the brother of His Late Majesty King Hussein, whom he served as Crown Prince, closest political adviser, confidant, deputy and Regent during his absences from the country from April 1965 until the changes in succession brought about by King Hussein in January 1999. Prince Hassan has honored the University of Oklahoma by ably serving as the Chair of the Board of Advisors of The University of Oklahoma Center for Peace Studies since 1999.
Jordanian peacemakers have not published accounts about negotiations of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Peace Treaty with the Israelis. On the Palestinian side, Hanan Ashrawi and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) published their stories and opinions. Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin, Uri Savir, Itamar Rabinovich and Eyton Benzar published Israeli accounts. This book makes available the experiences and views of Jordanian negotiators.
His Majesty King Hussein was a great leader for peace. His ascension in 1952, four years after the establishment of the State of Israel, coincided with the Egyptian revolution and the rise of Arab revolutionary movements. The bloody coup in Iraq in 1958 which terminated Hashemite rule there left the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan somewhat alone in a hostile region. The growing strength of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) since its establishment by the Arab League in 1964 had implications for the Kingdom of Jordan which, more than any country, has accepted Palestinian refugees, treated them humanely, and accorded them Jordanian citizenship. The Jordanian Government for reasons of internal security, territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty was forced to expel Yasir Arafat and the PLO from Jordan in 1971. Notwithstanding this history, for two decades it was the Hashemite Kingdom that enabled Palestinians to participate directly and advance their national interests in international meetings.
Since the end of the 1967 War and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, Jordan has played a lead role in practically all international efforts aiming at obliging Israel to restore the occupied territories. His Majesty King Hussein and his closest counselors understood that a political settlement was needed with their powerful neighbor Israel. King Hussein simultaneously remained committed to Arab consensus and would not sign a separate peace treaty with Israel unless other Arabs were willing to do so and steps were underway to resolve the ‘Palestinian problem’. His Majesty King Hussein was the ‘godfather’ of United Nations Resolution 242 of 1967 that called for peace in exchange for territories.
The Egyptian–Israeli peace accord of 1979 brokered by President Jimmy Carter, the instability and civil war in Lebanon and its invasion by Israel in 1982, King Hussein’s decision to abandon Jordan’s territorial claim to the West Bank in 1988, and the first Gulf War in 1991, combined to prompt the United States to work diligently to bring Arabs and Israelis together at the negotiation table to peacefully resolve their protracted conflict. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker with support from the Soviet leaders succeeded in convening a Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. The letters of invitation to the parties provided the basis and opportunity for movement toward a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the land for peace formula. Jordan, as it had done since the mid-1970s in international meetings, and this time against strong domestic opposition, allowed the stateless Palestinians to participate as part of its delegation to the 1991 Madrid Conference. Peacemaking reveals the interactions and complexities of Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian relations which add greatly to understanding of the peace process. The chapter which focuses upon the debates within Jordan on the pros and cons of making peace with Israel, especially the debates between the negotiating team and the most prominent Islamists in Jordan at the time, is particularly enlightening.
This book is an important contribution to literature on the Middle East. It joins other books on this region published by the University of Oklahoma Press and the University’s International Programs Center, directed by Ambassador (ret.) Edward J. Perkins. These books on the Middle East have been inspired by and grown out of the programs and conferences of the Center for Peace Studies (which is part of the International Programs Center). The Center for Peace Studies is formed by Bethlehem University (Palestine), Haifa University, the Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya Academic College (Israel), the Horizon Studies and Research Center (Jordan), and the Cairo Peace Association (Egypt) as well as the University of Oklahoma. The Chair of the University of Oklahoma Center for Peace Studies is Dr Christopher Howard and the Director is Dr Joseph Ginat. The general editor of the International and Security Affairs Series is Ambassador (ret.) Edwin G. Corr, Associate Director of the International Programs Center. I am proud to share with you the fourth volume in this series, Peacemaking: The Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli Treaty.
Authors’ Preface
This book tells the inside story of peacemaking between Jordan and Israel and the parallel efforts to make peace between Israel and the other Arab parties in as much as they impacted on Jordan. The authors were at the center of action throughout the peace process. Dr Majali was picked by King Hussein in October 1991 to lead the Jordanian delegation to the Jordanian–Israeli bilateral peace negotiations. He occupied that post until May 1993, when he was entrusted by His Majesty to form the Jordanian Cabinet. He became Jordan’s Prime Minister, and during his tenure the negotiations with Israel culminated in the Peace Treaty. Dr Majali signed the Treaty on behalf of Jordan on Wednesday, October 26, 1994, and presented it to the Cabinet and to Parliament where it was approved by 55 votes out of 79 members of the Lower House who attended the session (with one absentee). The Treaty was then ratified by the King on November 11, 1994.
Dr Anani was a senior member of the Jordanian delegation to the bilateral negotiations, and was also head of the Jordanian delegation to the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees in the Multilateral Conference until May 1993, when he joined the Cabinet under Dr Majali. Dr Anani was given the portfolio of Minister of State and managed the negotiations with Israel.
Dr Haddadin was a senior member of the Jordanian delegation to the bilateral negotiations where he led the team to negotiate matters concerning water, energy and the environment, and participated in the negotiations over borders. He was concurrently the head of the Jordanian delegation to the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources, and a member of the Jordanian delegation to the Steering Committee of the Multilateral Conference, and a member of the Jordanian delegation to the Trilateral Economic Committee (the United States, Jordan and Israel) to which he presented the plan for the integrated development of the Jordan Rift Valley. Dr Haddadin later joined the Cabinet under Dr Majali when he formed his second Cabinet in March 1997. He followed up on the implementation of the water Annex to the Peace Treaty, and on the development plan of the Jordan Rift Valley.
The authors were intimately involved with peacemaking (1991–4) and peace-building (1994–8) between Jordan and Israel as part of a comprehensive Middle East peace. They had designed the bilateral peace process in order to make progress on the Jordanian negotiations and to be in tandem with progress achieved on the other bilateral tracks of negotiations between the other Arab parties and Israel, and especially the Palestinians. The efforts culminated in a Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty after the Palestinians and Israel had exchanged recognition in September 1993 and had arrived at an agreement to set up a Palestinian Authority in May 1994, commencing with Gaza and Jericho. Parallel progress was made on the Israeli–Syrian track of negotiations and there were signs that the two parties would soon reach an agreement in the summer of 1994. All these encouraging achievements were made while moderate governments and strong political leadership were in power in the countries concerned. The political will to make peace on the part of the leadership and peoples of these countries existed and it was influential in overcoming the stumbling blocks on the way to peace. King Hussein led Jordan in that process while Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin headed a coalition of moderate parties in Israel in the same process. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with Yassir Arafat as its Chairman, led the Palestinians in pursuit of a final status settlement with Israel. President Hafez Assad of Syria had the strength to lead Syria to a full peace with Israel based on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from their occupying position in the Syrian Golan heights. Except for Syria, the bilateral face-to-face contact by the leadership of the negotiating parties overcame the difficult issues encountered in the bilateral negotiations. The famous Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994 made jointly by Rabin and King Hussein and their subsequent meetings in the region gave impetus to the negotiations and accelerated agreements and resolution of several thorny issues concerning borders, security and water-related matters.
The personal involvement of the leaders proved necessary in the period that followed the 1994 Peace Treaty. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin was a tremendous blow to this approach of higher diplomacy. Political power in Israel soon shifted to a coalition led by Likud and religious parties, and strain quickly loomed over the Palestinian–Israeli contacts. King Hussein was influential in bringing the Palestinian and Israeli leadership to negotiate in 1996 over Hebron and again in 1998 during the Wye River negotiations. The sustained efforts also made by President Bill Clinton kept the Palestinians and the Israelis engaged. The death of King Hussein in January 1999 was another setback to the approach of higher diplomacy. President Clinton took it upon himself to stimulate the negotiations in the Middle East peace process. He attempted to narrow the differences between Syria and Israel and met with President Hafez Assad in Geneva in March 2000 but he did not succeed. Soon after, President Assad also passed away and his successor and son, Dr Bashar Assad, ascended to power with the negotiations with Israel stalled. Encouraged by the ascent to power in 1999 in Israel of a labour-led coalition headed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, President Clinton decided to attempt to steer the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians to a successful end before his presidential term expired. He brought the parties to another round of talks at Camp David in the summer of 2000 and again in the fall of that same year and an agreement on a final status between the Palestinians and Israel appeared to be very close. However, the issue of the right of return of Palestinian refugees proved the stumbling block and the negotiations collapsed.
In late August 2000, using a provocative visit to the Aqsa Mosque by the newly elected head of the Likud, General Ariel Sharon, the Palestinians responded the next day (after Friday prayers in the mosque) with riots and stone throwing. The Israeli reaction was more serious and blood was shed again. The event soon developed into a second Intifada that has raged since then. Elections were called in Israel and the combined effect of the failure of the Camp David talks and the new Intifada swayed the Israeli electorate to the right, and the Likud, headed by Ariel Sharon, triumphed at the elections. A violent confrontation was inevitable. The occupied Palestinian territories had never witnessed as much bloodshed as has occurred since the Intifada began. Israeli tanks violated the territories run by the Palestinian Authority and destroyed several refugee camps. The Israeli Defense Forces waged pre-emptive attacks against Palestinians suspected of ‘terrorist’ tendencies and targeted many Palestinian leaders for airborne assassination. The Palestinians responded with suicide bombers; victims fell on both sides, but the majority were Palestinians. The opposing extremists had their way, with no end yet in sight.
A crucial discouraging factor was the initial disengagement of the United States Administration that succeeded Clinton’s. They were discouraged by the failure at Camp David and decided to put the Palestinian–Israeli conflict on the back burner. This eased the job of the new Israeli government in its violent confrontation with the Palestinians. General Ariel Sharon declared Arafat, Chairman of the PLO and President of the Palestinian Authority, as a supporter of terrorism and had him confined to his headquarters at Ramallah. Sharon further declared that there was no Palestinian partner to negotiate with.
The murderous attack on the American World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 led to ramifications for the Palestinians. The United States launched a ‘War on Terrorism’, declared some Palestinian groupings as terrorist organizations, and froze their assets. Sharon’s actions against the Palestinians were marketed on his behalf as part of the ‘War on Terrorism’. Soon, the ‘Honest Broker’ of the Middle East peace process appeared to be taking sides, a move that pushed the Palestinians and the Arabs in a corner.
The situation worsened again in 2003 when the United States led a coalition to attack Iraq on the pretext of an imminent danger posed by the alleged acquisition by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s regime was forcibly changed amid worldwide protest. The coalition occupied Iraq and installed a provisional government to whom it attempted to restore sovereignty.
The situation at the time of writing is very different from the situation that prevailed after an earlier coalition led by the United States evicted Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991. Soon after that, the United States administration was capable of designing a peace process that was sponsored jointly by itself and the Soviet Union. The high expectations on the part of officials and the people in the region facilitated negotiations. The neutrality of the co-sponsors added to that facilitation. Some confidence building was necessary and that was not impossible. The parties met in Madrid on October 31, 1991 and the bilateral conference began. All concerned parties (except Syria and Lebanon) met in Moscow in late January 1992 along with other international parties and the multilateral conference was initiated. Progress gave hope of a better future shaped by peaceful relations and fruitful cooperation.
However the multilateral conference stalled soon after the Likud coalition took office in Israel in 1996, and the bilateral negotiations continued, only to terminate in 2000. A lot of damage has been done to Israeli–Palestinian relations and the image of the United States as a peace sponsor has been tarnished. The United States is no longer viewed as honest and neutral, but rather as taking the side of Israel, casting a negative vote in the United Nations Security Council whenever the Israeli operations were discussed. A lot of confidence rebuilding between the parties lies ahead before negotiations can be restarted with hope of any successful conclusion. Most recently, Israel, under the pretext of security, has been erecting a barrier of fences and walls that trespasses on occupied Palestinian territories. The barrier has been ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice, and a resolution against the barrier was passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Instead of cooling things down, developments have ignited hatred and re-established enmity. To add insult to injury, the internal Palestinian situation has been upset and a case close to chaos now prevails in the Gaza Strip. Remedial measures are needed to rectify the Palestinian internal front, and more work is needed to restore confidence in the sponsor and between the parties. A ‘Road Map’ leading to the final status between the Palestinians and the Israelis had been laid down. Sponsored by Russia, the European Union, the United Nations and the United States it currently forms the basis of the final settlement leading to two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and harmony. The translation of this vision into actuality is a formidable task that requires courageous leadership and brave popular support.
This book details the events that the authors experienced during the negotiations and lays out the arguments put forth by the parties. Issues covered by colleagues are extracted from reports they submitted on the work of their Working Groups of the Multilateral Conference, but their accounts are carried simply to put the bilateral negotiations into perspective.
Introduction
Tribute to a Royal Peacemaker
The Princedom of Transjordan, the predecessor of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was established in 1921 in the wake of the Mandate over Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Abdallah Ibn al-Hussein, the second son of Hussein Bin Ali who led the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, was named the Emir (prince) of the new Emirate. His elder brother Ali was the Emir of Hijaz under his father, and his younger brother, Faysal, who ascended the throne of Syria for a short while, was chosen to be King of Iraq after the French ousted him from Syria. Their father, Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, died in Cyprus where he was exiled because of a dispute with the British Government over its unfulfilled promise to unite the Arab East in one Arab Kingdom under him, and over the British intention to establish a national home for the Jews in Palestine.
It was as he was leading troops from Hijaz to claim the throne of Syria that Abdallah was invited by the British Minister of the Colonies to a meeting in Jerusalem where he was offered the Emirate of Transjordan and was thus dissuaded from continuing his mission to regain Syria. Confident that the Hashemite plan for the unity of the Arab East would eventually come to fruition, Abdallah accepted the offer and established the first system of centralised government in what today is modern Jordan on April 11, 1921. Throughout his reign as head of the Emirate of Transjordan and the Hashemite Kingdom, Abdallah never lost sight of his basic goal of unifying the Arabs into one kingdom. He sought the unity of Greater Syria (Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria), and at times considered working for the unity of the Fertile Crescent by adding Iraq to the ‘Syrian’ states.
Emir Abdallah worked to loosen the grip of the British Mandate over Transjordan by concluding an Anglo-Jordanian Treaty on May 15, 1923. The British formal recognition of the Emirate of Transjordan as a state under the leadership of Emir Abdallah effectively truncated Transjordan from Palestine thereby reducing the area earmarked for a national home for the Jews under the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. The Treaty stipulated that Transjordan would be prepared for independence under the general supervision of the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem.
In May 1925, immediately after Emir Ali was overthrown and Hijaz fell to the House of Saud after a Hashemite rule of 724 years (1201–1925), the Aqaba and Ma’an districts, then parts of Hijaz, became part of Transjordan. Between 1928 and 1946, a series of Anglo-Transjordanian treaties led to almost full independence for Transjordan. Emir Abdallah negotiated a new Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty on March 22, 1946, ending the Mandate and gaining full independence for Transjordan. In exchange for the provision of military facilities within Transjordan, Britain continued to pay a financial subsidy and supported the Arab Legion that it had helped set up and organize under the leadership of British officers, most notably General John Baggot Glubb. Two months later, on May 25, 1946, the Transjordanian parliament proclaimed Emir Abdallah king, while officially changing the name of the country from the Emirate of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Abdallah realized that true stability could only be achieved by establishing representative institutions. As early as April 1928, he promulgated a Basic Law (constitution) that provided for an elected Legislative Council to exercise advisory powers. The first Legislative Council followed elections in February 1929. It comprised 21 members, seven appointed by the Emir.
The early years of the new Emirate of Transjordanian were dominated by the issue of Palestine. Under the British Mandate, this became the destination of Jewish migration from Europe. As Jewish immigration grew, Palestinians became increasingly worried. In Transjordanian political parties emerged opposing the entry of Jewish immigrants, or the purchase by Jews of lands in Transjordan. A minority did not fear Jewish entrepreneurship inside Transjordan, but no such Jewish activities were ever allowed by the British Mandate or by the Transjordanian Government. That did not prevent contacts being made by the Jewish Agency, part of the Zionist Movement, with persons inside Transjordan in the hope that opposition to the Zionist schemes for Palestine would be diluted. However, the connection between Palestine and Transjordan was strong, so much so that political parties spanned the River Jordan to include Palestinians and Jordanians in their membership. As Jewish immigration to Palestine continued unabated, the Palestinians organized themselves and staged their first ‘Intifada’ in 1936.
The British Government sent its first high-level Royal Commission in November 1936, headed by Earl Peel, former Secretary of State for India, to study the situation and make recommendations. The mission proposed the partition of Palestine into an Arab Palestinian state and a Jewish state, set a limit on Jewish immigration and specified a special status for Jerusalem. The mission’s report angered both Palestinians and Zionists, who planned more immigration. The British Government sent a second mission, headed by Sir John Woodhead, whose report slightly amended the Peel Commission’s recommendations.
Zionist efforts to increase Jewish immigration into Palestine were enhanced by the rise of Nazism in Europe. Throughout the period of the Second World War and thereafter, the Jewish influx into Palestine increased manifold, and the proposed ceilings for Jewish immigration set by both the Peel and the Woodhead Commissions were not enforced. The cauldron of Palestine reached boiling point in the years immediately after the Second World War. With international sympathy firmly behind the Jews in the wake of the Holocaust, Zionist leaders in Palestine brought pressure on the Mandate Administration through terrorism and other means. Finally, extracting itself from the situation, Britain declared in February 1947 that its mandate over Palestine would end on May 14, 1948.
The newly founded United Nations Organization (UN), successor of the League of Nations that had issued the Mandate, had to deal with the matter. After rejecting various plans, the UN voted for the partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947. More than half the territory of Palestine, including the fertile and valuable coastal plain, was allocated to the Jews who owned only 6 per cent of the land. Jerusalem would come under UN trusteeship.
The Palestinians and the Arabs were shocked, and conflict was inevitable. Serious clashes took place between the underground Jewish paramilitary organizations and the Jordan Arab Legion, whose three battalions had entered Palestine to assist the British Mandate in maintaining domestic peace. Additionally, well-armed and trained Jewish extremist groups waged attacks on Palestinian villages and killed and terrorized their inhabitants with the objective of having them flee their country. The flight of Palestinians started in the spring of 1948 to escape the terror of these Jewish groups with the belief that they would return to their homes as soon as law and order were established. Jordan was a natural destination for the Palestinian refugees, and so were the parts of Palestine with exclusive Arab inhabitants.
The British terminated their mandate over Palestine on May 14, 1948, and the Jews immediately proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel. The new state was recognized and was admitted to membership of the United Nations. The United States White House, against the recommendation of the State Department, prepared the recognition announcement even before it knew what the name of the new state would be. Two days before the end of the Mandate, an Arab League meeting was held in Amman and concluded that Arab countries would send troops to Palestine to join forces with the Jordan Arab Legion there to defend the Palestinians against the Jewish atrocities. Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq sent regular troops to Palestine. The Arab League also started to mobilize volunteers under the leadership of Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Lebanese national, to help protect Palestine against the Jewish takeover. The better prepared, trained, equipped and disciplined Israeli forces outnumbered the Arab forces and eventually had the upper hand in military confrontations with Arab regulars and volunteers, and the Israelis were able to occupy more territories of Palestine than the UN partition resolution allotted to them. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled the horrors of war and took refuge in the predominantly Arab parts of Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank), the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.
The Jordan Arab Legion was able to rout Israeli forces from the old city of Jerusalem and keep possession of it and the surrounding Arab villages, including Latrun. The Arab Legion and Iraqi forces were able to defend the West Bank, and the Egyptian forces defended Gaza, while the Syrian forces were able to gain and keep a foothold in areas of Palestine north, east and south of Lake Tiberias. The war was interrupted by two UN-imposed truces and ended with the conclusion of four truce agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria respectively in February, March, April and July of 1949.
The Palestinians of the West Bank, who were saved from a Jewish takeover by the Arab Legion and Iraqi forces, decided in a conference held at Jericho to seek unification with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Arrangements were made for the elections of a new Parliament on April 11, 1950 in which Palestinians had an equal number of representatives to the Jordanians. Thirteen days later, the Parliament unanimously approved a motion to unite the two banks of the Jordan, constitutionally expanding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to include the West Bank. The move was consistent with the aspirations of Jordanians who saw it as a step toward greater Arab unity, and was responsive to the hopes of the Palestinians who feared Israeli expansion at their expense. It was also consistent with goals of the Hashemite king, Abdallah, whose efforts to unite Greater Syria never wavered.
King Abdallah’s reign came to an end on July 20, 1951 when he was assassinated as he was entering al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem to perform Friday noon prayer. The assassin also fired a shot at the young prince Hussein, and had the bullet not ricocheted off a medal on his chest, he might also have perished.
Following the death of King Abdallah, the Jordanian throne passed to Crown Prince Talal, the late king’s eldest son, who assumed the monarchy on September 6, 1951. For health reasons, King Talal had to abdicate less than a year later, on August 11, 1952, in favor of his eldest son, Prince Hussein. During his brief reign, King Talal enacted a modern constitution on January 1, 1952. The document made the government collectively, and the ministers individually, responsible to the parliament. The young King Hussein could not assume power until he became 18 lunar years of age, and a Regency Council performed his functions until he assumed constitutional powers on May 2, 1953. The smoothness of the transfer of power from Abdallah to Talal and from Talal to Hussein was remarkable, indicating the extent to which King Abdallah had succeeded in achieving constitutional order in Transjordan. The smoothness of transition was further confirmed as the world witnessed the assumption of constitutional powers by King Abdallah II Ibn al-Hussein on February 7, 1999 upon the death of his father, King Hussein.
King Hussein reigned during difficult times in the Middle East region. The 1950s witnessed multiple military coups in Syria, one in Egypt and another in Iraq. The most bloody was the Iraqi coup on July 14, 1958 when the Iraqi Royal Palace, Qasr al-Rihab, was stormed by rebellious troops and the young Hashemite King Faysal II, Hussein’s cousin, was murdered along with all his relatives. The most notable events were frequent military clashes with Israel, the Suez Campaign, a decade of Arab cold war between 1957 and 1967, and one of armed tension in Yemen.
The Palestinian tragedy clouded Arab skies and overshadowed most other issues. In the midst of the Arab cold war, President Nasser of Egypt called for an Arab Summit in Cairo in January 1964 to work out plans to counter Israeli designs to divert the waters of the River Jordan. Another summit was convened in Alexandria, Egypt, in September of the same year at which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created, and the late Ahmad Shuqeiry was installed at its head. The aim of the Arab leaders was to organize Palestinian efforts to recover their rights in their homeland, and to establish a Palestine Liberation Army that would join other Arab armies in the forthcoming battle over territory. A few months later, on January 1, 1965, a group of young Palestinian graduates, led by engineer Yassir Arafat, announced the formation of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (PNLM), better known by its acronym, FATH (Harakat al-Tahreer al-Filasteeni, read in reverse). Supported by leftist regimes of the Arab states, FATH conducted limited incursions into Israel from Syrian and Jordanian territories to carry out sabotage operations. (The Egyptian front was closed to such operations by virtue of the deployment of a UN Emergency Force after the Suez Campaign.) Such activities further worsened the fragile truce between Syria and Israel and between Jordan and Israel.
King Hussein’s preoccupation with ending Israeli occupation after the June 1967 war did not cause him to neglect the economic and social development of what remained under his jurisdiction of the Kingdom. His brother, al-Hassan Bin Talal, Crown Prince for 34 years, was entrusted with a major role in the process of rehabilitation of the economy and its further development. The country achieved impressive rates of economic growth and social development through carefully prepared five-year plans. Throughout the reign of King Hussein the per capita income of Jordan soared from a modest $180 equivalent in 1952 to almost ten times that figure in 1988. It dipped in 1989 due to financial hardships and the drying up of Arab grants, but resumed its ascent in the 1990s to approach $1,600 by the end of the century. Strides were made in the various fields of social development, including education, health care, the role of women, public utility coverage of the entire country, and impressive rates of higher education among males and females.
As far as Palestine was concerned, the most devastating blow came in June 1967 with the defeat of the Arab armies, including the Jordanian Armed Forces that were put under Egyptian command, at the hands of Israel and the occupation by Israel of Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights and whatever remained of Palestine (the West Bank including old Jerusalem, and Gaza). These events gave the PLO and FATH global prominence. Many other factions quickly emerged, some transformations of underground nationalistic parties. The number of organizations that existed after the war seeking the liberation of Palestine exceeded a dozen. They soon came under the umbrella of the PLO, and Yassir Arafat became its third leader in 1968, succeeding Ahmad Shuqeiry and Yahya Hammoudeh.
In Jordan King Hussein worked hard to rebuild the shattered Jordanian Armed Forces, and to secure the domestic situation that was threatened by the paramilitary presence of the various factions of the PLO. In a swift operation in September 1970, the Jordan Army succeeded in routing the PLO, and forced them to evacuate Amman in April of 1971. Regionally, the King maintained his drive to find a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict, rallying the Arabs to adopt a solution through the convening of an international peace conference. Five devastating wars between Israel and the Arab parties had taken place but had failed to achieve the results people were after: peace and stability. King Hussein participated in each Arab Summit during his reign in an attempt to cement Arab solidarity in the face of common dangers. In one Arab Summit convened in Rabat, Morocco, the Arab leaders decreed that the PLO was the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’. The King reluctantly went along with the Arab consensus that he had always respected.
Throughout the 1980s, King Hussein devoted his attention to Middle East peace. He attempted to coordinate closely with the PLO and reached agreement with Arafat on Palestinian-Jordanian representation in any peace conference, but that agreement was aborted in 1984. In July 1988, all administrative and legal ties between Jordan and the West Bank were severed to give the PLO a free rein to liberate the Palestinian territories from Israeli occupation.
American efforts to start a Middle East peace process resumed after the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in January 1991. American Secretary of State, James Baker, made history in bringing Arabs and Israelis to a peace conference. A peace process started in Madrid on October 30, 1991 and Jordan participated along with Syria and Lebanon. It enabled the Palestinians to participate under the state umbrella of Jordan. The bilateral negotiations between Jordan and Israel culminated in a Peace Treaty that was signed between the two countries on October 26, 1994, and witnessed by the President of the United States.
King Hussein was instrumental in overcoming serious stumbling blocks in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. He was behind the successful agreement to have the Israeli Army withdraw from Hebron in 1997, and he rushed from his hospital bed during his treatment for lymphoma to the aid of President Clinton when the Wye River negotiations almost collapsed in October 1998. ‘We have no right,’ said the King, ‘to jeopardize the life of our children and our children’s children. There has been enough destruction and enough hatred. It is time to make up for lost time.’ Death, however, snatched the King away on February 7, 1999, and the peace process lost a primary player and an important stabilizer. The other major player was Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, a hero in wars, and a hero in peace. Rabin lost his life on November 4, 1995 when an Israeli extremist shot him in a main Tel Aviv square after he participated in a celebration marking the first anniversary of the Peace Treaty with Jordan.
1 A Call to Peace
The President of the United States, George Bush, having organized a coalition of 33 countries against Iraq and forcing it out of Kuwait in 1991, decided to resume the quest for peace in the Middle East. His Secretary of State, James Baker III, shuttled between Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, and Israel to conduct talks with top officials. There were many thorny issues to address, resolve, and remove from the path to peace.
On the Arab side, the atmosphere was tense in the wake of the war on Iraq, and the ranks were split. Jordan, having declined to join the American-led coalition to liberate Kuwait, was viewed as a supporter of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The PLO Chairman, Yassir Arafat, and the leaders of Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria were also considered to have sided with Iraq, only because they insisted on an Arab solution to the invasion they, in fact, deplored. Jordan suffered economic losses and almost total isolation from the rest of the world. Its only seaport, Aqaba, was blockaded by the US Navy, and ships visiting that port were subject to inspection to eliminate any possible flow of goods to Iraq from Aqaba in violation of a series of Security Council resolutions passed to enforce economic trade and military sanctions against Iraq.
Secretary Baker’s efforts were a resumption of American peace efforts initiated during the Reagan administration and conducted in the region by his Secretary of State, George Schultz. A major obstacle was the representation of the Palestinians. The PLO, decreed by the Arab leaders as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, was not recognized by the United States, and contacts with it were prohibited. However, on November 15, 1988, the Palestine National Council (PNC) voted to recognize Israel’s legitimacy, to accept all relevant UN resolutions going back to the Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, and to adopt a two states solution for Palestine. The PLO subsequently denounced all forms of individual, group and state terrorism. This step prompted the United States to start a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis, led by the US Ambassador, Robert Pelletreau, but was not enough for the United States to override the Israeli veto against official or private contacts with the PLO. Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s prime minister, countered the Palestinian initiative on May 14, 1989 by presenting his Cabinet with a peace plan. He called for elections in the West Bank and Gaza to select a non-PLO leadership with whom Israel could negotiate an interim agreement for self-government based on the Camp David Accord.
On May 22, Secretary Baker spoke at an annual convention of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in Washington, DC. In his opening remarks, Baker highlighted the shared commitment to democratic values and the strong strategic partnership between America and Israel, and he welcomed the Shamir plan as ‘an important and positive start down the road toward constructing workable negotiations’. But when Secretary Baker came to the fate of the Occupied Territories, his pronouncements differed very importantly from Shamir’s proposal. The Secretary interpreted Resolution 242 as requiring the exchange of land for peace; he referred to ‘territorial withdrawal’ as the probable outcome of negotiations. In a pointed reference to Shamir’s and many Jews’ ideology, Baker said,
For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza – security and otherwise – can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242. Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow schools to reopen. Reach out to Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights.
Secretary Baker’s speech was not well received by his large Jewish-American audience, and it raised worries in Israel. It marked a shift toward a more active effort by the Bush administration to redesign the Shamir initiative into something that might be acceptable to the Palestinians. Such an approach found acceptance among Arabs and signaled to them Secretary Baker’s commitment to be fair, serious and bold in his search for a common ground on which a peace process could be based. To define such common ground and get a process started required cooperation among the concerned parties. Innovative ideas and exceptional diplomatic skills were also mandatory. Secretary Baker possessed the needed skills and innovations. The Arab parties directly involved in the process were Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon. The influential regional parties among the Arabs were Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
The relations between the leaders of those countries left a great deal to be desired, especially after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Assad of Syria was hardly on speaking terms with Hussein of Jordan; he had severed all contacts with Arafat of the PLO. Leaders of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were not on speaking terms with Hussein or Arafat. Arafat always harbored suspicions toward Hussein fearing that he wanted the West Bank taken back into his Kingdom, and so on. Secretary Baker therefore had to bridge Arab rifts as well as get the Arabs and Israelis talking. The PLO was central to the initiation of the process, yet was not eligible to participate because of Israeli objections and American reservations. No public Palestinian figure would venture to step out of the PLO line, or to indulge into political talks with any other party without the consent of the PLO. A leaflet issued by the leadership of the Palestinian Intifada, after the Shamir Plan was announced, rejected Shamir’s call for elections because they would occur under occupation, insisted there was no alternative to the PLO, and asserted that settlement of the Palestine–Israeli dispute could only be reached through an international conference with full powers.
The fiercest opposition to the Shamir Plan, not surprisingly, came from within Shamir’s Likud party ranks. General Ariel Sharon, along with David Levy and Yitzhak Moda’i, accused Shamir of leading Israel toward destruction. They proposed four conditions, by which they hoped to thwart the Plan, and received the endorsement of the Likud Central Committee. The four conditions were: a) the Intifada (on the rise since December 1987) should be crushed, b) the Arabs of East Jerusalem should be prohibited from participating in the Palestinian elections, c) there must be no divisions in the western part of the Land of Israel (meaning west of the Jordan River and implying that there was a ‘Land of Israel’ east of it), and, d) there should be no contact with the PLO. Shamir did not fight for his plan and allowed the opposition to destroy his initiative.
The disagreements inside Israel over peace with the Arabs brought the national unity government to a crisis when Shamir dismissed Shimon Peres, vice premier and a Labor leader, from the government because Peres had claimed that the government was not trying to advance the peace process. Peres’ colleagues in the governing coalition walked out of the Cabinet and his Labor Party put a motion of no confidence in the government to the Knesset. The government fell. It was the first Israeli government to fall because of a no-confidence vote.
Shamir assembled a new coalition with a small majority in the Knesset that was composed of religious and ultra-rightist parties. The basic guidelines of the new government were: a) no Palestinian state, b) no negotiations with the PLO, c) Jerusalem to remain united under Israel’s sovereignty, d) new settlements to be created and existing ones expanded, and, e) talks with the Arab states and non-PLO Palestinians to proceed on the basis of the Shamir Plan.
Secretary Baker shuttled between Cairo, Riyadh, Amman, Tel Aviv and Damascus seeking consensus to start the peace process. Difficulties faced him in each of these capitals. The Arab side, on the one hand, demanded that an international conference should be the mechanism through which the Arab–Israeli conflict should be resolved. This had been their position for a long time, frequently reiterated by King Hussein. The Israelis, on the other hand, insisted that the conflict should be resolved through bilateral negotiations conducted separately between Israel and each of its Arab rivals. Israel further opposed the participation of the PLO, a primary player in any peacemaking between the Arabs and Israel.
Secretary Baker achieved a breakthrough by combining the demands of both the Arabs and the Israelis. He proposed that the peace process would be composed of two conferences: a bilateral conference in which Israel would negotiate separately with each of its adversaries to resolve bilateral issues of dispute, political and otherwise; and a multilateral conference in which a number of countries would participate including the five permanent members of the Security Council. The multilateral conference would tackle issues that needed international involvement for resolution; and it would gain support for the bilateral negotiations, and reinforce peace and stability in the area.
Secretary Baker’s second breakthrough was to pull Israel into the process. The Shamir government made conditions for its involvement in peace that were hard to satisfy. The strategy was to evade and defy American pressures. The Secretary skillfully used diplomatic tools available to him. Israel was in need of funding for the settlement of Jewish immigrants pouring in from the collapsing Soviet Union. In addition to the annual US official aid package of $3 billion, Israel needed loan guarantees of $10 billion to fund a housing program for these immigrants. The United States had by then given Israel a total of $77 billion dollars in official aid, a per capita level unmatched in the history of foreign aid for any country. Secretary Baker made it clear to the Israelis they could keep the occupied Palestinian territories of which the rightist Israeli government was unwilling to let go, or keep the support of the United States. (The Bush administration probably did not feel it owed much to American Jewry, since President Bush got no more than 5 per cent of the Jewish vote in his bid for the presidency in 1988.)
Secretary Baker’s third achievement was to bring the Palestinians into the peace process. Without bringing in the PLO, he saw to it that Palestinian representatives would have the PLO blessing but that Israel retained a veto power over any such representative. In this he was assisted by King Hussein who agreed to enable the stateless Palestinians to participate in the peace conferences under the state umbrella of Jordan in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He also assured the representation of Jerusalem in the Jordanian delegation, thus compensating for its absence from the Palestinian delegation by virtue of the Israeli veto.
The admirable work of Secretary James Baker, supported by President George Bush, made possible the convening of the peace conference in Madrid, Spain, on October 30, 1991. The Secretary issued letters of invitation to the conference, provided assurances to each participating party, and stipulated that the process would be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of exchanging land for peace.
In preparation for the Madrid Conference, King Hussein called a Jordanian national meeting to which dignitaries, officials and Jordanians from all walks of life were invited. His Majesty announced in a speech that Jordan could not afford to stay behind while the future of the region was being shaped, and he provided convincing arguments, quoting from the Qur’an, for Jordan to join the peace process in Madrid with its other Arab brothers.
The King chose Dr Abdul Salam Majali,1 a seasoned statesman with long experience of service to Jordan, to head the Jordanian delegation to the bilateral negotiations. Returning from a mission to Paris for UNESCO, Majali received a briefing from King Hussein on the latest developments for the convening of a peace conference. On October 26, 1991, the King sent Majali an open letter of assignment, broadcast over the radio and television, in which the King extolled Majali’s leadership and loyalty, and wished him good luck on his assignment. Majali’s appointment was well received in the country. His dedication, loyalty, and public and private records have earned him the respect of all who have known him or heard of him. ‘Your appointment is another call to arms,’ noted one of his colleagues, ‘except this time it is a battle for peace. I am sure it will be harder for you than the wars that you have been through.’
Honored to be chosen by the King, for his part Majali held sober views and perceptions of the Arab–Israeli conflict. He noted that the Zionist Movement, since its formal creation in 1897, was able to ally itself with the most powerful countries and force commitments out of influential leaders. The Arabs had practically no allies. In preparation for the Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Ottoman Turks, for example, the Arabs had allied themselves with Britain which, it turned out, was deeply committed to the Zionist Movement! He realized that the balance of power in the world scene was heavily in favor of the Jews. ‘Throughout this century,’ Majali would point out,
the Zionist Movement has been involved in hot wars and cold wars with the Arabs. We lost Palestine to the Zionists after they gained the support of the advanced western countries and the socialist bloc. There developed throughout the twentieth century a dichotomy in the world’s perception of Palestine, a western perception and an Arab perception. In the countries of the West there has been deep sympathy with the Jews for many reasons; such as the religious linkages of Christianity with Judaism through the Old Testament, the sharing of western culture and value systems, the active presence of Jews in western societies, the stories of the horrors of the holocaust, the influence of Jewish interests in economic, financial, political, ideological, educational, scientific and other fields in the western world. Western perception of Palestine was gradually reinforced by a revival of the notion of the Promised Land for the Jews. Palestine also contains the Christian holy sites on which Christian Orthodoxy and Catholicism place high religious value. Western perceptions normally overlook Palestinian suffering and human aspirations to avoid moral and ethical questions over the support of western societies for the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Western perception, in addition, is not without the extensional effects of the Crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when the confrontation between the Arabs and Europe lasted for two centuries.
Palestinians as people do not enter the consciousness of Westerners; but when they do, they are almost always in the context of violence and are portrayed mostly as terrorists. There is no mention of their elite that have excelled in various branches of science, art and literature. Palestinians are way behind Israel in the contest for winning western public opinion.
People did not know what to expect. They remembered the United Nation’s frustrated efforts to have Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 implemented. They remembered the difficulties faced by the United States in its attempts to make peace in the Middle East in recent decades: The Roger’s Plan in 1969; President Jimmy Carter’s partial success at Camp David in 1978, making peace – but not a comprehensive one – between Egypt and Israel; President Ronald Reagan’s Plan of 1982; and the shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State George Schultz in the mid-1980s. Many recalled the reports of King Hussein’s continuous efforts to initiate a peace conference and several of Majali’s friends and colleagues wondered how it could be possible, after all this, to start a process now aimed at a comprehensive peace in the region.
Majali would reason thus:The Cold War is over, thanks to Gorbachev’s perestroika. The Gulf War is over. Iraq is all but destroyed and something has to be done to usher the region into a new era. Oil is critical to modern civilization and will continue to be important in the competition among the world’s economic powers. In the previous era, before the end of the Cold War, the West depended on Israel to guard its interests in the oil fields. The Gulf War that the United States led against Iraq brought the western powers into the region, and they no longer have to depend on Israel to protect the oil fields. They can do it by themselves. No fire should be ignited next to that precious flammable wealth – oil – and the West must diffuse the potential for igniting such fire. The protracted conflict between the Arabs and Israel therefore has to be resolved. That conflict has been the major source of tension in the region, and it should be brought to an end.
‘A new element recently emerged,’ Majali stated.It is Secretary of State Mr James Baker. His talents, diplomatic skills, intelligence and wit, his immense courage, fairness and persistence made a difference today. He has meticulously designed the process so that all parties who have a stake in the outcome will play a role of some kind. Many states, in addition to the permanent members of the Security Council, have interests in Middle East peace. Europe, Canada and Japan, and countries in Asia, Africa and South America have been affected in different ways by tensions in the Middle East. Their interests in peace should be accommodated.
Secretary Baker succeeded in formulating the peace process to accommodate demands by the Israelis and the Arabs; he also brought in the EU, Canada, Japan and the Soviets as partners.
The following days were very busy for Majali and for the leadership of the country. The Jordanian delegation to Madrid had to be selected, important homework had to be done, and done correctly in the short time left before October 30, 1991. Contacts with the sponsors of the peace process were continuous for clarification and coordination. Logistical support had to be put in place. The Royal Court became like a beehive and the Government of Taher al-Masri2 worked at peak efficiency.
Crown Prince al-Hassan managed the preparations. He called on experts for consultation and counsel from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and others. He met frequently in marathon sessions with the Jordanian delegates. He examined the draft position papers, asked critical questions and provided enlightening comments. Drawing on directions from Crown Prince al-Hassan, and on the provisions of the Letter of Invitation and Letter of Commitment that Jordan had received from the sponsors of the peace process, Majali conducted successive meetings with the Jordanian delegation at the Government’s VIP Guest House in Jebal Amman. He reviewed the situation, appraised the stands each of the negotiators expressed, issued instructions, organized logistics, and set out rules of conduct.
The King ordered a special flight of a Royal Jordanian Airline Tri-Star to carry the Jordanians and Palestinians to Madrid. His Majesty presided over the official ceremony to bid farewell and wish good luck to the joint delegation at the Amman Airport. The Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, and Cabinet Ministers were present. In Madrid, the organization of the conference by the Spaniards was superb. Security was very tight. The opening session was historic.
The President of the United States, George Bush, the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, attended. The delegates took their seats in accordance with a pre-arranged understanding. The joint JordanianPalestinian delegation sat across from the Israeli delegation, and we Jordanians stared at our ‘enemies’, some with inhibition. Yizhak Shamir, Israel’s Prime Minister, headed the Israeli delegation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamel Abu Jaber, headed the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Syrian and Lebanese delegations were headed by their respective foreign ministers, Farouq al-Share’ of Syria and Faris Boise of Lebanon. There were also regional delegates. Abdallah Bisharah represented the Gulf Cooperation Council and Foreign Minister Amr Musa represented Egypt. The European Union was also represented.
