Sony vs Samsung E-Book

Sea-Jin Chang

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 291

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

"Sony vs. Samsung is business history at its best! It explores the divergent fortunes of these two electronics giants in the last decade and identifies the true reasons behind Sony's decline and Samsung's rise. Contrary to popular belief, Chang shows that success (or failure) does not simply arise from different strategies. Rather, it emerges from major decisions that are deeply rooted in the companies' organizational processes and their executives' political behavior. This book is a must-read for any senior executive." --Constantinos Markides, Robert P. Bauman Professor of Strategic Leadership and Chairman, Strategy Department, London Business School "Sea-Jin Chang has produced that rarity in a business book--one that is as valuable to practicing managers as it is insightful to academic researchers. In this fascinating comparison of two modern global giants, he applies his high resolution research microscope to their changing fortunes by dissecting their contrasting strategies, and providing interesting insights into their divergent organizational processes and management practices. This is a very valuable contribution to the international business literature. It will end up in as many corporate boardrooms as faculty seminars." --Christopher A. Bartlett, Thomas D. Casserly Professor Emeritus, Harvard Business School "Sea-Jin Chang has written a fascinating comparison of Sony and Samsung that will be valuable to anyone interested in strategy, organizations or international business. The interwoven and very detailed case studies of two very different companies in overlapping industries illuminate problems such as adaptation to technological change (analog to digital), organizational flexibility and globalization. His attempt to analyze both strategic development and implementation is successful and very useful. Both academics and practitioners will learn a lot from this book." --Stephen J. Kobrin, William Wurster Professor of Multinational Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania "Refreshingly original and entertaining, this book analyzes major strategic decisions of Samsung and Sony and highlights organizational processes and top management leadership that have shaped their performances. This is a must-read for all executives who want to understand the strengths and weaknesses of Asian competitors. It also provides penetrating insights to other Asian companies with global ambitions." --Myoung Woo Lee, President and CEO, iriver

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright Page

Preface

Chapter 1 - Sony and Samsung: Portraits of Two Global Competitors

The Fall of Sony and the Rise of Samsung Electronics

The History and Business Areas of Sony and Samsung Electronics

Sony and Samsung Electronics’ Performance

Part 1 Strategic Analysis

Chapter 2 - Prince and Pauper in the Analog World

Sony, the Prince of Analog

The Late-Starter, Samsung Electronics

Chapter 3 - Digital Dream Kids and the Digital Sashimi Shop

Digital Revolution

Sony’s Digital Dream Kids

Samsung Electronics’ Digital Sashimi Shop

Chapter 4 - New Kids on the Block

Sony’s Marketing Strategy: Focusing on New Products

The Marketing Strategy of the Latecomer, Samsung Electronics

Increasing Bargaining Power of Retailers

Chapter 5 - Wannabe Globals

Sony’s Global Strategy

Samsung’s Globalization Strategy

Problems with External Globalization

Part 2 Organizational Process and Leadership

Chapter 6 - Same Silos but Different Outcomes

Sony’s Company Structure

Problem with Sony’s Organizational Structure

Corporate Culture and Organizational Structure of Samsung Electronics

The Problem of Samsung Electronics’ Organizational Structure

Chapter 7 - From Founders to Professional Managers

Sony’s CEO and Governing Structure

Problems with Sony’s Governing Structure

Samsung’s Powerful Owner-Centered Structure

The Problems with Samsung’s Governing Structure

Chapter 8 - The Future of S ony and Samsung Electronics

Superficial Crisis and Internal Crisis

Lessons Learned by Sony and Samsung Electronics

Endnotes

Glossary

Index

Copyright © 2008 by John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd.

Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 2 Clementi Loop, #02-01, Singapore 129809 All Rights Reserved

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

ISBN 978-0-470-82371-2

Typeset in 11-14 point, Minion Pro by Superskill Graphics Pte. Ltd. Ltd.

Preface

This book emerged out of my own curiosity to understand why Sony’s performance, which had dominated the electronics industry for many decades, had dropped so rapidly, while Samsung Electronics, an obscure OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) not so many years ago, had emerged from nowhere. I must confess that I was one of the admirers of Sony for its innovative products as well as for its global management. I was fascinated by the late Akio Morita’s book, Made in Japan, and was impressed by his global mindset and business acumen. This had led me to a research project in 1994-1995 to examine the evolution of Sony’s U.S. operation. I had opportunities to meet with many outstanding managers and engineers at Sony including Kunitake Ando, who then was a head of its U.S. operation.

Sony was a role model for many Korean companies, including Samsung Electronics, with which I have maintained a close contact through various projects, and a direct comparison between these two would have been inappropriate at that time. Ten years later, however, the fortunes of these two companies changed dramatically. Sony’s performance deteriorated, and Chairman Idei and President Ando had to resign in 2005. On the other hand, Jong-yong Yun, CEO, was applauded for turning Samsung Electronics into one of the most profitable companies in the electronics industry. I felt compelled to find out what had caused their changing fortunes.

Faced with the rapid digitalization of the electronics industry, Sony and Samsung Electronics had pursued rather different strategies. Sony tried to create synergies between hardware and contents by using the network. Samsung Electronics, on the other hand, focused on its parts business, and attempted to secure competitive advantages in end products by being a superior manufacturer. As I dug deeper in the analysis, I became more convinced that the performance differences between Sony and Samsung Electronics could not be attributed to their strategies. Rather, organizational processes and executives’ leadership may have made the difference. Sony’s independent business units quickly became silos when its top management leadership was questioned. Internal politics among executives further exacerbated its stagnation. On the other hand, the fit between Samsung’s strategy in responding to commoditization with speed and its militaristic organization may have contributed to its stellar performance. I further examine the challenges that Samsung Electronics faces, despite its remarkable performance, and evaluate Sony’s potential, despite its current struggles.

My endeavor to analyze key strategic decisions by Sony and Samsung Electronics during the last decade would not have been successful without the assistance of Myoung-woo Lee, a 20-year veteran of Samsung Electronics, and, more recently, the president and chairman of Sony Korea. With his unique vantage point of both companies, he not only shared his own perspectives, but also introduced me to executives and managers of both companies for further interviews. I was fortunate enough to have personal interviews with high-level executives (including retirees) of both companies, which would not have been possible without Mr. Lee’s introductions. In addition, I had interviews with security analysts and executives of other firms in the electronics industry to get more objective, external opinions. I would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his contributions and assistance.

I am also deeply indebted to several other individuals and organizations. I would like to thank Korea University for providing a special research fund for this project to cover my frequent trips to Japan. I also benefited from discussions with my colleagues at Hitotsubashi University, where I spent the summer of 2007 while preparing the manuscript. John Lafkas, Kyung-hwan Yun, Sejung Seo, Sang-hee Lee, Young-jae Koh, and Jung-wook Shim provided very helpful editorial and research assistance for the project. I would like to thank Nick Wallwork, my editor at Wiley, and his fellow staff members including Joel Balbin, Fiona Wong, and Pauline Pek, as well as copyeditor Jay Boggis, who all did a wonderful job of turning the manuscript into a book. Last but not least, I would like to thank the executives and managers at Sony and Samsung Electronics who were willing to share their valuable time to meet with me. I cannot name them all here partly because there are too many and partly because most wanted to remain anonymous. I believe in management education. I believe managers can learn from the experience of other firms so that they will not repeat the same mistakes and they can make better informed decisions. Executives and managers from both companies I interviewed were eager to share their own perspectives. I would like to dedicate this book to them.

Sea-Jin Chang

Philadephia February 2008

1

Sony and Samsung: Portraits of Two Global Competitors

Digital technology… [presents] … the greatest opportunity for those manufacturers who did not have a top market share in the analog world. If they make the correct changes in strategy, they possibly could leap-frog well-entrenched industry leaders.

—Steve F. Smith, Editor-in-Chief, TWICE Magazine

Sony ruled a slower age when it could bring out a new gadget like the Walkman as a luxury item, then gradually lower the price and widen the market over time. Now, since the rise of cheap Asian manufacturing in the 1980s, companies need to bring out a stream of new products that sell immediately at high volume for a relatively low price, and are quickly displaced by the next new thing. Samsung is king of this age.

—Newsweek1

The Fall of Sony and the Rise of Samsung Electronics

A Turning Point

A few years ago, the electronics industry reached a milestone. Sony had long been acknowledged as the world’s best electronics manufacturer, but in 2002, Sony’s market capitalization fell below Samsung’s, which had been an obscure memory chip producer not many years ago. Figure 1.1 shows some of the raw data behind this story. By December 2006, Samsung’s market capitalization was $106 billion, an increase of 400% since 2000 and twice that of Sony’s. Since becoming CEO in 1997, Jong-yong Yun, has become famous for turning Samsung Electronics into one of the most profitable companies in the electronics industry. By contrast, Sony’s Chairman Nobuyuki Idei and President Kunitake Ando resigned in 2005 and were succeeded by Howard Stringer and Ryoji Chubachi, respectively.

Figure 1.1 The Market Capitalization of Sony and Samsung Electronics

Source: Samsung Securities, Sony Fact Book.

Sony began from a position of strength. The late Chairman Akio Morita had shown the world that Sony had become a global company. Michael Porter, a strategy guru, praised Sony highly as one of the few Japanese companies that actually had a strategy.