The Last Nazis E-Book

Professor Perry Biddiscombe

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 554

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2004

Beschreibung

The history of the shadowy Werewolf guerrilla bands formed at end of the Second World War as the last desperate defence of Nazis. Founded by Heinrich Himmler in 1944 when it became clear Germany would be invaded, the Werewolf guerrilla movement was given the task of slowing down the Allied advance to allow time for the success of negotiations or wonder weapons. Staying behind in territory occupied by the Allies, its mission was to carry out acts of sabotage, arson and assassination, both of enemy troops and of defeatist Germans. Perry Biddiscombe has researched the movement exhaustively, and details Werewolf operations against the British, Russians and fellow Germans, on the Eastern and Western Fronts and in the post-war chaos of Berlin. Giving the lie to the established story of a cowed German population meekly submitting to defeat, this is a fascinating insight into what has been described as the death scream of the Nazi regime.

Leseprobe

First published 2000

This edition first published 2004

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

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This ebook edition first published in 2013

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© Perry Biddiscombe 2000, 2004, 2013

The right of Perry Biddiscombe to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9642 9

Original typesetting by The History Press

CONTENTS

List of illustrations

Preface and acknowledgements

Introduction

1 The nature of the beast

2 The trouble with werewolves

3 The watch on, before and behind the Rhine

4 Man is wolf to his fellow man

5 Swept by the red tide

6 Werewolves after the fact

7 The wolf hunt

Maps

Notes

Bibliography

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Picture sources:

Illustrations are from the author’s collection.

Plate Section

1Freikorps ‘Werdenfals marches into Munich, 1919

2The Schlageter Company of Self-Defence Storm Battalion ‘Heinz’, 1921

3A Hitler Youth leader caught behind Allied lines

4‘Siegen oder fallen!’, Völkischer Beobachter, 3 April 1945

5The ‘Wolfsangel’

6‘Anschlagsarten bei der Panzerfaust’ Völkischer Beobachter, 18 February 1945

7Dead SS and Luftwaffe men in civilian dress, April 1945

8Hitler Youth radio operators

9Wreckage of a locomotive driven onto an American armoured column, April 1945

10A train derailed by saboteurs, April 1945

11HSSPf Jürgen Stroop

12SA rifle training, Illustrierter Beobachter, 15 June 1944

13Boy snipers captured in Aachen, October 1944

14Georg Heidorn, a Werewolf guide

15Hans Zöberlein, Freikorps ‘Adolf Hitler’ chief

16Swastikas cut into ice on the Neckar river, 23 December 1945

17Hitler Youth leader Fred Borth

18Siegfried Kabus, leader of the ODESSA bombing gang in Stuttgart

19‘Nest for hatching new Nazis’, The Milwaukee Journal, 1946

20A dead sniper on display, Lübeck, May 1945

Maps

Map of ‘security incidents’ in the Rhineland, May – June 1945

Map of ‘civil and internal security incidents’ in the US zone, November 1945 – January 1946

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is a sequel to one that I wrote several years ago titled Werwolf!, published by the University of Toronto Press and the University of Wales Press. In Werwolf!, I argued that the Nazi guerrilla movement of 1944-45 – the ‘Werwolf’ – had a considerable impact on the invasion and occupation of Germany, and that it provided the main thematic focus for a distinctive final stage in the history of the Nazi regime. I also contended that the movement reflected some important characteristics of the Nazi state, particularly with regard to its allegedly totalitarian character. In order to drive these points home, Werwolf! was written and organized in an expository fashion, and a large number of examples were deployed in order to validate the main themes of the book.

The present work is a very different kind of effort. If Werwolf! was an attempt to provide a broad survey of the topic, this book is best understood as giving the proverbial view from the ground, and it emphasizes corroborative detail. The introduction covers the folklore and cultural motifs that Werewolf organizers exploited in trying to establish historical precedents for the movement. Chapter one sketches out the basic nature of the Werewolf movement, and chapter two the training and tactics used by Werewolves. The next three chapters detail Werewolf operations behind both the Western and Eastern Fronts, as well as attacks on German collaborators. Chapter six describes some of the activities of post-war groups that carried on the Werewolf tradition in occupied Germany. Chapters three to six are comprised of a number of vignettes, some brief, some quite lengthy, depending on the quality and depth of source material. The conclusion spells out some of the consequences and significance of Werewolf militancy.

In all of this, I have refrained from trying to be exhaustive in covering the scope and range of Werewolf activities, preferring instead to address a limited number of incidents, groups and persons with some degree of narrative and descriptive precision. Who were the Werewolves? What did their training entail? How did it feel to be deployed in hostile terrain behind the lines of the most powerful armies ever assembled, or to be told to hunt one’s own countrymen in murderous vigilante actions? How were such operations rationalized by the people who planned and executed them? I have trusted that such questions will provoke interesting answers. In the final analysis, I hope that the resulting work complements its predecessor but also works independently of it, providing the reader with stories and moments of the past that are intrinsically absorbing and which, given the neo-Nazi revival in Germany, have some importance.

Like all writers, historians tend to have a solitary reputation. Ours, however, is actually a highly collaborative effort that usually involves large numbers of people standing behind the shoulder of the author. My heartfelt thanks go to these mainstays who have made this work possible, especially the inter-library loans staff at the University of Victoria. Through their ability to lay their hands on hard-to-find material, these women have proven to be intellectual life-savers. Thanks also to the archivists at the US National Archives and the various bureaux of the Bundesarchiv, who helped me gather fresh documentary material and photographs for this study. In particular, John Taylor at Archives II in College Park deserves commendation for his encyclopedic knowledge of American intelligence records, the benefits of which he shares most willingly. Thanks as well to my colleague David Zimmerman, who kindly read a draft of chapter two and offered many helpful comments.

My publisher, Jonathan Reeve, helped me devise the project and gave me some sense of what the book could be. His unflagging enthusiasm kept me inspired, while his good sense kept me on the straight and narrow.

Most of all, my heartfelt thanks to my wife, my son and my dogs, who put up with me as I dived into my files for a six month hiatus, only to occasionally emerge in order to hog computer time. As always, my family’s patience, love and support has been crucial.

Perry Biddiscombe

Victoria, BC

INTRODUCTION

The Werewolves were no bit players on the stage of modern European history. Although they are often portrayed in World War Two literature as minor supernumeraries in a tragic Nazi finale, the instruments of a last gasp effort that was derided, ineffective and ignored, in reality the Werewolves did considerable damage. Their malicious combination of guerrilla warfare and vigilantism caused the deaths of several thousand people, either directly or through the Allied and Soviet reprisals that they provoked. The property damage inflicted upon the already devastated economies of Central Europe equalled tens of millions of dollars. In addition, the policies of Germany’s occupiers and neighbours, which in a best case scenario could have been expected to have been tough on Germany, were prompted by the Werewolves to become tougher yet. The Soviets and their Polish and Czech friends moved quickly and brutally to eject German minorities from the eastern part of Central Europe, and inside Germany the occupying powers imposed rigorous non-fraternization and denazification policies and severely prohibited German civilian movement and right of assembly. Almost all the country’s soldiers, sailors and airmen were incarcerated, at least temporarily, and Germany’s central government was dismantled. Anyone who thinks that Allied occupation policies in Germany were too harsh, however, should keep in mind what the Werewolves were trying to do, and what impact the organization of such a movement under the noses of the invaders and occupiers – was likely to have had.

To many people, the collapse of the Third Reich might seem as remote as the fall of Troy, but the Werewolves are unfortunately part of a living history. While many former Werewolves eventually escaped the influences of Nazi indoctrination and went on to lead productive and respectable lives – the Sudeten-German Werewolf Hans Klein later became a West German cabinet minister and vice-president of the German parliament – it is true that a few former members of the movement remained unreformed and later drifted into the German and Austrian neo-Nazi milieu. Such elements typically involved themselves in small-scale hatemongering and kept a memory of the Werewolf movement alive, at least among individuals on the right-wing fringe. At least one former Werewolf officer was arrested when a spate of swastika scrawling and defacing of Jewish tombstones broke out in 1959-60. In the last several decades, as neo-Nazi militants took a cue from left-wing terrorists and launched direct action campaigns – joined in the early 1990s by surly masses of unemployed and alienated youth from the former German Democratic Republic – the Werewolf has increasingly re-emerged as a theme for racist and xenophobic violence. The rediscovery of the theme was encouraged in the 1980s by the murder trial of former Werewolf Kurt Rahäuser, which showed that the Werewolves of 1945 had shared a homicidal antipathy toward ‘foreign workers’. The appearance of memoirs by ex-Werewolf and neo-Nazi activist Fred Borth added more fuel to the fire, as did the republication of the Werewolf combat manual by presses like Karl-Heinz Dissberger and Paladin.

In the 1990s, neo-Werewolf terrorists became sporadically active. A ‘Werwolf Kommando’ from the ‘Volkswille’ organization threatened opponents and sprayed walls with Werewolf slogans. There was also a notable tendency among fragments of the ‘Free German Labour Party’, banned in the mid-1990s, to form violence-prone Werewolf cells. One person was killed by ‘Werwolf Jagdeinheit Senftenberg’ in 1991, and a policeman was murdered in 1997 by self-proclaimed ‘lone Werewolf’ Kay Diesner, who also attempted to kill three other people. Diesner was particularly inspired by the way control of the 1944-45 Werewolves had eventually atomized, leaving individual Werewolves to function autonomously.1 This modus operandi also seemed to complement advice coming across the Atlantic from ‘Aryan Nation’ leader Louis Beam, who spoke of ‘one-person cells’ and called for militant neo-Nazi clusters to remain independent of each other, thus inhibiting attempts by the authorities to roll up right-radical networks. A widely circulated pamphlet originating in Nebraska, A Movement in Arms, also lauded the Werewolves of 1945 and described the ‘Werewolf of the future’ as an activist dabbling in holiday and weekend terrorism. Some degree of contact has been maintained by an underground ‘Werwolf Author’s Collective’, and by the secret exchange of manifestos and blacklists, particularly through the internet; the Frankfurter Rundschau reported in 1999 that a Werewolf ‘hit list’ was circulating.2 Some observers on the left have warned of a wholesale attempt to re-found a Werewolf movement, and recent government statistics do reveal a rising number of terrorist attacks by scattered right-wing militants.3

Given this environment, it seems especially appropriate to tell the real story of the Werewolf in the period 1944-47, with special emphasis upon the malevolent vandalism, the disorganized and often self-defeating deployments behind enemy lines, the pointless waste of precious lives and resources, and the sadomasochistic tendency to inflict pain and suffering on fellow Germans (even more than upon foreign invaders and occupiers). The alleged Nazi respect for the integrity of the ethnic community and the supposedly sacred bonds of blood were again revealed – as they had been in other ways – to be a superficial overlay for the envy-laden and nihilistic impulses that actually lay at the core of National Socialism. ‘We are faced,’ noted one contemporary observer, ‘with a harder and harder core of homicidal maniacs, to whom even their own people mean nothing once they throw them over.’4

MADE AND MOULDED OF THINGS PAST

Like most military and political movements, the Werewolf organization did not suddenly appear out of thin air in 1944-45, totally devoid of earlier models or antecedents. While it would be wrong to see the Werewolves solely as the product of a centuries-old tradition – and it would certainly be wrong to see the movement as the inevitable product of any such tradition – there is no doubt that the Nazis had lots to work with as they rummaged through the treasure house of German history, looking for precedents and precursors with which to legitimize the movement.

A few sources of inspiration dated from the dawn of the modern literary age in the early sixteenth century. While there was nothing that could properly be described as a Romantic Movement during this stage of German literary history, there were some scattered elements beginning to contend that Germans were a naturally freedom-loving people and that as such, they were allowed the use of irregular military methods that did not accord with chivalrous notions of warfare or with the supposedly honourable employment of arms. This argument was sometimes made by early peasant propagandists like the ‘Bundschuh’, who took the heavy peasant boot as their symbol and who claimed through leaflets, popular songs and ditties that peasants had a right to defend the ‘old law’ – folk justice – against tyrants, even if this demanded forms of passive or active resistance. It is no wonder that the Nazis later battened on to the ‘Bundschuh’ symbol, first as an instrument to help in selling their ideas to German farmers, and then, in 1944-45, as a theme for anti-Allied underground resistance.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, themes suitable for later Nazi exploitation receded, particularly since the reigning ideas of the age, absolutism and Enlightenment rationalism, tended to inspire hostility toward folkish communalism, ‘associational’ forms of military structure and nostalgia about medieval or tribal forms of social organization. Peasant rebellions were no longer recognized as legal movements by German law.5 Militias and guerrilla bands occasionally appear in the historical record during this period, but any such organizational initiatives from above were undertaken reluctantly and in bad conscience; Frederick the Great characterized members of the partisan levies he raised in 1756-57 as ‘adventurers, deserters and vagabonds’.6

By the late eighteenth century, however, the cultural cycle was again turning, and with the advent of the Romantic Movement the violent pursuit of German freedom, partisan warfare, tribal and medieval savageries and ‘associational’ forms of soldiering were all once again worthy of the intellectual stamp of approval, at least in some quarters. In plays such as Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen and Kieist’s Kätchen von Heilbronn, medieval vigilante courts, or Vehme, were invested with a romantic aura, being depicted as instruments of popular justice in anarchic times. Kleist also wrote the epic Hermann’s Battle, which celebrated the ancient victory of Hermann, lord of the Cheruscans, over the Romans in the Battle of the Teutoberger Forest. Kleist’s Hermann was a proto-national hero, defying ‘Latin’ tyranny, despite the fact that he had resorted to subterfuges and ambush tactics in order to achieve his purpose. This interest in Hermann, to which the nationalist writers Friedrich Klopstock, Ernst Arndt and Friedrich Jahn also subscribed, marked the point of origin for the modern Hermann-cult, which eventually centred around a towering statue built in the Teutoberger Forest during the mid-nineteenth century. As Wolf Kittler notes, Hermann quickly became ‘the great model for Prussian patriots’.7

Such Romantic literature formed the cultural background to the formation of a series of secret nationalist societies, the ‘Tugendbund,’ which took shape after the French – the modern ‘Latins’ – secured uncontested domination of Germany in 1806, and it is interesting to note that it was a bookseller, Johann Philip Palm, the first fatal victim of French repression, who subsequently served as something of a martyr for the underground liberation movement. The plotters were further inspired by the contemporary examples of Freikorps (Free Corps) Chief Ferdinand von Schill and Tyrolean rebel leader Andreas Hofer, who both launched abortive risings against the French in 1809, and who both – like Palm – were caught and executed by Napoleon’s forces. This rebel movement was finally institutionalized and given formal sanction by a reluctant Prussian monarchy in 1813, after Napoleon’s defeat in Russia. Under pressure from the nationalist conspirators, Frederick William III authorized a pseudo-guerrilla levee en masse, the Landsturm (or ‘Country Storm’), as well as forming a small state-authorized Freikorps under Adolf von Lützow, which had a mandate to launch guerrilla warfare in the territories west of the Elbe River most heavily dominated by the French. Ernst Arndt happily gushed that Germans had finally reverted to their age-old tradition of an ‘associative’ and voluntary community in arms, and as Kittler notes, Hermann’s Battle practically became ‘the handbook of the Prussian Guerrilleros’, and even influenced the tactical writings of such military theorists as Karl von Clausewitz.8

As one can imagine, there was much in these movements and events that could later serve the needs of Nazi propagandists, even if the latter often had to twist matters out of their historical and cultural context in order to extract maximum inspirational and indoctrinational value. The rituals of the Vehme were later adopted by post-World War One Freikorps leaders, most of whom were familiar with historical romances by Goethe, Kleist and Scott, and from there the practices spread to the early Nazi Party, particularly influencing intra-party tribunals. In the early 1920s, several high-profile German politicians and office-holders, like Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau, were dispatched by Vehmic killers. Naturally, there was a recrudence of the Vehme in the Nazi guerrilla movement of 1944-45: the organization’s main radio station bragged menacingly in April 1945 that ‘the movement has its own courts of law which will judge offenders, and disposes of the necessary forces to carry out its sentences.’ The Nazis laid claim to the Landsturm even more explicitly. The term had been revived in the Reich Defence Law of 1935, which declared that in time of emergency the war minister had the right to declare a popular levee en masse, and this patriotic rally was actually mobilized in the fall of 1944. Apparently the new mass militia was originally envisioned functioning under the name ‘Landsturm’, but it was also referred to during the planning stage as ‘Volkswehr’ (or ‘People’s Defence’), and the two terms were apparently combined to yield ‘Volkssturm’. The 1813 Landsturm decree was broadcast on German radio on 28 September 1944, and Heinrich Himmler, in announcing the creation of the Volkssturm, was sure to tip his hat to the ‘fanatical freedom fighters’ of 1813.9 Who would have thought, Emil Obermann later wondered, that the romantic and idealistic vision of 1813 ‘would lead unnaturally to the Volkssturm and Werwolf activities of a dying National Socialism.’10 Andreas Hofer and Adolf von Lützow were also frequently mentioned in propaganda for Nazi guerrilla efforts, and the Lützow Freikorps, having already contributed the idea of black uniforms and death’s head emblems to the SS, was also cited as an inspiration for the Nazi tank destroyer detachments of 1945, which functioned along enemy flanks and in the rear of Allied and Soviet forces. The leading newspaper of the Third Reich, Völkischer Beobachter, called these tank busters the ‘Lützowish Jäger of modern war’.11 Interestingly, one of the main literary achievements of the Romantic period that was not harnessed to the needs of the collapsing New Order was Schiller’s play Wilhelm Tell; its inalterably liberal tone had already led Hitler to ban it from German art and school textbooks, and the main character’s act of tyrannicide seemed to render it particularly unsuitable in the wake of the July 20th 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life.12

The ‘Realist’ period that succeeded the Romantic Age did not have much to offer Nazi propagandists; in fact, as Germany unified in the 1860s and ‘70s, with no help from any sort of nationalist guerrilla movement, and as the country subsequently emerged as a European superpower, irregulars fighting in guerrilla fashion were more typically found opposing German soldiers than themselves bearing German arms. The ‘official’ state position on guerrilla warfare – one of disapproval and vilification – developed during this period and still had a profound impact on German mentalities as late as the 1940s. The French franc-tireurs of 1870-71 were widely condemned in German war memoirs and historical literature – Hans Wachenhusen called them ‘bands of hoodlums’13 – and they were obviously regarded as unworthy of humane consideration or treatment. The same standards were applied in 1914 to franc-tireurs in Belgium and northern France; even a We-imar-era German parliamentary committee, asked to investigate the savage German treatment of enemy partisans and civilians in 1914, called them ‘a sort of civil militia who in international law are not recognized as belligerents’.14 When occasionally faced with criticism that the Prussian monarchy had itself endorsed such tactics in 1813, the new elite seemed almost to agree that fond and romantic remembrances aside, the 1813 levee en masse was perhaps better left forgotten. The semi-official historian of the new German state, Heinrich von Treitschke, admitted in 1879 that the movement had ‘demanded the impossible of a civilised people, and if completely carried out would have impressed a stamp of fanatical barbarism upon the conduct of the war…’15 Shortly afterwards, the whole idea of the Landsturm as a final call up for defence of the Fatherland, an idea vaguely institutionalized since 1813, was all but abandoned by the Wilhelmine state.16 When Russian forces briefly invaded East Prussia in 1914, German authorities made no attempt to rouse popular resistance to the enemy, instead leaving all military tasks to the regular army.

Once again, however, the cultural cycle turned in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and even though official state and military attitudes toward guerrilla warfare were already cast, at least in part, popular notions continued to evolve. Part of this development was related to the rise of a brand of ‘naturalistic’ neo-Romanticism, which was in turn linked to the appearance of a radical German nationalism that was openly jingoist, racist, pseudo-socialist and critical of the conservative and ‘safe’ inclinations of the Bismarckian-Wilhelmine state. Especially notable in this regard was a group of popular writers of adventure stories, such as Adolf Bartels, Gustav Frenssen, Walter Flex and Hans Grimm, most of whom spun violent tales built upon an underlay of primitivism, bucolic ruralism, folkish communalism, anti-modernism, and a conception of life as being validated by vivid experience and adventure. By far the two most important members of this group were Karl May, the writer of dozens of adventure tales, many set in lands he had never visited (the romantic triumph of imagination over reality), whose ‘Red Indian’ stories inspired the play of whole generations of German children; and Hermann Löns, the North German journalist and ‘Heimatdichter’ or regional nature writer, who became famous for his masterful descriptions of the Lower Saxon heaths and for his collected poems and folk lyrics, which were great favourites of the developing German Youth Movement.

From the perspective of the 1945 Nazi guerillas, Löns was the more important of the two, if only because a few years before he died in battle at Reims in September 1914 he wrote and published his seminal work, titled The Wehrwolf. Basing his story on the semi-mythical ‘Werewolves,’ the peasant guerrillas who had supposedly prowled the Lüneberg Heath during the Thirty Years War, Löns created the archetype for folkish partisans: fundamentally decent men, under the pressure of war these embattled farmers had formed a ritualistic secret band, based in a remote redoubt, in order to deal out terror to interloping Swedes and foreign mercenaries who brought with them the threat of miscegenation and the intrusion of alien values into an otherwise idyllic rural community. According to Löns, the guerrillas were close to the soil and close to the forest; he repeatedly compared them to wolves. Löns also hinted that although the Werewolves’ bloodthirsty vigilantism and sadistic killings seemed cruel, such cathartic forms of action and militant mobilization of energies were undertaken in service of a true folk justice and were valid in a situation where normal forms of law and order had collapsed. Given the situation in a modern Germany that also saw itself as increasingly besieged, crisis-ridden and threatened by internal and external enemies, Löns’s raw and savage tale was extremely well-received by the public: sales of over half-a-million books by 1940 made the novel one of best-selling and most widely read novels of the early twentieth century.17

With the publication and popularity of The Wehrwolf, nearly all the requisite building blocks were in place for later Nazi organizers and propagandists to build a specifically National Socialist guerrilla movement. The spirit and much of the bloodstained symbolism of Löns’s book were revived in the post-World War One Freikorps, members of which were described by Alfred Döblin as ‘a new kind of humanity brought forth by the war – a kind of wolf-men.’18 In fact, one of the leaders of the paramilitaries, Peter von Heydebreck, went the full distance and called his following ‘the Wehrwolves,’ a name (and spelling) he borrowed directly from Löns. Heydebreck deployed his ‘Wehrwolves’ in guerrilla operations against the Poles in Upper Silesia, and he also formed a para-political party of the same name, ranged under a black flag with a death’s head and oriented toward fighting Marxism and liberalism in favour of right-wing ‘National Bolshevist’ objectives.19 Like most fragments of the Freikorps, the ‘Wehrwolves’ were eventually absorbed by the increasingly monolithic Nazi Party, which, as it inherited valuable inspirational themes and symbols from such sources, tucked them away for use at an appropriate hour. By 1944-45, that hour had arrived.

In the fall of 1944, with the Third Reich on the anvil and mighty hammers beating at it in both East and West, the Nazi Party chancellery published a ‘special edition’ of The Wehrwolf that was supposed to be read by German guerrilla trainees and militiamen. In 1945 several German newspapers also published excerpts from the book for the ‘benefit’ of the general public.20 Once a Nazi guerrilla radio station came on the air in April 1945, it frequently quoted both May and Löns, recommending May’s ‘Red Indian’ skirmishing tactics and drawing the fiery spirit of Werewolf warfare from passages by Löns. ‘All that roams through the land and sets fire to houses,’ quoted the station, ‘that is vermin and must be treated as such. Blow for blow and blood for blood.’ Here we see, in a shockingly public context, the language of the perpetrators of the Final Solution, equating opponents with vermin. In a chaotic situation where – and the station again cited Löns – God seemed to have surrendered his sovereignty to the devil, all manner of deeds became acceptable: ‘horrible things have happened, but we must defend ourselves secretly. We must creep like sneak thieves if we want to get rid of the rubble.’

It was from such expressions of bloodlust and xenophobia that the Nazi guerrilla movement derived its most direct source of inspiration and its clearest sense of purpose. In the final analysis, however, it would perhaps be fitting to consult Greek drama rather than German literature and history in order to plumb the full depths of meaning in the werewolf symbol. Euripides suggested that certain beings could, by giving in to hate and a desire for revenge, renounce their humanity and transmogrify into beasts. It was in this particular sense that the Nazis, in 1944-45, quite unintentionally chose a metaphor that accurately reflected their own transformation. Werewolves indeed!

1

THE NATURE OF THE BEAST

The Werwolf is best described as a movement in the loosest sense of the term, that is, as a series of people and acts tending toward a specific goal, in this case, the conduct of Nazi guerrilla warfare, vigilantism, and various types of ‘suicide missions.’ An SS-Werwolf organization served as the original paradigmatic model, which throughout 1944-45 sprouted numerous extensions and parallels as various bodies within the Third Reich sought to participate in the project. In a manner typical of the internal organization of the Nazi regime, none of this bureaucratic sprawl was either integrated or coordinated. Far from being a totalitarian state, the collapsing Third Reich was a chaos of conflicting personalities, some determined to resist, others eager to compromise with the enemy, others content to drift aimlessly among the shifting currents. The boss of the SS Security Service, Walter Schellenberg, later recalled that the entire structure eventually collapsed in upon itself like a compressed accordion: SS-Werwolf, Hitler Youth, Nazi Party, German Labour Front, Gestapo, Wehrmacht guerrilla units, SS Rangers – ‘everything upside down and everybody solely responsible for everything.’1 In its most irregular and bizarre manifestations, such as the anarchic ‘Werewolf Radio’, the Werewolf movement was merely a theme. The announcers of Werewolf Radio struck a decidedly existential note by proclaiming in early April 1945 that each person was on his own in deciding how to harass advancing enemy forces. ‘Each individual,’ they suggested, ‘is his own judge and solely responsible for his own deeds.’

Although authorities during the Weimar era had maintained a skeletal guerrilla organization called the ‘Field Jäger Service’, this structure had collapsed after being transferred from the War Ministry to the Border Guard in 1928, and subsequent proposals to replace it with armed units of right-wing war veterans (Stahlhelm) or Nazi Brownshirts went nowhere.2 The Nazi state that arose in 1933 pledged itself to re-assert Germany’s place as a true great power and not to continue the Weimar Republic’s supposed fixation with defending Germany while operating under the handicap of the Treaty of Versailles’ military restrictions, a factor that had made planning for guerrilla warfare necessary. As a result, a specifically Nazi guerrilla framework only dated from the autumn of 1944, when it first became obvious that Germany would be invaded, and it only reached its peak in April 1945. By that later date, however, its original raison d’être – to help save the Third Reich by slowing down the pace of the Allied and Soviet advance, thus allowing time for the success of either negotiations or ‘wonder weapons’ – was already becoming obsolete. Hostilities were coming to an end more quickly than had been anticipated. By the final weeks of the war, the movement increasingly redirected its attention toward Germans who seemed to lack conviction for a ‘scorched earth’ defence, and Werewolf Radio even hinted that it might be necessary to fight on, both against the enemy and against domestic ‘traitors’, even after the collapse of the Nazi regime, a possibility that had never previously been considered – ‘Only by ceaselessly fighting can we prove to the enemy that it would be senseless to attempt to keep us down for years with an army of occupation. Ceaseless fighting will make life a hell for the enemy occupation troops.’3 Obviously, this process involved an increasing politicization of the Werewolf apparatus and its conversion from being a mainly military instrument.

Since the Werewolf movement as a whole never exceeded the sum of its parts and was much-defined by its various portions, perhaps the best way to proceed is to delineate its constituent elements and to depict each of these it turn, beginning with its original SS core.

PRÜTZMANN’S WERWOLF

Former officers of the German Landeschutz (national guard) began in the spring of 1944 to discuss with Waffen-SS leaders the contingency of Nazi guerrilla resistance in any German borderland areas that might eventually be occupied by the Western Allies or the Soviets. The Waffen-SS chief, Gottlob Berger, himself a former officer in the partisan units maintained by the German Army in the 1920s, was particularly interested in these discussions, and he contacted Generalleutnant von Voss, the former head of Weimar-era guerrilla forces, in order to get his help in plotting out the course for a new guerrilla movement.4 A top secret SS unit to explore the issue was also formed from historians, sociologists, psychologists and counter-intelligence experts with experience in battling anti-German underground movements, and members of this team were sent into Warsaw during the 1944 uprising in order to study the structure of the Polish Home Army.5 Since the senior Nazi leadership had vetoed all talk of defeat, the only possibility that could be anticipated was the evacuation of limited portions of the country. In such areas ‘temporarily’ lost to the enemy, it would be permissible to organize tactical harassing movements by Nazi guerrilla formations as a supposed stage in a mobile war in which Germany would eventually emerge triumphant.

The emphasis during this planning process was on decentralization. Such a course seemed dictated by the enemy air and land attacks that were destroying Germany’s geographic unity, and it also seemed a sound security strategy that would guarantee the entire movement against local captures or desertions that were almost inevitable. Although Waffen-SS officers had been much involved in the planning stage of the movement, it was finally decided, probably by SS boss Heinrich Himmler, to build the organization around the apparatus of local Nazi security officials, the Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPf), of whom there were twenty based in regional headquarters around the country. In the fall of 1944, the HSSPf in the Rhineland, Baden and East Prussia were ordered to appoint ‘Commissioners’ (Beauftragter) responsible for organizing guerrilla warfare, and it was hoped that the Gauleiter and regional Hitler Youth and Brownshirt officials would also appoint similar Beauftragter, who would work together with the HSSPf point-men in order to build local partisan groups.6 Once all of Germany came under effective threat of enemy occupation, this method of organization spread to every area of the country, even districts deep in the interior.

In keeping with the decentralized nature of the movement, much of the initiative for the recruitment, training and supply of prospective guerrillas was handled locally. Some of the HSSPf undertook their tasks vigorously; others did only the minimum demanded by Himmler. Consequently, the strength and vitality of the movement varied from region to region. The fanatic Jürgen Stroop, HSSPf in the Rhenish Palatinate and Hesse-Nassau, managed to field about 1,100 guerrilla fighters; the unenthusiastic Friedrich von Eberstein, HSSPf in southern Bavaria, did almost nothing at all. Local idiosyncrasies were also reflected by the fact that some regional organizations chose their own code names. In northern Bavaria, for instance, Beauftragter Hans Weibgen dubbed his headquarters Special Kommando ‘Klara’; in Thuringia, Obersturmbannführer Wolff called the organization Unternehmen ‘Sterben’ (Enterprise ‘Death’), a term that suggested a sense of foreboding. Apparently, the name ‘Werwolf’ was first used in the fall of 1944 to describe East Prussian partisan troops. The name spread from there, soon becoming a generic label for the entire movement.7 Some debate has recently arisen over the issue of whether ‘Werwolf’ was meant to invoke Löns or to call to mind directly the terror of shape-shifting lycanthropes. It was mainly the former: Himmler told his SS section chiefs in a conference in the fall of 1944 that the name was drawn from the title of Löns’s book.8

Naturally, there was a need for someone to coordinate the Werewolf operation at a national level, and unfortunately for the Nazis, the figure chosen to undertake this crucial function was not a particularly exhilarating or reliable individual. Hans Adolf Prützmann was appointed on 19 September 1944 as ‘General Inspector for Special Abwehr with the Reichsführer-SS’ becoming a sort of central director for Werewolf efforts. Born in 1901 at Tolkemid, near the West Prussian city of Elbing, Prützmann grew up tall and handsome, and developed a gregarious personality. He was a veteran of Freikorps ‘Upper Silesia’ and later liked to brag of having played a part in the underground struggle against the French in the Rhineland and the Ruhr. He joined the Brownshirts in 1929 as well as the Nazi Party and the SS in 1930. After the Nazi take-over in 1933, he rose quickly, becoming a member of the Reichstag, an HSSPf in Hamburg and Königsberg, and eventually the SS police commander in the German-occupied Ukraine. The savage experience of fighting partisans (and killing civilians) in Russia was supposed to have prepared Prützmann for organizing Germany’s own guerrilla units, combined with the fact that he had built home guard detachments of ethnic Germans living in Russia, and that he had negotiated with Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas willing to accept help from the Germans. Through this service, Prützmann made a wealth of friendships and contacts later valuable to the Werewolves: Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was the head of SS anti-partisan units and was destined to play a major role in Werewolf training; Jürgen Stroop, an SS-police commander in the Ukraine and Poland, later became one of the HSSPf in western Germany, an early Werewolf stamping ground; and one of Prützmann’s protégés, Josef Spacil, later became the quartermaster-general of the SS Security Service.9

In theory, Prützmann was an able man; his eventual rank, SS-Oberstgruppenführer, was second only to Himmler’s in the SS hierarchy. He clearly had several gifts – he was clever, self-confident and had an aptitude for staying calm under pressure – but each of these abilities was matched by negative characteristics which reflected the same core values and capacities that made him superficially impressive. He was so intelligent that he felt free to ignore his work; so sure of himself that he was unbearably conceited; so composed that he could maintain a mode of vacant calm even in situations where pumping adrenaline should have driven him to greater efforts. One SS officer who worked with him later described him as ‘ice cold.’ Prützmann’s friend-cum-rival, the SS security chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner, said that the Werewolf leader was ‘lazy, liked to travel around, [and] was never good for serious, consistent work.’ His main interests were women and horses. To further complicate matters, Prützmann’s limited time and energy were thinly spread: on 5 December 1944, he was appointed as the German ‘Special Plenipotentiary’ in Croatia, a job that was supposed to serve as a stepping stone for making Prützmann the SS-police overlord for all of south-eastern Europe in the same manner in which another of Himmler’s favourites, Obersturmbannführer Karl Wolff, had been appointed as SS chief in Italy. There was some suspicion during this period that Waffen-SS boss Gottlob Berger was ready to slide comfortably into Prützmann’s place if the latter started spending too much time in Zagreb, but there was no danger of that happening. As was his wont, Prützmann ignored his Croatian posting even more thoroughly than his other tasks, so that he was never away long enough to be displaced.10

If the Oberstgruppenführer was hardly an inspirational leader, his saving grace was that he was skilful at assembling a staff who attended to all the work that their boss either would not or could not address.11 The key members of the central Werewolf directorate, the Dienststelle ‘Prützmann’, were SA Brigadeführer Siebel, a fifty-year-old militia and Freikorps veteran, tall, well-mannered and military in bearing, who was in charge of Werewolf training; Standartenführer Tschiersky, an SS Security Service officer who had helped field anti-communist guerrillas in Russia and served as Prützmann’s chief of staff; Sturmbannführer Müller-West, Prützmann’s loyal adjutant, seconded from the Waffen-SS, a forty-five-year-old administrative whiz who followed Prützmann to Croatia around the turn of 1944-45; police Hauptmann Schweizer, who was in charge of Werewolf communications and of the organization’s contacts with the ‘Lauschdienst’, the assemblage of SS, army and Luftwaffe men trained in signals and in intercepting enemy messages; Frau Maisch, the diplomat’s wife who headed a female component of the Werewolf organization; and Hauptsturmführer Dr Huhn, the Werewolf specialist in medical supplies and poisons, the latter of which were used both for suicide and for the murder of enemy troops.

This retinue was headquartered in a special camouflaged train codenamed ‘Krista’, which was guarded by police troops and protected by two wagons equipped with anti-aircraft guns. ‘Krista’ was initially based in Petz, near Berlin, later shifted to Rheinsburg, also in the Berlin area, and eventually wound up in Steinebach, in southern Bavaria, a region where Prützmann believed that his guerrillas were especially well-supplied and into which he thought they might one day have to retreat. When Prützmann was not on board ‘Krista’, the train was under the operational and security control of a German army officer named Neuenhoffer. Arrogant and unpopular, Neunhoffer was called back to Berlin on the day after the train arrived in Steinebach, never to return.12

Since so much in the Werewolf organization was determined locally, it is difficult to make generalizations about the movement’s personnel, training, supplies and tactics. Trainees, often known as ‘Prützmann-men’, or ‘P-men’, were usually recruited from the Waffen-SS, the army, the Hitler Youth, the Gestapo and the gendarmerie. There was also some attempt to mobilize civilians, such as the largely unsuccessful effort by Werewolf chiefs in Dresden to recruit Silesian refugees. Several Werewolves captured by the Allies admitted that the movement had a special appeal for Germans who felt guilty of some crime or who believed that they were on an enemy blacklist of war criminals; such elements thought that they had little left to lose. One example was Polizeimeister Wimmer, who was responsible for numerous acts of terror in the Netherlands, including the retaliatory burning of the town of Alem on 20 April 1945, and who was reportedly an active member of the Werewolf organization. Most inductees were given SS uniforms and were paid, insured and accredited by the Waffen-SS. By the end of 1944, about 5,000 Werewolves had already been registered by Prützmann’s staff in Petz.13

Since preparations had first begun along the physical extremities of the Third Reich, it was in the Rhineland, Baden and East Prussia that the movement was most advanced. In the Black Forest and in areas of Germany west of the Rhine, a chain of secret bunkers was dug and then occupied by small Werewolf teams, although the advancing Allies typically had little trouble in uncovering these hideouts and their tenants rarely made any attempts to carry out the tasks for which they had been trained.14 The nature of these tasks was revealed in a report from the leader of a three-man guerrilla team to the intelligence officer of the 353rd Volksgrenadier Division, dated 2 February 1945. This Werewolf chief noted that his group was supposed to sabotage ‘vital’ objectives behind Allied lines; it was free to choose its own methods and had been encouraged to liquidate Germans who collaborated with the enemy, although members were also supposed to disguise themselves as devout Catholics and make contacts with the local clergy. The men had orders to return to their division after their ample supply of canned food was exhausted.15 At a somewhat later date, Werewolves were also used as line-crossers, particularly by units under Field Marshal Model, who was a keen advocate of such deployments.16 At Freiburg im Breisgau, Werewolf partisans were thrown into the defence of the city by garrison commander Rudolf Bader, although they proved less adept at fighting than in smearing city walls with hair-raising threats aimed at ‘defeatists’.17

In the classic fashion of conspiratorial organizations, members of Werewolf cells were known to each other but not to the personnel of other cells. Orders were delivered and information retrieved by mobile SS officers, although Werewolf leaders in south-west Germany also had a ‘mail box’ – a drop point for communications hidden in a tree in the Zuflucht Forest.18 Communications were also maintained by using German and French shortwave wireless sets, which kept cells in contact with regional relay stations in such areas as the Eifel, the Ruhr and the Harz. These regional transmitters were in turn linked to a Werewolf radio headquarters located south-east of Munich. Wireless operators from the Wehrmacht, the SS, the Gestapo and the Hitler Youth were seconded to the Werewolves in order to run this network,19 although the SS Security Service and its newly absorbed military counterpart, the Abwehr, refused to cooperate despite being directly ordered to do so by Himmler. They contended that resources were inadequate and one Security Service officer reported from Wiesbaden that the raw teenagers who had arrived there for training were such a lost cause that they had to be sent home.20

During the last three months of the war, Prützmann realized that a final collapse was inevitable, but apparently did little to convert the Werewolf organization into an agency capable of surviving the cessation of organized resistance by the Wehrmacht.21 One well-connected member of the SS Security Service later told the Allies that Prützmann had ‘created a special organisation within the Werewolves to operate only some time after the end of the war’, but this statement is not substantiated by other sources. The informant, an officer named Olmes, claimed that the Kreisleiter of Ulzen told him shortly before the arrival of the Americans that two members of this special group had been infiltrated into the municipal savings office in Ulzen and that they were being left behind in order to recruit further agents and carry out operations on the Lüneburg Heath.22

When the imminence of defeat began to frazzle even the usually unflappable Prützmann, he began planning a flight to the North Sea or Baltic coastal regions; he talked wistfully of eventually disappearing in the area of Lübeck Bay, with which he was familiar. As intended, when the time came that enemy advances were on the verge of bisecting Germany into two separate halves, one in the north and one in the south, Prützmann fled northward even though his Dienststelle simultaneously travelled to the supposed Werewolf stronghold in the Bavarian Alps. By the end of April 1945, Prützmann had established an emergency headquarters in the Colonial School in Rendsburg,23 a town in central Schleswig, and he usually kept himself in the near-vicinity of Himmler, probably in the hope that the latter could pull the entire SS out of a tough spot by negotiating a last-minute armistice with the Western Powers.

After the capitulation, Prützmann was forced to give up on the idea of trying to dicker with the Western Allies. He and a few officers reportedly wandered around northern Germany in semi-civilian dress, minus the faithful Horst Müller-West, who threw in the towel on 6 May 1945 and reported to a collection centre at Flensburg. The vague intention of Prützmann and his fellow hold-outs was to break through to the alleged Werewolf redoubt in the Alps. They never got there. On 11 or 12 May, this motley band was caught by the British at Hohenlied, near Eckernförde. After shifting Prützmann to several POW compounds, the British eventually sent him to Field Marshal Montgomery’s intelligence headquarters at Lüneburg, where about a week after his capture, the Werewolf chief succeeded in taking his own life by swallowing a vial of cyanide. He had apparently been rattled by his interrogators’ suggestion that he would fare poorly after being handed over to the Soviets, given his numerous crimes in the Ukraine. Although three capsules of poison had already been discovered in Prützmann’s clothes and personal effects, he had managed to hide a fourth dose that he consumed when alone in his cell. Ironically, the caretaker who lost Prützmann in this dramatic fashion, British Sergeant Major Edwin-Austin, failed to learn much from the incident. The same soldier was guarding Himmler on 23 May 1945 when the latter was also able to kill himself through similar means.24

Although most Werewolf formations disbanded around the time of the German capitulation, a few fanatics expressed an intention of carrying on, mainly with the hope of making the full occupation of Germany so difficult that the enemy would lose heart and become eager to withdraw occupation forces.25 In the woods north of the Sudeten town of Aussig, a Werewolf squad leader tried to convince officers of the 4th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment to join him in an extended partisan campaign against the Soviets and Czechs, only to be rudely rebuffed.26 In the Black Forest, another local Werewolf leader was captured by the French and explained that his group had adopted a long-term strategy, assuming that a period of approximately three years would be necessary to organize operations on a large-scale.27 Some of the most fanatic HSSPf aided in this effort; Stroop withdrew nearly 300 young Werewolves into the Alps in order to prepare for an extended campaign, although on 9 May he himself bolted and surrendered to the Americans while disguised as a Wehrmacht reserve officer, leaving his forlorn Werewolves vainly trying to garrison the Tyrolean town of Kufstein.28

The bulk of Dienststelle ‘Prützmann’, now led by Siebel, was involved in a similarly flailing effort. As rail car ‘Krista’ rolled southwards, disguised as the headquarters of a Field Police Kommando, officers of the detachment engaged in pipedreams about post-capitulation adventures. At Germering, the unit’s guard formation was dissolved, the special train was returned to the Reichsbahn, and the remainder of the staff conducted a further flight into the ‘Alpine Redoubt’. Eventually, these personnel joined with a smattering of combat soldiers and supply troops to form a Werewolf battle group, but this unit, constantly hampered by breakdowns, desertions and bad weather, was eventually pinned down by the Americans and dispersed.29 This was as close as the SS-Werwolf got to a vainglorious last stand.

AXMANN’S WERWOLF

Most of the chiefs of the Werewolf hierarchy – the notable exception was Karl Tschiersky30 – hoped to use recruits from the Hitler Youth as the main cannon fodder for the organization’s activities. The bosses of the Hitler Youth naturally had different ideas. Adults in the group’s leadership cadre had no intention of playing second fiddle to the overlords of the SS, and many of the younger members of the movement deeply resented the more senior generations in their own organization and in the SS and the party, many of whom seemed to be standing in the way of their own advancement. The more militant of these youths had a strong desire to prove themselves in some dramatic endeavour, particularly one in which their elders had failed. The war is an example that comes readily to mind. Moreover, this cohort’s anti-establishmentarianism was sometimes focused upon moderate elements that seemed to merit censure, such as ‘defeatists’, ‘reactionaries’, and ‘potential collaborators.’ Such tendencies were similar to those manifested two decades later by the Chinese Red Guards, who in 1966-67 scorched the heels of the old order and displayed their radical disdain for the powers-that-be. Obviously, it was difficult for the Hitler regime to ride this tiger of generational conflict, but efforts to redirect its power toward enemies in both east and west were not without effect.

There is some evidence that sporadic preparations for Hitler Youth stay-behind operations preceded those of the SS-Werwolf by quite a measure, dating at least as far back as 1943. Four Hitler Youth spies captured by the Americans in Heidelberg on 21 or 22 April 1945 had been told about the history of their network, and it was an interesting story that they related to their interrogators. According to these agents, a Hitler Youth underground, organized for the purposes of both espionage and sabotage, had once been headquartered in Paris, whereafter it was evacuated to the Mannheim area and thence on to a location in southern Bavaria. Allegedly, the network retained international links, particularly in France, where German agents were sent in 1944-45 posing as Alsatians. Information about senior instructors in Hitler Youth training camps suggests that the movement was supported – or perhaps even controlled – by Abwehr front intelligence formations. Such a theory is further supported by the corroborative evidence of another captured Hitler Youth agent, nineteen-year-old Hubert Kamp, who was arrested at Longuyon on 23 March 1945. Kamp had begun espionage and sabotage training in April 1943, when he entered a special reconnaissance school run by Hitler Youth District 85, based at Trier. He was activated in January 1945 and told to penetrate enemy lines while posing as an agricultural worker, whereafter he was supposed to collect intelligence on Allied military movements and pass this information on to fellow agents in radio contact with German lines.31

In early October 1944 this modest program was given a potentially mass character when one of the regional leaders of the Hitler Youth in western Germany, Oberbannführer Kloos, was ordered by the Reich Youth Leader, Arthur Axmann, to organize a large-scale Hitler Youth resistance movement.32 At this point it was apparently envisioned that nearly all members of the Hitler Youth over fourteen years of age would be formed into either combat, reconnaissance or guerrilla units, although the dividing line between these different functions was not clearly defined. A good example of this program is provided by the experiences of two sixteen-year-old refugees from American-occupied Aachen, Richard Wendels and Willi Putz. In December 1944, Bannführer Scheuer, a Hitler Youth chief from Aachen, recruited Wendels, Putz and a number of other boys from amongst Hitler Youth labourers digging field fortifications along the Western Front. Scheuer’s pitch was that volunteers would be engaged in a ‘special schooling’ program which would replace the combat training that had become the normal channel of development for most Hitler Youth members, and for which the boys were slated. Given this approach, the program attracted many boys who were hardly fanatical but wanted to avoid military training. Nonetheless, even most of these boys still believed in many of the stock Nazi ‘truths’ about the war and about the supposedly exhausted condition of the enemy. Once initiated, the boys were told that they were now part of Project ‘Nussknacker’ (‘Nutcracker’), and that they could consider themselves sworn to secrecy on pain of death. Along with forty other boys from locations west of the Rhine, the lads were run through a six week program in infantry tactics, demolitions, sabotage and reconnaissance, all staged on the grounds of the ‘Adolf Hitler School’ in Königswinter.33

Meanwhile, Axmann had been informed that the SS was working on an identical program, probably with the implication that the latter had precedence. Under pressure, Kloos was transferred to the Dienststelle ‘Prützmann’ in January 1945, thereafter becoming the Werewolves’ designated specialist for Hitler Youth recruitment and training. Regional Hitler Youth Beauftragter were appointed in order to liaise with their HSSPf and Nazi Party counterparts, and the chiefs of existing youth guerrilla groups were ordered on 18 January 1945 to put their organizations at the service of the HSSPf. Sabotage supplies were henceforth drawn from the HSSPf, and Dienststelle ‘Prützmann’ got the right to exercise a loose jurisdiction over Hitler Youth guerrilla training schools. The HSSPf also became responsible for arranging draft deferment for military-age Werewolf volunteers from the Hitler Youth. Kloos’ staff and the regional Hitler Youth Beauftragter were all given formal Waffen-SS grades and uniforms, although they were probably unsettled to learn that these SS designations came with the expectation that the recipients would earn their ranks through direct participation in combat at the front or along enemy lines of communication.

This arrangement was not as cosy as it appeared. Many Hitler Youth guerrilla chiefs refused to put themselves under effective SS control or even to reveal the nature and extent of their local programs. Kloos and his regional Beauftragter also retained control over important functions wholly independent of Dienststelle ‘Prützmann.’ These included the use of volunteers to detonate ‘scorched earth’ demolitions and to ‘remove… persons who are under suspicion on account of their political sympathies and who stay in the evacuated areas in order to help the enemy.’ It was precisely through such activities that alienated youths were able to vent their most hostile feelings toward the old order. One popular couplet promised: ‘Whoever is of the German spirit, will with us bind. Whoever hoists the white flag, will a knife in his body find.’ Line-crossers trained by the commando units of the Abwehr – a program under the purview of Kloos that antedated the Werewolves – also remained formally outside SS-Werwolf command channels.34 Moreover, Hitler Youth-Werewolves continued to use the distinctive ‘Nutcracker’ code name.35

After some success in deploying Hitler Youth members as reconnaissance agents in the first few months of 1945, the program was showing signs of disintegration by late March. Recruits who began training during this period started the detailed courses necessary to prepare effective wireless operators and stay-behind agents, but the exigencies of Germany’s desperate military situation soon led Werewolf organizers to abandon proper training schedules and rush Hitler Youth guerrillas into action with unspecified missions, after completion of which they were simply supposed to return home. Recruits from the western Ruhr, for instance, were sent into action on 3 April 1945, after their school at Mettmann was threatened by enemy advances. Their commander, Leutnant Hermann Elfers, forced the trainees to sign Werewolf oaths of service, which no one had a chance to read before initialling, and they were then presented with demolition kits. The teams were infiltrated through Allied lines, whereafter they were supposed to bury their explosives and then reconnoitre appropriate targets. Re-supply was to be delivered via Nazi Party stay-behind agents, who had contact with a local underground headquarters called Dienststelle ‘Lausbub’.36

A further step in the same unsteady direction came with the distribution of leaflets to encourage sabotage by Hitler Youth boys to whom the Werewolf had been unable to provide personal instruction or who had been too young to be evacuated to training camps in the German hinterland. Despite nationwide shortages of paper and ink, crucial stocks of these materials were diverted in March 1945 toward the preparation of this incendiary type of literature. One such pamphlet, ‘Miscalculations of Our Enemies’, was distributed by the Hitler Youth Beauftragter in the southern Rhineland. Werewolf organizers were told to reinforce the main points of the leaflet with exhortations explaining how sabotage in enemy-occupied territory could cause crucial diversions of American forces and play a direct role in hindering supplies of material used to kill German soldiers. Even Josef Broz Tito was extolled as a hero who had begun his career as ‘a petty bandit and saboteur’, but eventually wound up causing the German high command severe difficulties.37

One example of the activities of misguided youth inspired by such means came from the valley of the Lahn River, where American authorities arrested four boys at Giessen on 28 April 1945. These lads were not very well trained and had only one pistol, but their aspirations were boundless. Once they had procured arms and ammunition, they planned to ambush an American jeep, destroy a bridge near Dorlar, blast a railway span between Lollar and Wetzlar, and then cap their campaign by blowing up a munitions train. American counter-intelligence agents noted that although these would-be perpetrators were caught before they could act, the threat was hardly idle – ‘The main thing that these fanatic adolescents were lacking was organization.’38

Perhaps the greatest point of distinction between the Hitler Youth’s Werewolf structure and its SS counterpart was that coherent and vigorous preparations were made by the movement’s leaders in order to anticipate post-war conditions. Agents trained as line-crossers were sometimes told to expect future missions even if all of Germany was eventually occupied, in which case they would receive appropriate orders.39 In March 1945, Axmann and other senior officials met with the German commando chief Otto Skorzeny in order to discuss possibilities for post-capitulation operations. The conferees were given impressive demonstrations of Nipolit and other explosives.40 In late April Moscow Radio reported – probably with good reason – that Axmann had received a direct mandate from Hitler to gather 50,000 Hitler Youth boys in the Alps and train them as ‘death battalions.’