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- Herausgeber: ibidem
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Building on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, this groundbreaking book puts the phenomenological paradigm into a new perspective. Overcoming the focus on self-reflection of the thinking subject and instead arguing for the importance of sociality as a responsibility for the Other, this new approach is based on inter-subjectivity and introduces a social dimension in phenomenology. This also allows for a different interpretation of the notion of justice, which in this context sits in the space between the one, the other, and the third before settling into any relation to the law. In the vast area inhabited by more or less distant others, moral responsibility is implemented through the establishment and maintenance of just institutions.
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Seitenzahl: 438
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
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ibidemPress, Stuttgart
Table of Contents
Introduction[1]
In modernity, people began to identify themselves through their belonginginsociety striving to go beyond provincial bordersandfollowing a new sense of cosmopolitanism, i.e.,of universality. They aspired to find the general essence of all people on the planet and to spread this kind of humanity amongst humankind.Modernityallowedeffortsto bedirected firstlyat establishing whatit is that appliesto"everyone". In modern philosophy, the basic social relation was expressed by the formula"the individual and society", ignoring the intermediary role of communities andtheirreducible diversity of individuals. In postmodernity this main oppositionbetween individual andsocietyremains, but efforts are being made to restore the rights of particular community,groups, and individuals which in previous epochs were ignored or renounced in the name of the protection of thetotality.
ZygmuntBaumanexplains thatthe freedom of"the universal man"in modernity was understood by replacing the colourful diversity of parishioners,familyand other local people with"citizens". The citizen is a person with attributeswhichare bestowedupon him or herbyasole and undisputed authority,acting in the name of the united and sovereign nation-state. The postulate of human essence asauniversality of reason corresponded with the ambitions and actions ofthemodern nation-state in its battlemediating betweenlocalised authority figuresand individualswhom it wished to subdue.This wasa battleagainst local customs,labellingthemsuperstitions; local languages, calling themdialects;local markets, describing them as anti-competitive,and,local regulationswhich were linked to primitivism of the tradition. Allhad to concede andsubordinatethemselvestothe common currency ofcentralized government. The ruleof statepower spread across all subjects of the territory within its jurisdiction.[2]Of course, the legitimacy ofa modern state is conferredwithreference to reasonanddeclared universal. So reason itself becomes identicalto and identifiablewith thestate'sinterest;in turn,becoming indistinguishablewith the interest of what Pierre Bourdieu calls"state nobility".
However, to recognize only thosedirectivesthat can stand the test of universalityis a task doomed to fail. Universality means ex-territoriality and ex-temporality implying a rejection timeandplace relatedtoparticular claims which, by virtue of their limitations, come into conflict with each other and also with the proclaimed universal interest:
While promoting ostensibly universal, yet by necessity home-grown and home-bound standards, the polity finds itself opposed and resisted in the name of theselfsameprinciple of universalism which enlightens and/or ennobles its purpose. Promotion of universal standards then looks suspiciously like suppression of human nature and tends to be censured as intolerance.[3]
Universality (or civilization, where civilization is understood as the pursuit of the ideal of universality) protects itself through its self-empowerment and by alienating those who were not sufficiently universalised (civilized) by exercising pressure and coercion upon them. When standards of universalization were already adopted, and the mandated central authority felt unchallenged, it began to introduce different policies, allowing the inclusion and recognition of the previously unrecognized and excluded. Usually this was implemented, and is still implemented today, through techniques of integration and/or of pluralisation. The principle of universality, which until then was being promoted by overcoming many difficulties and obstacles and demoting the various local and particular differences, began to be seen as aprinciple of totalitarianism where the state forcibly unifies, homogenizes and excludes.[4]It was believed that these totalitarian tendencies could be corrected by embracing ethnic or cultural diversity and perhaps even replacing them with more pluralism in all spheres of public life. Pluralism, however, despite of any tolerance and respect for diversity which it can bring, as a negation of unity, is only a reaction, led, perhaps under protest, by the discourse which privileges totality. Pluralisation opposes totalitarianism by presupposing it. Diversification and recognition of differences take place against a backdrop of universalisation and usually establishes a second, reflexive level of discourse, which cannot take place without recognition of totality, embedded in its foundation.
Pointedly,modernityproclaims the inclusion of allpeople intoapresupposedcitizenship and the equality of all citizenswithinthe state. Thisisdone by neutralizing differences.Many see thehidden roots of this neutralizationin the tendency of the market to give quantified expression to qualitative characteristics through valuation. Qualitative differences are reduced to theirmonetaryequivalence so that the natural movement of capital leads tohomogenization, depersonalization, unification etc.[5]Nevertheless, although this tendency is maintainedtoday (due to the logic of capital), acritiqueof homogenization has arisen proclaiming that general rules and laws which apply equally to all, as suggested in early modernity, do not sufficiently take into account individualorgroup characteristics. It is evident that differences are of utmost importancefirst of allfor the marketing.In a globalizing world, the politics and culture of differences are in opposition to the culture andpolitics of unification and strive to replace them. In reality, however, as Bauman stresses, globalization processes go hand in hand with those of localization.[6]
As globalisation develops, the firstindicationstoseize the attention of analysts arethe openness of identity and the"fluidity"of the whole. Individuals and groups areunderstood asidentification-processes and not as something pre-givenordetermined by static individual and/or group featureswhichunitsthemformally in a closedsubstantialwhole. They aregrasped ratheras temporary"identifications", constructed andrelativelymobile. Indeed, contemporary communities, unlike earlier ones, are based on pluralism as their own immanent principle to a much greater degree than before. Nowadays societies are multi-racial, multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, etc.In such an environment of pluralisation, fragmentation, hybridization, universality as a symbol of humanity and humanrights, if not entirely obsolete, is not sufficient on its own.
Formal justice which classifies particular cases underanuniversal law, is already unsatisfactory.[7]In debates on the topics of universality and particularity, of formal equality and special rights, two different concepts prevail, often rendering mutually exclusive interpretations of the problem: (1) from the liberal perspective, according to which the citizen is anautonomous person whose rights andobligations are guaranteed and realised through public institutions and, (2)on the other hand, fromthe communitarian perspective, defining citizens through their membership in the community and their attitudes towards its values. In both cases, the relationbetween theindividualandsocietyremains, andwhat has to be negotiated is how the particularity and universality of individuals and different groups can be reconciled in favour of their joint participation inthe whole of society.
In this work social relationisperceived not as a connection between the individual and society(as this relation was habitually articulated and society was thought, and still is thought, as a totality stretching far beyond the individual), but is seen primarily as a relation of one individualtoanother. This does not mean that group and inter-group relations are ignored. Rather, we begin at the premise that the individualinconcretoenters into relations with other individuals, and only then is connectedinabstracto(i.e. through principle, by law, through the generalnotions, standards, norms)and therefore,indirectly,tosocialinstitutions, community, society and humanity as a whole.
Thisbook will discussan approach where the main relation is the interpersonal connectionand in order to understand the whole, we proceed fromintersubjectivity.The ultimate goalis notthe understanding ofthe totalityor of the individual within totality, but one's own responsibility fortheOtheras the primary human attitude toward him—on the base of it is composed totality. The whole is placed at the service of theOther(notofman in general,butthe Otherin its uniqueness); however, this service is always personalized as the totality itself cannot respond and act; always the individuals respond to other individuals, think and act. However, the Iand theOtherare not equal andintersubjectivityis not areciprocal nor symmetrical relation. To quoteLevinas,I alwayshaveone more responsibility than theOther.The responsibility for theOtheris constitutive for my Self, while the responsibility of the Other for me is his own business.Totality, the state, society and community, obtain and update their meaning if the I, which embodies them as"individualized society"(a famous phrase of Pierre Bourdieu) behaves responsibly towards theOther. However, what does behaving responsibly mean? This is atopic discussed throughout thetext. For sure,goodness, responsibility and sociality represent the very selflessness of the relation to theOtherwherein the loss of my identity and the achievement of a new one as a process of self-identificationisa side effect of the communication.We can nevertheless state that it is due to one'sresponsibility that theOtherhas the opportunity to become a Self too (as in relation to the Third one). Only withthe appearance of the Third do reflection andknowledge of relations emerge, followed by their institutionalization and transformation into possible values for"everyone".
Notwithstanding, all institutions and mechanisms of society are products of technology andnamelyas such are subordinated to the people. We support the thesis that the state machine,and any other public organisation,must be personalized in order to work.In the totality of societytheIis exactly such a personalization, a subject bearing on his shoulders all the credentials, knowledge, competences etc. bestowed upon him by institutionalization. Still, for the I to beanI, it must use all the resources at its disposal to respond to others. The resources in any situation are utilised not just to take care of myself, i.e. of my own needs, interests, preferences, etc., but first of all toaddressto the needs of theOther. These resources are provided by society as a whole.
The human relationship between theOtherandIbegins with speech but before its beginning I hear thecallfrom the Other (albeit a silent one).The Iresponds to this call notonlywith words, but above all with deeds. Words motivate actions and give meaning to practices that henceforth also matter for the Third andfor each and every-one-else.
The advantages and disadvantages of social and political discourse in a pluralistic society are explicated and observed in the continuous debate between liberals and communitarians.The starting point for this work, however, is thenotionthat diversity as a philosophical category together with the principle of pluralism, become meaningfulbecause oftheir implicit or/andexplicit opposition to unity and totality. Pluralism's standing is fuelled by the criticism of the wholeand, as such,is the negation of identity, of theprinciple,and of universality.Yet in its quality of negation and reaction, pluralismis a prisoner to this same principle.Pluralismcannotgo beyond the framework set out by the boundaries of the wholeandremains in the shadow of the concept of totality.
Departing from primarilyempirical observations, both communitarians and liberals recognize that theuniversalistpoint of view ignores particularity and diversity of differences and is both illusory and utopian, leading to unattainableimaginings;such an universalism isalso unjust—a finding that helps both communitarian and liberalcritical pathos unfold. People inevitably examine emerging problems and participate in the course of events,influencedby their life-experience as well asby their perception of social reality.According to Bourdieu, their story is the unconscious which appears in public as different habitual practices. These differences are not only the result of a clash of interests and the employment of different tactics of self-defence, but are also the product of theirsocioeconomic and cultural backgroundswhich determines different perceptions and understanding of public relations and orderas well asdifferingmotivations of theirthought and(in)action.When preferenceis given to particulardifferences,wecan easily fall into the trap of fragmentation.In fragmentation and heterogeneity, with even greater force than in unification, we find the exclusion of individuals and groups defined as different by empoweredsomeprivate interests, claiming, however,to be"common"and even"universal". In a pluralised society, people are not forced"to improve, develop, elevate, perfect themselves"according to some universal standard in the attempt to catch up with the"more improved, developed and perfected"groups and societies, but are left to"be what theyare".A large number of these groups, however, arefactually in the position ofbeing the weaker, marginalized,suffering from deprivations, often repressed and without the right to voice their opinion and therefore also lacking many other rights. Pluralized, fragmented and atomized social environments immediately benefit powerful groups (as is clearly seenfor examplein disputes over theminorityrights). Both concepts of citizenship, liberal and communitarian, insist that it is necessary to take into account the individual and/or group needs and desiresto meet our moral obligation toarrange group and individual interests in accordance with the common good making sure thateveryone isprovided withthe opportunity for participation. As Bourdieu critically notes, monopoly over the universal continues to gain supporters and to legitimize itself with the values of neutrality and universal recognition.Hence the age-long issue of monopolization of the right to speak on behalf ofagroup and of the privileged perspective appears. Even when the emphasis is not put on the"common goal", butplaced insteadon differences, where everyone contributespreciselyaccording to theirparticularity to thesharedwork, the shared meaningis constituted by thecommonality of them all.If we resign from the common, it is not clear how the principle of justice could be conceptualized and implemented. Inevitably the question arises whether,how and why people should be treated differently and conversely, the question of whether, how and why people should be put under a common denominator.This work is not a rejection of the categories of"whole","total","private","single","similarity","difference","equality", etc., butrather, it isan attempt to present a different logic of relations between them. Thisseems more appropriate in articulating social constructionsandopens other opportunities for discourse in the field of social and political philosophy.
In this text, wewill show asa weakness the conceptions of both communitarians and liberalsin their attempts to define social bondsas unificationsor oppositionsinsideapresupposed totality.Within this totalitythe individuals or groups are preconceived as monads, but opento conversingwithone another. Their conversation is always mediated by the commonlanguage.Social coherence is perceived firstly as belonging to a type based on shared characteristics, i.e. a relation to others with whomone feelsaffiliated or"the same", unlike"the others"in respect of whom we emphasize our essential difference. These distinctivesimilaritiesor differencesas a sign of solidarityor conflictmake people recognize each other or group together. The essentialist approach is hence maintained even when insisting that group affiliation is a matter of free choice (liberalism) or interactive recognition (communitarianism). It could be argued that the alternative to the essentialist approach is to be soughtbyidentifying individuals and groupsbeingin a network of relationsof responsibilitiesand not in their definition as substances according to a principle (such as repeatability, universality, law, similarity, etc.).The premise that essence is not predetermined and insurmountable, but acquired and transientbecause of the roles we perform or, perhaps,as the task of self-constitution that everyone sets, does not break with thesubstantialistor essentialist approach. Inevitably, in the process of ongoing self-constitution and self-assertion, people are free(although their freedom is limited)to determine the group to which they belong and therefore the qualities they possess, but this kind of self-identification presupposes,without explanation, preserving the opposition between"mine"and"other","own"and"other,"my rights versus yours".Thisalso leads to the issue of identification through ownership (own and other's), and thus participation in the creationof or/and in the divisionof totality. Hence even if human essence is not"facticity", but"openness", there is a new conflict in addition to that of the universal/particular, i.e. whole and part—the problem of"the otherness andmineness". Thus a categorization of our relations and interactions comes forth which, to a certain extent, is more fundamental than the division between universal/particularorcommon/individual. Both in theory and inpractice, the universal/particular division involves separation of mine from theother's. Inside the totality, even when it is in the process of its becoming, alienation from the mine-ness and the difficulties in integrating the other-ness (to accept and assimilate otherness or at least recognize, tolerate or ignore it) impede communication and interaction. From a philosophical perspective it seems the category of"otherness"is the one that creates problems.
Both communitarians and liberals define otherness in relation to the principle (the norm, the majority, law, etc.) or through mutual commensurability (which also presupposesa prioricommon standard, common measurement unit etc., even when one of the comparable entities is used as such and is imposed on the others). The starting point is the law of identity and after experiencing theperipetiaof the play with otherness, there is a return to it. As others have been originally excluded from the class of the same, it is very difficult to find the way back to cohesion and inclusion in an extended community (whether a community of representation, recognition or common practices). This simply shows that neither liberals nor"defenders of community"have cut the umbilical cord with early modern ways of thinking. Such a conclusion applies both to those who today consciously uphold the continuation of the project of modernity and to those who relentlessly oppose it. The reflex of absorption of the alterity and its integration into the whole, with which the Self is identified(as a part or as an outsider), has been preserved in many even to this day. It emerged in modernity's discourse and reached its profound justification in Hegelian philosophy where theOtheris assimilated, based on the identity of opposites (differences), as it occurred and still occursde factoin society. Those who oppose such an assimilation reach at most neutrality towards otherness, tolerance to others and eventually indifference to differences. Today, on the one hand, diversity is promoted and encouraged, yet on the other hand, due to the preliminary opposition of viewpoints, new attempts arebeing made to collectivize differences by uniting them into a cohesive wholeby fusing horizons. This is attempted through dialogue, consensus, demand for tolerance, monitoring of human rights, recognition, etc. Well, sometimes people with a pretention to beopen-minded tend to abandon cohesion which for them is not obligatory: let differences remain differences and others remain others, let us rejoice in diversity and enjoy variety, but on one condition—differences should not create problems for usand must obey the universal law and the constitution adopted"in the name of all".
Serious philosophical criticism of universality stems not from the attack oftotalitarianism, as is usual in the field of politics, but rather from elsewhere, i.e. from ethical considerations. As summarized by Bauman, the fact of the matter is that moral impulses and restrictions were neutralized in modernity and perceived as irrelevant[8], hence men and women were given the opportunity to perform inhumane deeds without ever feeling inhumane.After a review of the literature on these topics it could be concluded that by challenging modern ideals in terms of the antinomies attained in postmodernity, most philosophers'and theorists'attention hovers mainly around ethical issues.
Wetry to defendherein a new understanding of primary sociality, and hence of primary community based on theresponsibilityof the I in relation to theOtherand not on theaffiliationof individuals to the whole.The Iis in the process of identification through the responsibilities itundertakes.This presupposes a new conception of subjectivity and freedom as wellofthe protection of human rights, based not on our group or individual selfishness, but above all on the responsibility for the rights of theOther, which is the authentic concern for him. It is not about responsibility which is sought after by virtue of reflection and court proceedings, when acts have already beenperformed (e.g. judicially), but rather about the sensitivity and the preliminary consideration of what my deeds would mean to others in my relationship with them.[9]Some may argue, and rightly so, that thisis theKantian approach to universalization, which requires the maxim of my behaviour to comply in advance with the others so that it becomesanuniversal law for everyone's actions. There is, however, an essential difference: for Kant the Self is the starting point,while in our proposed approach we start with theOtherandtherebyfollowLevinas. Clearly, such a perspective cannot be sustained unless we rethink our conceptions of communication and dialogue,justice and law, morality and citizenship. It is important to understand this change in perspective, which can be summed up in the words ofLevinasas"we"is not the plural of"I", because theOtheris not another I for me; the Other is"I"only for himself.He exists by himself, is significant for himself and is not just the bearer of the significance that I attribute to him. TheOtheris not perceived as negativity—as enemy, rival, boundary, barrier to the freedom of the Self; on the contrary—he is perceived as positivity. What does this mean? What constitutes the positivity of theOtherwith his otherness is a topic at the centre of the entire analysis at hand. Even in this foreword we could state that the positivity of otherness is not evaluated in accordance with the possibilities it opens for me, i.e. is not assessed in the light of instrumental thinking in which theOtheris reduced to his usefulness for my Self. It is also necessary to rethink the concept of community in disagreement with whatis already assumedin philosophy:
1.Community is not made up of the multiplication of transcendental subjects whose only commonality is the fact that each one is constitutedas self-consciousness through"I think which is accompanies all my ideas and representations";
2.In a community we do not treat theOtherwith respect for the sake of some abstract humanism, i.e. according to the universal law (Kant's imperative), but in view of his empirical or historical presence in all his particularity and moreover—in all his singularity. In early modern philosophy and German idealism the Other's particularity is the boundary of mine;
3.Community is not the universal substance-subject, i.e., that which hashistorically become whole, wherein self-consciousness is the distinction that is not actually distinction, as any difference is created by the absolute subject to distinguish itself from itself (Hegel).
These forms of understanding of community and human co-existence are being opposed by both liberals and communitarians, starting from the empirical differences to find a theoretical, moral and/or legal basis to reconcile them. Both liberals and communitarians want to see in theOthera partner despite him being my frontier and, in fact, namely because the Other is my frontier. Let's remind ourselves that albeit interpreted differently nowadays, reconciliation is the last chord since Hegel's philosophical symphony. But even as per the noblest and most generous motivation towards the Other, when efforts are focused mainly on ensuring the recognition of his otherness, liberals and communitarians put the Other at beston my level, beside me, next to"me","shoulder to shoulder with me"(which of course is not below or after me). Unfortunately, in these efforts their ultimate refuge is egalitarianism. Liberals and communitarians believe that to achieve equal opportunities for the individual and group autonomy respectively, differences should be reduced to mutual recognition. The thought of theOtherbeing superior to me (or us) is not allowed, because it almost instinctively identifies with a relationship of domination and subordination. Conversely, in this work we maintainLevinas'conception that theOtheris one to whom my existence is in service (even when I do not want this consciously) and thatthis kind of attitude is not slavery to, but responsibility for, the Other. This is the way in which the existence of the Self, who is"for theOther"acquires a social dimension.The Ibecomes"Self"due to its answers to others. Only in this manner can sociality transcendnaturalityand sense can transcend non-sense. Here theOtheris Transcendence, but
[the] Other is not transcendent because he will be free as I am; on the contrary his freedom is a superiority that comes from his very transcendence. …heoverflows absolutely every idea I can have for him.[10]
The freedom of theOtheris not a limitationonmy freedom as in the interpretation of community asa formal centralized entity. In the social whole, according to the usual individualistic-atomistic conception, the individual has more freedom when least restricted by others and accordingly, when being able to impose most limits on their freedom. Freedom defined as independence from others—from their customs, beliefs, prejudices, community attachments and tradition in general—stems from the beginning ofthemodern epoch,unfolding later in the concept of autonomy, where the subject itself sets the law whichitmust follow. However, since the whole always has limits, everyone experiences theOtheras a constraint and an obstacle. So one'sautonomyis inevitablyopposed to the others'. The more independent the individual is, the greater his ability to achieve his chosen objectives, the wider the scope of his activities and the more successful his self-realization. But since the opposite side, the other individual also seeks its maximum realization within the space of their interaction, the expansionist claims of theOneclash with those of the Other. Thus one's freedom is inevitably an obstacle to the freedom of theOtherand vice versa. To be honest, however, let us point out that today's neo-liberal and communitarian concepts aim to underline the relations of cooperation,not competition and this topic will be discussed in more detail in the third chapter.
In this work, the category of freedom, understood as autonomy, will be deprived of the privileged position it has acquired. The concept of heteronomy has been thrown"overboard"byKantianphilosophy. Here Kant's definition of self-determination is re-examined for the purpose of the rehabilitation of heteronomy. The very autonomy of the Self is understood differently, specifically as a response toaheteronomous request by theOther.And the notion of heteronomy is also changed as it is not anymore understood as despotism over the individual but as the Other's appeal to me.It is more accurate to say that protecting the freedom of theOther,and his right to be his Self,empowers me as an autonomous subject to act, i.e. to"respond to and for the Other."My behaviour acquires its importance and focus not according to the law which I establish for myself but in response to the presence of theOther. Otherwise my expression of freedom would be just a rash act of spontaneity, a whim, and falls under the rubricof arbitrariness and theinstrumentalisationof others. Even the Kantian categorical imperative cannot be a cure for these two malignant mutations. If the Kantian imperative requires universalization of the maxim I follow, being the expression of my will and claiming to express the rationality of humanity in general, then itshould extend to others as equally valid for them. However, such a claim for postulatinganuniversal moral law imposed by me on everybody else would represent a danger rather than a solution. It is necessary to take into account the demands and the situation of others in advance as they motivate my behaviour accordingly—not just in their capacity ofnoumenalbeings, butin response to their otherness. The question is how such consideration is possible and/or realistic.
If we assume, as proposed here, that autonomy should be the answer to heteronomy—heteronomy, identified with the call of the Other whichquestions the spontaneity of my will—the issue appears whether we give up all normativity and the very concepts of freedom and justice as they are understood by Kant and in modern discourse in general. Isn't the principle, protecting the individual autonomy of all individuals, the precondition for any legislation and any justice? This work gives a negative answer to these questions, not, however,by rejecting these categories. The ambition advocated here is the promotion of a new understanding of them.
Aristotle believed justice to be the highest virtue and injustice the greatest evil man could commit against his fellow citizens. However, whilst agreeing with Aristotle on this point, we ask ourselves whether our life together can have another more fundamental and important meaning, different from that to which we are accustomed, namely, that the polis is the whole in which we all participate(according to ourstatus of free citizens and ourfunctionsin the system)and it is only this participationwhichgives sense to individual human life.The question is whether such aninclusion exhausts the meaning of"togetherness". This paper argues that the constitution of togetherness as an interpersonal relation preceded its organization into a unity, as unity implies sameness or uniformity according to a certain pattern of categorization, while togetherness owes its creation to the very differences that exist before the establishment of unity. Moreover, unity itself might impose a new kind of tyranny—universalization, homogenization, depersonalization. Depersonalization however could be overcome if the resources ofsuch a formalunity allow for the Self to support theOtherin his otherness, and not to enter into confrontation with him.Then,through theresponsibility for andcooperation with theOtheran authentic totality appears in contrast to the mere formal totality.[11]
Aristotle believed our sameness was the result of our participation as free citizens in making decisions concerning the polis.[12]A point to be made here is that before our participation in the hierarchy and the organization of the whole of the polis, we participate in interpersonal relations that are primary when compared to institutional and organizational links.Or better, they are the base of them.The primordial need for communication between different individuals (e.g. between child andadult, worker and employer, employee and client, doctor and patient, etc.—not only between those with equal status as freecitizens and the operators of the system)is drivenprecisely by their differences.At first they are not depending on a particularwhole. Before being mediated, the human link is immediate: because one needs the other, they meet. The secondpartyis necessary for the firstpartyprecisely becauseithassomething to give tothe first party, taking into accountitsspecific condition as needing—advice, favour, protection, security, information, etc. Namely this alterity creates the primary community between them which is further expandeddue to repetition, regularity and regulation, i.e.,institutionalization. But the institutionalization is demanded when the third, the forth and each one in his turn can enter into the similar relationship—then it can be structured in order to facilitate and make more effective their contacts. However, ifthe relation between the One and theOtherisorganized andinstitutionalized, it canbe beneficial but can also abandon its original function and become an obstacle to such contacts.
***
Probably the pioneer of such an innovative understanding of togetherness,prioritizing the interpersonal,is Martin Buber,whose main themeis dialogue.Philosophy before him wasmonological, unlike the new trend founded by him which emphasized the dialogicalform of human history and culture.[13]The basic movement inmonologicallife is reflection, wherethe Iretreats into itself. Buber insists that although the alterity of theOthertouches my soul, it is in no way inside it, so as to allow the different one to exist only as my experience just being"part of myself."[14]In philosophy based on the dialogic principle, the"I–Thou"relationshipis separated fromthe"I–It"relation and meeting with theOtheris the event which marks the beginning of togetherness. Only afterwards does this event drive the reflection of the Self, so that"I-Thou"can become the"I-It"relation.
In the tradition of the older idealistic philosophy, where only the subject-objectrelationship is present, the object (It) has an ambiguous status: it is transcendent in relation to the knowing Self; whilst on the other hand, as a result of the activity of consciousness, it is transformed into immanence, into an idea. This duality has given rise to the creation of many different theories of the subject-object relationship, but isnevertheless adopted as a model inmonologicalphilosophy. In these theories every thought and movement of the Self is reflection and self-reflection, and language is simply an additional factor,considered only as a means of expression and objectification of inner experiences. However, in his philosophy of dialogue Martin Buber examines language and communication in a different manner. The most important for language is addressing the Other as"Thou". The"I-Thou"creates the world of the relationship, while the"I–It"is the experience. Experience is the world of the Self—it is"in the Self"and not between the Self and the world, becausethe world does not have a sharein experience. The world is studied but itdoes not invest in this experiential learning anything of itself and nothing is returned in tribute.Buber argues that the event of the meeting"I–Thou"is reciprocity, incompatible with the act of cognition. Plus that in Buber's works,the Iin the"I–Thou"andinthe"I–It"relation is not the same"I".
InLevinas'works"I"and"You"are not equal and reciprocal (as one might claim upon reading Buber).The basic speech as"I-Thou"is the condition for the occurrence of any language, and the"I–It"relationship is a derivative of it. The"I-It"relationship is also language, but—as is perceived here, unlike Buber's position—it is the language, denoting things in the world, that is residual and the dependent onof the"I–Thou"relation.
In the dialogic line of philosophizing the subject-subject relationship precedes as well as transcends (both chronologically and logically) the subject-objectrelationship. For the purposes of this work, however, such astatementwould be extremely botched. To understand what constitutes its weakness it is necessary to take into account the concept that dialogue is not a reciprocal relation between equal subjects. That isLevinas'lesson:there is no original equality betweenI and Thou. More likely, the formulation"I-Thou"ismaybeinadequate. Therelation between theOtherand the Istarted precisely because of the originalinequality and difference between the two. ForLevinas,all social connections arise from the moral relation between theOtherand me, which is asymmetrical and non-reciprocal, even when—as with tyranny, despotism and all other forms of violence against the Other—in this asymmetry and non-reciprocity, morality is seemingly rejected. Moral responsibility, in its most extreme and exaggerated form, is substitutingtheOtherby me.[15]The fundamental difference between theOtherand myself—thedifference from which all other differences originate—is precisely my exclusive responsibility,which does not cease to facethealterityof the Other. The moral"I"does notcease to questionwhat, how and why the other is theOtherand how to respond to his othernessbut this means to question myown identificationand responsibility. The moral subject, according toLevinas,by its responsibilityweaves the net ofcloseness andtogetherness.
Unlike Buber's conception which remainssubstantialist(although not the beings but the meeting is substantiated), forLevinasmy identity is not born from my participation in the space of the meeting or the community anymore, but from my identification (being the chosen one) as sole and irreplaceable bearer of responsibility for theOther(others). The Self takes this responsibility as it fall on to him without any expectations of sharing, reciprocity or reversibility of the relationship (although this can happen, but is not determining factor in the interpersonal relationship; sometimes it is presumed that,in totality of society,taking risks and responsibility will be compensated with the mediating function of the state, by the justice of institutional order, due to tradition or custom etc.). Togetherness does not imply equality, multiplication and a collection of elements indifferent to one another, although aggregated on the basis of their similarity; it implies non-in-difference of the One towards theOtherprecisely because they are not equal, equivalent and interchangeable at the very beginning of the social relationship.
In the dialogical line of philosophizing there are other branches besides the one of Buber andLevinas, but as a rule they remain supportive of totality.Two of them arethe hermeneutics of Hans-GeorgGadamerwhich largely reproduces the Hegelian logic and favours the creation of a common horizon in the dialogueandthe theory of communicative action of JürgenHabermas, which relies on consensus. Although they emphasize openness in dialogue, these paradigms are based on the old division of part/whole, i.e. particular/universal, with the premise that unity and totality represent a higher achievement. The relationship between mine and not mine replaces the relationship between theOtherand me. Hence individuals acquire the status of elements or stages in the process of speech and only in the light of the result of the conversation do they obtain adequate significance. Buber statesthat:
… [according to the]reigning modern perspective ... in the end, only the so-called objectives, or rather collectives are real, and individuals are given meaning only as workers or tools for collectives.[16]
Conversely, it is held here that individuals havesignificance, created in communication without resorting to theteleologismof unity. The Other is the beginning of communication (not I, nor every one,and neither the universaltranscendental subject) and he has a significance which is not obtained from his participation in the totality but itself makes this social totality possible, understandable and meaningful by the provoking (to be more precise—by the investing) of sociality in the I. The I as"individualized society"allows and helps theOtherto be admitted to the conversation. But because of the remoteness and elusivenessof theOther, on the one hand, and the position"here and now"(which corresponds to the present, includingprotentionand retention, using the terminology of Husserl) of my I,on the other hand, we participate differently in the interaction. The Other andmy Iplay a completely different role in the drama ofhuman being-here.
Thus, this work does not follow the stances and solutions inHabermas'critical theory orGadamer'shermeneutics, but rather relies on achievements in phenomenology. In the phenomenological paradigm after Husserl‘sCartesian Meditations, the division is no longer based on the principle"I andtheTotality", present throughoutentiremodern culture, buton the transcendental asymmetricalintersubjective relation. This is, as already pointed out, a different categorization which sets a new depth of philosophical discourse not only by not giving up, but rather developing the tradition of Continental philosophy.
The goal of this bookis, by building on the work ofLevinas, to show a new perspective in the phenomenological paradigm which does not focus on the self-reflection of the thinking subject, but on his sociality as a"responsibilityfor theOther."The conversation may be taken as a model, in which the features of social bond are primordially exhibited. The difference between saying and said (Levinas)creates the matrix of all other relations. Sociality, however, occurs ininterpersonalrelation of the One to theOtherand not just as a common characteristic inherent,"by nature"ora priori,equally in all individuals in the human kind. To convert the asymmetric and non-reciprocal relation into a symmetrical and reciprocal one we need the Third. Then in the true sense of the word we can talk about the social relation between them. The presence of the Third alongside the Second invokes the question of institutionalization and justice, which is central to any humanitarian discourse and every society. Here the Third is a name for"everyone", for third persons—he, she, they—who are excluded from the immediacy of the relationship, establishing the narrow space only between theOtherand me. The Thirdsuggests mediation. This is, as we know, already problematized in a certain wayterritory, at least since Hegel.[17]
Thisnew perspective in philosophyrelying onintersubjectivitycan be calledsocial phenomenology. It tries to restorethe rights of immediacy, not as a cognitive category of sensationand knowledge, as it is traditionally conceived, but as a moral category for the primordial relation to theOther. Broadly speaking, we support the thesis that morality as responsibility for others is the"alpha and omega"of the human way of being, even when everything in the human world has turned against morality and peoplequestion itssense.[18]The thing is however, that morality is not a necessity that can be satisfied or not—we are used to hearing that morality is a highly spiritual need. We attempt to show that morality—not as a moral code, different for different communities and epochs, but as responsibility—is thedeepestroot of anyhumanassociation. Society as an entity with all its branches, institutions and relations would have died without morality. Justice,before becoming a category of social philosophy,is an ethical category,absolutely unavoidable in the vast area inhabited by more or less distant others. They are multitude(sometimes completely foreign, unknownand anonymous)and responsibility in such a plan is implemented only through the establishment and maintenance of just institutions in the scale of the whole society. But justice ceases to be justice if we stop to ask whether it is just enough, i.e. how far it stands from moral holiness. Justice inhabitsfirstly the space between one, the other and the third, and then, it settles in their relation to the law.
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The field of the intelligible, the meaningful to which we adhere by in our everyday life and the tradition of our philosophical and scientific thought, is characterized by seeing. The structure of seeing which has as its object or theme the seen (the so called intentional structure)is found in all forms of perception and thus intentionality is present in any reasonable approach to everything in theworld, including in the way human beings interact."Intentions"also play a decisive role between beings that speak between themselves or, as we say, see one another[19]or know each other by paying attention to the other, putting their knowledge in some kind of language form. This is the ordinary way of understanding language. It is necessary to take into account, however, that in speaking, knowledge and seeing, we resort to signs which being communicated to others, go beyond the pure ego-logical summation of the signified into representation or theme. Here arises the problem of the motivation of this communication carried out through the use of signs. Is language important only by what is said, that is, by the sentences in different moods, by the content of the statements, instructions and descriptions, by the pure relaying oninformation that can be recorded and objectified in language forms after beingsaid?Is it not important through its other functions where not just ideas and messages matter but the most significant is the contact with theOther, which in all forms of speech and action, as we will see later, is of paramount importance.
The stake for modern philosophy throughout its existence istruth."I think"was the certainty ofthe"I". Thinking about thinking, all this tradition which is broader than philosophy and characterizes the culture of modern times, suggest that thought as such leads us to the deepest interiority declared as the beginning and therefore as the principle, i.e.subjectivity. Speaking is also interpreted as one of the activitiesofthe I, beingthe subject. But today we see how speaking leads us onto other paths, guiding us to that"outside"which"commands"speech and where the speaking subject seems to disappear because of the said. As if modern philosophy anticipates the danger looming over traditional attitudes, when the experience of language takes the place of the self-evidence of"I think".Language requires two people—the one who emits signs into circulation and the one that should receive them, i.e. the addressing party on the one hand, and the addressee on the other. Due to this shift of focus—from thinking of thinkingsubjectto the other of thinking and the Other in speaking—philosophy begins to finally comprehend,albeitgradually and slowly, throughout the entire 20th century, a language feature that was earlier not noticed: dialogism. True dialogue is quite different from theinternal dialogue or monologueas conversation of the soul with itself (Plato), precisely because in conversation with theOther, the interlocutor is not reduced to my idea of him, but is a face to me. This is a relation precisely to his otherness, not tobean object of my perception and seeing; the collocutor is not the one who because of the universal and unifying reason (seeing) is understood as the same as me, like me, the present, a being among other beings,athing among other things, spatially existent before me.In speech, my attention to theOtherhumanises him.TheOtheris present for me in a way in which the I is not present for itself. TheOtheris different in his own way and this difference calls for myattention andconversation with him.
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If in the early modern epoch priority was placed on knowledge, production and creativity, the epoch of late modernity or post-modernity pays much more attention to communication and its forms. The exclusiveprimaryplace thinking and work, and generally humanactivity occupied in modern philosophyisnow reserved to language and communication. If earlier the very process of communication was seen as a kind of human knowledge and practice, now the practice itself, knowledge and even thinking are viewed as a kind of communication. The point is not to remove one of those two moments under the scheme"either/or"(either communication or activity), but toanalysetheir role in the creation and re-creation of social relations. Of course, people produce their living conditions, public institutions and themselves due to their own activity, ensuring the reproduction of the social totality. But we maintain here that communication, by defining the motives and meaning of human activity, is primary to instrumentality and determination of actions and interactions. Before reifying, objectifying and transcending oneself through his actions, one learns about the existence of transcendence, including the transcendence of the objective world due to his meeting with the alterity of theOtherwhere also the source of all understanding is.
Conceiving himself as a limited being, the individual has always wanted to be correlated with a reality beyond his own boundaries. Looking back through the centuries, we see how the individual was identified with a totality(as its element), precisely because it always exceeded by far the limits of his capabilities. He saw himselfas an componentof its order and subject to its universal laws, even if—as in Kant, and many philosophers after him—the individual himself was declared the legislator, though no longer of a pre-given totality, but of one constituted and designed by man himself. Any such totality has always been and is still thought in terms of its universal laws or principles—natural, social, moral, etc.—but by whom? By man, identified with the reason, in the stance of an"objective observer",almosthaving occupied the vacant throne ofall-seeing andjudgingGod—this is the conception of early modernity. Even though Kant warns us inCritique of Pure Reasonof the transcendental illusion, which we ourselvescreate, but which is inevitable, i.e. the illusion that we can embrace the whole of the experience constitutively, with the help of principlesin order to understand it as a totality.Further, in the language of Marx's critique of German philosophy it could be added that people really felt themselves participants in the unity of reality, i.e.subjectsto its universal laws, universalizing their own ideas and concepts as well their own essence.Or,put in the aphoristic language of Pierre Bourdieuand from another angle, the universal is always the object of universalizedrecognition:
The universal is the object of an official recognition and the recognition universally given to the sacrificing of selfish interests (especially economic ones) universally favours the strategies of universalization, through the undeniable symbolic profits it provides.[20]
However, since faith in the universal turns out to be problematic, since (to quote Buber) the individual feels"socially and cosmically homeless", since he has no hope that by self-reification, he would transcend himself towards universality, the question of transcendenceis exceptionally acute. The entire history of the modern West is regarded asadestruction of the piety before Transcendence by destroying Transcendence itself. The problem is that the legitimacy of universally valid norms, imperatives, laws, etc. (which were actually extrapolation of human limitations or of one or another private interest, prejudice, belief or conviction) is put under question. The particular was seen as one or another absolute, expanded to the scale of the universal, i.e.to the principleof the whole. This work maintains the conception that true transcendence is not predominantly the Whole to which one relates as subject to object and in which one is eventually absorbed but thatthe true transcendence is the other human.Transcendence of the external world—of nature, community, society, the artefacts of culture, etc.—appears and is understood only through the correlation of the I with the transcendence of the Other.
It seems that the first one to reach this insightinto the Other's transcendenceis Husserl but in his phenomenology theOtheris just myAlter Ego. The Other'ssubjectivityis created by analogy with my subjectivity in my own immanence, but is loaded by me with transcendenceand with the sign of otherness. Conversely, this workdoes notsupportHusserl's conception aboutthe otherness of theOther, particularly,because the Other is met and not constituted;the I and the Other are in anasymmetricalintersubjective bond in the event of the meeting.This bond, although bilateral, at least in its primary formis notreciprocaland theOtheris not derived from and described by analogy with myself. The relationship between theOtherand me in the meeting is not the same as the relationship betweenmyI and the Other. The path from theOthertowards me is not the same as the path from me towards the Other. It could also be said that in this primordial intersubjective relationshipthere is nointerchangeability.
In the many attempts to articulate this relationship, EmmanuelLevinas'thinking is of extraordinary importance. We should pay tribute to him for the introduction into philosophy of the primordial sociality of the subject, which is neither reduced to nor is derived from the participation of the individual in apreliminary establishedsocial totality. The involvement of the individual in the community and society is rather due to this asymmetrical and irreversible relation between theOtherand me, where precisely the key to sociality is found.
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When in the history of philosophy a new perspective is proposed, it cannot be represented as a mere clash of arguments"for"and"against", because it would presuppose a tacit prior agreement on paradigmatic coordinates. In philosophy, however, a challenge of an alreadyestablished paradigm or interpretation of the world (this is the critical function of philosophical thinking), and the proposal for a new understanding (which is the constructive work in philosophy) are inseparable. That is why the history of philosophy is anever-endingconversation betweendifferent schools and thinkers who follow and at the same time criticise each other.
