25,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017
Risk management solutions for today's high-speed investing environment Real-Time Risk is the first book to show regular, institutional, and quantitative investors how to navigate intraday threats and stay on-course. The FinTech revolution has brought massive changes to the way investing is done. Trading happens in microsecond time frames, and while risks are emerging faster and in greater volume than ever before, traditional risk management approaches are too slow to be relevant. This book describes market microstructure and modern risks, and presents a new way of thinking about risk management in today's high-speed world. Accessible, straightforward explanations shed light on little-understood topics, and expert guidance helps investors protect themselves from new threats. The discussion dissects FinTech innovation to highlight the ongoing disruption, and to establish a toolkit of approaches for analyzing flash crashes, aggressive high frequency trading, and other specific aspects of the market. Today's investors face an environment in which computers and infrastructure merge, regulations allow dozens of exchanges to coexist, and globalized business facilitates round-the-clock deals. This book shows you how to navigate today's investing environment safely and profitably, with the latest in risk-management thinking. * Discover risk management that works within micro-second trading * Understand the nature and impact of Real-Time Risk, and how to protect yourself * Learn why flash crashes happen, and how to mitigate damage in advance * Examine the FinTech disruption to established business models and practices When technology collided with investing, the boom created stratospheric amounts of data that allows us to plumb untapped depths and discover solutions that were unimaginable 20 years ago. Real-Time Risk describes these solutions, and provides practical guidance for today's savvy investor.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 348
Ähnliche
Real-Time Risk
What Investors Should Know About FinTech, High-Frequency Trading, and Flash Crashes
IRENE ALDRIDGE AND STEVE KRAWCIW
Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Silicon Valley Is Coming!
Everyone Is into Fintech
The Millennials Are Coming
Social Media
Mobile
Cheaper and Faster Technology
Cloud Computing
Blockchain
Fast Analytics
In the End, It's All About Real‐Time Data Analytics
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 2: This Ain't Your Grandma's Data
Data
The Risk of Data
Technology
Blockchain
What Elements Are Common to All Blockchains?
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 3: Dark Pools, Exchanges, and Market Structure
The New Market Hours
Where Do My Orders Go?
Executing Large Orders
Transaction Costs and Transparency
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 4: Who Is Front‐Running You?
Spoofing, Flaky Liquidity, and HFT
Order‐Based Negotiations
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 5: High‐Frequency Trading in Your Backyard
Implications of Aggressive HFT
Aggressive High‐Frequency Trading in Equities
Aggressive HFT in US Treasuries
Aggressive HFT in Commodities
Aggressive HFT in Foreign Exchange
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 6: Flash Crashes
What Happens During Flash Crashes?
Detecting Flash‐Crash Prone Market Conditions
Are HFTs Responsible for Flash Crashes?
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 7: The Analysis of News
The Delivery of News
Preannouncement Risk
Data, Methodology, and Hypotheses
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 8: Social Media and the Internet of Things
Social Media and News
The Internet of Things
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 9: Market Volatility in the Age of Fintech
Too Much Data, Too Little Time—Welcome, Predictive Analytics
Want to Lessen Volatility of Financial Markets? Express Your Thoughts Online!
Market Microstructure Is the New Factor in Portfolio Optimization
Yes, You Can Predict
T
+ 1 Volatility
Market Microstructure as a Factor? You Bet
Case Study: Improving Execution in Currencies
For Longer‐Term Investors, Incorporate Microstructure into the Rebalancing Decision
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Chapter 10: Why Venture Capitalists Are Betting on Fintech to Manage Risks
Opportunities for Disruption Are Present, and They May Not Be What They Seem
Data and Analytics in Fintech
Fintech as an Asset Class
Where Do You Find Fintech?
Fintech Success Factors
The Investment Case for Fintech
How Do Fintech Firms Make Money?
Fintech and Regulation
Conclusions
End of Chapter Questions
Authors' Biographies
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 3: Dark Pools, Exchanges, and Market Structure
Table 3.1 List of National Securities Exchanges (Stock Exchanges) Registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as of August 4, 2016
Table 3.2 Exchanges Registered by the SEC to Trade Equity Futures, as of August 4, 2016
Table 3.3 Dark Pools Trading Equities in the United States, Tier 1, 1st Quarter, 2016, Tier 1 Stocks, Ordered by Total Share Volume
Chapter 4: Who Is Front‐Running You?
Table 4.1 A Sample from the Level III Data (Processed and Formatted) for GOOG on October 8, 2015
Table 4.2 Distribution of Order Sizes in Shares Recorded for GOOG on October 8, 2015
Table 4.3 Distribution of Difference, in Milliseconds, between Sequential Order Updates for All Order Records for GOOG on October 8, 2015
Table 4.4 Size and Shelf Life of Orders Canceled in Full with a Single Cancellation for GOOG on October 8, 2015
Table 4.5 Distribution of Times (in milliseconds) between Subsequent Order Revisions for GOOG on October 8, 2015
Table 4.6 Distribution of Duration (in milliseconds) of Limit Orders Canceled with an Order Message Immediately following the Order Placement Message
Chapter 5: High‐Frequency Trading in Your Backyard
Table 5.1 Average Aggressive HFT Participation in Selected Commodities and Equities on August 31, 2015
Table 5.2 Employment Figures as Reported by Bloomberg
Chapter 7: The Analysis of News
Table 7.1 Correlation of realized values of Construction Spending Index (“Construction”) and ISM Manufacturing Index (“Manufacturing”) Less Prior Month Values and Less Forecasted Values
Chapter 9: Market Volatility in the Age of Fintech
Table 9.1 AbleMarkets Flash Crash Index, Predictability of T+1 Downward Volatility
Chapter 10: Why Venture Capitalists Are Betting on Fintech to Manage Risks
Table 10.1 Raymond James Estimates of Enterprise Value Premia over Revenues for Fintech Businesses (USD in millions)
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1: Silicon Valley Is Coming!
Figure 1.1 Global fintech investment
Figure 1.2 Zopa originations by month
Chapter 2: This Ain't Your Grandma's Data
Figure 2.1 Breaking a row‐oriented database into columns
Figure 2.2 Volume of computer manufacturing in US billions by geography
Figure 2.3 Evolution of technology and computing power over the past century
Figure 2.4 Simultaneous input of broken down information packers into the world's network systems
Chapter 3: Dark Pools, Exchanges, and Market Structure
Figure 3.1 Sample limit order book
Figure 3.2 How NBBO execution works
Chapter 4: Who Is Front‐Running You?
Figure 4.1 Stages of order identification
Figure 4.2 Aggressive HFT's orders impact bid‐ask spreads
Figure 4.3 Illustration of a passive HFT order placement
Figure 4.4 Buy‐side available liquidity exceeds sell‐side liquidity
Figure 4.5 Example of impact of flickering quotes
Figure 4.6 Limit order book in the dark pools and phishing
Figure 4.7 Histogram of number of order messages per each added limit order
Chapter 5: High‐Frequency Trading in Your Backyard
Figure 5.1 Stylized representation of market making in a limit order book of a given financial instrument
Figure 5.2 The consequences of adverse selection for market makers
Figure 5.3 One‐minute performance of aggressive HFTs identified by AbleMarkets.com Aggressive HFT Index
Figure 5.4 Stylized liquidity taking (panel a) and making (panel b)
Figure 5.5 S&P 500 ETF (NYSE: SPY) on October 2, 2015. A sudden drop in price circa 8:30 AM coincided with smaller‐than‐expected job gain figures.
Figure 5.6 Proportion of aggressive HFT buyers and sellers in the S&P500 ETF (NYSE: SPY) on October 2, 2015. Shown: 10‐minute moving averages of aggressive HFT buyer and seller participation
Figure 5.7 Average participation of aggressive HFT buyers and sellers, as percentage by volume traded, among all the Dow Jones Industrial stocks on October 2, 2015
Figure 5.8 Aggressive HFT buyers and sellers in American Express (NYSE:AXP) on October 2, 2015
Figure 5.9 Evolution of aggressive HFT participation in the US Treasuries as a percentage of volume traded, measured by the AbleMarkets Aggressive HFT Index (HFTIndex.com)
Figure 5.10 Daily average aggressive HFT on crude oil and corresponding price and implied vol on crude oil
Figure 5.11 Daily average aggressive HFT on crude oil and implied vol on crude oil
Figure 5.12 Aggressive HFT participation as a percentage of volume traded in foreign exchange (daily averages)
Chapter 6: Flash Crashes
Figure 6.1 The number of flash crashes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index per year. Flash crashes are defined as the intraday percentage loss in the DJIA index from market open to the daily low that exceeds –0.5 percent, –1 percent, and –2 percent, respectively.
Figure 6.2 The number of flash crashes in IBM per year, defined as a percentage loss in the IBM stock from market open to the daily low
Figure 6.3 Net Share Issuance of ETFs, billions of dollars, 2002–2014
Figure 6.4 Total net assets of ETFs concentrated in large‐cap domestic stocks, billions of dollars, December 2014
Figure 6.5 Average monthly ETF turnover on Deutsche Borse Xetra
Figure 6.6 Number of flash crashes per year in the S&P 500 ETF (NYSE:SPY) and the annual trading volume in the S&P 500 ETF. The number of flash crashes appears to be exactly tracking the volume in the S&P 500 ETF.
Figure 6.7 Number of flash crashes in the S&P 500 index (not ETF) and the respective annual share volume in the stocks comprising the S&P 500. The S&P 500 trading volume appears to lag the number of flash crashes—increase following an increase in flash crashes.
Figure 6.8 250‐day rolling correlation of the intraday downward volatility (low/open –1) and daily volume of the S&P 500 ETF (NYSE:SPY)
Figure 6.9 Timeline of cross‐asset institutional activity on the day of the flash crash of October 15, 2014, as estimated by AbleMarkets
Figure 6.10 Number of single‐stock crashes (when daily low fell below the daily open over 0.5 percent) among the 30 constituents of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Figure 6.11 An illustration of positive, negative, non‐positive, and non‐negative runs
Figure 6.12 Empirical conditional probabilities of observing a longer run given the present length of a run
Figure 6.13 Conditional probabilities of continuing in a run measured on one‐second data on May 6, 2010. Identical conditional probabilities are observed for positive and negative runs at one‐second frequencies.
Figure 6.14 Average empirical economic gain and loss observed in positive and negative runs
Figure 6.15 Conditional probability of observing
N
lags in a run of non‐negative returns, given the run has lasted
N
– 1 lags
Figure 6.16 Conditional probability of observing
N
lags in a run of non‐positive returns, given the run has lasted
N
– 1 lags
Figure 6.17 The average economic value of a non‐negative run corresponding to Figure 6.15
Figure 6.18 The average economic value of a non‐positive run corresponding to Figure 6.16
Figure 6.19 The difference between the maximum length of a positive run and the maximum length of a negative run observed on a given day
Chapter 7: The Analysis of News
Figure 7.1 Aggressive HFT (the difference of aggressive HFT sellers and aggressive HFT buyers), as a percentage of 10‐minute volume
Figure 7.2 Institutional investor participation in Wal‐Mart (WMT) trading on October 14, 2015, as a percentage of daily volume
Figure 7.3 Institutional investor participation in Wal‐Mart (WMT) trading as a percentage of 30‐minute volume
Figure 7.4 Instantaneous price adjustment in response to positive publicly released news, according to the efficient markets hypothesis
Figure 7.5 Instantaneous price adjustment in response to negative news, according to the efficient markets hypothesis
Figure 7.6 Actual price adjustment in response to positive publicly released news, according to behavioral studies
Figure 7.7 Actual price adjustment in response to negative news, according to behavioral studies
Figure 7.8 Realized average price changes for the Russell 3000 stocks in response to (1) higher‐than‐previous values of the ISM Manufacturing Index (Realized vs Prior Avg Cum +), (2) lower‐than‐previous values of the ISM Manufacturing Index (Avg Cum −), and (3) all announcements (AVG)
Figure 7.9 Cumulative price change of Agilent (NYSE:A) surrounding the 10:00 AM ISM Manufacturing Index announcement recorded in BATS‐Z on July 1, 2015
Figure 7.10 Participation of aggressive HFT by volume in Agilent (NYSE:A) on July 1, 2015, before and after the ISM Manufacturing Index and Construction Spending figures announcements at 10:00 AM
Figure 7.11 Average cumulative price change for all the Russell 3000 stocks surrounding the ISM Manufacturing and Construction Spending announcements at 10:00 AM on July 1, 2015
Figure 7.12 Average cumulative price change and price change volatility across all the Russell 3000 stocks surrounding Construction Spending announcement at 10:00 AM on July 1, 2015
Figure 7.13 Participation of aggressive HFT averaged across all Russell 3000 stocks around 10:00 AM news on July 1, 2015
Figure 7.14 Standard deviation of average Russell 3000 cumulative price responses surrounding ISM Manufacturing Index announcements. Shown price volatility is measured for cases where the realized news was higher than the prior month's news, lower than the prior month's news and across all the cases.
Figure 7.15 The
t
‐ratios of the cumulative price responses of the Russell 3000 stocks around the ISM Manufacturing Index announcements
Figure 7.16 Average price response of the Russell 3000 stocks to the changes in Construction Spending relative to the prior month's announcements. Many times, the Construction Spending figures remained unchanged relative to their prior values.
Figure 7.17 Average price response across the Russell 3000 stocks in response to (1) realized ISM Manufacturing Index spending exceeding consensus forecast (Avg Cum+), (2) realized ISM Manufacturing Index falling below the consensus forecast for that day (Avg Cum−), and in response to all cases. Data covers January 2013 to October 2015
Figure 7.18
t
‐ratios of price response of the Russell 3000 stocks to the ISM Manufacturing Index announcements from January 2013 through October 2015 whenever the realized Manufacturing Index exceeded the forecast (t avg Cum+), underachieved the forecast (t avg Cum−), and all cases (t avg)
Figure 7.19 Cumulative price response of Russell 3000 stocks to the Construction Spending announcement when the realized construction spending exceeds the forecasted value (Avg Cum+), and falls short of the forecasted value (Avg Cum−)
Figure 7.20 Statistical significance of cumulative price responses of Russell 3000 stocks measured around Construction Spending announcements when realized Construction Spending figures exceed forecasted values (t avg Cum +), fall short of the forecasted values (t avg Cum−), and all cases
Figure 7.21 Behavior of aggressive HFT
buyers
around the ISM Manufacturing Index Announcements in instances when the realized news was higher (Avg Cum+) and lower (Avg Cum−) than the previous month's value
Figure 7.22 Behavior of aggressive HFT
sellers
around the ISM Manufacturing Index announcements in instances when the realized news was higher (Avg Cum+) and lower (Avg Cum−) than the previous month's value
Figure 7.23 The difference between aggressive HFT buyer participation when the realized Construction Spending Index exceeds the forecast and that when the realized value falls short of the forecast
Chapter 8: Social Media and the Internet of Things
Figure 8.1 AAPL in social media leads AAPL closing prices.
Figure 8.2 Normalized social media conversations, as measured by AbleMarkets Social Media Quotient (left axis) vs. same‐day intraday range volatility for VMware (ticker VMW)
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Pages
iv
v
xi
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
Copyright © 2017 by Irene Aldridge and Steve Krawciw. All rights reserved.
Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.
Published simultaneously in Canada.
All cartoons © Irene Aldridge.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600, or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
For general information on our other products and services or for technical support, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at (800) 762-2974, outside the United States at (317) 572-3993 or fax (317) 572-4002.
Wiley publishes in a variety of print and electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some material included with standard print versions of this book may not be included in e-books or in print-on-demand. If this book refers to media such as a CD or DVD that is not included in the version you purchased, you may download this material at http://booksupport.wiley.com. For more information about Wiley products, visit www.wiley.com.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available:
ISBN 9781119318965 (Hardcover)
ISBN 9781119319061 (ePDF)
ISBN 9781119319047 (ePub)
Cover Design: Wiley
Cover Image: © PM Images/Getty Images
To Henry and Rosalind
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank our intrepid editor Bill Falloon, and the great production team: Judy Howarth, Cheryl Ferguson, Sharmila Srinivasan, and Michael Henton for great cover design.
CHAPTER 1Silicon Valley Is Coming!
Knock‐knock.
—Who is there?
—Bot.
—Bot who?
—Bot and sold, it's a stat‐arb world.
Do you wonder why the markets have changed so much? Where's it all heading? How will it affect you? You are not alone. Today's markets are very different from what they used to be. Technological advances morphed computers and infrastructure. Changes in regulation allowed dozens of exchanges to coexist side by side. The global nature of business has ushered in round‐the‐clock deal making. All of this has created stratospheric volumes of data. The risks that come along with automated trading in real‐time are numerous. Now, the inferences from these data allow us to go to previously untapped depths of markets and discover problems and solutions that could not even be imagined 20 years ago.
Do you remember Bloomberg terminals? If so, you are reading this book not so long after it was written. JP Morgan's January 2016 announcement “to pull the plug” on thousands and thousands of Bloomberg terminals is a leading example of the sweeping disruption facing investment managers. Billion‐dollar hedge fund Citadel followed suit on August 16, 2016, by announcing that it was taking on Symphony messaging as Bloomberg's replacement. Symphony, who? Many still struggle to wrap their head around the situation, with social media platforms like LinkedIn buzzing with discussions about pulling the plug on traditional sources of market data. Yet, here is fact: The competition is not sleeping, but working hard. And now, the competition is so strong that Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, and others may end up in significant financial peril if they ignore fintech. Is your company also oblivious to changes in innovation?
The unfortunate truth is that many established firms are completely unprepared for the fast train of innovation currently passing them by. Old, manual procedures may have been fine in the past, but with innovation sweeping through, risk management executives have to be ready to see established operating models and platforms go out the door as newer, untried approaches take their place.
Consider the investment advisory industry. Reliance on charming brokers to seduce ever‐dwindling pools of clients into paying for their commissions and overhead expenses remains the business model for some firms. At the same time, a number of well‐established startups deliver cutting‐edge portfolio‐management advice to investors right over the Internet, with some charging as little as $9.95 per month.
Global banks like Barclay's and Credit Suisse have exited the US wealth management arena while at the same time hundreds of millions of dollars in venture funding have been channeled to fintech startups working to streamline financial advice and beyond.
The bet has been wagered that new innovative and cost‐efficient business models are here to stay. Innovation can take the form of a completely new approach to conducting business or through advances in the information used for the existing way of conducting business. As an illustration, while many finance professionals are still debating market structure and whether a new exchange will help people avoid high‐frequency traders, companies like AbleMarkets deliver a streaming map of high‐frequency trading activity directly to subscribers' desktops, leaving nothing to chance and helping to significantly improve trading performance across all markets. Similar innovations are going on in insurance, risk management, and other aspects of financial services, and firms that are not up to par on what's going on are at a significant risk of failure.
EVERYONE IS INTO FINTECH
Have you ever missed opportunities in the markets because you felt you were disrupted? We have been in a unique and fortunate position to be immersed in the heart of fintech innovation and to observe first‐hand the extent of what is becoming a true disruption to businesses that, in turn, disrupted financial markets in the late 1970s and 1980s. Think of this as Finance 3.0. The possibilities are endless, and the new players are already embedded in most facets of traditional finance. These new players are not boiler rooms—most founders have advanced degrees and the most recent scientific innovations at their fingertips.
According to the Conference Board, investment in financial technology, trendily abbreviated into fintech, grew by 201 percent in 2014 around the world. In comparison, overall venture capital investments have only grown by 63 percent. The digital revolution is well underway for banks, asset managers, and customers. The impact on the financial institutions from the many startups that are trying unproven ideas is beginning to crystallize. Venture capitalists are betting that the once‐stodgy financial industry is about to experience a considerable transformation.
The pace of change for the financial world is speeding up, and startups and venture capitalists are hardly alone in the fintech craze. Apple, Amazon, and Google, among others, have already launched financial services platforms. They have aimed at niches where they can establish a strong position. Threatened by these new entrants, traditional financial stalwarts are hearing the pitch: Adapt to the new environment or perish.
Banks are launching their own internal funds and hiring significant numbers of developers for internal builds. Why now? In his latest annual letter to shareholders, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, wrote that “Silicon Valley is coming.” While this statement went unnoticed by the news, it reflects the torrent of venture capital flowing into fintech. Estimates by the Economist, shown in Figure 1.1, suggest that 2014 was the watershed year for fintech startups.
Figure 1.1 Global fintech investment
Source: Economist, May 19, 2015.
The Current State of Big Data Finance
What is big data finance? For many financial practitioners, big data is still just a buzzword, and finance is business as usual. However, looking at the hottest‐financed areas of business, one uncovers particular trends that move beyond buzz into billion‐dollar investments. According to Informilo.com, for instance, the fastest‐growing areas of big data in finance in 2015 were:
Payment services
Online loans
Automated investing
Data analytics
Each of these areas, in turn, translates into automation. The payment services businesses, such as TransferWise, harness technology to commoditize counterparty risk computations. Counterparty risk is a risk of payment default by a money‐sending party. Some 20 years ago, counterparty risk was managed by human traders, and all settlements took at least three business days to complete, as multiple levels of verification and extensive paper trails were required to ensure that transactions indeed took place as reported. Fast‐forward to today, and ultra‐fast technology enables transfer and confirmation of payments in just a few seconds, fueling a growing market for cashless transactions.
Similarly, the loan markets used to demand labor‐intensive operations. Just 10 years ago, the creditworthiness of a bank's business borrowers were often judged during a round of golf and drinks with the company's executives. Of course, quantitative credit‐rating models such as the one by Edward Altman of New York University have proved invariably superior for predicting defaults over most human experts, enabling faster online loan approvals. Online loan firms now harness these quantitative credit‐modeling approaches to produce fast, reliable estimates of credit risk and to determine the appropriate loan pricing.
Can anyone issue loans over the Internet or facilitate payments? According to recent industry reports, yes, the founders of many loan startups that originated during the credit squeeze of 2009—have little prior background in lending.
The key issues in lending are (1) having capital to lend, and (2) estimating credit risk of the borrowers correctly. The pricing of the loan service, interest, is then a function of the credit rating. If and when a borrower defaults, the loan should be optimally paid out from the interest. More generally, the average loan interest should exceed the average loan amount outstanding in order for the lender to make money.
The lending business is central to banking, and banks have had a near monopoly over the lending business for a very long time. New approaches to lending have emerged that compete with banks. Banks fund loans with deposits, whereas peer‐to‐peer lending is funded by investors. The leading players in this new approach to lending are the LendingClub and Prosper in the United States and Funding Circle and Zopa in the United Kingdom. In 2015, Zopa passed the Great Britain pound (GBP) 1 billion mark. Zopa's growth is shown in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 Zopa originations by month
Source: p2p‐banking.com
With peer‐to‐peer lenders prospering with their new model, not only have banks noticed, but in some cases, started to acquire the upstart companies. SunTrust Bank acquired FirstAgain in 2012, later rebranding it LightStream.
New technologies are making their presence felt in wealth management as well. The topics of the robo‐advising and a broad group of analytics are the most diverse and least exact. Robo‐advising takes over the job of traditional portfolio management. The idea behind robo‐advising is that a computer, programmed with algorithms, is capable of delivering portfolio‐optimized solutions faster, cheaper, and at least as good as its human counterparts, portfolio managers. Given a selected input of parameters to determine the customer's risk aversion and other preferences (say, the customer's life stage and philosophical aversion to selected stocks), the computer then outputs an investing plan that is optimal at that moment.
Automation of investment advice enables fast market‐risk estimation and the associated custom portfolio management. For example, investors of all stripes can now choose to forgo expensive money managers in favor of investing platforms such as Motif Investing. For as little as $9.95, investors can buy baskets of ETFs preselected on the basis of particular themes. Companies such as AbleMarkets.com offer real‐time risk evaluation of markets, aiding the judgment of market‐making and execution traders with real‐time inferences from the market data, including the proportion of high‐frequency traders and institutional investors present in the markets at any given time.
Not only are the changes aimed at managing the portfolios of the retail investor but also in the way companies are raising capital from these same investors. Crowdfunding has become a popular way for ideas to turn into projects with real funding. Kickstarter is one of the more popular sites.
And companies like Acuity Trading, Selerity, and iSentium are trying to harness data from platforms like Twitter to give an indication of investor “sentiment,” which, in turn, gives them an idea of which way to trade.
The information‐driven revolution is changing more than the investing habits of individuals. Institutional investors are increasingly subscribing to big data information sources, the more uncommon or uncorrelated is the data source, the more valuable it is. Each data source then drives a small profit in market allocations, and, when combined, all of the data sources deliver meaningful profitability to the data acquirers. This uncommon‐information model of institutional investing has become known as Smart Beta or the Two Sigma model, after the hedge fund that grew 400% in just three years after the model adoption.
Underlying all these developments are the advances in scalable architecture and data management. Ultra‐fast computation and data processing are critical enablers of other innovative forms of financial research and investing. Several companies have lately generated multibillion‐dollar valuations by providing analytics in the software‐as‐a‐service (SaaS, pronounced “sass”). For instance, Kensho is delivering the power of human‐language queries in customers' data, which have been rolled out across Goldman Sachs.
Risk managers face a daunting challenge. Finding a risk event is the needle in a haystack. With automation and big data, the haystack becomes a mountain, and that mountain is virtual. The potential to catch issues could never have been stronger, but the ways of doing so are drastically novel.
THE MILLENNIALS ARE COMING
Why is technology transforming financial services now? Where was it 20 years ago, when computers and the Internet already existed? The short answer is the millennials, a generation of young people loyal to their smart phones and technology platforms and caring little for other brands, such as those of banks. With this generation of people now in the workforce, the choices that this group of 84 million make can provide the momentum to carry change. The millennials, born between 1980 and 2000, are expected to hold $7 trillion in liquid assets by 2020.
Recent findings in the Millennial Disruption Index (MDI) paint a startling portrait of preferences so different from older generations and so aligned with corporate digital heavyweights that financial services may change further dramatically. For example, according to the MDI study, one in three millennials will switch banks in the next 90 days. Additionally, over 50 percent of the 10,000+ respondents consider all banks to share the same value proposition. In other words, millennials don't see any difference among financial institutions. With over 70 percent of respondents saying, “They would be more excited about a new offering in financial services from Google, Amazon, Apple, Paypal, or Square than from their own nationwide bank,” it is clear that change is before us. Such findings open the door for brands like Google to enter the market and build a stable business with the millennials before bringing in older generations.
Traditional banks are feeling the threats of new entrants. Apple, Google, and Amazon are now all actively participating in the financial services industry. Whether through payments, cloud infrastructure, or investments into other fintech companies, firms considered technology leaders are focusing on financial services. The technology giants have even created their own lobbying group to avoid getting mired in regulatory red tape encasing banks. (See “An Excerpt about the Silicon Valley Lobbying Entity.”)
AN EXCERPT ABOUT THE SILICON VALLEY LOBBYING ENTITY
Leading Silicon Valley players are so intent on entering financial services that they have launched a collaborative advocacy group to push Washington to create rules that are friendly to new technologies for financial services. The group, known as Financial Innovation Now, comprises founding members Google, Apple, Amazon, PayPal, and Intuit.
“These five companies are coming together because innovation is coming to financial services,” Brian Peters, the group's executive director, told BuzzFeed News. “And they believe that technological transformation will make these services more accessible, more affordable, and more secure.”
Whether through products like Google Wallet, Amazon Payments, and Apple Pay, acquisitions like PayPal's purchase of mobile payment startup Venmo, or investments like Google's in peer‐to‐peer lending outfit Lending Club, the group's founding companies all have a stake in the evolving industry and its regulation.
“The goal here is to serve as the voice of technology and innovators,” Peters said. “Because honestly the banking policy conversations in Washington have not had that voice historically.”
Source: Buzzfeed, Nov. 3, 2015.
How can this affect you? For years, financial services companies focused their investments on meeting regulatory changes or incremental improvements—automation, workflow, and so on. The essential business model went untouched. What's changing now is that new startups are bringing a Silicon Valley approach, and they are entering financial services with bold new business ideas.
The same message resonates for most investors: institutional or retail, global macro or small‐cap, trading in the dark pools or lit exchanges. The sudden demand for new technology concerns all aspects of the financial ecosystem. At least some of the demand is based on the idea that operating models need to become leaner to offer services at lower price points, utilize a labor force based all over the world, and compete with new players. While slimming their offerings makes banks less prominent, it may enable them to face the challenge of new well‐heeled Silicon Valley entrants as they get into the business of financial services.
How do you protect your company in an environment of disruptive change? How do you anticipate shocks to the markets precipitated by new dynamics at play? How do you ensure you know your customer when more and more of your company's process are moving to new platforms? These are some of the questions we explore in the following chapters.
How is the current environment different from the one, say, just 10 years ago? Today, many companies have adopted the Digital One company strategy with the idea to integrate social media, mobile technology, cheap computing power, fast analytics, and cloud data storage.
SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media alone creates change, and not just because of all the new tools connecting billions of individuals worldwide. People use social networks to gain immediate access to information that is important to them. The increased independence that people feel when they can access their networks whenever and wherever they want makes these networks a treasured part of the way they spend their day.
For investors, social media may mean wide access to a variety of information on the go. On the train and feel like learning the business model of some obscure public company? Not an issue. At the airport, but thought of investing in a specific municipal bond and need more information on the jurisdiction? Here it is. A successful fintech business has a social network that reaches investors both proactively and responsively. By offering a social experience, the business can provide traditional services in a setting that is consistent with the social network's way of navigating. Analyzing a customer's use of the social network allows a company to respond to clients in a tailored fashion, offering messages and ideas that are consistent with what the customer wants.
The implications of social media, however, go far beyond the communication and customer service experience a business can have with prospects and clients. Unlike news, social media is a powerful user‐generated forum where ideas collide, opinions are formed, and beliefs are floated, often completely under the radar of traditional media. The participants who offer the opinions often join in anonymously, concealing their identity in a degree of masquerade where they feel comfortable to disclose their thoughts honestly and passionately. The same degree of honesty is often impossible in our politically correct daily interactions, even with the nearest friends behind closed doors. The chatroom‐formed opinions then often trickle into the stock markets as people trade on their beliefs, putting their money where their mouths are.
Harvesting and interpreting social media content has thus been a boon for a range of financial businesses. Machine‐collected sentiment on specific stocks has been shown to predict intraday volatility and future returns. The AbleMarkets Social Media Index, for example, has consistently predicted short‐term volatility over the past six years, and is used by investors, execution traders, and risk management professionals.
Is all social media content created equal? As you have guessed it, this is very far from being the case. With proliferation of automatic social media tools, for instance, a lot of the content comprises “reposts” and “retweets” of information found elsewhere. This duplication of materials sometimes is worthwhile and reflects the copying party's agreement or endorsement of the original content. In many instances, however, duplicate content appears to be streamed simply to fill the informational void of a given social media participant's stream.
Another social media hazard is fake news. This may come in the form of individuals' posts or, much worse, via fraudulent posts on hijacked accounts of other users. A classic in the latter category was a Twitter post on the Associated Press account informing followers of an explosion at the White House on April 23, 2013.
Separating the wheat from the chaff in the social media space is not a job for dilettantes, and requires advanced machine‐learning algorithms. In today's market environment, where the profit margins are thin and every bit of information is valuable, correct inferences are critical and experience in dealing with various circumstances is worth a lot.
MOBILE
How is mobile affecting your business? The prevalence of mobile devices has already driven business of all shapes and sizes to offer their services through an online channel. Why are people choosing to transact over the mobile channel? Accessing a service at a convenient time without any concern of intrusions during the experience is a very powerful use case. There are no lines, no puddles to navigate on the way to the service, and the customer can jump between the transaction and doing something else as needed.
Furthermore, mobile takes instant gratification to a new level. Are you sitting on the beach, yet have a sudden urge to send money back to your parents in Canada? TransferWise will take your order right there and then. Need to apply for a loan at the same time? No problem—100 or so new apps will be at the ready to process your information and issue preapproval in a matter of minutes, if not seconds.
The ability to fulfill your latest craze or wish anywhere at any time is clearly driving much of market innovation. In response to people's 24/7 newly found ability to demand financial services, companies like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) now offer around‐the‐clock trading in selected futures. Whenever you want it, you can bet your money on the latest thought or piece of research.
Adding to the real‐time 24/7 availability of services is the proliferation of smart watches. Whereas “traditional” mobile devices may be securely packed out of site, say, in your back pocket, the wrist gadget is much harder to ignore. And the millennials reportedly love it. In response, the development of smartwatch applications devoted exclusively to all things financial has exploded. According to Benzinga, there are at least 22 fintech apps coming to Apple Inc.'s smartwatch (see “Financial Services Applications Being Developed for the Apple Smartwatch”). And there is no mention of Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters on this list. Are they wise to stay away from the smartwatch, or will someone else just step in and replace them altogether?
FINANCIAL SERVICES APPLICATIONS BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE APPLE SMARTWATCH
Scutify
. Scutify (a financial social network) was the first fintech company to confirm to Benzinga that it was developing an app for Apple Watch.
“Anyone that's an investor [will] want to be able to check stock quotes and interface with their portfolio and see if the portfolio is up or down and what it's doing for the day,” Cody Willard, chairman of Scutify, told Benzinga. When asked why Scutify was so eager to jump on the Apple Watch bandwagon, Willard recalled the words of a hockey legend that was famously quoted by Apple co‐founder Steve Jobs.
“You want to be as, Wayne Gretzky famously said, skating to where the puck is going, not to where it is,” said Willard. “We've got to move forward if we're moving to a wearables culture.”
NewsHedge
. NewsHedge, a Chicago‐based fintech startup that develops software solutions for the global financial community, is working on an app for multiple smartwatches.
Prism
