The Truth About Trident E-Book

Timmon Milne Wallis

• Herausgeber: Luath Press
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 457

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Beschreibung

The UK is one of nine states possessing nuclear weapons. Renewal of the Trident programme would extend Britain's commitment to so-called nuclear 'deterrence' well into the second half of this century, despite treaty obligations and an 'unequivocal undertaking' to disarm. With more than 16,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled worldwide, the risk of one going off by accident or design is increasing every day.Wallis in The Truth about Trident explores the issues Trident presents and raises questions like: what would be the impact of their use? How safe are they in the meantime? Are they really necessary? Can we afford them? Are there better alternatives? This book aims to peel back layers of confusion and deceit to reach the truth about Trident.

Leseprobe

TIMMON MILNE WALLIS was born in Boston, Massachusetts and moved with his family to Cullen on the Moray Firth. He did his ‘O’ grade and ‘Higher’ exams at Buckie High School and studied politics and international relations at the University of Aberdeen. He then discovered the peace studies course at Bradford University in West Yorkshire and ended up getting a PhD from there.

Timmon spent several years living at a peace camp and campaigning against the building of a nuclear cruise missile base at RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. He then went on to be international secretary of Peace Brigades International (PBI), editor of Peace News magazine, director of the National Peace Council, founder and director of Peaceworkers UK, training manager for International Alert and executive director of Nonviolent Peaceforce. He also had a brief stint working for the Hollywood actor, Forest Whitaker, before returning to the UK in 2014 to work for Quaker Peace & Social Witness, where he is now job-sharing the position of Programme Manager for Peace and Disarmament.

Timmon has two grown daughters, who are both artists. When he is not writing or campaigning, He spends his time singing and performing his own peace and protest songs. He has written numerous articles on peace-related issues. His first book, Satyagraha, the Gandhian Approach to Nonviolent Social Change, was published by Pittenbruach Press in 1984.

First published by Luath Press Ltd 2016

in association with

Quakers in Britain

Reprinted 2016

ISBN: 978-1-910324-82-0

The author’s right to be identified as author of this book under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 has been asserted.

Typeset in 11 point Sabon

© Dr Timmon Milne Wallis 2016

Contents

List of Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Author’s Preface

Introduction: Getting at the Truth

PART 1: THE BASICS

Chapter 1 What is Trident?

Chapter 2 What is Radiation?

Chapter 3 What is Deterrence?

Chapter 4 What is Mutually Assured Destruction?

PART 2: WE NEED TRIDENT FOR OUR SECURITY

Chapter 5 Did Nuclear Weapons End WWII?

Chapter 6 Have Nuclear Weapons ‘Kept the Peace’ Since 1945?

Chapter 7 Are Nuclear Weapons Keeping Us Safe Today?

Chapter 8 Do Nuclear Weapons Protect Us From Future Risks?

PART 3: WE NEED TRIDENT TO MAINTAIN OUR PLACE IN THE WORLD

Chapter 9NATO and the ‘Special Relationship’

Chapter 10 Is Trident Really ‘Independent’?

Chapter 11 Does Trident Give the UK a Seat at the Top Table?

PART 4: WE CAN MANAGE TRIDENT LEGALLY, SAFELY, RESPONSIBLY

Chapter 12 Are Nuclear Weapons Legal?

Chapter 13 Are the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Safe?

Chapter 14 Is Renewal of Trident Affordable?

Chapter 15 Do We Need Trident to Protect Jobs?

Chapter 16 What About Scotland?

PART 5: WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO DISARM

Chapter 17 Is the UK Committed to ‘Multilateral’ Disarmament?

Chapter 18 Hasn’t the UK Already Disarmed to the Minimum?

Chapter 19 Would Disarmament by the UK Have Any Effect?

PART 6: THE BOMB IS HERE TO STAY

Chapter 20 ‘But You Can’t Uninvent the Bomb’

Chapter 21 Would Opposition to Trident Make Labour ‘Unelectable’?

Chapter 22 Can Nuclear Weapons be Morally Acceptable?

Chapter 23 Does Trident Fit the World of Today?

PART 7: WRAPPING IT ALL UP

Chapter 24 The Truth About Trident

APPENDIX I:Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

APPENDIX II:Summary of Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

References

Endnotes

Quakers in Britain

This book is dedicated to all those people who have worked tirelessly over so many years in so many different ways for the cause of nuclear disarmament. May your efforts finally come to bear fruit in a world free of all nuclear weapons…

List of Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to the following experts and advisors, without whom this book could not have been written: John Ainslie, Martin Birdseye, Frank Boulton, Elizabeth Chappell, Janet Fenton, Steve Hucklesby, Paul Ingram, Bruce Kent, David Lowry, Steven Schofield, Rae Street, Jane Tallent and Phil Webber. As author, I of course take full responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions in the text. Thanks also go to Nora Catlin, Haifa Rashed and Holly Wallis for typing up drafts, and to Ellis Brooks, Izzy Cartwright, Stephen Clement, Roslyn Cook, Helen Drewery, Naomi Engelkamp, James Grant, Claire Poyner, Andrew Rigby, Chris Venables, Emily Wallis and colleagues at the Norges Fredsrad for reading and commenting on earlier drafts, and to Gavin MacDougall, Marigold Bentley, Juliette King and Lotte Mitchell Reford for getting the book into final shape for publishing.

Author’s Preface

ON 18 JULY 2016, the British parliament voted, by 472 votes to 117, ‘to take the necessary steps required to maintain the current [Continuous at Sea Deterrence] posture by replacing the current Vanguard Class submarines with four Successor submarines.’ This marked the official end of a ten-year debate about the future of Britain’s Trident nuclear weapon system which began in 2006 when Tony Blair went to parliament with a proposal to maintain the UK’s dependence on nuclear weapons well into the second half of this century.

The decision to move ahead with Trident replacement was made in the wake of the EU referendum result, with no analysis of how the latter might affect the cost of the former. Two days after the vote, the chair of the National Audit Office went on record to say that Trident, along with several other very large capital projects, may have to be put ‘on ice’ until the decision to leave the EU has been fully costed.

In any case, the Trident replacement programme is beset with a number of technical and managerial problems that mean it cannot go ahead as originally scheduled. The UK programme is heavily dependent on the US Trident programme, which is behind schedule and cannot be put back on track until after the US elections are done and dusted. There are unresolved technical issues and difficulties finding suitably qualified engineers to fix them.

Meanwhile in Scotland, where Trident is based and where MPs voted against the renewal of Trident by a majority of 58 to one, there were renewed calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence. Since Scotland also voted (unlike England and Wales) to remain in the European Union, the combination of these two decisions – directly affecting the people of Scotland whilst going against what the people of Scotland voted for – may yet prove to be what leads to the break-up of the United Kingdom.

Internationally, the UK decision to replace Trident only further enflames the majority of other countries in the world who are still waiting for the UK to fulfil its legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to eliminate all its nuclear weapons. The World Court has yet to hear the case brought against the UK by the Marshall Islands, and could well decide that the UK is, in fact, in breach of its international obligations by continuing with its Trident programme.

Whatever happens at the World Court, it now seems inevitable that a new international treaty will be signed into law in the not-too-distant future, banning the development, financing, testing, production, stockpiling, deployment and transfer of all nuclear weapons. Even though countries like the USA have still not signed the Landmines Treaty, they have been forced to accept that world public opinion and international law do not allow them to use the landmines they still have. The same will apply to the UK and to Trident once this new treaty comes into force.

So while the decision to press ahead with Trident has now been made and is unlikely to come up in parliament again, there are many reasons to believe that it may still not go ahead or may be scrapped at some point even if it does.

It therefore remains vitally important that people understand the issues and the arguments for and against Trident. It is nothing short of shocking to find so little discussion about this topic and so many people, especially younger people, who know little or nothing about the issues involved. While a number of excellent books have been written on this subject, few are geared to the general reader or readily accessible to them, combining all the arguments for and against into a handy reference.

This book attempts to fill that gap. It is written in the firm belief that the issue of Trident is too important to be left to politicians and generals. It needs to be discussed in the pub, at the school gates and over the kitchen sink so that people are aware of the issues involved and have had the opportunity to think them through.

While I myself have always been opposed to nuclear weapons on moral grounds, I was happy for many of the other arguments in favour of having them to go unchallenged. In doing the research for this book, I was in no doubt that I would be able to make a convincing case that was on balance firmly against Trident. Even if as many as 10 of the 20 arguments in favour of Trident could not be easily refuted, I was still confident that the moral case could be made to outweigh the ‘lesser’ arguments based on finances, jobs, politics, strategic interests, deterrence and so on.

What I never expected to find was that none of the pro-Trident arguments stand up to scrutiny. Trident is supposedly the most powerful weapon ever deployed by the UK. But the arguments used to justify having it are themselves exceedingly weak. It therefore takes relatively little effort to effectively disarm whatever force those arguments may have been thought to have. What we are left with is a weapon system that is not powerful at all, but still exceedingly dangerous. Trident does not keep us safe but actually makes us – and the rest of the world – less safe. It is time to disarm not only the arguments, but the system itself.

INTRODUCTION

Getting at the Truth

ANY BOOK WITH the word ‘truth’ in its title is bound to attract a certain amount of scepticism if not downright ridicule. The idea that there is a single, knowable ‘truth’ about anything is rightly to be questioned. Even if such a concept exists in any objective sense, perhaps we are each bound by our own set of circumstances to see only our own truth and to claim anything beyond that is a delusion.

And yet, the reality is that none of us would be able to go about our daily lives without some concept of truth as a reference point. Being able to distinguish truth from lies, facts from opinions, evidence from hearsay is part of what makes us human. We all need to be able to establish for ourselves what is true and what is not.

Every witness in a court of law promises to tell ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ before giving their testimony. That is a very exacting bar to meet, but if you are caught lying in court, you will go to prison for it. This book attempts to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth – as best we are able to ascertain it – about Trident. It is a tall order, and not without its challenges.

Trident starts with a secret

For a start, we are faced immediately with the difficulty that what we are talking about is, at its core, a secret. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were US citizens found guilty of passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union, given the death sentence, and executed by electric chair in 1953. Today, vastly more information about the design and construction of nuclear weapons than was available to the Rosenbergs is freely available on the internet and accessible to anyone in the world. Yet the UK remains highly secretive about key aspects of Trident.

This is not just because these are horrifically dangerous weapons that the government doesn’t want falling into the ‘wrong hands’. It is also because, as we shall see, the whole doctrine of nuclear deterrence depends upon convincing a potential opponent that the British government is deadly serious about this business. Deterrence is all about presentation and perceptions rather than about the reality that may lie beneath these.

It is precisely because these are such horrifically dangerous weapons and because the government is so deadly serious about them that there also needs to be much more public discussion about Trident than there is. We need to know why we have these weapons, under what conditions would they ever be used, what would be the impact of their use, how safe are they in the meantime, are they really necessary, can we afford them, are there better alternatives? These are right and proper questions which ought to be discussed openly and publicly in a democracy. And in order to discuss these questions, we need to know a certain amount about the subject matter.

The approach of this book

This book attempts to dig out the truth about Trident by examining the arguments for Trident and putting those to the test. Do they hold up under scrutiny? What assumptions are being made and are these valid? What are the facts as best we know them and where are they coming from? What is the logic of the argument and is it valid and reasonable?

Many arguments are used on both sides of this debate, and each argument has many variations. Some are directed to particular audiences, such as the claim that the Labour party would be ‘unelectable’ if it adopted an anti-Trident position. Others are more general and universal, such as the claim that Britain would not be safe from attack by another nuclear power, like Russia, if it were to abandon Trident at this point.

This book looks at 20 key arguments that are regularly used to present the case in favour of Trident, including some focussed on particular audiences as well as more general ones. In each case, the argument in favour is explained, along with the assumptions and logic behind it. The arguments are then unpicked and examined in more detail, revealing in most cases cracks in the logic, gaps in the evidence and inherent contradictions in what is being asserted. This analysis then forms the basis for summarising the anti-Trident position in each case. The arguments in favour of Trident are given a fair and sympathetic hearing. But this is not a book aiming to present a ‘balanced’ view, in which each side of the argument is given equal weight and neither turns out to be more ‘right’ than the other. This is a book about the truth of the matter and trying to seek out and determine what that is.

It will become obvious to the reader, if it is not already, that this book comes down clearly in favour of the anti-Trident position. Whether this is justified on the basis of the arguments and the evidence presented is up to the reader to judge. What most people hear, however, are the pro-Trident arguments. These are presented to us every day by politicians of all the major political parties, the vast majority of journalists and broadcasters, academics, think tank experts, admirals and generals, business leaders, trade unionists, teachers and parents. It is hard to imagine another issue of such importance that is presented in such a one-sided, unbalanced way. This book is one small attempt to redress that balance.

Who this book is for

This book is intended for the general reader who may know little about the subject beyond what they hear on the news. It is also for those who have followed this issue closely over the years but may now wish to refresh their memories in order to more confidently join in the current discussions. While covering in some detail the 20 arguments for and against Trident, this book does not need to be read from cover to cover. Some may want to dip into chapters that are particularly relevant to them or to the discussion at hand. Others may want to review the different arguments for and against Trident by looking at the beginnings and/or endings of each chapter.

The aim of the book is to get beyond the soundbites, headlines and slogans that tend to dominate the debate about Trident. The issues are complex and nuanced. They require more thought and attention than they are normally given. But for people who have neither the time nor the patience to read through a full-length book, there are plenty of short-cuts at hand.

Structure of the book

This book is divided into seven parts. Before looking at the arguments in favour of Trident, the four chapters in part one summarise what it is we are talking about. What is Trident (Chapter 1)? What is the fundamental difference between a nuclear weapon and any other kind of weapon (Chapter 2)? What is meant by ‘deterrence’ (Chapter 3) and what does nuclear deterrence mean when other countries also have nuclear weapons (Chapter 4)? Following on from this introductory section, the arguments in favour of Trident are grouped into five parts (and then there is a concluding part at the end).

Part two looks at the arguments that centre around the claim that we need nuclear weapons for our security. Did nuclear weapons end WWII (Chapter 5)? Have they ‘kept the peace’ since 1945 (Chapter 6)? Is Trident protecting us here and now (Chapter 7) and is it needed to protect us from future risks (Chapter 8)?

Part three looks at the arguments which focus on Britain’s ‘place in the world’. Do we need Trident to be part of NATO and to maintain our ‘special relationship’ with the US (Chapter 9)? Is it really independent (Chapter 10)? And does it give us our seat at the ‘top table’ (Chapter 11)?

Part four looks at the arguments relating to Trident in terms of the UK as a sovereign, democratic state. Does it comply with our international legal obligations (Chapter 12)? Is it safe, even if never used (Chapter 13)? What are the real costs of Trident renewal and can we afford it (Chapter 14)? Do we need it to protect jobs (Chapter 15)? And what about Scotland (Chapter 16)?

Part five then addresses the arguments that claim the UK is doing all it can to disarm, we just need to be patient (and hold on to Trident in the meantime). Is the UK committed to ‘multilateral’ disarmament (Chapter 17)? Has the UK already disarmed as much as it can (Chapter 18)? And even if we got rid of Trident, would it have any effect on other nuclear weapon states (Chapter 19)?

And finally, in part six, we address the set of arguments that say you can’t ‘disinvent’ the bomb, so we need to learn to live with it, however awful that may be (Chapter 20). This includes the claim that Labour would be ‘unelectable’ if it opposed Trident (Chapter 21), the moral arguments (Chapter 22) and the claim that opposing Trident is not living in the ‘real world’ (Chapter 23).

In brief, the main arguments for and against Trident and the chapters in which they are covered are as follows:

The main arguments made for and against Trident:

Chapters 1 & 2

FOR

The awesome destructive power of Trident is what makes it effective as a deterrent.

AGAINST

It is a Weapon of Mass Destruction with unacceptable humanitarian consequences.

Chapters 3 & 4

FOR

It is a deterrent and will never be used as a weapon.Having it prevents others using it.

AGAINST

A deterrent is a weapon that will sooner or later be used as a weapon.

Chapter 5

FOR

Nuclear weapons forced Japan to surrender and ended WWII, saving lives as a result.

AGAINST

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary and unjustified.

Chapter 6

FOR

Nuclear weapons have kept the peace since 1945 and prevented WWII.

AGAINST

There is no hard evidence that they have ever ‘worked’ as a deterrent.

Chapter 7

FOR

Nuclear weapons are essential to Britain’s security in the 21st century.

AGAINST

Nuclear weapons serve no military purpose and do not defend us from 21st century threats.

Chapter 8

FOR

It is an insurance policy against future unknown risks.

AGAINST

Trident will be increasingly vulnerable and only makes the UK and the world less safe.

Chapter 9

FOR

We have a duty to share the nuclear burden with the US and to play our part in NATO.

AGAINST

US nuclear weapons do not protect the UK either. NATO nuclear policy makes the world less safe.

Chapter 10

FOR

Trident gives the UK an independent deterrent in case the US cannot be relied upon.

AGAINST

Trident is not independent from the US.

Chapter 11

FOR

Trident gives the UK a seat at the top table and status in the world.

AGAINST

The UK does not need Trident to be a key player in the world and would be more respected without it.

Chapter 12

FOR

The UK can renew Trident without reneging on its international commitments.

AGAINST

Trident is illegal under international law and renewing Trident violates NPT obligations.

Chapter 13

FOR

It is kept safe and out of harm’s way with little risk.

AGAINST

There is a large and increasing risk of accident, miscalculation or unauthorised use.

Chapter 14

FOR

The costs are affordable and justified, and do not adversely affect other government spending.

AGAINST

The costs are huge and take funds away from other much-needed government programmes.

Chapter 15

FOR

Trident provides much needed jobs in shipbuilding and nuclear engineering that cannot be replaced if lost.

AGAINST

Jobs are needed for decommissioning Trident but also for developing high tech alternative energy sources and meeting other social needs.

Chapter 16

FOR

Scotland is part of the UK and Trident will remain based at Faslane.

AGAINST

Scottish opposition to Trident should be taken seriously and is a significant obstacle to renewing Trident.

Chapter 17

FOR

The UK is committed to a multilateral approach to nuclear disarmament.

AGAINST

The UK continues to block multilateral disarmament because it is not really serious about it.

Chapter 18

FOR

The UK has already disarmed to the barest minimum needed for deterrence.

AGAINST

The UK has removed obsolete weapons but renewing Trident will be a further upgrade to UK capabilities.

Chapter 19

FOR

There’s no point in the UK disarming further because it will have no effect on other nuclear states.

AGAINST

If the UK took a lead it could break the deadlock on disarmament and speed up the process towards elimination.

Chapter 20

FOR

Nuclear weapons are here to stay and they cannot be ‘uninvented’.

AGAINST

Eliminating nuclear weapons is doable and there is no need to hold onto things that are no longer needed.

Chapter 21

FOR

Opposing Trident will make the Labour party unelectable.

AGAINST

If the public are given an informed choice, they will choose to cancel Trident.

CHAPTER 22

FOR

Nuclear weapons prevent war, which is a greater evil, so they are morally justified.

AGAINST

Trident is morally indefensible.

Chapter 23

FOR

Nuclear weapons are part of the real world and those who think otherwise are living in cloud cuckoo land.

AGAINST

The real world is one in which the majority of countries oppose nuclear weapons. No country can be secure unless all are secure.

Each chapter investigates these issues in detail and at the end of each chapter is a summary of the conclusions reached. At the end of the book is a summary of all the chapters (Chapter 24). For anyone looking for even more information, there is a detailed bibliography of relevant books and other materials, including websites with vast amounts of relevant information. These can all be accessed through the dedicated website for this book: www.TheTruthAboutTrident.com.

PART ONE

The Basics

CHAPTER 1

What is Trident?

‘TRIDENT’ IS SHORT-HAND for the UK’s nuclear weapons system. This system consists of three main components: nuclear warheads that explode when detonated, the missiles that carry the nuclear warheads to their target, and the submarines that launch the missiles from a secret location under the sea. Each of these components in turn consists of a number of sub-components that all together make up the weapon ‘system’ as a whole.

We know a great deal about some of the components and subcomponents that make up the Trident system, but some key information is still a closely guarded secret. We know, for instance, that the UK currently has approximately 215 nuclear warheads,1 of which 120 are considered ‘operationally available’.2 We know that the UK has access to 58 Trident D5 missiles that are leased from the US naval stockpile in King’s Bay, Georgia.3 We know the submarines have 16 missile tubes each (because these are visible in photos), but the government has said a maximum of 8 missiles are currently deployed on any of the submarines.4

We are told by the government that at any one time, there is at least one submarine on ’continuous at-sea deterrence’ (CASD) patrol with up to 40 nuclear warheads. This would mean that the 8 missiles on board must have an average of 5 warheads each.5 We know that each patrol lasts for 2–3 months, during which time a second submarine is being readied for the next patrol, one submarine is on ‘R&R’ being scrubbed up from the previous patrol and one submarine is in dry-dock for maintenance and repairs.

Theoretically it would be possible to have all four submarines fully loaded with their nuclear weapons, at sea and able to launch them all at the same time. In practice, one submarine is always out of action and would not be deployable even in a crisis. Of the three remaining submarines, only one is considered ‘operational’ by the MOD at any given time, although at least one more can be made operational in a matter of hours or days.6

How powerful are the Trident warheads?

What we don’t know from official government sources is how much explosive power is contained in each nuclear warhead on board those Trident submarines. Most nuclear experts believe these are 100 KT7 warheads of similar design to the USW76 warhead.8 We know much more about the US warheads because this information is publicly available. The W76 is a 100 KT warhead deployed on most of the US Trident missiles. Some nuclear experts believe that despite the enormous amounts of money being poured into nuclear weapons research and development at Aldermaston, the UK Trident missiles carry warheads that are not just similar to the USW76 warhead but actually are the W76 warheads.9

According to the ‘Rifkind Doctrine’ of the late 1980s,10 the UK’s Trident submarines needed to be able to undertake a ‘sub-strategic’ role that might involve firing a ‘demonstration shot’ or destroying a more limited military target with a smaller nuclear warhead. For this reason, warheads of much smaller yield were tested at the US underground testing site in Nevada as late as March 1989, just prior to the Comprehensive Test Ban coming into effect and ending underground tests.11 The official position since 2007, however, is that Trident has only a ‘strategic’ role and therefore it is unlikely that smaller yield warheads are still deployed, but that is not known for sure.12

If a Trident submarine is loaded with 40 warheads of 100 KT each, that would give it the firepower equivalent to four megatonnes of TNT (4 million tonnes) in total, or more than 250 times the firepower unleashed on Hiroshima. This is more than the total firepower of all the bombs dropped during wwII, including both Hiroshima and Nagasaki – all on a single submarine.13

What would be the effects of a 100 KT explosion?

The Hiroshima bomb was estimated to be in the range of 12,000–18,000 tonnes of TNT (12–18 KT), or roughly 1,000 times as powerful as the largest conventional bomb in the US arsenal today.14 The total number killed by the Hiroshima bomb is not known. The original estimate of 68,000 dead and a similar number injured was based on a random survey of households in 1946. However this did not take into account up to 20,000 Korean prisoners of war and an unknown number of refugees from other Japanese cities known to be in the city at that time.

Many of those who were injured by the Hiroshima blast died subsequently from radiation sickness and fatal injuries, in part because medical facilities were destroyed and very little was known about the dangers of radiation poisoning. It is difficult to know how many of the subsequent deaths in Hiroshima should be attributed to the atomic bomb as opposed to other causes. Most sources now use the figure of 140,000 as the total number killed by the Hiroshima bomb, although the city of Hiroshima maintains an official register of deaths from the atomic bomb right up to the present day, and that register now has more than 200,000 names.15

The atom bomb which was dropped on Nagasaki was of a different design and estimated to be slightly more powerful at 20 KT. The total death count was initially estimated at 60,000, or slightly less than at Hiroshima. A much larger number were injured but more of these people survived than did in Hiroshima. Other differences between the death tolls in the two cities have to do with weather conditions, the terrain, the type of buildings, the population density of the city and where the bomb was dropped in relation to where people were at the time.

If a single Trident warhead has a yield of 100 KT, it is 6.6 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The scale of the destruction and the number of people who would be killed or injured from such an explosion is difficult to determine and depends on many factors, including those just mentioned above. There is not a linear relationship between the size of a nuclear explosion and the numbers killed or area destroyed. The biggest factor has to do with whether the bomb is detonated at, or near, the ground or higher up in the atmosphere (see next chapter). Nevertheless, based on what we know about Hiroshima, it is clear that the effects of a single Trident warhead landing on, or above a city, would be devastating.

The nuclear fireball

The detonation of a nuclear weapon creates a massive fireball as the nuclear chain reaction, or ‘fission’, breaks down the atoms of uranium and/or plutonium that are the initial fuel of the bomb. The temperature inside this fireball rises to tens of millions of degrees Centigrade. This is hotter than the interior of the sun and thousands of times hotter than a conventional explosion.16 Inside the fireball, these temperatures trigger the thermonuclear ‘fusion’ reaction that creates even more destructive energy as atoms of hydrogen are fused into helium and other by-products. The fireball of a 100 KT warhead is a sphere approximately 500 metres (1,500 ft) across in all directions.

If the fireball is 500 metres across and the centre of it is more than 250 metres above the ground, this is called an ‘airburst’. With the whole of the fireball in the air, very little else is consumed by the fireball other than the nuclear fuels contained in the bomb and small quantities of oxygen and other gases in the air. If the fireball is detonated below this height, this is considered a ‘groundburst’. Everything within that sphere is then turned into radioactive by-products as a result of the explosion, and this is a critical factor which we shall explore in greater detail in the next chapter.

From a basic airburst explosion, already more than 300 different radioactive isotopes are created from the exploding uranium and/ or plutonium.17 Many more varieties of radioactive material may be additionally created from a groundburst explosion, depending on what was on the ground at that precise time and place. If the target of a groundburst explosion was a nuclear missile silo, nuclear weapons store or other nuclear facility, any nuclear warheads or other nuclear materials – as well as living creatures – that end up within reach of the fireball are themselves going to be irradiated and added to the total fireball and subsequent release of radioactive by-products.

Heat and blast effects

Conventional explosives cause death, injuries and destruction of property from the heat and blast of the explosion. This rips through buildings, sets fire to anything that burns and throws shrapnel, bits of building and other debris through the air, all of which is highly dangerous to anything or anybody that may be nearby. A nuclear explosion causes all these same effects, in addition to the unique effects of radiation, which are discussed in the next chapter.

At a distance of 4 km from a 100 KT nuclear explosion, temperatures are still high enough to set papers and other flammable materials alight.18 Therefore fires are an enormous hazard in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion even at great distances from ground zero. In Hiroshima, the entire city centre was burnt to the ground and many of the injuries suffered by the inhabitants were the result of burns.

Blast is normally measured in pounds per square inch (psi) of ‘overpressure.’19 Ten psi of overpressure is enough to damage lungs and cause widespread fatalities and 20 psi is enough to pull down a heavily reinforced concrete building.20 Near the nuclear fireball, the shock wave which is created by the explosion reaches 200 psi of overpressure, with winds of more than 2,000 mph, enough to flatten and kill anything, even the most heavily reinforced concrete bunker.21 At 1 km (0.6 miles) from a 100 KT blast, the overpressure is 20 psi, which is lethal for human beings and still capable of considerable damage to buildings. At 2 km, the overpressure still reaches 5 psi, with windspeeds over 100 mph and up to 50% fatalities.22

Nuclear winter and nuclear famine

Another product of a nuclear explosion is the dust and soot that rises up as a result of fires and the intense heat created. Most atmospheric tests took place on Pacific islands, barren atolls or in the deserts of western US, central Australia or Siberia. Under these conditions, even groundburst explosions would not be expected to cause major fires and therefore the soot content has been minimal. If a nuclear explosion took place over dense forest or a densely populated city, however, fires could be expected to burn out of control for some days over a large area. This happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as in places like Dresden and Tokyo where conventional explosives were used in huge quantities to create ‘firestorms’.

During the 1980s there was concern that an all-out nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West could push so much soot into the atmosphere that it would lead to a ‘nuclear winter’ – a lowering of global temperatures, causing widespread famine, disease and death of large numbers of people not already killed by the nuclear weapons themselves or the after-effects of radiation.

The US and Russia each had an estimated 2,500 MT worth of TNT in their nuclear arsenals at that time and climate scientists estimated that an all-out nuclear war would therefore put about 150 million tonnes of soot into the atmosphere. Using complex computer modelling of the earth’s climate, they estimated that that much soot could lower the earth’s average temperature by as much as 8.5 degrees C and reduce annual rainfall globally by as much as 1.4 mm. This in turn would reduce growing seasons worldwide and mean that some key grain-producing regions like Iowa and Ukraine would remain below freezing even in the height of summer and thus unable to grow anything for up to two years.23

Using the same modelling techniques, scientists then tried in the 1990s to estimate the climatic effects of just 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs (ie. just 15 of the 40 100 KT warheads on a single Trident submarine), for instance in a regional war between India and Pakistan.

Given the population densities in those two countries and the vulnerability of crops to radiation damage, it was concluded that even a ‘small-scale’ nuclear war in that region would have hugely devastating consequences for all the countries across the whole Northern Hemisphere and could lead to the death of over two billion people.24

Further studies have looked at the effects of ‘limited’ forms of nuclear warfare, for instance the launching of nuclear weapons from a single Trident submarine. Dr Philip Webber, chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility, has estimated that the simultaneous detonation of 4 megatonnes of TNT, roughly the total firepower of one Trident submarine, could produce between 10 and 38 million tonnes of soot, sufficient to cause a cooling of the earth by 1.5–3 degrees C and a shortening of growing seasons by 10–30 days over a five-year period.25

How this might affect global food supplies is hard to estimate, but the implications are clear. Even a comparatively ‘limited’ nuclear war would cause devastating and long-lasting climactic effects. A major all-out nuclear war would endanger the entire planet.

Targeting Trident

Trident is currently ‘de-targeted’, meaning the missiles are deployed on submarines without specific targeting instructions. These instructions, however, are very easily and quickly assigned to the missiles once a decision is made to do so. There are two types of target for Trident warheads. ‘Counterforce’ targets are basically military installations, specifically nuclear missile sites. ‘Countervalue’ targets are cities or other civilian facilities.

Since the early 1960s, the UK’s nuclear weapons have been aimed at countervalue targets in Russia (or rather the Soviet Union, as it was), and specifically at Moscow, with the aim of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ should they ever be used. Unacceptable damage was defined initially as being able to destroy 50% of the buildings and kill 50% of the people in Moscow and in at least four other Russian cities. This was later amended to 40% of buildings and 40% of the population. There have been many discussions and proposals within the British government as to exactly what does or does not constitute ‘unacceptable damage’, but this basic concept, known as the ‘Moscow criterion’ apparently still stands and is easily met by present-day targeting assumptions (see below).

Since the 1980s there have been various attempts to tone down the Moscow criterion to make it sound less like mass murder. The ‘master’ of deterrence theory, the late Sir Michael Quinlan, redefined the Moscow criterion in 1980 as destruction of ‘key aspects of Soviet power’ rather than the destruction of Moscow and the killing of half its civilian population per se.26 In 2012, the then Defence Secretary Nick Harvey criticised the MOD’s ambitions to ‘flatten Moscow’ as outmoded but was told that the MOD’s aim was ‘holding at risk what any potential adversary leadership would value most… In the Russian case, Moscow of course always represented the very centre of state power.’27

Altogether, there are four possible target scenarios for Trident to be used against Russia.

• The first would be a ‘counterforce’ attack against Russian nuclear missiles and delivery systems in order to prevent a retaliatory strike. Although the UK does not have enough nuclear weapons to destroy all the Russian nuclear weapons completely, Trident could be used as part of a massive US counterforce attack against Russian nuclear missiles.

• The second target scenario would be to aim Trident at other purely military targets, such as military command bunkers as well as airfields, missile defences, submarine and naval bases, etc.

• The third set of targets would be military but also including civilian centres of power and control. The revised ‘Moscow criterion’ seems to fit this scenario most closely, aiming at government buildings in Moscow as well as military command and control centres.

• The final set of targets would be purely ‘countervalue’, aimed at destruction of Moscow and other large cities.

John Ainslie, in his paper If Britain Fired Trident,28 drew up a list of possible targets in and around Moscow based on publicly available documents in the National Archive and using targeting assumption three above. This list included ten key government buildings in the centre of Moscow, ten key military command centres in outer Moscow and a further 20 military bunkers and other likely military targets on the outskirts of Moscow, for a total of 40 targets for the 40 nuclear warheads on a single Trident submarine.

In fact a nuclear attack by the UK, were it to take place, would almost certainly involve all the warheads on at least two submarines if not three, since these are what the UK considers as ‘operationally available’ warheads.29 Such an attack would therefore involve up to 120 nuclear warheads of what we are assuming to be around 100 KT each.

Not all these warheads would necessarily reach their targets, however, since Russia has an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defence shield around Moscow that would attempt to shoot down incoming missiles before they landed. A certain number of warheads would be expected to be duds and fail to detonate, and there could be other errors and problems that would reduce the total number of actual explosions.

If, however, we assume that 40 Trident warheads hit government and military targets in and around Moscow, what would be the impact? John Ainslie’s paper goes into great detail about the impact of fires across the city, destruction of power stations, carbon monoxide poisoning in underground bomb shelters, damage to schools and hospitals, collapsing skyscrapers and chaos of fleeing civilians trying to evacuate and fatal levels of radioactive fallout in different parts of the greater Moscow region, depending on weather conditions. Overall, he estimates that out of Moscow’s total population of 11.5 million, nearly five and a half million people would be killed outright and more than one million injured from an attack by one Trident submarine aimed solely at government and military targets. Physical destruction would be severe and long-term radiation effects would continue to cause cancers and other fatal diseases for many years to come.

Under what conditions would Trident ever be used?

The UK states that Trident would only ever be used as a last resort in self-defence. This could mean either in a so-called ‘first strike’ before any hostile nuclear weapons have been launched against the UK or an ally, or in a retaliatory ‘second strike’ after one or more nuclear weapons have landed on the UK or an ally. In the first case, let us imagine that the so-called deterrent failed and that Russia was either about to invade, or had already started to invade, a NATO member such as Poland, with their conventional forces. No nuclear weapons have been used yet, but with nothing else to stop Russia from steamrolling across Europe, NATO decides to respond by destroying as much of Russia’s war-fighting capability as possible in an all-out nuclear attack.

In such a scenario, the role of the UK’s Trident missiles would be exactly as described above. Their job is to ‘take out Moscow’ as the UK’s contribution to a massive NATO assault which would involve US Trident submarines, US Minuteman Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and free-fall nuclear bombs dropped from long-range warplanes from US bases across Europe as well as from mainland USA.

The second set of scenarios in which Trident might be used involves the so-called ‘second strike’ or retaliatory strike, after the UK or an ally has already been attacked with nuclear weapons. In this case, the UK might be all but destroyed already and there might be no functioning government even to make the decision to launch Trident. Submarine commanders would be left to open the sealed orders from the Prime Minister to know what to do next. Alternatively, perhaps only one or two cities would have been hit with nuclear weapons or perhaps an ally, such as Poland, has been hit but not the UK.

In this second set of scenarios, it is hard to imagine what the point of launching Trident missiles would be apart from as a form of revenge. The ‘deterrent’ would have failed by that point and the risk of all-out nuclear war, and with it the destruction of human civilisation as we know it, would be extremely high if not already underway. All communications would have been disrupted; no one would likely have any idea what cities were hit, how many people were dead or still alive or what nuclear weaponry was still remaining. Nevertheless, the whole concept of nuclear deterrence, as we shall see in Chapter 3, rests exactly on this scenario.

When David Cameron says that he would press the button ‘under certain circumstances’, these are the circumstances he is talking about. Unless the UK is ready and willing to launch Trident in retaliation for a nuclear attack against the UK or any of its allies, Trident is not considered to be a credible deterrent. Therefore it is this second scenario in which Trident is primarily designed to be used – as retaliation for a nuclear attack, whether or not such retaliation would make any political or military sense at that point.

Other possible targets

Since 1998, the UK has given what are known as ‘negative security assurances’ to every country that does not have nuclear weapons, saying that the UK will only use its nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states or states believed to be acquiring nuclear weapons.30 The UK government has also stated repeatedly that it would only use nuclear weapons as a last resort in self-defence.

This means at present that UK nuclear weapons could in theory only be used against the US, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel or North Korea were any of these countries to attack the UK. It is unlikely that Trident would be used against the US or France, with both of whom the UK has close relations and shares nuclear secrets and nuclear technologies. Indeed it is doubtful that the UK would be able to launch a Trident missile at the US, given that the missiles themselves are US-made and US-owned, together with the software required to fire them (see Chapter 10).

China has a much smaller nuclear arsenal than either the US or Russia, but apart from Russia, China is the only other state against which Trident might realistically be used, were it to decide to attack the UK. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have nuclear weapons, but currently not the means for these to reach the UK. Therefore it would be unlikely that the UK would use Trident in ‘self-defence’ against one of these countries (see Chapter 12).

Summary

Trident is a nuclear weapon system capable of causing death and destruction on a scale unparalleled in human history. A single Trident warhead can produce temperatures of tens of millions of degrees Centigrade and a shock wave sufficient to flatten skyscrapers, together with everything else that may be standing, or alive, within 500 metres of the blast.

At a distance of 2 km, the blast is still sufficient to bring down buildings and cause many casualties, with wind speeds at over 100mph. At a distance of 4 km from an exploding Trident warhead, the heat is still intense enough to set newspapers on fire.

Each Trident submarine carries on board up to 40 warheads, ready to launch if given the order, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Launching all 40 warheads could push millions of tons of soot into the atmosphere and seriously affect global food supplies.

The UK considers three Trident submarines, or a total of 120 Trident warheads, ‘operationally available’. The consequences of launching all 120 warheads or the equivalent of more than 800 Hiroshima bombs, would have a devastating impact not only on the country being hit, but also on the entire ecosystem of the planet.

Trident is currently ‘de-targeted’. However the missiles can be easily ‘re-targeted’ and traditionally they have been targeted at Moscow. Even if the targets are a combination of military and government buildings and bunkers, aimed at destroying ‘key aspects of Russian state power’, the result is likely to be over five million civilians killed from the missiles of one Trident submarine. Trident could also be targeted at China, either to destroy cities and/or military targets.

UK policy is to use Trident only against another nuclear weapon state threatening the UK. This is unlikely to be the US or France. Although North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have nuclear weapons, none can reach the UK, so it would be difficult to imagine a scenario in which any of these countries would be targeted by Trident in ‘self-defence’.

CHAPTER 2

What is Radiation?

THE BLAST AND heat effects of a nuclear explosion are very similar to those of a conventional weapon, just multiplied many times in scale because a nuclear explosion is so much more powerful than the most powerful conventional explosions. Even the environmental effects are not qualitatively different, since extensive fire-bombing of cities with conventional weapons would also push equivalent amounts of soot into the atmosphere, potentially affecting global climate in a similar way.

But nuclear weapons also produce short-term and long-term effects from ionising radiation which are qualitatively different to any effect produced by other types of weapon. These have huge importance in terms of the impact of nuclear weapons beyond the immediate point of detonation, not only in terms of spreading death and injury far and wide geographically, but also spreading it across time to future generations.

The main forms of ionising radiation are alpha, beta and gamma rays, and also neutrons. These are produced in large quantities from a nuclear explosion. All ionising radiations increase the chemical reactivity of the materials they irradiate, by altering the electrical charge of (or ‘ionising’) their atoms. In living things, these chemical effects can be very damaging.