The Russian Army and the First World War E-Book

Nik Cornish

• Herausgeber: Spellmount
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 361

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2006

Beschreibung

This book covers not only the three major events on the Eastern Front, the battle of Tannenburg and the March and October Revolutions, it also dispels some of the myths that have grown up around the Tsar's army: their often-cited inability to adapt to 'modern' warfare being one. The nationalist formations and the Revolutionary units of the Provisional Goverment are also described, something difficult if not impossible to find in other publications. 140 photographs and six maps bring the Eastern Front into sharp focus.

Leseprobe

This book is dedicated to my mother, Dorothy Gardner, for always being there and to my children Alex and Charlotte for being who they are.

Acknowledgements

Thanks and acknowledgements are due to the following splendid people: Stephen Perry, Dmitry Belanovsky, Norbert Hofer, August Blume, Lt Col Tom Hillman (US Army), Steve Locker-Lampson and Angie Meyrick-Brown.

Contents

Title

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1

Russia to 1914

Chapter 2

1914: The Shock of War

Chapter 3

1915: A Time of Mixed Fortunes

Chapter 4

Winter 1915–16

Chapter 5

The Caucasian Front

Chapter 6

1916, Brusilov’s Summer

Chapter 7

Romanian Winter 1916-17

Chapter 8

1917: The Hopeful Revolution

Chapter 9

1917, Kerensky’s Offensive: The Last Gamble

Chapter 10

Epilogue: September-November 1917, Russia’s Exit

Appendix 1

The Russian Navy

Appendix 2

The Russian Military Air Fleet

Appendix 3

TAON: The Heavy Artillery of Special Duty

Appendix 4

Conscription and Casualties

Appendix 5

Chemical Warfare

Bibliography

Copyright

Introduction

I have written this book with the simple purpose of providing a reasonably clear introduction to the Russian Army of 1914–18 and events on the Eastern Front during that period. Militarily this was the era of many new technologies and industrial warfare but set in the minds of many soldiers, of all nations, were the ideas of glory, a noble cause and victory in under a year. These men were not fools, but rather products of their training, societies and modes of thinking. There had been several wars during the fifty years before 1914 but no one influential person was gifted with the powers of a seer to be able to anticipate what the First World War would be like.

Three events dominate much of the western literature that covers this subject: the battle of Tannenberg and the revolutions of March and November 1917. The Russian defeat at Tannenberg was important and certainly the revolutions of 1917 were world-changing events, but they were not the only things to happen. During the two and a half years that separated the outbreak of war from the outbreak of revolution the Russian Army had learnt the facts and bitter realities of modern warfare through a mix of bloody experience, success and failure. These lessons were common to every other belligerent: what varied from nation to nation was how they were applied and the human cost.

Please note that the dates throughout are given using the Gregorian as opposed to the Julian calendar so that direct parallels may be kept with events elsewhere without continually adding thirteen. Throughout the text the term army will be used to include the navy and air fleet as both were subject to the authority of the Army Headquarters – Stavka.

As there is sometimes more than one Russian personality sharing a surname, initials will be given to avoid confusion other than in the case of major characters. I have deviated from accepted practice by referring to the Austrian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, not as Conrad but as von Hotzendorf. Austria-Hungary will be Austria; Poland refers only to that area of the Russian Empire, not the state that re-emerged at the war’s end.

The Tsar, Nicholas II (seen here reviewing the Konvoi) loved his army. The Konvoi was the Tsar’s personal bodyguard and was composed of Cossacks from the Kuban and Terek regions of the north Caucasus. Nicholas’ birthday (6 May 1868) was the festival of the prophet Job which was regarded as highly inauspicious.

In 1914 the provinces of Austria, Galicia and the Bukovina where much of the fighting took place were still almost unknown lands, undeveloped and populated by peasant farmers whose lifestyle had changed little during the previous 500 years. Across the frontier in Russia life was little different. Neither the Russians nor the Austrians had provided much in the way of roads and railways and this lack of infrastructure was to play havoc with troop and supply movements during the war years. When it rained, the earth tracks turned to mud and any movement slowed to a crawl. Moving north into Poland conditions were similar, although the population density was greater and rail links marginally better. It was only across the border in East Prussia that conditions improved significantly, here the German government had overseen the development of strategic roads and railways to facilitate the rapid movement of their army in all weathers.

A final point regarding the Central Powers, Austria and Germany. Although they were allies they did not enjoy a unified plan or command structure. Certainly for the first year of the war Austria pursued a semi-independent strategy: it was only from mid-1916 that the Germans exercised almost complete control over operations.

CHAPTER 1

Russia to 1914

Background

During the century leading up to 1914 Russia’s military experience had been mixed. Having effectively destroyed Napoleon’s Grand Army during the winter of 1812–13, the army of Tsar Alexander I emerged as the most powerful in Europe. However, during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825–55) the fear of a revolution led by army officers tainted with western-style liberalism created an atmosphere that discouraged innovation and initiative. This stifling of independent, creative thought produced an army that was plagued by a determination to perform well on the parade ground and translate this precision onto the battlefield. Consequently the army that faced the Turkish-British-French alliance during the Crimean War was defeated by generals whose performance was only marginally less inept than their Russian opponents.

Alexander II, who succeeded his father in 1855, recognised that military reform was vital when informed by his War Minister that it would take up to six months to assemble four army corps on the border with Austria. Yet things moved slowly in imperial Russia and it was only with the appointment of General D. A. Miliutin as War Minister in 1862 that things began to improve.

Throughout the 1860s and 1870s the army was engaged in a series of campaigns in the Caucasus and Central Asia which impeded the reform process and consumed the military budget. Furthermore in 1861 Alexander II had emancipated the serfs and this colossal piece of social engineering, involving over ninety per cent of the population, was more than enough to deal with, certainly in economic terms. Nevertheless, by 1865 the empire was divided into fifteen military districts. Each of these areas was, in effect, a small state answerable to the Tsar and the War Ministry in St Petersburg. The War Minister was chief military adviser to the Tsar and controlled the Imperial Headquarters, the Military Council, the High Military Council, the War Ministry Staff and the Main Staff. Despite this profusion of bureaucrats there was no General Staff and all decisions remained the prerogative of the Tsar. In 1868 a new Field Regulations Manual was issued. It noted that the army (in this was included the navy) was to be led by a Supreme Commander in Chief who, “represented the person of the Tsar and was invested with Imperial authority”. It was assumed that, in time of war, the War Minister would lead the armies in the field regardless of his command experience. This situation was to remain unchanged until the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917.

Following the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) General N. N. Obruchev reported that Austria and the newly united Germany would be the most likely enemies of Russia in any future conflict. And due to the excellent railway networks at their disposal they could mobilise their forces in half the time it took the Russians and that they would outnumber the Russian army by a considerable margin. The area under immediate threat was Poland jutting peninsula-like between German East Prussia and Austrian Galicia. Poland west of the Vistula River was virtually indefensible, but a system of fortresses covered Warsaw and the shoulders of the Polish salient. Obruchev suggested investing £4,000,000, twenty-five per cent of the annual military budget, in upgrading the fortresses and extending the railways in that region as well as doubling the number of available troops within easy reach of Poland. At that time, 1873, Russia’s army of theoretically 1,400,000 men was 500,000 understrength and could barely cope with its current responsibilities, let alone expand.

A conference chaired by the Tsar was convened and following a series of stormy meetings, it was agreed to introduce conscription but that the strengthening of the Polish railways and fortresses and, “other items [would have to] wait upon the financial means at hand” because the Finance Minister declared that any further military expenditure would bankrupt the empire. The basic idea of conscription was to create a body of time-served, trained men who at mobilisation would swell the ranks of the active or standing army and provide replacements.

With the introduction of universal military service on 1 January 1874 all males over the age of twenty-one were required to spend six years in the active army and nine in the reserve. Men who did not serve with the active army were to register for the Imperial Militia (Opolchenie) that could only be called to the colours by Imperial Decree (Ukase). In practice there was a multitude of exemptions that excused almost half of those reaching military age from peacetime service and a quarter from wartime service. Nevertheless Miliutin now had the manpower to expand the army.

The infantry grew to three Guards, four Grenadier and forty-one line divisions, each of four, four-battalion regiments. Distributed along the borders were twenty-nine rifle battalions. A battalion numbered one thousand officers and men. Each division was allotted an artillery brigade with sixty-four guns grouped in eight gun batteries.

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, pictured here in the uniform of a hussar regiment, shortly before becoming Supreme Commander in Chief of Russia’s armed forces. The Grand Duke was an imposing figure, well over six feet tall, who reputedly enjoyed the confidence of the rank and file. Born in 1856 the Grand Duke retired to his estates in the Crimea in 1917 and took no further part in Russian politics. He died in exile in the south of France in 1929 where he was given a state funeral.

The cavalry, artillery and other branches of service expanded proportionately. The cavalry now consisted of two Guards, fifteen line and two Cossack divisions. A cavalry division comprised two brigades each of two regiments. The first brigade having a lancer and dragoon regiment, the second a hussar and a Cossack regiment. A regiment numbered almost 800 officers and men. However, Guards regiments were frequently home to more officers than their establishment due to the social cachet of such regiments and the selection procedure, including the candidate’s capacity to hold his liquor like a gentleman, was scrupulous in the extreme.

The Cossacks perceived themselves as a military caste and were treated as irregulars enjoying different terms of service established decades before. They were divided into two groups; hosts, those of the steppe, the Stepnoy, and those of the Caucasus, the Kavkas. In 1914 there were nine Stepnoy hosts and two Kavkas. The largest Stepnoy host was that of the Don, the Kuban the largest of the Kavkas, between them they provided over fifty per cent of the Cossack manpower. Other than a small number of Kuban Cossack infantry battalions, the plastuni, Cossacks were cavalry with their own horse artillery formations. Each Cossack regiment was backed by two more composed of older men: these second and third line regiments would, in time of war, be attached to army corps for escort, reconnaissance and other duties. This structure would remain the basis on which the Russian Army went to war in 1914. Finns and native Caucasions were exempt from conscription as were all the Tsars Moslem and Asiatic subjects.

In 1874 it was announced that the Polish fortresses, particularly the major ones at Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk would undergo a rolling programme of modernisation over the next thirty years at a cost of £6,500,000. The value of the changes was tested during the Russo-Turkish War, the first serious challenge Russia’s reforming army would face.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877–78

On 24 April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. The causes and course have no place here but the effect on the Russian Army does.

Russia’s mobilisation and deployment to the main theatre of operations (modern day Bulgaria) was carried out efficiently. But the region lacked roads and railways and those through Romanian territory were primitive. The supply route was long and tortuous as Russia lacked a significant naval presence on the Black Sea and was thus confined to the land. The Turks had adopted a defensive strategy based around the town of Plevna that was defended by hastily thrown up earthworks. The Russian plan of campaign had anticipated that the fighting would be over before Christmas. However, Plevna’s stout defence prolonged the war into the next year. The entrenched Turkish infantry were presented with the opportunity to use their excellent Peabody-Martini rifles against Russian and Romanian infantry who advanced in neat formations across almost open ground with inadequate artillery support. Inevitably the attackers were mown down, but Plevna eventually fell. The victory was regarded as clear proof of the value of fortresses and the Russian belief that bravery and the bayonet would always triumph over the rifleman. What their analysis would have been had the Turks deployed machine guns in their trenches is unknown. As it was Russia had suffered over 100,000 casualties and the losses amongst officers had been particularly high as they had to expose themselves to retain control over a battlefield that lacked communications and cover and where they were expected to lead very clearly from the front.

A Cossack outpost on Manchurian front during the Russo-Japanese War enjoys a tea break. The small size of their ponies is evident but deceptive as they were hardy, strong and capable of finding forage in the most inhospitable of conditions. The casual pose of the men is rare in photos of this period, as the camera was not common in the front line.

Miliutin established a commission to compile an accurate history of the war. However, the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and Miliutin’s resignation led to the commission’s report being delayed for twenty years by which time its conclusions were almost redundant.

The new Tsar, Alexander III was a parsimonious reactionary as was his War Minister General P. S. Vannovski. The officer corps and the men were discouraged from study as in the time of Nicholas I and the heroes of Russia’s Napoleonic campaigns were chosen as more appropriate role models than contemporaries such as Germany’s von Moltke or the Confederacy’s Lee or Jackson.

Despite the economic retrenchment of Alexander’s reign, he did allow for the introduction of a new rifle, the Mosin-Nagant M1891 7.62mm, that was to remain in service for over 50 years. Alexander disliked the growing western influence that was creeping into Russian life and undertook a wholesale “Russification” of the army’s uniforms which led to the adoption of a very simple style of dress; a loose tunic, trousers and knee boots which reflected traditional peasant attire. All regular cavalry regiments were converted into dragoons reflecting their new role as mounted infantry. Unpopular as these changes were, the Tsar had spoken and therefore the decisions were beyond question. Diplomatically the picture was gloomy; Russia stood alone until, in 1894, the Tsar signed a defensive treaty with France that was to draw republic and autocracy closer and closer during the next 20 years.

The empire now reached from the Pacific Ocean to the middle of Europe and from the Arctic to the deserts of central Asia and it was this vast expanse, one sixth of the Earth’s landmass, which Alexander bequeathed to his son Nicholas II on his death in 1894.

Nicholas II

Nicholas II was, for a variety of reasons, ill-prepared for the role he was to play. Nevertheless he was committed to the idea of preserving the monarchy as it was at the time of his father’s death so he married a woman, Alexandra of Hesse-Darmstadt, who was equally if not more committed to this ambition. Both Nicholas and Alexandra disliked court life and withdrew from the capital city of St Petersburg to live at Tsarskoe Selo some 24kms (15 miles) away. However, despite their belief in the common people’s devotion to the dynasty, the imperial couple’s unpopularity began with the aristocracy and seeped downwards through society over the course of the next twenty years.

To those of a liberal persuasion Nicholas was a tyrant, indifferent to the lives of his people and devoted to the maintenance of his family’s position. To those of the right he was the living symbol of the state wherein the characteristics of warlord, spiritual leader and political patronage were manifest. To the mass of his subjects he was simply the Tsar, the all-powerful, all-seeing ruler in whose name policies were formulated, laws passed and wars fought. The Tsar was the embodiment of the state and his word brooked no opposition. Simplistic as these perceptions may appear they were the essence of imperial Russia, which during the early years of the twentieth century was viewed by foreigners as being a snowbound enigma: on the one hand cruel, unpredictable and threateningly xenophobic, while on the other mystical, immensely wealthy, ripe for economic exploitation and a potentially unconquerable ally. Tsarist Russia could provide evidence for any label an observer chose to hang on her, depending on need or political standpoint. Nicholas inherited from his father a multi-ethnic, multi-faith land-based empire. But although over eighty per cent of the people were peasant farmers there was a growing urban population, a tiny but rising mercantile and entrepreneurial class and the beginnings of an industrial revolution. However, many of the recently conquered lands in the Caucasus and Asia were not assimilated into the empire. Similarly, despite intensive Russification programmes, Poland, the Baltic provinces and Finland had nationalist – often socialist – underground movements. In the words of Count Sergei Witte, President of the Tsar’s Council of Ministers, Russia was, “essentially a military empire.” Indeed civil servants wore uniforms and were, to the untutored eye, virtually indistinguishable from the military on gala occasions. The Council of Ministers was the body that advised the Tsar on all matters of policy and below them a vast bureaucracy carried out the decisions thus made. But there was no elected body to represent the interests of society at large. A degree of local government had been established some years before but these bodies, the Zemstvos, had limited powers and were elected by a very exclusive group of voters.

Nicholas’ first military test was to come in 1904 with a war against people he described as, “long-tailed monkeys” – the Japanese.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05

Again the causes and course are out of place here but the effects on Russia and its army are not. In 1903 the army numbered over 750,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry with 5,500 guns. When fully mobilised some 70,000 Cossacks would swell the ranks to almost 1,000,000 without calling on the reserves or the Opolchenie. As a British commentator remarked, “The Russian army must always be a very formidable foe from its great numerical strength.” But the majority of these troops were quartered within European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains; the war with Japan was to be fought thousands of miles to the east in Manchuria.

The war began on 8 February 1904 with a surprise Japanese naval attack on the Russian Pacific squadron in their base at Port Arthur. The Russians initially relied on units of the Pri Amur and Siberian military districts, which amounted to just over 140,000 men with 120 guns operating from Mukden. Reinforcements, drawn from the Kiev, Moscow and Kazan military districts, would be sent via the incomplete, single track Trans-Siberian Railway along which everything from bullets to bandages would also travel. Separated from the munitions factories in the west, the Russian forces in Manchuria were in a potentially critical situation.

The Russian Army’s standard issue machine gun the 7.62mm M1910 Maxim mounted on its signature Sokolov wheeled carriage. Drag ropes were attached to the metal loop at the rear. The thin metal shield is not in use on this example. As with all Russian equipment it was simple to produce and maintain and regarded as “soldier-proof.”

The War Minister, General A. N. Kuropatkin journeyed east to take command but from the beginning was at loggerheads with the regional Viceroy who was theoretical commander of the land and sea forces in the area. The Viceroy wanted to wage an offensive war from the outset whereas Kuropatkin intended to build up his forces and choose his time and place. The result was a compromise and a string of defeats for the Russians. Port Arthur surrendered on 2 January 1905 after a siege lasting for several months during which the Japanese suffered huge casualties as they attempted to storm its entrenchments. Two months later the Russian field army suffered another defeat and Kuropatkin resigned. Nine years to the day after Nicholas’ coronation on 27 May, the Russian Baltic Fleet having steamed from St Petersburg to the Korean coast was destroyed by the Japanese at the battle of Tsushima. Nicholas sued for peace. On 5 September 1905 the war officially ended in the American town of Portsmouth. It is interesting to note that by April 1905 the Japanese treasury and armies were exhausted whereas the Russian field army, despite its losses, had increased in strength and held very strong positions putting Japan’s ultimate victory in doubt. Russia’s domestic problems and the naval defeat at Tsushima brought the war to an end.

The 1905 Revolution

Nicholas firmly believed that, “he was accountable to God for the country entrusted to his care,” and that, “he believed it to be his duty to direct governmental policy according to his own conscience and understanding.” Membership of the Council of Ministers was in his gift and his power was enshrined in the Fundamental Laws, which only he could alter. The deteriorating situation in Manchuria and problems in Poland, along with the deaths of hundreds of civilians who were shot down in St Petersburg on “Bloody Sunday” 22 January 1905 while peacefully attempting to petition the Tsar, led to an empire-wide outburst of sympathy strikes and demonstrations which cut across the social strata. The naval disaster at Tsushima only added to this tale of woe. In June the mutiny of the crew of the battleship Potemkin provided an ominous glimpse of things to come while across the non-Russian areas of the empire nationalist movements were stirring, demanding various degrees of autonomy.

By the autumn of 1905 passions were riding high and a general strike was called. Nicholas finally yielded to the urgings of his Ministers and issued the October Manifesto which granted a range of civil liberties and the establishment of an elected legislature to be known as the Duma. However, the Tsar retained his power over military and foreign affairs and crucially over when the Duma should be called. The October Manifesto effectively satisfied the demands of all but the most militant of revolutionaries. To maintain control the Council of Ministers had dispatched troops to support the police in major trouble spots. Ironically the soldiers were paid more to quell domestic difficulties than to fight a war. Towards the end of 1905 the Semenovsky Guards Regiment, with artillery support, was deployed on the streets of Moscow where it brutally suppressed an armed uprising leaving hundreds dead. For the next eighteen months the army was engaged in hundreds of similar actions but was itself not immune to outbreaks of trouble. During the summer of 1906 the first battalion of the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment, in which Nicholas himself had served when young, refused to obey orders. This mutiny ended rapidly and without bloodshed but demonstrated that politics had spread even to the ranks of the army’s élite. Dozens of similar instances of unrest occurred in the army and navy and were dealt with by a combination of tact and repression, and discipline was gradually restored. Nevertheless such incidents were a clear warning that the armed forces were no longer an obedient, unthinking mass that could be relied upon to obey any order from the sovereign no matter how harsh.

Military reform post-1905

Humiliated by the Japanese, engaged in police actions across the empire and lacking funds to replace lost equipment, the Russian armed forces presented a sorry spectacle in 1906. This crisis prompted the Tsar to listen to his advisers and take action. To increase the pool of trained men the length of service was reduced for the infantry to three years and four in the other branches of service. A new War Minister, General G. F. Rediger, was appointed and a Council of State Defence (CSD) was created and led by the Tsar’s uncle the Grand Duke Nicholas. The CSD’s mission was to oversee military policy and it enjoyed direct contact with the Tsar, bypassing the War Ministry. Furthermore a General Staff, again outside the thrall of the War Ministry, was set up with undisputed power over planning and mobilisation.

With stability returning to Russia revenue became available to provide resources for the military. The CSD proposed a reduction in the size of the army using the savings made to improve its efficiency. However, the War Ministry and both staffs made other proposals. The Tsar took the opportunity to reassert his power and demonstrate his renewed self-confidence by playing one group off against the other. Nicholas decided to allocate the lion’s share of the money to re-equipping the navy splitting the funds between the Black and Baltic Sea fleets.

The Duma was also prey to the Tsar’s rediscovered confidence, its powers were curbed and the franchise narrowed. By 1908 the return of stability firmly convinced Nicholas that reform was unnecessary and it was time to show that he still ran the empire. That year the Grand Duke Nicholas was transferred from the CSD to take charge of the St Petersburg Military District and the powers of the General Staff curtailed. Finally, in 1909 the CSD was abolished and the General Staff brought under the control of the new War Minister General V. A. Sukhomlinov. Happily for Sukhomlinov his appointment coincided with an upturn in the empire’s economic fortunes and significant loans from France, consequently he had money to spend on the armed forces.

With money available to spend on the armed forces one of the measures brought in was the re-introduction of the different classifications of cavalry. Here three NCOs of the 13th Narvski Hussar Regiment pose in the parade, in the field uniforms of their unit. The parade uniform was mid-blue with white frogging.

Choices

Expansion and modernisation would all take time and choices would have to be made. With the benefit of a century of hindsight we can see that Sukhomlinov had a mere five years but at the time this was not obvious. However, as time was not apparently a problem the bureaucratic machinery could grind on at its own pace. A plethora of committees could assemble, negotiate and discuss for example whether to import a new type of heavy gun or create a factory to produce one. New uniforms were introduced and the old cavalry descriptions of hussar and lancer were reintroduced in an effort to improve morale.

But there were undercurrents and disputes, particularly in planning for a future war. The empire’s border was roughly 40,000kms (25,000miles) in length and therefore, with the possibility of war in remote districts, where to deploy was problematic.

Planning

For decades Russian planning had been based on the understanding that its mobilisation would be slower than either Austria or Germany due to their superior railway networks. Therefore the Russian Army would assemble well within its borders covered by the fortress system of Poland that would prevent any surprise attack. When mobilisation and deployment were complete a short campaign would decide the issue.

In 1906 General M. V. Alexeyev, a member of the newly created General Staff, reviewed Russia’s strategic position identifying the Central Powers (Germany and Austria) as the main threat with Germany as the driving force. Alexeyev reiterated the need to adopt an initially defensive posture but argued that Russia’s main effort should be directed against Germany. He reinforced this proposal by declaring that, as the bulk of Germany’s forces would be committed against France, an offensive against Germany, before Russia’s mobilisation was complete, was a risk worth taking.

In 1908 Plan 18 acknowledged the Central Powers as the main threat and determined that the Russian Army would await events until its enemy’s strength and objectives were clear. Two years later Plan 19 was drafted. It called for an “active defence” and allowed for the deployment of units from Siberia to the west as the threat from Japan was believed to have diminished. Fifty-three divisions would face Germany but only nineteen Austria. Most of Poland, including Warsaw and the fortress system would be abandoned, as the troops would deploy further to the east. Both fleets would be subordinated to Stavka (the Supreme Headquarters).

Plan 19 caused uproar. Its opponents, including Alexeyev, argued that such a weak force facing Austria would be unable to prevent Austrian cavalry threatening the rear and communications of the forces facing Germany and capture Warsaw. Furthermore as the loyalty of the Poles was questionable what other trouble might ensue?

The plan’s author, General I. N. Danilov, argued that despite Russia’s increasing military power the army was still comparatively weak and that French support would be inadequate. To quell dissension a compromise was reached resulting in Plan 19 (revised) which came into force in June 1912. As it was mainly under the terms of this plan that Russia went to war in 1914 a deeper examination is justified.

Plan 19 (Revised)

The revision had two variants: A with the main thrust at Austria, or G with the main thrust at Germany. It was understood that A was the most likely scenario even if Germany deployed more troops than anticipated.

Variant A

In this case the plan was, “to go over to the offensive against Austria and Germany with the objective of taking the war into their territory”. Forty-five infantry divisions, divided between Third, Fourth and Fifth armies would comprise the South Western (SW) Front to invade Austria. Twenty-nine infantry divisions, First and Second armies, had the task of, “the destruction of German forces in East Prussia…with the goal of creating an advantageous assembly area for further operations”.

Variant G

The intent in this case was, “to go over to the attack against German forces threatening us from East Prussia, paralysing the enemy on the remaining fronts”. The First, Second and Fourth armies, grouped as North Western (NW) Front, with forty-three infantry divisions would face Germany and only Third and Fifth with thirty-one would challenge divisions Austria.

By October 1913 Plan 20 had been devised which changed the forces committed to Variant A. Eighth Army was added to the line up and SW Front would be split into two groups. Fourth and Fifth armies would invade Austria from the shoulder of the Polish salient, Third and Eighth armies would advance from the east. This deployment would envelop the Austrian army in Galicia, capture the regional capital Lemberg (Lvov), isolate (if not take) the railway junction and fortress of Przemysl, occupy the Carpathian passes and invade Hungary and probably capture the vital railway centre of Cracow. NW Front, First and Second armies, would invade East Prussia and move towards the mouth of the Vistula River west of the great fortress of Konigsberg.

Under the terms of all plans the Army of the Caucasus was deemed to be capable of containing any threat from Turkey, a single corps would monitor Sweden (which the Russians considered likely to cause trouble in Finland). Sixth and Seventh armies would protect the Baltic coastline and the capital St Petersburg and cover Romania respectively. The movements for both variants were the same for the first week of mobilisation so there was a period of grace before final commitments were made. Unfortunately the debates about which enemy to face first created two schools of thought which were not to be reconciled and the discord was to continue beyond 1914.

A further complication was the promise made to the French in 1913 that, “Russia would begin operations against Germany with 800,000 men on M [mobilisation] +15.” The French, in the same year, approved a loan to Russia that was to be used to build or upgrade 5300km (3293 miles) of railway lines in Poland to facilitate a move against Germany. This project had hardly left the drawing board by 1914 but Plan 20 was designed with it in mind.

Another strategic controversy was over whether to retain the Polish fortress system. It was decided to keep it and improve its artillery stock although its value was debatable. Much would depend on how it was used and the weight of artillery an enemy deployed against it. The Plevna and Port Arthur definitive systems had worked effectively and very significantly the fortresses were a potent symbol of imperial power in Poland.

Army reform, 1910–14

The modernisation overseen by Sukhomlinov did not fundamentally alter the structure of Miliutin’s army that rested on the army corps and cavalry division. The standing army was divided into thirty-seven corps; the Guards, the Grenadiers, I–XXV line, I–III Caucasian, I and II Turkestan and I–V Siberian. These included all the infantry divisions with their attached artillery. The usual structure of a corps was comprised of two infantry divisions, two field artillery brigades (each of two divizions or half regiments) of six, eight-gun batteries, a sapper battalion, telegraph and telephone sections and one divizion of light howitzers, two, six-gun batteries. The 208 line infantry regiments recruited from specific areas, the Guards, the Grenadiers and all other branches of service from across the empire.

Even though the Russo-Japanese War had highlighted the difficulties of command, communications and control across a large combat zone, the infantry retained the four-battalion regiment, including an eight-gun machine gun section and specialist scouting and communications personnel. In total the wartime strength of a regiment was 4000 officers and men.

During this period it was decided to disband the fortress troops and reserve formations. Instead cadres, trained with the standing army, would form the basis of thirty-five reserve divisions which would be numbered from Fifty-three to eighty-four and from the 12th to the 14th Siberian. These divisions would have the same structure as those of the standing army but the artillery would not be as modern. An additional seven infantry divisions for the standing army were to be raised and the Opolchenie would provide 640 battalions.

The cavalry establishment in 1913 stood at twenty-four divisions; including the Guards and the Cossacks with a further eight separate brigades. Each division included eight machine guns and specialist scouting, communications and demolition sections as well as two six-gun horse artillery batteries. The military districts of the Caucasus, Siberia, Finland, Turkestan and Kiev all had two batteries of mountain artillery, the latter for use in the Carpathian Mountains. Artillery ammunition was stockpiled at 1000 rounds per gun, a third more than the total expended during the Russo-Japanese War but less than the French who maintained 1390 for their field artillery.

Industrialisation

Field artillery, rifle and small arms production and stock in hand were deemed to be adequate for a future war. However, Russia lacked the capacity to produce heavy artillery. To overcome this, negotiations were under way with Vickers of Britain to build and manage a factory in Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad/Volgograd) to produce guns for the army and possibly the navy. The negotiations were protracted as the Russians were seeking to expand their domestic industrial capacity. Therefore to fill the gap one hundred and twenty-two 152mm (6-inch) guns were bought from Schneider of France and a similar order was placed in Germany for 122mm (4.8-inch) guns. Tooling and skilled workers were also brought in to allow for the licensed production of heavy artillery. Aircraft, aero engines and motor vehicles had been imported from a variety of suppliers again with an eye to creating Russian-based production facilities. It must be understood that government and private investment was viewed as long term and decisions were made on the basis that speed was not of the essence before or even after 1914.

A Junior Under Officer (corporal) of the Pavlovski Guards Regiment. The piping on the tunic front is white but the main distinguishing feature of this regiment was the turned up noses of the men. All the Guards regiments jealously protected their traditions and were very selective when choosing recruits. A British commentator described the Guards infantry during 1916 as, “The finest human animals in Europe.”

The Russians had experimented with armoured cars for several years before 1914. Pictured here is one of the first tested. Made by the Charron Automobile Company of France it was armed with a single 8mm Hotchkiss machine gun in the turret. The gun barrel is protected in the usual Russian manner with thin sheet metal. One vehicle of this type saw service with a cavalry formation in 1914.

Training and debate

Following the 1905 revolution the army’s training had taken second place to internal security missions. During the years that followed some efforts were made to expand the men’s skills beyond parade ground necessities but the quality of training depended on the enthusiasm and motivation of the Military Districts’ staffs which were sometimes lacking.

The officer corps was variable in quality and an inordinate amount of their time was taken up with paperwork. Although the number passing through the Staff Academy was rising and professionalism was growing, there were still many who regarded a military career as less than serious – after all, war was still perceived across much of Europe as a great adventure that would be brief and glorious.

Amongst the more serious students of military theory was Colonel A. A. Nezmanov who was closely involved in the writing of the new field regulations. Nezmanov believed that the army command needed a unified doctrine for conducting a war and questioned many traditional Russian military theories. He became such a figure of controversy that the Tsar intervened personally to end the resultant disputes with the words, “Military doctrine consists of doing everything I order.”

Artillery officer cadets under training with the Schneider M1910 122mm (4.8 inch) howitzer in the months before 1914. This piece was imported from France and licensed to be built in Russia. Served by 8 men, it fired a 22.7kg (50lbs) shell 7,680m (8,400 yards). With modifications it served with the Red army during the Second World War.

Many of those younger staff officers who shared Nezmanov’s iconoclastic views found themselves sidelined and promoted to the provinces by their more conservative superiors. Money for new technology and more men coupled with the long established prowess of a Russian soldier wielding a bayonet would be more than enough to see off any enemy. The Tsar approved a further round of spending in November 1913. The “Great Programme for Strengthening the Army” would provide more men, including a further six cavalry divisions, more artillery and more equipment than ever before. Eight months later the Duma also gave its approval to the Great Programme which it was anticipated would take three years to complete.

Tsarist Russia did not have three years. The assassination of the Austrian heir apparent on 28 June 1914 set Europe on the slippery path to war and just over five weeks later the sunny avenues of Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna and St Petersburg would be ringing with the measured tread of men marching into battle.

The citizens of St Petersburg greeted Germany’s declaration of war at the beginning of August with a vast demonstration of loyalty. But in the countryside Milukov (leader of the Kadet-Liberal party) remembered, “…eternal silence reigned”. At the end of August 1914 St Petersburg became Petrograd, a more Slavonic name.

Although Sukhomlinov had just a few months earlier declared, “Russia is ready”, had the right choices been made? Nezmanov had written, “We must know what we want” about the lack of a common military doctrine. That question suddenly took on a new urgency. The realities of war would mean that incorrect choices and indecision would have to be paid for in flesh and blood. The campaigns of 1914 would be a testing time.

CHAPTER 2

1914: The Shock of War

Mobilisation and deployment

During the early summer of 1914 the Russian empire had been experiencing wave after wave of strikes and unrest. In St Petersburg itself demonstrations were an almost daily occurrence, presenting the picture of a state divided against itself. As the Balkan crisis deepened, the government authorised the armed forces to assume the condition of the Period Preparatory for War under which the class of men who were due to complete their military service was retained. As the diplomatic services attempted to prevent war, the Tsar telegraphed his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II in a last ditch effort to resolve matters. However, when this appeal to family feeling proved useless, Nicholas issued the order for general mobilisation at 1800 hours on 31 July. Six hours later Germany declared war on Russia, followed by Austria on 6 August. Almost by magic the strikes and demonstrations ceased to be replaced by crowds declaring their unswerving loyalty to the dynasty and giving practical expression to their feelings by sacking the German embassy under the Nelsonian eye of the police.

The response to the mobilisation order was, on the whole, satisfactory: ninety-six per cent of those summoned answered the Tsar’s call without a qualm. The scattered instances of trouble were generally contained without too much difficulty although at least 225 people, including sixty policemen, died. But as Sir George Buchanan, Britain’s ambassador to Russia remarked, “What would be the feelings of these people for their ‘Little Father’ (the Tsar) were the war to be unduly prolonged?”

As his men travelled to their regiments Nicholas was dissuaded from taking the post of Supreme Commander in Chief and that honour passed to his uncle the Grand Duke Nicholas on 3 August. The Chief of Staff, General N. N. Yanushkevitch, was not the Grand Duke’s choice but the first of many appointments that the Tsar would make to demonstrate his authority. When Romania and Italy declared their neutrality on 3 August the battle lines were clearly drawn. Oddly, the Romanian General Staff were still asking the Austrians where they should deploy as late as 8 August. Clearly news travelled slowly in Bucharest. The Duma was summoned to declare its solidarity with the Tsar and to vote through war credits, both objectives were achieved although with opposition from the extreme left, on 8 August. That same day Yanushkevitch visited the French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, to inform him that the garrison of St Petersburg would be leaving for the front as, “The Government has every confidence in the maintenance of order” in the capital.