19,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: ibidem
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
- Sprache: Englisch
In this timely book, the authors provide a detailed analysis of Russia's national interests in the Arctic region. They assess Russia's domestic discourse on the High North's role in the system of national priorities as well as of Moscow's bi- and multilateral relations with major regional players, energy, environmental, socio-cultural, and military policies in the Arctic. In contrast to the internationally wide-spread stereotype of Russia as a revisionist power in the High North, this book argues that Moscow tries to pursue a double-sided strategy in the region. On the one hand, Russia aims at defending her legitimate economic interests in the region. On the other hand, Moscow is open to co-operation with foreign partners that are willing to partake in exploiting the Arctic natural resources. The general conclusion is that in the foreseeable future Moscow's strategy in the region will be predictable and pragmatic rather than aggressive or spontaneous. The authors argue that in order to consolidate the soft power pattern of Russia's behavior a proper international environment in the Arctic should be created by common efforts. Other regional players should demonstrate their responsibility and willingness to solve existing and potential problems on the basis of international law.
Das E-Book können Sie in Legimi-Apps oder einer beliebigen App lesen, die das folgende Format unterstützen:
Seitenzahl: 263
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
Ähnliche
ibidemPress, Stuttgart
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
This book resulted from various research and educational projects. In 1993, 1996–98 and 2000–2003 several projects on Russian policies in Northern Europewere implemented with the generous grant support of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).[1]Weremain indebted tothe lateProfessor Håkan Wiberg, ex-Director of COPRI, who played a key role in launching and executing the above-mentioned projects by being its principal consultant and by providing uswith useful advice at all their stages.Wealso extend special thanks to Pertti Joenniemi, Senior Research Fellow, COPRI/DIISand Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, for his extensive and insightful comments and suggestionsduringourwork on the projects.
In cooperation with the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) and Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) a series of research projects on Russia's relations with the Arctic and non-Arctic actors has been implemented in 2010–2014. These projects have been particularly helpful in understanding Russia's national interests in theHigh Northas well asspecificities of Moscow's bilateral relations with various regional players. A deeper insight in Russia's Arctic policy making has also resulted from these research activities. One of the projects with RIAC was of an educational character and resulted in producing a three-volume anthology/reader on Arctic politics[2]as well as course syllabus and teaching manual based on this publication.
In 2012–2013, the project titled"The Arctic: avoiding a new Cold War"and funded by the International Discussion Club"Valdai"has been implemented by an international team under the leadership ofProf. Lassi Heininen, University of Lapland. Some ideas that have been generated and discussed in the context of this project arenow reflected in this book.Particularly,we aregrateful to the project team fortesting the theoretical approaches applicable to the Arctic politics and Russian foreign policy behavior.
Since2013 aproject titled"Arctic Urban Sustainability in Russia"run jointly by the Barents Institute at the University of Tromsø(Aileen A Espíritu) and George Washington University(Marlene Laruelle and Robert Orttung) is being implemented withourparticipation. It wasespeciallyhelpful in understanding the role of the Russian subnational units in the country's Arctic policy making.
Ourparticipation in theGlobal Arcticprojectlaunched in2014andrun by the Thematic Network on Geopolitics andSecurity(Prof. Lassi Heininen)has provideduswith a global vision of the Arctic and new approach to human security in the region.
It is a pleasant duty to mention hereourgratitude to many colleagues who have helpeduswith especially useful advice or materials for this book.They include:Prof.Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Barents Chair in Politics,andPiotr Graczyk,University of Tromsø-The ArcticUniversity of Norway;Dr.Rob Huebert, University of Calgary, Canada;Prof.TapaniKaakkuriniemiand Dr. Hanna Smith,Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki;Prof.Alexander Kubyshkin, St. Petersburg State University;Prof. Roar Kvam, Trondheim Business School, Norway;Gunnar Lassinantti, ex-Project Leader, Olof Palme International Center (Stockholm); Professor Marina Lebedeva, Chair, Department of World Politics,and Prof. Lev Voronkov,Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO);Prof.Kari Liuhto,Turku Schoolof Economics, University of Turku, Finland;Dr. Natalia Loukacheva, University of North British Columbia, Canada;Arild Moe, Acting Director,Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway;Dr. Ingmar Oldberg, Senior Research Fellow, FOA (National Defense Establishment)and Swedish Institute of International Affairs;Mikhail Rykhtik, Director, Institute of International Relations and World History (IIRWH), Nizhny Novgorod State University(NNSU);Professor Poul Wolffsen, Roskilde University (Denmark);Jian Yang,Vice-President,BaozhiChengandPei Zhang,Research Fellows,Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China; Dr. Gleb Yarovoy, Petrozavodsk State University, andDr. Andrei Zagorsky,Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science.
We arethankful to a number of research centers and institutions—the School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University; Department of Political Science, Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg campus; IIRWH NNSU;the Department of International Relations & Political Science, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, Russia; COPRI/DIIS, Denmark; StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute, Sweden;Aleksanteri Institute and Department of Politics, University of Helsinki, which provideduswith excellent research environments and warm hospitality. Without their liberal support and help this work was not possible.
Alexander Sergunin
Valery Konyshev
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
July 2015
Acronyms
ABM
Anti-ballistic missile
AC
Arctic Council
AEPS
Arctic Environment Protection Strategy
AGF
Arctic Group of Forces
AMAP
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
AZRF
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation
BEAC
Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BEAR
Barents Euro-Arctic Region
BRC
Barents Regional Council
BRICS
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CBC
Cross-border cooperation
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
COPRI
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CRBC
Canada-Russia Business Council
CTA
City Twins Association
CSBM
Confidence and security building measure
DIIS
Danish Institute for International Studies
EEZ
Exclusive economic zone
ENPI
European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument
ETC
European Territorial Cooperation
EU
European Union
FOA
National Defense Establishment
FSS
Federal Security Service
ICBM
Intercontinental ballistic missile
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IEC
Intergovernmental Economic Commission
IIRWH
Institute of International Relations and World History
IMO
International Maritime Organization
INTERREG
EU's program on interregional co-operation
IR
International Relations
IRSP
Ice-resistant stationary platform
MGIMO
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NWSP
North-Western Strategic Partnership
NCM
Nordic Council of Ministers
ND
Northern Dimension
NEFCO
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
NGO
Non-governmental organization
NNSU
Nizhny Novgorod State University
NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSR
Northern Sea Route
PGE
Platinum-group element
POS
Permanent observer status
PTT
Power transition theory
RADARSAT
Canadian space satellite
RAIPON
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East
RIAC
Russian International Affairs Council
RISS
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
SAR
Search and rescue operation
SDS
Sustainable development strategy
SEZ
Special economic zone
SME
Small and medium size enterprises
SWOT
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threads
TBC
Transborder cooperation
Tu
Tupolev
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UNCLCS
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
US
United States
USD
US dollar
USSR
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction
Contending views on Russia's Arctic strategy.TheKremlin'sstrategyin the High Northis a vexedquestion both in the media and researchliterature.Russia's decision to plant a titaniumflag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean on theNorth Pole in August 2007 and resume strategicbomberand navypatrols in the High North, as well as thepublication of itsfirstArctic strategy in 2008, has ledsome Western experts to criticizeRussia's Arcticpolicies as expansionist, aggressive, and anexample of"gunboat diplomacy"(Kraska 2009,1117; Schepp and Traufetter 2009; Willett 2009,53).Accordingto some Westernanalysts, due toRussia's economic weakness and technologicalbackwardness, it tends to emphasize coercivemilitary instruments to protect its national interestsin the Arctic, which will inevitably leadto a regional arms race, remilitarization andmilitary conflicts in the HighNorth (Borgerson2008; Huebert 2010; Huebert et al. 2012; Macalister2010; Smith and Giles 2007).
However, in contrast with the Cold War era,when Soviet behavior was driven by ideologicalor geopolitical factors, current Russian policiesin the Arctic are explained by Moscow's pragmaticinterests such as competition for naturalresources and/or control of northern sea routes.
On the other hand, there are authors (mostlyRussian but alsosomeWesternones) who seeRussia'sintentions in the Arctic as innocent, inward-looking,purely defensive, and oriented towardthe protection of its legitimate interests (Alexandrov2009; Belov 2012; Diev 2009; Grigoriev2010;Khramchikhin 2011and 2013;Nenashev 2010; Oreshenkov 2009); orwho at least see Russia's national intentionsin the context of international Arctic cooperationas comparable to other Arctic states (e.g.Heininen 2011). This group of experts emphasizesthe fact that Moscow's primary interestis the development of the Arctic Zoneof theRussianFederation(AZRF), which is rich in natural resources andunderdeveloped in terms of the local economy,infrastructure, communication systems, socialinstitutions and culture. They contend thatMoscow is not pursuing a revisionist policyin the Arctic; on the contrary, Russia wantsto solve all disputes in the region by peacefulmeans, relying on international law and internationalorganizations.
There is also a noisy but marginal group ofanti-Western writers in Russia who are notafraid to champion Russia as a revisionist,expansionist or imperial state—and not only inthe Arctic (Dugin 1991, 1993 and 2002; Indzhiev2010). They believe that Moscow's Arctic policymust be assertive and proactive to resist theWestern ‘encroachment'on ‘Russia's Arctic'anda multitude of anti-Russian conspiracies. Theyeven criticize the Russian government for lackinga sound and assertive strategy in the region,or for making concessions to other internationalplayers (for example, the 2010 Russian-Norwegian treaty on delimitation of maritimeterritories, or granting a number of non-Arcticstates with permanent observer status in theArctic Council).
The vast majority of authors are either tooanti-Russian or openly pro-Russian in theiranalysis of Russia's strategy and policies in thepost-Cold War Arctic. But there are quite a fewworks that try to objectively analyze Russianinterests, motivation, behavior and strategiesin the Arctic (Gorenburg 2011;Heininen 2011;Konyshev andSergunin 2011a,2012and 2014; Laruelle 2014; Lasserre, Le Royand Garon 2012; Voronkov 2012; Zagorsky 2011;Yarovoy 2014). Thisstudycontinuesthis tradition and aims to provide a comprehensivepicture and analysis of the currentsituation in the Arctic, as well as a rigorousassessment of the interests and problems of theRussian Federation in the Arctic, particularlythe Russian Arctic.
Theoretical framework.The dichotomy of revisionistvs.status quo states stems from the realist/neo-realistpower transition theory(PTT) by A.F.K. Organski (1958) and his followers (Wittkopf 1997; Tammen 2000). This theory aimed at explaining the causes of international conflicts and wars by the rise of emerging powers that were discontent with international rules established by the dominant powers. According to this theory, powerful and influential nations such as the U.S. who have benefited from the previously established world order fall under the category of status quo states while nations dissatisfied with their place on the international spectrum are often considered revisionist states. The PTT was based on the assumption that the revisionist state aims at either a radical change of old rules or imposing new rules on other international actors.
While this theory that was mainly designed for the Cold War period can still probably work in some cases even in the present-day world, it is hardly applicable to the regions such as the Arctic. None of the regional players can be considered as purely status quo or revisionist power. The five coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the U.S.) hardly can be considered asstatus quo/dominant powers who want to impose its own regional order on other players and whose positions are challenged by the rising powers. Their legitimate rights to have exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Arctic Ocean are not questioned by other states. At the same time, from the PPT perspective, the Arctic-5 themselves can be seen as revisionist powers because Canada, Denmark, Russia and the U.S. have ambitions to extend their EEZs (Norway has already done this in 2009), i.e. to change existing rules. But in contrast with the PTT postulates, these quasi-revisionist states aim at solving disputable questions in a 'civilized' way, through international institutions, particularly, in the framework of the UN Commission onthe Limits ofContinental Shelf(UNCLCS). Moreover, as theIlulissat Declaration of 2008 proclaimed, the Arctic-5 intend to solve all disputes by peaceful methods through negotiations and on the basis of international law.
Other regional players also demonstrate a mixture of revisionist and status quo behavior. For example, on the one hand, three sub-Arctic (Finland, Iceland and Sweden) and non-Arctic states (especially the East Asian ones) are unhappy with the rules that the Arctic-5 tend to establish in the region. They try to elevate their statuses by becoming either full-fledged members of the regional organizations (the former three countries) or permanent observers (the latter ones). On the other hand, in some areas these actors tend to be status quo powers. For instance, they prefer to keep the current situation with the EEZs in the High North unchangeable because some ‘lucrative pieces'of the Arctic continental shelf (e.g. the Lomonosov and Mendeleev underwater ridges which are allegedly rich in oil and gas) are located interra et aqua nullius(nobody's lands and waters) and theoretically—if their legal status remains legally indefinite—they can be exploited by everyone who has money and technologies for doing this.
It should be noted that, in fact, a real multipolar system exists now in the Arctic, the regional order that cannot be explained with the help of the PTT because it was designed for the Cold War-type hierarchical (bipolar) system.
One more problem with the revisionist/status quo powers theory is that it ignores the existence of the third type of states—the reformist one. Similar to the revisionist powers this kind of states is unsatisfied with the existing rules of the 'game' but they do not want to change them radically; rather they aim at reforming them to adapt them to the new realities and make them more comfortable for all the members of world or regional community. Such states prefer to act on the basis of existing rules and norms rather than challenge them. All changes (reforms) should be made gradually, through negotiations and to the benefit of all the parties involved. It is safe to assume that all the Arctic states (and even the non-Arctic countries) perfectly fall into this category, including Russia. One can distinguish between more or less assertive reformist actors but even most assertive ones hardly can be seen as revisionist states.
The concept of a reformist state is relatively new in the InternationalRelations(IR)literature. Scholars prefer to call them 'pluralist', 'non-aligned', etc. The concept of 'coexistence' (but without its Marxist connotation) has recently become again popular in theIR literature with regard to the emerging powers (such as the BRICS countries) (De Coning2014;Odgaard 2012). According to this school, countries with completely different socio-economic and political systems can peacefully coexist. The emerging powers agree to play by existing rules but want to make them more just and adequate to the changing realities (Nadkarni and Noonan 2013). They do not accept a dominant state (states) imposing rules on the rest of the world and favor a multipolar world model. The 'coexistence' concept quite nicely fits the reformist state's political philosophy and can be applicable to the explanation of foreign policy behavior of manynewlyemerging powers, including Russia.
It should be noted that the type of actor does not tell much about the style of its behavior or instruments used to achieve its goals. The status quo state may be violent in protecting its interests and international positions while the revisionist state—for various reasons—may prefer non-coercive instruments such as diplomacy or economic leverages.
To explain the changing meaning of power in the present-day world and new patterns of behavior of the key international actors, new theories have emerged in the post-Cold War era. The soft power concept coined by Joseph Nye is one of the new generation theories that toourunderstanding can be helpful in understanding Russia's Arctic strategies.
According to this school, in the post-Cold War period key international players prefer to exercise ‘soft'rather than ‘hard'power because the economic, socio-cultural, institutional and legal instruments are much more efficient now than the military strength or direct political pressure. For Nye, the author of the concept, the soft power is, first and foremost, an ability to be attractive. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources:"its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)"(Nye 2004: 11).
The Russian theorists and policy-makers suggested their own versions of the soft power theory. For example, with regard to the Russian sector of the Arctic they make emphasis on economic attractiveness of the region because of its vast natural resources and shorter sea and air routes. For President Vladimir Putin, soft power is a sort of a PR technology that helps either to lobby Moscow's interests in foreign countries or improve Russia's international image (Putin 2012a and Putin 2012b). The most recent Russian Foreign Policy Concept (12 February 2013) defines the ‘soft'power as a"complex set of instruments to achieve foreign policy aims by means of the civil society, information, communicative, humanitarian and other methods and technologies that are different from classical diplomacy"(Putin 2013a). It is important to note that irrespectively how the Kremlin interprets the soft power concept and whether it is in tune with Nye's original definition Moscow has no intention to use coercive instruments in its Arctic policies and be a trouble-maker in the region.
To sum up the theoretical part ofourstudywe'd like to emphasize that this research is based on two assumptions/hypotheses: First, Russia is a reformist rather than status quo or revisionist state in the Arctic. Second, Russia tries to be a soft rather than hard power in the High North. The research below aims at examining these key hypotheses.
Research agenda.Thisstudyseeks to determine whether Russiais really a revisionist power in the Arctic, orwhether it is interested in regional stability andinternational cooperation in the High North.To answer this question, a number of smallerquestions must be discussed:
·What are Russia's real interests in the Arctic,as opposed to its rhetoric regarding the region?
·How do different schools of thought on Russianforeign policy understand the problemsposed by the Arctic?
·What is the conceptual/doctrinal basis forRussia's Arctic strategy?
·How does Russia build relations with majorArctic and non-Arctic actors in the region?
·What is Moscow's political approach toworking within international organizationsand fora that deal with Arctic issues?
·How does Russia address major Arctic challengessuch as climate change, environmentaldegradation, territorial claims anddivision of the continental shelf, the use ofsea routes, etc.?
·What are Russia's real military policies andplans in the Arctic? Do they pose a securitythreat to other Arctic players, or are Moscow'slimited military preparations and activitiesin keeping with the existing regionalmilitary balance?
Sources.This paper is based on the following sources:
·International documents (treaties, agreements,resolutions, etc.).
·Governmental/official publications and materials(Russian and Western).
·Published interviews with officials, politicians,NGO leaders, and experts.
·Statistical information, yearbooks, guides,and reference books.
·Research literature: monographs, analyticalpapers, and articles.
·Media publications.
As with any study of ‘hot'political issues,it's difficult to find reliable data. Informationis often classified, misleading, or not fullyreported. A scholar has to corroborate datafrom numerous unconfirmed media reports.
Research is further complicated by differencesof opinion among experts on methods ofstatistical analysis. Moreover, research techniquesand terminology can vary. Therefore,we have relied on our critical judgment and acareful comparison of sources in compiling thedatabase for this research. Since it involves notonly data collection but also data analysis, werelied on three main criteria for selecting andinterpreting sources:
·Validity: Data must represent the mostimportant and characteristic trends ratherthan occasional or irregular developments.
·Informativeness: Sources that provide valuableand timely information are given priority.
·Innovativeness: Preference is given tosources that offer original data, fresh ideas,and untraditional approaches.
These research techniques are helpful inovercoming the limitations of available sourcesand compiling substantial and sufficient datafor the study.
Structure of the book. The book consists of an introduction, nine chapters, conclusions and bibliography.
Thefirst chapterdemonstrates that Russia has important economic, societal, environmental and military-strategic interests in the High North. These interests include the access, exploration and development of the Arctic natural resources (especially the hydrocarbon ones). Russia tries to modernize and further develop theAZRF'sindustrial base which makes a significant and valuable contribution to the country's economy. Moscow is also interested in opening up of the Northern Sea Route(NSR)for international commercial traffic and developing circumpolar air routes. Moscow is deeply concerned about the debilitating ecological system in the AZRF and trying to stop and reverse the negative trends in this sphere. Russia still has considerable military-strategic interests in the region. These have not lost their relevance with the end of the Cold War. This continuity can clearly be seen in Russia's security perceptions of the Arctic as a region of both challenges and opportunities.
Chapter 2examines the Russian post-Soviet debate on the Arctic. It is argued thatdespite the continuing prevalence of the realist and geopolitical schools the Russian discourse on the High North became much more diverse, creative and interesting than fifteen-twenty years ago. A number of alternative schools have emerged, namely—neo-liberalism, globalism, critical geopolitics and social constructivism. Nowadays, the Russian decision-makers, facing a rather diverse intellectual landscape, can get expertise on the Arctic issues from different schools and groupings.
Chapter 3analyzes the evolution of the Russian Arctic doctrinal/conceptual frameworks in the post-Soviet period. The Russian Arctic strategies of 2008 and 2013 are characterized.The conceptual/doctrinal basis of Russia's Arctic strategy has turned out to be less ambitious and aggressive, and more realistic and cooperative in spirit, than many might have expected. Russia's most recent Arctic strategy (February 2013) is more inward-looking than expansionist. Regarding the international dimension, Moscow's Arctic policy calls for international cooperation, multilateral diplomacy.
At the same time, the chapter argues that the Strategy-2013 is a good invitation to further discussions on Russia's Arctic policies rather than a comprehensive and sound doctrine. To become an efficient national strategy in the region it should be further clarified, specified and instrumentalized in a series of federal laws, regulations and task programs. It should be also better designed for the international consumption.
Chapter 4focuses on the Russian sustainable development strategy in the Arctic.Theauthors note that theRussian academic community has managed to develop a comprehensive vision of the Arcticsustainable developmentwhich is based on the combination of different interpretations of sustainable development—economic, ecological and social/human.Such an integrated approach has been reflected in the Russian doctrinal documents,including themost recent ones.Numerous efforts have been made over the last two decades to solve most acute environmental problems of the AZRF, including the programs on stopping or limiting pollution in Russia's major industrial centers and environmental clean-up on the Arctic islands.
It is argued, however,thatthe course toward a combination of modernization and innovation withsustainable developmentcharted by the Russian government should move from making declarations to the implementation phase involving specific, realistic and the same time environmentally friendlyprojects in the AZRF.
In thefifth chapter,the phenomenon of paradiplomacy of the Russian Arctic subnational actors isexplored.Particularly, thischapter examines how paradiplomacy is exploited by the Russian Arctic subnational actors (regions and municipalities) for building their sustainable development strategy. More specifically, three research questions are addressed: First, what are the actors'incentives for subnational international activities? Second, what are the main paradiplomatic strategies, instruments and institutions? Third, what are the negative and positive implications of paradiplomacy for the center-periphery relations and Russia's foreign policy?Thechapter focuses on the following strategies/methods of paradiplomacy: making direct agreements with international partners; attracting foreign investment; creatingapositive imageof the regions; cooperation with international organizations; establishing representative offices in foreign countries;city-twinning; participation in subregional arrangements;capitalizing on national diplomacy and federal infrastructures, etc. The authorsconcludethat in the foreseeable future paradiplomacy will retain its importance for the subnational actorsof theRussian Arctic as an efficient instrument for building sustainable development strategies.
Chapter 6is devoted to the analysis of competitive advantages and disadvantaged of the NSR.Despite someserious obstacles tothe NSR's exploitation as an international sea lane,it will remain a priorityforRussia'sstrategy in the Arctic regionin the foreseeable future.The Kremlin considers the NSR an effective resourcefor developing theAZRFboth domestically and internationally. For thisreason, Moscow plans to make considerableinvestments in the NSR and bring its infrastructurein line with international standards.However, as with other aspects of its Arcticpolicy, Russia faces a difficult dilemma: howto maintain control over the NSR while alsoopening it up to international cooperationand integration with the global transportationsystem.
Chapter 7addresses Russia's policies towards key Arctic powers(U.S.,Canada, Norway and Denmark), emerging Arctic powers fromEast Asia(China, Japan and South Korea), and international organizationswhich are eager to become active circumpolar actors (NATO and the EU).It is argued that Moscow pursues a differentiated policy towards these players. While the Kremlin tries to build partnership-type relations with other Arctic coastal states, it is rather cautious with regard tothe newcomers from East Asia, overtly negative to NATO and lukewarm to the EU. It is argued that even in those cases when Moscow is displeased with the Arctic actors'behavior or intentions it tries to avoid an open confrontation with them and prefers dialogue with all regional players.
In theeightchapter,territorial disputes in the High North(with Russia's participation) are examined. These conflictsare seen bytheRussian strategists as a significant threat to the country's security. The Arctic region has inherited a number of territorial disputes from the Cold War era and Russia was a party to them. Some of these conflicts were successfully settled down while others are still waiting for their resolution. This chapter addresses four cases:the U.S.-Soviet/Russian dispute on the Bering Sea;the Norwegian-Russian dispute on the Barents Seadelimitationwhich was successfully resolved in 2010;the Svalbard questionwhich isanother Norwegian-Russian disputable issue,andthe Russian claim on the extension of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.The chapter concludes that despite these disputes Moscow believes that the territorial problems should be solved through negotiations and on the basis of international law.
Chapter 9aims at analysis of the Russian military strategies in the High North.In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, the authorsargue that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region.Theynote that the Russian military modernization programs are rather modest and aim to upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or restoring the Soviet-time huge military potential. Given the financial constraints these programs have recently become less ambitious and more realistic.They do not violate the regional military balance and do not provoke a new round of of arms race in the Arctic.The Russian military increasingly aims at defending the country's economic interests in the region and control over the huge AZRF territory rather than expanding its ‘sphere of influence'.
