Resemblance and Representation E-Book

Ben Blumson

• Herausgeber: Open Book Publishers
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

It’s a platitude – which only a philosopher would dream of denying – that whereas words are connected to what they represent merely by arbitrary conventions, pictures are connected to what they represent by resemblance. The most important difference between my portrait and my name, for example, is that whereas my portrait and I are connected by my portrait’s resemblance to me, my name and I are connected merely by an arbitrary convention. The first aim of this book is to defend this platitude from the apparently compelling objections raised against it, by analysing depiction in a way which reveals how it is mediated by resemblance. It’s natural to contrast the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance, which emphasises the differences between depictive and descriptive representation, with an extremely close analogy between depiction and description, which emphasises the similarities between depictive and descriptive representation. Whereas the platitude emphasises that the connection between my portrait and me is natural in a way the connection between my name and me is not, the analogy emphasises the contingency of the connection between my portrait and me. Nevertheless, the second aim of this book is to defend an extremely close analogy between depiction and description. The strategy of the book is to argue that the apparently compelling objections raised against the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance are manifestations of more general problems, which are familiar from the philosophy of language. These problems, it argues, can be resolved by answers analogous to their counterparts in the philosophy of language, without rejecting the platitude. So the combination of the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance with a close analogy between depiction and description turns out to be a compelling theory of depiction, which combines the virtues of common sense with the insights of its detractors.

Leseprobe

RESEMBLANCE AND REPRESENTATION

Resemblance and Representation

An Essay in the Philosophy of Pictures

Ben Blumson

http://www.openbookpublishers.com

© 2014 Ben Blumson

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Blumson, Ben,Resemblance and Representation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Pictures. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0046

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ISBN Paperback: 978-1-78374-072-7

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ISBN Digital ebook (epub): 978-1-78374-075-8

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DOI: 10.11647/OBP.0046

Cover image: Kazimir Malevich, Suprematist painting (with black trapezium and red square) (1915). Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam. Wikimedia Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazimir_Malevich_-_Suprametism.jpg

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Printed in the United Kingdom and United States by Lightning Source for Open Book Publishers (Cambridge, UK).

For my father, Richard Blumson

Contents

List of illustrations

ix

Acknowledgements

1

Note on the text

5

1. Introduction

9

1.1 An ostensive definition of depiction

10

1.2 The analysis of resemblance as sharing properties

13

1.3 An intuitive taxonomy of representation

21

1.4 The methodology of analysis

23

1.5 Conclusion

28

2. Defining Depiction

31

2.1 Grice’s analysis of speaker meaning

32

2.2 The intended effect in Grice’s analysis

35

2.3 The salient feature in Grice’s analysis

39

2.4 Abell’s analysis of depiction

44

2.5 Conclusion

49

3. Depiction and Intention

51

3.1 Objections to the necessity of intention

52

3.2 Objections to the necessity of an audience

57

3.3 Objections to the sufficiency of intention

60

3.4 Objections to the necessity of reasons

63

3.5 Conclusion

66

4. Depiction and Convention

67

4.1 Goodman’s definition of symbol systems

68

4.2 Formal definition of languages

70

4.3 Lewis’ analysis of convention

73

4.4 Analysis of depictive symbol systems

77

4.5 Conclusion

81

5. Symbol Systems

85

5.1 Analysis of conventional language

86

5.2 Analysis of symbol systems in use

88

5.3 Depiction outside of symbol systems

92

5.4 Meaning outside conventional language

94

5.5 Conclusion

96

6. Depiction and Composition

99

6.1 Theories of representation

102

6.2 The finite axiomatization constraint

105

6.3 The mirror constraint

108

6.4 The structural constraint

111

6.5 Conclusion

114

7. Interpreting Images

117

7.1 Compositionality and language understanding

118

7.2 Compositionality and understanding pictures

122

7.3 Understanding pictures without compositionality

126

7.4 Understanding language without compositionality

130

7.5 Conclusion

136

8. Intentionality and Inexistence

139

8.1 Analysing depiction in intentional terms

141

8.2 Denying depiction is relational

145

8.3 Denying relations are between existents

148

8.4 Depiction of states of affairs

151

8.5 Conclusion

157

9. Perspective and Possibility

159

9.1 The possible worlds analysis of content

159

9.2 Centred properties and possible worlds

161

9.3 The two-dimensional analysis of content

168

9.4 Structured intensions and impossible worlds

172

9.5 Conclusion

177

10. Pictures and Properties

179

10.1 Predicate nominalism

182

10.2 Class nominalism

185

10.3 Scientific realism

188

10.4 Inegalitarian nominalism

193

10.5 Conclusion

196

References

199

Index

207

List of illustrations

1

A white sphere in front of a black sphere. From Jeff Ross (1997), Semantics of Media (Dordrecht: Kluwer), p. 73. © Kluwer. With kind permission from Springer Science and Business Media.

161

2

A black sphere in front of a white sphere. From Jeff Ross (1997), Semantics of Media (Dordrecht: Kluwer), p. 73. © Kluwer. With kind permission from Springer Science and Business Media.

161

3

A black sphere to the left.

163

4

A black sphere to the right.

163

5

A black sphere to the left from above.

164

6

A black sphere to the right from above.

164

7

An impossible triangle. Image from Wikimedia: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pentriangle.svg

172

Acknowledgements

This book has had a long gestation, and I have needed a lot of help, so there are a lot of people to thank. Much of the philosophy of language and mind I draw on in these pages I learnt as an undergraduate at the University of Queensland. I thank especially Deborah Brown, William Grey, Dominic Hyde and Gary Malinas for everything they taught me. I also met many of my closest friends at the University of Queensland – I would especially like to thank June Mahadevan.

The first version of the book was my PhD thesis at the Australian National University (ANU). I especially thank my supervisors Daniel Stoljar, David Chalmers and Martin Davies. Andy Egan, Frank Jackson and Robert McRoberts read entire drafts, while Catharine Abell, Jake Beck, Elizabeth Coleman, Daniel Friedrich, Brendan Jackson and Uriah Kriegel gave me comments on various chapters. The examiners also gave me helpful comments on the finished thesis.

I learnt as much at ANU from my fellow students as my teachers. In particular, Jens Christian Bjerring, David Bourget, Campbell Brown, Carl Brusse, Jacek Brzozowski, Brett Calcott, Yuri Cath, Philippe Chuard, Aisling Crean, Nic Damnjanovic, Ben Fraser, Akira Inoue, Ben Jeffares, Mitch Joe, Ole Koksvik, John Matthewson, Yujin Nagasawa, Karen Riley, Kelly Roe, Stewart Saunders, Martin Smith, Nic Southwood, Weng Hong Tang and David Wall all helped me more than they know.

In addition, I am very grateful to Magdalena Balcerak, John Bigelow, David Braddon-Mitchell, Tyler Dogget, Christoph Fehige, Alan Hajek, Bernard Nickel, Daniel Nolan, John O’Dea, Brad Richards, Denis Robinson and Declan Smithies for discussions at ANU. When Yuri Cath saw the thesis acknowledgements he accused me of thanking everyone indiscriminately. But this list is just a small fraction of the people I spoke to at ANU – I am very sorry to all those I have omitted.

I finished the first draft of the book, conceived as such, as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Sydney. I’m grateful to Uriah Kriegel, Raamy Majeed and Luca Moretti for discussions during this time. I also thank Axel Gelfert, John Holbo, Wang-Yen Lee, Mike Pelczar, Neil Sinhababu and especially Tang Weng-Hong for taking part in a reading group on the book at the National University of Singapore, and Gabriel Greenberg, Raamy Majeed and David Wall for comments on the draft.

Finally, I am grateful for conversations at conferences and seminars with Catharine Abell, Rafael De Clerq, Mitchell Green, Robert Hopkins, John Kulvicki, Paisley Livingston, Dominic Lopes, Dan Marshall, Michael Newall, Josh Parsons, Michael Rescorla, John Williams, Alberto Voltolini and John Zeimbekis. And I’m grateful to very many – but unfortunately not to all – referees who read the book manuscript or drafts of the papers mentioned below.

Parts of chapters one, two and three appeared previously as “Defining Depiction” in the British Journal of Aesthetics (2009a). This paper was presented at the Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference in Melbourne, the University of Queensland and the Singapore Management University in 2005, at the Australian National University and the British Society of Aesthetics in 2006, and at “Images and Intentionality”, a workshop I organised at the University of Sydney in 2008.

Parts of chapters four and five appeared as “Depiction and Convention” in dialectica (2008). This paper was also presented at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference in Canberra and at the Australian National University in 2006. The final paragraphs of chapter four are from “Depictive Structure?” in Philosophical Papers (2011). This paper was presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division in 2009 and at the University of Western Australia in 2010.

Parts of “Maps and Meaning” from the Journal of Philosophical Research (2010a) are reused in chapter six. I thank Daniel Friedrich and Uriah Kriegel for reading this paper. Chapter six in its current form, “Depiction and Composition”, was presented at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference in Sydney in 2010, the University of Copenhagen and the London Aesthetics Forum in 2011 and the Victoria University of Wellington in 2013.

Chapter seven, “Interpreting Images”, was presented to the American Society of Aesthetics Pacific Division in 2009, at a workshop, “Depiction and Description” in Singapore in 2010, and to the International Society of Philosophy and Literature in Singapore and at the University of Western Australia in 2013. I thank Liz Blumson for reading this chapter. Chapter eight previously appeared as “Images, Intentionality and Inexistence” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2009b) and was presented at the University of Sydney and the Australian National University in 2007.

Chapter nine was published as “Pictures Perspective and Possibility” in Philosophical Studies (2010b). This paper was also presented at the New Zealand division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy in 2007 and the University of Sydney in 2008. Chapter ten was presented at a workshop at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, “Art and Metaphysics”, and at the University of Sydney in 2012.

It’s difficult to acknowledge family without sounding like one is winning an academy award rather than writing an academic monograph. Nevertheless, Elizabeth, Erica and Emily Blumson are the best mother and sisters one could ask for. While a quick look at my thesis convinced my nephew that it was mind-numbingly repetitive (no doubt some other readers will be sympathetic), my father patiently read it all, and corrected several mistakes. This book is dedicated to him.

Note on the text

I use single quotation marks to mention an expression. So whereas Boston is a North American city, ‘Boston’ is the name of a North American city. I use double quotation marks to quote what another person said. For example, Quine said that quotation “… has a certain anomalous feature …” (Quine, 1940, 26). I use corner quotation marks when I need to use a variable or subscript within a quoted expression. So ‘˹the bank1 is open˺’ and ‘˹the bank2 is open˺’ refer to disambiguations of ‘the bank is open’.

I also use corner quotes for substitutional quantification. In particular ‘(∏φ) ˹φ˺ in English means that φ’ asserts that for every English sentence φ, writing φ (not ‘φ’!) in quotation marks, followed by ‘in English means that’, followed by φ without quotations marks results in a truth. In particular, it asserts that ‘snow is white’ in English means that snow is white, that ‘grass is green’ in English means that grass is green, … and so on.

The passage just quoted from Quine continues “A quotation is not a description, but a hieroglyph; it designates its object not by describing it in terms of other objects, but by picturing it” (Quine, 1940, 26). Though I mostly follow Quine’s recommendations for the usage of quotation marks I cannot agree with this: in fact I take quotation as a paradigmatic example of descriptive, rather than depictive, representation. I think this presupposition is defensible, but also dispensable, so I won’t defend it here.

The fact is that on that night I laughed at the axiom Quae sunt aequalia uni tertio sunt aequalia inter se (“Things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other”), for the portrait resembled M. M. and it also resembled the strumpet, and the latter did not resemble M. M. Murray admitted it, and we spent an hour philosophizing.

Giacomo Casanova, History of My Life, volume 4, chapter 10

http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0046.01

1. Introduction

It’s a platitude – which only a philosopher should dream of denying – that whereas words are connected to what they represent merely by arbitrary conventions, pictures are connected to what they represent by resemblance. The most important difference between my portrait and my name, for example, is that whereas my portrait and I are connected by my portrait’s resemblance to me, my name and I are connected merely by an arbitrary convention. The first aim of this book is to defend this platitude from the apparently compelling objections raised against it, by analysing depiction in a way which reveals that it really is mediated by resemblance.

It’s natural to contrast the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance, which emphasises the differences between depictive and descriptive representation, with an extremely close analogy between depiction and description, which emphasises the similarities between depictive and descriptive representation. Whereas the platitude emphasises that the connection between my portrait and me is natural in a way the connection between my name and me is not, the analogy emphasises the contingency of the connection between my portrait and me. Nevertheless, the second aim of this book is to defend an extremely close analogy between depiction and description.

The main strategy of the book is to generalise ideas from the philosophy of language to encompass pictures. Depiction is representational in the same sense as description, except whereas the latter is mediated by convention, the former is by resemblance. It turns out, I will argue, that many ideas from the philosophy of language apply directly to depiction, with only superficial amendments or the incorporation of resemblance. And it turns out that the apparently compelling objections raised against the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance are merely manifestations of, and amenable to the same solutions as, familiar problems from the philosophy of language.

This chapter introduces the central themes of the book. The first section clarifies the subject with an ostensive definition of depiction. The second section introduces the analysis of resemblance as sharing properties and explains how it underlies the most compelling objections to the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. The third section provides a brief taxonomy of kinds of representation, and discusses the place of depiction within this taxonomy. The fourth section elaborates and defends the method of analysis, which is the central method of the book. The fifth section outlines the remaining chapters of the book.

1.1 An ostensive definition of depiction

Depiction is a distinctive kind of representation. Figurative painting and drawing are the paradigm example, but figurative sculpture, photographs and maps are also central examples. Language is the paradigm of non-depictive representation, but symbolic notation – whether in mathematics or music – and indication – as when clouds represent rain or smoke represents fire – are also central examples. In contrast, material objects such as rocks, tables and planets are not examples of either kind of representation, but are at most degenerate cases of indication. The rest of this section clarifies and defends this ostensive definition.

Three clarifications. First, although figurative painting and drawing is the paradigm example of depiction, defining depiction as a kind of representation means that not all paintings and drawings are depictions. Although figurative and abstract painting, for example, have much in common, abstract paintings are not counterexamples to the thesis that depiction is mediated by resemblance, because figurative and abstract paintings intuitively don’t belong to the same kind of representation (Lopes, 1996, 5-6). Figurative and abstract paintings are similar because they are flat surfaces marked with paint, not because they represent in the same way.

Second, defining depiction as a kind of representation means depictions may belong to any media (Hopkins, 1994, 1; Kulvicki, 2006, 106-114). Although sculptures, for example, are not flat surfaces marked with lines or colour, this does not disqualify sculptures from being depictions, since it is plausible that figurative sculptures and pictures represent in the same way. Similarly although most music, for example, is neither depictive nor representational, program music is an important exception. Most dance is not representational, but mime is depiction in the medium of movement. And movies are plausibly depictions in the medium of film (Currie, 1995, 2).

This point is methodologically important. John Hyman, for example, begins a very different inquiry when he writes “Is an apple red because of the visual sensation it produces in us when we see it, or does it produce this sensation in us because it is red? All pictures – whatever kind of substance they are made of – consist of colour distributed on a plane. So this is the right way for a study of depiction to begin” (Hyman, 2006, 7). If the subject of inquiry is a kind of representation, rather than a representational medium, the right way to begin is not to inquire into the nature of perception and colour, but into the nature of representation in general.

Third, while depictive and descriptive representation are distinct kinds, I allow that they may overlap. Take, for example, a picture of a signboard which reads ‘danger’. The picture both represents a signboard and represents danger. But whereas the signboard is represented depictively, danger is represented merely descriptively, since it is represented by the appearance of the word ‘danger’ within the picture. Similarly the Soviet flag represents a hammer and sickle as well as representing the Soviet Union: the hammer and sickle are represented depictively, but the representation of the Soviet Union is arguably merely conventional (Peacocke, 1986, 383).

Allegorical representation is the reverse of this pattern. The words of the fiction are paradigmatically descriptive, but the events described also represent a real situation. While the representation of the fiction is descriptive, the representation of the real situation is depictive, and plausibly mediated by resemblance. Animal Farm, for example, describes in language the takeover of a farm by pigs (Orwell, 1945). The events described in turn depict the Russian Revolution, perhaps in virtue of the resemblance between the events of the story and the events of the revolution. So allegorical stories are plausibly a kind of depictive representation.

If it’s insisted that depiction must be a kind of visual representation, then this could be accommodated by substituting resemblance below for resemblance in visible respects. Although Animal Farm and the Mona Lisa, for example, have in common that they both represent what they do by resemblance, they differ because whereas the Mona Lisa resembles Lisa in respects which are visible, the story of Animal Farm resembles the revolution in respects which are invisible. So although the analysis below does not distinguish between depictions in different media, it can be easily modified if it’s desirable to do so (Abell’s (2009) analysis, for example, adopts this suggestion).

One objection. Beginning with an ostensive definition of depiction which – whether by accident or design – classifies all and only representations which are mediated by resemblance as depictions might be thought to beg the question in favour of the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. If the main objections against the resemblance theory were about which representations it classifies as depictions, then this objection would be right: choosing figurative painting and drawing as paradigm examples of depiction would stack the deck in favour of the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.

But the most compelling objections against the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance aren’t merely about its classification of different kinds of representation, but purport to show that it’s impossible for any kind of representation to be mediated by resemblance. If successful, these objections would show that depiction is not mediated by resemblance, no matter which representations are classified as depictions and no matter how depiction is ostensively defined. So in the context of rebutting these objections, beginning with an ostensive definition of depiction doesn’t beg the question in favour of the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.

Beginning with an ostensive definition of depiction which – whether by accident or design – classifies all and only representations which are mediated by resemblance as depictions may also be thought to beg the question against other theories of depiction, according to which what is distinctive of depiction is a distinctive kind of perceptual experience (Wollheim, 1980; 1987), a special kind of syntactic and semantic structure (Goodman, 1968; Kulvicki, 2006), or a peculiar kind of perceptual processing (Schier, 1986; Currie, 1995; Lopes, 1996; Newall, 2011). Since these theories disagree in their classifications, my choice of examples may also stack the deck against them.

But if a different choice of ostensive definition leads to a different final classification, and thence to a different theory, this only shows that the different definition ostended a different class of things, for which a different theory is appropriate. If, for example, one begins with an ostensive definition of depiction which includes abstract painting and excludes figurative sculpture, then one will end with a different classification and a different theory of depiction. But that theory of depiction would not disagree with the theory I argue for here, because it has a different subject matter. Beginning with an ostensive definition doesn’t beg the question, but merely describes the subject.

Because different theories of depiction – whether or not they agree about which things they classify as depictions – are not obviously inconsistent with each other, I will not adopt a last man standing approach, which seeks to establish the resemblance theory by first refuting every other plausible theory, and mention alternative approaches only when they’re relevant to the exposition of my own. If there’s an analysis of depiction in terms of resemblance which captures the classification outlined here, discovering that analysis suffices for success. If there are other analyses or theories in other terms which capture other classifications, discovering them is an even greater success.

1.2 The analysis of resemblance as sharing properties

The naïvest analysis of depiction in terms of resemblance simply assimilates depiction to resemblance (Goodman, 1968, 3). According to it:

(1)

Something depicts another if and only if the former resembles the latter.

The Mona Lisa, for example, is supposed to depict Lisa simply because the Mona Lisa resembles Lisa. Counterexamples to the necessity and sufficiency of this analysis illustrate some of the most compelling objections to the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.

In turn, the naïvest analysis of resemblance simply assimilates resemblance to having properties in common. According to it:

(2)

Something resembles another if and only if the former has a property in common with the latter.

Peas in a pod resemble each other, for example, because they have the properties of greenness, roundness and yuckiness in common. So according to the naïvest analyses of depiction and resemblance, the nature of depiction ultimately depends on the nature of properties.

But there are rifts in our conceptions of properties. A first is the rift between sparse and abundant conceptions of properties (Lewis, 1983a; 1986, 59-69). According to an abundant conception of properties there’s a property corresponding to each (possible) predicate, and so the number of properties is the number of (possible) predicates. Just as there’s a property of being white which corresponds to the predicate ‘is white’, for example, there is also, according to abundant conceptions of properties, a property of being a raven or a writing desk, corresponding to the predicate ‘is a raven or a writing desk’. So properties, according to the abundant conception, are ubiquitous.

(A predicate is just a sentence with a name removed. The predicate ‘is white’, for example, results from removing ‘snow’ from ‘snow is white’. Likewise, the predicate ‘is a raven or a writing desk’ results from removing ‘Edgar’ from the sentence ‘Edgar is a raven or a writing desk’. The semantic value of a predicate is often thought of as a property: the semantic value of ‘is white’, for example, is the property of being white, whereas the semantic value of ‘is a raven or a writing desk’ is the property of being a raven or a writing desk. So abundant conceptions of properties are motivated in part by the need to find a semantic value for every (possible) predicate.)

Sparse theories of properties deny there is a property corresponding to every possible predicate, and so deny the number of properties is the number of possible predicates. Which predicates correspond to properties, according to sparse theories, is revealed a posteriori by total science (Armstrong, 1978b, 7-9). Whether the predicate ‘is white’ corresponds to a property of being white, for example, is an a posteriori question; the existence of the property of being white cannot be deduced from the existence of the predicate ‘is white’, and no property of being a raven or a writing desk corresponds to the predicate ‘is a raven or a writing desk’.

Whereas an abundant conception of properties is considered most appropriate for the analysis of predication, it’s the sparse conception which is considered appropriate for the analysis of resemblance. As David Lewis, for example, writes “Because properties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. … Thus properties do nothing to capture facts about resemblance. That is work more suited to the sparse universals” (Lewis, 1983a, 13). But it’s almost as difficult to square the analysis of resemblance as having properties in common with a sparse as with an abundant conception of properties. So, until chapter ten, I’ll attempt to stay neutral on this issue.

A second is the rift between the subjective and objective conception of properties. According to subjective conceptions of properties, whether a particular instantiates a property is dependent on us, whereas according to objective conceptions of properties, whether a particular instantiates a property is a fact independent of us. According to a subjective conception of colours, for example, whether a particular is red depends on whether it is disposed to appear red to us under certain conditions, whereas according to an objective conception of colours, whether a particular is red depends on whether it is disposed to reflect light of a certain wavelength.

The platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance is often associated with an objective conception of properties. In his criticism of the resemblance theory, Michael Newall, for example, says “I will call all theories that hold that a viewer-independent resemblance between a picture and its referent is necessary for depiction resemblance theories. … Viewer-independent resemblances involve identity in some respects – a sharing of viewer-independent properties … Viewer-independent resemblance is close to the everyday meaning of the term ‘resemblance’, and it is this that resemblance theorists employ” (Newall, 2011, 67).

Likewise, in his defence of the resemblance theory, Hyman writes “I shall argue that there is a strict and invariable relationship between the shapes and colours on a picture’s surface and the object which it depicts, which can be defined without referring to the psychological effect the picture produces in a spectator’s mind …” (Hyman, 2006, 73). But although it’s natural to combine the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance with an objective conception of properties and resemblance, the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance is equally compatible with the subjective conception, and so I will also attempt to stay neutral on this issue.

In light of the analysis of resemblance as having properties in common, the necessity of the first analysis is not obvious, because it’s not obvious which properties pictures have in common with what they represent. As Robert Hopkins, for example, writes: “Resemblance must be resemblance in certain respects. If two things resemble, they must do so in respect of some property or other, perhaps in respect of many. Unfortunately, when we ask in what respect picture and object resemble, it is easier to find difference than likeness” (Hopkins, 1998, 11). Whereas most pictures are flat and rectangular, most of the things they represent are neither flat nor rectangular.