The International Arms Trade E-Book

Rachel Stohl

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: War and Conflict in the Modern World
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 447

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

The multi-billion dollar business of the international conventional arms trade involves virtually every country in the world. Around the globe, people's lives are being irrevocably changed by the effects of guns, tanks, and missiles. These weapons have the potential to cause a deadly and current threat - one responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year.

This succinct and accessible new book explores the complexities and realities of the global conventional weapons trade. The first book on the subject in nearly a decade, The International Arms Trade provides an engaging introduction to the trade, the effects, and the consequences of these weapons. The authors trace the history of the arms trade and examine how it has evolved since the end of the Cold War. In particular, they assess the role of the largest arms exporters and importers, the business of selling conventional arms around the world, and shed new light on the illicit arms trade and the shadowy dealers who profit from their deadly commerce. The book also looks closely at the devastating effect the business can have on countries, societies, and individuals and concludes with an evaluation of the various existing control strategies and the potential for future control opportunities.

The International Arms Trade will be invaluable for students and scholars of international relations and security studies, and for policymakers and anyone interested in understanding more about the conventional arms trade.

Leseprobe

The International Arms Trade

The International Arms Trade

RACHEL STOHL AND SUZETTE GRILLOT

polity

Copyright © Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot 2009

The right of Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2009 by Polity Press

Polity Press

65 Bridge Street

Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press

350 Main Street

Malden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5418-8

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Typeset in 10 on 13 pt FF Scala

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Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk.

Contents

Acknowledgements

List of acronyms

1

Introduction to the international arms trade

2

The international arms trade in historical perspective

3

The legal supply and transfer of arms

4

The illicit arms trade

5

The consequences of the international arms trade

6

Controlling the international arms trade

7

Conclusion

Appendix.

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgements

Any undertaking of this magnitude would not be possible without the considerable assistance of friends and colleagues around the world. We would, therefore, like to thank a number of people who contributed significantly to this project. Rhea Myerscough and Sara Rafferty served as invaluable researchers, editors and sounding boards throughout this process. Doug Tuttle, Jonah Leff and Camilla Kardel stepped in to provide additional research and helpful suggestions in the book’s final stages. Kerri Shadid, Lessa Keller-Kenton, Brooke Hammer and Holly Presnell also provided much-needed research support. We would also like to thank numerous colleagues at the Center for Defense Information at the World Security Institute and the University of Oklahoma, for supporting this endeavour. In addition, Emma Hutchinson and Louise Knight at Polity have been incredibly supportive and helpful in the development and production of this manuscript. We have been extremely fortunate to work with such talented and encouraging women. While numerous colleagues have assisted in the production of the book, we alone are responsible for its content. Lastly, we thank and acknowledge our families, without which such projects would never see light nor be as fulfilling. We thus deeply thank Quentin, Sophia and Samuel Baird, Pat Lannon and Hannah Grillot for their unconditional love and unending patience as we undertook this project.

Acronyms

AECA

Arms Export Control Act

APLs

Anti-Personnel Landmines

ATT

Arms Trade Treaty

AU

African Union

BERR

Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform

BIS

Bureau of Industry and Security

BMS

Biennial Meeting of States

CAT

Conventional Arms Transfer Talks

CCL

Commercial Control List

CCW

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

CFE

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

CIEEMG

Commission for the Study of Military Equipment Exports

CIFTA

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials

CMC

Cluster Munitions Coalition

COCOM

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

COSTIND

Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence

CRS

Congressional Research Service

CTFP

Counterterrorism Fellowship Programme

DCS

Direct Commercial Sales

DDTC

Directorate of Defence Trade Controls

DESO

Defence Export Services Organisation

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DOD

Department of Defense

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSCA

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DSEI

Defence Systems & Equipment International

DTRA

Defence Threat Reduction Agency

DTSI

Defence Trade Security Initiative

EAPC

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECA

Export Control Act

ECO

Export Control Organisation

ECOSAP

Economic Community of West African States Small Arms Project

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EDA

Excess Defence Articles

ELN

National Liberation Army, Colombia

EU

European Union

EXBS

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

FAO

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation

FAR

Armed Forces of Rwanda

FARC

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucianarias de Colombia

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMS

Foreign Military Sales

FY

Fiscal Year

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

HMRC

Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs

IANSA

International Action Network on Small Arms

ICBL

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICE

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IDPs

Internally Displaced People

IEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices

ITAR

International Traffic in Arms Regulations

LURD

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MANPADS

Man-Portable Air Defence Systems

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGOs

Nongovernmental Organizations

NISAT

Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers

NRA

National Rifle Association

NSPD

National Security Policy Directive

OAS

Organization of American States

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAC-3

Patriot Advanced Capability-3

PCASED

United Nations Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development

PDD

Presidential Decision Directive

PoA

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

PSSM

Physical Security and Stockpile Management

QSC

Quadripartite Select Committee

RevCon

United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action

RMAF

Royal Malaysian Air Force

RUF

Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SAFICO

Service des Autorisations Financières et Commerciales

SAS

Small Arms Survey

SEESAC

South Eastern and Eastern European Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SMEs

Small and Medium Enterprises

TSZ

Temporary Security Zone

UAVs

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNITA

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

US

United States

USML

United States Munitions List

WA

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

WAANSA

West African Action Network on Small Arms

WFSA

World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities

WMDs

Weapons of Mass Destruction

1

Introduction to the international arms trade

On 24 July 2007, a French government plane travelling from Tripoli, Libya, carrying five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor landed in Sofia, Bulgaria. The healthcare workers had served eight years in a Libyan prison after being sentenced to death, accused and convicted of infecting children with HIV. The release came after a deal was struck between Libya, the European Union (EU) and France, signalling an improvement in Libya’s ties with the international community. Although, at the time, France and the EU denied any financial compensation had been given to encourage the prisoners’ release, one week later France announced a major conventional weapons sale to Libya, worth a total of $405 million. The arms deal, the first between any western country and Libya since the EU lifted restrictions on arms sales to Libya in 2004, consisted of anti-tank missiles worth $230 million and radio communication equipment worth $175 million. Less than six months later, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi visited France – his first trip to the West since he renounced terrorism and nuclear weapons – and announced a $14.7 billion deal for conventional weapons and nuclear reactors. The deal included Rafale fighter aircraft, military and attack helicopters, air defence radars, patrol boats and armoured vehicles.

These arms deals, and their geo-political significance, likely missed the attention of the majority of the world’s population. While headlines describing the dire threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) often dominate the front page of daily papers, conventional weapons deals often escape notice. But these weapons cause a far more deadly and current threat – one responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year. Around the globe, people’s lives are being irrevocably changed by the effects of guns, tanks and missiles. The international trade in these weapons is a multi-billion-dollar business engaged in by virtually every country around the world.

While countries have participated in the conventional arms trade for decades, attention to, and the effects of, conventional weapons have been more intense since the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of a bi-polar world resulted in the emergence of new kinds of warfare, namely the move from inter-state to intra-state wars. These conflicts often rely solely on conventional weapons. In many cases, small arms and light weapons are the only weapons used by warring parties, including government armies, paramilitaries, rebel forces and terrorists. Since the early 1990s, increased attention has been given to the tools of this violence, not just the violence itself. Although some criticisms have been levied at the conventional arms trade – many of which we discuss in this book – others argue that the international arms trade is a necessary part of many international security frameworks and an important tool that can be used to create and strengthen alliances, influence state behaviour and contribute to economic stability.1

Still, the dangers and consequences of the conventional arms trade touch every aspect of society – from political to military and cultural to economic – yet, weapons of mass destruction still preoccupy the minds of policy makers and the general public. Further complicating matters is the fact that conventional weapons are essential to national security and are tools of national politics, with legitimate military, police and even civilian uses. Thus, controlling conventional weapons is often more difficult than controlling other classes of weapons.

Main findings

This book describes the international conventional arms trade and examines the impact of conventional weapons throughout the world. These are weapons that range from guns to sophisticated fighter aircraft and naval ships – in other words, the conventional weapons of war. The book provides a basic understanding of the myriad aspects of the international arms trade and illustrates why people should be concerned with its details. It also explores how the conventional weapons trade is relevant to any study of war and modern conflict, and describes how the international arms trade affects the lives and deaths of billions of people around the world.

The book provides historical and current perspectives on the arms trade. We highlight the role of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China – the five largest arms exporters in the world. These five countries are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and are responsible for nearly 80 per cent of the entire international arms trade. Thus, their role in the international arms trade is central to any larger discussion of the nature and consequences of the conventional arms trade, as well as efforts to control them. From their export policies, or lack thereof, to the size of their trade, the five largest arms exporters frame our examination of the global arms trade. The largest arms recipients are also examined, as supply alone does not drive the weapons trade. The demand for weapons is driven by a variety of factors and any analysis of international arms transfers must take the wants and needs of importing states and non-state actors into account. Major arms purchasers have seen weapons affect their overall economies, their national and regional stability, and their military and political relationships.

This book provides a historical and conceptual context for the arms trade and draws five main conclusions.

First, the supply of, and demand for, weapons, both legal and illegal, have ebbed and flowed as new international crises emerge and are resolved. Throughout history, the conventional arms trade has been driven by conflicts – both hot and cold – from their conception to their resolution. In fact, significant shifts in the conventional arms trade are marked by major world events, such as World Wars I and II, the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the War on Terror. Moreover, national and international political and economic issues more generally affect the international trade in arms. Numerous factors, therefore, influence weapons supply and demand.

Second, the control of, and trade in, conventional weapons are more complicated than those of other weapons systems. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms are legitimate tools of governments, militaries, police forces and civilians. Indeed, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of all states to individual or collective self-defence and the right to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms toward that end. Thus, regulating and controlling the trade in conventional arms pose additional challenges for states and the international community.

Third, conventional arms are profitable. Conventional arms transfer agreements worldwide were worth approximately $60 billion in 2007.2 This total only accounts for the legal trade in arms. There is a thriving black market trade in arms, as well as a robust grey market – those sales that fall in the blurry category between the legal and illicit markets. Smaller, however, than the international trade in oil and gas, valued at $1.7 trillion, or agricultural products, valued at $852 billion, the international arms trade is worth only half a percentage of all global trade.3 Nonetheless, the arms trade has a significant influence on national and global economies.

Fourth, in many cases, national security trumps human security and arms transfers go unchecked. The resulting unrestrained trade of conventional weapons leads to significant consequences. From deaths and injuries, to the undermining of human security, the uncontrolled conventional arms trade has put peacekeepers in danger, diminished national and multinational business opportunities, impeded the ability of humanitarian and relief organizations to conduct their efforts, hampered sustainable development and, overall, negatively affected global peace and security.

Fifth and finally, conventional arms controls are underdeveloped and face significant challenges. One of the most immediate challenges is that some of the primary exporters have not supported or participated in proposed and existing controls. Controlling conventional arms involves multiple solutions with multiple actors in multiple forums. Conventional weapons transfers occur simultaneously at individual, national, regional and global levels and, therefore, require simultaneous responses at various levels.

Content and structure

Each chapter of this book highlights an aspect of the conventional arms trade – from historical changes in the international arms trade to its consequences and control options at a variety of levels.

Chapter 2 examines the arms trade throughout history. Beginning the arms trade narrative at the dawn of western civilization, the chapter links early weapons development, procurement and trade to diplomatic efforts, imperial activities, domestic politics and private business. The chapter also discusses the role of the arms trade in the post-World War II and Cold War eras, which clearly reflected the global stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War is examined at length, as well as the post-Cold War period, which has led to a dynamic conventional arms market capable of altering itself in response to changing world events. The chapter highlights the increased importance of dual-use technology – and that of the commercial sector and the globalization of the defence industry, including joint ventures and mergers, which have also complicated the relationships between companies and countries. The chapter reminds readers that the post-Cold War world has seen the emergence of intra-state, rather than inter-state wars, which has resulted in increased competition among arms exporters and new markets becoming available to historical rivals. The chapter also examines the 1991 Gulf War, which was a watershed event leading to global efforts to rein in the international arms trade, and yet led to increasing global weapons purchases, particularly in the Middle East. Finally, the chapter describes the economic conditions and international security concerns resulting from the attacks of 11 September 2001, which have created new trends in the international arms market, whereby the major arms importers have shifted away from traditional Middle East customers toward Asian customers, notably India and Pakistan.

Chapter 3 examines the big business of the international arms trade, particularly through the legal supply and transfer of arms, including five short case studies. It focuses on the politics and economics associated with the arms trade and on the actual mechanics of this global trade. The chapter reveals the various issues related to the global transfer of arms, including production of new weapons and stockpiling of weapons (and what happens when those weapons become obsolete), and discusses the impact of some arms transfer trends and technologies. The chapter also examines how market trends influence competition and cooperation between companies, countries and regions, and the symbiotic relationship between technology development and the trade in arms, as exemplified in national procurement strategies. The chapter also focuses on the purchasers of weapons, examining changing trends among arms recipients. The chapter includes a description of the bizarre world of arms shows, explains what makes a sale legal or illicit, and looks at the peculiarities of the legal small arms trade.

After a comprehensive look at the legal trade, chapter 4 focuses on what we can and do know about the illicit arms trade. The chapter highlights the highly profitable illicit trade in arms – both heavy conventional weapons and their spare parts – as well as the significant small arms black market. It examines trends in the illicit trade, and the variety of actors involved. The chapter also describes the multiple ways weapons move from the legal to the illicit market and explores issues related to the supply and demand of weapons, using examples from recent international events. It covers the shadowy world of arms brokers – the individuals or companies that act as intermediaries to facilitate the trade in weapons. Additionally, the chapter surveys the changes in arms brokering since the end of the Cold War and the ways in which arms brokers have had to adapt to the new paradigms of conflict and weapons demand. Finally, the chapter explains how arms brokers are able to manipulate legal networks for illegal purposes and how governments often use the same networks and routes to transport grey market arms.

Chapter 5 turns its attention to the effect these weapons have on countries and societies and unpacks the varied consequences of the arms trade utilizing the human security framework, including the impacts on international peace, security and development. The chapter demonstrates that, although the world remains focused on the threat of weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms are responsible for the majority of deaths and suffering in today’s conflicts. Small arms, in particular, have played an important role in the world’s bloodiest conflicts. The chapter discusses the direct, indirect and consequential impact of the weapons trade, using examples from every region of the world. The chapter describes how the conventional arms trade – both legal and illicit – has significant negative consequences, and highlights how these weapons are used to kill people in countries experiencing conflict and in countries at peace, and how conventional weapons contribute to cycles of violence, trapping communities in endless fighting and bloodshed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of conventional arms and terrorism.

Chapter 6 examines the various strategies for controlling the arms trade. The chapter highlights the numerous efforts to control the global trade in arms that have emerged over the years. The chapter points out historical arms control efforts, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which focused largely on limiting the numbers and types of weapons a state could possess, as well as where they could be deployed. The chapter then describes the evolution of current conventional arms control strategies, which grew out of greater concerns about civil conflict, genocide and other human rights abuses in the post-Cold War era. In this section, the chapter examines a number of instruments that have emerged to control the spread, circulation and misuse of conventional weapons. The chapter describes the various global, regional and national control measures that focus specifically on conventional weaponry, paying particular attention to small arms strategies, such as the UN Conventional Arms Register, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The chapter also highlights the important role of nongovernmental organizations and their efforts to facilitate stronger and more comprehensive measures for the control of the international arms trade.

Finally, chapter 7 concludes the book with a more in-depth discussion of the major findings. We also argue that, although we now know more about the international arms trade, there is still more work to do, more awareness to raise, and more attention to focus on the issue.

Sources

This book draws heavily on news sources, United Nations documents, analyses and data compiled by nongovernmental organizations, author interviews and, when available, primary source government data. However, a significant amount of information on the conventional arms trade is not available to the public in open sources. Governments often prefer to keep information on their arms exports and imports classified, in order to protect their proprietary, political and strategic interests. As a result, analyses of the international arms trade are often limited, particularly in countries without a tradition of transparency and democracy. We have tried to provide a comprehensive and international picture of the arms trade, but ask the reader to take the data limitations into consideration.

2

The international arms trade in historical perspective

From past to present

On 25 July 1969, US President Richard Nixon decided to make a few remarks for reporters while on a refuelling layover in Guam. Those remarks became known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ and ushered in a new era in US foreign policy. Specifically, Nixon’s comments suggested that internal security problems in Asia and elsewhere should be handled internally, but the United States would provide military and economic assistance to friendly regimes in order to support them. With this statement, Nixon elevated arms transfers to a prominent foreign policy position, promising to send arms instead of troops as a way to wield force and exert influence in third world countries without assuming the risks and costs associated with intervening directly. Little consideration was given at the time to the fact that once weapons were transferred, the United States would lose all control over how they were used or to whom they would flow next. Although it has been suggested that Nixon did not intend to make such a sweeping announcement on that day in Guam, the new policy was born nonetheless. Soon thereafter, the United States went on a supply spree, sending billions of dollars of weapons around the world, even into the hands of despots and dictators.1

Indeed, the history of the global arms trade goes much further back, before 1969 and the Nixon Doctrine. The international arms trade, in fact, has a long and storied past. Politics, power, economics and technology, among other things, have all affected the ways in which, and the extent to which, governments, private enterprises and various actors have engaged in the production and diffusion of weapons. This chapter offers a historical overview of the international arms trade, highlighting the evolution of the trade in armaments over many centuries. Beginning with a discussion of the early arms trade, the chapter then reviews the factors that influenced the modern arms trade system. Several trends evident in the international trade of arms are outlined, and recent (post-Cold War) changes are explored. This chapter serves as a foundation for the remainder of the book as the historical nature of this subject is important for our understanding of the international arms trade today.

The early arms trade

Although we have rather scant information about arms transfers throughout history, we do know that weapons have long been an important commodity. Thucydides wrote in The Peloponnesian War about the importance of the trade in arms, supplies, ships and men.2 Later historical patterns show that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century weapons production and transfers spread from Italy, England and the Netherlands to Sweden, Germany and, later, France, Russia and Spain. The spread of arms production tended to follow the spread of capitalism, generally from Italy and north European states to countries such as France, Russia and Spain, and then to states like Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, Scotland, Hungary, India, Japan, Poland and the Balkans, where manufacturers replicated foreign weapons.3

In the early to mid fifteenth century, Italy was the most notable centre of arms production and transfers in the world. Centres of production of secondary importance could be found during this time in Germany and the Low Countries (present-day Benelux countries). Italy was originally able to dominate the arms trade because of its wide trading network, but by the middle of the seventeenth century the Low Countries, Britain and Sweden had taken over as the centres of weapons innovation and production. In 1492, the town of Liège in the Low Countries declared neutrality and disarmed. Because of its vast trading base, this resulted in a boom to the arms industry and Liège supplied vast quantities of arms to the Spanish and Dutch. However, the flow of arms from Liège stopped in 1797 when the town was annexed by the French and a ban was placed on weapons exports.4

In the sixteenth century, England transformed from an arms importer to an arms exporter for two reasons. First, a migration of iron workers to England brought knowledge of arms production, and, second, England was under economic pressure to make the transformation. The dominant centre of cast-iron cannon production had moved to Sweden where it stayed until the late eighteenth century after Elizabeth I limited the production of guns to those needed by the realm, resulting in a migration of skilled labour.5

In the first half of the seventeenth century, Suhl, Germany was the only large gun manufacturer in central Europe, but political differences and destruction during the Thirty Years’ War kept its role in the arms trade minimal.

From 1422 to 1498, the kings of France established Tours as an arms centre and encouraged workers in weapons production to migrate there as a solution to French weapons shortages. France experienced temporary success in arms production during this period, but remained partially dependent on arms imports through the seventeenth century.6

The production of arms was well established in Russia by the mid sixteenth century, but the country remained a secondary producer, and had to resort to importing large quantities of arms from the West when arms production technology advanced in the early seventeenth century. Recognizing the problem, Peter the Great pushed for the improvement of Russia’s arms production technology and output, and by 1720 Russia had become an exporter of arms, remaining self-sufficient until new technological advances occurred in the nineteenth century.7

Spain encouraged the emigration of arms and foundry workers in the 1570s to remedy its near-total dependence on imported artillery. The country experienced some success, but was not able to create a dominant modern armaments industry. The migration of skilled workers and the accompanying diffusion of arms production technology boosted the Swedish, Russian, French, Spanish and Ottoman arms industries. However, only France, Russia and Spain succeeded in developing significant, although far from dominant, production, while Portugal and the Ottoman Empire remained peripheral producers.8

The sixteenth to seventeenth centuries saw the spread of weapons to Portugal, Ottoman Turkey, Scotland, Hungary, India, Japan, Poland and the Balkans.9 During the sixteenth century, Portugal, Scotland and Hungary were peripheral producers, meaning they had some arms production capacity, but mainly imported their weapons. Despite its lack of production, Portugal, with its large trade network, served to bring new weaponry to Asia and Africa. Turkey, India, China and Japan were third-tier producers who were able to imitate the arms developments of European states. By the end of the sixteenth century, cannons were being produced in China, Japan, Korea, India, Java, Burma and Afghanistan. Artillery production developed in India in the late seventeenth century, and Japan was casting its own firearms by the mid sixteenth century.10

A primary driver of the arms trade throughout this period, particularly from 1560 to 1660, was the development of modern war-making instruments – firearms, gunpowder and cannon. This ‘military revolution’ significantly enhanced the international trade in arms. For nearly 200 years following the military revolution, however, the arms trade was relatively stable.11 The period from the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century saw little change in the arms trade after the technological diffusion of arms production during the previous period. The main reason for this stability was the lack of technological innovation in arms production during the period. While weapons continued to be traded, no new centres of production arose from 1650 to 1850. This period was a time of relative peace, and as a result innovation in weapons production slowed, even if the spread of firearms continued.12 Ultimately, technological advances in armaments progressed rather slowly until the ‘industrial revolution’ in the mid-1800s.

The advent of the industrial revolution brought metallurgical innovations and the development of steam power, which improved the technological sophistication of weaponry. Moreover, the industrial revolution enhanced the capitalist economic system that dominated international trade. Weapons producers, like any other manufacturer, took advantage of laissez-faire economics and sold weapons to interested customers, no matter who or where they might have been.13 After the British government began purchasing guns from the private firm of William Armstrong in 1854, other British arms manufacturers began calling for open competition in 1862, which resulted in a crisis that led the government to go back to using state arsenals to supply its arms but left the private arms sector renewed. This resulted in British arms producers vigorously pursuing export sales. Many governments in this period adopted the laissez-faire attitude of the industrial era and entered the international arms market. A French law prohibiting the exportation of weapons was repealed in 1885, allowing the French arms industry, which had doubled in capacity from 1874 to 1885, to export its surplus weapons. The governments in states with first-tier weapons production encouraged the exportation of arms because they thought a greater military advantage could be gained by maintaining their private weapons firms and research development expertise.14

Up until World War I, therefore, the international arms trade largely reflected the activities of private enterprise – private weapons manufacturers and merchants. Because of the significant death and destruction resulting from World War I, however, these private actors were eventually labelled ‘merchants of death’ engaged in a ‘bloody business’.15 Private weapons firms were often accused of inciting war with their irresponsible weapons sales.16 During the last part of World War I, many members of the public gave some credence to the theory that ‘only arms manufacturers could expect to profit by continuance of the struggle and that therefore only arms manufacturers could wish to prolong it’.17 However, some argue that there was no evidence that arms manufacturers expected to profit from war, as they too were tired of the restriction from foreign markets and the burdensome workload that came with war. In fact, the post-WWI public enquiry into the arms industry in Britain found no evidence of warmongering on the part of arms manufacturers during the war.18 Studies of conflicts during the past two centuries show that the build-up of arms does not necessarily lead to war, but that almost all wars throughout this period have been preceded by an accumulation of arms by one or more of the parties involved.19 Nonetheless, some believed that the main cause of World War I was the activities of the private arms manufacturers. As a result, governments began to assert control over the international trade in arms after World War I (see below). Government control, however, did not lead to a reduction in weapons transfers.20 In fact, the arms trade flourished throughout the twentieth century.

The arms trade in the twentieth century

Early in the twentieth century, some believed that private arms sales were an ‘odious form of profiteering likely to cause war’.21 During the period between World Wars I and II there was public antagonism toward the arms trade and a feeling that the profit from arms sales must be eliminated to preserve the peace. After World War I, preparing for war went ‘out of fashion’, and standing armies were considered a threat to liberty.22 Also during this period, a number of pamphlets and books began to appear depicting arms sellers as evil men who only cared for profit, not people. In Britain, this attitude led to calls for an enquiry, both from the readers of these pamphlets and from Members of Parliament.23Once governments assumed control of the arms trade process, however, official and authorized weapons sales were viewed as a ‘laudable export achievement . . . necessary to preserve peace’.24 This shift in controlling actors is the first of four trends evident throughout the modern arms trade period. The second trend is the tremendous growth in the volume of weapons traded in the twentieth century. A third trend demonstrates a shift in the number and type of weapons suppliers, and a fourth trend shows a shift in the location of arms recipients.

From private affair to government authority

The first major trend in the modern arms trade system was the shift from private to government actors as the dominant players. Arms manufacturers were once solely responsible for the promotion of their weapons, but, leading up to World War II, governments became more directly involved in promoting arms exports through government offices, agencies and publications. Governments, for instance, began to increase support for weapons manufacturers by making research and development funds available for new and better weapons designs. Other government support and control came by way of advisory personnel. The United States, United Kingdom, France and even the Soviet Union provided advisors to defence forces in foreign countries to assist in the development of specific weapons systems that would address their individual defensive requirements. This activity led to the development of ‘package deals’ through which arms buyers could purchase tailored defence systems developed precisely for the country’s needs. Ultimately, these package deals allowed arms sellers to make larger sales.25

Governments also involved themselves in the international arms trade throughout the twentieth century by offering credit for arms purchases and by offsetting the foreign exchange costs associated with the financial transaction. The Soviet Union, United States and France, in particular, offered credit programmes for arms exports – most often involving large sums of money at little to no interest. Similarly, offsetting the costs of foreign currency exchange allowed governments to significantly enhance the prospect of an arms deal (see chapter 3). Credit and offsets, therefore, were a significant component of government involvement in and control of weapons transfers.26

In addition to their direct support of weapons production and arms sales, governments also began to develop and enforce laws and procedures for regulating and licensing the trade in armaments.27 Such procedures allowed governments to monitor and, ultimately, exert control over where and to whom weapons were exported. Governments and manufacturers, therefore, became collaborators, with governments at the helm, during the twentieth century, to facilitate the international trade in arms. Together they developed, produced and exported arms, under government direction. After all, politics play a key role in the arms trade (see chapter 3). Weapons sales are an important tool of diplomacy and often reflect government desires to ensure sovereignty, express self-determination and enhance state protection, among other rationales (which will be discussed below).28 Government authority, therefore, continues to be an important aspect of international weapons activities.

Growth in the arms trade

A second trend in the international arms trade that occurred throughout most of the twentieth century, and particularly after World War II, was the tremendous growth in the volume of arms traded worldwide. In 1950, the value of global arms sales totalled around $7 billion. By 1953, the total jumped to a record $20 billion, demonstrating the rapid diffusion of weapons in the early Cold War period. Global weapons sales peaked at $45 billion in 1982. By the end of the Cold War in 1990, global arms sales fell to $30 billion, and continued to decline until later in the post-Cold War period (as discussed in more detail below).29

To make sense of the growth in the arms trade, it is important to explore the various reasons why states engage in weapons production and sales. Three motivations are of particular importance – power, security and economy. Pearson refers to these primary factors as ‘military ambition’, ‘threat perception’, and ‘economic wealth’.30 Others refer to ‘wealth’, ‘power’ and ‘war’.31 Although most analysts suggest that considerations of war and peace – foreign policy and security – matter the most in determining whether, why and when states produce and export weapons,32 some argue that no one motivation has ‘absolute primacy over the others’.33

A primary motivation throughout the history of the arms trade is domestic consumption. States encouraged and supported the production of armaments to supply their own military and police forces for the purposes of national defence and internal order. Weapons were exported primarily as an ‘afterthought’ for many years, but soon arms sales came to be seen as important for enhancing one’s power and security – as well as one’s economy.34 The lack of a domestic market, however, also prompted arms exports. Western and central European countries, for example, once sold weapons to Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, because a small market existed at home. Maintaining production capacity was important for the supply of one’s domestic forces, but the domestic market would not always suffice to keep the industry alive.35 A stark reality for some arms manufacturers was ‘export or perhaps die’ – and without an arms industry, governments realized they would be dependent on others for their national defence.36 All of these reasons and more have allowed the international arms trade to thrive.

Power and security are also important factors as weapons have often been exported to support various foreign policy goals. Weapons transfers serve to enhance the military capability of allies and counter the capability of rivals.37 Arms supplies to foreign forces also work to minimize or avoid a direct military presence. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union transferred billions of dollars’ worth of weapons to their respective client states to improve their own military and strategic positions. Exporting arms to increase a government’s leverage and influence over the recipient, or to counteract the capacity of real or potential enemies, may not, however, always serve to do so.38 Arms suppliers cannot always control what recipients do with the weapons – nor can they control whether and to whom the recipients re-export the weapons. Suppliers also cannot predict political changes that may have an impact on weapons deployment, use or transfer. The United States provided more than half a billion dollars in arms to Ethiopia over a twenty-year period, before political changes in the country caused a switch in allegiance from the United States to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s client state, Somalia, experienced a change in regime that led it away from the Soviets and back to the Americans.39

Certainly, recipients of arms transfers have their own power and security concerns that motivate their weapons purchases. Those who cannot, or who prefer not to, produce weapons must import them for national defence and policing purposes.40 Weapons importers may or may not share their suppliers’ international political perspectives when it comes to friends and foes or threats and hazards. In many cases, weapons recipients have their own agendas and concerns. Nonetheless, experts suggest that arms transfers are best understood as ‘reciprocal, bargaining relations’ rather than ‘separate unilateral acts of supplying and receiving’.41

Another aspect of power and security is the technological force motivating weapons transfers. Advanced military equipment is a symbol not only of power, but also of technological prestige as there is most often a significant correlation between weapons production and industrial power. One way in which technology is transferred is via the arms trade. Krause, for example, describes how ‘first-tier [weapons] suppliers’ develop the technological innovations relevant for advanced weaponry, which are then transferred to ‘second-tier suppliers’ who develop technological capacities as a result. ‘Third-tier suppliers’ duplicate the designs of these existing technologies, but do not benefit necessarily from the innovations in the enhancement of technological capacity.42 State desires for technological capability, as well as desires to transfer and enhance technological capacity, have influenced and facilitated the arms trade as much as more strict concerns with power and security.

Economic motivations for engaging in the arms trade are perhaps more varied. With the growth in technology and enhanced sophistication of weaponry throughout the twentieth century, the costs associated with producing weapons for domestic consumption increased substantially. Due to increased costs in production – and the significantly increased costs of research and development – weapons-producing countries looked to arms exports to offset expenses. The marketability of weapons then became an issue as arms manufacturers found that they could not just develop and produce weapons merely for a domestic market, based on domestic military and other needs, but that they must develop and produce weapons that serve the international market.43

In addition to a reduction in costs, there are other economic issues that motivate weapons production and sales. Ownership within the military industrial enterprise may vary from country to country, but whether weapons-producing firms are privately or state owned, arms exports certainly have contributed substantial financial payoffs. Significant profits can be made by manufacturing and selling weapons. The creation of wealth, therefore, has also been a primary motivator for the arms trade. The overall economic benefits are not, however, all that great, and weapons have represented a small amount of overall exports for even the largest exporters. In 1980, for example, arms comprised only 4–5 per cent of the total amount of goods exported from the United States. Nonetheless, domestic employment in the weapons industry has often provided significant motivation for arms exports. Selling weapons abroad, in other words, has sometimes meant keeping jobs at home.44 Finally, transferring arms to foreign forces may allow for a reduction in domestic defence budgets. It is far more costly to build up, deploy and maintain one’s own domestic forces than to rely somewhat on the forces of foreign allies.45 Exporting arms has, therefore, contributed to reduced costs at home in a number of ways.

Growth in arms suppliers

A third trend in the twentieth-century arms trade was the growth in the number of weapons producers and suppliers. The global sources of weapons multiplied significantly throughout much of the 1900s. A few weapons suppliers have, however, clearly dominated the production of and international trade in arms. The United States and the Soviet Union supplied the bulk of the international arms market throughout the Cold War period, but the UK, France and Germany – and later China – were also major suppliers. From 1950 to 1990, the Soviet Union out-sold the United States by a few billion dollars each year, with the exception of 1963–5 and the early 1990s (see table 2.1).

The United Kingdom ranked third in terms of arms sales with an average of $1 billion to $3 billion throughout 1950–90. China sold a few hundred million dollars’ worth of weapons each year until 1971 when it began to sell more than $1 billion to $2 billion a year. By far, however, the Soviet Union and the United States dominated the twentieth-century international arms trade.46

Although only two weapons-producing countries cornered the international arms market, numerous other suppliers emerged throughout the twentieth century, and particularly during the Cold War. Arms sales originating from secondary suppliers, located primarily in the third world, rose steadily until the 1960s and then jumped significantly in the 1970s. In the mid 1960s, third world arms production increased from $6 million to $23 million, from where it grew at a steady pace until another substantial increase in 1972 when third world weapons production rose from $43 million to $129 million. Countries such as India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, North Korea, Argentina, South Korea and Egypt produced and exported weapons from 1950 to 1984. Although a small part of the worldwide arms trade, such secondary suppliers contributed significantly to the global supply of ammunition, small arms, ships, armoured vehicles, missiles and aircraft.47 By the end of the Cold War, forty-two countries maintained weapons exports of some variety.48

Shift in weapons recipients

A final trend in the twentieth-century international arms trade was the shift in recipients of arms transfers. For nearly seventy years, the major suppliers of weapons sold their weapons primarily to developed countries.49 Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, transferred weapons mainly within the alliance.50 By the 1970s, however, primary recipients shifted to the third world, with the Far East, Indian subcontinent, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America emerging as major recipients of arms produced in the developed and developing worlds.51 Between 1960 and 1980, third world military spending quadrupled. Third world arms imports swelled from $6.2 billion in 1969 to $15.5 billion in 1978.52 The Cold War environment facilitated the influx of weapons to the third world as the US–Soviet rivalry allowed arms recipients to play ‘one side off against the other’.53

The Middle East, in particular, has received the major share of weapons exported since the 1970s, with the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France providing the overwhelming bulk of arms to the region.54 As oil prices rose in the 1970s and Britain decided to leave the Persian Gulf region, a ‘massive infusion of Western arms to both Iran and oil-rich Arabs’ resulted.55 In 1977, Middle Eastern countries received 39 per cent of global arms exports, with Africa receiving 17 per cent, Asia 11 per cent and Latin America 6 per cent. The Cold War also played out in the Middle East context. By the late 1970s, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel were primary recipients of US weapons, while Syria, Iraq, Libya and Egypt received the bulk of Soviet weapons.56

The arms trade in a new era

These changing dynamics of the international arms trade throughout the twentieth century laid the foundation for post-Cold War arms trade activities. The supremacy of government authorities came to be challenged by new, non-state actors in the post-Cold War period; the volume of trade continued to ebb and flow; and suppliers and recipients remained in flux. The practices put in place throughout the twentieth century, however, affected how the international arms trade evolved into the twenty-first century.

The end of the Cold War: a new arms trade dynamic

The end of the Cold War marked a significant change in the international arms trade. The days of two superpowers arming their allies in proxy wars around the world came to an abrupt end. Instead, the world witnessed the growing prevalence of intrastate, rather than inter-state wars, which were based on internal struggles for power, rather than battles between Soviet and US ideologies and interests. These new wars resulted in increased competition among arms exporters, as historical rivals could now cater to the same markets. Business could now be dictated by profit, rather than ideology, and the myriad civil wars that took place in the aftermath of the Cold War, along with the numerous countries that began to modernize their outdated Soviet arsenals, meant that the arms trade was an extremely profitable business during the early 1990s. However, by the mid 1990s, several major conflicts were ending and several economic crises were beginning around the world, leading arms sales to decline and causing the defence industry to adjust to new world realities. In addition, traditional major arms suppliers found their supremacy challenged by emerging arms exporters, eager to break into the global market.

Post-Cold War trends

The geo-political changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War spawned several trends in the global arms trade and subsequent control regimes (for more on these control regimes, see chapter 6). In particular, three trends have emerged as most significant for understanding the dynamics of the current international arms trade system. First, global arms sales have fallen dramatically and consistently since the end of the Cold War. According to SIPRI, global arms sales between 1984 and 1988 averaged nearly $42 billion a year. In contrast, global arms sales dipped to approximately $27 billion per year between 1989 and 1993, and continued to fall throughout the 1990s.57 Between 1994 and 1998, arms sales averaged approximately $22 billion a year.58 Global arms sales dropped so low that, although arms sales generally increased each year between 2001 and 2005, the average during those years was still only $18.7 billion.59 Currently, the trend is being reversed. New arms sales agreements reached a new post-Cold War high at nearly $60 billion in 2007, the highest in eight years.60 However, arms deliveries decreased in 2007 from 2006 levels, due to significantly fewer arms deliveries to China and the United Arab Emirates. However, even with the downturn in the value of arms transferred in 2007, worldwide arms transfer agreements increased over 29 per cent in the 2004–7 period, as compared to 2000–3.61

The downturn in global arms sales can be explained by several factors. For the most part, the peaks and valleys in the international arms trade since the end of the Cold War have been tied to global economics and global and regional conflicts, rather than Cold War proxy conflicts supported by the two superpowers. Conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Angola and throughout Central America had been fuelled by large quantities of arms and, in turn, fuelled global arms sales. With the conflicts’ conclusions, the same quantities of arms were no longer regularly and reliably needed.

Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War many countries simply did not need to purchase any more weapons, as their arsenals were already saturated with purchases made during the Cold War.63 In 1990, for example, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that many countries continued to absorb the weapons that were purchased in the late 1970s and early 1980s and simply did not need to make large purchases of new conventional weapons systems.64 The same trend can be observed during the mid 1990s when global arms sales reached a plateau, after most Middle Eastern countries made sufficient arms purchases during the Gulf crisis to meet their security needs for the foreseeable future.

In addition, the economic crises of the late 1990s also lowered the global demand for weapons. For example, in the late 1990s Chile expressed interest in receiving up to twenty-four F-16 fighter jets from the United States. However, in 1998, the cost of copper – one of Chile’s most profitable exports – dropped significantly in response to the global economic crisis, and Chile could no longer afford to make such an expensive purchase. The effects of the widespread economic recession in the late 1990s led to the cancellation of potential sales throughout Latin America, the Middle East – where crude oil prices dropped significantly – and Asia, as countries no longer had the resources for new major conventional weapons.

Moreover, at the end of the Cold War, countries began to cut their arms production, due in part to decreases in domestic demand.64In 1995, for example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Germany cut its arms procurement more than any other European country and that its arms industry cut production by nearly 50 per cent in the previous four years.65 However, this trend began to reverse itself by the late 1990s and, for many countries, arms production has had a resurgence, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001. (For more on the effects of 11 September, see below.) After a dramatic fall in the early 1990s, Russia has seen its arms production increase since 1998, when it began to increase its arms exports as well as domestic procurement.66 Russia decided to kick-start its arms production again after realizing that arms exports represented a potentially lucrative avenue for acquiring hard currency.67

A second trend that has developed in the international arms market since the end of the Cold War is the rise of the United States as the most dominant arms exporter in the world, despite falling demand for weapons. This pattern marks a shift from a bi-polar arms trade system to a unipolar one.68