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Never before has diplomacy evolved at such a rapid pace. It is being transformed into a global participatory process by new media tools and newly empowered publics. 'Public diplomacy' has taken center-stage as diplomats strive to reach and influence audiences that are better informed and more assertive than any in the past. In this crisp and insightful analysis, Philip Seib, one of the world's top experts on media and foreign policy, explores the future of diplomacy in our hyper-connected world. He shows how the focus of diplomatic practice has shifted away from the closed-door, top-level negotiations of the past. Today's diplomats are obliged to respond instantly to the latest crisis fueled by a YouTube video or Facebook post. This has given rise to a more open and reactive approach to global problem-solving with consequences that are difficult to predict. Drawing on examples from the Iran nuclear negotiations to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Seib argues persuasively for this new versatile and flexible public-facing diplomacy; one that makes strategic use of both new media and traditional diplomatic processes to manage the increasingly complex relations between states and new non-state political actors in the 21st Century
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Seitenzahl: 209
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Preface
Introduction
Notes
1 Open Diplomacy
Some history: communication technology evolves
The internet and smartphones arrive
Security and privacy
The empowered public
Connecting to the public
Notes
2 The Rise of Public Diplomacy
China’s cultural outreach
Russia’s broadcasting
Israel’s politicking
The United States’ grass roots outreach
Tomorrow’s public diplomacy
Notes
3 States and Non-States
Ancient history: the Cold War
Everybody’s century
Non-state actors
The virtual state
The Facebook factor
Conflict and diplomacy
Religion and diplomacy
Notes
4 Staying on Track
Perils of politics
Diplomacy diffused: who’s in charge?
Mission creep
What should diplomats know?
Notes
5 Shaping Diplomacy’s Future
Two-tier diplomacy
The quest for data
Narratives
Diplomacy in the new global community
The future and the past
Notes
Index
End User License Agreement
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Philip Seib
polity
Copyright © Philip Seib 2016
The right of Philip Seib to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2016 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press350 Main StreetMalden, MA 02148, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-0723-8
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Seib, Philip M., 1949- author.Title: The future of diplomacy / Philip Seib.Description: Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA : Polity Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2015046315 (print) | LCCN 2015049255 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509507191 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781509507207 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 1509507191 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 1509507205 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781509507221 (mobi) | ISBN 9781509507238 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Diplomacy.Classification: LCC JZ1305 .S444 2016 (print) | LCC JZ1305 (ebook) | DDC 327.2--dc23LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015046315
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
The purpose of this short book is to stimulate thinking and conversation about the ways diplomacy is changing and what diplomacy’s future is likely to hold.
Although I love diplomatic history, I have minimized historical material in the book, providing just enough to establish context as needed. Countless volumes are available that exhaustively examine where we have been. Far less has been written about where we are going. That is what interests me now.
This is a heady time to be considering such matters. Not since Gutenberg has communication changed as profoundly as has happened during the past decade or two, thanks to the internet. The latest manifestation of this change is seen in the pervasiveness of mobile technology, which means more people are connected to more of the world more of the time. This phenomenon is still lopsided; people in the most developed nations are the most connected. But that is changing. Inexpensive smartphones and expanding internet access are proving to be great equalizers. The “global village” is moving from cliché to reality.
These new connections are being used for more than mindless chit-chat and the exchange of cute cat videos. People are learning more about the world around them, and not in passive ways. Their new communication tools allow them to gather information and to converse at levels that have never before been feasible. They can watch what their own and other governments are doing and participate in debate about those doings. They can also use these tools to disseminate information themselves: emailing, posting, tweeting, as well as talking. A few minutes of video on YouTube can be seen worldwide almost instantly, leaping across borders, defying gatekeepers, and stimulating reaction.
When people learn from YouTube or a regional satellite television channel that a young man has set himself on fire because of hopelessness caused by political oppression, the sympathy and anger generated in response can also be transmitted so quickly and widely that a revolution might be born. When people use online networks to tell each other about the plight of refugees who are flooding across borders, compassionate responses might help alleviate the problem. Or, on the darker side, hateful reaction might spread.
All this matters to diplomats because during past centuries their work had proceeded at a measured pace. Theirs was a closed club – elite, male, and disdainful of anyone outside their circle. No more. The ranks of diplomats have been opened to become more inclusive and egalitarian, and the public’s attention to their work has grown exponentially.
This was obvious in 2015 in events surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – the Iran nuclear agreement. I have included quite a bit of information about these negotiations and their aftermath because the public’s involvement in the debate about the plan provided good examples of the diplomacy that exists beyond the work of professional diplomats. Taking advantage of the connectivity provided by new media tools, especially social media, advocates and opponents of the nuclear deal conducted a global debate designed to influence implementation of the agreement. An issue that once would have remained exclusively the business of a small cadre of diplomats and other officials moved into the public domain. Doors to the world of diplomacy had been thrown wide open, and this affected how the negotiations were conducted and how the surrounding political debate took shape.
This is diplomacy’s present, and it foreshadows a fast-evolving future.
I had valuable help with this book. My principal debt is to my wonderful research assistant, Sohaela Amiri. Brilliant and hardworking, she tracked down essential material and steered me away from my tendency to embrace the obscure. Some friends read parts of the manuscript or discussed ideas with me, and they provided valuable insights: Bob Banks, Donna Bragg, Dina Jadallah, Elizabeth Linder, Melody Mohebi, and Andreas Sandre.
At Polity, my editor, Louise Knight, was a joy to work with. She guided me through the entire publishing process, from numerous revisions of my proposal to the final version of the book. She understands my odd temperament and manages it well. Louise’s assistant, Nekane Tanaka Galdos was also most helpful and patient. Paul Sharp and an anonymous reviewer provided valuable suggestions about the draft manuscript.
At the University of Southern California, being surrounded by smart colleagues has been a pleasure. Special thanks to Ernest Wilson, Dean of USC’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism.
I also want to pay tribute to the diplomats, scholars, journalists and others, past and present, whose work has long nurtured my interest in diplomacy: John Lewis Gaddis, Richard Holbrooke, George Kennan, Margaret MacMillan, James Mann, Harold Nicolson, Joseph Nye, David Rothkopf, William Rugh, Mary Elise Sarotte, John Wheeler-Bennett, Lawrence Wright . . . the list is much longer than this and keeps growing.
Most of all, I honor the diplomats and their professional kin who work in often difficult, and sometimes dangerous, circumstances, not only for their own countries, but also to improve the lives of the people amidst whom they serve. They continue to shape the future of diplomacy.
For centuries, diplomacy was the domain of an insular elite. The protagonists worked quietly, often secretly, until ready to unveil their accomplishments or lack thereof. Diplomats were comfortable in this closed environment, speaking just to one another and paying little heed to those publics whose future might be shaped by their work. British diplomat Harold Nicolson, in his 1939 book Diplomacy, wrote, “In the days of the old diplomacy it would have been regarded as an act of unthinkable vulgarity to appeal to the common people upon any issue of international policy.” He lamented “the invention of the wireless,” which gave “a vast impetus to propaganda as a method of policy” and allowed manipulators such as Adolf Hitler to wield “a formidable weapon of popular excitation” that could obstruct or even supersede the work of diplomats.1
Today Nicolson’s “unthinkable vulgarity” has become integral to diplomacy, and it would be an act of unthinkable stupidity to disregard the “common people” (now more felicitously referred to as “the public”) when conducting international relations. The “wireless” of Nicolson’s time has evolved into devices that individuals carry in their pockets and consult almost constantly to peruse a vast array of venues ranging from satellite television channels to social media properties such as Twitter and Facebook. For a member of the public to intrude into the diplomatic process may require only a tap on an app.
In this new information era, people gather information from diverse sources, disseminate their own views, and participate in nonstop virtual conversation. The governmental gatekeepers who controlled access to information and shaped much of its content have been nudged aside by the individual seeking out and disseminating “news” as she or he defines it.
Hunger for information has political ramifications, as does the ability of “citizen journalists” with their own agendas to reach large audiences in real time. Diplomats feel the reverberations from this process, and although diplomacy may have been an elitist enterprise for many centuries, it has now, for good or ill, been opened up in the sense that people (at least in democratic societies) can know more about diplomatic activity and can make their voices heard. This is largely the result of media-based empowerment of the public. Diplomats know that speculation as well as solid information about their work will appear quickly and widely. Nothing can be done about that, and so the art of the rapid response has become part of the diplomatic repertoire.
The “popular excitation” that concerned Nicolson can now happen in minutes, as a YouTube video ricochets through online networks and leaps across political boundaries. Diplomats often find themselves compelled to move at a similar pace, responding to the crisis of the moment with little or no time to corroborate information or to reflect on consequences of rapid action. Traditionalists who believe that fast diplomacy is almost always bad diplomacy face a disconcerting reality. They must adapt to a strange and inhospitable new world in which the interests of diverse publics must be addressed quickly, and deciding what to say may therefore take precedence over deciding what to do.
A central premise of this book is that the future of diplomacy is inextricably tied to the future of media. Much more than speed is involved. The popularization of personal media tools – primarily the mobile phone and including tablets, laptops, and similar devices – empowers individuals in unprecedented ways. People no longer need to rely on traditional news providers, which can be influenced if not controlled by governments. Instead, all those with access to the internet can independently find information about the topics that most interest them on social media venues such as Twitter or through specialized online news services, many existing solely to advance partisan viewpoints. Even more important, members of the public can supplant the traditional relationship between news media and audience by disseminating information through their own networks. In this new media world, everyone can be a journalist of sorts.
The pathways for information extend into the distance. Consider the retweeted tweet. It doesn’t go just from A to B and B to C. If B and C retweet it and members of their networks also retweet, its audience can grow exponentially in moments. It may reach thousands of people, few of whom had any connection to the original sender. The information keeps moving, finding its audience and then being pushed ahead to a yet larger audience.
People rely on this process, which is why 500 million tweets are sent every day and 300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute. This profoundly changes the relationship between the public and institutions such as the BBC, New York Times, Reuters, and even relative newcomers such as Al Jazeera and China Central Television (CCTV). These “legacy” news organizations are far less necessary than they once were in maintaining the flow of information.
The new media tools that are changing journalism also reduce the insularity of diplomacy. People expect a river of information, not a trickle, and they expect governments and other societal institutions to contribute to that flow. This requires new levels of transparency in government, including on the part of those who conduct diplomacy, and a commitment by governments to reach out to their own and other publics.
This is another facet of diplomatic practice addressed in this book: “public diplomacy,” which in a nutshell means that governments not only must speak to other governments, but also must address global publics – a collective worldwide public or citizens of individual or clusters of countries. Those publics can be accessed through tools such as satellite television and social media. Further, people around the world can talk back to those who wield power and dispense information, and they expect to be listened to. Public diplomacy is no longer just a “nice” thing to do; it has become an essential part of statecraft.
This does not mean that the long slog through the esoteric and sometimes disputatious aspects of negotiation and other diplomatic tasks must always be undertaken in public view. If that were the case, posturing would overwhelm substance even more often than it already does. Rather, the new diplomacy must include a commitment to provide the public with as much information as possible as soon as possible. This is a practical necessity because the information environment has become so porous that doing diplomacy “privately” is decreasingly feasible, as Wikileaks and Edward Snowden’s revelations illustrate. Not all diplomacy can be conducted openly; sensitive negotiations may shrivel in sunlight. But there should be a predisposition toward transparency.
Providing information is not a selfless act. Governments use public diplomacy to advance their interests. They do not merely inform; they shape information for their purposes. That said, there are limits to the elasticity of truth, and sometimes the line between truthful “public diplomacy” and misleading “propaganda” becomes blurred. Diplomacy does not exist in an ethical vacuum, and so those who direct public diplomacy must respect the boundaries of honesty. Failure to do so is not only morally irresponsible but also, in an information-rich environment, is likely to be discovered and produce negative results.
In addition to the trend toward democratizing diplomacy that is facilitated by personal media devices, diplomats today must cope with the unprecedented speed at which information-driven events move. A fast-spreading rumor can cause a bloody crisis. A world leader may be compelled to decide whether to take time to respond thoughtfully or act immediately. Ideally, the two could both happen, but to expect that in every case is wishful thinking.
This acceleration has gone on steadily, with new technologies setting the pace: in the nineteenth century, the telegraph and telephone; in the twentieth century, radio and television; in the twenty-first century, social media. It is neither wise nor accurate to scoff at new venues such as YouTube and Facebook as merely homes for soap operas and cat videos. They can suddenly and forcefully intrude into the diplomat’s world. If a mosque in Islamabad is blown up and social media chatter says US military personnel were seen nearby, diplomats cannot play for time by saying, “Show us proof.” Regardless of whether the allegation is true or not, and regardless of the venue in which it is presented, it may sweep through the public like a forest fire, destroying rationality and igniting passions. Mobs will form in Islamabad and in far-away places, endangering everyone caught in the red-hot updraft.
How can this be dealt with? Only a few decades ago, most angry protests would build slowly enough that governments could craft a response to address the problem before it got out of hand. Today, that cushion of time has become an illusion. The timetable is now based on minutes, not hours or days.
This means that the modern diplomat’s training and professional duties must include media skills that extend beyond offering platitudes in front of a television camera and using social media for innocuous, self-serving messaging. “No comment” or “Let me get back to you” may not be tolerated by an audience accustomed only to “NOW.”
The new information environment is not only large, it is intellectually competitive. Diplomats’ media tactics must conform to public expectations about receiving information, and that information must be able to withstand challenges that come quickly and from many sources. Information disseminated through social media must be part of a larger strategy that advances the home country’s interests, and it must be created and dispensed in systematic fashion. Social media use requires a redesign of diplomatic structure to include determination of who should be the social media “spokespersons” for the ministry or embassy, and how the material should be vetted. Several years ago, officials in the US State Department reportedly suggested a rule that all tweets must undergo a two-day approval process before being sent. Two days in the social media world is an eternity. After much derisive laughter, the plan died, but this case underscores how the realities of new media and public expectations clash with traditional diplomatic culture.
In many past cases, “Let’s see how things develop” was a wise response to events and was feasible because information moved relatively slowly to policymakers and even more slowly to the public. When President John F. Kennedy received the first, incomplete information about construction of what was to become the Berlin Wall, he determined that no American lives were in danger and there was no need for an immediate, provocative response. So, he said nothing publicly and went sailing. Several days passed before news coverage fully caught up with the story, and there were no alternative media sources that could speed the process. Kennedy had time to gather facts, weigh policy alternatives, and proceed deliberately.
Today, however, the public may become aware of events at the same time or even before policymakers learn what is happening. With media voices of all kinds yapping about the need to “do something,” it can be tempting to set aside wise caution in favor of dramatic expediency. The results may range from unfortunate to disastrous.
The “Arab spring” uprisings of 2011 exemplify the high-speed environment in which diplomats work today. In countries such as Egypt, information of varying accuracy was flowing at great volume and great speed. Internal messaging, primarily using social media, helped the anti-government movement retain cohesion, while external audiences in the region and beyond could keep track of events in real time thanks to Arab satellite television channels as well as Facebook, YouTube, and the like. Governments found that these media were outpacing their own diplomatic and other sources. At the White House, most televisions were tuned to Al Jazeera English as a fast and relatively reliable means of keeping abreast of developments in the Arab states. Traditionally, the US embassy in Cairo would have been the main source of updates about events, but embassy personnel cannot keep pace with thousands of individuals gathering and disseminating information. Even intelligence agencies cannot match the speed of Twitter.
The “Arab spring” case illustrates how new media have replaced the diplomatic pouch and most traditional news providers as the way some information is delivered to governments. This necessitates increasingly sophisticated monitoring of media sites. Keeping track of dozens or even hundreds of satellite television channels’ content is feasible, but mining the veins of social media is far more challenging because of the size of the task and the difficulty of judging veracity.
Public diplomacy has been developed in different ways by different countries, and sometimes differently by diplomats from the same country. A recent Mexican ambassador to the United States was the first foreign diplomat in Washington to use Twitter as an official tool, and he did so frequently, in Spanish and English, reaching out to the Mexican diaspora in the United States as well as audiences in Mexico and the rest of Latin America and the world. His successor, on the other hand, did not see fit to use Twitter at all.
China has invested heavily in public diplomacy, relying on its CCTV broadcasts in numerous languages, its Confucius Institute cultural centers, its aid programs in Africa and elsewhere, and other initiatives. Chinese diplomats rely less on social media than do their counterparts from other nations, perhaps because the Chinese government prefers control rather than spontaneity in its diplomacy. This might be unrealistic. Despite concerted efforts to control online access and content, Chinese officialdom may soon realize that they are trying to hold back the tide.
These examples and others make clear that the newest kind of diplomacy is not uniform and is still evolving. Throughout this book, cases illustrate this. Any nation that fails to take seriously the transformative power of new media will be limiting its diplomatic effectiveness. Today’s publics expect a degree of participatory diplomacy, meaning that the old model of directing messages at an audience is being replaced by communicating with the audience. People who grow accustomed in their personal lives to the back-and-forth of social media are likely to expect governments to likewise engage with their constituents, which in the era of globalization includes diverse and far-flung groups.
Moving farther beyond their traditionally cloistered practice, diplomats have increasingly become involved in shaping public opinion. Again, media tools are at the heart of this. An example is the Israel–Gaza conflict of 2014. In addition to the purely military aspects of this, both sides engaged in a diplomatic battle as they tried to shape news organizations’ coverage and also deliver their versions of the aggressor–victim debate directly to global publics through social media.
The Palestinians know that in conventional battlefield terms, the Israelis will almost always prevail, but media messaging can be a political equalizer of sorts. This is not a matter of simply tweeting occasionally. For diplomacy at this level to be successful requires creative and consistent use of numerous social media forums, such as using YouTube to disseminate video that major news organizations may consider too graphic, one-sided, or unverifiable.
