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About the Book
The problem of explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness has risen in the Western philosophy mainly because the consciousness itself and its manifestations or reflections are treated separately. Whereas, according to the Vedānta school of India, the phenomenal consciousness is merely manifestations of self-consciousness which is embodied in the human beings. In this approach, the phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness are one and the same thing because the former depends upon the latter. Hence, there is no explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness. Similar is the case with the mind–body problem which exists in the Western philosophy mainly because the mind is treated as synonymous with  consciousness.
This book solves the above problems on the basis of the Indian philosophy and existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. In both the philosophies, there is no explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness and the mind–body problem.
About the Author
V.N. Misra, PhD, retired from Indian Economic Service (IES), has worked as Economic Advisor in different ministries of Government of India. He had several consultancy assignments with the ADB, FAO, World Bank and IFPRI. Dr Misra has also to his credit more than forty research papers published in reputed journals in the field of agricultural policy and development, labour, employment, rural poverty, etc. He has also co-authored (with V.S. Vyas and D.S. Tyagi) a book, Significance of New Technology for Small Farmers. Dr Misra’s study on Terms of Trade is a published work. He has now shifted his interest from economics to philosophy and has recently published two books: Science of Consciousness: A Synthesis of Vedānta and Buddhism and Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa: A Unifying Vision.

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Phenomenal Consciousness

and Mind–Body Problem

Phenomenal Consciousness

and Mind–Body Problem

in East–West Perspective

V.N. Misra

Cataloging in Publication Data — DK

[Courtesy: D.K. Agencies (P) Ltd. <[email protected]>]

Misra, V.N., author.

Phenomenal consciousness and mind–body problem in

East-West perspective / VN Misra.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Consciousness. 2. Mind and body. 3. Phenomenology.

4. Philosophy of mind. 5. Hindu philosophy. I. Title.

LCC B808.9.M57 2018 | DDC 128.2 23

ISBN: 978-81-246-1007-7

First published in India in 2019

© V.N. Misra

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, except brief quotations, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior written permission of the copyright holder, indicated above, and the publishers.

Printed and published by:

D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd.

Regd. Office: Vedaśrī, F-395, Sudarshan Park

(Metro Station: Ramesh Nagar), New Delhi - 110015

Phones: (011) 2545 3975, 2546 6019

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Website: www.dkprintworld.com

Preface

This study attempts to provide the solution to two problems of the Western philosophy: (i) the explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness; and (ii) the mind–body problem. The intentionality of consciousness and the mental causation having some bearings on the above problems are also discussed in the East–West perspective. The intentional consciousness is more or less similar to the phenomenal consiousness, whereas the mental causation would provide better understanding of the mind–body problem.

The gap in explaining the pheonomenal consciousness arises in the Western philosophy mainly because the distinction between the functions of consciousness and consciousness itself does not seem to have been perceived in proper perspective. In this context, it may be stated that consciousness which is embodied in human being is one. When it manifests or reflects, it becomes many. This fact has been realized in the Indian philosophy more than 2,000 years ago. More recently, an existentialist philospher Jean-Paul Sartre has evolved the concept of pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. These two are one consciousness because reflective consciousness depends upon pre-reflective consciousness.

If one realizes the pathway of reflection of consciousness, it would be easy to explain the phenomenal consciousness. In the Western philosophy the access consciousness is also discussed along with the phenomenal consciousness. According to Sartre, access consciousness is real because it is accessible to every human being. Therefore, it may be said that the phenomenal consciousness is the reflection of the access consciousness. In the approach, there is no explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness.

However, an attempt has also been made to explain the phenomenal consciousness through the higher-order thought. This approach does not seem to be appropriate because the higher-order thought happens to be the object of consciousness. In this context, it may be stated that according to Sartre, consciousness can be the only source of consciousness. If this view is accepted, it may be reassuringly to be told that the access consciousness happens to be the source of phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, there is no explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness. In the Indian philosophy also, there is no gap in experiencing phenomenal consciousness because it is treated as a menifestation or reflection of self-consciousness.

The mind–body problem arises in the Western philosophy mainly because the mind is treated as synonymous to consciousness. But it ought be recognized that the Western philosopher John R. Searle has solved the mind–body problem by differentiating the consciousness from mind. In that he has recognized the consciousness happens to be the first-person ontology, whereas the mind is the third-person ontology because it is identical to brain.

What is equally important is that even the quantum theory has solved the mind–body problem by admitting the connection between the mind and the body. It is stated that in the implicate order, mind enfolds matter in general and the body in particular. Similarly, the body enfolds not only mind but also in some sense the entire material universe. This in a way solved the mind–body problem.

On the basis of above observations, an inference may be drawn that those Western philosophers who are raising the mind–body problem, are not interested in solving the problem. Their main purpose seems to be that let this problem be a live one. However, an attempt has been made in this study to provide the solution to the mind–body problem based on not only the philosophical views of East and West but it has also included the solution based on the scientific reasoning.

I am, indeed grateful to Shri M.L. Pandit who always encouraged me to write books having bearing on philosophical problems. I am indebted to Dr S.M. Pathak, Dr S.K. Mishra, Shri S.K. Sharma, Shri P.R. Sharma and Shri A.B. Choudhury for their appreciation of my earlier books on philosophy.

I express my gratitude to the authors from whose works I have quoted passages across the chapters of this book.

I also express my gratitude to Shri Susheel K. Mittal, Director, D.K. Printworld, for two things: (i) sincere efforts in producing error-free and good quality books to the extent possible, and

(ii) respectful attitude to the author.

V.N. Misra

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Explanatory Gap in Phenomenal Consciousness

Manifestation of Consciousness

Advaita Vedānta

Yogācāra Vijñānavāda Buddhism (Transformations of Consciousness: Ātman and Dharma)

Mind–Body Problem

Descartes’s Formula

Sartre’s Interpretation of Descartes’s Formula

Vedāntic Interpretation of Descartes’s Formula

Some Scientific Facts as Solution of the Mind–Body Problem

The Identity Theory

Nested Hierarchy of Brain

David Bohm’s Concept of Matter

Matter: Wholeness and Implicate Order

What Is Order

Interconnection between Consciousness and Matter

1. Explanatory Gap inPhenomenal ConsciousnessSolution in East–West Perspective

Introduction

Higher-Order Thought as Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness

Critical Assessment

Kant’s Philosophy

SOUL–BODY DUALISM

The Concept of “I Think”

Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness

Vedāntic Interpretation of Transcendental

Unity of Self-Consciousness

Noumenon

Vedāntic Interpretation of Noumena

Sartre’s Interpretation of Noumena

Pratyabhijñā (Recognition) School of Kashmir Śaivism

Two Aspects of Consciousness: Light and Awareness

Light of Consciousness (Prakāśa)

Self-Awareness and Consciousness

2. Mind and Consciousness in East–West Perspective

Introduction

Western Philosophy

Views of Sir William Hamilton Bart Lectures on Metaphysics

Mind

Consciousness

Consciousness as Actual Knowledge

Consciousness as Immediate Knowledge

Consciousness as Contrast: A Discrimination

Consciousness as Judgement

Consciousness as Memory

Consciousness and Attention

Explanatory Gap in Phenomenal Consciousness and Mind–Body Problem

Indian Philosophy: Mind and Consciousness in Upaniṣads

Mind

Consciousness

Mind and Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta

Mind

Mind and Consciousness

Defining Four Aspects of Internal Organ, Manas

Buddhi

Citta

Ego

Mind and Consciousness in Buddhism

Concluding Remarks

3. Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta

Introduction

Self-consciousness and Knowledge

Consciousness as Foundational Knowledge

Criticism of Pure Consciousness

as a Fictitious Entity

Consciousness as Witness

Unity of Cit-Ātman (Pure Consciousness)

Nature of Reality

Existence and Consciousness

Criticism

Reconciliation

Causal Body of Human Being and Causal Consciousness

Causal Body

Causal Consciousness

Concluding Remarks

4. Consciousness in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Philosophy of Existentialism

Introduction

Characteristics of Consciousness

Spontaneity

Absoluteness

Self-Consciousness

Transphenomenal Being

Classification of Being

Being In-Itself

Being For-Itself

The For-Itself and the In-Itself: Their Relationships

Kant’s Interpretation of Thing in-Itself

Nothingness

Origin of Nothingness

Nothingness and Freedom

The Cogito

Pre-reflective Consciousness (Non-thetic Consciousnessand Reflective Consciousness (Thetic Consciousness)

Pre-Reflective Consciousness

Reflective Consciousness

Unity Between Pre-Reflective Consciousness and Reflective Consciousness

Possibility of Pure Reflection

Consciousness and Time

Temporality of Consciousness

The Past

The Present

The Future

The Ekstatic Unity of Consciousness

Concluding Remarks

5. Intentionality in East–West Perspective

Introduction

Intentionality of Consciousness in Western Philosophy

Intentionality of Consciousness in Phenomenology

And Existentialism of Husserl

Intentionality of Consciousness

In The Philosophy of Sartre

Cause and Motive

Undetermined Choice

Freedom

Intentionality of Waking Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta of Indian Philosophy

External Perception

Mental Mode

Cognitive Process

Perceptual Illusion

6. Solution to Mind–Body Problem in East–West Perspective

Introduction

Western Philosophy

Searle’s Solution to Mind–Body Problem

Body in Existentialism of Sartre

The Body as Being For-Itself

The Body for Others

The Third Ontological Dimension of the Body

Indian Philosophy

Dualistic Philosophy of Sāṁkhya–Yoga: Puruṣa and Prakr̥ti

Prakr̥ti

Puruṣa

Interaction between Prakr̥ti and Puruṣa

Mind (Manas)

Body

Theory of Five Kośas of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad

Annamaya-kośa (Matter and Life)

Prāṇamaya-kośa (Vital Sheath)

Manomaya-kośa (Mind Sheath)

Vijñānamaya-kośa (Intellect Sheath)

Ānandmaya-kośa (Bliss Sheath)

Five Kośas as Solution of Body–Mind Problem

7. Mental Causation and Inner Sense in East–West Perspective

Introduction

Internal Perception or Self-Consciousness and Reflection as Explained by Sir William Hamilton Bart

Memory

Inner Sense

Self-Consciousness and Mental Perception

Ālaya-Vijñāna and Karmic Seed in Yogācāra Vijñānavāda Buddhism

Ālaya-Vijñāna: Factors Responsible For Its Origin

Kārmic Seed

Main Function Of Vijñāna, Flow And Internal Causation

Main Function

Flow Of Ālaya-Vijñāna

Internal Causation

Four Pratyayas

Five Mental Factors Associated With Ālaya-Vijñāna

Sparśa (Mental Contact)

Vedanā (Sensation)

Saṁjñā (Conception)

Manaskāra (Attention)

Cetanā (Volition)

Sensation of Ālaya-Vijñāna

Manas: Nature and its Activity

Pravr̥tti-Vijñāna

Ālaya-Vijñāna and Momentariness

Reconciliation

Epilogue

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

Two main problems: (i) explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness, and (ii) the mind–body problem have been discussed quite intensively during the last few decades in the Western philosophy.

An attempt has recently been made to explain the phenomenal consciousness through of higher-order thought. It may, however, be pointed out that the phenomenal consciousness or reflective consciousness and higher-order thought are the objects of consciousness itself, which are embodied in human being. This consciousness is generally known as self-consciousness because it manifests through mind, according to the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. If the phenomenal consciousness is not treated as manifestation or reflection of self-consciousness, it is rather difficult to explain it.

The mind–body problem has risen in the Western philosophy mainly because consciousness and mind are treated as synonymous. However, J.R. Searle has solved the mind–body problem mainly because consciousness has been treated as first-person ontology. He has categorically stated that we cannot reduce consciousness to its neurobiological basis, because such a third-person reduction would leave out the first-person ontology of consciousness.1

This study attempts to provide the solution to both the problems: explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness and the mind–body problem. This is mainly because both the problems are interconnected in the sense that self-consciousness which is responsible for the pathway of reflection of the phenomenal consciousness can also be the source under which the mind–body problem may be resolved. The study also discusses the intentionality and mental causation in East–West perspective. The former deals with the objective or external world, whereas the latter is mainly concerned with the subjective or inner sense. The intentionality and mental causation are expected to provide better understanding of the phenomenal consciousness and the mind–body problem.

I. Explanatory Gap in Phenomenal Consciousness

The source of phenomenal consciousness may be found in the consciousness itself. This may be explained through the pathway of reflection. It means that the self-consciousness exists in me, when it manifests, it becomes the phenomenal consciousness or reflective consciousness to be involved in the phenomenal world. If this basic fact is not accepted, it will be all the more difficult to explain the phenomenal consciousness. The pathway of reflection is explained as:

A question about being is one that we pursue the pathway of reflection. The philosophy of being discovers its subject matter by bending back its attention to the awareness of being that we already possess, that is given us all with our life and breath. All human beings have an awareness of being — they are aware that they exist and that other people and other things exist. Attention to that awareness will guide the philosophy of being. A philosophy that pays heed to human awareness will discover, through reflection, the awareness of being that we have always had.2

It may be stated that consciousness and awareness are synonymous.3

Now let us see how the reflective consciousness has been explained by the pre-reflective consciousness in the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Since by nature all consciousness is self-consciousness; the pre-reflective consciousness or non-thetic consciousness is also self-consciousness. As regards the reflective consciousness, it is also known as thetic consciousness or positional consciousness. However, the main difference between the pre-reflective and reflective consciousness is that in the former (i.e. pre-reflective consciousness) there is no ego, whereas the latter (i.e. reflective consciousness) contains ego. But the reflective consciousness cannot be separated from the pre-reflective consciousness. This is evident from the fact that the reflective consciousness of an object is at the same time the pre-reflective consciousness itself. The reflection has no primacy over the consciousness reflected on. It is the pre-reflective consciousness which becomes the basis of reflective consciousness.

It may, however, be stated that the pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness are two different phases of the one and the same consciousness. These two successive phases — the first pre-reflective is the subjectivity, which transforms itself into the second phase of reflective consciousness, which reveals the objects involved in the phenomenal world.

If the above observations regarding the pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness are taken into account, the phenomenal consciousness may be easily explained. But the fact of matter is that those who are found explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness, they are not interested in looking at other’s observations in which there is no problem of explanatory gap in the phenomenal consciousness. Those who love their own experience, it is difficult for them to solve the problem of explanatory gap. It is rather a well-known fact that if there is any problem, its reconciliation may be possible only by looking at other’s observations under which there is no explanatory gap in explaining the phenomenal consciousness. This is the most important not only for explanatory gap, but it is also important for knowing the truth; for “the best way to consider truth is through the interplay of viewpoints: the interest of truth requires a diversity of opinions”.4

It may be reassuringly to be told again that the consciousness cannot be divided, which is evident from the following observation:

The consciousness, although it is a complex entity, is only one. When we speak of its “parts” or “divisions”, the only thing that we want to indicate is that it has diverse activities, diverse forms of manifestations, in the empirical reality — empirical reality that is created by the same consciousness when it manifests itself. It is not a real concrete division; it is only a theoretical division, a product of the conceptual analysis.5

Now let us see how the manifestations of consciousness are taking place in the Indian philosophy of Advaita Vedānta and Yogācāra Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

II. Manifestation of Consciousness

Advaita Vedānta

When pure consciousness reflects in antaḥkaraṇa (the mind or internal organ), it is known as cidābhāsa, which gives rise to the ego (ahaṁ). This consciousness associated with the eternal organ is capable of reflection which takes place during our waking and dream experiences. “In our waking experience there is “I” which functions as knower (jñātā), as doer (kartā), and as experiencer (bhoktā): it functions, that is to say, as the subject of knowledge, as the agent of action and as the experiencer of the consequences of action”.6 This shows that the consciousness becomes intentional when it is associated with the mind.

However, the intentional consciousness is mostly associated with “I” which limits the functioning of consciousness because it is tied up with objects, internal or external involved in the empirical world. In fact, it is stated:

By cutting the knot of the ego, consciousness ceases to be personal, it is spread out infinitely, and becomes identical with the world which is a content of the transcendental consciousness — arising from it and again withdrawing into it. So long as consciousness is ego-centric, all thoughts, feelings and actions are directed towards furthering the interests of the ego. But when consciousness is universe-centric, thoughts and actions no longer serve the interests of a single individual, they become disinterested. As there can be no sense of want there is no longer any feeling of pleasure or pain: there is only a sense of fullness, unvarying and undying.7

All manifestations are based on duality: the knower and the known, the observer and the observed. This is created by the mind with a view to gain the experience from the empirical world. The mind is mainly capable of discursive knowledge which understands everything through differentiations and distinctions. Therefore, without creating duality in the sphere of knowledge, the mind cannot gain experience. The manifestations of consciousness take place mainly in the empirical world, which has only relative existence.

In the reflective consciousness, the mind is involved as an instrument. Therefore, consciousness in reflection becomes pramātr̥ (knower).8 It may be noted that Vedānta has also recognized the concept of sākṣī-caitanya (witness consciousness), which in itself does not decide about the right or wrong, its main function is to reflect its own light. In this context, the deciding factor happens to be pramātr̥-caitanya (knower).9 However, in the reflection pramātr̥-caitanya is not separate from the witness consciousness: the former depends upon the latter. Whatever is known to sākṣī-caitanya, it also becomes known to pramātr̥-caitanya. The witness consciousness reflects the modifications of mind, which are unknown to pramātr̥-caitanya, but it is known to witness consciousness.10 Therefore, an inference may be drawn that the reflective consciousness knows the objects mainly through the light which it receives from the witnessing consciousness (sākṣī-caitanya).

Self-consciousness has, however, been interpreted as jīvātman in the Vedāntic framework. It is stated that pure consciousness (i.e. Brahman) is manifesting in every human being as self-consciousness that is direct and intuitive. It is explained as:

This is immutable consciousness (kūṭastha) ever present as the witness-self (sākṣī). It illuminates the mental states: pleasure, pain, hope, fear, knowledge, ignorance, love, hate, memory, loss of memory and so forth. The mental states are immediately cognized because of their presence to witness self. It is the immediacy of self awareness that makes an object immediately known. To be directly cognized, an object must be allied with luminous self. Knowledge is direct, i.e. perceptual, when the object is known directly. The immutable consciousness that the witness self is being reflected in the mind and apparently limited by it, appears as the ego, the empirical self, which functions as the percipient (pramātā).11

The above description of self-consciousness as jīvātman is fairly comparable to self-awareness (self-consciousness) treated as mental perception by Diṅnāga. In this case comprehension aspect of self-consciousness happens to be knowing subject, representing thereby as self in perception. This may be reassured by any other observation that “Self-consciousness is essentially a case of knowledge, it makes presence to us our own Self. It is not a construction, it is not an illusion and therefore it is direct knowledge.”12 It has also been assured that without the doctrine of self-consciousness self-cognition) recollection is not possible.

Yogācāra Vijñānavāda Buddhism (Transformations of Consciousness: Ātman and Dharma)

The Absolute Reality happens to be pure consciousness and how it gets transformed into the duality in appearance of subjective and objective sides of experience, is explained below on the basis of the first verse of thirty stanzas (Triṁśikā):

आत्मधर्मोपचारो हि विविधे यः प्रवर्तते।

स विज्ञानपरिणामेसौ परिणामः स च न्निधा।।1।।

ātmadharmopacāro hi vividhe yaḥ pravartate A

sa vijñanpariṇāmesau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā AA

Whatever, indeed, is the variety of ideas of self and elements that prevails, it occurs in the transformation of consciousness. Such transformation is threefold.13

Self (ātman) and element (dharma) are treated as subjective and objective sides, respectively of experience.14 In another interpretation, ātman is referred to as controlling power and dharma is used as a norm or support. The former may appear as sentient beings (sattva) or as living things (jīva), whereas the latter may appear as substance (dravya), qualities (guṇas), actions (karmas) and aggregates (skandhas).15 The word pravartate (arising) signifies the appearances of self (ātman) and dharmas, which are produced by causes and conditions.16

Pariṇāma (transformation) indicates that:

The substance (saṁvitti bhāga) of consciousness develops itself into two divisions (bhāgas), when it is produced, i.e. the perceived division (nimitta-bhāga) and the perceiving faculty (darśana-bhāga). These divisions arise out of another decision called self-witness, i.e. svasaṁvitti-bhāga which is their essential substance. On the basis of these two functional divisions, ātman and dharma are established.17

III. Mind–Body Problem

Descartes’s Formula: “I Think Therefore I Am”

The mind–body problem has been started by Descartes 300 years ago in the Western philosophy. This problem has been realized by him in the sixth meditation in which it is observed:

When the mind understands, it in some way turns towards itself and inspects one of the ideas which is within it; but when it imagines, it turns towards the body and looks at something in the body which conforms to an idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses. I can, as I say, easily understand that this is how imagination comes about, if the body exists; and since there is no other equally suitable way of explaining imagination that comes to mind. I can make a probable conjecture that body exists. But this is only a probability; and despite a careful and comprehensive investigation I do not yet see how the distant idea of a corporal nature which I find in my imagination can provide any basis for a necessary inference that somebody exists.18

The above observation shows that the imagination provides the basis for necessary inference that body exists. However, the mind is thinking an unextended substance, whereas the body happens to be unthinkable an extended one.19The interaction between the mind and the body has been established by Descartes through soul, which “is joined to the whole body, and that we cannot properly say that it exists in any one part of the body to the exclusion on the others”.20It is further stated that there is a little gland referred to as the pineal gland in the centre of the brain where the soul exercises its functions more particularly than in the other parts of the body. This is explained below:

On carefully examining the matter I think I have clearly established that the part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not the heart at all, or the whole of the brain. It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of the brain’s substance and suspended above the passage through which the spirits in the brain’s anterior cavities communicate with those in its posterior cavities. The slightest movements on the part of this gland may alter very greatly the course of these spirits, and conversely any change, however slight, taking place in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of the gland.21

The above observations indicate that the interaction has been established between the spirit and the body rather than the mind and the body. Does it mean that Descartes has used the spirit as synonymous to the mind? There is no clarity on this aspect. However, Descartes’ idea about mind as thinking substance has been quite influential, yet it cannot be reduced to brain.22 That apart, the fact remains that Descartes’ ideas about the mind–body problem has been criticized by many. This has been summed up very well in the following critical assessment:

Many objections have been raised to the idea that a non-physical mind controls the movement of physical body. It is not clear just how a non-physical substance and a physical substance can interact. The idea that the pineal gland mediates this interaction has long since been rejected on physiological grounds, and it is unclear whether any better causal nexus could exist. Further, it is often held that this interaction cannot be reconciled with physics, which postulates a closed network of physical interactions, with no room for a non-physical mind to play any role.23

Sartre’s Interpretation of Descartes’s Formula:

“I Think Therefore I Am”

The above formula has been criticized by Sartre on the following grounds:

i. The consciousness which says “I am” is not actually the consciousness which thinks. Instead we are dealing with a secondary activity.24

ii. Descartes has confused spontaneous doubt, which is a consciousness, with methodological doubt, which is an act. When we catch a glimpse of an object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain. But Descartes’ cogito has posited this consciousness itself as an object: the Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has reflected upon it.25

On the basis of above observations, Sartre has concluded as follows:

This cogito is not Descartes doubting: it is Descartes reflecting upon the doubting. “I doubt therefore I am”, is really, “I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am”. The Cartesian cogito is reflective, and its object is not itself but the original consciousness of doubting. The consciousness which doubted is now reflected on by the cogito but was never itself reflective: its only object is the object which it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish the pre-refelctive cogito as the primary consciousness.26

For details, see Chapter 4 which deals with consciousness in Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy of Existentialism.

Vedāntic Interpretation of Descartes’s Formula:

“I Think Therefore I Am”

According to Vedānta school of Indian philosophy, consciousness is embodied in human being. It becomes self-consciousness because it manifests through the mind. That is why a person is spontaneously conscious of his own existence as “I am”. Therefore Descartes’ formula has been interpreted by the Vedānta as “I am therefore I think”.27

SOME SCIENTIFIC FACTS AS SOLUTION OF

THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM

The mind–body problem is known as, how some physical particles in brain can cause the mental experiences.28 This has been rephrased in science as, “is the mental just the physical”. In this context, it is observed:

The explanatory adequacy of physics leads directly to the conclusion that the mental states are physical states (as Lewis points out). Take pain. Pain has physical effects: it can cause you to take aspirin, or hold your hand to your head, for example. According to the explanatory adequacy of physics, physical effects have physical explanations; more precisely; all physical phenomena are in principle ultimately explainable in terms of “fundamental particles or fields governed by a few simple laws, more or less as conceived of in present-day theoretical physics” (Lewis, 1971, p. 169). It follows trivially that the physical effects of pain are so explainable. Of course, pain is what explains these effects; consequently; pain itself is ultimately completely described and explained in terms of fundamental physics.29

The above explanatory adequacy of physics has been denied by Thomas Nagel. This is explained below:

We have increasing knowledge of a fascinating character about the physical conditions of particular types of conscious states, but these correlations, even if substantially multiplied, do not amount to a general explanatory theory. In order to achieve a real understanding of these matters, we would have to make progress of a fundamental kind with the mind–body problem; progress which constituted a conceptual advance, rather than merely more empirically ascertainable information, however interesting. A theory which succeeded in explaining the relation between behavior, consciousness, and the brain would have to be of a fundamentally different kind from theories about other things. It cannot be generated the application of already existing methods of explanation.30

It may, however, be noted that the scientific concept of the mental state as physical one is also known as the materialism. The materialistic philosophy has been started from the ancient Greece. The elementary particles were seen as ultimate indestructible units of matter in the Democritean sense. According to him, “the material atoms alone can account for the whole universe”.31

Materialism may be justified on the basis of following observations:

i. Modern science admits that “its subject of study is primarily our observation of nature, and not nature itself. The new picture must then inevitably involve mind as well as matter — the mind which perceives and the matter which is perceived”.32 This shows that perceiving and perceived are one and the same thing because both are the act of human being. In this approach there is no duality between the mind and the matter and hence there is no scope of the mind–body dualism.

ii. It is observed that “the materialists do not recognize anything like the mind–body dualism. They hold that the mind is simply the brain. And hence all processes are physical and none is mental. Thus the materialists try to solve the mind–body problem by doing away with mind and recognizing matter only”.33

iii. When the energy of the fundamental matter (prakr̥ti) gradually increases, it acquires the form of caitanya (consciousness).34

The Identity Theory

In the identity theory, the mind is treated as identical to brain. According to a few neuroscientists, “the mind arises from the integrated activity of large population of neurons distributed along multiple brain regions. It is also proposed that each neuron in the neuron system is independently conscious”.35 This identity theory does not seem to be appropriate mainly because of the following reasons.

i. The mind is subjective and personal, and for this reason the mind and the self cannot be reduced to the brain.36 The similar observation in different words has been made by Searle as mentioned earlier.

ii. There is no one place in the brain at which the images physically come together. Rather, the two images create a mental condition where their meanings are conjointly represented in awareness to produce a higher level of meaning.37

Nested Hierarchy of Brain

The brain functions in a nested hierarchy. So is the case with all biological systems. Therefore, “the proper model for the integration of the mind and brain is that of a nested hierarchy”.38 Now the question is that “how is the mental representation of a face unified in awareness if so many areas of the brain are involved in its manifestation? The convergence of neural pathways makes possible cell so specific that it will only fire to face. This process might lead to think that a single “grandmother” cell, at the top of perceptual hierarchy, embodies the representation of an entire face in consciousness.”39 In this nested hierarchy, “higher brain regions purposely control lower regions is one of the cornerstones of modern neurological thought”.40 This is explained below:

The nervous system evolved from a simple reflexes that could be found at the lowest hierarchical levels of the nervous system to voluntary forms of action that are produced by the highest cortical levels of the brain. Jackson’s hierarchical nervous system views higher cortical regions as controlling and suppressing lower levels. What appears at the top of a Jacksonian action is not a pontifical cell. Jackson had no image of a “ghost in the machine” controlling lower levels of the nervous system. For Jackson, it was purposeful action, or what Jackson referred to as voluntary (as opposed to automatic) behavior that sits at the highest levels of the nervous system. Voluntary behaviors were the most complex, most specialized, least automatic, involved the greatest degree of consciousness, and had the greatest degree of independence from other movements. Voluntary action was also the most conscious form of action. It was voluntary or purposeful action that constrains the lower elements in the motor hierarchy, not a single cell or brain region.41

It is further observed that “in the nested hierarchy of an organism, all its parts — the cell, tissues, organs — are alive, and the life of the parts is what makes the entire thing alive”.42

The above observations of Feinberg get diluted when he has agreed to Searle’s finding that “mind cannot be reduced to the brain”.43

That apart, the fact, however, remains that the quantum physics provides the solution to the mind–body problem. This is based on the new concept of matter as wholeness and implicate order profounded by David Bohm.

David Bohm’s Concept of Matter

MATTER: WHOLENESS AND IMPLICATE ORDER

Bohm’s contribution in developing a new theory of the relation between consciousness and matter in a scientific manner is the most exciting.44 However, it has been observed:

In a discussion of the “wave function of the universe”, the implicate and generative order of the whole is involved. Out of this whole emerge sub-wholes (including observers), which themselves can be organized into wider context, and these in turn are further organized until the total universe is encompassed in this way.45

An attempt has recently been made to examine the Bohm’s contribution in establishing the relationship between consciousness and matter in a logical framework. This is evident from the following observation:

Matter as a whole can be understood in terms of the notion that the implicate order is the immedīate and primary actuality (while explicate order can be derived as a particular, distinguished case of the implicate order) . . . . If matter and consciousness could in this way be understood together, in terms of the same general notion of order, the way would be opened to comprehending their relationship on the basis of some common ground. Thus, we could come to the germ of a new notion of unbroken wholeness, in which consciousness is no longer to be fundamentally separated from the matter. David Bohm points out that if all actions are in the form of discrete quanta, the interactions between entities (e.g. electrons) constitute a single structure of indivisible links, so that the entire universe has to be thought of as an unbroken whole. . . . Eventually Bohm points out that matter and consciousness are manifestations of implicate order, which enfolds all that which is. We may remark that this is strikingly similar to the Vedāntic notion, in the light of which a contradiction between the mind and the body is resolved.46

What Is Order

Order has been defined by Bohm in a very broad sense. “Whatever we do pre-supposes some kind of order”.47 However, order may be experienced in a number of different ways. For instance,

There is the order of number, of points on a line, of space and time, of the movement of a particle through space, and of the functioning of a machine. But order need not be only mechanical or restricted to inanimate systems.48

Interconnection between Consciousness and Matter

The existence of an electron particle as well as electron wave is complementary in the quantum field theory of physics. This paves the way to find out an essential link between consciousness and the primary field. It may be noted that “the fundamental realities of the primary field and consciousness are inseparable aspects of the same underlying process”.49 It has been observed:

David Bohm has named this underlying process the implicate order. Basil Hiley suggests: Mind and matter are but different projections from this deeper implicate order, where such a division does not exist. He also emphasizes that “the implicate order is not some woolly metaphysical construction, it is a precise description of the underlying process”, which is supported by credible mathematical analysis.50

It is reassuringly to be told that the implicate order provides the solution to the mind–body problem. This is mainly because “the quantum theory implies certain quality of wholeness in the sense that a system cannot be dealt with properly as a set of separate parts”.51 The connection of the mind and the body is explained in the following words:

In the implicate order we have to say that mind enfolds matter in general and therefore the body in particular. Similarly, the body enfolds not only mind but also in some sense the entire material universe.52

This in a way has solved the mind–body problem.

1 Searle, 2004, Mind: A Brief Introduction, p. 79.

2 Nicholson, 1962, Illustration of Being, p. 6.

3 Dretske, 2002, “Conscious Experience”, p. 422.

4 Sarbadhikari, 1991, Mill’s Self Regarding Acts, p. 4.

5 Tola and Dragonetti, 2004, Being as Consciousness, p. 201.

6 Balasubramanian, 2004, “Advaita Vedanta on the Problem of Enworlded Subjectivity”, p. 84.

7 Bhattacharyya, 2004, “Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy”, p. 72.

8 Swami Madhavananda, 2000, Vedāntaparibhāṣā of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, p. 14.

9 Manju, 1986, Advaitavāda aura Śūnyavāda, p. 53.

10 Manju, 1986, op. cit., p. 53.

11 Swami Satprakashananda, 2001, Methods of Knowledge, p. 91.

12 Stcherbatsky, 1996, Buddhist Logic, vol. II, p. 30.

13 Kalupahana, 1992, op. cit., p. 192.

14 Kochumuttom, 1999, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, p. 129.

15 Ganguly, 1992, Treatise in Thirty Verses on Mere Consciousness, p. 76.

16 Ibid.

17 Ganguly, 1992, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

18 Descartes, 2002, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, p. 14.

19 Chakraborty, 1997, op, cit., p. 35.

20 Descartes, 2002, op. cit, p. 21.

21 Ibid., p. 22.

22 Feinberg, 2001, Altered Egos, p. 139.

23 Chalmers, 2002, Philosophy of Mind, p. 2.

24 Sartre, 1984, Being and Nothingness, “Translator’s Note”, p. xi.

25 Ibid.

26 Sartre, 1984, op. cit., p. xi.

27 Swami Satprakashananda, 1965, Methods of Knowledge, p. 83.

28 Searle, 2004, op. cit., p. 3.

29 Warner and Szubka (eds), 1994, The Mind–Body Problem,