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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
Scenario planning allows companies to move away from linear thinking and better understand external change. Eight years (and 30,000 copies) after publication Scenarios is still acknowledged as the definitive work in the field. Now, Kees van der Heijden brings his bestseller up to date, following up on his original case studies and adding significant new material. The Second Edition changes focus slightly by providing more in-depth analysis and application of the concept of the 'strategic conversation'. While maintaining the underlying rigour of the first edition, van der Heijden revisits the text to make it far more practical and accessible, and in doing so gives you the tools you need to set out and negotiate a successful future course for your organization in the face of significant uncertainty.
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Seitenzahl: 672
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
A CONVERSATION
OVERVIEW
INFLUENTIAL THINKERS
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
Part One
: The Context
Chapter One
: 1965 to 1990: Five Discoveries at Shell
ROBUST DECISION MAKING
STRETCHING MENTAL MODELS LEADS TO DISCOVERIES
ENHANCING CORPORATE PERCEPTION
ENERGISING MANAGEMENT
SCENARIOS AS A LEADERSHIP TOOL
Chapter Two
: Introduction to Scenario-based Planning
WHY PLAN?
SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING IS ‘‘LEARNING’’
THE PURPOSE OF SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING
HOW POPULAR IS SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING?
Chapter Three
: Three Competing Paradigms in Strategic Management
THE RATIONALIST PARADIGM
EVOLUTIONARY PARADIGM
PROCESSUAL PARADIGM
THE LEARNING LOOP
Organisation as Organism
GROUP LEARNING
THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Part Two
: The Principles of Scenario-based Planning
Chapter Four
: Strategising
STRATEGY AND LEARNING
ORTHODOXY AND REFRAMING
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Chapter Five
: The Business Idea of an Organisation
PROFIT POTENTIAL
DISTINCTIVE COMPETENCIES
SYSTEMIC STRUCTURE OF THE BUSINESS IDEA
EXAMPLES OF BUSINESS IDEAS
The Business Idea of a Construction Company
LEVELS OF BUSINESS IDEAS
CONSIDERING THE BUSINESS IDEA IN THE MANAGEMENT TEAM
VALUE CREATION THROUGH TRUST BUILDING
BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE
SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS OF THE BUSINESS IDEA CONCEPT
Chapter Six
: The Uncertain Environment
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT COMPLEXITY
FORMS OF UNCERTAINTY
PREDICTABLE RISK
STRUCTURAL UNCERTAINTY
THEORIES OF STRUCTURE
FORECASTING VS. SCENARIOS
Chapter Seven
: Scenario Analysis
DEFINITION
THE STRATEGISING PURPOSE
THE PROCESS
FRAMING OF SCENARIOS
Chapter Eight
: Scenarios and the Strategic Conversation
ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS
INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION
ORGANISATIONS AS COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
SCENARIOS AS INSTITUTIONAL PERCEPTION DEVICES
EFFECTIVE SCENARIOS
Linking the Old with the New
BECOMING AWARE OF EARLY SIGNALS
Part Three
: The Practice of Scenario-based Planning
Chapter Nine
: The Practitioner’s Art
PURPOSE
SETTING THE AGENDA
THE SWOT WORKSHOP
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS
INTERNAL AND CONTEXTUAL DATA
FEEDBACK
THE HORIZON YEAR
Chapter Ten
: Articulation of the Business Idea
SURFACING A BUSINESS IDEA IN A MANAGEMENT TEAM
ELEMENTS OF THE BUSINESS IDEA
INITIAL DATA REQUIREMENT
THE PROCESS
THE FACILITATOR
SUMMARY OF THE BUSINESS IDEA SURFACING PROCESS
Chapter Eleven
: Competitive Positioning
A STRUCTURED DISCUSSION IN THE MANAGEMENT TEAM
SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS OF COMPETITIVE POSITIONING
Chapter Twelve
: Scenario Development
SCENARIO TEAM
INTRODUCING NOVELTY
DEVELOPING THE SCENARIOS
A FEW USEFUL DEFINITIONS
FIRST DATA ANALYSIS
SCENARIO STRUCTURING
DEVELOPING THE STORYLINES
NEXT STEPS
SCENARIO RESEARCH
SPECIAL TYPES OF SCENARIOS
Chapter Thirteen
: Option Planning
DEVELOPING STRATEGIC DIRECTION
MANAGING THE OPTION SET
OPTION EVALUATION
STAKEHOLDER TESTING OF OPTIONS
INTEGRATION OF STRATEGY
Part Four
: Institutionalising Scenario-based Planning
Chapter Fourteen
: The Management of Change
ACTING ON THE SCENARIOS
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Chapter Fifteen
: Planning Process
THE PLANNING CYCLE
HYGIENE FACTORS
FIVE LEVELS OF PLANNING IN A PLANNING CYCLE, OVERVIEW
STRATEGIC PLANNING
MASTERPLANNING
PROJECT PLANNING
BUDGET PLANNING
APPRAISAL
Chapter Sixteen
: The Informal Strategic Conversation
SCENARIOS AND THE INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
TREATING ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING PROBLEMS
PERSEVERANCE
Conclusion
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter Two: Introduction to Scenario-based Planning
Figure 1. World oil demand and refining capacity
Figure 2. Demand for new tanker capacity
Chapter Three: Three Competing Paradigms in Strategic Management
Figure 3. Periods of turbulence
Figure 4. Kolb’s ‘‘learning loop’’
Figure 5. Elements in strategic management
Figure 6. Integrating the three schools of strategy
Chapter Four: Strategising
Figure 7. Fit between the environment and the Business Idea
Chapter Five: The Business Idea of an Organisation
Figure 8. Overlap between competencies and value creation
Figure 9. Elements of the Business Idea
Figure 10. The KinderCare Business Idea
Figure 11. The Business Idea of a construction company
Chapter Six: The Uncertain Environment
Figure 12. Principle of scenario building
Figure 13. The balance of predictability and uncertainty in the business environment
Figure 14. Drilling scenarios USA 1980–1990
Figure 15. The perceptional ‘‘iceberg’’
Chapter Seven: Scenario Analysis
Figure 16. Principle of iterative scenario building
Figure 17. Scenarios test the Business Idea
Figure 18. The iterative scenario analysis process
Chapter Eight: Scenarios and the Strategic Conversation
Figure 19 Scenarios provide a new perspective
Chapter Nine: The Practitioner’s Art
Figure 20. The elicitation cycle
Figure 21. The business in its environment
Chapter Ten: Articulation of the Business Idea
Figure 22. Start of a Business Idea diagram
Figure 23. First stage Business Idea diagram
Figure 24. Reducing the Business Idea to its essentials
Figure 25. The Business Idea considered against scenarios
Chapter Eleven: Competitive Positioning
Figure 26. The five-forces model of competition
Chapter Twelve: Scenario Development
Figure 27. Starting an influence diagram
Figure 28. Example of a driving force analysis
Figure 29. The ‘‘Mont Fleur’’ scenario structure
Figure 30. Scenario structure, based on dominant trends
Figure 31. Example of a scenario matrix
Figure 32. Driving force ranking space
Figure 33. The actor/stakeholder matrix
Chapter Thirteen: Option Planning
Figure 34. Scenario/option matrix
Figure 35. Option/stakeholder matrix
Chapter Fourteen: The Management of Change
Figure 36. Creating action
Chapter Fifteen: Planning Process
Figure 37. The five levels of business planning
Chapter Sixteen: The Informal Strategic Conversation
Figure 38. The art of strategic conversation
Figure 39. Two scenarios about societal development
Guide
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Table of Contents
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Scenarios
The Art of Strategic Conversation
2nd Edition
Kees van der Heijden
Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester,
West Sussex PO19 8SQ, England
Telephone (+44) 1243 779777
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Van der Heijden, Kees.
Scenarios : the art of strategic conversation / Kees van der Heijden.—2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-470-02368-6 (cloth)
1. Communication in management. 2. Creative thinking. 3. Strategic planning. I. Title.
HD30.3.V36 2005
658.4’52—dc222004018710
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 0-470–02368-6
To Anta
Preface
A CONVERSATION
Between Peter Schwartz, chairman of Global Business Network (and probably the world’s best-known scenario planner (Schwartz 1992)), and the author, about scenarios and the art of strategic conversation.
Peter:
How did you come to combine scenarios with strategic conversation in the title of your book?
Kees:
I wanted to project the power of scenarios as a process tool, in addition to how they are normally seen, as analytical devices. Scenario work always involves a conversational process among people involved. If the process works well the organisation achieves a higher level of strategic skill.I think there are essentially three ways of looking at how strategy comes about: rationalist, evolutionary and processual. The rationalist assumes there is one truth out there, and the art of the strategist is to get as close to it as possible. First, you work it out in your mind, then when you are close enough to the optimal strategy you decide, and then you implement. Thinking is separate from action. That means the task can be delegated, e.g. to a planning department. You can ask them: ‘‘Go and analyse the situation, and come back with a report on how things hang together out there, and what in the light of that is the best line of action to take.’’
Peter:
That approach is common enough. A popular paradigm apparently. And a lot of very good scenario analysis is being done from that perspective. This is where people try to increase their grip on the future by understanding better the predetermined elements in the situation in which they find themselves.
Kees:
Yes, it is the area in which Pierre Wack, the father of scenario-based planning, made his greatest contributions. He was of the opinion that if you looked long and hard enough you would always come to see the situation in a new light. He called this reperceiving. And reframing the situation and gaining a new unique insight is the ultimate source of success.
Peter:
No organisation can be successful unless it has something unique to offer to the world. Really good strategy can only be based on being different from anybody else. If everybody follows the same strategy, however good it seemed at the time, it cannot be good for very long. This applies across the board, from the corner shop to the global/multi-national company. It seems so obvious, yet it is nowhere near enough in people’s consciousness. Pierre’s quest was for that unique insight that would provide the opportunity to create that distinctiveness.
Kees:
Pierre recognised that this would always be difficult to do. Imagine that good strategy would be easy, then everyone would do it, and for that reason alone could not lead to success. We need to make the necessary resources available and we must take our time. Formal planning processes with deadlines and preformatted reports are the enemy of thinking.
Peter:
Pierre could not be hurried. And he didn’t want to work on more than one project at the time. He created the iterative scenario thinking process, in which scenario building alternates with deep thinking and research of the underlying systems that gradually emerge. And this has to continue until the moment of truth, when you suddenly discover: ‘‘I can see it now.’’
Kees:
But there is another view, known as the evolutionary paradigm. This is epitomised by Henri Mintzberg’s idea of emergent strategy. He argues that most strategy can only be defined in retrospect, as a pattern you recognise in what has already happened. There is not much you can do about it; your power over the future is actually quite small. Almost everything is uncertain and unexpected. The idea of controlling your destiny is an illusion. He talks about the ‘‘fall of strategic planning’’.
Peter:
I have often been struck by how the majority of CEOs I have met are very modest in their beliefs about the degree of control they have over their situation.
Kees:
Yes, rather different from how this is often portrayed in the media. However, in its extreme form most people find the evolutionary paradigm not intuitive. You cannot give up good thinking in organisations, it must pay out somewhere. This has given rise to the third paradigm, the processual one. This says that in a fast moving situation, where there is a lot of uncertainty, success is more related to having a good process than to having found the ‘‘optimal strategy’’. After all, when things are moving fast what looks optimal today may look like disaster tomorrow. Mental agility is what counts.
Peter:
Yes I recognise that paradigm. Microsoft thought that putting all attention on W95 was the best strategy, and they set up MSN as an information provider. Meanwhile they overlooked the internet (for a time). Shell had carefully worked out that dumping the Brent Spar was the best strategy. Suddenly they were facing unexpectedly strong environmental resistance.I think it is right to call these views on strategy paradigms. People are unconscious of their paradigm, and therefore unaware of the fact that others may work from a different one. I have seen things going wrong between planners and CEOs working from different paradigms without being aware of it.Which paradigm do you subscribe too?
Kees:
I think they are all three valid. I believe that the situation we look at in strategy is so complex that we can use all the help we can get. I suppose I start from process, but very soon I am aware that content enters the picture. Creating a successful organisation is not about improvisation! You can’t ignore Pierre’s view that there is no success without a unique insight. And all the time you take account of uncertainty and ambiguity that separates the strong from the weak. So all three perspectives are helpful and important. Each tells a part of the story. For example, start from the processual view. As soon as more than one person is involved in the organisation the process involves conversation. For action to occur mental models in the minds of the individuals need to be aligned. And they are coupled through the strategic conversation. The norm for organisational conversation is rationality. We try to argue our case to each other. So you have to rationalise things. My thesis is that, because of the strategic conversation, organisations are more rational than individuals as decision makers. One reason why they continue to exist and thrive.
Peter:
Looked at in that way conversation becomes quite central in strategy, both in its process and its content aspects. It is at the heart of good process, and talking about strategy makes it a rational thing.But the rationalist should not forget the incredibly important role of motivation and emotion in strategy. Being able to mobilise this can make or break a strategy project. You have got to know your organisational psychology. So I would like to view conversation in a wide sense, in the context of people’s experiences and actions, on the basis of which they are motivated to engage in the conversation. So not only what they say, but also why they say it and why they don’t say something else. Call it their learning loops if you like.
Kees:
Yes, the conversation couples together the people with power-to-perceive, those with power-to-think and those with power-to-act. All three are necessary in a good strategic conversation. All three roles have an essential part to play.
Peter:
The conversation is the common force through which they align their joint learning. If you then call strategy the pattern in their resulting actions you have closed the loop between the community, their conversation, their alignment, their motivation, their joint thinking and action, back to creating and reinforcing the community.Why do you think this is of importance to the practitioner?
Kees:
I believe that processes can be influenced, even managed to some extent. The strategy process has a formal part, designed by the managers, and an informal part, which consists of the casual spontaneously emerging conversation about the future. The latter is extremely important because it determines where people’s attention is focused. Managers cannot control the latter, but they can intervene. The issue here is to find the high leverage points.
Peter:
Yes, an imbalance between formal and informal processes can lead to serious problems. I once worked with an energy company where things were too hierarchical and formal. So, when their situation changed in a fundamental way, a new CEO announced that there would be no more top-down strategy. He was going to facilitate the bottom-up generation of ideas. On the other hand we have done work for a construction company, where things were so informal that people talk only about operational issues, without any focus at all on the longer term. A degree of formality is probably required in all organisations, even the fast moving. I have seen examples of companies that have gone too far leaving things to informal conversational processes. They find that they have become very short term and are not any longer focusing enough on the strategic horizon and creating the potential for the future. Such companies have to reinforce the formal system, simply to put strategy back on to the agenda.
Kees:
I think there is a link with the rate of change. Fast-moving organisations, or organisations that go through a patch of white water in their business environment, will find that too formal arrangements make the system rigid and not adaptable enough. You find that in companies working in the new technology areas. On the other hand in slow-moving periods there is time to install a proper formal system of strategy. But we should not forget that simultaneously there is always the informal conversation. In fast-moving times this will become relatively more important. In such companies you will need a culture of open communications and success in management will depend more on facilitation than command and control.
Peter:
In such cases you require particularly strong processual skills in the planner. First, the planner needs to work on understanding the mind of management. Remember, the object of the exercise must be not just to come up with clever ideas, but also to change the mental models of the management. Second, he needs to be prepared to open channels and create the conversation while subordinating his own opinion to the views emerging from the conversation. We sometimes speak of the ‘‘altruistic planner’’. Third, the process must be ahead of the game. Quite a challenge.
Kees:
Yes, companies need to find an optimum here. It is the dilemma that every organisation faces, working simultaneously towards integration and differentiation. Too much differentiation and the organisation fragments, there is no longer any strategic conversation, formal or informal, everyone follows their own agenda, puts up the political barriers and goes their own way. Such organisations stop functioning. Political parties go through periods when internal conflict makes them completely dysfunctional. Voters don’t like parties that do not have a clearly defined platform. On the other hand too much integration and you move into the pathology described as ‘‘groupthink’’, with its danger of impoverishment of mental models, leading to poor perception and failure to see early signals. IBM in the late 1980s is the classical example. You have to stay away from these two extremes, and this requires constant attention and active management of the group process.
Peter:
Indeed, so we see management trying to intervene, for example by bringing in ‘‘new blood’’ to move away from groupthink (this is what IBM did), or by engaging in ‘‘team building’’, to move away from fragmentation, for example by taking the management team on an outward-bound training project. These are examples of intervention by management in the strategic conversation.
Kees:
Another powerful intervention is by creating more space for the informal conversation, by organising events through which views can be exchanged outside the pressure of immediate decision making. A company I know well introduced ‘‘strategic forums’’ through which all managers participate in a conversation about the future away from the workplace. The effect is dramatic in the way in which a rigid organisation is being loosened up. But this type of intervention needs to be carefully designed to ensure that it works towards the balance between integration and differentiation, and doesn’t drive the system into one of the two pathologies.
Peter:
This is, I suppose, where scenarios come in. They are the best tool I know to allow the conversation to reflect different perceptions of the situation (differentiation), but in such a way to create room for people to consider these different viewpoints and gradually align on what needs to be done, and what they want to do (integration). After all, the evolutionary paradigm makes us aware of uncertainty and ambiguity in the strategic situation, which means thinking in terms of multiple, different, but equally plausible interpretations of what is happening. Scenarios are a way of doing that.
Kees:
Absolutely, scenarios as a process tool in an ambiguous world. But they are also a content tool, a way of gaining a new perspective on the world. Let’s not forget Pierre’s legacy. Good strategy requires an original invention. And an original invention requires the ability to see the world in a new way, as no one has seen it before.
Peter:
Scenarios can be such a reframing tool. By breaking out the uncertainties you gradually get into view what is driving the system and its underlying structural relationships, and what is already ‘‘in the pipeline’’. Once you have arrived there your strategy will be laid out in front of you. It will be clear what needs to be done; there will be no doubt. But this is not a process for the squeamish, only the strong with tenacity and staying power will get there. Whether the new way of seeing is accurate or just a construction created by the management team is a moot point, and basically an unanswerable question. But the crux of the matter is the originality and the clarity of the new vision, the unique insight. The team is ready to move. And while engaging with the world they will quickly find out where adjustments need to be made.
Kees:
I want to re-emphasise a point we made earlier: this ‘‘eureka’’ moment of invention cannot be forced, it has to emerge. People who approach scenario-based planning as an algorithmic step-by-step process that has to be finished at a predetermined time are unlikely to reach this point. Only if the team are prepared to stay with it, continue to ask questions and research answers, explore new territory and reiterate the process will they eventually open the door towards this new way of seeing and acting.
Peter:
I agree that good strategy can’t possibly be easy. It is a contest that you need to win. You have to be different and better than the next guy. It requires both strength and good coaching. A strong management team and a big responsibility for the scenario planner.
OVERVIEW
The above conversation, which I had some time ago with Peter Schwartz in front of an audience of strategic planners, provides in a nutshell an overview of the territory this book covers. Let me reiterate a few crucial points here.
This book is about organisational strategy. The words ‘‘scenarios’’ and ‘‘strategic conversation’’ in the title indicate some aspects of strategy that I judge are underdeveloped in the literature. I see strategising as thinking about how we can intervene in the hustle and bustle of the evolutionary process that organisations are subject to. Strategy is about winning in this process, judged in terms of survival and self-development. I will assume that it takes place against a background of irreducible uncertainty and human/social interpretation, where communication is just as important as individual thinking, and where intuition and creativity are just as important as rational reasoning.
Strategy is a highly dynamic area, full of fads and fashions that come and go. Yet a few texts seem to remain valid over the years. These mostly aim at analysing underlying structures rather than proposing specific strategies. After all, copying ideas that ‘‘work’’ for others is unlikely to be a winning strategy. Success can only be based on being different from (existing or potential) competitors. This will be a fundamental point of the line of argument developed here.
I find it helpful to sift through the rich literature on strategy by distinguishing between three ‘‘schools of thought’’:
Rationalist (aimed at finding the ‘‘optimal strategy’’, e.g. Michael Porter),
Evolutionary (assuming that strategy emerges and can only be understood in retrospect, e.g. Henri Mintzberg), and
Processual.
Managers tend to have a preference for the rationalist school; it assigns to them the power to affect the destiny of their organisation. However, they also realise that it does not always work very well. Things often turn out rather unexpectedly, compared to plan, and there is a lot of uncertainty about implementation, even if the plan turns out to have been just right.
Most managers don’t have a lot of sympathy for the evolutionist school. It disempowers them to a large extent and this feels counterintuitive. Managers need something in between the rationalist and the evolutionary schools of thought. This is where the processual school of strategy comes in.
If things change rapidly and are unpredictable, today’s best strategy may be tomorrow’s disaster. Managers have to stay with the issues as these change around them until real world action is taken, and then they have to stay with the consequences. The lower the level of predictability the more attention you need to pay to the strategy process.
Uncertainty has the effect of moving the key to organisational success from the ‘‘optimal strategy’’ to the ‘‘more skilful strategy process’’.
The essential medium of any strategy process is the strategic conversation that goes on in any organisation. It has a formal part, designed by the managers, and an informal part, which consists of the casual conversation about the future that spontaneously emerges. The informal conversation affects strongly where people’s attention is focused. Managers cannot entirely control this, but they can intervene. It is the most powerful lever they have to affect where the organisation is going. The issue here is to find the high leverage points. That’s what this book is about.
The language of the organisational strategic conversation is largely rational. Managers aiming to intervene try to build a solid line of strategic reasoning, around which others in the organisation can gather. This starts with aligning views in the management team. If there is one thing that kills management interventions it is mixed signals from the top. Management needs to keep up this strategic conversation until change champions stand up and go out to ‘‘make things happen’’. A significant part of this book, therefore, is about how management should get its own strategic process in order.
But building solid logic cannot be sufficient. In the end organisational success derives from being different. Success requires an original strategic invention. Management can contribute by creating the enabling conditions that make it favourable for inventions to emerge. But there will always be an unfathomable part to this; how else could the invention be truly original? Blending original invention into the logical language of strategy is an art, the art of strategic conversation. Nobody can tell you how to make an original invention. We can learn from studying the great masters who have gone before us, and create appropriate conditions in the organisation, but when the moment comes we are on our own.
The question, of course, is how we can create the conditions for true strategic creativity to emerge. Pierre Wack suggested that if we look long and hard enough the moment of reframing will always come, when we suddenly see the world in a new light, and gain a unique insight in how to find/regain success. An example of management intervention for this purpose is the creation of more ‘‘space’’ for the informal conversation, by creating a process of events through which views can be exchanged outside the pressure of immediate decision making. Taking the strategic conversation away from the pressure of immediate decisions allows people to explore possibilities more freely.
Generally speaking strategic conversation is shaped by the way people in the organisation see their world. Their mental models have been built up over time, and have become coupled through a common language that makes the strategic conversation possible. Over time people influence each other in the way they see their world. The result is a degree of overlap in their mental models, the socially constructed ‘‘reality’’, sometimes called the ‘‘Business-As-Usual’’ model, or the dominant orthodoxy in the organisation. Without such overlap there cannot be a strategic conversation, and therefore no strategy, the organisation fragments into a bunch of separate and unconnected individuals. But danger also looms at the side of too much overlap. If everyone sees the world in the same way the organisation loses the ability to perceive a wide range of weak signals in the environment, based on multiple viewpoints. As a consequence it fails to develop understanding and cannot introduce this into the system and the conversation, and react. Therefore there are two pathologies at both ends of the organisational behaviour continuum from integration to differentiation of mental models, namely ‘‘groupthink’’ in case of an excess of integration and not enough differentiation, and fragmentation in case of an excess of differentiation and not enough integration. Organisations, if left to their own devices, will inevitably drift towards one of these extremes. A healthy balance requires active management involvement and intervention.
Scenarios are the best available language for the strategic conversation, as it allows both differentiation in views, but also brings people together towards a shared understanding of the situation, making decision making possible when the time has arrived to take action.
Managers have always been involved in these tasks. However, through the conceptualisation of the notion of the strategic conversation, as the underpinning ‘‘nervous system’’ of the organisation, it has become visible how these interventions link to the strategy of the organisation, and ultimately to its success or failure. Being aware of the strategic conversation in the organisation and the opportunities it offers helps managers practise more skilfully and intentionally the many aspects of the job that the best managers have always addressed intuitively anyway.
INFLUENTIAL THINKERS
This book represents my experience as a planner and as a manager during my 35 years with Shell. The last 12 years, which I spent as an academic at Strathclyde University, have been a great opportunity to articulate this experience and confirm its validity over a much wider range of organisations. During all this time I have had access to the heritage of thinking about strategy through reading and direct interaction with a number of remarkable people who stick in my memory as pivotal at crucial times in the development of my thinking.
While many people were experimenting with scenarios for organisational decision making in the 1960s and early 1970s Pierre Wack, through his work in Shell since the mid-1960s, is the undisputed intellectual leader in the area of organisational scenario-based strategic thinking. He was the first to set out the essentials of the use of scenarios as instruments for strategy development. Subsequent historical evolution has clearly shown his far-sightedness, as most other, more probabilistic approaches have fallen by the wayside. Crucial elements of this thinking include:
The need to take existing mental models of the decision makers as the starting point.
Creating a reframing of the situation, through the introduction of new perspectives. The essential link between successful strategy and ‘‘seeing’’ the world in a new way. The new unique insight.
The need to understand predictability and uncertainty.
The aim of changing mental models of decision makers.
From the early days of scenario-based planning in Shell a prominent role was given to what became known as the ‘‘remarkable people’’, who could be helpful in creating such a reframing. The network of remarkable people became a crucial instrument of the scenario activity, first in Group Planning in Shell and subsequently embodied in Global Business Network. Nobody understands the power of such a network better than Napier Collyns, now with GBN, who showed the art and power of networking, and what was required to make it happen. The remarkable person ‘‘par excellence’’ for me is Peter Schwartz. I don’t think I know anyone who has his ability to introduce a new perspective into just about any conversation in which he participates (Schwartz 1991).
Interestingly, while Shell as a company did not have any problems seeing the value of scenarios, planners from the early days of scenarios onwards considered it somewhat problematic that they could not always lay a clear trace from the scenario activity to organisational action. In studying the work of Emery and Trist it became clear to me that scenarios become meaningful only in the context of an understanding of the ‘‘organisational self’’ (Emery & Trist 1965). Thoughtful managers have powerful insights, albeit often intuitive, into the characteristics of the organisational self against which the scenarios can be made meaningful. Jay Ogilvy’s metaphor of scenarios as test conditions in a wind-tunnel for designing strategic success helps to clarify this. From this it seemed to me that in order to understand the overall notion of scenario-based planning it would be useful to help people articulate the essentials of the organisational self. This would allow them to look at the organisation and its environment in each other’s contexts, and in this way make both more meaningful.
Pierre Wack also led the way in thinking about the organisational self. While Pierre is well known for his contribution to the area of scenario-based planning (his Harvard Business Review articles are the most frequently cited in scenario related literature, Wack 1985a, Wack, 1985b) few people realise that he was one of the first to articulate a ‘‘resource view’’ of strategy. In the late 1970s Pierre undertook a comprehensive study of strategy making as practised at that time, with the aim of showing the strategic context of scenario-based planning more clearly. In the heyday of the ‘‘positioning school of strategy’’, articulated by Michael Porter in 1980, Pierre intuited (inspired by Richard Normann 1977) that a resource view might lead to a more stable theory of corporate success. At the end of his second HBR article (Wack 1985b) he summarises his conclusions in a simple diagram in which he introduces the notion of ‘‘Strategic Vision’’. He saw Strategic Vision as ‘‘the counterpoint of scenarios’’ for coping with turbulence and uncertainty, a ‘‘complexity reducer’’, a common frame of reference within which information can be organised. It enables executives to know what signals to look for, against the ‘‘noisy’’ background of the business environment.
His basic thinking on this, dating back to the 1970s, has never been published. Internally in Shell he described his concept of Strategic Vision as follows:
It is a clear and explicit rationale for achieving business success, focusing on building up ‘‘profit potential’’, by developing a reservoir of potentialities.
It is a system for dominance, expressed as a commitment to excellence in a number of capabilities (more than two, less than 10) perceived as the few critical factors of success, the importance of which tends to override everything else.
Coalesced into a unique combination it is experienced as a strategic vision of what the company wants to be.
Note his ‘‘hard-nosed’’ emphasis on profit potential, and the systemic view of a limited number of capabilities working together to create uniqueness. At Shell we subsequently developed this concept further in what I call in this book the ‘‘Business Idea’’. But the conceptual underpinning of the thinking in this book, including the insight that scenarios can only acquire meaning against an (tacit or explicit) understanding of the identity of the organisation – the organisational self and its Business Idea – derives from Pierre Wack.
Arie De Geus (1988) introduced me to the theories of William Stern. It made me realise that the search for profit potential may be related to shareholder interests, but is in the final analysis a manifestation of a basic characteristic of any ‘‘living system’’, namely the urge to survive and grow. Another major component, related to this, was the view of organisations as systems of loops. This has a long history, with contributions from Darwin, Maruyama, Bateson, Varela and many others. From that perspective growth means ‘‘reinforcing feedback’’. Michel Bougon used the concept for drawing out the essentials of the organisation’s success formula (Bougon & Komocar 1990). It became clear that a ‘‘success formula’’ would always be based on a reinforcing feedback loop. I will argue that uniqueness results from reinforcing feedback. The discussion of uniqueness has a long history in economics. It is usually discussed in terms of scarcities, barriers to entry and competencies. The term Distinctive Competencies goes back at least to Selznick (1957). Today people seem to prefer to talk about ‘‘core competencies’’ (I find this a step backwards, contrary to distinctiveness the notion of ‘‘core’’ is entirely metaphoric and cannot be conceptually tested). Pierre Wack introduced Dick Rumelt to Group Planning in Shell in the late 1970s, and through him I became aware of the economic literature in this area. Shortly afterwards I had the opportunity to work closely with Paul Schoemaker (Schoemaker & van der Heijden 1992), who joined us for an extended sabbatical from the University of Chicago. Together we worked through the literature and experimented with ways to apply these concepts in the real world of Shell. Paul pointed out that distinctiveness could never be forever, it would always depreciate over time, and organisations need to maintain and develop these if they want to stay ahead.
Gradually the specifics of the reinforcing feedback loop we were looking for became clearer, with Distinctive Competencies leading to competitive advantage (Porter 1985), leading to profit potential, leading to resources which can be invested in maintenance and development of the Distinctive Competencies. Richard Normann helped us a great deal in clarifying the relationship between competitive advantage, customer value and Distinctive Competencies. I am most grateful for the many in-depth discussions with Richard and his colleague Rafael Ramirez, as part of the ‘‘Business Logics for Innovators’’ initiative, launched by their company SMG. I believe that their books (Normann & Ramirez 1994, Ramirez & Wallin 2000, Normann 2001) will be some of those lasting contributions to the strategy literature. In this way the concept of the Business Idea took shape. It has proven powerful in bridging the gap between scenario analysis and strategic thinking and conversation. The underlying paradigm emphasises the ongoing process of strategy making. Don Michael made me realise that from the moment of acknowledgement of uncertainty the key to success moves from the idea of onetime development of ‘‘best strategy’’ to the most effective ongoing strategy process (Michael 1973). Under the influence of Colin Eden, at Strathclyde University, I began to understand the overriding importance of the quality of the ongoing strategic conversation in the organisation (Eden 1992, Eden & Ackermann 1998). As said earlier the strategic conversation is partly formally embedded in various mechanisms, including the planning system, mandatory submissions and documentation, meetings and decision-making processes. But a large part of it is informal, and takes place when people meet casually. It is important to understand the role of scenarios and the Business Idea in the context of this total process.
At the time of his involvement in Group Planning Arie De Geus promoted the idea of ‘‘Organisational Learning’’ to encapsulate all of this (De Geus 1988). Our purpose became to conceptualise the notion of Organisational Learning beyond the metaphorical. Colin Eden suggested the crucial interaction between learning and action. The embodiment of this in the learning loop as articulated by David Kolb (Kolb & Rubin 1991) allows a direct connection with the idea of a reinforcing feedback loop, and helped me to develop an overall framework for the argument in this book.
In writing this book it has been my intention to discuss practical tools and techniques. I wish to acknowledge the contributions of many people with whom I have been working over the years in trying things out in a practical setting. I am grateful to have been able to work in a company like Shell that provides room for experimentation. And we experimented a lot. The person I worked with most to make our theories useful in a practical setting is Jaap Leemhuis. Our partnership dates back to 1980, and in the course of the years we have worked on scenarios, strategy development, entrepreneurial innovation and organisational development. Many of the approaches suggested in this book go back to that partnership. I am also grateful to my friends in Group Planning, in particular Graham Galer, Brian Marsh and John Collman, without whom most ideas in this book would have remained stuck in theory. They suggested that the best laboratory to test approaches to strategy are the smaller companies, without complex planning resources obscuring a higher-level overall view. As it turned out the smaller companies have forced us to become very clear about what it is we are trying to do if any practical result is to be achieved. It proved a salutary discipline.
Over the last 20 years I have been privileged to participate in the conversation among the world’s top practitioners in this area who are part of the Global Business Network. GBN was one of the early enthusiastic adopters of electronic networking in the early 1980s through which practitioners compared theory and real-life experiences. Much of this conversation has been captured. Going through it one cannot be anything else but impressed with the quality of the thinking developed in those conversations.
I finally acknowledge the contributions of Colin Eden, George Burt and Ron Bradfield who played such a crucial role in extending our work since I joined Strathclyde University.
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
The book has four parts that cover the subject in the following way. In Part One we will discuss a number of the underlying assumptions on which thinking about strategy is based. Specifically we will discuss the three paradigms, based on views of the world characterised by rationalism, evolution and process. Consideration of uncertainty and ambiguity will allow us to see that all three are valid perspectives on a situation that is too complex to be packaged in only one of these views. We will then argue that a synthesis can be achieved by the introduction of the notion of institutional learning. We will show how all three traditional views on strategy have a logical place in the organisational learning loop. Finally we will argue that scenario-based planning can be seen as a form of such integrative institutional learning. Using that as a basis we discuss what this means in terms of shaping the approach with the objective of creating a practical tool, using all three modes of thinking about strategy.
In Part Two we will discuss the theory of scenario thinking. This is based on articulation of the characteristics of the organisation itself, and consideration of the environment in which it exists. Understanding of the organisational ‘‘self’’ is the starting point of skilful strategy. We will introduce the concept of the ‘‘Business Idea’’ as a way of making explicit those aspects of the organisation that are crucially tied up with the question of survival and development. In the business environment we will be particularly interested in ambiguity and uncertainty, which will lead to a characterisation in the form of multiple, equally plausible futures. We will then bring these two together and address the question of how to judge the robustness of the Business Idea in the future business environment, and reinvent it if necessary. We will distinguish adaptive scenario-based planning, in which incremental change is considered sufficient, from generative processes in which a more fundamental redesign is required for institutional survival. This will lead us towards an understanding of strategic direction.
Part Three introduces the practice of the scenario-based planning process. Specifically we will discuss how a management team can go about engaging in a thinking and discussion process to surface the understanding of the executives in a form which allows rational discussion leading to strategic conclusions and action. We will also discuss how external perspectives need to be introduced into the process, to avoid ‘‘institutional myopia’’. Although there are many ways in which this can be achieved we will suggest specific approaches that can be adopted by the less experienced. Following these, a management team will articulate its shared Business Idea, analyse its business environment in all its uncertainty, analyse its competitive position, and then discuss its strategic fit in the world. On the basis of the conclusions reached the process helps in articulating options available for strategies to either improve the fit, or develop its position by exploiting an already strong situation.
After Part Three has taken the management team through a rational thinking process to articulate its position, Part Four introduces the wider institutional behaviour context. The institutional learning model underpinning this book argues the crucial role of action and experience in strategy development. It therefore cannot happen only within the management team of an organisation but involves all layers of decision making. A management team that tries to develop strategy in isolation will quickly find that there is not much relation with the actual behaviour the organisation as a whole displays in the world. If the ultimate aim is to make the organisation more adaptable in a changing world, strategy processes must pervade the organisation. Therefore we will need to address the formal planning and decision processes, and we will discuss steps that can be taken to move the whole organisation into a more skilful behavioural pattern. We will also reach the conclusion that an organisation that wishes to move from a traditional rationalist approach towards a corporate learning approach will need to work towards changing the culture. The decision by management to introduce scenario-based planning will not be effective unless followed by a cultural process in the organisation. This is a time-consuming process that will require not only a conscious decision, but also persistence and consistency on the part of management over a considerable period of time. They need to realise that they have embarked on a road that will be demanding. On the other hand, we are discussing questions of life and death for the organisation; it would be unrealistic to expect survival to come ‘‘cheap and easy’’.
Supplementary resources can be found at www.wiley.com/go/scenarios
Part OneThe Context
OVERVIEW
In this part we introduce scenario-based planning and consider it in the wider general management context. We will base this discussion on the premise that the ultimate purpose of the scenario planner is to create a more adaptable organisation, which first recognises change and uncertainty, and second uses it creatively to its advantage. Traditionally this has been the subject of a discipline known as ‘‘strategic management’’, and we review the various schools of thought that have developed over the years under this heading. We will argue that three main directions can be distinguished which tend to be put forward by protagonists as competing explanations of what happens in real-world organisations.
We will then develop a framework for integrating these schools of thought by means of the concept of organisations as learning organisms. We will move beyond the metaphor and develop a model for organisational learning, based on a general learning model suggested by David Kolb.
This unified theory of strategic management will put us in a position to discuss the contribution that scenario-based planning can make. We will argue that, properly institutionalised, the effect of scenario-based planning can be all-pervasive in an organisation’s ability to adapt and be successful in a continuously changing world.
Chapter One1965 to 1990: Five Discoveries at Shell
Scenario-based planning has a long history. Its emergence in the organisational world is preceded by its use by the military in war games. It moved into the civil domain through the activities of the RAND Corporation during and after World War Two, and was subsequently developed by the Hudson Institute, created by Herman Kahn after he resigned from RAND. Kahn adopted the term ‘‘scenario’’, with its Hollywood association as a detailed outline of a future movie that was fictional, reinforcing his assertion that he did not make accurate predictions, but stories to explore. The Hollywood link was strengthened when director Stanley Kubrick used Khan as part of the model for his film character Dr Strangelove.
Kahn’s most quoted scenario publication was his book The Year 2000 published in 1967 (Kahn & Wiener 1967). From the late 1960s onwards scenario-based planning took off in the corporate world. Scenario analysis has evolved quite considerably since then. A short history of this evolution will help in understanding the basic principles involved.
Initially scenario analysis was essentially an extension of the traditional ‘‘predict-and-control’’ approach to planning, except that a single line forecast was replaced by a probabilistic assessment of alternative futures, leading to a ‘‘most likely’’ projection. This did not prove a fundamental advance over other forecasting approaches. By the end of the 1960s, the flaws in this approach were widely known. It is important to understand that the scenario-based planning process described in this book has at its core an entirely different central idea. This type of scenario-based planning relies not on probability but on causality. As such it appeals more to the intuitive needs of the typical decision makers in their search for enhanced understanding of the changing structures in society. Shell, one of the pioneers of scenario analysis, can probably claim to be one of the first and most consistent users of the methodology.
In Shell, interest in scenarios at a more conceptual level arose with the increasing failures of planning based on forecasts in the mid-1960s. Scenarios were initially introduced as a way to plan without having to predict things that everyone knew were unpredictable. Through Pierre Wack, who introduced scenarios in Shell, the early attempts were based on the Kahn philosophy. He suggested that planning must be based on the assumption that something is predictable. If the future is 100% uncertain planning is obviously a waste of time. The primary task therefore is to separate what is predictable from what is fundamentally uncertain. The predictable elements became known as the predetermined elements. The idea of the Kahn scenario approach was that predetermineds would be reflected in all scenarios in the same predictable way. Uncertainties, on the other hand, would be reflected through the different ways they play out in various different scenarios.
ROBUST DECISION MAKING
These multiple, but equally plausible, futures served the purpose of a test-bed for policies and plans. In Shell, an engineering dominated company, most big future-related decisions are project related. Each project is evaluated economically against a set of, say, two or three scenarios, so two or three performance outcomes are generated, one for each scenario. And a decision on whether to go ahead with the project is made on the basis of these multiple possible outcomes, instead of one go/no-go number. The aim is to develop projects that are likely to have positive returns under any of the scenarios. The scenarios as such are not the decision calculus indicating whether or not to go ahead with a project, they are a mechanism for producing information that is relevant to the decision. Decisions are never based on one scenario being more likely than another; project developers optimise simultaneously against a number of different futures which are all considered equally plausible, and treated with equal weight. In this way both the value and the downward potential of the project are assessed.
Similarly if a particular strategy or plan needs to be evaluated this is done against each scenario. This produces multiple outcome assessments, which are considered by the decision makers. Instead of one picture they look at, for example, three. After more than 35 years of scenario analysis top management in Shell would not want to make do with anything less. They are fully aware that if the quality of a strategic decision has been whittled down to one single indicator, important knowledge about the fundamental uncertainty in the project has been filtered out. In this way the first objective of scenario-based planning became the generation of projects and decisions that are more robust under a variety of alternative futures.
STRETCHING MENTAL MODELS LEADS TO DISCOVERIES
One of the early findings of the scenario planners was that the search for predetermined elements required them to consider driving forces in the business environment in some depth. The need to separate predetermineds from uncertainties requires a considerable degree of analysis of causal relationships.
The earliest examples of scenarios created by Wack’s team are a good example. The first item on the scenario agenda in the early 1970s was, not surprisingly, the price of oil. So planners had to consider what was predictable and what was fundamentally uncertain in the price of oil. That meant they had to examine what drives oil price, and, therefore, the whole question of supply and demand.
Interestingly, in those days the outlook for total demand worldwide was hardly problematic. It was regarded as predictable, growing around 6% every year. This had been a consistent pattern since World War Two and was not questioned. So attention turned to supply. To what extent was this predetermined or uncertain? This involved the question of where the supply would be coming from. Of course the Middle East loomed large in this.
Shell’s technical people had concluded that supply availability was predetermined, the resource in the ground was plentiful, and the necessary number of wells could be drilled. But Pierre Wack was not satisfied with that answer. He looked behind it, considering the people who have control over the reserves who would be making the actual production decisions. In the late 1960s these were still the major oil companies, but the producing governments had started to establish their sovereign authority. It was one of Pierre’s great contributions to the scenario process that he insisted on looking at the people behind decisions, not just at the technical or macro phenomena. The planners started to wonder whether it would make sense, from the point of view of the producing governments, to continue to supply the increasing quantities required by the oil consumers. They had to conclude that this was sufficiently uncertain to make it worth developing a new scenario. This scenario (one out of six initially) became known as the crisis scenario, in which producing countries would refuse to continue to increase production beyond what made sense from the perspective of their own cash needs.
