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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Radical Media Ethics presents a series of innovative ethical principles and guidelines for members of the global online media community.
- Offers a comprehensive new way to think about media ethics in a new media era
- Provides guiding principles and values for practising responsible global media ethics
- Introduces one of the first codes of conduct for a journalism that is global in reach and impact
- Includes both philosophical considerations and practical elements in its establishment of new media ethics guidelines
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
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CONTENTS
Cover
Title page
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Transformations
Why Worry?
Integrated and Global
Acts of Journalism
Nomenclature
Structure of the Book
References
Part I: Theoretical Foundations
Chapter 1: Ontology of Ethics
Naturalist Ontology
Enabling Conditions
Ontological Features
Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: Ethics as Normative Interpretation
Conceptual Schemes
Interpretation and Purpose
Normative Interpretations of Practice
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Implications for Radical Ethics
Implication 1: Respect for Ethical Thinking
Implication 2: Egalitarian Pluralism
Implication 3: Holistic Interpretation
Implication 4: Expect Slack
Implication 5: Independence of Ethics
Implication 6: Between Absolute and Arbitrary
Implication 7: Emergent and Contested
Implication 8: Ethics as Activism
Conclusion
References
Part II: The Shape of a Radical Integrated Ethics
Chapter 4: Radical Media Ethics
Origin of Pre-digital Media Ethics
Toward a Digital Media Ethics
Features of Digital Media Ethics
The Agenda
References
Chapter 5: Defining Journalism
How Define?
A Schema for Journalism
Constructing the Schema
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Theory of Meaning for Integrated Ethics
Ecumenicalism at Work
Meaning and Multiple Realizability
Application to Media Ethics
Shape of an Integrated Ethics
Conclusion
References
Part III: Principles of Global Integrated Ethics
Chapter 7: Political Values for Integrated Ethics
What Type of Democracy?
Citizens, Publics, and Democracy
Dialogic Journalism
Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: Aims for Global Integrated Ethics
Aims
Human Flourishing as the Ultimate Aim
Applying Human Flourishing
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Realizing Global Integrated Ethics
What Type of Endorsement?
A Code for Global Integrated Ethics
Steps to Realization
Conclusion
References
Appendix: Ward Code for Global Integrated Ethics
Preamble: Global Responsibilities
Moral Roots
Fundamental Concepts and Principles
Principles of Integration
Norms of Practice
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Radical Media Ethics
A Global Approach
Stephen J. A. Ward
This edition first published 2015© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ward, Stephen J. A. (Stephen John Anthony), 1951– Radical media ethics : a global approach / Stephen J. A. Ward. pages cm Summary: “Provides guiding principles and values for practising responsible global media ethics” – Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-118-47758-8 (hardback) – ISBN 978-1-118-47759-5 (paper) 1. Journalistic ethics. 2. Mass media–Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title. PN4756.W375 2015 174′.907–dc23
2014048343
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
To my friend Lynn Dupuis and my sister Ann Legere for helping me cross to the brighter side of the road.
Acknowledgments
The development of my ideas on global media ethics has been stimulated by interaction with an extraordinary group of scholars. Together, we have planted the seed for a movement towards global media ethics in the years to come. We have written books and journals together. We have spoken at conferences. We have organized roundtables around the world and published the results. These discussions and writings have added to the scholarship of, and fledgling literature on, global media ethics. I have benefited greatly from my scholarly association with this august group of media ethics leaders. And, I might add, I have enjoyed the pleasure of their friendship and good company.
They are: Professors Clifford G. Christians of the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign), Lee Wilkins of Wayne State University-Detroit, Shakuntala Rao, State University of New York-Plattsburgh, and Herman Wasserman of the University of Cape Town, South Africa.
Introduction
This book responds to the impact of the current communication revolution on media ethics. Media ethics is in turmoil. Nothing less than a radical rethinking of its scope, methods, and principles will do. We need to engage in radical media ethics.
This is a book of ideas, a work in the philosophy of journalism. Why philosophize? As Lyotard said, to ask “Why philosophize?” is to ask a philosophical question. It is the fate of humans to philosophize because of the creatures they are – with consciousness, desire, language and a critical ability to question what is and to wonder what might be. Philosophy springs from the loss of childhood naivety followed by our adult experience of life as incomplete, fragmented, and lacking integration. Part of philosophy’s philosophical mission is to recall humans back to their inherent capacity and need to philosophize, and to ask questions that “irritate everybody” (Lyotard 2013, 13). Philosophy calls on us to clarify and evaluate those ideas that define our worldview and justify our actions.
In writing this book, I have drawn deeply from philosophical, ethical, political, and communication theories. The book provides my conception of how media ethics should evolve. The conception provides a target at which our invention and construction can aim. I propose a radical media ethics that is global and integrated, applying across media formats and borders.
Transformations
Media technologies have transformed journalism and communication into a global, interactive enterprise practiced by an unusual cast of characters. Every day, networks of professionals, citizens, bloggers, politicians, activists, and others commit a million acts of journalism. Creators, sharers, and consumers of media are part of a global public sphere linked by a web of ever-new communication channels. Online networks offer information, analysis, and advocacy under conditions of social inequality, cultural difference, and imbalance in power. Formidable powers of communication can promote or damage prospects for peace, justice, and the good.
This new media ecology questions traditional ethical principles which were formulated a century ago for non-global newspapers long before the Internet. In question are principles such as objectivity in reporting and the rigorous verification of stories prior to publication or posting. A previous consensus on the principles of media ethics, created by professionals, has collapsed as professional and non-professional journalists, online and offline, quarrel. Media ethics is a fragmented domain where just about any notion, including the very idea of journalism, is debated. Media ethics, once a sleepy domain of mainstream media’s codes of ethics, too often presumed to be invariant, is now a dynamic, chaotic space of contested values.
Therefore, the central question is: What are the aims and principles for responsible media practice and public communication in an era of global, digital media? The question is as crucial as it is difficult. Many journalists, editors, news outlets, media ethicists, and citizens are no longer sure what the answer might be. Or, they disagree on the answers. Some wonder whether there are answers.
We arrive at a crossroad. We have three options. First, we can be skeptics about media ethics. That is, we regard the idea of media ethics – commonly agreed upon norms for responsible practice – as an impossible goal for today’s media world. Ethics, we may say, is irrelevant for a global, digital world. Or, second, we can be conservatives. That is, we call for a return to traditional media ethics and engage in a cautious reform of existing principles. Or, third, we can be radical. That is, we reconstruct the basic ideas of media ethics.
This book chooses the third option. Why? Because the other two options are unattractive.
Why Worry?
The first option is not acceptable, ethically. To reject media ethics holus bolus is irresponsible, given the impact of media as a practice and social institution. It is one thing to be skeptical about the relevance of traditional approaches or specific principles. It is quite another to think that a concern for ethics is not worth the bother.
Media ethics in any era is the responsible use of the freedom to publish, no matter who creates the content or who owns the means of publication. Journalism and all forms of public communication can do great good or great harm. Journalists can inform citizens or mislead them; they can investigate government wrong-doing or they can chase after celebrities; they can rigorously verify their stories or they can ruin reputations by trading in reckless rumors. Journalists can promote understanding among ethnic and racial groups, or they can spark tensions.
To reject ethics is to ignore a crucial link between media ethics and democracy. The health of our democratic public sphere depends, in large part, on a robust but responsible media system that encourages rational and informed analysis of crucial issues. Informed public discourse requires responsible media practitioners.
Citizens have an interest in the reliability, diversity, and ethical character of their media system in general. The ethics of media should be debated regularly by societies. A concern for media ethics does not belong to the owners of the press, to media associations, or to media professionals. It belongs, first and foremost, to citizens. In this debate, professional journalists will play an important part. Nevertheless, the primary question of media ethics is not: What are the rights and needs of journalists, or advertisers, or media owners? The primary question is: What sort of media system does our society (and world) need? What are the “media needs” of the public? Given these needs, we can define the duties and freedoms of news media.
The second option, of conservative resistance to major reform, is inadequate when we consider today’s seismic shift in the nature of media and its relationship with the public. To call for a return to basics is a misleading nostalgia for a golden past that never existed. In Chapter 4, I will make a detailed case against conservatism in media ethics. For now, I simply state my view that reform must be radical in times of revolution. We need to engage in radical ethics if media ethics – clinging to traditional ideas – is not to sink into oblivion. The discipline of media ethics is ready for bold steps. It should show how the contradictions and tensions in journalism can be addressed by new concepts and approaches. To reject media ethics, or to fail to update its concepts, is to fail to rise to the challenges of a new era. Our media ethics must evolve with, and track, changes in the media system and in society. Also, to reject media ethics is to create an opening for irresponsible communication or erroneous editorial policies. If anything goes in journalism, than ethics can have little purchase on our conduct.
Integrated and Global
Articulating an integrated, global media ethics is a goal of this book.
By “integrated” I mean a coming together or agreement at the level of principle and aim which unifies media ethics as a whole. An integrated ethics must show how the many new forms of journalism today can find common ground in what I call ecumenical principles. These principles and aims provide a “unity in difference” – different practices sharing common values. These principles and aims, if endorsed by sufficient numbers of media practitioners, would constitute an integrated ethics, thereby reducing the fragmentation of media ethics today.
In media ethics, acknowledging a unity in difference among values and practices is not the same as acknowledging an irresolvable fragmentation among values and practices. The former recognizes local differences as an important source of values in media work. Yet the unity in difference approach also attempts to show how differing media values and practices can (and should) recognize common principles and overlapping aims.
Some believe media ethics is necessarily a fragmented domain and they are skeptical of the idea that there are commonalities across differences. They see the project of constructing unifying frameworks as based on a futile and unrealistic hope for commonality in a world of irresolvable difference. They believe that the ethical and value differences among individual practitioners, groups of practitioners, and cultures of media are so pronounced that unity in difference is impossible. There are only fragmented, conflicting, islands of values.
To the contrary, I will argue that there are conceptions of unity in difference that are not based on unrealistic expectations. Further, some form of unity in difference is crucial to the very idea of a media ethics. In what follows, I attempt to show how unity and difference can coexist as macro trends in today’s global media. I oppose fragmentation in practice and in idea.
The book also provides a global foundation for this integrated media ethics. It proposes a number of global aims for journalism based on humanitarian values, human rights, and human flourishing. Once we adopt this global foundation, other parts of media ethics, such as the notion of who journalists serve, also receive a global reinterpretation.
Acts of Journalism
In this book, I will be concerned primarily with developing a new framework for thinking about ethical issues in journalism and news media. The reader may assume, incorrectly, that this means I can provide a clear, rigid, and unequivocal definition of “journalism” and “journalist.” I cannot provide such rigorous definitions, especially in a time of rapid change. However, I do not regard this difficulty to be an insurmountable obstacle to ethical analysis. As I explain in Chapter 4, I do not believe such “rigorous” definitions in journalism and related social practices are possible or necessary. In fact, strict definitions cannot be given for many practices, yet those practices carry on, none the worse. However, in Chapter 4, I do provide a schema that amounts to a flexible definition of journalism. It begins with defining acts (and works) of journalism as an activity that, from the 17th to the 21st century, grew from an idiosyncratic concern of individual editors into a distinct social practice and institution. Public recognition of journalism as an institutional practice grounds journalism ethics since this recognition comes with public expectations that journalists fulfill certain roles and honor certain values. To anticipate, I define journalism as the timely and regular production of news and commentary for a public on publicly significant events and issues, the performance of which fulfills crucial institutional functions for democracy, such as informing a self-governing public.
For stylistic variation, I use the two pairs of terms, “media ethics” and “journalism ethics,” and “media” and “journalism,” interchangeably in the text. Media ethics is often used to refer to a wider group of media practitioners than what we find in newsrooms. It includes the ethics of media advertising, public relations, marketing, and so on. These are important topics but this book will not address them directly. For this book, media ethics is the ethics of news media, and the journalism of news media.
Nomenclature
Throughout this book I refer to the principles, norms, standards, maxims, and protocols of ethical systems and of media ethics.1
The term “principle” has a long history going back to ancient Greece, where it meant the origin, source, or fundamental cause of something, such as a primary element of nature. In physics, a principle, such as the principle of gravity, is a general law that explains the behavior of many things. In logic and mathematics, a principle is a premise of an argument or proof.
My meaning of principle is epistemic and is defined with ethics in mind. The term is defined in terms of its function in our ethical belief systems. A principle is a general and fundamental belief which helps to justify other less general beliefs and which applies, as a guide for conduct, to a range of specific practices and situations. The power of principles comes from their general nature – the fact that they apply to a large range of cases. For example, in journalism, the principle of avoiding (or minimizing) harm to others condemns the circulating of a salacious rumor while approving the practice of not identifying the victims of sexual assault. Psychologically, logically, and epistemically, principles are identifiable as “basic” beliefs, a term I will explain in Chapter 4. Psychologically, principles are basic because we regard them as the fundamental values of our ethical viewpoint, and so we tend to hold them with greater strength. For instance, I may admit that I was wrong to place a certain item on the list of human rights, e.g. the right to work, but I may still maintain, strongly, my belief in the principle of human rights.
Logically and epistemically, we use principles to judge the ethically right thing to do and to judge the value of norms and standards. Some principles, such as “maximize the happiness of the greatest number of people,” are so general as to be considered a criterion of what is ethically good or right. What is good or right is whatever maximizes utility. General principles are not just formal or methodological, such as “any action that is not wrong is permissible” or “to test a rule ethically, universalize it to all people.” Principles can also be substantive. They can promote actual goods, such as the ideal of human flourishing, to be explored in Chapter 8.
Norms have the same normative character as principles but they are of a less general nature. Their range of application is smaller and their justification depends on our accepting more general principles.2 By norm, I do not mean what usually occurs, or what is accepted as normal conduct. I mean a belief that people ought to act in certain ways. There is the norm of treating my co-workers in a respectful manner. There is the norm of reporters identifying themselves and their purposes when seeking interviews. The norms of respectful treatment and self-identification are grounded in the principles of human dignity and not treating others as (only) a means.
Finally, there are maxims and protocols. I use these terms interchangeably to identify our most specific rules and procedures for recurring situations. There is the maxim in journalism to not base a story on anonymous sources if at all possible; and there is the protocol that, if journalists do use anonymous stories, they should follow certain procedures, such as informing their editor of the identity of their sources and using documents to cross-check the claims of these sources. In newsrooms, maxims and protocols can be found in editorial guidelines and in directions from the editor.
Principles, norms, and maxims (or protocols) are practical tools for the evaluation of conduct and practice. All of them give us reasons for acting or for refraining from action. As we will see, their justification is a complex, holistic affair involving all levels of our ethical scheme. These three ethical tools differ in terms of their scope and generality, their relative immunity from revision, and how basic they are to our ethical system.
Structure of the Book
The book’s nine chapters and appendix describe the basic concepts of integrated, global ethics. I develop a radical theory of integrated, global media ethics by following a path that begins with the idea of radical ethics and radical media ethics, carries on to the idea of integrated media ethics, and ends with the idea of global integrated ethics.
In Part I, I provide the theoretical foundations. Chapter 1 examines the all-important ontology of ethics – what ethics is. I adopt a naturalistic ontology that sees ethics as part of a distinct social reality that depends on human intentionality and agreement. Chapter 2 explains ethics as normative interpretation of conduct and practice. Chapter 3 draws out the implications of Chapters 1 and 2 for my conception of radical ethics. I reject the presumed need for absolute and unchanging principles for the evaluation of human conduct. Instead, I view ethics as a constantly evolving interpretation of our values as we respond to ever new conditions.
In Part II, I construct the basic structure of radical media ethics. Chapter 4 explores the meaning of radical media ethics and the main features of media ethics today. Chapter 5 provides a schema for defining journalism. Chapter 6 outlines a tri-level theory of meaning for media ethics. The tri-level theory explains how an integrated ethics can consist of principles endorsed by many journalists, yet those principles can be applied and interpreted in different ways in specific contexts.
In Part III, I lay down some basic principles and aims for radical media ethics. Chapter 7 puts forward one set of those principles – the political principles that hold for many forms of democratic journalism. Chapter 8 argues that the ultimate aims of integrated media ethics should be global, and cosmopolitan, promoting human flourishing around the world. Chapter 9 assesses the likelihood that a global media ethics will become a dominant normative interpretation of journalism. The appendix contains my own code for global integrated ethics. The code is a succinct statement of the principles explained at length in the book.
References
Ridge, Michael, and Sean McKeever. 2010. “Moral Particularism.” In
The Routledge Companion to Ethics
, edited by John Skorupski, 629–639. New York: Routledge.
Lyotard, Jean-François. 2013.
Why Philosophize?
Trans. Corinne Enaudeau. Cambridge: Polity.
Notes
1
I regard principles as important to understanding moral reasoning and ethics. Therefore, I reject the position of “moral particularism” (Ridge and McKeever 2010) which denies that principles play a prominent role in morality.
2
I sometimes use the term “standard” which is an idea that extends beyond ethics. We establish certain things as exemplars or authorized units by which to judge objects. For example, we have standards of weight and measurement. In ethics, principles and norms act as standards to evaluate conduct. We judge how an action conforms to our standards of right or wrong. The idea of a standard is, etymologically, close to the idea of a norm.
Norma
, the root for “norm,” is Latin for a carpenter’s rule or square.
Part ITheoretical Foundations
Chapter 1Ontology of Ethics
Ethics today should be radical. In ethics proper, we need a radical global ethics of humanity. In media ethics, we need a radical global, integrated ethics of responsible practice.
But what is “radical”?
The first entry for “radical” in The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ( 1993) says the word means “going to the root or origin… affecting what is fundamental; far-reaching; thorough.”
This is the sense of radical that informs this book. My radicalness is philosophical.
My radicalness seeks reform of fundamental ideas. Reform requires intellectual boldness and moral imagination: boldness to challenge outdated, yet cherished, ideas and imagination to invent new ideas. To be philosophically radical is to alter the structure of our thinking.
In media ethics, fundamental ideas such as responsible publishing and impartiality are like reinforcing rods that run through the structure, providing support for more specific values. Reform of fundamental ideas has a far-reaching impact.
I start, therefore, with meta-ethics. Why? Because meta-ethical beliefs color how we approach ethical questions. If I believe that ethics is God’s absolute commandments for mankind, I may demand that society require all citizens to keep the commandments. Similarly, if I think ethics is a contemptuous attempt by the weak to restrain the strong, I feel justified in pursuing my interests at the expense of others. The need for meta-ethics is especially clear when we try to think in a new way about ethics. No radical media ethics is possible without radical meta-ethical thinking.
I proceed in this chapter as follows: In the first half of the chapter, I introduce my social ontology of ethics. That examines the mode of existence of ethics as a social activity for the regulation of conduct. I trace the origins of this activity to human nature, the intentional powers of the mind, and the evolution of human society and institutions. Ethics is not unique in this normative practice. Rather it is part of a distinctive human-dependent social reality whose objects, activities, and functions cannot be reduced to physical or biological properties.
In Chapter 2, I use this ontology to outline the psychology and epistemology of the practice of ethics – how it proceeds by way of holistic conceptual schemes and interpretations. In Chapter 3, I state the implications for ethics that flow from the two chapters. The result is a meta-ethical perspective on the nature of ethics as social, human-dependent, and interpretive.
Naturalist Ontology
What is ethics?
Ethics is the study and practice of what constitutes the best regulation of human conduct, individually and socially. Humans apply their notions of ethics by acting according to principles, norms, and aims. Ethics is the activity of constructing, critiquing, and enforcing norms, principles, and aims to guide individual and social conduct. The phrase “the best regulation” indicates a zone of critical and ever-evolving thought about the notions and norms of ethics. Existing norms may be inadequate, or even unethical.
Ethics takes all of life as its subject matter. Almost any form of conduct can fall under its critical gaze. Ethics applies to the conduct of individuals, groups, institutions, professions, and countries. Ethics asks how we, as persons and as a society (or species), ought to live. What are the primary goods that we should seek so people enjoy flourishing lives? How should we live together, so that our pursuit of those goods is just, dutiful, and respectful of others? How do we develop people of moral character who do what is right and serve the common good? The good, the right, and the virtuous: these are the three great, intertwined themes of ethics. Ethics, therefore, has three concerns: Appropriate ethical beliefs, correct application, and the disposition to act ethically. Ethics is about the most serious normative aspects of our existence: the most important goods in life, our basic rights and duties, our roles and how we carry out our responsibilities, and the pursuit of virtue. Ethics demands that we live in goodness and in right relation with each other. Ethics may require us to forgo personal benefits, to carry out duties, or to endure persecution.
Ethics is both individualistic and social. It is individualistic because individuals are asked to make certain norms and values part of their character. It is social because ethics is not about every person formulating their own rules of behavior. Correct conduct is honoring rules of fair social interaction – rules that apply to humans in general or to all members of a group. We experience ethics internally as the tug of conscience. We experience ethics externally as the demands placed upon us by codes of ethics, backed by social sanction. Psychologically, one learns ethics as a set of responses shaped by social enculturation and the ethical “climate” of society. My ethical capacities are nurtured and exercised within groups. Also, ethics requires that I adopt a social perspective that looks to the common good and transcends selfish individualism. Ethically speaking, “How ought I to live?” cannot be asked in isolation from the question, “How ought we to live?”
Ethics is practical. Ethics is an activity, a process, and a dynamic practice. It is something we do. We do ethics when we weigh values to make a decision. We do ethics when we modify practices in light of new technology. It may be convenient, but also potentially misleading, to talk about ethics as an object, the way we talk about our automobiles. Society and ethics is an evolving set of social interactions and processes, not a “thing.” Ethics is always situated in, yet transcendent of, a context. Reflection on ethics is carried out by fallible humans embedded in historical eras and in distinct cultures. Situated inquirers also scrutinize their beliefs. All societies, no matter how rigid or traditional, face the future. They cannot avoid struggling with new problems and new ethical questions. Both the cultures and their denizens are ever evolving, ever confronting new challenges. Ethics is not a static set of rules. Ethics is a natural and inescapable human activity. It is the attempt by individuals and societies to respond to quandaries created by changing conditions, unexpected issues, and new ways of thinking and acting.
Ethics at its best is reflective engagement with the urgent problems of the day, in light of where we have been and where we hope to be tomorrow. The questions are created by new technology and media, the progress of science, cultural and social trends, and the redefining of the planet’s geo-political and environmental climate. In today’s world there is no shortage of urgent normative questions. We live in a global world shaped by dramatic changes in technology and media, a world of vast inequalities in wealth and power, a world threatened by conflict and emerging technologies for war. Ethics is reflective engagement with questions that range from what developed nations ought to do to reduce global poverty to how media technology should be used to protect human rights. Engagement involves the reinterpretation of norms, the invention of principles, and the development of new and responsible practices.
Reflective engagement can occur in any area of society. For example, developments in genetic knowledge call for new ethical thinking in the sciences of life. Is it morally permissible to use genetic knowledge to “design” babies, or to force citizens to be tested for genes linked to debilitating diseases? In recent times, our concern about the impact of human activity on nature and on non-human forms of life has prompted the development of environmental ethics and the ethics of animal welfare.
Ethics starts from the lived experience of ethical doubt and plurality of values, and then seeks integration and theoretical understanding. Ethical theorizing can be divided into two types, meta-ethics (or philosophical ethics) and applied ethics (see Ward 2011, 7–51). Meta-ethics asks three big questions about the nature of ethics: What are we saying when we make an ethical claim? How do we know that what we say is justified? Why does ethics exist in the first place? There are plenty of ethical theories, from descriptivism and intuitionism to realism and relativism. Applied ethics, on the other hand, asks not what we mean by ethical concepts like good or right but what is good or right, and how to do what is good or right in certain situations. Examples of approaches to applied ethics are consequential theories of the good, deontological theories of the right, and theories of virtue.
In applied ethics, moral norms are often codified. Principles of ethics, such as “Help others in need” and “Live a life of non-violence and peace” are brought together to form moral systems, such as utilitarian ethics and Buddhist ethics. The Bible’s Ten Commandments is one such code. In addition, there are codes of increasing specificity for doctors, lawyers, and journalists. As a set of principles, “ethics” can refer to something singular or multiple. We can understand “ethics” as the proper name for a single ethical system. One may believe that there is only one set of correct principles and that is what ethics is. Or, we can think of “ethics” as a general term that refers to many ethical systems. “Ethics” as a general term resembles “language,” which refers to many language systems. I prefer to use “ethics” in this plural sense, reserving “ethic” for a single set of principles.
If ethics is a dynamic activity, ethics is not a set of rules to be followed blindly or defended dogmatically. In many cases, there will be legitimate debate as to whether and how rules should apply. Even principles we hold dear may have to be reinterpreted in light of new developments. For example, how should we apply the principle of respect for life to the issue of how long to keep a dying person alive through new technology? Moreover, the boundaries of ethics shift. In our time, ethics has come to include such issues as animal welfare, protecting the environment, and the rights of gay couples. Ethics is not just the disposition to adhere to rules but also the disposition to critique and improve our rules. The difference between living one’s ethics and following mores is that the former rejects the sheer acceptance of rules and conventions. Ethics requires that we follow rules that we have examined critically.
Taken as a whole, ethics is the never-completed human project of inventing, applying, and critiquing the principles that guide interaction, define social roles, and justify institutional structures. Ethical deliberation is critical normative reason in social practice – the construction of fair ethical frameworks for society.
Naturalism
A meta-ethics needs an ontology. Ontology is the study of what exists and how it exists. Is everything material? Do things exist external to my mind, and how do they exist? What types of things exist, e.g., do abstract entities like numbers exist? How does one part of reality, e.g., our thoughts, relate to other parts of reality, such as sub-atomic particles? Is the mind the brain?
Applied to ethics, ontology asks about the mode of existence of the ethical sphere of society – the activity of conduct regulation described above. How did the ethical domain arise in the evolution of society? Do values and norms actually exist in the world apart from our minds? What must exist in the world for an ethical judgment to be true or correct? How do our ethical conceptions fit with a scientific conception of the world?
A full ontology of ethics needs to explain three things – practice, language, and reference – and their place in our overall worldview.
Level of practice: First we locate ethics as normative conduct regulation, and assess, ontologically, this aspect of our social reality. How is this ethical sphere related to other normative domains, to society, and to the natural world?
Level of language and assertion: Given this view of practice, we assess the ontology of ethical language in terms of judgments, assertions, and claims. Is ethical language descriptive, potentially fact-stating, and true? Or, is it non-descriptive, and therefore a language that prescribes, not describes, what should be done, and is potentially correct or reasonable?
Level of reference: Do ethical terms and statements refer to objectively existing things in the world, e.g., moral facts? What must exist to account for ethical language?
Preferably, the direction of inquiry proceeds from (a) to (b) to (c). If we begin with level (c) and inquire into specific ethical terms, such as “right” or “duty,” we fail to see how these terms work together, and we fail to place the use of such terms against the background of ethical practice in society. It is this social functioning that gives sense to the use of individual ethical terms. An advantage of starting with (a) is that ethics as social provides us with a public and objective phenomenon to study – public conduct and public norms.
The question now is: What ontology best fits ethics as a social process? I believe the best ontology is naturalistic and evolutionary in approach.1
To construct an ontology of ethics we must presume, as background, some view about the world. Naturalism requires the ontology of ethics to be based on our leading and most plausible natural theories about the world – theories about nature, life, and society. The ontologies of such theories, e.g., what physics says exists in the world, should support and mesh with a naturalistic ontology of ethics. What are the leading and most plausible theories about the world?
They are a cluster of large understandings that define a naturalistic, scientific view of the world. I am not thinking about specific theories, such as the latest theory about the creation of stars. I am thinking about the overall view of the world as it arises from non-metaphysical, naturalistic inquiry. What are these understandings? First, that nature is physical. It is composed of non-purposeful, non-conscious forces and sub-atomic particles. In some manner, the universe evolved physically from a Big Bang (or some other originating moment) and, in time, the process created our planet, as one among many in an expanding universe. Second, that life and all biological species on Earth evolved through some form of Darwinian selective process, without the intervention of some transcendent deity or prior design. Third, that society arose from the evolution of the human species, a species that is biologically similar to other species, especially primates. Yet evolution also gave humans distinctive capacities such as consciousness, intentionality, rationality, and language, plus the ability to use such capacities to create distinct societies.
The natural and biological sciences (including neuroscience) provide the facts for a theory of the evolution of society and ethics. Like Russian dolls, the ontologies of these theories – natural science, biology, human society, and ethics – should fit inside each other.
Moreover, naturalistic explanations of ethics should be (a) historical, (b) contemporary, and (c) futuristic. By historical, I mean an account of how humans constructed society and then ethics as a normative domain. By contemporary, I mean that it explains how ethics is practiced today, and how it relates to other normative domains. By futuristic, I mean that the account must be able to explain how ethics changes and is always future-orientated.
While these theory requirements are broad, they do constrain the construction of ethical ontology. One restraint is the rejection of an ontological dualism of mind and body, as found in Descartes. It also rejects the use of spiritual or metaphysical entities to construct explanations. We should avoid postulating different realities – mental, physical, social, and normative. As Searle insists ( 2010, 3–4), we need to explain how we move, live, talk, think, and ethically evaluate all in one world, a world that includes quarks and cocktail parties. Also, a naturalistic ontology has to find the “sources of normativity” – the compelling nature of duties and norms – in some naturalistic feature of human beings and society. It precludes, for instance, a religious theory of the authority of norms, as commandments from a deity.
The great question
The ontology of society and ethics is wrestling with profound questions about the place of humans in a natural world.
Since the emergence of modern times, and now in post-modern times, a deep question has haunted us, as a species. How is it possible for consciousness, social purposes, and normative ethics to exist in a physical universe that has no mental and normative properties – a universe explained by physics and chemistry? Searle ( 2010, ix) put the fundamental questions this way:
How can we give an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits – as mindful, rational, speech-act performing, free-will having, social, political human beings – in a world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless, physical particles? How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of brute physical facts?2
Psalm 8 of the Bible wonders: What is man that thou art mindful of him?3 Today, we ask a different question: What are humans that they are mindful of themselves in a mindless world? I concur with Searle ( 2010, 3–4) that this question is the “fundamental question in contemporary philosophy,” even if many philosophers fail to address it directly.
Some people believe that, in a post-modern world, it is implausible to find the source of normativity in God, who may not exist, or in nature, since nature lacks norms or purpose. As Larmore ( 2008, 223–224) has noted, this view has encouraged theories of ethics that see the source of norms, values, and purposes in the operations of the human mind. Norms are human creations and, as such, are inherently subjective phenomena; they are not literally part of an independently existing physical world.
Enabling Conditions
Given a naturalistic approach, what are the enabling conditions for the existence of ethics? The main conditions are: (1) existence of humans with an impulse to pursue what ought to be; (2) existence of human minds with collective intentionality; (3) existence of a distinctive social reality that combines social and institutional properties that do not reduce to physical properties, and are created through recognition and agreement; (4) existence of formal social systems for coordinating types of conduct, through the recognition of roles, powers, and functions; (5) existence, as part of (4), of normative domains created to articulate and monitor the honoring of certain types of norms, such as the domains of law and ethics.
Let’s examine each of these conditions in turn.
Existential sources
The source of all ethics is neither critical philosophical reason nor social traditions. It is the human condition; the conditions of our existence.
The human condition is the intersection of human nature, the state of the world, and the social context in which we live. Human nature contributes the fundamental capacities that are essential (and common) to life and within the range of all humans.4 It includes the basic physical, biological, and mental features of the human species, including essential needs. Human nature is distinctive in never being a settled fact. Humans have a yet-to-be-completed nature that is always seeking development both organically, mentally, and ethically. The distinctive forms of human consciousness, language and society, create normative impulses about what ought to be, impulses which are foreign to other species. That is one reason we can talk about a human condition, apart from the “given” condition of tigers or ants.
The motivation for doing ethics arises from the peculiarities of our existence as conscious, social, language-wielding creatures. Ethics is an inescapable expression of being human. No amount of skepticism about the objectivity of ethical rules, or cynicism about morality, will eradicate the ethical impulse.
What is that impulse?5
I begin with an assertion that sounds paradoxical: We are factual creatures but we don’t live in a world of facts. To be a factual creature is to exist as a material, biological entity. We exist. We eat, digest, desire, feel, think, talk, move about, cooperate with others, and sleep. Your existence is a fact; you are an item in the physical world. You can be a datum in statistical surveys of the population; your body can be studied scientifically like any other physical object. As a matter of fact, we have a body that is the result of centuries of evolution of nature and species. As a matter of fact, we occupy a certain location in a certain culture.
This is the factual substratum for all we do.
However, humans are more than facts. Usually, people think that “more” refers to human consciousness and the life of the mind. That is part of what “more” means, but there are other considerations. Principally, we live in a hybrid world of facts and values, a social world where fact and value are intertwined. Only later do we separate fact and value, and wonder about their relationship; only later do we call values “subjective.”
How is this possible? It has to do with the nature of our consciousness and our agency.
We are aware of the world’s existence and how things usually go, but we are also aware of how things might go, or go better. The human world is shot through with strivings and yearnings that go beyond what is; with criticisms, disappointments, and dissatisfactions with what is; with goals and reform of what is; with utopian dreams beyond what might ever be.
Also, we are practical agents who must act, individually and in groups. We have interests to pursue. For every fact and earthly condition we encounter, we feel compelled to change it, to transform what exists, to create artifacts and technology, to develop non-natural environments. To act means we choose ends and means. This prompts us to judge, compare, assess, affirm, and evaluate what is. We propose how what is could be better. The essential category of the human condition is not thought but action. Action is a doing that incorporates a sense of who one is and how things stand with oneself and the world. Humans are called into action and into valued ways of living by a self-reflective agency. We ask “What am I doing?” which is intimately linked to the “anthropological” question which Augustine was apparently one of the first to ask explicitly. He asks, “Who am I?” and distinguishes it from “What am I?”6
Therefore, we wonder, at least at times, what to make of this existence, if anything. We wonder what sort of person we should be, what desires we should have, what type of character and virtues we should develop. From a factual life in a factual world, humans envisage the normative counterfactual – what might be, what ought to be for myself and others. All of these activities are future-orientated because we are a species for whom, as Heidegger said ( 1962, 1, 68) our existence is a “possibility” and time is the “horizon” for any understanding of being.
Harry Frankfurt provides a description of how ethics grew from this development of a consciousness that could assess current conditions and desires. Evolution created a space between reaction and action by developing in humans the ability to think, to interpret, to intend, to reason, to engage in symbolic thinking, and to evaluate our emotions and desires. These capacities allowed humans to take themselves seriously by not responding unreflectively to desires and by not simply following existing norms. Evolution has given our species the ability to question and restrain the onslaught of restless desires and to sort out conflicts among values. Ethics is possible because we can reflect on desires and values and seek to integrate them into a good life, dominated by a conception of who we should be. With regard to living, Frankfurt ( 2006, 45) says, we want to “get it right.” How is it possible for us to take ourselves seriously? It is “our peculiar knack of separating from the immediate content and flow of our consciousness and introducing a sort of division within our minds.” In addition to the level of immediate content, we have an “inward-directed monitoring oversight” which enables us to focus on ourselves. This self-objectification allows us to form higher-order responses to our experiencing. We may like the person we are, or want to change it. We come to value things; care about things.
