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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
- Sprache: Englisch
Created by two of the field’s leading experts, this unique introduction to international religious demography outlines the challenges in interpreting data on religious adherence, and presents a contemporary portrait of global religious belief.
- Offers the first comprehensive overview of the field of international religious demography – detailing what we know about religious adherents around the world, and how we know it
- Examines religious freedom and diversity, including agnostics and atheists, on a global scale, highlighting trends over the past 100 years and projecting estimates for the year 2050
- Outlines the issues and challenges related to definitions, taxonomies, sources, analyses, and other techniques in interpreting data on religious adherence
- Considers data from religious communities, censuses, surveys, and scholarly research, along with several in-depth case studies on the global Muslim population, religion in China, and the religious demography of recently created Sudan and South Sudan
- Argues against the belief that the twentieth-century was a ‘secular’ period by putting forward new evidence to the contrary
- Provides resources for measuring both qualitatively and quantitatively important data on the world's religious situation in the twenty-first century
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013
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Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I: Overview
Part II: Data and Methods
Part III: Case Studies
Recent History
A First Offering
Part I Overview
Chapter 1 Global Religious Populations, 1910–2010
Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated
Christians
Muslims
Hindus
Agnostics
Chinese Folk-Religionists
Buddhists
Ethnoreligionists
Atheists
New Religionists
Sikhs
Jews
Spiritists
Daoists
Baha’is
Confucianists
Jains
Shintoists
Zoroastrians
Chapter 2 Regional Religious Populations, 1910–2010
Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America
Northern America
Oceania
Chapter 3 Religious Diversity
Diversity versus Pluralism
Changes in Religious Diversity from 1910 to 2010
Method 1: Religious Diversity Index (RDI)
Method 2: Religious Diversity by Number of Religions
Method 3: Religious Diversity by Size of Population
Religious Diversity in the United States
Globalization
Conclusion
Chapter 4 Projecting Religious Populations, 2010–50
Methodology
Findings for the Larger World Religions
Research on the Future of Religion
Part II Data and Methods
Chapter 5 Defining Religion and Religious Identity
How Many Religions, and What Religions, Are World Religions?
Defining not “Religion” but “a Religion”
Chapter 6 Religious Demography as an Emerging Discipline
Demography as a Growing Field of Study
Religious Demography
Religious Demography and Other Disciplines
Demography as a Disconnected Field of Study
Religious Demography Is Also Disconnected
Religious Demography and International Relations
Chapter 7 Major Sources and Collections of Data
Censuses in Which a Religion Question Is Asked
Censuses in Which an Ethnicity or Language Question Is Asked
Surveys and Polls
Scholarly Monographs
Religion Statistics in Yearbooks and Handbooks
Governmental Statistical Reports
Questionnaires and Reports from Collaborators
Field Surveys and Interviews
Correspondence with National Informants
Unpublished Documentation (or Published Items with Limited Distribution)
Encyclopedias, Dictionaries, and Directories of Religions
Print and Web-Based Contemporary Descriptions of Religions
Dissertations and Theses on Religion
Physical and Electronic Collections of Data
Chapter 8 Analyzing Data on Religion
International Religious Demography Data Quality Index1
Reconciling Discrepancies Between Data
Chapter 9 Dynamics of Change in Religious Populations
Births
Deaths
Births Minus Deaths/Total Fertility Rate
Converts To
Converts From
Converts To Minus Converts From
Immigrants
Emigrants
Immigrants Minus Emigrants
Part III Case Studies
Chapter 10 Estimating Changes in the Global Muslim Population
Data
Projection Assumptions
The Projected Global Muslim Population Scenarios
Discussion of Sources
A Note on Country and Territory Designation
Overview of the Findings
Growing, but at a Slower Rate
Muslim-Majority Countries
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims
Other Key Findings of the Study
Chapter 11 Factors Driving Change in the Global Muslim Population
Main Factors Driving Population Growth
Related Factors
Chapter 12 Estimating China’s Religious Populations
Overview
Reported Religious Affiliation in China According to Surveys
Toward a More Comprehensive Count of Religion
Chinese Folk- or Traditional Religion
Buddhism and Taoism
Christianity
Islam
Atheism
A Comprehensive Estimate of Religious Affiliation in China
Government Officials Interested in Hearing about Religion
Chapter 13 Assessing Religious Populations in the Sudans
Religious Demography of the North and South
Chapter 14 Migration and Religious Diasporas
Religious Diasporas
Migration as One Component of Religious Change
Civility
Additional Methodological Notes
Conclusion
Appendix: World Religions by Country
Geographic
Religious adherents (chapters 1–2)
Glossary
Index
This edition first published 2013© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Johnson, Todd M. (Todd Michael), 1958–The world’s religions in figures : an introduction to international religious demography / Todd M. Johnson, Brian J. Grim; editorial associate, Gina A. Bellofatto.pages cmIncludes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-470-67454-3 (cloth)1. Religions–Statistics. I. Bellofatto, Gina A. II. Title.BL80.3.J65 2013200.2′1–dc23
2012047272
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Cover image: Top: Praying with rosary beads © spxChrome. Detail from people praying on a sajadah © Eray Haciosmanoglu. Priest in robe blessing wine for Communion © kokophoto. Bottom: Sadhu Indian holyman sitting in the temple © Bartosz Hadyniak. Three Hasidic Jews © Keith Reicher. Detail of bust of Buddha © Navin Khianey.Cover design by www.simonlevyassociates.co.uk
List of Figures
8.1
Bulgarian census, 2001
8.2
World Values Survey religion question for Bulgaria (European Values Survey Edition), 1999
9.1
Calculating net religious change
10.1
Muslims as a share of world population, 1990–2030
10.2
Annual population growth rates for Muslims and non-Muslims, 1990–2030
10.3
Percentage of population of Muslim-majority countries in selected age groups, 1990–2030
10.4
Annual population growth rates for Muslims by region, 1990–2030
10.5
Where Muslims live, 2010 and 2030
10.6
Annual population growth, Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, 1990–2030
11.1
Trends in fertility, 1990–2035
11.2
Trends in life expectancy at birth, 1990–2035
11.3
Percentage of births attended by skilled health professionals, 1990–2008
11.4
Trends in infant mortality, 1990–2035
11.5
Trends in migration, 1990–2035
11.6
Percentage of population in selected age groups, 2010 and 2030
11.7
Muslims as a share of world youth and young adults, 1990–2030, people ages 15–29
11.8
Trends in median age, 1990–2030
11.9
Percentage of population of Muslim-majority countries in selected age groups, 1990–2030
11.10
Percentage of population aged 60 and older, 1990–2030
11.11
Education and fertility in Muslim-majority countries, 2011
11.12
Poverty and fertility in Muslim-majority countries, 2011
13.1
Majority religion in Sudan and South Sudan by province
14.1
Calculating net religious change
List of Tables
1.1
World religions by adherents, 1910–2010
1.2
Percentage of the world’s population belonging to no religion or religion, 1910–2010
1.3
Christians (C) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.4
Countries with the most Christians, 1910 and 2010
1.5
Countries with the highest percentage of Christians, 1910 and 2010
1.6
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Christians, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.7
Christian (C) traditions and movements, 1910 and 2010
1.8
Christians by mother tongue, mid-2010
1.9
Muslims (M) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.10
Countries with the most Muslims, 1910 and 2010
1.11
Countries with the highest percentage of Muslims, 1910 and 2010
1.12
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Muslims, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.13
Muslim traditions, 1910 and 2010
1.14
Muslims by mother tongue, mid-2010
1.15
Hindus by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.16
Countries with the most Hindus, 1910 and 2010
1.17
Countries with the highest percentage of Hindus, 1910 and 2010
1.18
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Hindus, 1910–2010 and 2000–2010
1.19
Hindu traditions, 1910 and 2010
1.20
Hindus by mother tongue, mid-2010
1.21
Agnostics (A) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.22
Countries with the most agnostics, 1910 and 2010
1.23
Countries with the highest percentage of agnostics, 1910 and 2010
1.24
Countries with the fastest annual growth of agnostics, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.25
Chinese folk-religionists (CFR) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.26
Countries with the most Chinese folk-religionists (CFR), 1910 and 2010
1.27
Countries with the highest percentage of Chinese folk-religionists, 1910 and 2010
1.28
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Chinese folk-religionists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.29
Buddhists by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.30
Countries with the most Buddhists, 1910 and 2010
1.31
Countries with the highest percentage of Buddhists, 1910 and 2010
1.32
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Buddhists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.33
Buddhist traditions, 1910 and 2010
1.34
Buddhists by mother tongue, mid-2010
1.35
Ethnoreligionists (E) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.36
Countries with the most ethnoreligionists (E), 1910 and 2010
1.37
Countries with the highest percentage of ethnoreligionists, 1910 and 2010
1.38
Countries with the fastest annual growth of ethnoreligionists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.39
Atheists (a) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.40
Countries with the most atheists, 1910 and 2010
1.41
Countries with the highest percentage of atheists, 1910 and 2010
1.42
Countries with the fastest annual growth of atheists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.43
New Religionists (NR) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.44
Largest New Religions, 2010
1.45
Countries with the most New Religionists, 1910 and 2010
1.46
Countries with the highest percentage of New Religionists, 1910 and 2010
1.47
Countries with the fastest annual growth of New Religionists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.48
Sikhs by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.49
Countries with the most Sikhs, 1910 and 2010
1.50
Countries with the highest percentage of Sikhs, 1910 and 2010
1.51
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Sikhs, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.52
Jews by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.53
Countries with the most Jews, 1910 and 2010
1.54
Countries with the highest percentage of Jews, 1910 and 2010
1.55
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Jews, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.56
Spiritists (Sp) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.57
Countries with the most Spiritists, 1910 and 2010
1.58
Countries with the highest percentage of Spiritists, 1910 and 2010
1.59
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Spiritists, 1910–2010 and 2000–1056
1.60
Daoists (D) by United Nations continents, 1910–2010
1.61
Countries with the most Daoists, 1910 and 2010
1.62
Countries with the highest percentage of Daoists, 1910 and 2010
1.63
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Daoists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.64
Baha’is (Ba) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010
1.65
Countries with the most Baha’is, 1910 and 2010
1.66
Countries with the highest percentage of Baha’is, 1910 and 2010
1.67
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Baha’is, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.68
Confucianists (Co) by United Nations continents, 1910–2010
1.69
Countries with the most Confucianists, 1910 and 2010
1.70
Countries with the highest percentage of Confucianists, 1910 and 2010
1.71
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Confucianists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.72
Jains by United Nations continents, 1910–2010
1.73
Countries with the most Jains, 1910 and 2010
1.74
Countries with the highest percentage of Jains, 1910 and 2010
1.75
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Jains, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.76
Shintoists by United Nations continents, 1910–2010
1.77
Countries with the most Shintoists, 1910 and 2010
1.78
Countries with the highest percentage of Shintoists, 1910 and 2010
1.79
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Shintoists, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
1.80
Zoroastrians (Z) by United Nations continents, 1910–2010
1.81
Countries with the most Zoroastrians, 1910 and 2010
1.82
Countries with the highest percentage of Zoroastrians, 1910 and 2010
1.83
Countries with the fastest annual growth of Zoroastrians, 1910–2010 and 2000–10
2.1
Religious affiliation and growth in Africa, 1910–2010
2.2
Religious affiliation and growth in Asia, 1910–2010
2.3
Religious affiliation and growth in Europe, 1910–2010
2.4
Religious affiliation and growth in Latin America, 1910–2010
2.5
Religious affiliation and growth in Northern America, 1910–2010
2.6
Religious affiliation and growth in Oceania, 1910–2010
3.1
Religious Diversity Index (RDI), 1910 and 2010
3.2
Countries with highest Religious Diversity Index (RDI) values, 2010
3.3
Countries with the most religions over 0.5% of the population, 2010
3.4
Countries with the most religions over 5% of the population, 2010
3.5
Countries with the most religions over 10% of the population, 2010
3.6
Number of countries with total populations crossing population thresholds, 2012
3.7
Religious diversity by size (example of a country from each major region), 2012
3.8
Most religious diversity by size, 2012
3.9
Least religious diversity by size, 2012
4.1
Major world religions, 2010–50
4.2
Christians (C) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.3
Countries with the most Christians, 2010–50
4.4
Muslims (M) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.5
Countries with the most Muslims, 2010–50
4.6
Hindus (H) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.7
Countries with the most Hindus, 2010–50
4.8
Buddhists (B) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.9
Countries with the most Buddhists, 2010–50
4.10
Agnostics (A) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.11
Countries with the most agnostics, 2010–50
4.12
Atheists (a) by United Nations continents and regions, 2010–50
4.13
Countries with the most atheists, 2010–50
8.1
International Religious Demography Data Quality Index
10.1
Fertility scenarios: Examples from three Muslim-majority countries, 2005–35
10.2.1
Population projection scenarios outside of Europe and the US
10.2.2
European population projection scenario
10.2.3
US population projection scenario
10.3
World Muslim population growth scenarios, 2020 and 2030
10.4
European Muslim population growth scenarios (includes Russia), 2020 and 2030
10.5
US Muslim population growth scenarios, 2020 and 2030
10.6
Muslim population by region, 2010 and 2030
10.7
Muslim population of Muslim-majority countries, 2010–30
10.8
Shi’a Muslim population growth in the four largest Shi’a-majority countries and Sunni Muslim population growth in the four largest Sunni-majority countries, 2010–30
11.1
Most children per woman among Muslim-majority countries, 2010–15
11.2
Fewest children per woman among Muslim-majority countries, 2010–15
11.3
Most access to clean drinking water among Muslim-majority countries, 2006
11.4
Least access to clean drinking water among Muslim-majority countries, 2006
11.5
Highest projected infant mortality among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2010–15
11.6
Lowest projected infant mortality among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2010–15
11.7
Highest projected life expectancies at birth among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2010–15
11.8
Lowest projected life expectancies at birth among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2010–15
11.9
Largest losses from emigration among Muslim-majority countries, 2010–15
11.10
Largest gains from immigration among Muslim-majority countries, 2010–15
11.11
Highest median age among Muslim-majority countries, 2010
11.12
Lowest median age among Muslim-majority countries, 2010
11.13
Highest percentage of population age 60 and older among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2030
11.14
Highest percentage of population age 15–29 among Muslim-majority countries, ranked as of 2030
11.15
Where girls can expect to receive the most years of schooling among Muslim-majority countries, 2010
11.16
Where girls can expect to receive the fewest years of schooling among Muslim-majority countries, 2010
11.17
Highest percentage of population below the poverty line among Muslim-majority countries, 2000–06
11.18
Lowest percentage of population below the poverty line among Muslim-majority countries, 2000–06
11.19
Highest GDP-PPP per capita, 2010–15
11.20
Lowest GDP-PPP per capita, 2010–15
12.1
Importance of religion among Chinese public, 2006
12.2
Giving to religion among Chinese public, 2007
12.3
Reported formal religious affiliation from surveys in China
12.4
Traditional/folk practices and beliefs in China, 2007
12.5
Christians in China, 2010
12.6
Range of existing Christian population estimates for mainland China, 2010
12.7
Religious affiliation in China, 2010
12.8
Interest in the topic of religion by occupational group
13.1
Religious adherents in Sudan before 2011 split
13.2
Religion in Sudan (North) and South Sudan by province, 2011
13.3
Religion in Sudan (North), 1900–2010
13.4
Religion in South Sudan, 1900–2010
14.1
Religionists in diaspora, mid-2010
14.2
Top 10 host countries of diasporas ranked by diaspora population, mid-2010
14.3
Top 10 “sending” countries, ranked by size of diaspora outside of host country, mid-2010
14.4
Top 10 peoples, ranked by number of countries in diaspora, mid-2010
14.5
Top 10 peoples, ranked by percentage in diaspora, mid-2010
14.6
Top 10 diaspora peoples by religion, mid-2010
Foreword
This book is a remarkable achievement. It is the result of many years of work by the two authors, who must be considered the deans of international religious demography, a discipline that now has as its primary location the two centers with which the authors are associated (Todd Johnson with the Center for the Study of Global Christianity, near Boston, and Brian Grim with the Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life, in Washington). It pleases me that they have deposited (if that is the right word in our electronic age) their database at our Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University. The book, with its plenitude of numerical tables, is a wonderful companion to another recent publication, this one full of maps, by Todd Johnson and Kenneth Ross, Atlas of Global Christianity (2009). The two volumes together constitute an indispensable and enormously useful resource for anyone interested in the shape of religion in the contemporary world. These are not books to be read once and all from cover to cover, but rather to be kept close at hand for ready reference (my own case).
The present volume consists of three sections. The first section, the juiciest of the three, contains an overview of the findings. There follows an elaborate discussion of the methodology employed. This is obviously of most interest for any putative practitioners of religious demography, but it is also useful in allaying the skepticism about statistics felt with good reason by many scholars of religion: we know that people lie about their own religious activity or find it difficult to fit themselves into the categories of a survey questionnaire, that numbers declared by religious institutions and by governments are iffy, and that many believers meet in informal or even illegal gatherings which are difficult to count. Johnson and Grim are skeptical themselves, and they explain in great detail how they have developed methods which painstakingly cull credible findings from highly discrepant bodies of evidence. The third section of the volume consists of what they call “case studies” – two from very important areas, the Muslim world and China – to which is added the religious demography of the new nation of South Sudan and of what remains of Sudan after its southern parts seceded. Needless to say, this unhappy region is not very important on the contemporary scene, but the secession is the result of a violent conflict (not yet fully ended) between the Christian South and the Muslim North – an instructive case of what Samuel Huntington famously called “the bloody frontiers of Islam” (inThe Clash of Civilizations, 1996).
It would be futile, indeed impossible, to summarize the rich contents of the present volume. It contains well over 150 numerical tables (I started to count, gave up before I got to the end). This is a formidable mountain to climb even for someone less numerophobic than me. (I have often explained that, every time arithmetic was taught in my elementary school in Vienna, I had the measles – like three times weekly.) I will not pretend to have studied every table (no one would believe me if I did). I have skimmed through the volume, especially the first section, and often stopped to read especially intriguing portions of the text. What I will do here is to comment briefly on what I think are key findings, some of which throw startling light on the global religious scene. Then I will, also briefly, point out significant political implications that should be of interest to people not particularly enamored of religious demography. Johnson and Grim are obviously fond of numbers. But they succeed in making the numbers speak. Often the numbers make us change the way we look at the world.
Perhaps the most startling findings come from a comparison of two dates – 1910 and 2010. The former date, not so incidentally, marks the international Protestant missionary conference in Edinburgh, which proclaimed the twentieth century as the era of world evangelization. That purpose was remarkably successful. However, in addition to spreading Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular, into previously “heathen” regions, the time span between the two dates saw an amazing demographic shift from the global North to the global South. In 1910 over 80% of Christians lived in Europe and North America; in 2010 that had shrunk to less than 40%. Today the majority of Christians live in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This shift has many important implications. Possibly the most important is the fact that Christians in the global South (Protestant as well Catholic) are more robustly supernaturalist than their coreligionists in the North. Thus African Christians, for example, live in a world of spirits (divine as well as demonic), miracles, and exorcisms quite different from their Northern brethren – and much closer to the world of the New Testament. This theological fact is now beginning to sink in widely. It is vividly illustrated by developments in the Anglican communion, as dissident conservative Episcopalians in places like the parish in Falls Church, Virginia (where George Washington, no less, used to worship), put themselves under the care of African bishops, and as the Archbishop of York, the second-ranking cleric in the Church of England, is an African. But it is mostly through immigration that Southern Christianity is washing over into the Global North – for example, in the increasing presence of Latinos in the Catholic Church in the United States.
Despite the great successes of Evangelical and especially Pentecostal missionaries in many countries, notably in Latin America, there are now more Catholics than Protestants among Christians globally (51.5%) than there were in 1910 (47.6%). While Catholics may not match Protestants in missionary successes, they keep up demographically by way of fertility. But this comparison obscures an enormously important fact: the dramatic growth in both groupings of what the authors call “Renewalist” Christianity (a less than happy synonym, in my opinion, for what is conventionally called Pentecostal or Charismatic). This is, precisely, a robustly supernaturalist version of the faith, characterized by the “gifts of the spirit,” notably miraculous healing and “speaking in tongues.” “Renewalists” were 0.2% of all Christians in 1910, but had grown to 25.8% in 2010. Put simply, at least one fourth of today’s Christians have a worldview much closer to the New Testament than that of most theology professors in Europe and the United States. This fact should be understood in the larger context that, in all likelihood, the majority of all Christians in the global South, not only the Charismatic ones, have a familiar relationship with the supernatural that is much rarer in the North. In other words, the “gifts of the spirit” are even washing up into the suburbs of Washington.
Islam has grown substantially in the relevant time span – from 12.6% of the world population to 22.5% in 2010. In some parts of the world the increase was due to missionary activity, especially in Africa, but mostly it was caused by high fertility. The future projections are interesting; I’ll get to them presently. But today the geographical distribution of Muslims is very interesting indeed: The largest number is in Indonesia, followed by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iran. Egypt occupies the sixth place in this demographic hierarchy. The denizens of Cairo may be justified in thinking of themselves as being at the heart of the Arab world, but surely not of the Muslim world. In other words, the center of the Muslim world is not in the Middle East, as is widely assumed. Arabs can proudly recall that Islam originated in Arabia, that the language of the Qur’an is Arabic, and that the holiest cities for Muslims are indeed in the Middle East. But today most Muslims live in countries to the east of that region.
Those of us who have long pondered the questions raised by so-called secularization theory – the proposition that modernity means a decline of religion – can also derive useful lessons from the demographic data in this volume. If there was a process of secularization in the past, it reached its worldwide peak in 1970, when around 20% of the global population was self-described as “not religious.” Needless to say, one might quibble about what this phrase actually means (probably very different things to different people), or for that matter about the categories of “agnostic” and “atheist” used by the authors. Be this as it may, the number of people who can be described as “nones” (having no allegiance to any religion, here arrived at by a combination of “agnostics” and “atheists”) stands today at 11.8%. By contrast, there has been a steady increase since 1970 of people who describe themselves as religious. That category is projected to be 91% by 2050. Again, this may be due to differential fertility – the religious have more kids – not necessarily to greater religious fervor. In many countries there will be greater religious diversity. If I may beat my own drum in this connection, I have long argued that secularization theory should be replaced by pluralization theory. But that is another story.
I am much intrigued by the authors’ projections of future demographics. Of course these are prefaced by the phrase “if present trends continue.” The phrase reminds me of the one coined by Herman Kahn, sometimes called the father of futurology – “surprise-free future”; we know all too well how many surprises, many of them very unpleasant, the future may hold. Still, some present trends will continue, and it is instructive to imagine the ensuing demographic scenarios.
There is what the authors call “the continued resilience of world religions into the future.” Christians in 2010 number 32.8% of the world population, and are projected to number 35.8% in 2050. The corresponding Muslim numbers are, respectively, 22.5% and 27.5%. In other words, there will probably be no great change in the global distribution of the two major religions. There is projected a significant decrease in the number of people under the age of 30 in Muslim-majority countries, from 60% to 50% – bad news for Jihadist recruiters (even worse news would be comparable or larger decreases of unemployed young men in this age bracket). The aforementioned decrease in the “agnostic/atheist” category will likely continue unabatedly, from 11.8% to 8.7%. In other words, the age of triumphant secularity, whether hoped for or feared, is becoming more implausible as we look into the future.
As an old joke has it: As the lady said to the insect specialist after sitting next to him at a dinner party, during which he told her endlessly about his beloved insects – “This is very interesting, if you are interested in it.” There are important political reasons to be interested in demographic data about religion. This has become increasingly clear to people in international relations and in the policy community since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The first focus, logically enough, was on Islam. Then grew an understanding of the complexity of the Muslim world, and the insight that religious groups with no terrorist activists can be politically relevant. If the Muslim projection is broken down from the “resilient” total, things become very interesting indeed. The Muslim population in Europe is projected to go from 5.6% now to 6.9% in 2050 – a sizable increase, but hardly supporting the “Eurabia” dystopia evoked by anti-Muslim agitators. In the United States the Muslim population is projected to go from 2.6 millions now to 6.2 millions in 2050. The political implications of this become clear when one reflects that the increase will mean that there will be roughly equal numbers of Muslims and Jews in the country, with probable consequences for US Middle East policy. Demography is also likely to be significant for the domestic future of Israel. Palestinian fertility seems to be declining, while the fertility of Orthodox Jews in Israel (as in America) is expected to remain high. Consequently, demography suggests that there is no basis for the fear (by many Israelis) and the hope (by many Arabs) that there will be before long a Palestinian majority even within the 1967 borders of Israel (not to mention the entire territory “between the river and the sea,” that is within the borders of historic Palestine).
China is another focus in this volume. Demography features highly in any speculation about its future. Overall is the much-discussed consequence of the one-child family policy. A shrinking workforce will have to take care of an expanding population of the non-working aged. No religious factors come immediately to mind (unless it be a decline in the Confucian virtue of filial piety). But there are two demographic developments involving religion. Ethnic minorities have been exempted from the one-child policy, thus making for a higher birthrate among ethnic Muslims than among Han Chinese. Also, there has been a big increase in the number of Christians, now estimated by Johnson and Grim to be about 67 millions, or 5% of the population. Given the great difficulties of counting Christians in China, because of the illegal or semi-legal status of many churches, I suspect that this estimate is too low. If present trends continue, the number of Christians is likely to grow considerably. Much of this growth is Protestant, not (as in many other regions) by upwardly mobile poor people, but through the conversion of people who are already middle class (some with the wonderful title of “boss Christians”). One can only speculate on the political effects of an assertive Protestant middle class in China, possibly similar to effects already visible in Latin America.
I think I have said enough on why this book is important and why it should be read by people who are not, and do not aspire to become, religious demographers. Todd Johnson and Brian Grim are to be warmly congratulated and thanked.
Peter L. BergerSenior Research FellowInstitute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs, Boston University
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the support of our two research projects: the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South Hamilton, MA, and Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project at the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life in Washington, DC, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation.
We would not have been able to write this book without significant help from our Editorial Associate, Gina Bellofatto. Gina worked with us from the beginning of this project, organizing and editing the material, filling in the gaps, and keeping us moving in the midst of many other commitments.
At the Center for the Study of Global Christianity we are grateful for the work of our Data Analyst, Peter Crossing, who provided all the detailed tables extracted from the World Religion Database. We are also thankful to Research Associate Albert Hickman for copy-editing this text, making numerous suggestions and improvements throughout. Other researchers working at the Center include LouAnn Stropoli, Brad Coon, Shawn Woo, Joanne Yen, Elizabeth LeLievre, Chak Him Chow, Sam Rogers, and Katie Bethea.
At the Pew Research Center, we thank Conrad Hackett, Philip Connor, Juan Carlos Esparza Ochoa, Chris Gao, Noble Kuriakose, Anne Shi, Peter Henne (now at the University of Virginia), Becky Hsu (now at Georgetown University), and Mehtab Karim (now at George Mason University). Also, Vegard Skirbekk, Marcin Stonawski, Michaela Potančoková, and Anne Goujon, researchers at the Age and Cohort Change Project at the International Institute for Advanced Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, contributed to the case studies on Muslim population growth.
We are also grateful to Peter Berger and Robert Hefner at the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University for hosting us as Visiting Research Fellows in the Study of International Religious Demography. The World Religion Database, on which much of this study is based, is housed there.
The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
Introduction
Censuses of people have been conducted for several centuries. The science of counting religionists around the world, however, is a relatively new field of study – the development of the academic discipline of international religious demography has taken place largely in the latter part of the twentieth century. In 1969, Hyman Alterman published Counting People: The Census in History,1 one of the first comprehensive treatments of censuses. Our book, over 40 years later, is an attempt to compose an analogous volume on counting religionists around the world. We describe the emerging discipline of international religious demography by examining its methods and techniques in the context of national, regional, and global statistics on religious adherents. We define “religious demography” as the scientific and statistical study of the demographic characteristics of religious populations, primarily with respect to their size, age-sex structure, density, growth, distribution, development, migration, and vital statistics, including the change of religious identity within human populations and how these characteristics relate to other social and economic indicators. In this sense, we go beyond basic demographic features of religion (age, sex, fertility, mortality) and look at religion as a demographic characteristic of human populations deserving its own field of inquiry.
The increased prominence religion has assumed in academic fields including history, sociology, international relations, and a host of others is one of the unexpected developments of the early twenty-first century. In the latter part of the twentieth century, conventional wisdom held that religion was on the wane and, by implication, that the study of religion was of little importance to understanding the world. In particular, leading anthropologists and sociologists such as Anthony F. C. Wallace and Bryan Wilson predicted the demise or even disappearance of religion within a very short time. One of the first sociologists to recant this position was Peter Berger, who founded the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs (CURA) at Boston University and later published The Desecularization of the World.2
Recent books, such as John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge’s God is Back,3 show that journalists’ and scholars’ treatments of religion as a passing fad were not simply minor oversights. God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics by Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah4 offers evidence that a lack of attention to religion has greatly hindered international relations and peacemaking.
In the meantime, the number of sources of religious data has greatly expanded (see chapter 7 for a detailed overview of major sources). Approximately half of the world’s national censuses ask questions on religion. Religious communities continue to collect data on their members and publish annual reports of the results. Professional survey groups conduct polls and surveys, increasingly outside of the Western world. Scholars are writing monographs on religious communities, including their demographics. All of these data offer a rich repository of information for an assessment of religious demographics.
While the main purpose of this book is to describe in detail how one counts religionists around the world, we felt that it would be helpful to provide a summary of the number of people counted in each religion in the first chapter. While in other publications we have used maps to display these data,5 in this volume the data are presented in sets of tables. Explanations of the methodology, sources, and techniques of analyses behind these figures follow in the remainder of the book. The documentation for these estimates resides in our databases and research centers: the World Christian Database,6 the World Religion Database,7 the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary (South Hamilton, MA), and the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life (Washington, DC).
This book is divided into three parts: (1) Overview; (2) Data and Methods; and (3) Case Studies. In addition, we offer a technical glossary and appendix with country-by-country statistics on religion. Each chapter also includes lists of references.
Part I: Overview
The overview offers results of our analysis of religious populations around the world. Detailed tables list the number of adherents in each of the world’s major religions by United Nations continents and regions.8 Religious diversity is also explored via three distinct measurement techniques, highlighting the reality that due to movement of the world’s peoples (as well as conversions to and from religion), most countries are becoming more diverse in their religious composition. Next is a comprehensive treatment of the future of religion worldwide, with projections to 2050. The chapter explains the methodology undergirding these projections and makes suggestions for research on the future of religion.
Part I ends with a series of projections to 2050 for the future of the largest world religions, as well as agnostics and atheists. The overview addresses important issues about the status of religion in the beginning of the twenty-first century, issues that have critical implications for governments, non-governmental organizations, religious communities, and others.
Part II: Data and Methods
The chapters on data and methods offer the rationale, techniques, and specific problems associated with counting religionists. They begin by discussing differing definitions of religion, settling on one that allows the creation of a taxonomy of religions and their followers – essential for counting religionists. Also discussed are complexities related specifically to counting religionists, such as multiple religious belonging.
The academic study of religious demography is introduced by examining its context in the broader field of demography. Demography is not well integrated with other academic disciplines, yet at the same time, religious demography is increasingly recognized as impacting foreign policy, development, health, education, and a host of other fields.
The methodology chapters continue with an examination of sources of data on religion. While the three most significant are government censuses, commissioned surveys, and membership reports from the religious communities themselves, other sources of data are investigated and commented on. Part II also considers the limitations of each source of data on religion. We conclude by exploring the three sets of dynamics of religious change – births and deaths, conversions to and conversions from, immigration and emigration – that serve as the foundation for analyzing religious populations around the world.
Part III: Case Studies
The included case studies reproduce recent scholarship that provides the results of specific demographic inquiries. The most detailed of these case studies centers on counting Muslims, the world’s second most populous religion. Other case studies include reflections on how to count religionists in the largest country in the world (China) as well as one way of interpreting the religious demographics of the world’s newest country (South Sudan) and of the remainder of the former Sudan. Also included is perhaps the most detailed examination of the religious affiliations of migrants – highlighting especially the religious diasporas created around the world by the movement of peoples.
Recent History
This book emerges from two sources on religious demography that have developed over the past several decades. First, Anglican researcher David Barrett essentially pioneered this field with the award-winning World Christian Encyclopedia,9 first produced in 1982. Barrett studied the demographics of Christianity in detail but also collected data on other religions. Thus, Barrett produced the first country-by-country comprehensive statistical assessment of religion. Todd Johnson joined Barrett in 1989 and helped him to produce the second edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia, published in 2001.10 In 2003, Johnson moved the research center to Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary near Boston, where he established the Center for the Study of Global Christianity and launched the World Christian Database – an online database with detailed demographics on over 9,000 Christian denominations. In 2009, he co-edited the Atlas of Global Christianity with Kenneth R. Ross, offering the first comprehensive visual representation of international religious demographics.
Second, the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life in Washington, DC has given great priority to researching international religious demography. Thus, through the work of sociologist Brian Grim (and, more recently, including Conrad Hackett and Phillip Conner), the Pew Forum has released a series of reports on various aspects of religious demography. Some of these are reproduced with permission in the case studies in part III.
In 2008, we started the International Religious Demography project at Peter Berger’s Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University. This project has provided a place to work out specific challenges in the field of international religious demography. The first achievement was launching the World Religion Database in 2008, the source of most of the data in part I. The World Religion Database is updated every quarter, and new variables are added regularly.
A First Offering
Our hope is that this book will offer a starting place for a global conversation on the academic field of religious demography. We recognize the crucial nature of this field for understanding the world today and believe that these studies can have a direct impact on international relations, diplomacy, foreign policy, and a host of other practical considerations in how the world is governed. An additional hope is that a deeper understanding of religious demography will help inform debates that are often driven by anecdotes and conjecture instead of facts and figures.
Notes
1 Hyman Alterman, Counting People: The Census in History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).
2 Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999).
3 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is Changing the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).
4 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
5 Todd M. Johnson and Kenneth R. Ross, eds., Atlas of Global Christianity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
6 Todd M. Johnson, ed., World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
7 Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008).
8 Since the data in this volume originate from two different sources (the World Religion Database and The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life), some differences in nomenclature regarding names of world regions and some countries exist.
9 David B. Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982).
10 David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, eds., World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
References
Alterman, Hyman. Counting People: The Census in History. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
Barrett, David B. World Christian Encyclopedia. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Barrett, David B., George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, eds. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, 2 vols. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Berger, Peter L., ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.
Johnson, Todd M., ed. World Christian Database. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007.
Johnson, Todd M., and Brian J. Grim, eds. World Religion Database. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008.
Johnson, Todd M., and Kenneth R. Ross, eds. Atlas of Global Christianity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge. God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith is Changing the World. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011.
Part I
Overview
Chapter 1
Global Religious Populations, 1910–2010
Religion is a fundamental characteristic of humankind. While it is possible to find commonalities in different religions across history, peoples, languages, and cultures, it is also true that “religion” encompasses a dizzying array of rituals, practices, doctrines, sacred spaces, and personalities. This diversity is found even within major religions. For the purposes of creating a taxonomy it is possible to refer to seven or eight major religions, and to approximately 10,000 total different religions.1 At the same time, a significant minority of people claim no religion. Even in the past 100 years this “group” has waxed and waned as a percentage of the world’s population. Any serious treatment of religious demography must take both religionists and non-religionists into account.
Viewing the world’s religions on a global scale reveals a striking demographic reality.2 Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and even agnostics live side-by-side in many countries, often showing diversity within a province or state.3 These huge blocs represent to some extent cultural realities (for example, Arabs as Muslims, South Asians as Hindus), but each of these religions also has enormous cultural diversity (for example, most Muslims are not Arabs). This clustering gives rise to other seeming contradictions as well. For example, the Muslim world is perceived as stronger at its core than on the periphery (e.g., Muslims constitute a higher percentage of the population in Saudi Arabia than in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population). Yet, at the same time, the majority of Muslims live in Asia, not the Middle East or North Africa.
Chinese folk-religionists are an absolute majority in no country or province, although they make up over 6% of the global population; most live in China (which is majority agnostic). Conversely, Sikhism and Judaism – although less than 0.3% of the global total each – have local majorities in the Indian state of Punjab and in Israel, respectively. India is also notable for having the highest number of different provincial majority religions (five) in a single country.
Table 1.1 World religions by adherents, 1910–2010.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012).
The activities of groups as diverse as missionaries, militaries, and migrants can lead to significant differences in religious demographics over time. As a result, one can see two profound changes when comparing the strengths of religions globally in 1910 with those of 2010. First, sub-Saharan Africa was predominantly ethnoreligionist in 1910; by 2010 ethnoreligionists had been displaced as a majority bloc, with either Christianity introduced from the south or Islam from the north now forming the majority in almost all provinces. Second, Eastern Asia has gone from a majority of Chinese folk-religionists to a majority of agnostics and atheists. The growth of agnostics and atheists globally is shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 is a quick-reference for comparing the global strength of each of 18 religions as a percentage of the world’s population in 1910 and 2010, as well as a way to compare a religion’s growth rate with those of other religions and of the world’s population as a whole. In addition, one can compare growth rates over the century (1910–2010) or over the past 10 years (2000–10). Four trends for the 100-year period are immediately apparent. First, Christianity, as a percentage of the world’s population, has declined slightly (from 34.8% to 32.8%). Second, Islam has grown from 12.6% to 22.5% of the world’s population, the most significant change in proportion for any of the large religions. Third, Buddhists and Chinese folk-religionists have together shrunk from over 30% of the world’s population to only about 13.5%. Fourth, agnostics and atheists grew from less than 1% of the world’s population to well over 11%.
One-hundred-year growth rates (expressed as average annual growth rate4) in table 1.1 put these changes in context. World population grew at an average rate of about 1.38% per year from 1910–2010. Atheists (6.54% p.a.) and agnostics (5.45% p.a.) grew more than four times faster than the world’s population while Confucianists grew at 2.16% p.a., nearly twice as fast as the world’s population. A different situation is described by the 10-year growth rates from 2000–10. During that period, world population grew at an average rate of 1.20% p.a. Among the larger religions, Islam was the fastest growing during this period, at 1.86% p.a.; Christianity lagged somewhat, at 1.31% p.a.5 Note that both agnostics (0.32% p.a.) and atheists (0.05% p.a.) are now growing much more slowly than the world’s population. This is due largely to the resurgence of religion in China.
Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated
Despite attempts to depict the twentieth century as a “secular” century, most of the people who lived during that period were, in fact, affiliated with a religion. In 1910, well over 99% of the world’s population was religiously affiliated. By 2010 the figure had fallen below 89%, but this 100-year trend hides the fact that the high point for the non-religious was around 1970, when almost 20% of the world’s population was either agnostic or atheist (see table 1.2). The collapse of European Communism in the late twentieth century was accompanied by a resurgence of religion, making the world more religiously affiliated in 2010 than in 1970. While religious affiliation is not a direct indication of how religiously active people are, political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart point out, “The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving towards more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless, the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population.”6
Table 1.2 Percentage of the world’s population belonging to no religion or religion, 1910–2010.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012).
This resurgence of religious affiliation continues in the present (even though the number of atheists and agnostics continues to rise in the Western world), and the current growth of religions of all kinds in China (where the vast majority of the non-religious live today) indicates that the religious future of the world is indeed one worth studying.
What follows is a statistical summary of religious adherents (ordered largest to smallest in 2010 from table 1.1), including agnostics and atheists as separate categories.
Christians
Christianity – the world’s largest religion – traces its origins to a small group of Jewish disciples in first-century Palestine. Christians believe that Jesus Christ is divine, was crucified in Jerusalem, but rose from the dead. Jesus was seen as the fulfillment of messianic promises recorded in the Jewish scriptures. He is worshipped today in hundreds of languages around the world. The Bible is its foundational document, divided into Old and New Testaments.
As observed in table 1.1, Christians have constituted approximately one third of the world’s population over the past 100 years.7 Yet, over this same period, Christianity has experienced a profound shift in its ethnic and linguistic composition (examined more closely in table 1.3). In 1910 over 80% of all Christians lived in Europe and Northern America (the “global North”).8 By 2010 this had fallen to less than 40%, with the majority of Christians located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The global North was 95% Christian in 1910. Five regions in the global South,9 all the recipients of intense Christian missionary activity over the preceding centuries, were also at least 90% Christian in 1910. The 21 United Nations regions listed in table 1.3 (and similar, subsequent tables) illustrate the North/South dichotomy.10 This dichotomy is especially significant today for Christians because the term “Southern Christians” or “Christians of the global South” is increasingly replacing the synonymous term “non-Western Christians.”11 Christians were all Southerners12 at the time of Christ, gradually becoming more Northern until 1500, when fully 92% of all Christians were Northerners (Europeans). This percentage began to decline gradually until 1900 when it was 83%. After 1900 the Northern percentage declined precipitously while the Southern rose meteorically. By 2100, over three fourths of all Christians will likely be living in the South.13 This represents a return to the demographic makeup of Christianity at the time of Christ (predominantly Southern), but also depicts a vast expansion of Christianity into all countries as well as thousands of peoples, languages, and cultures.
Table 1.3 Christians (C) by United Nations continents and regions, 1910–2010.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012).
Following what Kenneth Scott Latourette refers to as the Great Century for Christianity,14 churches outside Europe and the Americas that took root in the nineteenth century grew rapidly in the twentieth century.15 Africa, in particular, led this transformation, growing from only 11.6 million Christians in 1910 to 494 million by 2010. Given current trends, Africa could be home to more than 1 billion Christians by 2050.
By 2010 only three of the “most Christian” regions in 1910 (Central America, South America, and Polynesia) were still at least 90% Christian, and each one is in the global South. They have been joined by Micronesia and Melanesia (the latter seeing its Christian population rise from 15.4% in 1910 to 91.5% in 2010). An additional seven regions exceeded 80%, including Middle Africa, which also saw phenomenal growth in its Christian population (from 1.1% in 1910 to 82.5% in 2010). Africa as a continent grew from 9.3% Christian in 1910 to 48.3% in 2010. Both Australia/New Zealand and Western Europe, however, had fallen below 80% Christian by 2010. Although three of the five regions that were less than 10% Christian in 1910 remain below that level in 2010, the Christian percentages increased over the century, except in Northern Africa. Western Asia also saw its Christian percentage drop, to 6.1% in 2010 from 22.8% in 1910.
In 1910 nine of the 10 countries with the most Christians were in the North (see table 1.4). The shift of Christianity southward over the following century has left the United States, Russia, and Germany as the only Northern countries on the list. The percentage of Christians in all of 1910’s “top 10” in Christian population also declined between 1910 and 2010 (see table 1.5). Of the countries with the fastest Christian growth between 1910 and 2010, seven were in Africa and three in Asia (see table 1.6). In the period 2000–10, the fastest growth is found in Asia (seven countries) and Africa (three countries).
Of the major traditions in Christianity, Roman Catholicism represents just over half of all Christians, growing from 47.6% of all Christians in 1910 to 51.5% in 2010. Catholics’ percentage of the global population grew slightly, from 16.6% in 1910 to 16.9% in 2010. This rise, however, masks a steep decline in adherents in Europe accompanied by a simultaneous rise in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Since 1910, the percentages of the population, both within Christianity and globally, that are Orthodox and Anglican have declined. Orthodoxy, decimated by the rise of the Communism in Europe, dropped from 20.4% of the global population in 1910 to 12.2% in 2010. At the same time, Orthodox fell from 7.1% of all Christians in 1910 to 4.0% in 2010. Anglicans, like Roman Catholics, lost many adherents in the global North while gaining in the global South. In 1910, Anglicans represented 1.9% of the global population, dropping to 1.3% in 2010. Over the 100-year period, Anglicans as a percentage of all Christians fell from 5.4% to 3.8%. Protestants also experienced slight losses, going from 18.8% to 18.6% of all Christians between 1910 and 2010. Their share of the global population also decreased from 6.5% to 6.1% in the same period. Independents and Marginals,16 on the other hand, increased their shares of the total Christian community and of the global population. Independents, especially in Africa and Asia, represented only 1.5% of all Christians in 1910 but rose meteorically to 15.0% by 2010. Their share of the global population also increased from 0.5% to 4.9%. Marginals, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons, experienced significant growth over this century, growing from 0.2% to 1.5% of all Christians and from 0.1% to 0.5% of the global population from 1910 to 2010.
Table 1.4 Countries with the most Christians, 1910 and 2010.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012).
Table 1.5 Countries with the highest percentage of Christians, 1910 and 2010.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012). Countries >100,000 population.
Table 1.6 Countries with the fastest annual growth of Christians, 1910–2010 and 2000–10.
Data source: Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, eds., World Religion Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, accessed January 2012). Countries >100,000 population.
Movements within Christianity17 (and across the traditions) also experienced changes in size and percentage over the 100-year period (see table 1.7). In 1910, Evangelicals, mainly Protestants in the global North, represented 13.1% of all Christians and 4.6% of the global population. By 2010, these had dropped to 12.6% and 4.1%, respectively. Renewalists (Pentecostals and Charismatics), on the other hand, grew rapidly from just 0.1% of the global population and 0.2% of all Christians in 1910 to 8.5% and 25.8%, respectively, by 2010.18
Another important aspect of Christian demographics, mother tongues spoken by Christians, is shown below in table 1.8. Note that Spanish is in the top position (and has been so since at least 1970). English is a distant second, followed by Portuguese and then Russian. The surprise is in the fifth position. With the recent growth of Christianity in China, Mandarin Chinese is now the fifth-largest Christian mother tongue, surpassing traditionally “Christian” languages such as French, German, Polish, and Ukrainian. Languages of the global South are moving up the list, with Tagalog, Amharic, Yoruba, Igbo, and Korean poised to push European languages out of the top 10.
Muslims
Islam was founded in the seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula where Muhammad (570–632 CE), honored by Muslims as the last and final messenger of God, brought a monotheistic message to Arab tribes. Within 100 years of the Prophet’s death, Muslims could be found from Spain to China. Today, Muslims are found in nearly every country of the world.19 (See chapters 10 and 11 for a separate case study looking at Muslim population trends from 1990 to 2010, including projections to 2030.)
The growth of Islam over the past century has been remarkable. Globally, Islam has grown almost 1.5 times faster than the general population.20 While experiencing steady growth in both Africa and Asia, it has grown almost three times faster than the general population in Europe and almost five times faster in Northern America.21
