Thinker, Thought and Knowledge E-Book

V.N. Mishra

• Herausgeber: D.K. Printworld
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 431

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

Thinker, Thought and Knowledge critically and analytically reasons that some of the philosophical expositions like “thought has created the thinker” and “higher-order thoughts are themselves conscious” hinder us from explaining our sense of unity of consciousness. This book presents and elucidates some observations – thought cannot create thinker; along with thinker and thought, thinking too is quintessential for individual experience to take place; thinker, thinking and thought are fundamentally one in self-consciousness; thought becomes the object of self-consciousness; and the modern science attempts to undermine the principle of causation – from the East–West perspective, and registers its disproval with the philosophical views of scholars like J. Krishnamurti and a few other modern philosophers.

Leseprobe

Thinker, Thought and Knowledge

in East–West Perspective

Thinker, Thought and Knowledge

in East–West Perspective

V.N. Misra

Cataloging in Publication Data – DK

[Courtesy: D.K. Agencies (P) Ltd. <[email protected]>]

Misra, V.N., author.

Thinker, thought and knowledge in East-West

perspective / V.N. Misra.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 9788124610442

1. Thought and thinking. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. 3.

Knowledge, Theory of (Hinduism) 4. Advaita. I. Title.

LCC BF441.M57 2021 | DDC 153.42 23

ISBN: 978-81-246-1044-2 (Hardbound)

ISBN: 978-81-246-1127-2 (E-Book)

First published in India in 2021

© V.N. Misra (b. 1940)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, except brief quotations, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior written permission of the copyright holder, indicated above, and the publishers.

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Preface

It is recently observed that thought has created thinker. Thought thinks itself. Each thought carries out with it the potential for self-consciousness. Thought is also treated as the source of nature and modern physics has a tendency to undermine the principle of causation. In another study it is stated that higher order thoughts (HOTs) are, themselves, conscious. This seems to prevent it from being able to explain our sense of unity of consciousness. As against these observations, the following observations of the present study, Thinker, Thought and Knowledge, are quite different:

i. Thought cannot create thinker. This is mainly because thought happens to be the object of self-consciousness which is embodied in human being. It may be noted here that only human beings can become thinker, because they have both mind and consciousness.

ii. Those who believe that thought creates thinker, they have taken into consideration only thinker and thought. This leads to duality under which it is difficult to know whether thinker has created thought or thought has created thinker. If one takes the triplicity of thinker, thought and thinking, in that individual experience takes place. This is mainly because in thinking, thinker and thought both are involved.

iii. Thinker, thinking and thought are not different but they are fundamentally one in self-consciousness. In reality, I, the thinker, am consciousness which thinks, thinking is that consciousness myself operating; thought is also myself, a form or movement of the same consciousness. This shows that consciousness itself is unity. In this context, it is all the more important to quote Searle’s observation that “consciousness is by its very essence qualitative, subjective and unified” (Searle 2004: 95). If consciousness itself is unity, how the atomic character of thought may prevent it from being able to explain our sense of the unity of consciousness.

iv. Thought as source of nature does seem to appropriate in the sense that it becomes the object of self-consciousness, which is embodied in human being. An inference may, therefore, be drawn that it is the self-consciousness rather than thought which becomes the source of nature. Self-consciousness, while knowing the objective world, it knows itself. There is no other entity which knows itself.

v. In the context of undermining the causation in the quantum physics, it may be stated that since the observer (i.e. human being) is involved how can he undermine the causation? The cause resides in the observer having causal body according to the Vedānta of Indian philosophy. The observer influences the properties of the quantum theory. In fact, it is the work of human consciousness which broke the tangible chunk of matter into ordinarily invisible atoms and the latter into absolutely invisible particles.

As regards the knowledge aspect of the study, it may be stated that perceptual knowledge concerning the relative existence and knowledge dealing with the Absolute Reality is discussed on the basis of Advaita Vedānta, and the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda of Buddhist philosophy. Kant’s theory of knowledge is also discussed.

According to Kant, there are two main sources of knowledge. In the first source, object is given to us. This is known as the faculty representations. The second one is the power of cognizing by means of representation. This is referred to as spontaneity in the production of conceptions.

In the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy, the higher knowledge is mainly concerned with Brahman which happens to be the Absolute Reality. It is pure consciousness. This is important because it is treated as the foundation through which the entire universe is known. Pure consciousness in itself is the Absolute Reality. Whereas, pure consciousness for itself is involved in the world affairs which have only relative existence. However, the perceptual knowledge is twofold: external and internal. The former is known by any of five sensory organs such as hearing, sight, touch, taste and smell. Whereas, the latter is the mental perception of pain and pleasure of knowledge, ignorance, love, hate, etc.

In the Buddhist philosophy, the self is represented by self-consciousness. This is involved in the internal perception. Whereas, the external perception depends on the images of the objects. However, the object of perception happens to be a unique particular meaning thereby an entity that is not shared by anything. The Buddhists have adopted the representative theory of perception under which everything happens as an inner episode with the mind. This is justified by the dream experience in which action also takes place.

The knowledge of Absolute Reality is treated as emptiness in the Buddhist philosophy. This has also been described as the Buddha nature known as tathatā (suchness), which is dependently co-arise. However, the ālaya-vijñāna happens to be the noetic aspect of tathatā. When ālaya-vijñāna returns to itself, it becomes the dharmakāya of the Buddha, the non-dual (advaya) principle, the Absolute. In order to achieve the stage of dharmakāya, one has to purify his consciousness by going through four stages: (i) kāmāvacāra-citta-bhūmi (sphere); (ii) rūpāvacāra-citta-bhūmi;(iii) arūpāvacāra-citta-bhūmi; and (iv) lokuttara-citta-bhūmi. The fourth stage is the supramundane consciousness. This stage happens to be the realization of nirvāṇa, the Absolute Reality.

The changes in ālaya-vijñāna are momentary. Each moment, on the basis of the Buddha statement, has three sub-moments: arising, presence and dissolution.

It may, however, be stated that according to Sartre, the momentary instants of consciousness are unity in itself. Each instant of consciousness is a new existence, which does not arise out of a prior instant. This unity is treated as real and it is called the “unity within duration”.

I am, indeed, grateful to Dr S.M. Pathak whose guidance in the research studies in economics has changed my entire life. His encouragement even in writing of philosophical books gives opportunity to express my feeling that his guidance has helped me in writing books even at the old age.

My gratitude is beyond words to Shri M.L. Pandit for encouraging me to write philosophical books.

I am indebted to Shri S.K. Sharma and Shri P.R. Sharma for their appreciation of my earlier books.

I express my gratitude to the authors from whose books the passages have been quoted in different chapters of this book.

I also express my gratitude to Shri Susheel Kumar Mittal, D.K. Printworld for his sincere efforts in publishing this book.

V.N. Misra

New Delhi

5 January 2021

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Thinker as Thinking Being

Sartre’s Interpretation of Descartes Formula: I Think, Therefore I Am

Vedāntic Interpretation of Descartes’ Formula: I Think, Therefore I Am

The Cogito in Existential Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre

Pre-reflective consciousness or cogito

Reflective Consciousness or cogito

Unity between pre-reflective consciousness or cogito and reflective cogito

The Cogito in Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

The Transcendental Ego as Thinking Being

Transcendental Ego in Kant’s Philosophy

Transcendental Ego in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Pure Ego in Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita of Indian Philosophy

Thinking Being in Kant’s Philosophy

Thinking as Freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy

Thinking as Subject and Object

Thought

Self (Self-Consciousness) and Knowledge

1. Thinker as Self-Conscious Being

Introduction

Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness

Vedāntic interpretation of Transcendental unity of self-consciousness

Self-consciousness in Hegel’s Philosophy

Lordship and Bondage

Freedom of Self-consciousness

Puruṣa (Self-conscious Human Being) in the Sāṁkhya–Yoga of Indian Philosophy

Self-Conscious Being in the Advaita Vedānta

Vivaraṇa School of Vedānta

Bhāmatī School of Vedānta

Relation between the Absolute and the Individual Self

Witness Consciousness

2. Nature and Process of Thought

Introduction

Nature of Thought in Advaita Vedānta

The Postulates of Empirical Thought in Kant’s Philosophy

Thought in Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy

Laws of Thought

Hegel’s Denial of Laws of Thought

Thought and Being in Hegel’s Philosophy

Higher Order Thought

Critical Assessment

Thought Process and Atom

Vaiśeṣika’s Atomic Theory of Indian Philosophy

The Atomic Theory

The Eleven Moments Theory

Functions of Different Atoms

Thought Process in Buddhist Philosophy

Bhavaṅga Citta and Transcendental Ego

Order of Thought (Citta-Niyāma) in Buddhist Philosophy

Vedāntic Interpretation of Constant and Variable’s Aspects of Every Consciousness

3. Thought, Memory and Time

Introduction

Saṁskāra (Disposition) and Consciousness

Memory and Consciousness

Memory in Buddhist Philosophy

Memory in the Vaiśeṣika’s philosophy

Memory in the Nayāya Philosophy

The Concept of Saṁskāra of Sāṁkhya–Yoga

Advaita Vedānta Theory of Saṁskāra (Disposition)

The Epistemology of Recollection (Smr̥ti)

Citta

Memory in Sir William Hamilton Bart’s Philosophy

Pratyabhijñā (Recognition) School of Kashmir Śaivism

Thought and Time

Thought as Existence

Thought as Time

Objective Time

Thought as Space

Temporality of Consciousness

Consciousness, Thought and Time

4. Thought as the Source of Nature and Quantum Physics

Introduction

The Quantum Theory of Physics

The Concept of One in Many and Many in One

Matter: Wholeness and Implicate Order

What Is Order

Quantum Field Theory and Implicate Order

Implicate Order and Generative Order

Consciousness and Implicate Order

Consciousness and Matter

Interconnection between Consciousness and Matter

Observer in Quantum Physics

Emerging Implications

5. Kant’s Theory of Knowledge

Introduction

Perception and Consciousness

Sensibility

Understanding

Interaction

Perception

Object

Sensation

External Perception

Space and Time

Space

Time and Inner Sense

Metaphysical Exposition of the Conception

Concluding Observations

Elucidation

Priority of Time over Space

6. Knowledge and Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta

Introduction

Self-consciousness and Knowledge

Consciousness as Foundational Knowledge

Unity of Ātman or Brahman(Pure Consciousness)

Ātman as Sat

Ātman as Cit

Ātman as Bliss (Ānanda)

The Non-dual Nature of Ātman

Proof of Ātman

Mind and Consciousness

Consciousness and Manifestation

Theory of Five Kośas: Realms of Knowledge

Annamaya-Kośa (Matter and Life)

Prāṇamaya-Kośa (Vital Sheath)

Manomaya-Kośa (Mind Sheath)

Vijñānamaya-Kośa (Intellect Sheath)

Ānandamaya-Kośa (Bliss Sheath)

Five Kośas as Solution of Body–Mind Problem and Gaining Different Kinds of Knowledge

7. Perceptual Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta

Introduction

Internal Perception

External Perception

Contact of Sense Organs with their Respective Objects

Mental Mode of Advaita Vedānta

Cognitive Process of External Perception

Perceptual Illusion

8. Self-knowledge of Advaita Vedānta

Introduction

Liberation as Self-Realization

The Locus of Ignorance

Three States of Consciousness (Sleep, Dream and Waking)

Metaphysics of Sleep Consciousness

Dream Consciousness

Waking Consciousness

Causal Body of Human Being and Causal Consciousness

Causal Body

Causal Consciousness

Means of Liberation

Turīya

9. Perception and Self-consciousness in Yogācāra Vijñānavāda of Buddhist Philosophy

Introduction

Self in Tattvasaṁghraha

External World and Object of Perception

External World

Atomism

Object of Perception: Unique Particular

Sense Perception and Sensation

Source of Sensation in Yogācāra Vijñānavāda

Momentary Perception

10. Quantum Physics and the Buddha Nature

Introduction

The Absolute Reality: Buddha’s Nature as Tathatā(Suchness)

Critical Comments

Dharmakāya

Svābhavikakāya

Saṁbhogakāya

Nirmāṇakāya

Purification of Consciousness

Kāmāvacāra-citta-bhūmi (sphere)

Rūpāvacāra-citta-bhūmi

Arūpāvacāra-citta-bhūmi

Lokuttara-citta-bhūmi

Universal Flux

Quantum Physics

Buddhist Philosophy

Six Hetus in Abhidharma

Kāraṇa-hetu

Sahabhū-hetu

Saṁprayuktaka-hetu

Sabhāga-hetu

Sarvatraga-hetu

Vipāka-hetu

Ālaya-Vijñāna and Momentariness

Reconciliation

11. Epilogue

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

This study attempts to examine thinker, thought and knowledge in East–West perspective with a view to provide substantial response in the sense that it is thinker who creates thought. Whereas in the following observations it is observed that thoughts creates thinker.

i. It is thought that has created the thinker;1 thoughts themselves are the thinkers.2

ii. Each thought carries with it the potential for self-awareness.3

iii. The idea of a thinker is itself produced by thought and therefore cannot be separated from the process of thinking. Thought thinks itself.4

iv. Thought is treated as the source of nature.5

v. Modern physics has a tendency to undermine the principle of causation.6

The above first three observations can be justified on the basis of process philosophy, which has been started by the Buddha about 2,500 years ago, under which there is no being, but only becoming exists. Everything is in process and flux. Now this process philosophy in the West has been revived again by A.N. Whitehead. It is stated that:

Whitehead has said that philosophers who have started with being have given as the metaphysics of “substance” and those who have with “becoming” developed the metaphysics of flux. Whitehead points out the inseparability of the two.7

In this context, the following observation is worth stating:

With all its organismic leanings, the process philosophy is predominating materialistic and mechanical and hence unmindful of the possibilities of consciousness. Had it become mindful of these possibilities of consciousness, it would not have been required to accord that independence to process as actually it has done. Process, indeed, is a product of consciousness proceeding from its concentricity of self-consciousness to the extensity of objectification.8

In the process philosophy, thinker and thought are not treated separately on the ground that are dependently co-arising as mutual causality. Therefore, it may be said that in the process system, there is no scope for storing the impressions in the mind because experiencer and experience cannot be relied separately. Further, with process philosophy the substance also cannot be separated from the flux as mentioned above.

Thinker and thought, however, become one in self-consciousness (jīvātman) of human being. This is mainly because thought becomes an object of self-consciousness. In other words, thought gets objectified of one’s self-consciousness. Yet both thinker and thought may be distinguished. This is the Vedāntic interpretation.

The other fact is that thoughts are both quality (guṇa) and acts (kriyā), “they require the self as their supportive substance and the thinker. We note it as a ground of disagreement, then, that if the substance ontology is accepted, thoughts cannot be thinker.”9 This may further be supported by the observation that “thought exists only in relation to a conscious and abiding subject. Apart from this relation, it is an unreal abstraction.”10

In view of the above facts this study attempts to examine, thinker, thought and knowledge covering the most significant divisions of philosophic study. These are: (1) Logic of the theory of thought; (2) epistemology or theory of knowledge; and (3) metaphysical or theory of being.11 It may, however, be stated that theory of being is explained through thinking being in the Western philosophy, started by René Descartes. Whereas in the Eastern philosophy, being is known as conscious being, which is explained through self-consciousness because it happens to be jīvātman (self) according to the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. Here, it may be pointed out that there is no difference between thinking being and consciousness being. Both have metaphysical notion.

However, thought has also been identified with the self. It is stated; “Thought is self, thought is the word which identifies itself as the ‘me’, and at whatever level, high or low the self is placed, it is still within the field of thought.”12

The Yogācāra Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist philosophy has also divided consciousness into two aspects as stated below:

When consciousness is born, its manifestation has two aspects: (i) that what discriminates the seeming subject (what can cause); and (ii) that what is discriminated, the seeming object (what is caused). As a seeming subject the aspect of consciousness is called perceiving division (darśana-bhāga). As a seeming object, the aspect of consciousness is called perceived division (nimitta-bhāga). There is another functional aspect of consciousness that what is the support of the perceiving and the perceived division, and may be regarded as their essential nature. This is called the “self-corroboratory aspect” (sva-saṁvitti-bhāga). It is the realization of the consciousness itself. If this was lacking, there would be no way of remembering the various manifestations of mind and its activities.13

It may, however, be pointed out that consciousness cannot be divided. Yet in the observations, the duality and triplicity aspects of consciousness are mentioned. This is mainly because of the following reason:

The consciousness, although it is a complex entity, is only one. When we speak of its “parts” or “divisions”, the only thing that we want to indicate is that it has diverse activities, diverse forms of manifestations, in the empirical reality – empirical reality that is created by the same consciousness when it manifests itself. It is not a real concrete division: it is only a theoretical division, a product of the conceptual analysis.14

Now coming to other observations like thought as the source of nature and modern physics undermining causation, it may be stated here that thought being the object of self-consciousness, cannot be the source of nature. In fact, it is human consciousness (i.e. self-consciousness) which itself is the source of nature. However, the quantum physics does not seem to undermine causality. It interprets the causality in different ways. The causal interpretation depends upon the quantum wave which carries information potentially active everywhere, but it becomes active in real sense when energy enters into the particle. This is, further, explained below:

When a physicist observes an elementary particle – which, from the quantum point of view, “causes” the particles to exist. …Before, the advent of quantum physics, the hallmark of “reality” was its measurability – for something to attain the status of being real, it had to be able to be measured. Quantum physics has startled the physics community by seeing through and dissolving this long-held and cherished notion. It is revealing that we ourselves are intimately involved in producing the results of our own measurements. Our discovery of a quantum entity in a very real sense “causes”, it to be there, which implies that there is no physically real world independent of our observation of it. Before these entities are observed they do not really exist. There is nothing we can say about them; they are “unspeakable”.15

Thinker as Thinking Being

(Descartes Formula – Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am))

In the cogito, ergo sum, one is affirming the existence of oneself as something which thinks. This is experienced below:

The essence of the Cartesian self consists, therefore, only in thinking. I am, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing – that is, a mind that doubts, understands, (conceives) affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines and also perceives. … This “thinking thing” is a substance and we do not know this substance immediately, in itself, but only because it is the subject of certain acts.16

This Cartesian cogito is interpreted in two ways as stated below:

i. Sometimes it is understood universally, implying the certainty of existence in all cases of conscious activity. Wherever there is consciousness there must be the ego as the subject of it.17

ii. It conveys the existence of a particular, contingent fact, namely that I in being conscious exist here and now. I cannot be conscious without existing at this moment; my very existence is implied in my thinking.18

It may be stated that these two ways of interpreting the cogitoprinciple is necessarily interrelated. This interrelation is necessary for all truths of reason.19 However, the most important aspect of the cogito principle is that existence and thinking are inseparably connected.20 It means that my thinking reveals and guarantees my existence.21 The cogito principle has been the best mode of discovering the nature of mind as evident from the following observations:

Explaining the nature of mind, Descartes suggests that cognition or thought is the essence of mind and all other experiences like perception, imagination, emotion, volition, etc. are the “modes” of this thinking. Regarding the distinctness of this mind from the body, Descartes maintains that not only they possess different attributes but in some cases at least, the mind can function independently of the body, for clearly there can be no use of the brain for pure intelligence but only for imagination and sensation. The mind or soul is equipped with certain innate ideas, which it applies to but does not derive from external objects. These ideas are not always explicit in consciousness, but they are present in mind as latent potentialities at least. In any case, they have not originated in experience, which only can serve as an occasion of their explicit recall.22

However, Descartes’ cogito principle has been influential, yet has been criticized and interpreted in different ways. These are stated below.

Sartre’s Interpretation of Descartes Formula: I Think, Therefore I Am

The above formula has been criticized by Jean-Paul Sartre on the following grounds:

(i) The consciousness which says “I am” is not actually the consciousness which thinks. Instead, we are dealing with a secondary activity.23

(ii) Descartes has confused spontaneous doubt, which is a consciousness, with methodological doubt, which is an act. When we catch a glimpse of an object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain. But Descartes’ cogito has posited this consciousness itself as an object: the Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has reflected upon it.24

On the basis of above observations, Sartre has concluded as follows:

This cogito is not Descartes’ doubting: it is Descartes’ reflecting upon the doubting. “ I doubt, therefore I am”, is really, “I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am”. The Cartesian cogito is reflective, and its object is not itself but the original consciousness of doubting. The consciousness which doubted is now reflected on by the cogito but was never itself reflective: its only object is the object which it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish thepre-reflectivecogito as the primary consciousness.25

Vedāntic Interpretation of Descartes’ Formula: I Think, Therefore I Am

According to Vedānta school of Indian philosophy, consciousness is embodied in human being. It becomes self-consciousness because it manifests through the mind. That is why a person is spontaneously conscious of his own existence as “I am”. Therefore, Descartes’ formula has been interpreted by the Vedānta as “I am, therefore I think”.26

The Cogito in Existential Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre

Sartre has started his existentialist theory of consciousness with an appraisal of Descartes’ cogito – “I think, therefore I am”. On the basis of this formula, Descartes has deduced the certainty of man’s existence from his thought. “But Sartre’s maxim – ‘existence, precedes essence’ may be interpreted as suggesting – I am, therefore, I think.”27 Sartre, in fact, “believes that man cannot act or think if he does not exist before hand. Consciousness, to him, is only a part of the encompassing structure of existence.”28 It may, however, be stated that the suggested formula of Sartre – I am, therefore, I think – is in complete agreement with Advaita Vedānta as mentioned above.

The Cartesian cogito has, however, not been accepted by Sartre mainly because it does not provide us the picture of the real consciousness – pure and simple. In this context, it is stated:

The Cartesian cogito to Sartre is the consciousness of the “second order” or the reflected consciousness. Distinguishing the pure consciousness from the Cartesian one, Sartre makes a distinction between the two phases of consciousness, which he calls the pre- reflective cogito and the Cartesian or reflective cogito.29

The cogito is treated by Sartre as reflective consciousness.30 However, reflection has not been given any kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected on.

It is not reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito.31

Pre-reflective consciousness or cogito

However, the main difference between pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness is that in the former there is no ego, whereas in the reflective consciousness the ego appears.32 It may be stated that, “unreflected consciousness must be considered as autonomous”.33 This is explained below:

All unreflected consciousness, being a non-thetic consciousness of itself, leaves behind it a non-thetic memory that can be consulted. All that is required for this is to try to reconstitute the complete moment in which this unreflected consciousness appeared (and this is, by definition, always possible). For instance, I was just now absorbed in my reading. I am now going to try to remember the circumstances of my reading, my attitude, the lines I was reading. I am thus going to bring back to life not merely those external details but a certain thickness of unreflected consciousness, since it is only by this consciousness that the objects have been perceived, and they remain relative to it. This consciousness is not to be posited as an object of my reflection: quite the opposite, I must direct my attention to the objects I have brought to life, but without losing sight of this consciousness, I must maintain a sort of complicity with it, and draw up an inventory of its content in a non-positional way. The result is not in doubt, while I was reading, there was a consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the book, but the I did not inhibit this consciousness, it was merely consciousness of the object and non-positional consciousness of itself. I can turn these results, grasped athetically, into the object of a thesis and declare: there was no I in the unreflected consciousness. … When I run after a tram, when I look at the time, when I become absorbed in the contemplation of a portrait, there is no I. There is a consciousness of tram-needing-to-be-caught, etc. a non-positional consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects, it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousness, which present themselves with values, attractive and repulsive values, but as for me, I have disappeared. I have annihilated myself. There is no place for me at this level, and this is not the result of some chance, some momentary failure of attention: it stems from the very structure of consciousness.34

The reflective consciousness or cogito transcends itself in order to reach an object. This is stated below:

The reflective consciousness posits the consciousness reflected on, as its object. In the act of reflecting I pass judgement on the consciousness reflected on; I am ashamed of it, I am proud of it, I will it, I deny it, etc. The immediate consciousness which I have of perceiving does not permit me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It does not know my perception, does not posit it; all that there is of intention is my actual consciousness is directed towards the outside, towards the world. In turn, this spontaneous consciousness of my perception is constitutiveof my perceptive consciousness. In other words, every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. If I count the cigarettes which are in that case, I have the impression of disclosing an objective property of this collection of cigarettes; they are a dozen. This property appears to my consciousness as a property existing in the world. It is very possible that I have no positional consciousness of counting them. Then I do not know myself as counting. Proof of this is that children who are capable of making an addition spontaneously cannot explain subsequently how they set about it.35

According to Sartre, it is consciousness which serves as a link between me and the world. This is evident from the following observation.

The world did not create the me, the me did not create the world, they are two objects for the absolute, impersonal consciousness, and it is through that consciousness that they are linked back together. This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the I, is no longer in anyway a subject, nor is it a collection of representations; it is quite simply a pre-condition and an absolute source of existence. And the relation of interdependence that it establishes between the me and the World is enough for the me to draw all its content from the world.36

Sartre’s theory of non-egological consciousness as mentioned earlier, is acceptable to Advaita Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. This is explained below:

The view that the ego or “I” which is transcendent to consciousness arises only at the reflective level of consciousness is the echo of the Advaita view which holds that the ego (ahaṁ) arises when there is cidābhāsa, i.e. consciousness reflected in the internal organ; and this consciousness associated with the internal organ, which alone is capable of reflection, may be characterized in the terminology of Sartre as consciousness of in the second degree.37

However, according to Sartre, “ontological proof to be derived not from the reflective cogito but from the pre-reflective being of percipients”.38 This is clarified by the observation that “consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness: that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof.”39

Reflective Consciousness or cogito

Reflective consciousness is positional. In that, “it transcends itself in order to reach an object and it exhausts itself in this same positing”.40 It is further explained:

All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the table; all my judgments or practical activities, all my present inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the table and are absorbed in it.41

Unity between pre-reflective consciousness or cogito and reflective cogito

The reflective consciousness or cogito cannot be separated from the pre-reflective consciousness. This is because “every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness itself”.42

It emerges that without the pre-reflective cogito (non-thetic, non-positional consciousness), the reflective cogito (thetic–positional consciousness) is not possible. In such a situation, “it is agreed then that reflection must be united to that which is reflected-on by a bond of being that the reflective consciousness must be the consciousness reflected-on”.43 This reflected-on is pre-reflective (non-thetic, non-positional) consciousness.

The above observations regarding the unity between pre- reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness may be reassured by the following observation:

The pre-reflective and the reflective cogitos are merely the two different phases of the one and the same consciousness. These are really the two successive stages – one of which necessitates the other. The pre-reflective phase is the pure subjectivity having no objectivity in it, but insofar as intentionality or projection is the essential feature of consciousness, it soon transforms itself into the reflective phase. In this reflective phase, consciousness is essentially “of” or about something; it reveals the object or Being in-itself. Consciousness, thus, here, is neither a container nor it is insulated; it is in the world.44

The Cogito in Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

The cogito is recognized by the proposition, “I think, I am”. These two assertions are to be equated with each other; otherwise there would be no cogito. The meaning of the equivalence is explained in the following observation:

It is not the “I am” which is pre-eminently contained in the “I think”, not my existence which is brought down to the consciousness which I have of it, but conversely the I think which is re-integrated into the transcending process of the “I am”: and consciousness into existence.45

It is further stated:

I think, I am; but this is merely a verbal cogito, for I have grasped my thought and my existence only through the medium of language and the true formula of cogito should be “One thinks there one is.”46

This clearly shows that the language too changes the meaning of the formula. There does not seem to be any place for ego in the proposed formula by Merleau-Ponty.

However, all thought of something is at the same self-consciousness, which is embodied in human being. If this fact is not acknowledged there would be no object. In this context, the following observation is worth stating:

At the root of all our experiences and all our reflections, we find, then, a being which immediately recognizes itself, because it is its knowledge both of itself and of all things, and which knows its own existence, not by observation and as a given fact, nor by inference from any idea of itself, but through direct contact with that existence. Self-consciousness is the very being of mind in action. The act whereby I am conscious of something must itself be apprehended at the every moment at which it is carried out; otherwise, it would collapse.47

Having discussed various issues regarding Descartes’ observation from things to thought, Merleau-Ponty has stated:

Unless I learn within myself to recognize the junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, none of those mechanisms called other bodies will ever be able to come to life; unless I have an exterior, others have no interior. The plurality of consciousness is impossible if I have an absolute consciousness of myself. Behind the absolute of my thought, it is even impossible to conjecture a divine absolute. If it is perfect, the contact of my thought with itself seals me within myself, and prevents me from ever feeling that anything eludes my grasp: there is no opening, no aspiration towards an Other for this self of mine, which constructs the totality of being and its own presence in the world, which is defined in terms of “self-possession”, and which never finds anything outside itself but what it has put there. This hermetically sealed self is no longer a finite self. There is ... a consciousness of the universe only through the previous consciousness of organization in the active sense of the word, and consequently, in the last analysis, only through an inner communion with the very working of godhead. It is ultimately with God that the cogito brings me into coincidence.48

It appears that consciousness is unique and universal according to Merleau-Ponty. In that it provides not only existential experience but it also reveals that the absolute transparency of thought makes destiny of human being as a thinking nature. However, we perceive a world only provided that before being facts of which we take cognizance that:

World and that perception are thoughts of our own. What remains to be understood precisely is the way world comes to belong to the subject and the subject to himself, which is that cogitatio which makes experience possible: our hold on things and our states of consciousness. ... Perception and the perceived necessarily have the same existential modality, since perception is inseparable from the consciousness which it has, or rather is, of reaching the thing in itself.49

On the basis of above observation it may be said that according to Merleau-Ponty, perception and perceived have necessarily the same existential modality. There is no subject–object duality. This happens to be just opposite to Husserl’s thought; under which distinction between the noesis and the noema is accepted. It is stated that “since every thought demands an object of thought, and this object has a relationship to the pure ‘I’ in the cognitive act, we find a remarkable polarity in every act; on the one side the ‘I’ pole and on the other ‘object’ as counter-pole”.50

Since consciousness exists in me, it appears itself and transcends to the object. This involves a knowledge of itself, “its object, to will, and to know that one wills, to love and know one loves are one and the same act: love is consciousness of loving, will is consciousness of willing”.51 In such a situation, “everything is, then, truth within consciousness. There can never be illusion other than with regard to external object.”52

While reducing consciousness in terms of its appearance with regard to some intangible reality, we are facing dilemma of an absolute consciousness on one hand and endless doubt on the other. If we reject the first solution, the cogito would be impossible? This objection brings us to the crucial point. The action is by definition: “The violent transition from what I have to what I am to have, from what I am to what I intend to be. I can accomplish the cogito and have assurance of genuinely willing, loving or believing provided that in the first place I actually do will, love or believe and thus accomplish my existence.”53

Existence has been interpreted by Merleau-Ponty in a unique way. It always “carries forward its past, whether it to be by accepting or disclaiming it. We are, as Proust declared, parched on a pyramid of past life, and if we do not see this, it is because we are obsessed by objective thought.”54 This has been explained by Merleau-Ponty through acquisition. It is stated below:

Acquisition must be accepted as an irreducible phenomenon. What we have experienced is, and remains permanently ours: and in old age a man is still in contact with his youth. Every present as it arises is driven into time like a wedge and stakes its claim to eternity. Eternity is not another order of time, but the atmosphere of time. It is true that a false thought, no less than a true one, possesses this sort of eternity: if I am mistaken at this moment, it is for ever true that I am mistaken. It would seem necessary, therefore, that there should be, in true thought, a different fertility, and that it should remain true not only as a past actually lived through, but also a perpetual present for ever carried forward in time’s succession. This, however, does not secure any essential difference between truths of fact and truths of reason. For there is not one of my actions, nor one of my fallacious thoughts, once it is adhered to, which has not been directed towards a value or a truth, and which in consequence, does not retain its permanent relevance in the subsequent course of my life, not only as an indelible fact, but also as a necessary stage on the road to the more complete truths or values which I have since recognized. My truths have been built out of these errors, and carry them along in their eternity.55

In the context of above observation, it may be stated that whatever, we think or decide, according to Merleau-Ponty, “it is always against the background of what I have previously believed or done. … We possess a truth, but this experience of truth would be absolute knowledge only if we could thematize every motive.”56

However, the only way to think about thought is to think of something. This is essential to that thought not to take itself of an object. It is explained below:

To think of thought is to adopt in relation to it an attitude that we have initially learned in relation to things: it is never to eliminate, but merely to push further back the opacity that thought presents to itself. Every halt in the forward movement of consciousness, every focus on the object, every appearance of a “something” or of an idea presupposes a subject who has suspended self-questioning at least in that particular respect.57

The above observations clearly indicate that without subject (self-consciousness) it is rather difficult to think about thought.

The Transcendental Ego as Thinking Being

The transcendental ego is experienced as the ultimate core of consciousness, in the Western philosophy.58 It is stated that the transcendental ego, “cannot be apprehended in the manner of an object – since it is a perennial subject – but it is nonetheless present in experience”.59 It is further stated that:

The I is the transcendental ego, and the anxiety, joy, and body represent the empirical or psychological ego. The two egos are at opposite extremes of the intentional stream of consciousness. Our new triad therefore is Transcendental Ego–Cogito–empirical ego. Theproperties of the empirical ego (the Cogitatum) are not the same as those of the Transcendental Ego. Both egos, however, are clearly present in consciousness.60 It may also be possible to appear as the pure Transcendental Ego.61

The transcendental ego is treated as the ultimate core of consciousness as mentioned above. Whereas according to Sartre, the transcendental I is death of consciousness.62

Transcendental Ego in Kant’s Philosophy

According to Kant “the Ego is simple in thought”.63 This is explained below:

The I or Ego of apperception and consequently in all thought, is singular or simple and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects and therefore indicates a logically simple subject – this is self-evident from the very conception of an Ego.64

It may, further, be stated that the simple ego in thought is of itself important; “even although it presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject”.65 Yet it is said that, “apperception in something real and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility”.66

It is, indeed, difficult to get clarity on important issues in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In this context the following observation is worth noting:

Kant’s rebuttals of the paralogisms, showing that the “I” that thinks cannot itself be thought by way of the understanding and its categories, need not detain us at length. It has a great deal in common with the Humean attack on Descartes; like Hume, Kant brings representation upon representation before the tribunal of the understanding and finds that, upon close examination, they dissipate. What must concern us, rather, is the question whether the posture of the Critique, as a whole, is tenable. If Kant is lecturing us that the soul, the “I think”, and self-consciousness cannot be objects of any knowledge, what was he doing back in the Transcendental Deduction of Categories? Was he not, after all, showing us the way to talk about the “I”, Self-consciousness and so on? Since that discussion did introduce us to an activity and a functioning of the soul, is Kant just shrinking back in the second half of his book, from drawing out the true implications of his own doctrine? Or was he right to reject a substantive metaphysics of the mind? It is over this question that we can trace the parting of the ways among Kant’s philosophical successors in Germany.67

Kant has also made distinction between thinking and knowing. In this context, it is stated that, “Kant claimed that we can think about things in themselves, but we cannot know them”.68 But it also ought to be recognized that, “thinking certainly lead to knowing and in fact the most important scientific gains of modernity are to be traced to thinking”.69

Transcendental Ego in Husserl’s Phenomenology

The transcendental ego, “for Husserl was consciousness as such, purged of all contingency by the method of epoche”.70 The epoche, the phenomenological reduction, is the bracketing of the natural attitude.71 However, the transcendental ego happens to be the phenomenological basis and genesis of individual consciousness.72

The transcendental ego itself is, however, not “ontologically dependent upon anything else; and, therefore, the only real absolute is the transcendental ego, all else being ontologically dependent on it or relative to it”.73 This is further explained below:

Only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being, that it alone is non-relative, that is relative only to itself, whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect to essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity.74

The above observation shows that the ego is not a form-giving subject but it is a meaning-giving activity. In that it is the ground of experience. “It constitutes the meaning of the world through its conscious acts. The ego is actual because it lives in consciousness.”75

Husserl in the ideas says that when he performs the phenomenological epoche (the phenomenological reduction), “the empirical ago and the whole world of the natural attitude are suspended. What remains as residue is the pure experience as act with its own proper essence. And act is found to be related to the transcendental ego.”76 It may be noted that without the reduction, “the apprehension of the ego is not possible. The reduction, therefore, turns out to be the necessary operation which renders pure consciousness accessible to us and subsequently the whole phenomenological region.”77

What is equally important is that after phenomenological reduction, the appearance of the phenomenon of the transcendental ego, “discloses it to be closely related to the mystical experience of the inner self, the “Deeper Self”, as Royce called it of the Ātman or Puruṣa as the Vedānta and Sāṁkhya forms of Hindu philosophy respectively have called it”.78

As against the above observation, Sartre has denied the existence of transcendental ego. This is evident from the following observation:

The phenomenological conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualizing role of the I completely useless. It is, on the contrary, consciousness that renders the unity and personality of my I possible. The transcendental I thus has no raison d’ȇtre. Indeed, this superfluous I is actually a hindrance. If it existed, it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each consciousness like an opaque blade. The transcendental I is death of consciousness. The existence of consciousness, indeed, is an absolute, because consciousness is conscious of itself; in other words, the type of existence that consciousness has is that it is consciousness of itself.79

It may, further, be clarified here that there is no room for an I (ego) in unreflective consciousness.80 This is also known as pre- reflective consciousness. The I only ever appears on the occasion of reflective act.81 It is stated that “for Sartre does not merely claim that I is a product of reflective consciousness. Audaciously, he tried in addition to demonstrate its absence from unreflective consciousness.”82

The transcendental ego, “is experienced as the source of consciousness whenever experiencing takes place, i.e whenever man is conscious. Anyone can disclose to himself the introspectively verifiable characteristics of the transcendental ego.”83 However, transcendental ego is experienced as distinct from the body and psychological states of the individual. I experience my anxiety, my joy and my body. “The I that does the experiencing is structurally different from that which it experiences; the I is the transcendental ego, and the anxiety, joy and body represent the empirical or psychological ego.”84 These two egos create a lot more problem in understanding the different states of ego. The other problem is that how the transcendental ego becomes the source of consciousness. If I am not conscious, where is the transcendental ego. In dreamless sleep, there is no ego, the moment when one awakes, I (ego) starts its operation. This seems to be the reason, for denying the existence of ego in pre-reflective consciousness by Sartre. But it also to be recognized that Sartre has accepted the role of ego in reflective consciousness. In fact, the ego becomes the object of consciousness rather than its source.

Pure Ego in Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita of Indian Philosophy

The sleep is a most complex state. In that, one may experience pure consciousness. It is known only when one awakes from sleep and says that I have slept well or I could not sleep well. This seems to be reason for interpreting pure consciousness as witness consciousness in Advaita Vedānta. However, Śaṅkarācārya has taken deep sleep as the unity of subject and object. On waking up from sleep, one realizes that “I slept well”. This was not acceptable to Rāmānuja, founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. According to him, a person on waking from sleep says only that “I slept well” and has no consciousness of anything. Therefore, Rāmānuja denied the persistence of pure consciousness or witness consciousness in deep sleep.

According to Rāmānuja, the object of knowledge was absent in sleep, only “I” persisted in deep sleep. The soul remains in the state of self-consciousness, without any cognition at all in dreamless sleep. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, “self-consciousness is an essential and inseparable feature of consciousness. Self is a conscious subject which never loses its selfhood (ahaṁ-pratyaya). The ahaṁ-pratyaya is present even in deep sleep though in a dim degree.”85 This shows that ahaṁkāra (ego) happens to be the subject of consciousness. In other words, consciousness is a reflection of ahaṁkāra (ego), which has been referred to as pure ego. This pure ego has been used by Rāmānuja in the place of pure consciousness of Śaṅkarācārya, experienced on waking from dreamless sleep. What is the most surprising is that on the one hand, Rāmānuja has advocated that it is the ego (ahaṁkāra) which controls the consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness is treated as eternal, because it is the attribute of Ātman, which is eternal.86 The Ātman is treated as a substance and consciousness happens to be its attribute, therefore, it is also eternal according to Rāmānuja’s philosophy.

Now the question arises, how is the substance related to its attribute? In this context, it is stated that “substance and its attributes are inseparably related by their very nature and hence there is no need to postulate as separate third entity to account for their relationship and as such there can be no room for the fallacy of infinite regress”.87 In the defence of inseparability, it has been further stated that “existence always implies qualification by way of attribute”.88 Yet, it has been observed that “Viśiṣṭādvaita has failed to give reasons and prove its claim that the attribute is inseparably related to the substance in relation of apr̥thak-siddhi”.89Apr̥thak has meaning of inseparable. Siddhi in this system implies two things:

Sthiti implies that an attribute can have no existence without the support of substance andpratīti implies that no attribute can be perceived except as related to a substance.90

Inseparability of attribute from its substance is justified on the analogy of knowledge relation, which clearly proves that “the subject–object relation is one that inseparably connects the subject with object”.91 In the same say, the very svarūpa of substance and attribute are inseparable.

The above knowledge relation does not seem to be appropriate because in this case there is jñāna-tripuṭī [triad of knower, knowing (means of knowledge) and known]. Without this triad, no experience will take place. In fact “it is only when the integrated state of consciousness, is broken up into the triplicity of knower, knowing and known that individual experience takes place”.92 However, for Rāmānuja, consciousness is associated mainly with knowing. This is evident from the following observation:

To know is the very purpose of consciousness, the very existence of consciousness and even the very word “consciousness”; the word cit has emanated from the root citi – citi-saṁjñāne – that means to know. If one asks the question: What is consciousness?, it pre-supposes that one is conscious of something, otherwise one would not be able to pose the question. For Rāmānuja when thinking of something, jñāna-tripuṭī (the triad of knower, known and means of knowledge) comes in.93

The jñāna-tripuṭī (knower, known and knowing) is not different but fundamentally one in the Integral Vedānta as initiated by Sri Aurobindo. This approach is basically a transformation of the Advaita theory of consciousness. In that “in Reality, I, the knower, am the consciousness which knows: the knowledge is that consciousness, myself, operating; the known is also myself, a form or movement of the same consciousness”.94 Although such unification in consciousness may not be acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaitins probably because Rāmānuja has made a distinction between the Ātman and consciousness, and in the place of pure consciousness he has brought in the pure ego as mentioned above.

The relationships among jñāna-tripuṭī components have been explained through the concepts of svarūpa-jñāna and dharmabhūta-jñāna of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The former treated as “I” consciousness shines for itself, the latter shines for the “I” consciousness.95 This is similar to the Sāṁkhya system in which Prakr̥ti happens to be for the sake of Puruṣa and both (Puruṣa and Prakr̥ti) are treated as independent entities. However, dharmabhūta-jñāna is treated as the link between subject and object and it can also be the object of “I” consciousness.96 A fallacy in this approach may be evident by the fact that dharmabhūta-jñāna