The Age of Bismarck E-Book

Thomas Dyer

• Herausgeber: Jovian Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 191

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

THE period which elapsed between the close of the Crimean war and the establishment of the German Empire at the beginning of 1871, may be said to contain events of more importance as regards the European system than even its reconstruction by the Congress of Vienna. These events are, besides the new Empire just mentioned, and a few minor occurrences, the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy, the absorption of the Pope's temporal power, the realization of Prussian supremacy, the decline of Austria, and the Franco-German war...

Leseprobe

THE AGE OF BISMARCK

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Thomas Dyer

JOVIAN PRESS

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Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Dyer

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE UNION OF ITALY

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE AND THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 1878-1891

THE UNION OF ITALY

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THE PERIOD WHICH ELAPSED BETWEEN the close of the Crimean war and the establishment of the German Empire at the beginning of 1871, may be said to contain events of more importance as regards the European system than even its reconstruction by the Congress of Vienna. These events are, besides the new Empire just mentioned, and a few minor occurrences, the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy, the absorption of the Pope’s temporal power, the realization of Prussian supremacy, the decline of Austria, and the Franco-German war. In the same period occurred two events of vast moment in the history of the world: the Indian revolt and the civil war in America, which threatened at one time to break up and divide the great Republic of the Western Hemisphere; but these have no direct bearing on our peculiar subject, the European concert. The affairs of Italy first claim our attention, from their priority in order of time.

The Austrian occupation of Lombardy and Venetia seemed still in the year 1858 to offer an insuperable bar to Italian unity and freedom. Whilst the possession of these provinces severed Italy, it also enabled the Austrians to introduce their forces into that country for the purpose of upholding its several governments; all of which, with the exception of Sardinia, were more or less under their influence. The sovereigns of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, were connected with the Austrian Imperial family, and leaned on it for support; whilst the Austrian Cabinet had also a powerful voice in the Neapolitan and Papal councils, and may thus be said to have dominated nearly all Italy. Without the expulsion of the Austrians, the views of Italian patriots could not be realized, and without foreign help they could not be expelled. The attempt had been made in 1849, and ended in disastrous failure.

Other necessary conditions for the freedom and unity of Italy were, that the Italians themselves should desire them, and be agreed as to the means for their attainment. Hence a difficulty almost as great as the presence of the Austrians. For though dissatisfaction at the existing state of things was a very prevalent feeling, opinions varied as to the remedy to be applied. The more ardent patriots desired republican institutions, but of these some would have been content with a confederation of independent commonwealths, whilst others aimed at an undivided Italian Republic. This last party, the most stirring and influential, was led by Mazzini and his sect, or society, called La Giovine Italia, or Young Italy; which, though itself a secret society, had now pretty well superseded others of a like nature, as the Carbonari. The men who adhered to Mazzini were dazzled by ideas, which had the fault of being utterly impracticable. He was for reconstructing society from its foundations, something after the fashion of Rousseau; nay, he thought that art, science, philosophy, in short everything in the world required renovation. Nor were his views confined to Italy. They embraced all Europe, and in 1834 he had drawn up a scheme of La Giovine Europa, “an apostolate of ideas,” as he calls it, by which the whole continent was to be remodelled on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity; but he allows that he expected no practical result.

A few men of wiser and more statesmanlike views saw that the only hope for Italy lay in the suppression of such conspirators, who were not only abortive disturbers of the public peace at home, but also disposed European opinion against Italian freedom: for these politicians saw that the emancipation of Italy from a foreign yoke was simply impossible without help from abroad. This school, as was natural, had its origin in Piedmont, the only constitutional Italian State; and probably their plans for Italian unity were not unmixed with some desire for the aggrandizement of their native country. At the head of them must be placed Count Massimo d’Azeglio, and a few of his friends, as Balbo, Gioberti, and others. D’Azeglio’s leading idea was, that no revolutionary attempts could succeed but such as were conducted in open day. To the success of his plans the formation of a sound public opinion was necessary, and with this view he had undertaken in 1845 a journey through great part of Italy in order to ascertain the sentiments of the people; when he discovered that all persons of sense and respectability were disgusted with the absurdities of the followers of Mazzini, and desirous of a new path. His views were approved by King Charles Albert, who encouraged him to publish them. Such was the origin of his political writings. After the defeat and abdication of that sovereign in 1849, d’Azeglio became the Prime Minister of his son and successor, Victor Emanuel II, a post which he held till 1852, when he was succeeded by Count Cavour.

Without this change Italian independence and unity would probably not have been achieved. With all his talent and good sense, d’Azeglio lacked the energy, perhaps also we may say the unscrupulous boldness, without which great revolutions cannot be effected. Of a generous temper, and devoted to literature and art, he was somewhat inactive and unpractical. Cavour, on the contrary, was evidently a man of action, and from the time of his taking office, he may be said to have held the fate of Italy in his hands. A main part of his policy was to obtain for it the good opinion of Europe. Hence his commercial treaties with France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland; hence also the seemingly inexplicable part which he took in the Crimean war. It was, in fact, a well-considered blow at Austria. Sardinia appeared among the European Powers at the Congress of Paris in 1856, and her envoy sat side by side with the Austrian Minister, Count Buol; before whose face he denounced the dangerous state of Italy through foreign occupation.

Cavour, though enterprising, was cautious, and awaited his opportunity. He appears to have early contemplated the establishment of a northern Italian kingdom by means of French intervention, and he prepared for future events by strengthening Alessandria, Casale, and Valenza, and by creating a great naval arsenal at Spezia. With regard to home policy, he loudly denounced the revolutionists and republicans. A national opinion, fostered by the means to which we have adverted, was now beginning to prevail over the sects, and the “National Society,” organized by La Farina, served to recall many from Mazzinian affiliations. The last insurrectionary attempt of Mazzini, at Genoa, proved a miserable failure. With like views, Cavour conciliated Daniel Manin, the Venetian patriot. Manin repudiated as he did the plots of conspirators and the daggers of assassins, and pressed Mazzini to retire from a scene where he was only an obstacle to Italian progress.

Cavour thought that he might securely reckon on the help of Napoleon III, the insurgent in Romagna in 1831 for Italian independence, when a detestable act seemed to shatter his hopes. As the French Emperor and Empress were proceeding to the opera on the 14th of January, 1858, one Orsini, who after the Roman revolution had taken refuge in England, and hatched there his diabolical plot, discharged at the Imperial carriages a so-called “infernal machine,” consisting of a number of gun barrels, fired simultaneously by a train of powder. Fortunately neither the Emperor nor Empress was hit, but several of their suite, as well as bystanders, were killed or wounded. England was denounced at Paris as having hatched the conspiracy, and Count Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, addressed a remonstrance, couched in moderate terms, to the British Cabinet. It was of course an absurd suspicion that the English nation or government should abet assassination, but the French had some grounds for it. In the preceding year three Italians had gone from London to Paris, with the design of taking the Emperor’s life, but were arrested and convicted. Mazzini was proved to have inspired this plot, and a member of the British Cabinet, Mr. Stansfeld, was his professed admirer and correspondent. The threats of some French colonels occasioned in England the establishment of the volunteers, and the whole affair a change of ministry, Lord Palmerston giving place to Lord Derby. By moderation on both sides, however, the rupture of the French and English alliance was averted, and the visit of Queen Victoria to the French Emperor at Cherbourg, on the reopening of that port in August, 1858, seemed to disperse the clouds which had gathered on the political horizon.

Strangely enough an event which threatened to upset all Cavour’s plans served eventually to forward them. That Minister having loudly denounced in the Sardinian parliament the crime of political assassination, some confidential communications from Napoleon followed, and soon after a letter, inspired by him, containing the embryo scheme of an alliance between France and Piedmont. Cavour in consequence, ostensibly on a pleasure trip, procured an interview with Napoleon at Plombières, July 20th, 1858, where the terms of the projected alliance were arranged. They comprised the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy by the French and Italian arms; the erection of a Northern Italian kingdom of some eleven million souls in favour of Victor Emanuel, and in return the cession of Savoy and Nice to France. A marriage was also agreed upon between the Emperor’s cousin, Napoleon, son of King Jerome, and Clotilda, daughter of the King of Sardinia.

Napoleon, who had much of the conspirator in his nature, had formed this plot, for such it must be called, without the knowledge of his ministers. There was no legitimate cause of quarrel between France and Austria. The pretext put forth was Austrian misgovernment in Italy; Napoleon’s real motive, it can hardly be doubted, was to add strength and lustre to his dynasty by the aggrandizement of France. Piedmont also had not for the moment any valid plea for a war with Austria. But her case was very different from that of France. The occupation of Lombardy by the Austrians was a constant threat to her safety and independence, as well as the chief bar to Italian unity.

Napoleon displayed his intentions on receiving the diplomatic circle on January 1st, 1859, when he expressed his regret to M. Hübner, the Austrian Ambassador, that his relations with his master, Francis Joseph, were not cordial. Such an announcement so suddenly and openly made filled all Europe with astonishment and alarm. Suspicion had however prevailed in some quarters of an approaching rupture. In the preceding year, Piedmont had ostentatiously displayed her enmity towards Austria, and reports of French military preparations had been rife in diplomatic circles. Not only the Sardinian official press, but the Chambers also had attacked the right of Austria to her Italian possessions, whilst she, on her side, had redoubled her military precautions, and renewed her ancient treaties with Italian States. Already before Napoleon’s declaration, the Austrian troops, which had been largely reinforced, had taken up a threatening position on the Ticino.

Victor Emanuel’s speech on opening the Chambers at Turin, January 10th, 1859, taken in connection with Napoleon’s declaration, was calculated to remove any remaining doubt as to the true nature of the crisis. He exhorted the Parliament to meet coming events with resolution; he bade them remark the credit which the country had acquired in the councils of Europe, but that such a situation was not without danger, for if on the one hand treaties were to be respected, on the other, they could not be insensible to the cries of anguish directed towards them from every part of Italy. The marriage of Prince Napoleon and Princess Clotilda, January 30th, threw further light on the situation.

Napoleon’s views were set forth in a pamphlet published early in February, entitled “Napoléon III et l’Italie”; which, though written by M. de La Gueronniere, was well known to have been inspired by the Emperor. It insisted on the necessity of reorganizing Italy, freeing it from foreign domination, and reconstituting it on the base of a federative union. Treaties were spoken of with levity as no longer answering the needs of the time, and it was proposed to submit the whole question to the judgment of Europe—Napoleon’s favourite resort in difficult emergencies, or when he wanted to act the first part with a show of moderation. His speech, indeed, on opening the French Chambers, February 7th, seemed to breathe of peace. He affected astonishment at the uneasiness which had been shown; reminded the Assembly of his declaration, L’Empire c’est la paix, and in mentioning Austria, adverted only to some difficulties about the Danubian Principalities, as if they had been the occasion of his New Year’s declaration. When touching on the abnormal state of Italy, where order could be maintained only by foreign troops, he observed that it was not a sufficient motive for anticipating a war. And he concluded by solemnly declaring that his first impulses, as well as his last judges, were God, his conscience, and posterity.

But in spite of this declaration all Europe was convinced that war was imminent. England especially took the alarm and made some impotent attempts at mediation, which were answered only with rebuffs both at Vienna and Turin. In March, Russia suddenly proposed a Congress, and some negotiations on the subject ensued, when a hasty step on the part of Austria rendered war inevitable. She refused to admit Sardinia to the Congress, and required, as a condition of her own acceptance of it, that that power should immediately disarm; and on the 23rd of April she sent to Turin an ultimatum to that effect, allowing only three days for a reply.

Although Cavour ardently desired a war, his position was embarrassing. He knew that Napoleon III’s character was fickle; that his policy had encountered great opposition in France, especially among the Church party; that Count Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, was not only opposed to a war, but even personally hostile to himself. On the other hand, the attitude of the rest of Europe was encouraging. Although no active help could be expected from England, her sympathy and moral support might be relied on. Russia was then unfavourably disposed towards Austria, and on friendly terms with the French Emperor, who had made advances to her after the Crimean war. The Prussian Regent, influenced by England and by the attitude of Russia, perhaps also by ancient jealousy of Austria, had refused to interfere in the matter, and denied that it concerned the German Confederation. The South German States, however, supported Austria, and ultimately, when war was no longer doubtful, the Prussian Minister at the Diet carried a resolution that the Confederate troops should be held in readiness, and orders to that effect were given for the Prussian contingent, but solely as a measure of precaution and defence.

On receipt of the Austrian ultimatum, the Sardinian government demanded from Napoleon III an immediate succour of 50,000 men. A small body already assembled in the south of France was at once embarked for Genoa, while others took the road to Turin by the Col di Susa. The Austrians, who had in Italy about 200,000 men, under the command of Count Griulay, crossed the Ticino, April 29th, though it had been notified to them that France would regard such a step as a declaration of war. By so doing they abrogated the treaties of 1815, and put themselves in the wrong with the public opinion of Europe. They occupied Vigevano, Novara, Vercelli, and two or three other towns without opposition, and with due diligence it would have been easy for them to seize Turin, an open town, and to crush the small, and as yet unsupported Piedmontese army. But though they had displayed so much precipitation in their diplomacy, their military operations seemed struck with sudden paralysis. Griulay showed the greatest indecision, changed his plans every three days, advanced sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left, bank of the Po, seemed to stand on his defence rather than to take the offensive. Thus time was lost till May 10th, when the allies had assembled in force.

Cavour had made the most active preparations, and he accepted the help of the revolutionary party, except only the Mazzinians, whom he threatened to fire upon if they stirred. These irregular forces consisted of three regiments called Cacciatoridegli Alpi, or Riflemen of the Alps, led by Garibaldi. The Sardinian army, amounting to about 80,000 men, was commanded by the King, having at his side General La Marmora. Napoleon III took the command of the French army. Before starting to join it he published a proclamation denouncing the Austrian aggression, and declaring that Italy must be liberated as far as the Adriatic. He was visited at Genoa by Victor Emanuel, and next day, May 14th, he established his head-quarters at Alexandria. The Franco-Sardinian army now amounted to about 200,000 men.

We can give only the main outline of the campaign. On the advance of the allies, Giulay retreated to Pavia. In order to ascertain the position of the enemy, he directed a reconnaissance in force on Carteggio, May 20th. The Austrians having been beaten in an affair at Genestrello, retired to Montebello, whence they were expelled the same day, after an obstinate and bloody fight. Expecting to be attacked on the Po, Giulay had weakened his force in the neighbourhood of Lago Maggiore; and Garibaldi took advantage of that circumstance to seize Varese, the Austrians retiring on Como, May 23rd. Four days after Como also was entered. The Piedmontese, under the King, crossed the Sesia, and attacked the Austrians atPalestro, at first with doubtful success, but, being supported by a French Zouave regiment, completely defeated them.

The attack in this quarter was intended to mask the advance of the French. Giulay continued his retreat to an elbow formed by the junction of the Ticino with the Po. On the 1st of June General Niel entered Novara, after a slight engagement; and on the 3rd the French began to cross the Ticino. On the 4th they gained the victory of Magenta, chiefly by a skilful manoeuvre of McMahon, which procured for him on the field a marshal’s baton, and the title of Duke of Magenta. In this battle the Austrians are said to have lost 20,000 men. Their haste in evacuating Milan, without carrying off or even spiking their guns, revealed to the inhabitants that their masters had received a disastrous defeat. The municipality, except thePodestà, who fled, formed themselves into a temporary government, and sent a deputation to Victor Emanuel, to announce their annexation to Sardinia. On the 8th of June, that Sovereign, accompanied by the French Emperor, triumphantly entered the Lombard capital. Hence Napoleon addressed a proclamation to the Italians in general, calling on them to take up arms for the liberation of their country.

On the same day that the Emperor entered Milan, the French defeated the Austrians at Melegnano (anciently Marignano), who now crossed the Mincio,deeming their position impregnable through the so-called Quadrilateral, formed by the fortresses of Lonato, Peschiera, Mantua, and Verona. Here they were joined by the Emperor Francis Joseph; and, on the night of the 23rd of June, they recrossed the Mincio, to give battle to the allies. Both sides were unaware of the position of their opponents. The BATTLE OF SOLFERINO which ensued was a kind of haphazard affair, gained by sheer fighting (June 24th). All three Sovereigns were present at this battle, and displayed great personal courage. Early in the day the Piedmontese on the left wing had experienced several repulses, but after the taking of Solferino by the French, drove the Austrians from positions which were become untenable. The loss on both sides, and especially the Austrian, was enormous. By the 1st of July the allies had effected the passage of the Mincio, and the Austrians retired into Verona.

And now when the French Emperor seemed to be on the point of completing his programme, when the hopes of the Italians were excited to the highest pitch, and when all Europe was wrapt in expectation, Napoleon suddenly stopped short in his victorious career. On July 7th he despatched General Fleury to the Austrian camp, with proposals for an armistice, and on the 11th, after an interview with the Austrian Emperor, the preliminaries of a peace were signed at Villafranca.

Napoleon’s conduct has been variously accounted for. His apologists allege his age—a little past fifty, the heat of the weather, the sight of so much carnage, and the loss of so many men. He is also said to have received news of the probable intervention of Prussia; but, though some Prussian corps had been marched towards the Rhine, they were not intended to take the offensive. Austria, apparently from latent suspicions, had declined Prussia’s offer of an armed mediation, and called upon her for immediate action, for which Prussia was not inclined. What chiefly weighed with Napoleon were probably two circumstances, both of which might have been foreseen. One of these was the strength of the Quadrilateral, and the necessity for some tedious sieges. Another was the enthusiasm displayed in the Italian duchies for annexation to Piedmont. This formed no part of Napoleon’s plan; and lest the French should take alarm at some dictatorships which had been erected in the duchies by Victor Emanuel, he was careful to inform them in an official note in the “Moniteur,” June 23rd, that they were only provisional and temporary. But here it will be necessary to cast a glance at the proceedings in these States.