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An accessible and engaging anthology of readings focused specifically on applied ethics issues of sexual morality
Sexual Ethics: An Anthology addresses conceptual, ethical, and public policy issues about sex, providing a balanced and non-sectarian discussion of many of today’s most important and controversial moral topics. Covering a broad range of contemporary sexual ethics issues, this easily accessible textbook includes explications and point/counterpoint pieces on the definition of sex and sexual orientation, sexual harassment and rape law, sexual discrimination, age of consent, marriage and adultery, online affairs, gay marriage, polygamy and polyamory, sexual orientation change therapy, transgender and sex reassignment surgery, intersexed infants and surgery, pornography, prostitution, psychiatric classifications of sexuality disorders, and specific paraphilias. Organized around six broad themes—Consent, Marriage, Homosexuality, Transgender, Commerce, and Paraphilias—Sexual Ethics presents multiple sides of each issue, offering diverse perspectives on critical topics, supported by relevant philosophical arguments, position papers, psychological studies, government regulations, and court rulings.
Sexual Ethics is particularly designed to provide a ready-made course in sexual ethics, with several major elements ideally suited for classroom instructors and students:
Sexual Ethics: An Anthology is an excellent textbook for undergraduate classes in applied ethics, sexual ethics, and gender studies, as well as related courses in sociology, public policy, marriage and family law, and social work.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023
Cover
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Preface: How This Book Is Organized and How to Use It
History of the Text
Purpose of the Text
Organization of the Text
Instructional Benefits of the Text
Acknowledgements
Thanks
PART I: Introduction to Sex, Sexuality, and Sexual Ethics
1 What is Sex? What is Sexuality? What is Sexual Ethics?
Section 1: What is Sex?
Section 2: What is Sexuality?
Section 3: What is Sexual Ethics?
References
PART II: Consent and Coercion
2 A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment
I. Introduction
II. Current Law on Sexual Harassment
III. The Social Nature of Sexual Harassment
IV. Subjective v. Objective Definitions of Sexual Harassment
V. Implications of the Objective Definition
VI. Conclusion
3 Lost Innocence
The Mary and John Scenario
The Bombastic Macho Male Vs. The Timorous Heterosexual Male
Oppression Anxiety
The “Fighting Words” Doctrine Revisited in the Hostile Environment Context
Objections to the Idea of “Sexual Harassment Words”
Conclusion
4 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc.
*1533 I. Findings of Fact
II. Conclusions of Law
5 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
I
II
III
6 Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman
What is the Wrong of Rape?
The Present Criminal Law of Rape
Starting Over: What Should the Rules Look Like?
7 Rape and the Reasonable Man
The
Mens Rea
of Rape
Mens Rea
and Reasonableness
Conclusion
References
8 Revisions to the Uniform Crime Report’s Definition of Rape
9 Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders
I. Introduction
II. Background on the Age of Consent
III. Problems With age of Consent Laws in Modern America
IV. Strategies for Reform
V. Conclusion
10 A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to the “Age of Consent”
I. Adolescent Neurological, Cognitive, and Psychosocial Development
1. Self‐Regulation and Reward Sensitivity
2. Future Orientation
3. Peer Influence
4. Adolescent Capacity and Physical Appearance
II. Applicable Legal Principles and Guidance Relevant to Juveniles
1. The “Rule of Sevens” and the Restatements
2. Science and the United States Supreme Court Precedents
III. “Consent’ Versus Consent in Criminal Law and Civil Law
IV.Civil Law’s Treatment of “Consent”
V. Conclusions
PART III: Marriage and Fidelity
11 Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later
I. Introduction
III. What is Covenant Marriage?
IV. Obstacles to Its Implementation: Clergy and Civil Servants
V. Nock’s Research: What Distinguishes Covenant Couples from Other Married Couples?
VI. Completing the Vision of Marriage Within Covenant Marriage
VII. The Threat of
Lawrence v. Texas
and the Ability of Covenant Marriage to Withstand the Threat
VIII. Conclusion
12 Regulatory Fictions
Introduction
I. Literature as Law
II. Law as Science Fiction
Conclusion: Of Law, Literature, and Innovation
13 A Traditionalist Case for Gay Marriage
14 A Response to the ‘Conservative Case’ for Same‐Sex Marriage
I. Introduction: Considering the Conservative Case for Same‐Sex Marriage
II. Basic Principles of Conservatism?
III. A Critique of the Conservative Case for Legalizing Same‐Sex Marriage
IV. A Conservative Case Against Same‐Sex Marriage
V. Conclusion: A Day of Reckoning
15 United States v. Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer
16 Marriage
The Polygamy Question: Demands for Accommodation vs. The Public Good
17 Liberalism and the Polygamy Question
I. Introduction
II. Liberalism and Polygamy
III. The Argument from Public Reason
IV. The Argument from Democracy
V. The Argument from Exploitation
18 Multi‐Player Option
19 Is Adultery Immoral?
20 What’s Really Wrong with Adultery?
21 Sex Online: Is This Adultery?
Introduction
I. Divorce
II. Adultery
III. Technology
IV. Case Studies
V. Conclusion
22 Virtual Adultery
I. Introduction
II. Application of Adultery as a Fault Ground
III. Intersection of Social Media and Infidelity
IV. Approaches to Recognizing Virtual Adultery
PART IV: Homosexuality and Policy
23 Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal
1 Introduction
2 On “Function” and Its Cognates
3 Applications to Homosexuality
4 Evidence and Further Clarification
6 On Policy Issues
References
24 Homosexuality and Nature
The Argument from Nature
Prospects for Happiness
Issues at Law
25 Bowers v. Hardwick
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
26 Lawrence v. Texas
I
II
IV
V
27 Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies)
Preamble
Position Statement
References
Appendix 1
28 (A) Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation – Abstract; (B) Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of Homosexuality
Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation
Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of Homosexuality
References
29 Welch v. Brown, Appellants’ Opening Brief (Preliminary Injunction Appeal)
Introduction
Statement of The Case
Statement of Facts
I. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts Have Been Widely Discredited
II. SB 1172 Is Part of a Comprehensive Scheme Regulating the Mental Health Professions to Protect Public Health and Safety
III. SB 1172 Prohibits Licensed Mental Health Professionals From Providing a Widely Discredited Therapy to Minors
Summary of Argument
Conclusion
30 Welch v. Brown, Brief Amicus Curiae of Foundation for Moral Law, in Support of Plaintiffs – Appellees Urging Affirmance
Statement of Identity and Interests of
Amicus Curiae
, Foundation For Moral Law
Summary of Argument
Argument
I. The Appellees Donald Welch, Anthony Duk, and Aaron Bitzer have a First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to Practice Conversion Therapy With Willing Patients.
II. SB 1172 Also Violates the Rights of Minors and to Receive Conversion Therapy and of Parents to Obtain Conversion Therapy for Their Children.
Conclusion
PART V: Transgender and Medicine
31 Gender Identity Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence
Introduction
Problems with the Diagnostic Criteria
Reliability and Validity of GID Diagnosis
GID Is Not a Mental Disorder
Treatment Rationale
Conclusion
References
32 Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders
33 Gender Dysphoria
Introduction
Respecting the Patient, Ensuring Access to Care
Characteristics of the Condition
Need for Change
34 The Psychopathology of “Sex Reassignment” Surgery
Introduction
Background
Origins of the Desire for SRS
Psychological Disorders Associated with the Desire for SRS
Ethical Objection to SRS
Collaborating with Madness?
35 Transsexualism and Gender Reassignment Surgery
Introduction
The Case of Sam Hashimi/Samantha Kane/Charles Kane
The Extent to which Transsexualism is a Medical/Surgical Problem
Proceeding with Treatment
References
36 Surgical Progress is Not the Answer to Intersexuality
Introduction
A Surgical World‐View
Catch‐22
When is a Clitorectomy not a Clitorectomy?
Postcards Prom the Paradigm Shift
Conclusion
37 The Ethics of Surgically Assigning Sex for Intersex Children
Introduction
The Challenge to the Traditional Treatment Model and Early Surgery
Who Should Decide?
The Clinical Perspective: Should Early Surgery be Carried Out?
The Threat to Future Autonomy
Children’s Developing Autonomy
Does Early Surgery make an Intersex Individual’s Life Go Better or Worse?
Parental Attitudes
Key Points in the Management Decisions about Intersex
Conclusion
References
PART VI: Commerce and Speech
38 The Question of Harm
39 The Findings and Recommendations of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography
Pornography and Harm
Sexually Violent Pornography
Nonviolent and Degrading Pornography
Summary
References
40 Pornography and the First Amendment
I. Pornography, Obscenity, and Harms
II. Low‐Value and High‐Value Speech
III. The Problem of Viewpoint Discrimination
IV. Substantivity, Formality, and the Free Speech Guarantee
V. Slippery Slopes, Vagueness, and Overbreadth
VI. Conclusion
41 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
42 What’s Wrong with Prostitution?
2. Paternalism
3. Some Things Just Are Not for Sale
4. The Feminist Critique (a): Degradation of Women
5. The Feminist Critique (b): Oppression of Women
6. Conclusion
43 Moral Reflections on Prostitution
Introduction
I. Kantian Morality and Sexual Ethics
II. Mutually Respectful Sex
III. The General Dynamic of Prostitution
IV. The Client’s Objective
V. A Phenomenology of Prostitution
Conclusion
PART VII: Paraphilia and Pathology
44 DSM‐IV‐TR and the Paraphilias
Are the Paraphilias Mental Disorders?
The DSM Definition of a Paraphilia
The “B” Criterion: Distress and Dysfunction and the “Paraphilias”
When do “Paraphilic” Sexual Behaviors Become Pathological?
Statements of Fact?
The Special Case of Pedophilia
Discussion
References
45 Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders
46 Paraphilic Disorders
Characteristics of Paraphilic Disorders
Additional Changes to Paraphilic Disorders
47 Rethinking Sadomasochism
I. Anti‐SM Feminist Oppositional Strategies
II. Replication Versus Simulation: Interpretive Contexts of SM
III. Consent and Content
IV. Validation, Assimilation, and Public Relations
References
48 Naughty Fantasies
49 What (if Anything) Is Wrong with Bestiality?
I. Standard Objections to Bestiality
II. The Taboo against Bestiality
50 Horse Sense
51 Pedophilia
I
II
III
IV
52 What Really Is Wrong with Pedophilia?
Introduction
I
II
Index
End User License Agreement
Cover Page
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Preface: How This Book Is Organized and How to Use It
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Index
Wiley End User License Agreement
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Each volume in this outstanding series provides an authoritative and comprehensive collection of the essential primary readings from philosophy’s main fields of study. Designed to complement the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, each volume represents an unparalleled resource in its own right and will provide the ideal platform for course use.
1. Hopkins: Sexual Ethics: An Anthology
2. Eze: African Philosophy: An Anthology
3. McNeill and Feldman: Continental Philosophy: An Anthology
4. Cummins and Cummins: Minds, Brains, and Computers – The Foundations of Cognitive Science: An Anthology
5. Kearney and Rasmussen: Continental Aesthetics – Romanticism to Postmodernism: An Anthology
6. Jacquette: Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology
7. Jacquette: Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology
8. Harris, Pratt, and Waters: American Philosophies: An Anthology
9. Emmanuel and Goold: Modern Philosophy – From Descartes to Nietzsche: An Anthology
10. Light and Rolston: Environmental Ethics: An Anthology
11. Taliaferro and Griffiths: Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology
12. John and Lopes: Philosophy of Literature – Contemporary and Classic Readings: An Anthology
13. Cudd and Andreasen: Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology
14. Shafer‐Landau and Cuneo: Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology
15. Lange: Philosophy of Science: An Anthology
16. Curren: Philosophy of Education: An Anthology
17. Lycan and Prinz: Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (third edition)
18. Carroll and Choi: Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology Rosenberg and Arp: Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology
19. McGrew, Alspector‐Kelly, and Allhoff: The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology
20. May: Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings
21. Martinich and Sosa: Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (second edition)
22. Kim, Korman, and Sosa: Metaphysics: An Anthology (second edition)
23. Shafer‐Landau: Ethical Theory: An Anthology (second edition)
24. Hetherington: Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology
25. Scharff and Dusek: Philosophy of Technology – The Technological Condition: An Anthology (second edition)
26. Davis: Contemporary Moral and Social Issues: An Introduction through Original Fiction, Discussion, and Readings
27. Dancy and Sandis: Philosophy of Action: An Anthology
28. Lamarque and Olsen: Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art – The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology (second edition)
29. Goodin and Pettit: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (third edition)
30. Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath: Epistemology: An Anthology (third edition)
31. LaFollette: Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (fifth edition)
32. Cahn, Ross, and Shapshay: Aesthetics: A Comprehensive Anthology (second edition)
33. Cottingham: Western Philosophy: An Anthology (third edition)
34. Schuklenk and Singer: Bioethics: An Anthology (fourth edition)
Edited by
Patrick D. Hopkins
This edition first published 2023© 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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The right of Patrick D. Hopkins to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication DataNames: Hopkins, Patrick D., editor. Title: Sexual ethics : an anthology / edited by Patrick D. Hopkins.Description: Hoboken : Wiley‐Blackwell, 2023. | Series: Blackwell philosophy anthologies | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2022036460 (print) | LCCN 2022036461 (ebook) | ISBN 9781118615867 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119252177 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119252207 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Sexual ethics.Classification: LCC HQ31 .S515638 2023 (print) | LCC HQ31 (ebook) | DDC 176/.4–dc23/eng/20221017LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022036460LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022036461
Cover design: WileyCover images: The Flirtation (1904), by Eugene de Blaas, photographic reproduction, public domain, Wikimedia Commons
Sexual Ethics: An Anthology is an accessible and provocative collection of readings on conceptual, ethical, and policy issues about sex. Designed for students, teachers, and anyone interested in exploring one of the major moral topics of our times, this collection avoids jargon and obscurity in favor of clear, straightforward discussion, covering a wide array of cases from all sides. It is intended to provoke thought, generate discussion, and analytically clarify the definitions, arguments, assumptions, and options of our personal, public, and political treatment of sex.
Unlike many books, which make their way from author to publisher to classroom, this anthology made the trip the other way around. It started in a classroom and then made its way to the publishing house. Now it’s coming full circle. Toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when I was revamping my department’s offerings and putting several applied ethics courses into rotation, I decided to teach a stand‐alone course on sexual ethics. Such a course made sense, seeing as how sex was a major moral issue in society, every bit as controversial and publicly debated as medicine, business, and the environment. I assumed, then, that there would be textbooks on sexual ethics, focused on practical problems and organized in the same ways the medical ethics, business ethics, engineering ethics, and environmental ethics books on my shelves were. To my surprise, I found none. There were excellent books on the philosophy of sex and while those included some applied moral and policy articles, they focused mainly on conceptual, ontological, and epistemological issues. There were also quite a few books from particular sectarian perspectives whose aims were largely about doctrinal clarification or religious training. There were also various books on feminist theory and gender studies, which tended to center on conceptual, historical, and theoretical concerns, often using abstruse vocabulary. Finally, there were anthologies on very specific issues, such as entire books on sexual harassment law. While all useful for their purposes, these books did not address the needs of a wide‐ranging, non‐sectarian, accessible, applied ethics course. So, I created my own reader from the sizable literature on sexual ethics. When the class was a success, I decided to turn that reader into a book anyone could use. This is that book.
Applied ethics courses have been popular on college campuses for years. Delving into subjects from medicine to business to law to technology to the environment, they tap into an interest and a need people have to talk about, think about, write about, and hopefully learn about issues that grip our moral consciousness as well as our legislatures. Somewhat surprisingly, given the popularity of medical, business, and environmental ethics, sexual ethics courses are less common even though society seems seized at times with debate over sex and sexuality. The public controversies over gay marriage, pornography, premarital sex, sexual harassment, and adultery, just to name a few, have been as prominent and intense as those about abortion, healthcare costs, corporate misconduct, climate change, and endangered species. There could be several reasons why this is case. Perhaps it is because we are still embarrassed to talk about issues that feel as personal as sex, whether from a puritan inheritance or from a worry that others will think we must be talking about ourselves. Perhaps it is because the very act of talking about sex is sometimes part of a moral controversy itself – as with sexual harassment – and teachers worry that some discussions might be interpreted as inappropriate. Perhaps it is because sex is the area in which humans are both most literally and uncomfortably similar to animals – driven by the same powerful instinctual physical desires of beasts rutting in the field – and most anxiously and distancingly different from animals – driven to interpret, judge, and question those desires. Whatever the case, we seem to find it easier to talk about euthanasia than homosexuality in the classroom – although oddly, we seem to find much more talk about homosexuality in the media than euthanasia.
One way to address this asymmetry between public controversy and classroom discussion is to recognize that the passions and euphemisms and furor in public debates over sex should be taken seriously and can be discussed clearly, analytically, explicitly, and respectfully. A book that clearly labels sexual ethics as an academic and policy area worthy of focused, practical, attention can help with that.
This book is organized into three levels. The first level is a set of broad categories of concepts that shape various specific issues. For example, the concept of consent is crucial in analyzing the morality and legality of numerous sexual acts. Therefore, the broad category of consent and coercion is the rubric under which issues of sexual harassment, rape, and cognitive maturity are grouped. The second level is a set of applied framing questions that situate the broader conceptual problems with reference to specific issues. These questions do not exhaust the moral terrain but focus on the way the concepts work in real‐world moral and legal decisions. For example, under the broad category of marriage and fidelity, one framing question asks whether purely online romances should count as adultery. The third level is the set of articles themselves, arguing for one conclusion over another, one judgment over another, and one policy over another. For example, under the broad category of homosexuality and policy, and under the framing question of how we should assess attempts to change sexual orientation, one legal brief argues that “conversion therapy” should be criminalized as malpractice and another argues that it is justified by the right of the therapist to free speech.
With any text like this, the editor has a painful time selecting material. There are often so many good articles on a topic, sometimes only a few good articles on an important topic, and always far too many topics to cover at all. There are hard decisions then, as to what to cover and what to leave for another day. Inevitably, some readers will be disappointed that a topic or article important to them is left out. That is entirely understandable, but limitations of space preclude covering all that would be useful. In choosing the articles for this book, then, I had to decide what selection criteria would guide me. I chose topics I considered to be major issues, but “major” was interpreted in two ways. In one sense, “major” meant “amount of controversy in society.” Using that criterion, gay marriage had to be included since it has recently been a monumental cultural focus at the level of individual, city, state, nation, legislature, and supreme court. Interracial marriage, though controversial in its own time and important to look at for the history of sexual ethics, was left out because it currently engenders little public outcry. In another sense, however, “major” meant “getting at the conceptual heart of sexual ethics.” Using that criterion, the medical treatment of intersexed infants is included, even though it is a rare condition, and the moral analysis of pedophilia is included, even though there is hardly any public demand for decriminalizing sex with children.
Having been created in the classroom, for college and law students of all levels and all majors, this book has been deliberately designed to be as user‐friendly as possible, always in reference to what makes a text most useful for students, teachers, or anyone who wants a clear direction of where to go and a clear explanation of what to expect. The goal has essentially been to create a ready‐to‐go course. The specific user‐friendly design elements include:
Categorization
: The book is divided into six broad categories that emphasize how conceptual issues shape debates (Consent, Marriage, Homosexuality, Transgender, Commerce, Paraphilia) with a short introduction to the topic at the beginning of the section.
Framing Questions
: Each major section of the book includes specific framing questions that address a major moral or policy issue, not to limit the issues but to show how various concepts are employed in real‐world cases (e.g., How should we define rape? Should we legalize gay marriage? Should pornography be protected as free speech?).
Introduction
: The book begins with a concise introductory chapter on concepts and definitions of sex, sexuality, and sexual ethics that brings theoretical issues into clear view, providing the philosophical and scientific background for discussing the readings and explicitly showing how these conceptual issues have direct practical application. For example, definitions of sex are not just intellectual puzzles – definitions legally determine whether or not rape has occurred and thus determine whether or not someone goes to prison. The chapter includes recent empirical research on how people define sex and sexuality and recent empirical research on the moral psychology of emotional reactions to sexual issues.
Discussion Starters
: Each of the three sections in the introductory chapter (what is sex? what is sexuality? what is sexual ethics?) begins with 5 discussion starters, geared toward getting a class or group talking about issues and beginning to tease out conceptual and ethical elements of the issues. Instructors can use these starters early on in each section of the class to get students used to talking and to start fleshing out ideas.
Decision Cases
: One of the most valuable elements of this book is the set of decision cases that follow each of the three sections in the introductory chapter. Each of those sections conclude with 15 cases (45 cases altogether, almost all based on real‐world events, including recent hot‐topics) that call for in‐depth philosophical analysis and making actual determinations about what should be done or how a person should be judged. Covering a wide variety of issues, the decision cases are perfect for class debate, for research topics, and for class presentations.
Representativeness
: Every specific issue is addressed with both Pro and Con articles – sometimes in direct response to one another – showcasing areas of moral, conceptual, and empirical disagreement and exposing readers to multiple positions and arguments.
Article Summaries
: Every article is immediately preceded by a short summary, indicating the topic, major points, argument structure, conclusion, and implications of the piece. This not only helps readers follow and understand but is immensely helpful for teachers planning courses – allowing them to determine which readings are best suited for a class without having to pre‐read entire articles.
Article Variety
: The book contains a variety of types of readings on sex and sexuality, including argumentative essays, court rulings in specific cases, legal briefs in active court proceedings, position statements from medical organizations, government commission reports, and government agency regulations. This coverage provides a useful array of the types of writing that are influential in sexual ethics debates and demonstrates how actual, practical decisions are often made.
My thanks go to the following people for their help with this volume.
Jeff Dean at Wiley‐Blackwell was very helpful and insightful, seeing how a book like this addressed a gap in the practical ethics literature and shepherding the project through the initial process. Lindsay Bourgeois and Allison Kostka at Wiley‐Blackwell also helped develop the project, and were consistently efficient, responsive, and supportive. Finally, thanks to Will Croft and Charlie Hamlyn for finalizing the project and being so helpful and efficient.
My student research assistants were invaluable. Nedah Nemati tirelessly, creatively, and systematically helped with the initial research and formation of the book, not only finding material but adding to the perspective and focus. She is a gem. Connor Houlahan also provided very useful research and practical assistance and was admirably unflinching given the eyebrow‐raising search terms he had to regularly enter into the college library databases.
My Sexual Ethics class of 2008 – the first time I had ever offered such a class – was the impetus for this project. They signed up for a provocatively titled course and, though there were inevitably giggles and periodic uncomfortable‐seat‐shifting at first, quickly showed that serious analytic thinking can be brought to bear on a set of issues that normally are both difficult to talk about openly but also grip the social and legal conscience of society. This book is dedicated to them.
P.D.H.
Jackson, Mississippi
The editor and publishers gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproduce the copyright material in this book:
Patrick D. Hopkins, “What is Sex, Sexuality, and Sexual Ethics?” Written for this volume. Chapter 2
Anita M. Superson, “A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment,” pp. 46–64 from Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1994). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.
Laurence Thomas, “Lost Innocence,” pp. 91–98 from Stanford Law and Policy Review 5 (1994). Reproduced with permission of Stanford University.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. 909 F. Supp. 1529 United States District Court (M.D. Florida, Tampa Division) (1995). Public Domain.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. (96–568) 83 F.3d 118 (1998). Public Domain.
Joan McGregor, “Force, Consent and the Reasonable Woman,” pp. 231–254 from Jules L. Coleman and Allen Buchanan (eds.), In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.
Donald Hubin and Karen Healy, “Rape and the Reasonable Man,” pp. 113–139 from Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 18 (1999). Reproduced with permission of Springer Nature.
United States Department of Justice, “Attorney General Eric Holder Announces Revisions to the Uniform Crime Report’s Definition of Rape,” Friday, January 6, 2012. Public Domain.
Steve James, “Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform,” pp. 241–262 from UMKC Law Review 78 (2009). Reproduced with permission of Steve James.
Jennifer Ann Drobac, “A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to the ‘Age of Consent’,” pp. 63–96 from Journal of Law & Policy 20 (2011). Reproduced with permission of Jennifer Ann Drobac.
Katherine Shaw Spaht, “Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its As Yet Unfulfilled Promise,” pp. 605–634 from Louisiana Law Review 65 (2005). Reproduced with permission of Katherine Shaw Spaht.
Elizabeth F. Emens, “Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage,” pp. 235–269 from California Law Review 99 (2011). Reproduced with permission of University of California Berkeley Law.
Dale Carpenter, “A Traditionalist Case for Gay Marriage,” pp. 93–104 from South Texas Law Review 50 (2008). Reproduced with permission of Dale Carpenter.
Lynn D. Wardles, “A Response to the ‘Conservative Case’ for Same‐Sex Marriage: Same‐Sex Marriage and the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’,” pp. 441–473 from Brigham Young University Law Review 22 (2008). Reproduced with permission of Brigham Young University.
United States v. Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer (Syllabus) 570 U.S. No. 12‐307 (2013). Public Domain.
Marci A. Hamilton, “Marriage,” pp. 50–77 from God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.
Jon Mahoney, “Liberalism and the Polygamy Question,” pp. 161–174 from Social Philosophy Today 23 (2008). Reproduced with permission of Philosophy Documentation Center.
Michelle Chihara, “Multi‐Player Option,” from Nerve.com (June 8, 2004). Reproduced with permission of Nerve.com.
Richard Wasserstrom, “Is Adultery Immoral?” pp. 513–528 from The Philosophical Forum: A Quarterly 5 (1974). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.
Michael J. Wreen, “What’s Really Wrong with Adultery?” pp. 45–49 from International Journal of Applied Philosophy 3:2 (1986). Reproduced with permission of Philosophy Documentation Center.
Christine Tavella Hall, “Sex Online: Is This Adultery?” pp. 201–221 from Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 20 (1997). Reproduced with permission of UC Hastings Law.
Kathryn Pfeiffer, “Virtual Adultery: No Physical Harm, No Foul?” pp. 667–690 from University of Richmond Law Review 46 (2012). Reproduced with permission of University of Richmond.
Michael Levin, “Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal,” pp. 251–283 from The Monist 67 (1984). Reproduced with permission of Oxford University Press.
Timothy Murphy, “Homosexuality and Nature: Happiness and the Law at Stake,” pp. 195–204 from Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1987). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.
Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, No. 85‐140 (1986). Public domain.
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, No. 02‐102 (2003). Public domain.
The American Psychiatric Association, “Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies) COPP Position Statement,” APA Document Reference No. 200001 (2000). Reproduced with permission of American Psychiatric Association.
Robert L. Spitzer, (A) “Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation?: 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation – Abstract,” p. 403 from Archives of Sexual Behavior 32 (2003); (B) “Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of Homosexuality,” p. 757 from Archives of Sexual Behavior 41 (2012). Reproduced with permission of Springer Nature.
Kamala D. Harris, Douglas J. Woods, Tamar Pachter, Daniel J. Powell, Craig J. Konnoth and Alexandra Robert Gordon, “Donald Welch, et al. v. Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of the State of California, et al., Appellants’ Opening Brief (Preliminary Injunction Appeal),” pp. 1–76 in The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 13‐15023 (2013). Public Domain.
John A. Eidsmoe and Joshua M. Pendergrass, “Donald Welch, et al. v. Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of the State of California, et al., Brief Amicus Curiae of Foundation For Moral law, In Support Of Plaintiffs—Appellees Urging Affirmance,” pp. 1–35 in The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 13‐15023 (2013). Public Domain.
Darryl B. Hill, Christina Rozanski, Jessica Carfagnini, Brian Willoughby, “Gender Identity Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence: A Critical Inquiry,” pp. 57–74 from International Journal of Sexual Health 19 (2007). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.
Robert L. Spitzer, “Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders: Discussion of Questions for DSM‐V,” pp. 111–116 from Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality 17:3–4 (2006). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.
American Psychiatric Association, “Gender Dysphoria,” from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5). © 2013 American Psychiatric Association http://www.psychiatry.org/dsm5. Reproduced with permission of American Psychiatric Association.
Richard P. Fitzgibbons, Philip M. Sutton, and Dale O’Leary, “The Psychopathology of ‘Sex Reassignment’ Surgery,” pp. 97–125 from The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9 (2009). Reproduced with permission of The National Catholic Bioethics Center.
Heather Draper and Neil Evans, “Transsexualism and Gender Reassignment Surgery,” pp. 97–110 from David Benatar (ed.), Cutting to the Core: Exploring the Ethics of Contested Surgeries. Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Reproduced with permission of Rowman and Littlefield.
Cheryl Case, “Surgical Progress is Not the Answer to Intersexuality,” pp. 385–392 from The Journal of Clinical Ethics 9:4 (1998). Reproduced with permission of Journal of Clinical Ethics.
Merle Spriggs and Julian Savalescu, “The Ethics of Surgically Assigning Sex for Intersex Children,” pp. 79–96 from David Benatar (ed.), Cutting to the Core: Exploring the Ethics of Contested Surgeries. Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Reproduced with permission of Rowman and Littlefield.
United States. Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, “Chapter 5, The Question of Harm,” pp. 299–351 from Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Final Report, Volume 1. U.S. Department of Justice, 1986. Public domain.
Daniel Linz, Edward Donnerstein and Steven Penrod, “The Findings and Recommendations of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: Do the Psychological ‘Facts’ Fit the Political Fury?” pp. 946–953 from American Psychologist 42 (1987). Reproduced with permission of American Psychological Association.
Cass R. Sunstein, “Pornography and the First Amendment,” pp. 589–627 from Duke Law Journal 1986: 4 (September). Duke University School of Law. Reproduced with permission of Cass R. Sunstein.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234 No. 00‐795 (2002). Public Domain.
Igor Primoratz, “What’s Wrong with Prostitution?” pp. 159–182 from Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 68 (1993). Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.
Yolanda Estes, “Moral Reflections on Prostitution,” pp. 73–83 from Essays in Philosophy 2:2 (2001). Reproduced with permission of Philosophy Documentation Center.
Charles Moser and Peggy Kleinplatz, “DSM‐IV‐TR and the Paraphilias: An Argument for Removal,” pp. 91–109 from Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality 17: 3–4 (2006). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.
Robert L. Spitzer, “Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders: Discussion of Questions for DSM‐V,” pp. 111–116 from Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality 17:3–4 (2006). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.
American Psychiatric Association, “Paraphilic Disorders,” from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5). © 2013 American Psychiatric Association http://www.psychiatry.org/dsm5. Reproduced with permission of American Psychiatric Association.
Patrick Hopkins, “Rethinking Sadomasochism: Feminism, Interpretation, and Simulation,” pp. 116–141 from Hypatia 9 (1994). Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.
John Corvino, “Naughty Fantasies,” from David Boonin (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Reproduced with permission of John Corvino. This is a slightly modified version (with a new postscript) of an article that appeared in Southwest Philosophy Review: The Journal of the Southwestern Philosophical Society 18:1 (January 2002), pp. 213–220.
Neil Levy, “What (if Anything) Is Wrong with Bestiality?” pp. 444–456 from Journal of Social Philosophy 34:3 (2003). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.
Wesley J. Smith, “Horse Sense,” from The Weekly Standard (August 31, 2005) https://web.archive.org/web/20150906222530/http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/985pgwjh.asp. Reproduced with permission of The Weekly Standard LLC.
Igor Primoratz, “Pedophilia,” pp. 99–110 from Public Affairs Quarterly 13:1 (1999). Reproduced with permission of University of Illinois Press.
Robert Ehman, “What Really Is Wrong with Pedophilia?” Public Affairs Quarterly 14:2 (2000). Reproduced with permission of University of Illinois Press.
Thinking analytically about the subject matter of a book like this is both important and somewhat more complicated than might be expected. It’s not unusual when people hear about sexual ethics that they think it all centers around debating the morality of some particular sexual act. Is it right or wrong? Should it be legal or illegal? Is it good for us or bad? But in many cases we need to back up a bit and ask this question: What is it? What is the it we are talking about? What makes the action we are going to debate a sexual act? Or more broadly, what is sex? This question is not just an intellectual puzzle. It’s not just about “semantics.” After all, “semantics” refers to what words mean and what we mean by the term “sex” has a huge practical impact on our lives, personally, morally, and legally. A romantic partner might tell you they are a virgin – and yet regularly engage in an act you consider sex but they don’t. A friend might be charged with rape – but claim that they never went “all the way” so they never had sex in the first place. A boss might say something to you with a “sexual” innuendo, and then claim later it was totally innocent. How do we know?
Questions about sexuality can be convoluted as well and have just as important practical consequences. If the law says a person’s unchangeable, biological characteristics cannot be the basis of discrimination, then it would be crucial to know whether a person’s sexual orientation is genetic or not. If sexual discrimination means treating someone unfairly because of their sex, is it possible to be sexually discriminated against by someone the same sex as you? How should we understand a person who appears to be a heterosexual man since they are anatomically male and attracted to women but who nonetheless claims to be a lesbian?
Once we have a better understanding of what we mean by sex and sexuality, then how do we go about making decisions – both moral and legal – about certain actions? Should we worry exclusively about the effects on society? Or not care about social effects at all? Is it entirely individual tastes? Or can individuals be culpably self‐destructive and self‐degrading? Are some sexual actions just wrong in themselves? Or does it all completely depend on whether or not actions hurt someone? If someone consents to something, is it okay even if they do get hurt?
The First Part of this book helps clarify these questions and sort through possible answers. Organized around the three following framework questions, it will help set the stage for analyzing the specific moral and legal issues to come.
What is sex?
What is sexuality?
What is sexual ethics?
Patrick D. Hopkins
This chapter summarizes the basic problems in defining the central terms in sexual ethics in three sections – What is sex? What is sexuality? What is sexual ethics? Each section begins with five discussion starters, which are useful for eliciting common positions and intuitions and for initially demonstrating some of the complexity of the concepts of sexual ethics. These starters are followed by analytic outlines of the issues and concepts important in discussions of sexual ethics. Each section ends with 15 decision cases (most of which are drawn from real‐world examples, common college experiences, and court cases), which are useful for showing the practical consequences of the philosophical analysis of the concepts, for providing cases for debate, and for covering numerous contested contemporary issues that are not dealt with in depth in the following chapters.
If your parents asked you if you had had sex yet, what do you think they would mean by that? How would you know how to answer? If a physician asked you when was the last time you were sexually active, what do you think the physician would mean by that? How would you know how to answer? If a police officer asked you if you had had sex with someone they were questioning, what do you think they would mean by that? How would you know how to answer? Do you think your definitions would match theirs? What are the different consequences of having different definitions in each of those cases?
What does it mean for a man and a woman to “go all the way”? What does it mean for a woman and a woman to “go all the way?” What does it mean for a man and man to “go all the way”? Are your answers consistent?
Sometimes people joke in response to being asked if they have had sex recently: Does having sex with myself count? But is this a joke? Is masturbating having sex with yourself? Or is having sex with yourself impossible? If masturbation is not considered sex, then why has it been looked down on in so many sexual ethics systems? If masturbation is sex, are you cheating on your spouse if you masturbate? If another person masturbated you, would that count as sex or not? Why would another person make the difference? Are your answers consistent?
Zorax is an extraterrestrial anthropologist who has been observing human behavior and is confused by this sex thing. Can you help him out? For example, Zorax has stealthily observed one situation where one human male started kissing another human male at a party and the two of them stumbled into a bathroom where one of them slid his finger into the other’s rectum and rubbed his prostate. In another situation at a similar party, one male put his finger inside another male’s rectum after the second male passed out drunk on his couch. In a third situation, one male physician put his finger inside another male’s rectum and felt his prostate during an annual medical exam. To Zorax, these are all instances of the same physical behavior but apparently some are sexual and some are not. He understands there are differences in consent here, but he wants to know about the sex distinctions. Can you explain this to Zorax? He also wants to know if it would make a difference if the patient undergoing a physical experienced a pleasurable erotic sensation during the examination? And what if the physician was same man in the first party situation?
In discussing the problems of defining sex, several bloggers just say we should have a relativist position in which people define sex for themselves, claiming that no one definition is appropriate for everyone. For example:
“Of course people have been arguing for years that we should get away from this need to define sex so specifically, but maybe seeing that other people do indeed engage in many activities that they consider sex … will help more people feel comfortable defining sex for themselves. Which is really how it should be – not a single definition that everyone uses but a personal one. Sex is whatever you want to do when you get physically intimate with another person.” (Pisaster,
2011
).
“I'd say that for me, at this point, I'd love to be able to define sex by simply saying “Sex could earnestly be absolutely anything for a given person.” (Corinna,
2018
).
“The short answer is that sex can mean many different things to many different people. There's not one universal definition of sex but a variety of perspectives.” (GoAskAlice!,
2017
).
But are these positions workable? If sex means whatever an individual wants, then what sense could we make of the claims that “sex requires consent” or “she is guilty of having sex with a minor” or “he could be charged with sexual harassment for asking for sexual favors” or “we should offer more sex education” or “she is a victim of sex trafficking” or any of a number of such statements?
Thinking analytically about the subject matter of a book on sexual ethics is both important and somewhat more complicated than might be expected. It’s not unusual when people hear about sexual ethics that they think it all centers around debating the morality of some particular sexual act. Is it right or wrong? Should it be legal or illegal? Is it good for us or bad? Is it something a good person would do or a bad person would do? Is it consensual or forced? Is it perverted or normal? But in many cases, we need to back up some and ask this question: What is it? What is the it we are talking about? What is sex?
Even asking that question can be imprecise. We could be asking a psychological question about the emotional importance of sex in human life. We could be asking a biological question about procreation and how reproductively dimorphic organisms generate offspring. We could be asking an anatomical question about how to distinguish bodies and genitalia. Although all these questions may come into play in the issues debated in this book, ethics is going to be about judging the morality of actions and their related intentions and motivations. Sexual ethics then will be about analyzing and judging the morality of actions classified as sexual. So, what makes an action a sexual act as distinguished from a non‐sexual act? When can we correctly claim that sex occurred? Why use the term “sex” to describe some behaviors and not others? When we make laws about sex, what exactly are we covering?
We might start trying to understand these issues by looking up the term “sex” in a dictionary, focusing on the definitions not related to gender or anatomy but rather those about behavior. Wouldn’t that help? Here are a few dictionary examples:
sexual activity, especially sexual intercourse (American Heritage Dictionary, 2016)
(chiefly with reference to people) sexual activity, including specifically sexual intercourse (Oxford University Press,
2020
)
coitus (
Vocabulary.com
, nd.)
physical activity between people involving the sexual organs (Cambridge University Press,
2021
).
physical activity in which people touch each other's bodies, kiss each other, etc.: physical activity that is related to and often includes sexual intercourse; sexually motivated phenomena or behavior (Merriam‐Webster, nd.‐a)
the activity in which people kiss and touch each other’s sexual organs, which may also include sexual intercourse (Macmillan Dictionary,
2009
–
2021
).
Notice a few things about these definitions (these are just samples but look at a hundred dictionaries and you will find mostly similar entries).
First, they tend to be circular. Sex will be defined as sexual intercourse or sexual behavior or sexual activity or physical activity related to sexual intercourse. That’s not going to help. In looking to define sex, we are asking about what makes something sexual.
Second, some definitions, instead of being directly circular, will give synonyms, such as coitus. However, when you look up the word coitus, you find “sexual intercourse, especially between a man and a woman.” (Dictionary.com, nd.). When you look up sexual intercourse, you find “sexual activity between two people; especially: sexual activity in which a man puts his penis into the vagina of a woman.” (Merriam‐Webster, nd.‐b). Now we’re back to circular – sex is coitus, coitus is sex. Even the male/female and penis/vagina wording is given as an example of sexual activity or intercourse particularly connoted by “coitus” – suggesting non‐coital forms of sex.
Third, there are definitions that are more broadly behavioral, such as “physical activity between people involving the sexual organs or physical activity in which people touch, kiss, etc.” This is less circular and would help with some distinctions. These kinds of definitions could help us determine that an asteroid orbiting the sun is not an example of sex (since it doesn’t involve people or genitals) but it won’t always help us determine more specific things about people. “Activity between people involving the sexual organs” leaves us asking both what makes an organ sexual (are breasts? are fallopian tubes? are anuses? are mouths?) and whether any type of activity counts (is a vasectomy a sexual act since it involves physical activity touching sexual organs?). “Physical activity where people kiss, touch, etc.” probably needs no explication as to how unhelpfully broad it is.
Fourth, some definitions get more behaviorally specific, such as a man putting his penis into the vagina of a woman. That could be very helpful in making distinctions because it is much clearer. However, think about the way in which we use the term “sex” in language – which is all that dictionaries record in the first place. Do we use “sex” to describe anything other than penis‐in‐vagina? If we do, what makes those other activities sex?
Complicating the situation further, these formal dictionary definitions only cover the barest minimum of language dealing with sex. Think not only of formal synonyms for sex but the vast array of slang synonyms (if they are synonyms) for sex (if it is sex): hooked up, messed around, go all the way, third base, fornicate, got physical, were intimate, copulated, made love, screwed, slept together, made out, had relations, carnal knowledge, coupled, fooled around, mated, got some nookie, roll in the hay, hit the sheets, were in sexual union, experience sexual congress, consummated the relationship, bedded, bred, breed, lay together, lay down with, did it, do it, make it, shagged, fucked, got laid, got lucky, got busy, hit a home run, got some tail, got some ass, got some pussy, got some dick, took it up the ass, did the horizontal tango, made babies, got nasty, got naughty, rooted, ravished, sexed up, did the nasty, got some, got down and dirty, humped, scored, banged, bumped uglies, nailed her/him, rode her/him, boned her/him, put the P in the V, pounded, got a dicking, buggered, got into some hanky‐panky, one‐night stand, bonked, bagged, blew, sucked, ate, had a romp, had a quickie, hopped in the sack, knew in the Biblical sense, shtupped, diddled, hit it, knocked boots, booty call, boffed, dipped the wick, fiddled the flower, hid the sausage, got a hot beef injection, made whoopee, skrog, spank the monkey, hid the cannoli, get some stankie on the hang down, got busy, did the deed, boink, going to the boneyard, made a deposit, balled, and got a bit of the old slap and tickle – just to mention some of the more contemporary ones. You could also add slang from earlier historical periods – make a beast with two backs, give her a green gown, shoot twixt wind and water, get your corn ground, grope for a trout in a peculiar river, get your ashes hauled, and ride a dragon upon St. George (Okrent, 2014; Thorpe, 2015). It seems that it is important in language (these are only English examples here but there are many, many slang terms for sex in most languages) to refer obliquely to sex. But are these in fact all referring to the same thing? Could you substitute “engaged in sex” for every one of them?
It is important to recognize that there is a difference between the terms we use to describe behavior and the behavior itself. There is a difference between the objective fact of what physical action occurred, the objective fact of what psychological state the agent was in when the physical action occurred, and the subjective choice of words used to describe the physical action. A penis entering a vagina to a distance of x either happened or didn’t. A vagina pressing against a mouth and tongue either happened or didn’t. A finger entering an anus to a distance of x either happened or didn’t. Behavioral events a, b, c, … either happened or didn’t. Whether we call those acts “sex” as a moral and forensic term is a more complicated social process, but the acts stand alone.
