The Judicial Storm E-Book

• Herausgeber: Cal y arena
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 247

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

The constitutional reform of 2024 represents the most significant change to the judiciary in Mexico's history. Its implications are extensive. All federal and state judges will be replaced within less than three years. New judges will be elected through a popular voting process, which is unprecedented globally. Additionally, important mechanisms for protecting rights, such as the amparo lawsuit—Mexico's primary judicial tool for safeguarding constitutional rights—will be notably weakened. In light of such a significant change, the works presented in this book clearly explain the reform's content, making it accessible to a broad audience that may not be well-acquainted with the Mexican justice system. Addition ally, these works offer insights into the potential impact of this constitutional change. We believe that such a complex and radical reform requires careful and thorough analysis. This book brings together the work of a group of specialists in the Mexi can judicial system. Based on solid arguments and empirical evidence, these analyses provide a comprehensive overview of the most plausible scenarios that could arise when this storm hits Mexico's complex and diverse social conflicts. In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the impact of the reform is not limited to the popular election of judges. The reform is much broader and more complex, as it reshapes fundamental aspects of both the Federal Judiciary and the state judicial branches. The book examines the major changes in the structure and operation of the courts that extend beyond the election of judges. It also explores what these changes could mean for various stakeholders, from the most vulnerable populations to businesses and investors operating in the country.

Leseprobe

The judicial storm

Implications of Mexico’s2024 Reform

Edited bySaúl López-Noriega & Javier Martín-Reyes

Foreword byRoberto Gargarella

First published 2025

by Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura S. A. de C. V.

119 Mazatlán, Condesa, Cuauhtémoc, 06140, Mexico City, Mexico

© 2025 Nexos

The right of Saúl López-Noriega and Javier Martín-Reyes to be identified as the edi-tors of this volume has been asserted in accordance with applicable copyright law. All contributing authors retain moral rights over their respective chapters.

All chapters were translated by their respective authors, except the Foreword and Chapter 12, which were translated by Javier Martín-Reyes and Saúl López-Noriega, and Chapters 2 and 5, which were co-translated by the authors and the same editors.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDeriva-tives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). It may be shared for non-commercial purposes with proper attribution, but no modifications or derivative works are permitted. For details, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

Title: The Judicial Storm. Implications of Mexico’s 2024 Reform

Editors: Saúl López-Noriega and Javier Martín-Reyes

Description: Mexico City: Nexos, 2025

Subjects:

– Mexico—Judicial power—Reform—2024

– Courts—Mexico—Independence

– Constitutional law—Mexico—Popular election of judges

– Judicial review—Mexico

– Democracy—Mexico—Decline

– Political interference in the judiciary—Latin America

ISBN: 978-607-8564-83-5

Typeset in Times and Arial

by Angélica Musalem Achcar

Cover illustration: Josema Martínez

Contents

Foreword. The Aleph and Mexico’s Judicial Reform

Roberto Gargarella

Chapter 1. The 2024 Judicial Reform in Mexico: An Overview

Saúl López-Noriega and Javier Martín-Reyes

Chapter 2. Are Judicial Elections in the United States Comparable

to the Popular Vote Established by the Mexican Judicial Reform?

Francisca Pou Giménez

Chapter 3. Judicial Elections in Mexico: The Risk of Capture

Guadalupe Salmorán-Villar

Chapter 4. The Key to the Judicial Branch Election: The Allocation of Positions

by Districts

Alonso Zepeda Celis

Chapter 5. The Judicial Career after Obrador-Sheinbaum’s Reform

Andrea Pozas Loyo and Julio Ríos Figueroa

Chapter 6. The Other Side of the Reform: The New Discipline and the Same

Administration of the Federal Judiciary

Alfonso Oñate Laborde

Chapter 7. The Replacement of Elected Judges

Sergio López Ayllón

Chapter 8. The End of General Effects in Mexico’s Constitutional Justice

José María Lujambio

Chapter 9. Constitutional Justice Adrift: The Elimination of the Chambers

of the Supreme Court

José Omar Hernández Salgado and Mariana Velasco Rivera

Chapter 10. Case Law and the System of Precedents: Scenarios Following

Judicial Reform

María Amparo Hernández Chong Cuy

Chapter 11. The Other Judicial Reform: What’s Happening in Mexico’s States

Javier Martín-Reyes and Saúl López-Noriega

Chapter 12. Faceless Judges

Rodrigo Brito Melgarejo

Chapter 13. Beyond the Judicial Election: The New Mexican State

Daniel Quintanilla Castro

Acknowledgments

Foreword

The Aleph and Mexico’s

Judicial Reform

Roberto Gargarella1

I. Introduction and Acknowledgments

Above all, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Saúl López-Noriega and Javier Martín-Reyes, the editors of the book The Judicial Storm. Impli-cations of Mexico’s 2024 Reform, for the honor of inviting me to write the foreword for this work. Much of what I know about the Mexican judicial and political system has come from reading the authors included in this compi-lation. They represent a remarkable selection of the distinguished group of jurists and political scientists who regularly write about the public affairs of their country.

The work I am presenting here deals with the Mexican judicial reform—in my opinion, one of the greatest institutional tragedies of our time—which was passed by the Mexican government in 2024 within a few days. It is, there-fore, an urgent and essential book, published at just the right time: as I will explain, we are facing an institutional reform of extraordinary importance that must be examined and critically analyzed immediately. This is neces-sary, first, because the reform touches on one of the most sensitive aspects of the Mexican constitutional framework, and second, because it does so in

1 Professor and researcher at the University of Buenos Aires.

a manner I consider imprudent, hasty, and controversial. With this reform, the foundation of the separation of powers—perhaps its most essential pil-lar—is at risk.

As I will explain, the 2024 judicial reform represents a sweeping trans-formation of the judiciary, but it involves much more. By closely examining the changes implemented—what was done, how it was accomplished, how it was enforced, how it was negotiated, and what strategies were employed to withstand challenges—we gain insight into the entire institutional landscape. This reform allows us to explore all the major issues that affect contemporary constitutional theory. In this sense, if I may use a metaphor, one could say that we are facing an “Aleph,” an entry point into the vast universe of institutional reform with all its dramas, labyrinths, and challenges.

As we know, the Aleph refers to perhaps the most beautiful and moving of all the wonderful short stories by Jorge Luis Borges. The story revolves around a small and highly peculiar sphere—the Aleph—which the narrator discovers in the cellar of his former lover, Beatriz Viterbo. From there, one can see all things, the entire universe.2Similarly, the Mexican judicial reform can also be seen as an Aleph that allows us to see all the significant issues that affect the world of contemporary constitutionalism. And when I say all, I mean all the important concerns and pressing issues that preoccupy—indeed obsess—the legal theory of our time.

II. The Issues Raised by the Crisis of Justice

I will list and briefly comment on some of the most important issues that the Mexican judicial reform raises and that forces us to confront and critically reflect on them.

1)The Breakdown of the Traditional Model of the “Separation of Powers”

First of all, the Mexican judicial reform presents us with an extraordinarily unusual situation in contemporary democratic constitutionalism—a situation

2 In the author’s words, the entire “cosmic space was there... Each thing (the mirror’s moon, let’s say) was infinite things, because I clearly saw them from every point in the universe. I saw the teeming sea, I saw dawn and dusk, I saw the multitudes of America, I saw a silvery cobweb at the center of a black pyramid, I saw a broken labyrinth (it was London), I saw endless, immediate eyes scrutinizing me as in a mirror…” Jorge Luis Borges, El Aleph, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1957.

common in authoritarian regimes, but which we do not normally encounter in democratic systems.

I refer to the case where the three branches of government begin to show a similar “coloration” as they come under the control of the same group or political force. The “old” constitutionalism did not even imagine the pos-sibility of such a problem; it lacked the language to examine it and did not address it at all. There were various reasons for this (better and worse, more or less well-founded), including the assumption that societies would always be divided into homogeneous groups with different interests (between rich and poor, minorities and majorities, etc.) and that these divisions would in-evitably be reflected in any representative system.

For the constitutionalism we knew, within a system of “checks and balances,” none of the “relevant” social sectors—now institutionally repre-sented—was meant to overpower the opposing sector. In practice, the whole system of checks and balances was designed to prevent what Alexander Ham-ilton called “mutual oppression.”

Today, the social configuration has changed dramatically. We live in multicultural societies made up of thousands of heterogeneous groups. The tra-ditional representative system has largely “broken down,” as it is structur-ally incapable of expressing or representing the infinite diversity of existing groups and interests. As a result of this breakdown, the system of “checks and balances,” which no longer reflects the expected “simple” social basis, has also begun to “fail.”

For this reason, we now encounter “pathologies” that could become the new norm in contemporary constitutionalism. Pathologies like the one we see in Mexico, or the one we will see in a possible second Trump administration in the United States: institutional systems in which the three main branches of government are dominated by a single political orientation and in which the traditional system of separation of powers and checks and balances loses its purpose and strength.

2) The Form and Substance of the Constitutional Reform

The judicial reform in Mexico also draws our attention to another central theme of contemporary constitutional theory: constitutional reform. In this

context, we encounter different and controversial positions on fundamental issues that Mexico’s constitutional changes force us to reflect on.

I think about questions like the following: How should people in today’s democratic societies be involved in deciding important changes in their future political organization? Is it justifiable that popular participation is merely “mediated” by the ruling class? And is it possible that the leader-ship responsible for major constitutional reform is the same leadership that is responsible for “normal” politics, as Bruce Ackerman suggests (and not spe-cifically elected to discuss reform, e.g., through a constitutional convention)?3Furthermore, can such “mediated” participation, conducted through ordinary political institutions, be justified in present times, characterized by a deep crisis of representation?

Can we justifiably claim that a reform conceived in this way truly reflects “the voice of the people” in a meaningful sense? Can a judicial reform carried out by representatives of “ordinary” politics change the essential foundations of constitutional organization? And does it have the power to carry out such a reform in a way that benefits the (objective) interests of the ruling power, or should such a reform be considered invalid for this reason? Additionally, can a constitutional reform, in this sense, address “any” issue, or should certain aspects of constitutionalism (i.e., “eternity clauses,” the system’s fundamen-tal principles, its “entrenched clauses”) be understood as beyond the reach of the constituted power’s authority to control and amend?

3)The “Democratization” of Justice

The judicial reform in Mexico was carried out, as so often, in the name of the highest ideals, the most “virtuous,” even if this appeal to noble values served, as so often, to disguise changes that were anything but “noble.” The insis-tence on the need for a “democratization of justice” forces us to ask some crucial questions.

Should the judiciary, traditionally seen as “independent” from democratic politics, also be “democratized?” And if so, what does it mean to democratize justice? On the first point, I would say that the answer remains uncertain:

3 Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1991.

many have argued that a power whose essential function is to protect the rules of the democratic system—as John Ely might put it—or which is responsible for upholding “long-term principles,” as Alexander Bickel puts it, should not be institutionally influenced by short-term impulses (i.e., regular elections).4Let me put it this way: The judiciary will predictably abandon its role in pre-serving the stability of democratic rules, as well as its role in safe-guarding the “great principles” of constitutionalism (non-discrimination, equal respect, etc.) if its members—who are responsible for that preservation—are subject to the same short-term impulses that influence majority political bodies (i.e., seeking re-election, expanding their own power, etc.).

What has been said opens the door to the second issue raised, which has to do with the meaning of the term democracy/democratization. I have the impression that many who advocate the “democratization of justice” (in Mexico, as in my country, Argentina, years ago)5do so on the basis of a narrow, inadequate, and unattractive notion of democracy, where democracy simply means “regular elections.” According to this limited definition, the claim that the judiciary must be democratized merely implies, and in vain, that its members should emerge from a popular election.

Unfortunately, according to this idea of democracy, the democratic citi-zen’s task ends as soon as she has cast her vote for this or that judge, who from then on and for many years to come can act as she pleases, essentially free from any dialogue with the citizens and freed from any control by the people. A terrible idea of democracy, I might add. For those of us who understand democracy as essentially what happens between elections—debate, conflict, agreements, accountability—to say that the judiciary must be democratized as a synonym for “it must be elected by the people” is, in democratic terms, an insult. In this way, and in the name of democracy, it is ensured that judges can act at will and according to the pressure of the power of the moment, detached from any communication or control by the people, but always in the name of that same people, to whom they are no longer accountable.

4 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1962; John Ely, Demo-cracy and Distrust, Cambridge,Harvard University Press, 1980.

5 BBC Mundo, “Argentina discute un polémico plan de reforma judicial,”BBC News, April 24, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/04/130424_argentina_reforma_judicial_vs.

For a more robust definition of democracy, such as the one I propose, “de-mocratizing the judiciary” could mean something entirely different, such as radically enhancing citizens’ access to the courts, strengthening the channels of communication and dialogue between judges and ordinary citizens (i.e., through “public hearings” and mandatory consultations with certain groups—i.e., indigenous peoples—when discussing their rights), etc.

4)Eroded Democracies

The Mexican judicial reform also serves as a paradigmatic example of what is referred to in the literature as “democratic erosion.” The concept of “democratic erosion,” developed by Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, refers to situations in which the ruling power—typically a powerful president or prime minister—concentrates more authority, often from “within” the system, by “loosening the nuts and bolts” of control mechanisms.6

The term “democratic erosion” refers to a situation where democracy is gradually stripped of its essence through measures that transform it into something else, into an oligarchy, a government of the few. This process, in which democracy is gradually dismantled, differs significantly from the pat-terns that characterized the region decades ago, when democracy disappeared “overnight” or “in one fell swoop,” typically through a military coup. Today, as Guillermo O’Donnell predicted, democracies are dying a “slow death,” not from a coup, but from “a thousand cuts” that bleed them dry.7

Judicial reform, if carried out following Mexico’s example, is a current ex-ample of the gradual measures by which democracy can and will be “eroded.” It is one of the main methods by which the system of “checks and balances” can be hollowed out from within, making it irrelevant, unable to prevent abuses of power, and unable to “balance” the risks of excesses or abuses by the political branches.

6 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2018; Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, Tyranny of the Minority, London, Viking Press, 2023.

7 Guillermo O’Donnell, Disonancias. Críticas democráticas a la democracia, Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2007.

5) Imperial Presidencies and Hyper-Presidents

At the center of “eroded democracies” often lies a strong executive, which typically serves as the driving force behind such changes and is generally the primary beneficiary of these institutional disruptions.

In Latin America, Carlos Nino coined the term “hyper-presidentialism” to describe the form of presidentialism that has prevailed throughout the region since the 19th century, anticipating the kind of strong presidentialism that only became more visible in the United States after the regulatory changes following the September 11 crisis.8(In the United States, the historian Arthur Schlesinger had already warned of the dangers of an “imperial presidency,” while Bruce Ackerman researched and popularized this idea from a legal perspective).9

For Nino, Latin American presidents deserved to be called “hyper-pres-idents” compared to the presidentialism enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, as many “additional” powers were granted to the region’s executives. These “additional” powers included, in some cases, the power to restrict rights by declaring a “state of siege,” the power to “intervene” in federal or provincial states, the discretion to appoint and dismiss cabinet secretaries at will, and formal and informal powers—acquired legally or extra-legally—that allowed presidents to threaten or “co-opt” other officials, particularly judges (e.g., sal-ary increases, pressure from intelligence agencies, or “rewards” for leaving office, such as ambassadorships, etc.).

A reform like the Mexican judicial reform appears feasible only through the initiative and pressure of a “hyper-presidency” or “imperial presidency.” Unfortunately, as is often the case, the Mexican reform seems primarily aimed at strengthening these “imperial powers” of the Executive.

6) The Breakdown of Representative Political Institutions

The process of Mexican judicial reform also highlights another central theme of contemporary constitutionalism: the severe crisis of representative bodies.

8 Carlos Nino, “Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Argentina,” in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Wais-man (eds)., Institutional Design in New Democracies, New York, Westview Press, 1996.

9 Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010.

Without delving into the details of the approval process of this reform, the crisis becomes evident when we note that such a significant constitutional amendment with extraordinary implications was discussed and approved by the legislative chambers in mere minutes, only to be addressed and ratified later by a majority of state legislatures in moments, as if it were the appoint-ment of maintenance staff in a government building.

The fact is that Mexico was undergoing one of the most profound transfor-mations to the foundational structure of its entire judiciary—both the federal bench and the judicial bodies of the 32 states that make up the Mexican fed-eration. It was a reform that—also in a manner almost unprecedented in the world—led to the majority of the country’s highest judicial officials being removed from office within a few months.

Such changes, which can cause significant uncertainty in the legal frame-work of any country, were passed in Mexico at lightning speed. Without delving into the details and forms of these changes, which will be discussed in the following chapters, I would like to emphasize once again what con-stituted the essence of the reform. We are dealing here with institutions representing (supposedly) millions of diverse and heterogeneous individu-als and groups, unwilling to express even the slightest criticism or nuance regarding a controversial and radical project emanating from the Executive and essentially geared toward their own benefit. It was as if the political bod-ies were nothing more than mere “clerks” who obeyed, signed, and gave legal force to everything the executive orders. It was as if the dozens of representa-tives who raised their hands in unison were a single entity: the Presidency.

The “colonization” by concentrated political and economic power over representative bodies points to a problem that is both Western and global, a problem that authors such as Pierre Rosanvallon have studied well—even if the example of judicial reform in Mexico exaggerates the crisis of representa-tion we are talking about almost to the point of caricature.10

10 Pierre Rosanvallon, El pueblo inalcanzable. Historia de la representación democrática en Francia, Mexico City, Instituto Mora, 2012.

7) Models of “Judicial Review”

Another fundamental problem to which the recent judicial reform in Mexico draws our attention concerns the methods of “judicial review of laws.” In Mexico, the main courts could not set an appropriate limit to the president’s dramatic initiative. This happened despite the fact that their own members were among the most affected—another anomaly compared to the practice for which the traditional system of “checks and balances” seemed well prepared. Given the crucial levels of judicial authority, many of us felt that this was an optimal opportunity for the judiciary to introduce one of the most interesting, democratic, and robust concepts of judicial review.

I am referring to a “proceduralist” approach to judicial review, which requires judges to defer to the majority of (substantive) decisions made by political bodies, that is, to “tie their own hands” in a kind of self-restraint, while at the same time adopting a strongly “activist” or “interventionist” stance when confronted with political decisions affecting the rules of the game—changes traditionally promoted by the dominant political power for its own benefit.

By that kind of standard—defended in the United States since 1938 after the Carolene Products case—the Mexican judiciary should have reviewed the reform with the highest degree of suspicion or, if you prefer, a strong pre-sumption of unconstitutionality. This was necessary in order to declare the reform invalid if, as was the case, the necessary examination revealed that it was aimed at directly favoring the same actors who advocated it, while at the same time making the political situation more difficult for those who opposed the dominant group.

Of course, this does not mean that majorities in a democracy cannot push for reforms to the “rules of the game.” Instead, the argument is that such reforms to the fundamental “rules of the game” should be the result of a broad and deep agreement between the ruling party and the opposition; emerge from an extended public debate; and, as much as possible, defer their imple-mentation to the “next game” (i.e., ensuring that the President or Legislature that promotes the changes does not benefit from them during its own term). In any case, the Mexican judicial reform clearly shows the urgent need for transparent and clear legal reflection on the proper forms of judicial review.

With the preceding lines, I simply wanted to draw attention to the enor-mous richness of the debates to which an initiative of the size, weight, and impact of the Mexican judicial reform compels us. If this judicial reform were not so tragic, it could be considered an ideal practical experiment to reflect critically on all the major issues of contemporary constitutional theory. In the following chapters, many of the most important Mexican social science authors help us understand and critically examine the details of this com-prehensive, profound, and highly questionable reform with its remarkable effects. I have only provided an introduction to the Aleph here.

Chapter 1

The 2024 Judicial Reform in Mexico: An Overview

Saúl López-Noriega1and Javier Martín-Reyes2

I. Introduction: Forecasting the Judicial Storm3

The constitutional reform of 2024 represents the most significant change to the judiciary in Mexico’s history. Its implications are extensive. All federal and state judges will be replaced within less than three years. New judges will be elected through a popular voting process, which is unprecedented globally. Additionally, important mechanisms for protecting rights, such as the amparo lawsuit—Mexico’s primary judicial tool for safeguarding consti-tutional rights—will be notably weakened.

In light of such a significant change, the works presented in this book clearly explain the reform’s content, making it accessible to a broad audience that may not be well-acquainted with the Mexican justice system. Addition-ally, these works offer insights into the potential impact of this constitutional change. We believe that such a complex and radical reform requires careful and thorough analysis.

1 Professor and researcher at the School of Government and Public Transformation of the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education (ITESM).

2 Law professor and researcher at the Institute for Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (IIJ-UNAM) and nonresident scholar at the Center for the U.S. and Mexico of Rice University’s Baker Institute.

3 We thank Luis Mauricio Varas Silva and Gadiel Solorio Alvarez for their support as research assistants.

We know that this reform will unleash a genuine storm within the judicial system. Simultaneously, we recognize that the exact consequences cannot be predicted with certainty. Just like real storms, uncertainty is inherent to their nature. Keeping this in mind, the aim of this book is to provide an initial analysis of the most probable effects of this radical transformation of the Mexican justice system. The ultimate effects will only become clear over time. We therefore hope that this work will serve as a foundation for future research examining how the changes introduced by this constitutional reform will manifest in practice in the medium and long term.

This book brings together the work of a group of specialists in the Mexi-can judicial system. Based on solid arguments and empirical evidence, these analyses provide a comprehensive overview of the most plausible scenarios that could arise when this storm hits Mexico’s complex and diverse social conflicts. In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the impact of the reform is not limited to the popular election of judges. The reform is much broader and more complex, as it reshapes fundamental aspects of both the Federal Judiciary and the state judicial branches. The book examines the major changes in the structure and operation of the courts that extend beyond the election of judges. It also explores what these changes could mean for various stakeholders, from the most vulnerable populations to businesses and investors operating in the country.

In this introductory chapter, we present a general explanation of the origins and content of the 2024 judicial reform. Understanding its scope necessitates knowledge of the context in which it was conceived. Therefore, the subse-quent section reviews previous judicial reforms and their implementation. A decisive turning point occurred in 1994, when a reform was enacted to align the Federal Judiciary with the principles of constitutional democracy and overcome the role that the judiciary had played under the authoritarian regime that ruled Mexico for 70 years.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the tensions that emerged dur-ing the López Obrador administration (2018-2024) between the executive and legislative branches, on one side, and the judiciary, on the other. Specifically, we examine how the judicial reform bill introduced in 2024 represented the culmination of a six-year term characterized by conflicts between the judi-ciary and López Obrador’s movement.

Finally, we provide a brief overview of the chapters in this book, ex-plaining the reasons for their inclusion and describing their main arguments, contributions, and findings.

II. Mexico’s Transition to Democracy and the Role of the Judiciary

The 1994 judicial reform marked a pivotal moment in establishing a modern, independent, and effective judiciary. It was, of course, neither the first nor the last reform in this ongoing process. Prior to 1994, significant changes had already been made that enabled the Supreme Court, for instance, to con-centrate on the most critical cases.4After this year, important changes were implemented, including reforms that expanded the protection of human rights and broadened the scope of the amparo lawsuit (the primary mechanism for safeguarding these rights).

The 1994 judicial reform was an ambitious institutional project with two central objectives. The first was to create a more professional judiciary and to overcome the patrimonial control with which the members of the Su-preme Court administered the judiciary, especially in the appointment of lower courts (federal district judges and federal circuit courts). To achieve this, a judicial council was created—the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal, CJF)—which was responsible for the administration, supervision and discipline of the lower courts and introduced a judicial career based on merit and professional criteria rather than the informal system of favors and recommendations that had dominated for decades.5

The second objective was to strengthen the Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review. To achieve this, the reform introduced a new mechanism: the constitutional challenge (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), an abstract review mechanism based on the procedures of some European constitutional

4 Héctor Fix-Zamudio and José Ramón Cossío, El Poder Judicial en el ordenamiento mexicano, Mexico, FCE, 1996.

5 Andrea Pozas-Loyo and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, “Anatomy of an Informal Institution: The ‘Gentlemen’s Pact’ and Judicial Selection in Mexico, 1917–1994,” International Political Science Review, vol. 39, no. 5, 2018, pp. 647-661.

courts, which allow for the complete invalidation of a law or statute.6In ad-dition, the constitutional controversies (controversias constitucionales) were redesigned and enhanced with the reform. These controversies enable the Court to rule on conflicts between different branches of government.

The subsequent three decades (1994-2024) were marked by remarkable dynamism and an increasingly significant role of the Federal Judiciary. This was not only due to the fact that the implementation of the 1994 reform re-quired substantial and challenging measures from the Federal Judiciary but also because this new institutional framework enabled the various judicial bodies, particularly the Supreme Court, to take on a more active role in Mexico’s constitutional democracy: serving as an arbiter of conflicts among the branches of government and as an effective protector of constitutional rights. The progress achieved during this period is undeniable.

In the judicial realm, federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have started to move away from formalistic arguments focused on procedural as-pects and begun to protect a wider array of rights, from the most traditional to contemporary rights, using more reasoned and innovative arguments. This shift was also influenced by various political and social actors who brought increasingly complex and sophisticated cases to the federal courts.

A critical shortcoming, however, was that the decisions of the courts did not always have a direct impact on the majority of the population. This was due to a combination of factors. First, the courts were reluctant to establish clear and binding precedents that would ensure effective protection of several important rights, particularly in the area of economic and social rights, which are central in a country characterized by poverty and inequality. Second, despite the 1994 reform, legal limitations continued to exist that restricted the scope of judicial decisions, such as