16,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Dimensions of Security
- Sprache: Englisch
Religious violence is on the rise globally. Hardly a day passes without news of a vicious attack being carried out in the name of religion. Religion can, of course, bring security to many but its perversion leads to insecurity for all. Why is this? How and why do so many claim to act on God's behalf to inflict deliberate human suffering? In Religion and International Security Lee Marsden explores the return of religion as a major cause of insecurity in the contemporary world. He guides readers through the different theoretical perspectives surrounding the study of religion and security, arguing that the secular bias that marginalized the role played by religion in recent times must change to reflect the realities of the emerging post-secular international order. Packed with examples from around the world, the book offers a thoughtful and nuanced exploration of religion and security through key themes such as religiously motivated and inspired terrorism and warfare, the human security of women and gay people in religiously dominated communities, and the capacity for religious communities and leaders to heal conflict through peacebuilding. For those who would rather deny a role for religion when considering security, the genie is truly out of the bottle. This book seeks to understand this phenomenon and how to come to terms with it.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 425
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
Cover
Dedication
Title page
Copyright page
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Tables and Figure
Tables
Figure
Introduction: Looking Beyond the Religion as Good or Bad Dichotomy
1
:
Theorizing Religion and International Security
Secular World Order
Habermas and the Post Secular
Main Theoretical Paradigms
Conclusion
2
:
Sacred Violence and Clashing Civilizations
Girard, Mimesis, Scapegoats and Sacred Violence
Interfaith Conflict
Intrafaith Conflict
Conclusion
3
:
Just War and Jihad
Just-War Theory
Jihad
‘Religious’ Terrorism
Conclusion
4
:
Blessed are the Peacemakers
Peace in the Scriptures
Peacemakers
Religious Peacemaking
Conclusion
5
:
Faith-Based Initiatives and International Security
Faith-Based Diplomacy
Military Chaplains
Faith-Based Humanitarian Assistance
Conclusion
6
:
Suffering and Dying in the Name of God
Human Security
Government Harassment and Social Hostility
Strengthening Human Security for Religious Actors
Governance, Religion and Human Security
Charter for Compassion
Conclusion
Conclusion: Religions of Peace and War? A Matter of Choice
Appendix
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of tables
Table 1.1 International relations theory and religion
Table 2.1 Mimetic rivalry, sacred violence and the scapegoat mechanism
Table 4.1 18 lessons in religious peacemaking
Table 5.1 US faith-based initiatives and international security
Table 6.1 Key declarations on religion and human security
Table 6.2 25 countries with apostasy and blasphemy laws
Table 6.3 Religious texts on the golden rule
List of figures
Figure 2.1 Triangulation of mimetic desire
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Pages
ii
iii
iv
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
21
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
143
142
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
To Gill
Religion and International Security
Lee Marsden
polity
Copyright © Lee Marsden 2019
The right of Lee Marsden to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2019 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
101 Station Landing
Suite 300
Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-6362-3 (hardback)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-6363-0 (paperback)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marsden, Lee, author.
Title: Religion and international security / Lee Marsden.
Description: Medford, MA : Polity, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018019589 (print) | LCCN 2018041500 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509534319 (Epub) | ISBN 9780745663623 (hardback) | ISBN 9780745663630 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Security, International–Religious aspects. | Religion and international relations. | Violence–Religious aspects.
Classification: LCC BL65.S375 (ebook) | LCC BL65.S375 M37 2018 (print) | DDC 201/.727–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018019589
Typeset in 11 on 13 pt Sabon
by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited
Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website:
politybooks.com
Acknowledgements
This book is the product of many years’ research and contemplation about the increasing relevance of religion in politics and international security in the world today. As with all such endeavours there are many people to thank for helping me to formulate the ideas and thoughts and get them on the written page and for creating the time and space to complete the project. Firstly, I would like to thank Joseph Beakhouse for his research assistance, without which the book would be much weaker. I am indebted to students at the University of East Anglia who have taken my courses on Religion and International Relations and the Clash of Fundamentalisms over the years. The conversations and debates have proved stimulating and they will recognize many of the ideas and thoughts contained in the following pages. I appreciate colleagues and the university for affording me the time to be able to complete the book. My thanks go especially to Alan Finlayson, who made the ultimate sacrifice and took on my role as Head of the School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies to allow me a sabbatical.
There are colleagues whose work and example as brilliant academics and good citizens never fails to inspire. My academic life would be far poorer without them, so my thanks and respect go to Jeff Haynes, Stuart Croft, Inderjeet Parmar, Bela Arora, Heather Savigny, John Charmley, and Lee Jarvis.
I am grateful to my wonderful wife Gill for her love and patience. Finally, I would like to thank my editors at Polity, Louise Knight and Nekane Tanaka Galdos, for their encouragement and support throughout the project and also the three anonymous reviewers whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the final publication.
Abbreviations
ACN
Aid to the Church in Need
AJJDC
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
AIPAC
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AKP
Justice Development Party
BJP
Bahratiya Janata Party
CFF
Clonard–Fitzroy Fellowship
DUP
Democratic Unionist Party
EOKA
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
ES
English School
FLN
National Liberation Front
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICRD
International Center for Religion and Diplomacy
IR
International Relations
IRA
Irish Republican Army
IRFA
International Religious Freedom Act
ISIL
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
GWOT
Global War on Terror
NICRA
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
ORGA
Office of Religion and Global Affairs
PEPFAR
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
RSS
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UDHR
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC
United Nations Human Rights Council
USAID
United States of Agency for International Development
USCIRF
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
USDOS
United States Department of State
USIP
United States Institute of Peace
UVF
Ulster Volunteer Force
Tables and Figure
Tables
1.1
International relations theory and religion
2.1
Mimetic rivalry, sacred violence and the scapegoat mechanism
4.1
18 lessons in religious peacemaking
5.1
US faith-based initiatives and international security
6.1
Key declarations on religion and human security
6.2
25 countries with apostasy and blasphemy laws
6.3
Religious texts on the golden rule
Figure
2.1
Triangulation of mimetic desire
Introduction: Looking Beyond the Religion as Good or Bad Dichotomy
A scorpion and a frog meet on the river bank and the scorpion asks the frog to carry him on his back over to the other side. The frog asks, ‘How do I know you won't sting me?’ The scorpion replies, ‘Because if I do, I will die too.’ The frog is satisfied and they set out across the river. In midstream the scorpion stings the frog. The frog feels the onset of paralysis and starts to sink, knowing they will both drown; he just has enough time to gasp ‘Why?’
The scorpion replies ‘Because it's in my nature.’ In the pages that follow we analyse the complex relationship between religion and security and in doing so consider the multifaceted nature of religion as a source of violence, conflict and insecurity on the one hand and a channel of peace, goodwill and security on the other. What is in religion's nature? Like the scorpion in Aesop's fable who just can't help but inflict suffering because it's in its nature? Or like the frog willing and trusting, more sinned against than sinning?
In the scorpion/frog dichotomy lies much contemporary debate around religion and international security. Such a narrative portrays a Manichean worldview in which religion is either good or bad and needs to be understood by policy makers and wider society in order to enhance social cohesion and reduce tensions leading to violence. This approach appeals to a problem-solving narrative in which religion can be defined, analysed, engaged, co-opted or resisted by political elites and populations as part of a political agenda couched in terms of security, social cohesion, faith-based initiatives and religious freedom. Religion and what counts as religious in terms of security are highly contestable and require far greater nuance than religion good/bad or violent/pacific binaries.
In seeking to go beyond this dichotomy Religion and International Security makes five main claims. Firstly, that religion, conceptions of religion and the utility of religion as a category in international security are social constructs and as such ‘religion’ is what we make of it. Whether religion is portrayed as violent or peaceful is a social construction, dependent upon what counts as religion, which acts are considered religious and whether religion can be essentialized in given situations, with ‘religious’ motivations trumping competing interpretations. Secondly, that religion ‘good or bad’ presents a false dichotomy that enables states to control and use religion by co-opting or excluding certain religious actors. Thirdly, that politics shapes religion as much as, if not more than, religion shapes politics. Religion changes according to context, time and place and constantly evolves through political change and necessity. Fourthly, that what is described as ‘religious’ is often political, or involves a complex range of issues, where the term ‘religion’ is used as a signifier to mask political intentions and objectives. The fifth claim is that religion is inherently political and its sacred texts, traditions, rituals and pastimes emerged to order society and legitimate authority.
Over the course of Religion and International Security we consider in theoretical, historical and contemporary perspective what Robert Seiple and Dennis Hoover described as the ‘new nexus in international relations’ (Seiple and Hoover 2004). The newness of the nexus in the aftermath of 9/11 was a reflection of the neglect of religion in the international relations and security studies disciplines. In 1966 the front cover of the April edition of Time magazine asked ‘Is God Dead?’ while just over forty years later John Micklethwait and the editor and Washington Bureau chief for The Economist, Adrian Wooldridge, declared ‘God is Back’ (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009). Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel meanwhile declared the twenty-first century to be ‘God's Century’ (Toft et al. 2011). The reality is that God, or rather religion, has never gone away, it is simply that most Western scholars have turned a blind eye to the lived experience of large sections of humanity, for whom belief in God and religious practice is a reality.
Today, there is an increased recognition and acknowledgement, for good or ill, of the role that religion plays in international affairs, as not only scholars and commentators but also governments turn their attention to encouraging religious literacy, diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking and conflict resolution. The public square, once denied religious actors, has become more inclusive as a post-secular space (Mavelli and Petito 2012). Religion is not going away and, although atheism is increasing in the West, religious belief in ostensibly or formerly atheistic countries, including the former Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba is growing exponentially. China has an estimated Christian population of 67 million, approximately five per cent of the population (Pew Research Center 2011c). Fenggang Yang describes a spiritual revival taking place in China and estimates that by 2030 China will have the world's largest Christian population (Yang 2012). Europe's Muslim population is expected to rise from 4.9 per cent of the population in 2016 to between 7.4 and 14 per cent in 2050 (Pew Research Center 2017d). Religion is here to stay.
At the time of writing, civil war is raging in Syria between government forces and those of the opposition; based as much, if not more, on religious fault lines than on attitudes towards democracy. Shia and Alawites, backed by the Shia forces of Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, are pitted against Sunni Muslims, divided along factional lines between pro-democracy activists, secular Kurds and a plethora of Islamist groups with Christians and Palestinian refugees caught in the middle. Sunni and Shia refugees have fled to neighbouring countries and into Europe presenting significant economic, demographic and logistical challenges for host countries. The short-lived Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq has been destroyed, with Daesh fighters dispersing across the region and returning to their home countries with exhortations to use whatever weapons are available to attack Western and Jewish targets and those Muslims they consider apostate or takfir. Shia and Sufi mosques continue to be bombed and Coptic Christian churches and congregations targeted in Egypt.
Genocide has been committed by the Myanmar military and their Buddhist supporters against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine province and by Daesh fighters on the Plains of Nineveh against Yazidis and Christians. Violence has erupted in the Palestinian territories following the decision of Donald Trump to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, which in turn was inspired by pressure from conservative evangelicals and opposed by Pope Francis, other Christian leaders, moderate Jews and Muslims across the world. At the same time, and away from the glare of publicity, faith-based organizations are distributing foreign assistance, setting up hospitals, clinics, schools and clean water programmes, engaging in interfaith dialogue, brokering peace in communities and practically demonstrating compassion for humanity. Whether religion is better represented by the scorpion or the frog is a matter for conjecture or, as we shall discover, construction. What is clear is the need to study, understand, analyse and critique religion and international security today.
Any study of religion requires clarity about what exactly is being discussed. Sociologists of religion have produced thousands of volumes debating the definition of religion. We do not have the time or space to do so here but we utilize Scott Thomas’ helpful formulation that divides approaches to religion between a cognitive-propositional and rationalist position, where religion is defined as a ‘set of ideas, doctrines, or belief systems’ against a narrative/linguistic approach. The latter approach is communitarian and historicist, insisting on the importance of ‘cultural and religious traditions and historic faith communities’ (Thomas 2005: 89) see also (MacIntyre 2005, 2008). The narrative/linguistic approach contends that religious traditions help to mould individual and communal identity and to shape lived experience and worldview. In Religion and International Security religion and faith are used interchangeably and are defined by both approaches in different contexts. The narrative/linguistic approach is adopted when contemplating the lived experience of religious belief and practice as part of a community where tradition is an important identifier. The cognitive-propositional approach is used, where religion is ascribing to a set of beliefs and doctrines, rather than a way of life, where religion is co-opted for the furtherance of a political cause.
Security is also highly contested and requires defining in order to explain how the term is to be understood throughout the book. Security at its most basic level is about threats, not necessarily or exclusively about war, but threats at many levels and how to counter those. International Relations (IR) and security studies have expanded as a sub-discipline in recent decades beyond relations between states and ensuring the integrity of the state to consider other referent objects including the international system and the human. Security now concerns issues as diverse as regime security, gender, terrorism, environment, economic, energy and cyber security. Speech acts can be used to securitize anything that can be portrayed as an existential threat to our way of life. Religion and International Security adopts Peter Hough's broad definition of security: ‘If people, be they government ministers or private individuals, perceive an issue to threaten their lives in some way and respond politically to this, then that issue should be deemed to be a security issue’ (Hough 2008: 10).
Security is not limited to being safeguarded against threats but ultimately goes beyond that to create an environment free from threat. Ken Booth describes such freedom as emancipation, the ability to do what we would freely choose to do without human constraints. For Booth: ‘Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security’ (Booth 1991: 319). It is argued in this book that religion has emancipatory potential, which is realized in the willingness to reach out to and embrace the ‘other’. This emancipatory potential competes with the stultifying and threatening bellicosity and intolerance of some religious actors for whom the ‘other’ represents an existential threat. It also competes with governments seeking to co-opt religious actors to help bring about political objectives, using religion as another weapon in a domestic or foreign-policy armoury.
In order better to understand changing approaches to incorporating religion into international relations and international security we focus in the first chapter on how religion came to be marginalized in IR theory since the Treaty of Westphalia until comparatively recently. We explore the dominant paradigm of a secular world order, secularism and the secularization thesis that came to dominate the discipline. We then consider and contest the contribution of the guardian of the public square, Jürgen Habermas, to an emerging post-secular discourse in which religion is readmitted under certain preconditions. This discussion sets up an examination of the main theoretical schools in IR and their potential to incorporate religion, including Realism, the English School, Liberalism, Constructivism, Copenhagen School and Critical Security Studies. The chapter argues that there is no need for a separate international relations of religion but rather that existing IR theory needs to move beyond a secular paradigm in order to understand more fully and theorize about the role of religion in a global context on a case-study basis.
Chapter 2 moves beyond traditional IR theory to introduce and analyse René Girard's proposition on the role of religion in violence and conflict, where he posits that rather than being the cause of violence in the world as so many claim, religion came about as an antidote to constrain violence. The concepts of mimetic rivalry, sacrifice and scapegoating are introduced before turning to inter- and intrafaith conflict, exploring conflict leading to violence between people using Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis as a starting point. The chapter explores interfaith conflict between Christians and Muslims, Jews and Muslims and Hindus and Muslims, through this Girardian paradigm, before considering the origins and outworking of the intrafaith divide between Sunni and Shia in Islam.
The third chapter, on just war and jihad, examines how Christianity transformed from a pacifist religion to the religion of the greatest war machine of its age, the Roman Empire, and how this co-option by the state introduces the concept of just-war theory. The chapter goes on to discuss jihad, exploring the emergence of the lesser jihad, or jihad of the sword into prominence within Islamist streams of Islam. Finally, the chapter examines the efficacy of the term ‘religious terrorism’ to describe terrorist acts within a religious paradigm, whether or not these acts are religiously motivated. Critical terrorism studies have challenged the certainties around ‘religious terrorism’ advanced by Terrorism Studies and this debate is revisited here.
Chapter 4 focuses on peacemaking and fundamentalist and mainstream contributions to religious cooperation and conflict resolution. We begin with an exploration of peace within the sacred texts in Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism before examining the practice of religious peacemakers, highlighting Mahatma Gandhi's Satyagraha campaign and Clonard–Fitzroy Fellowship's contribution to peace and reconciliation within Northern Ireland. The chapter proceeds with critical analysis of secular governments’ use of religious actors to advise on, and even lead, aspects of conflict resolution, diplomacy and humanitarian assistance. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the capacity for religious actors to make a significant contribution to societal wellbeing through religious cooperation.
The fifth chapter considers how the United States has responded to a post-secular international environment and developed faith-based initiatives in US foreign policy in the twenty-first century, arguing that such attempts seek to co-opt religious actors to achieve US political objectives. Faith-based diplomacy and an increasing emphasis on religious literacy are examined critically, before considering the enhanced role of military chaplains within the US armed forces. The chapter then analyses the role of faith-based humanitarian assistance in the context of international security. In Chapter 6 we move on to discuss human security before exploring the state of government harassment and social hostility towards religious groups today. The countries and regions where religious persecution is most prevalent are analysed and we consider the potential for human security to be strengthened through the intervention of religious and political actors in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the Marrakesh Declaration and Charter for Compassion. The conclusion draws together the aspects of religion and international security covered in the book and concluding that whether religious practice is good or bad it is what we make it. Religion is inherently political and is often used as a signifier to mask political objectives and intentions. Governmental attempts to co-opt religious actors can be counter-productive but at its best, religiously motivated action has emancipatory potential to build bridges rather than walls, and to heal rather than to harm, and in doing so, enhance international security.
1 Theorizing Religion and International Security
While Western intellectuals and policy makers have sought to marginalize and neutralize religion within domestic and international polity as part of the Enlightenment project, religion has stubbornly refused to depart the scene. Indeed, for much of the world, religion has always been a significant component of political systems, individual and communal life. Even within the West the absence of religious actors in international politics and security has been illusory, with the contribution of religious actors to international security over the course of the twentieth century largely overlooked or subordinated to discussions of balance of power, security dilemmas, ideological competition and economic interdependence. The dualism of the private and public sphere, the sacred and the profane, is anathema to people and communities of faith where such division is artificial, a social construct which enables the development of theory at the expense of ignoring a significant empirical component.
The Iranian revolution of 1979, the mujahideen campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan, emergence of Islamism as a rival to secular and pan-Arabism in the Middle East, the role of Pope John Paul II in the Cold War, the individual faith of presidents and prime ministers and the events of 9/11 all require explanations and theorization to enable us better to understand the world. In this chapter we consider how religion has until recently been marginalized in IR theory and Western society, from the Treaty of Westphalia until the religious turn in the early twenty-first century. The chapter explores the secular world order, including the secularization thesis and secularism, before considering Jürgen Habermas’ re-evaluation of the sacred and what has come to be known as the post secular. We then critically engage with the main theoretical paradigms including realism, the English School, liberalism, constructivism, Copenhagen School and Critical Security Studies to see the potential for a greater engagement with religion as a relevant factor within IR. The chapter concludes that existing IR theory needs, and is equipped, to move beyond a secular paradigm in order to understand and theorize more fully about the role of religion – belief, practices and institutions in a global context.
Secular World Order
The myth of a secular world order for IR theorists begins with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which marks an agreement between Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the Schmalkaldic League. The treaty established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio – ‘whose region, his religion’, which enabled princes within the Holy Roman Empire to choose whether their region would follow Catholicism or Lutheranism, effectively ceding sovereignty to individual principalities. For subjects dissenting from their ruler's adoption of a particular version of Christianity, there was the option of converting or transferring to another region. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), bringing the Thirty Years War to an end, built on the Peace of Augsburg, reinforcing the idea of sovereignty. The principle of religious toleration and non-interference in the domestic religious affairs of other states laid the groundwork for a realist international order based on pluralism, with religion subordinate to raison d'état and states being the key actors in international relations (Shah and Philpott 2011; Thomas 2005: 54–5).
For mainstream IR theory, the death and destruction caused by religious conflict across Europe necessitated removing religion from politics and establishing principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as a means of reducing the prevalence of war. The privatization of religion was an essential component of modernization and the bringing about of an international system, order or society in an anarchical world. The allegiance of citizens or subjects to a transnational and transcendent religion could be transferred to the state instead, strengthening power and assuring rulers of the loyalty of their subjects. And yet such a narrow reading fails to acknowledge that Westphalia recognized religion's role within the state as its raison d'être. Westphalia produced a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain how religion was relegated in the West from being the central component in the life of the individual, community and state to being a privatized affair.
William Cavanaugh dismisses the idea that the liberal state, privatization of religion and secularization saves us from the excesses of religion's propensity for domestic disputes and international warfare as a myth (Cavanaugh 2002). Scott Thomas suggests that modernization theory is able to supply the missing dimension to account for international relations’ neglect of religion. Modernization theory has three components, beginning with the concept that a ‘modern’ society can be distinguished from a ‘traditional’ society, the former being characterized by rapid change, flexibility and economic progress, while the latter is regarded as inflexible, ‘static or monolithic’. Clearly, both portrayals are stereotypes and overlook change within traditional society. However, the stereotypes serve to restrict the public role of religion to traditional rather than modern society (Thomas 2005: 51).
The second concept of modernization theory is one of universalism – that the process of modernization is linear, from primitive, through traditional to modern society. This progression is an inevitable product of economic and scientific development, which will affect all parts of the world. The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment emerge from the religious foundations of traditional society in the West but these are outgrown, enabling society to continue to develop and progress. The superiority of Western liberal society in this second concept would inevitably extend to the rest of the world with differences between the modern and traditional eventually disappearing, including the public role of religion (Thomas 2005: 51–2).
As part of the belief in the inevitability of universal modernization the third aspect of modernization theory is critically important for attitudes towards religion within policy making and academic theorization. Secularization theory can be traced back to the eighteenth century and is implicit in the seminal works of two of sociology's founding fathers, Weber and Durkheim. As society becomes increasingly educated and modernized a cultural pluralism develops in which religion is no longer preeminent and withdraws, or is withdrawn, from the public square. Social, political and economic institutions will dominate modern society with religion becoming increasingly a private matter. Religion and religious institutions are portrayed as pre-modern, backward, based on irrationality and superstition, which increasingly only has relevance to individuals at the private level. As society becomes more modern the influence of religion and religious observance will decline (Berger 1990; Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Thomas 2005: 52).
Secularization Theory has paved the way for secularism to dominate Western polity, with its most pronounced expressions evident in the first amendment of the American constitution and the French constitution's introduction of laïcité with walls of separation between Church and State. Restricting religion to the private sphere and minimizing its influence released political, cultural and economic institutions to become utility maximizers operating on the basis of rational decision making. Religion is socially constructed as absolutist, irrational, divisive and backward with a propensity towards violence. While the Treaty of Westphalia was drawn up to put an end to religious violence, modernization was the key to reducing violence and warfare with religion demonized as being the leading cause of wars and violence throughout history (Cavanaugh 2009:17).
Secularization theory has dominated social scientific enquiry and the significance of religion in the public sphere of the liberal nation-state and yet is based on certain myths. It constructs a social world in which modernization and rationality are prerequisites and religion is seen as an impediment to progress. A world where religion and spirituality are no longer forces within the political, social and economic spheres but are remnants of a bygone age, which will disappear as societies are modernized (Bellah 1991). For Cavanaugh the belief that religion is ‘essentially prone to violence’ is a foundational myth legitimizing liberal nation-states, which are portrayed as able to pacify such tendencies. In the process, he argues, state sovereignty is strengthened by marginalizing religious groups, discourse and practices and casting ‘nonsecular social orders’ in ‘the role of villain’ (Cavanaugh 2009: 4).
A third myth involves the construction of ‘religion’ as a set of individual beliefs and practices, which can be carefully set aside before entering the ‘grown-up’ world of rational discussion and policy making. A dualism where the sacred and profane, the religious and the secular are divisible would have been anathema in traditional society and for people today, for whom their belief is all encompassing in every area of their life and community.
Talal Asad argues that secularism has been the dominant epistemic framework and has sought to construct ‘religion’, and what counts as religious, by continually redefining the ‘space that religion may properly occupy in society’ (Asad 2003: 210). Secularism has not sought simply to restrict religion to the private sphere but has also sought to control what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate religion. Religious actors, as with the Church of England, can be co-opted at the behest of the state to legitimate military action or honour troops who have fought a nation's wars. While emphasizing a separation of religion and the state, Western democracies’ governments have continuously intervened and regulated religious practice, while espousing the virtues of religions having freedom to operate without state interference (Hurd 2011, 2012). Following Saba Mahmood, secularism can be better understood not as a neutral actor establishing a public sphere in which all are free to participate on an equal basis and where the religious are free to practise their religion and are protected by the state to enable them to do so, but rather as a ‘discursive operation of power’ generating public and private spheres that seem perfectly normal (Mahmood 2016: 3). However, secularism provides power for the state to reorganize, shape and determine what constitutes acceptable religious practice.
Habermas and the Post Secular
While there has undoubtedly been a reduction in church attendance in Western Europe, religion obstinately refuses to fade away in the manner envisaged by secularization theory. Indeed, the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life research indicates that in 2015, 84 per cent of the world's population of 7.2 billion were religiously affiliated, with only 16 per cent declaring no religion. In the period up to 2050 religious affiliation is expected to rise rather than fall with the unaffiliated reducing to 12.5 per cent of the global population. While numbers of atheists and agnostics are expected to rise, largely through Christians in America and Europe defecting to no belief, the birth rates of the religiously affiliated outstrip those of non-believers and once death rates are factored in, the percentage of the projected 9.6 billion global population who believe increases to 87.5 per cent (Pew Research Center 2015, 2017b). Clearly there are issues around survey methodology and what actually constitutes religious belief, practice or adherence to a particular set of beliefs. The claim that significant numbers of people around the world self-describe themselves as belonging to a specific religion is significant.
The secularization thesis has also been challenged by the empirical evidence, suggesting that modernization was antithetical to religion. The thesis based on the myth of two separate and definable spheres seeks to construct a false dichotomy between the religious and the secular, which have always been intimately interconnected. Kings and Queens of Great Britain remained Supreme Governors of the Church of England, Popes championed anti-communism throughout the Cold War and continued to proclaim on all aspects of modern society, and the post-Second-World-War international order was influenced in no small measure by the work of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in December 1940. The commission appointed from the Federal Council of Churches produced the Six Pillars of Peace in 1943, which were largely adopted by the Roosevelt/Truman administrations as essential components of a pacific world order. These included the need for an overarching international organization (United Nations), economic justice, reform of the world system, decolonization, disarmament and the protection of individual freedoms of religion and intellectual liberty.
In a Europe seeking to rebuild and modernize after the war the emergence of Christian Democrat parties as major political actors in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Italy, is indicative of the accommodation secularism has made with religion in modernity. Christian Democrats have largely developed and governed as secular actors and yet cling to their initial religious identity as a signifier and for legitimation (Kalyvar 1996). While the modernization of Japan, during the Meiji restoration, and Turkey, under Kemal Ataturk, lent support to the secularization thesis, more recently secular leaders like Baathists Saddam Hussein and Bashar Assad appealed to religion to garner support for their diminished political authority.
Rather than ending religious influence, globalization has enabled a greater flow of ideas and peoples exposing people to a variety of religions, and indeed atheism, in a way that was previously not possible. The failure of secular ideologies including fascism, communism and neoliberalism to bring about peace, security and economic justice has challenged their legitimacy enabling religious actors to play a role in political processes and suggest alternatives which can and do resonate with the religious audiences. At its most extreme, such impulses led to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, at the other to the provision of social and welfare support services such as the provision of welfare and education by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, or the provision of foodbanks by churches in Great Britain.
This challenge to secularization theory has caused leading proponents of the theory to reconsider. Sociologist and public intellectual Peter Berger who had been the intellectual standard bearer for secularization in the United States (1979) recanted two decades later, enthralled by a world in which he saw religion as resurgent and secularization in retreat (Berger 1999). As significant as this has been, the shift in thinking in the later work of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (Calhoun, Mendieta and Antwerpen 2013). Still wedded to the fulfilment of the ‘unfinished project of modernity’, he now acknowledges the importance of engaging with religious actors in accordance with his theory of communicative action and discourse ethics ‘founded upon and expressive of the differentiated logic of validity claims contained within the act of communication and language itself’ (Ott 2015: 1; see also Habermas 1995, 2002, 2005). While this does not signal a retreat to religion from secularization and modernity, it nonetheless marks a significant shift in outlook and approach, which has encouraged other academics to re-evaluate their neglect of religion in IR and security studies, among other disciplines (Ott 2015: 3). More importantly, such shifts in thinking have paved the way for policy makers to reflect on their approaches to religion in the public sphere and Habermas’ change of emphasis should therefore be considered in greater detail.
Habermas acknowledges the continuing significance of religion in the twenty-first century and sees the necessity of involving religious actors in order to complete the project of modernity. He wrestles with the problem identified by John Rawls of how to involve ‘irrational’ actors in the rational discourse of modernity:
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons … are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support.
(Rawls 1997: 783)
Rawls was criticized on the grounds that citizens might refuse or be unable to separate contributions expressed in religious or secular languages and it would place an unreasonable burden on religious people for them to enter public discussion. Habermas claims to overcome both these objections by providing an opportunity for ‘the potential truth contents of religious utterances’ to be shared in the public sphere. However, first they ‘must be translated into a generally accessible language before they can find their way onto the agendas of parliaments, courts, or administrative bodies and influence their decisions’ (Habermas 2011: 25–6).
For Habermas ‘the deliberative mode of democratic will formation’ rests on two key principles – the equal participation of all citizens and the fact that discussion proceeds on the presumption of rationally accepted outcomes (Habermas 2004: 10, 16; 2006: 4). He argues that:
an institutional filter should be established between informal communication in the public arena and formal deliberations of political bodies that yield to collectively binding decisions … all legally enforceable and publically sanctioned decisions can be formulated and justified in a universally accessible language without having to restrict the polyphonic diversity of public voices at its very source.
(Habermas 2011: 26)
Citizens will respect one another ‘as free and equal members of their political community’ (Habermas 2006: 5). They are socialized in this way and ‘can form and stabilize their identity only within a network of relationships of reciprocal recognition’ (Habermas 2004: 16). Religious citizens must recognize that they live in a secular state and can express themselves in religious language but must rely on the impartiality of the state to translate this into secular language (Habermas 2006: 10). They should recognize both the need to explain to their secular counterparts political statements and attitudes and respect ‘the precedence of secular reasons and the institutional translation requirement’ (Habermas 2006: 13, 15). On the basis of reciprocity, secular citizens ‘are obliged not to publicly dismiss religious contributions to political opinion and will formation as mere noise, or even nonsense, from the start’ (Habermas 2011: 26). There should be the presumption that religious citizens are authentic in their faith (Habermas 2010: 20–1).
Habermas’ conversion to religious recognition was only partial and is still dominated by a secularist mind set (Pabst 2012: 1005). While acknowledging the authenticity of religious belief he nonetheless makes no allowance for religious truth claims in the public sphere. The asymmetric burden still falls on the religious rather than the secular side with continuing assumptions of religious irrationality and secular rationality. Secular citizens are required not to merely dismiss religious discourse in the public sphere as ‘nonsense’ while the religious require a secular language, an acceptance that the state will translate their discourse, and willingness for the myths, traditions and inspiration of religious imagery to be co-opted for the modernizing project. Ott accuses Habermas of seeking to use religion to further the ‘Enlightenment's liberal program’ while ‘the socio-ethical revolutionary substance of religion is pushed to the margins’ (Ott 2015: 30).
The need to translate religious discourse on the grounds of accessibility is rejected by Dallmayr, who points out that religious language in its texts is generally highly accessible to all and, on the contrary, it is rationalist texts from ‘Kant to Carnap, Quine and Rawls’ that are in need of interpretation, reinterpretation and translation (Dallmayr, 2012: 968–9). Indeed, one might also add Habermas’ own writings. Cerella is surely right when he claims that Habermas’ post-secular discourse only allows the ‘possibility of movement’ for ‘religion in the public sphere to be used for secular and instrumental ends’ (Cerella 2012: 976–7). Pabst is even more dismissive of Habermas’ post-secular vision, arguing that he draws a line in the public sphere between the state and communities and groups that religious arguments are not permitted to cross (Pabst 2012: 1005).
Habermas’ accommodation of religion in the public sphere appears largely illusory and is a normative position redefining the boundaries of religious involvement in the public sphere (see Butler et al. 2011). Habermas’ difficulties are indicative of the well-established construction and norm of a religious–secular divide in the social sciences and can be observed as Western states seek to utilize religion and religious actors in domestic and international politics. International relations and security theories have struggled to engage with the issue of religion in recent decades. We now turn our attention to how such theories can incorporate a religious dimension to reflect this increased awareness of the role of religion in international security.
Main Theoretical Paradigms
That international relations and international security grew and developed within a secular paradigm accounts for the difficulties many Western-centric IR theorists have experienced when considering how religion fits in to considerations of security. Charles Taylor identifies three moves of secularism, which include distinguishing Church from the State; separating Church and State, including the subordination of Church to the State; and the side lining of religion from the State and public life (Taylor 2007, 2009). Erin Wilson has added a fourth move to account for religious myopia when theorizing global politics. This involves the ‘positioning of secularization as a central part of modernization and development’, where religion is portrayed as regressive and secularism as natural and universal (Wilson 2012: 43).
The ultimate triumph of the secular over the religious or the transcendent over the sacred comes not when religion is disputed but when it is ignored. International relations theorists did not begin by marginalizing religion at the outset of the modern discipline, following the First World War, but with a few worthy exceptions it took the wake-up call of religious fanatics flying planes into New York skyscrapers at the start of the twenty-first century for the discipline to begin to reappraise a religious dimension in its theorization.
Table 1.1
International relations theory and religion
This chapter considers the main theoretical paradigms and how they have or could have utility in explaining the role of religion in international security and relations. There are many ways of theorizing about religion and its place in international relations: causal theories explaining violence and religion's role in either perpetrating or ending it; normative theories, which posit how the world ought to be and can include theories from a religious or non-religious standpoint such as secularization theory; and theory which helps us to understand and contextualize the role of religious groups within IR.
Realism
Modern international relations emerged from the killing fields of the 1914–18 war, understandably with a strong imperative to understand the causes of war and how to find a way for the ‘war to end all wars’ being just that. Idealists, or utopians, sought to build a brighter future based on normative ideals of inter-dependence, humanity, and pacific international order overseen by the League of Nations with mutual obligations and disarmament. As it became increasingly evident that the League would fail following its unwillingness to intervene in German reoccupation of the Ruhr, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia or the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, realists including E. H. Carr challenged the idealist paradigm presenting a realist perspective that purported to reveal international relations as they really are, not necessarily as one would like them to be. What was at stake were the vital issues of human nature and the use and abuse of power between nations. This became even more pertinent as the world once again descended into total warfare for the major powers and their areas of influence in 1939.
For classical realists the most important actor, or referent object, of international relations was the state, and the defining characteristic of international order (or disorder) one of anarchy. Unlike at the level below the state there was no overarching authority at state or international level and in order to maximize the security of one's own state in relation to other states a self-help system, augmented by alliances and theories of balance of power were necessary in order to avoid being attacked. Realists looked to earlier texts highlighting political power and security including Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses, Hobbes’ Leviathan and Clausewitz's On War. Each of these seminal texts is secular to the extent that religion is not seen as the driving force behind state's actions.
Reinhold Niebuhr (1960, 2008) however, reintroduces St Augustine to realist international relations theory:
The religious dimensions of political realism, with the emphasis on sin, or the limits of human nature, or on human knowledge, on the likelihood of irony or tragedy in political outcomes, and on the limits of what politics can accomplish begins with the rediscovery of St Augustine for the Realist paradigm.
(Thomas 2005: 57)
It is the fallen nature of humanity, with its accompanying sin and frailties, which produces a pessimistic prognosis linking human nature to conflict through a ‘will-to-power and the tendency of society to ignore moral considerations’ (Sandal and James 2010: 12). Niebuhr emphasizes the tragic nature of humanity, which aspires to individual morality and yet fails collectively to act morally.
Niebuhr's philosophy was a Christian Realism, which greatly influenced the key players in the Truman and
