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This innovative new collection features six original essays exploring the spatial, temporal, and other structures that shape conscious perception.
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Seitenzahl: 296
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
Each book in the series is devoted to a philosophical topic of particular contemporary interest, and features invited contributions from leading authorities in the chosen field.
Volumes published so far:
The Structure of Perceptual Experience, edited by James Stazicker Irrealism in Ethics, edited by Bart Streumer Classifying Reality, edited by David S. Oderberg Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory, edited by Brad Hooker Agents and Their Actions, edited by Maximilian de Gaynesford Philosophy of Literature, edited by Severin Schroeder Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters, edited by Jussi Suikkanen and John Cottingham Justice, Equality and Constructivism, edited by Brian Feltham Wittgenstein and Reason, edited by John Preston The Meaning of Theism, edited by John Cottingham Metaphysics in Science, edited by Alice Drewery The Self?, edited by Galen Strawson On What We Owe to Each Other, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake The Philosophy of Body, edited by Mike Proudfoot Meaning and Representation, edited by Emma Borg Arguing with Derrida, edited by Simon Glendinning Normativity, edited by Jonathan Dancy
Edited by
JAMES STAZICKER
This edition first published 2015 Originally published as Volume 27, Issue 4 of RatioChapters © 2015 The Authors Book compilation © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
INTRODUCTION
Notes
1 IS THE SENSE-DATA THEORY A REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORY?
1. Introduction
2. Representationalism
3. The Sense-Data Theory
4. Is Sense-Data Theory Compatible with Minimal Representationalism?
5. Is Sense-Data Theory Compatible with Weak, Strong, and Reductive Representationalism?
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
2 NAIVE REALIST PERSPECTIVES ON SEEING BLURRILY
1. Introduction
2. Some Aspects of Naive Realism
3. Seeing Blurrily: A Challenge
4. Developing Naive Realism
5. Seeing Blurrily and Ambitious Naive Realism
6. Seeing Blurrily and Robust Naive Realism
7. Conclusion
Notes
3 PERCEPTUAL GUIDANCE
1. Introduction
2. Guiding Experiences
3. Distinctions
4. Some Perceptual Guidance is Conscious
5. Conscious Guidance is (sometimes) Perceptual
6. Conclusion
Notes
4 THE PERCEPTION OF ACTIVITY
1. A Problem about the Perception of Events
2. Some Initial Responses
3. Activity and the Perception of Activity
4. Conclusion
Notes
5 AUDITORY APPEARANCES
Notes
6 SPACE, TIME AND MOLYNEUX'S QUESTION
1. Molyneux's Question and the Temporal Variation
2. Grush and the Skills-Based View
3. Explaining ASYMMETRY
4. The ‘different spaces, one time’ Explanation
5. Problems for the DSST Explanation
6. The Structural Explanation
7. Perspective, Modality-Specificity and Objectivity
Notes
INDEX
EULA
Chapter 1
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Cover
Table of Contents
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James Stazicker Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom
Fiona Macpherson Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom
Craig French Trinity Hall, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Sebastian Watzl University of Oslo, Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo, Norway
Thomas Crowther Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Matthew Nudds Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Louise Richardson Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, United Kingdom
James Stazicker
Perceptual experiences – for instance, conscious episodes of seeing and hearing – are variously structured. To understand the kind of cognitive contact with the world which perceptual experience provides, we must understand these structures.
We perceive structural features of our environment such as spatial, temporal and perhaps causal relations among perceived objects and events. But arguably perceptual experiences themselves are also structured by relations among the things we perceive, in ways which are not fully captured by the idea that we perceive these relations. When you hear a material event like a collision, you hear it by hearing the sound it causes. When you see a material object, you do so by seeing some of its constituent surfaces. On the face of it, this reflects an explanatory structure within perceptual experience: you experience one thing because you experience another, exploiting the causal or constitutive connection between them.
Arguably, perceptual experiences also have spatial structures which are not fully captured by the idea that we perceive spatial structure in the environment: in vision, but not in touch, you experience objects as extending into a certain region of space, a region whose boundaries are defined by your own visual limitations, such that this region is experienced as part of a larger space extending beyond what is currently visible. As Louise Richardson notes in this volume, this feature of visual experience is structural in the following sense: it remains in place independently of objects and relations in the environment are perceived, so it is naturally understood as a way in which objects and relations are perceived. Similarly, perceptual experience in general arguably has a temporal structure, not only in that episodes of experience unfold over time but also in the following way: you experience perceived events and temporal relations among them as occurring within a certain period of time; you experience this period as part of a longer stretch of time, stretching beyond what is presently perceptible.
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