The Fall of the House of Paisley E-Book

David Gordon

• Herausgeber: Gill Books
• Kategorie: Sachliteratur, Reportagen, Biografien
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2009

Beschreibung

In this hard-hitting study of political power, award-winning journalist David Gordon studies the political downfall of Ian Paisley and his son and shines an uncompromising light on Northern Ireland's political elite. Ian Paisley, firebrand Ulster Protestant preacher and politician, spent forty years denouncing compromise as treachery. Then, in March 2007, he agreed a power-sharing pack with Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Provisional IRA. The historic deal earned him plaudits from around the world and the top job in Northern Ireland's new devolved administration. His beloved son Ian Junior took up a ministerial post by his side. Yet within a year, this proud family dynasty had crumbled and collapsed. First Ian Junior resigned as a minister, after months of controversy over his links to a property developer. Then Paisley himself announced his retirement — despite having made repeated pledges to serve a full four years in office. In this fantastic work of investigative journalism, award-winning journalist David Gordon pinpoints the structural flaws in the House of Paisley and exposes the murky underworld of Northern Irish politics. Editorial Reviews 'David Gordon … in a fine piece of investigative journalism, doggedly following his nose, taking advantage of freedom of information, and with good contacts in the DUP and Free Presbyterian Church (FPC), seeks to explain why Ian Paisley fell at what appeared to be the moment of triumph.' Maurice Hayes, Belfast Telegraph 'David Gordon details where the storm came from and why it was so damaging to father and son in The Fall of the House of Paisley. While some readers will — to be blunt — enjoy reliving the difficulties faced by such a pair of individuals, there's more to Gordon's fine book than schadenfreude.' William Scholes, Irish News 'Gordon's account is as sharp as a blade, cutting deep into the murky world of Stormont.' Fachtna Kelly and Julian Fleming, Sunday Business Post Agenda The Fall of the House of Paisley: Contents Introduction Chronology - Welcome to the House of Fun - The Ghost of Paisley Past - With God on our Side - Dodgy Foundations - Causeway for Concern - Junior in Bother - Senior in Bother - Land Deal Lobbying - Out with the Old - St Andrews Bombshell - Other People's Money - Surprise in Dromore - All Fall Down - Legacy Matters - Life after PaisleyNotes

Leseprobe

The Fall of the House of Paisley

David Gordon

Gill & Macmillan

For Gill, Tony and Kate

Contents

Cover

Title page

Dedication

Introduction

Chronology

Chapter 1: Welcome to the House of Fun

Chapter 2: The Ghost of Paisley Past

Chapter 3: With God on our Side

Chapter 4: Dodgy Foundations

Chapter 5: Causeway for Concern

Chapter 6: Junior in Bother

Chapter 7: Senior in Bother

Chapter 8: Land Deal Lobbying

Chapter 9: Out with the Old

Chapter 10: St Andrews Bombshell

Chapter 11: Other People’s Money

Chapter 12: Surprise in Dromore

Chapter 13: All Fall Down

Chapter 14: Legacy Matters

Chapter 15: Life after Paisley

Notes

Copyright

About the Author

About Gill & Macmillan

Introduction

So what went wrong?

That seems a strange question to ask about a man who finished his political career as both the leader of unionism and the First Minister of Northern Ireland. Ian Paisley had come to prominence decades earlier as a notorious street preacher, firebrand Protestant hardliner, church-splitter and political pariah. His counter-protests to civil rights rallies in the late 1960s were officially blamed for stoking up tensions, as the province headed towards violent conflict.1 But by May 2007, Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) had completed a remarkable journey from the fringes to the centre of the province’s new devolved government. Its 81-year-old leader was being hailed internationally for sealing a monumental power-sharing deal with his long-standing foes in Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA. Yet just a year later, Paisley was standing down.

He had previously insisted that he fully intended to serve his entire term as First Minister. When questions started circulating about his future in early 2008, his devoted wife Eileen—Baroness Paisley—defiantly declared that he should stay on. He still went. It was not a neat and tidy end to a political career.

The truth was that Paisley had been damaged in his heartland over his power-sharing deal with Sinn Féin. The Free Presbyterian Church—the church he had built up from nothing—was hit by serious internal friction and he found himself relinquishing his post as its leader. Another blow came when the DUP lost a council by-election in Dromore, County Down, that it had been expected to win quite comfortably.

Then there was the Junior problem. Ian Paisley Jnr had proudly entered government by his father’s side, becoming a junior minister in his department. But he was forced to resign his post in February 2008 after a long-running ‘cronyism’ controversy over links to a property developer. A few years back, Paisley would have swiftly seen off those inside the DUP who wanted to point his son towards the exit door. But he could not save him.

The whispers started getting louder then, about when the father would be going too, and how a growing band of once-loyal supporters wanted it to be sooner rather than later. Paisley was not exactly run out of town. But people below him were ready to put a posse together.

This book charts the developments that led up to Ian Paisley’s dramatic resignation—including the Junior-related controversies that helped bring about the Fall of the House of Paisley. Junior and his allies now suggest that he was driven from office by an unjustified media campaign of innuendo. It is a matter of public interest to set the record straight on that front. Junior’s tumble from power highlighted damaging faults within the Stormont system, covering such issues as accountability, public standards, use of taxpayers’ money and nepotism. There is also some symbolism in the fact that his lobbying for a property tycoon caused his downfall.

In the new Northern Ireland of 2007, the housing market was booming and developers almost looked like a new aristocracy. It all seems a little pathetic now in light of the subsequent property crash and everything that accompanied it. Paisley Jnr’s resignation was significant in its own right on a number of grounds. But the way it helped to bring down his First Minister father has echoes of a biblical or Shakespearean drama. Hopefully, it also makes for a good read.

This is not the inside story of the DUP in power, and makes no pretence in this regard. Readers should always be suspicious of journalists who pretend to have been in the room at key moments in history. I was not in the room and I had the hilarious experience of being barred from media interviews held in May 2008 to mark Paisley’s departure as DUP leader. Some party sources have cooperated with the research for this book and gratitude for their anonymous contributions should be expressed. DUP headquarters made it clear that no official interviews would be given, and the Paisleys did not respond to requests to speak to them. That was no great surprise. In any event, a DUP inside story would inevitably be a self-serving and partial account of events.

This book seeks to objectively analyse why life did not go according to plan for the Paisleys in government. It can serve as a case-study of the first year of devolution after the DUP–Sinn Féin agreement. The early chapters set out key background factors on why the House of Paisley was not a particularly stable construction. A crucial theme is that Paisley’s problems with his traditional base over power-sharing stemmed in no small part from his own mouth. The political messages he preached for decades simply cannot be reconciled with his embrace of partnership government at the end of his career. Crucially, no credible attempt was made to explain his about-turn to his followers, many of whom were left feeling befuddled and betrayed. Instead, a pretence was maintained that there had really been no change at all. This helps to explain why Paisley faced revolts in his church and at the Dromore by-election that were greater than had generally been anticipated.

Another important weakness involved the inherent contradictions between his roles as First Minister and as head of a small, highly conservative religious denomination. Paisley’s brief period in power also missed out an expected long-term feelgood factor on the economic front. The credit crunch that swept the world from 2007 dashed hopes of a boom—and exposed some fairly half-baked ideological notions at Stormont. There is also no question that the physical demands of the First Minister’s job proved a challenge for Paisley. That was hardly surprising for a man in his eighties. His declining powers left him very reliant on his Junior Minister son. And that proved disastrous.

This book documents—largely in chronological order—the difficulties that hit both Senior and Junior from the autumn of 2007. These included a seemingly obscure policy dispute over commercial development at Northern Ireland’s best-known natural attraction, the Giant’s Causeway. That’s a case-study in its own right, featuring tensions between profit and environmental protection.

The final chapters of the book highlight the chain of events from the start of 2008 that brought the House of Paisley tumbling down, including the Dromore by-election, Paisley Jnr’s resignation and internal party machinations about the leadership. The abiding mystery of why the DUP leader said yes after a career built on saying no is also addressed, if not quite solved.

In conclusion, serious questions are raised about the structure Paisley Snr left behind—the power-sharing construction dominated by his party and Sinn Féin. The overall verdict on the devolution experiment to date is not exactly rapturous. The Stormont administration has had its good days. In March 2009, the DUP and Sinn Féin leadership produced an impressive display of unity in response to a renewed murder campaign by dissident republican factions. There have been low points too, particularly a five-month period in 2008 when the Executive—the power-sharing coalition cabinet—failed to meet. It is perfectly legitimate to critically examine current Stormont’s structures and politics, while accepting that Northern Ireland has progressed immeasurably from the days of the Troubles. There are also potential lessons for the next generation of politicians from Paisley’s brief period in power. For a start, people may not always conveniently forget everything their leaders tell them over the years. That’s something the political class here do not seem to grasp sometimes. Delivering good government, with proper standards of accountability, can be pretty important too.

Some nagging thoughts remain about the current Stormont setup, such as whether a workable settlement could have been achieved many years earlier with much less loss of life. Optimism about the future must also be tempered with the knowledge that Northern Ireland politics remains locked in sectarian patterns. Indeed, as the concluding chapter here argues, the present arrangements are biased against anyone wishing to challenge the status quo and shift political life away from its traditional communal routines. Against this backdrop, it will be a struggle to make politics truly functional or life in the Assembly inspiring.

The era in which Paisley Snr played such a dominant role is now gone. Meanwhile, his son’s future remains unclear. Junior’s profile has steadily risen since his resignation and his ambition to play a frontline role remains undimmed. It may be that he will rebuild the fallen House of Paisley in some shape or form.

But it will never stand as tall or as grand again.

Chronology

Good Friday 1998: The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) led by David Trimble backs the Belfast Agreement along with both nationalist parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Paisley’s DUP angrily opposes the deal.

A power-sharing government under the Agreement is subsequently formed with Trimble as First Minister and the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon as Deputy First Minister. But the devolved structures prove to be extremely unstable. Trimble’s hopes of a swift conclusion to IRA decommissioning are dashed, and his party steadily loses support to the DUP.

Devolution is suspended in October 2002, following allegations of an IRA spy ring within government.

October 2004: Inter-party talks at Leeds Castle, Kent, come close to securing a devolution agreement between the DUP and Sinn Féin. A DUP demand for photographic evidence of planned IRA decommissioning is rejected. A speech by Paisley saying that the IRA should be humiliated and wear ‘sackcloth and ashes’ helps to close down the prospect of a deal.

May 2005: The 2005 British General Election proves a watershed in Northern Ireland, with the DUP heavily defeating the Ulster Unionists. David Trimble stands down as UUP leader after losing his Westminster seat and is subsequently replaced by Sir Reg Empey.

October 2006: Talks involving Northern Ireland parties and the British and Irish governments in Scotland produce the St Andrews Agreement, a framework for a return to devolution. It preserves the main points of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, including a mandatory power-sharing coalition and north–south bodies.

March 2007: A fresh Assembly election sees the DUP cement its position as the main unionist party. Sinn Féin does the same on the nationalist side. The DUP’s election manifesto did not categorically commit it to a devolution deal.

Later that month, DUP leader Ian Paisley and Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams hold a historic joint press conference at Stormont, announcing that their parties will enter a new power-sharing devolved government within weeks.

May 2007: A new era begins in Northern Ireland with Ian Paisley as First Minister and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. A feelgood factor is evident in the province and they confound the cynics by establishing a warm working relationship. Their habit of laughing together at joint public appearances sees them branded the ‘Chuckle Brothers’.

September 2007: Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church announces that he will be stepping down as its Moderator—most senior minister—in the New Year. At the Assembly, policy controversies start clouding the new government’s honeymoon period. The first of these concerns plans for a development by a property tycoon and DUP member called Seymour Sweeney.

Ian Paisley Jnr’s lobbying for Sweeney comes under focus and he is criticised for being less than open about his links to the businessman. One answer during a radio interview—in which he says: ‘I know of him’ about Sweeney—proves particularly damaging.

February 2008: The DUP suffers a shock defeat in a council by-election in Dromore, County Down.

A few days later, Paisley Jnr resigns as a Stormont Junior Minister, immediately casting doubts on his father’s future as First Minister.

March 2008: Paisley Snr announces that he will be stepping down as First Minister and DUP leader.

June 2008: Long-serving DUP deputy Peter Robinson takes over as party leader and First Minister.

Chapter 1

Welcome to the House of Fun

‘…there is a sort of buoyancy in Ulster at the moment…’

IAN PAISLEY, April 20071

Historic moments abounded in Northern Ireland in 2007.

But nothing came close to matching the jaw-dropping moment on Monday 26 March when, at a televised press conference in Stormont, Ian Paisley confirmed the news that a power-sharing deal had been successfully negotiated. The camera panned back to show unbelieving viewers that Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams was sitting beside the DUP leader. That image was thanks in no small part to some clever improvisation behind the scenes.

The DUP had wanted the two leaders to be facing each other, while Sinn Féin insisted on them being side by side. Thanks to a diamond-shaped table formation, the two options were more or less satisfied. Paisley and Adams each sat at the end of their party’s table, bringing them beside each other if not quite side by side. The image management could not stretch to a historic handshake, however.

A deal had seemed anything but inevitable just a few days earlier. Monday 26 March had been Secretary of State Peter Hain’s absolutely final deadline for the restoration of devolution. But the DUP was determined to bust its way through that date. That meant the only way for it to avoid a total collapse of the process was to negotiate directly with Adams and co. on establishing devolution.

‘Today, we have agreed with Sinn Féin that this date will be Tuesday 8 May 2007,’ Paisley announced at the press conference.2 His statement that day was well crafted, giving every sign that he was going to throw himself into the new arrangements 100 per cent. It explained that ‘important preparatory work’ between the parties would get underway in advance of devolution day. ‘This will include regular meetings between the future First and Deputy First Minister,’ he added. That meant Paisley and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, a one-time top IRA man in Derry.

The famous Paisley rhetoric was expertly employed at the press conference, bridging the pain of the past and hopes for the future. ‘I want to make it clear that I am committed to delivering not only for those who voted for the DUP but for all the people of Northern Ireland,’ he said. ‘We must not allow our justified loathing of the horrors and tragedies of the past to become a barrier to creating a better and more stable future.’ And so the Paisley–McGuinness double act was born.

The First and Deputy First Ministers were soon laughing enthusiastically together at public appearances, even when there did not seem to be anything very funny going on. The nickname ‘Chuckle Brothers’ was coined in the summer of 2007, and attributed to an unnamed Ulster Unionist. This comment was quoted in a BBC Northern Ireland report marking the first 100 days of devolution.3 The original Chuckle Brothers were a comedy double act from children’s TV. The BBC Northern Ireland report also referred to government officials talking about the ‘chemistry’ between Paisley and McGuinness.

Although it eventually caused the DUP problems as it continued over the months, the chuckling did not seem like much of a liability at first. Paisley was demonstrating publicly that he was comfortable in his role, and determined to make it work. He gave an insight into the working relationship in one early interview, hinting at private jocularity within their department, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). ‘We have had agreement at the end of the day after perhaps a fair bit of argument and stating our views but it has been courteous, it has been honest, it has been straight, and it has also been tinged by a measure of sarcasm by both of us.’4

The Stormont honeymoon period went well beyond the two First Ministers. When the devolution project started to struggle in 2008, there was much speculation about a chill between McGuinness and Paisley’s successor, Peter Robinson. But they also evidently got on well during a joint trip to the US in June 2007. The pair represented the new Stormont administration at the opening of a major Northern Ireland promotional drive in the States.5 Robinson declared:

When you visit us—as I hope you will—you will be in no doubt about the astounding progress that is being made. Our two traditions are serving together in a new government. It is a government that is about change, about building, about progress, about promoting a confident and capable Northern Ireland and I believe there is no limit to what we can achieve together.6

In a joint BBC interview with McGuinness in Washington, Robinson said: ‘We have been working together for nearly two months and we haven’t had a row.’7

At times, the joint DUP–Sinn Féin choreography of the early days was almost beyond satire. OFMDFM Junior Ministers Ian Paisley Jnr and Gerry Kelly enthusiastically launched a new ‘superheroes’ comic for primary schoolchildren. A government press release helpfully explained: ‘Herbie Healthy, Sophie Safe, Archie Achiever, Emer the Eco Girl, Donna Does-a-lot and Rory Rights will use their super powers to help in the fight to secure a better society for children and ensure their needs are kept at the heart of government and the community.’8 Even ardent supporters of the peace process sometimes had to suppress memories of Gerry Kelly’s days as an IRA bomber. Likewise, it would have been unhelpful to recall all the abuse that Paisley Jnr and his DUP colleagues had been hurling at Kelly just a few years earlier.

Just in case there is any confusion, incidentally, this was the same Paisley Jnr who in 1999 had condemned the creation of the OFMDFM junior minister posts as a ‘waste of taxpayers’ money’. That was back when those jobs had gone to SDLP and Ulster Unionist MLAs. Paisley Jnr had at that time also described the two posts as ‘superfluous’ and claimed that the Assembly was ‘quickly becoming a white elephant’. His outburst—in December 1999—was echoed by senior Sinn Féin MLA and future minister Conor Murphy. Murphy claimed the junior minister positions were ‘the most blatant case of cronyism and jobbery imaginable’.9 Time had clearly moved on by the summer of 2007—Murphy and Paisley Jnr were Ministers together for a start. Everyone, it seemed, was on-message by then, and any cynicism or criticism was officially frowned upon.

Feelings of optimism went well beyond the confines of Stormont. Paisley Snr was not far off the mark when he told an interviewer: ‘I believe there is a sort of buoyancy in Ulster at the moment among both Roman Catholics and Protestants—that they’re seeing a way forward.’10 The spring weather that year was unusually warm and dry for several weeks. (Like a clumsy metaphor in a bad romantic novel, the summer turned out to be particularly wet and miserable.)

There were other elements to the feeling of optimism that had nothing to do with the Assembly, but nevertheless added to a real sense of optimism. The Northern Ireland football team was enjoying its best run for a generation, thanks to the inspired management of Lawrie Sanchez and the goal-scoring prowess of David Healy. On 28 March, just two days after that Paisley–Adams press conference, Northern Ireland claimed another famous giant-killing home win, defeating Sweden 2–1. In one of his more cringe-making comments of the year, Paisley Jnr said: ‘Northern Ireland is doing fantastically well—just like the DUP. They win all their big games and they have a superhero called Healy, we win all our big games and we have a superhero called Paisley!’11

Football soon provided another metaphor for devolution disappointment. Sanchez quit his Northern Ireland job a few weeks after the Sweden game to seek English premiership glory with London club Fulham. Healy was one of his first signings in his new job. They both flopped, and Sanchez was out of work within months.

Aside from football, there had been plenty more to cheer about on the sporting front in the first half of 2007. Ireland’s cricketers had achieved amazing success at the World Cup in the West Indies, defeating Pakistan and qualifying for the final stages of the tournament. Earlier in the year, sport and Irish history had combined magnificently. Ireland’s rugby team had found a temporary new home in Dublin’s Croke Park and had received a warm welcome in the GAA citadel. England’s rugby players were given a respectful welcome to the stadium and then happily thrashed.

On the music front, meanwhile, Northern Ireland band Snow Patrol had become one of the UK’s biggest rock acts. An article in the Belfast Telegraph noted: ‘They are headlining big summer festivals this year and it seems their songs are being played on the radio around the clock.’12 A Northern Ireland band had not enjoyed such a level of success since The Undertones in the late 1970s.

The optimism extended to the economic sphere as well. Tourists from various parts of the world were no longer a rarity on the streets. Belfast’s locals looked on with bemusement as open-topped tour buses became increasingly common. University of Ulster economist Michael Smyth commented: ‘A buoyancy in civil society about its own worth and own identity—helped by the political settlement and underscored by sporting and other achievements—is certainly a necessary condition for us to start to rebuild. But it’s not sufficient. We need to have a hard slog of selling ourselves to investors.’13 The commonly expressed economic hope was that the province could emulate the ‘Celtic Tiger’ success of the Irish Republic. The phrase ‘global credit crunch’ had not been coined at that stage.

The property market was enjoying the good times too. As the fine wines flowed, there were many after-dinner chats among the middle classes about the incredible sums their homes were now worth. Tales abounded of apartment blocks in various districts being snapped up in no time by buy-to-let investors. Home-owners were being approached by developers, keen to pay well over the asking price—and then knock down the properties to make way for new townhouses and flats.

One newspaper item published three days after the ground-breaking Paisley–Adams press conference epitomised the period perfectly. It reported that bidding on a red-brick detached home on Alliance Avenue in north Belfast had reached £800,000.14 The property had been put on the market three weeks earlier for just £285,000. The rich symbolism lay in the fact that Alliance Avenue sat in the heart of one of the city’s worst sectarian killing zones of the Troubles.

There was much excitement on the retail front as well. Middle-class spending power in particular was being buoyed by the property bonanza. The imminent opening of the province’s first IKEA furniture store was awaited with something close to euphoria in some quarters. And Belfast was looking forward to its new £400 million Victoria Square, bulging with designer clothes stores. Paisley and McGuinness were among the dignitaries present when the trendy centre’s long-awaited opening was finally held in March 2008. Belfast was being marketed as cool. Only the bitterest begrudger would surely have recalled the unique Victorian-era Kitchen Bar that had been controversially demolished to make way for Victoria Square.

The economic illusions that underpinned the apparent good times of 2007 painfully emerged over the course of the first 12 months of devolution. These hard lessons in financial reality will be examined later in this book. But it’s worth noting at this point that few if any sceptical voices were raised at Stormont at the time. Nobody seemed to think that the party might be followed by a hangover.

The positive atmosphere that followed the power-sharing deal also had a manufactured aspect to it. That was primarily because one of the first significant acts of the new power-sharing executive was to put looming household water charges on hold.

The hated ‘tap tax’ formed part of the ‘reform agenda’ enthusiastically pursued by Secretary of State Peter Hain and his Northern Ireland Office (NIO) ministerial team. It proved an effective lever for pushing Assembly members towards devolution. Hain, who arrived in the province following the Labour general election victory in May 2005, never tired of pushing his policy programme.

This was a break with the previous Direct Rule approach, where ministers largely held the fort in the expectation that the Assembly would be returning. ‘Care and maintenance’ was one way of describing the pre-Hain attitude. One senior figure from the Northern Ireland Civil Service coined the phrase ‘warm storage’ to sum up the thinking. Hain was much more proactive, and in the process managed to annoy quite a few people.

A source close to his NIO team insists that this was not an evil plot to hasten devolution’s return. ‘It was always a misunderstanding that this was about doing unpopular things deliberately,’ he says. ‘Decisions were taken on the basis of what was genuinely believed to be the right thing to do.’ This source confirms that Hain’s hands-on approach was a ‘deliberate policy change’. ‘It was agreed in Downing Street, but wasn’t born in Downing Street. They had to be persuaded. What we wanted to look like—and this was the big difference—was that we were enjoying it.’ It was correctly anticipated that this would impact on the mood among Northern Ireland’s political parties. ‘It built a sense, which helped the situation, that this was unfair, that this was their job. It created an itch to get round the table and make those decisions themselves.’

The NIO source points out that aspects of the Direct Rule policy drive were well received, including reductions in hospital waiting times. It is true to say that some Hain initiatives had admirers, not least in the voluntary and environmental sectors. But water charges were far from being the only contentious aspect of his ‘reform agenda’. The list also included the scrapping of the 11-plus transfer test, reform of household rates, and plans to slash the number of councils.

The councils issue was never likely to have people marching in the streets. But it was felt deeply at grass-roots level in politics. Councillors were not excited at the idea of losing their seats and the prestige that went with them. The drawing of proposed new local government boundaries is also an inevitably fraught topic, with much focus on how many of the new councils would be unionist or nationalist controlled. The 11-plus was also a massive issue, particularly among Protestant middle class voters. In water charges, however, Peter Hain had his best method of applying pressure to the local parties. He and his ministers could point out that direct household charges were in place in Britain, and ask why Northern Ireland should be any different. They could also explain that an estimated £3 billion was needed over the next 20 years to bring the province’s ageing water and sewerage infrastructure up to the required standards. Without the introduction of charges, this money would have to be taken from other public services like health, education, etc.

A new tax is never going to be popular. And so, reflecting the mood among voters, Northern Ireland parties railed against the plans. That’s where Hain and co. had the perfect response: if you don’t like it, agree to restore devolution and sort it out for yourselves. By happy coincidence, the first household ‘tap tax’ bills had been due to land on doormats a month after the 2007 Assembly elections. One senior NIO source freely admits that this was a deliberate ‘twisting of the knife’, with a timescale that helped to ‘focus minds’.

As the March deadline for a devolution deal approached, it was made clear that the bills were being prepared and would be posted out in the absence of an agreement. Water charges therefore played their part in the sealing of the deal. In his momentous 26 March devolution deal press conference with Adams, Paisley declared:

The two parties have already asked the prime minister to ensure that no water charge bills should be issued and the matter should be left for a local executive to determine. We hope, trust and believe that the secretary of state will at last listen to the voice of the people of Northern Ireland on this issue.

Adams for his part stated: ‘As an immediate step both Sinn Féin and the DUP have asked the British government not to issue the water bills.’

The government was more than happy to ‘listen to the voice of the people of Northern Ireland’. What they didn’t do was provide £3 billion to sort out the infrastructure crisis. Hain had himself boasted about how much water charges had featured in the March 2007 Assembly election. In an article for the Observer, he claimed that ‘the main issue in the election campaign was not sectarian mistrust, but the introduction of water charges and a comprehensive reform policy I have introduced’.15

This was somewhat disingenuous. Water charges were not the ‘main issue in the election campaign’ in the normally understood meaning of the phrase. Rival parties did not come up with alternative blueprints for solving the problem and then try to convince the electorate of their merits. All the Northern Ireland parties fought the election with manifestos opposing Hain’s water charges. Given such unanimity, this ‘main issue’ could hardly have had much bearing on how people cast their votes. The election was once again about who the Protestant and Catholic communities wanted to represent them in the Stormont tug-of-war. But the parties did get their ears bent on the doorsteps about getting back into the Assembly, taking control and stopping Hain having his wicked way. And that is what the Secretary of State wanted them to hear all along.

The new power-sharing government did indeed halt the tap tax bills being issued in 2007. But it was a deferral rather than a cancellation. Water charges are generally viewed as an inevitability within the next few years. The only questions are apparently when and how much. The electorate might be disappointed when the demands finally start arriving in the post. They might even recall voting against water charges back in 2007. But what’s a little disenchantment among the great unwashed compared to the business of striking historic peace accords?

Chapter 2

The Ghost of Paisley Past

‘I have told the Lord if I would ever think of compromising he will put me in a box and get me across the river. It is not the way you start your ministry, it is the way you finish it that matters. May God keep us true!’

IAN PAISLEY, January 19801

The theme of this chapter can be summed up in a biblical phrase that will be familiar to Ian Paisley. When it came to a backlash from hardline unionist elements, he reaped what he sowed. In short, the political and theological messages he thundered out over the years came back to haunt him in his new First Minister era. This was one of the factors that helped to make the new House of Paisley unstable.

It is generally accepted that the 2007 devolution deal could not have been secured without Paisley. His DUP deputy Peter Robinson carefully plotted the route to Stormont power, but it is very hard to envisage him getting there on his own. Only the Doc, as the party faithful call him, had the charisma and the standing to bring it about.

Ironically, a few years earlier, it would not have been uncommon to hear whispered suggestions that there would never be an agreement while Paisley was alive. It was claimed a lasting deal would have to depend on Robinson rising to the top and unionism realigning. Paisley confounded those predictions and brought the vast bulk of his party with him into power-sharing. There were some resignations, but Jim Allister, the DUP’s European Parliament Member (MEP), was the only senior figure to walk away. A Robinson-led party would surely have fractured to a greater extent in the circumstances.

But the deal brought with it a personal cost for Paisley. It won him praise from around the world, while causing unease and hurt within his traditional support base. This dissatisfaction was muted in the early days of the new era. While it was relatively small, it could also be vociferous. By July 2007, Paisley had already been on the receiving end of a form of loyalist protest he had long directed at others. He was heckled with cries of ‘Traitor’ and ‘Lundy’ at an annual pre-Twelfth of July rally in Loughgall, County Armagh. A local newspaper reported on police minders ‘unceremoniously shunting him into a car which ferried him away from a baying crowd’.2

Some of Paisley’s longest-serving followers were among those most disappointed and angry at the pact with Sinn Féin. For the Free Presbyterians among them, this was more than a case of personal disenchantment. They had thrown themselves into the Paisleyite cause over the years because they were convinced he was God’s anointed leader in Ulster. They believed him when he ranted against Rome-inspired nationalist plots against the last bastion of true Protestantism in Europe. In their eyes, their cause was not just about political opinions or tactics, but religious faith. And many of them did not see the power-sharing deal coming.

Amongst media commentators and other elements of the chattering classes, there was a general view that the DUP would go into government with Sinn Féin at some point after the March 2007 Assembly poll. However, that assumption was not shared by all the party’s supporters. The DUP’s election manifesto had left its options open on whether a deal would be agreed at all. It paid inadequate attention to the task of preparing its grass-roots for the new era. If sections of them were left befuddled, it was probably because they had believed everything Paisley had told them over the years.

WHAT WAS IT ALL FOR?

Veteran Larne councillor Jack McKee was a Paisleyite well before the DUP had even been formed. He was with Paisley in the 1960s and was a member of the DUP’s forerunner, the Protestant Unionist Party. He can look back on decades of working for the cause, at election times, at rallies and in unpaid advice centre work. ‘I had to take days off work, for instance when Dr Paisley was going to be in town. Over the years, it’s cost me a bag,’ he recalls.3

McKee says he was ‘sick to the very stomach’ when Paisley agreed to go into government with Sinn Féin, adding: ‘It was as if somebody had reached in and pulled the very heart out of you.’ It left him thinking all his work down through the years was ‘for nothing’. He now questions the past Paisleyite onslaughts on unionist Prime Ministers Terence O’Neill and Brian Faulkner for their efforts at accommodation in the 1960s and 1970s. And he asks why his erstwhile DUP colleagues ‘hounded’ Ulster Unionist First Minister David Trimble out of office over the Good Friday Agreement. ‘They’ve actually gone further than Trimble,’ he says.

It is clear that McKee would have spent a large chunk of his life very differently if he had known how the DUP’s future was going to pan out.

I thought there was a bond there, that there was a personal relationship that had been built up over the years. I saw the DUP as a family and in the early days, it certainly was that. The bit that galls me is that through all those years of barnstorming and table thumping, what was it all for? Why had all those people to die? Why did that have to happen? Logic has gone out the window.

McKee is now a supporter of MEP Jim Allister’s anti-Agreement TUV (Traditional Unionist Voice) movement. His brother Bobby, also a Larne councillor, stayed with the DUP and backed its Stormont position.

Veteran Ballymena councillor Roy Gillespie was another defector to the TUV following the devolution pact. The retired lorry driver had been a Paisley follower for some 40 years. He was a long-standing member of the Free Presbyterian Church as well as the DUP, believing Paisley had been ‘raised up’ by God for the situation in Northern Ireland. Asked to sum up his feelings after the power-sharing deal of 2007, he uses one word: ‘betrayal’. ‘I was in mourning. I found it very difficult. I had my tears and I lost sleep. It was hard going,’ he admits.4

Gillespie suspected that there would be political upheaval after the 2007 Assembly election, but held out hopes that Paisley would block a deal. ‘We did probably see big changes but we thought he would probably be the boulder at the end of the tunnel. We thought he would hold his ground,’ he says. ‘Being a man of God, you think he’s going to be standing firm and standing true to what he said. His word should be his bond.’

Gillespie’s hurt received media attention in early 2008 when Taoiseach Bertie Ahern paid a visit to his home town. Ahern was warmly welcomed to Ballymena by First Minister Paisley, providing yet more memorable images from the new Northern Ireland. Gillespie carried a union flag to the hotel event and staged a lonely protest with his wife Ruby. An emotional Mrs Gillespie told journalists: ‘We used to have a great man who stood for us, who spoke out for us, who led us. We protested, we marched and we believed in what we are doing and we believed in him. Now we’re let down, we’re let down so badly. Where do we go?’5

It may well be that Paisley had no option but to move away from the likes of the Gillespies and Jack McKee. Jettisoning old comrades who fail to move with the times can be one of the burdens of leadership. But having roused them to action, and fired them up year after year, were the ageing loyal followers not at least owed a full explanation from their leader?

David Trimble raised this point himself—on behalf of all the Northern Ireland electorate—in June 2007. He said:

Dr Paisley hasn’t made it clear why Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness is his number two—a man with a terrorist past—yet he criticised me for working alongside people like constitutional nationalist Seamus Mallon, my extremely able Deputy First Minister. It has been suggested that Ian Paisley and his colleagues found themselves in power after 40 years on the sidelines, and embraced it with both arms. Perhaps he always wanted to be Prime Minister of Northern Ireland at whatever cost—I pose the question which only he can answer.6

It was quite a reserved comment from Trimble in the circumstances. He could have added that he was entitled to an explanation himself after all the vicious abuse he had personally received from the DUP and its supporters.

Paisley did make some stabs at explaining his position. In his first post-deal interview, he spoke at some length about how the return of devolution had saved Northern Ireland from ‘Plan B’. This, he claimed, would have meant ‘curtains for our country’ and involved joint rule from London and Dublin. ‘How would I have faced my people if I had allowed this country to have the union destroyed and a setting up of a joint government by the south of Ireland?’ he asked.7

However, there is no evidence that ‘Plan B’ would have been anything close to joint sovereignty between Dublin and London, or the end of the union. It is true that a final collapse of the talks process in 2007 would probably have led to ongoing Direct Rule with a greener tinge—a British–Irish partnership with London and Dublin working closely together. That is some distance short of London and Dublin actually sharing joint authority. A source with an inside track to NIO thinking under Peter Hain says joint sovereignty was ‘never discussed’. ‘We had the next stage of energetic Direct Rule mapped out,’ this source adds. There would have been ‘lots of meetings’ with a north–south theme, but this would have been ‘more window-dressing than legal or structural’.

Greater London–Dublin co-operation, incidentally, would also have been the likely outcome had all of unionism walked away from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In contrast to Paisley’s post-deal claims, the Plan B issue had actually been played down by his deputy Peter Robinson some months earlier. In a newspaper interview in October 2006—following the St Andrews Agreement that paved the way for the DUP–Sinn Féin pact—Robinson denied having any detailed knowledge of an alternative British government plan. He added:

All I do know and my experience of the last number of years is that I would not trust my future to Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. If I have a viable alternative to that I will take it—but it has to be a viable alternative and not just anything that they cobble together and throw at me. The alternative, I have to say, has never been the key issue for me. I will not take the decision that I finally will have to take on the St Andrews Agreement because there is looming behind it the ogre of the British–Irish partnership. Of course I recognise that’s there and the threat is about but I’m not going to sign a bad package because there’s something worse down the road.8

Only a few months later, Paisley was effectively telling voters that ‘something worse’ was actually ‘the key issue’ after all.

The DUP’s defence of power-sharing does not always centre on how they delivered salvation from Plan B. The party also points regularly to the achievement of getting Sinn Féin to sign up to support for policing. Paisley’s own support for the police had not always been on display during his career. In 1974, after police had removed him and other anti-power-sharing politicians from a Stormont sitting, Paisley told the officers: ‘You have done something which will ruin your careers. From this moment on, loyalists will have no time whatsoever for the RUC.’9 In 1986, history repeated itself after another attempt at restoring devolution was abandoned by the British government. Paisley and other DUP members were carried out of the Assembly by police, prompting him to tell the officers: ‘Don’t come crying to me if your homes are attacked. You will reap what you sow.’10 This ominous warning was greeted with cheers from DUP colleagues.