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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Bringing together the most recent empirical evidence and the latest theoretical debates, this fully revised new edition gets to grips with a broad range of inequalities in people's lives. Examining social class, gender, ethnicity, disability and migration status, it demonstrates how these play out in relation to education, health, poverty, neighbourhood and housing and how they cumulate across the life course. Richly illustrated with figures and concrete examples showing the distribution of life chances across social groups, the book demonstrates how people's lives are structured by inequalities across multiple dimensions. Comprehensive topical chapters are framed by an exploration of the meaning and interpretation of inequalities and a discussion highlighting the important intersections between them. With new chapters on disability and international migration, this updated edition continues to provide a wide-ranging but detailed and theoretically sophisticated account of contemporary inequalities that will be invaluable to undergraduate and masters students alike.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019
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Table of Contents
Cover
Figures, Tables and Boxes
Figures
Tables
Boxes
Acknowledgements
Chapter One
:
Introduction
1.1
The importance of inequality
1.2
What do we mean by inequality?
1.3
Equality and inequality: concepts and definitions
1.4
Inequalities across groups
1.5
Coverage and key themes
Further reading
Part I
Chapter Two
:
Class
2.1
Concepts, definitions, measurement
2.2
The National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SeC) and the UK class distribution
2.3
Meritocracy and social mobility
Further reading
Chapter Three
:
Gender
3.1
Definitions, concepts and coverage
3.2
Women and labour market inequality
3.3
Gender and domestic work: women's double burden?
3.4
Explaining the gendered patterns of paid and unpaid work: socialization and preferences
3.5
Inequalities between women
Further reading
Chapter Four
:
Ethnicity
4.1
Ethnicity: definitions and measures
4.2
Ethnic groups in the UK: inequality and diversity
4.3
Explaining ethnic inequalities
Further reading
Chapter Five
:
International Migration
5.1
Defining migrants
5.2
Migrant diversity and inequalities
5.3
Explaining migrant inequality
Further reading
Chapter Six
:
Disability
6.1
Defining disability
6.2
Disability and inequalities
Further reading
Part II
Chapter Seven
:
Age and the Life Course
7.1
Inequalities and the life course
Further reading
Chapter Eight
:
Education
8.1
Educational attainment over time – and access to educational qualifications across different social origins
8.2
The role of educational institutions and their relationship to family resources and dominant cultures
8.3
Contemporary educational inequalities: gender and ethnicity
Further reading
Chapter Nine
:
Income, Wealth and Poverty
9.1
Income inequality
9.2
Wealth
9.3
Poverty
Further reading
Chapter Ten
:
Health
10.1
Drivers of inequalities in health
10.2
Health inequalities internationally and intra-nationally
10.3
Inequalities in health across social groups
Further reading
Chapter Eleven
:
Neighbourhood and Housing
11.1
Neighbourhood deprivation and neighbourhood effects
11.2
Housing
Further reading
Chapter Twelve
:
Conclusions: Inequality, Intersectionality and Diversity
12.1
A framework for understanding inequalities and stratification
12.2
Key themes
12.3
Looking forward
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of tables
Chapter One
TABLE 1.1 Key indicators of selected OECD countries used for cross-country compa…
Chapter Two
TABLE 2.1 Illustration of relative and absolute mobility chances
Chapter Three
TABLE 3.1 Shares in various occupations of men and women (percentages)
Chapter Four
TABLE 4.1 Ethnic group categories in England and Wales, 1991–2011
TABLE 4.2 Proportion of ethnic groups born outside the UK, England and Wales, 20…
TABLE 4.3 Hourly rates of pay by ethnic group and migration status, men and wome…
Chapter Five
TABLE 5.1 Those wishing to migrate permanently to another country, by region of …
TABLE 5.2 Unemployment, employment and participation rates among migrants age si…
Chapter Six
TABLE 6.1 The medical (individual) and social models of disability
TABLE 6.2 Attainment at the end of compulsory schooling in England, 2014
Chapter Nine
TABLE 9.1 Gini coefficients and income distribution, selected OECD countries, 20…
TABLE 9.2 Top ten countries for global shares of income, 2012
TABLE 9.3 Income distribution across ethnic groups, UK, 2016
TABLE 9.4 Poverty rates by individual and family characteristics and region, 201…
Chapter Ten
TABLE 10.1 Top ten global causes of death, 2016
TABLE 10.2 Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for the ten countries wit…
TABLE 10.3 Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, selected OECD countries,…
TABLE 10.4 Suicide rates for the ten countries with the lowest and highest rates…
TABLE 10.5 Suicide rates per 100,000 population, selected OECD countries, 2015
TABLE 10.6 Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for men and women in coun…
Chapter Eleven
TABLE 11.1 Local authorities by deprivation according to the indices of multiple…
List of figures
Chapter Two
Figure 2.1 The class distribution according to the NS-SeC categories, UK, 2011,…
Figure 2.2 Class distribution of men by current age, England and Wales, 2011 So…
Figure 2.3 Class distribution of women by current age, England and Wales, 2011 …
Figure 2.4 Class distribution across ethnic groups, England and Wales 2011, men…
Figure 2.5 Class distribution across ethnic groups, England and Wales 2011, wom…
Chapter Three
Figure 3.1 Labour force participation among men and women aged fifteen to sixty…
Figure 3.2 Employment ratios among those of working age, selected OECD countrie…
Figure 3.3 Employment rates of men and women aged sixteen to sixty-four, UK, 19…
Figure 3.4 Share of women in the occupations held by both men and women, UK, 20…
Figure 3.5 Part-time work as a percentage of employment of men and women in sel…
Figure 3.6 The UK gender pay gap, 1970–2016 Source: Compiled with data from OEC…
Figure 3.7 Average unpaid and paid work among working-age men and women in sele…
Figure 3.8 Proportion of women in aspired jobs of teenage boys and girls, 2015 …
Figure 3.9 Proportion of women in jobs carried out by men and women, 2003–2012 …
Chapter Four
Figure 4.1 Size and share of white and minority group populations, 1991–2011 No…
Figure 4.2 Distribution of ethnic minority groups in England and Wales, 2011 So…
Figure 4.3 Timing of arrival by selected countries of origin, England and Wales…
Figure 4.4 Economic status: men aged sixteen to sixty-four, England and Wales, …
Figure 4.5 Economic status: women aged sixteen to sixty-four, England and Wales…
Chapter Five
Figure 5.1 Share of top ten countries of origin as a percentage of all those fo…
Figure 5.2 Share of top ten nationalities of all foreign nationals, England and…
Figure 5.3 Unemployment gap between migrants and non-migrants among those aged …
Figure 5.4 Unemployment rates for the population aged twenty to sixty-four acro…
Figure 5.5 Distribution of qualifications among those native and foreign born o…
Figure 5.6 Difference in rates of overqualification among migrants compared to …
Figure 5.7 Health status of those aged thirty-five to forty-nine by time of arr…
Chapter Six
Figure 6.1 Employment, unemployment and economic inactivity rates among disable…
Chapter Seven
Figure 7.1 Rowntree's perspective on the life-cycle alternation of poverty and …
Figure 7.2 Life expectancy at age sixty-five, selected OECD countries, 2015 Not…
Figure 7.3 Poverty rates among older adults and the whole population, selected …
Chapter Eight
Figure 8.1 Trends in those attaining at least upper secondary and tertiary qual…
Figure 8.2 Tertiary qualifications across two age bands, selected OECD countrie…
Figure 8.3 Highest qualification of resident population of England and Wales by…
Figure 8.4 Highest qualification of resident population of England and Wales by…
Figure 8.5 Attainment of tertiary qualifications among those aged thirty to for…
Figure 8.6 Attainment of GCSE grades A* to C in English and maths, by free scho…
Figure 8.7 Share of graduates from tertiary education who are women, selected O…
Figure 8.8 Attainment of more than five GCSEs at grades A* to C by sex, ethnic …
Chapter Nine
Figure 9.1 Poverty rates across selected countries and by individual characteri…
Figure 9.2 Persistent and total poverty across the EU and other selected countr…
Chapter Ten
Figure 10.1 Infant mortality (rates per 1,000 live births) by neighbourhood dep…
Figure 10.2 Obesity (BMI > 30) among adults (aged over eighteen), selected coun…
Figure 10.3 Different causes of amenable mortality for men and women in the EU,…
Figure 10.4 Different contributors of preventable mortality for men and women i…
Chapter Eleven
Figure 11.1 Employment rate (% employed of all those aged sixteen to sixty-four…
Figure 11.2 Housing tenure across Europe, 2014 Source: Compiled with data from …
Figure 11.3 Housing type by tenure, England, 2008 Source: Department for Commun…
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
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Understanding Inequalities
Stratification and Difference
Second Edition
LUCINDA PLATT
polity
Copyright © Lucinda Platt 2019
The right of Lucinda Platt to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First edition published in 2011 by Polity Press
Polity Press
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Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
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Suite 300
Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-2125-8
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-2126-5 (pb)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Platt, Lucinda, author.
Title: Understanding inequalities : stratification and difference / Lucinda Platt.
Description: Second edition. | Medford, MA : Polity, 2019. | Revised edition of the author’s Understanding inequalities, 2011. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018041103 (print) | LCCN 2018043427 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509521296 (Epub) | ISBN 9781509521258 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509521265 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Equality--Great Britain. | Social stratification--Great Britain. | BISAC: SOCIAL SCIENCE / Social Classes.
Classification: LCC HM821 (ebook) | LCC HM821 .P553 2019 (print) | DDC 305.0941--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018041103
Typeset in 9.5 on 13 pt Swift Light
by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited
Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Limited
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Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Figures, Tables and Boxes
Figures
2.1
The class distribution according to the NS-SeC categories, UK, 2011, all persons aged sixteen to seventy-four
2.2
Class distribution of men by current age, England and Wales, 2011
2.3
Class distribution of women by current age, England and Wales, 2011
2.4
Class distribution across ethnic groups, England and Wales 2011, men
2.5
Class distribution across ethnic groups, England and Wales 2011, women
3.1
Labour force participation among men and women aged fifteen to sixty-four, UK and OECD
3.2
Employment ratios among those of working age, selected OECD countries, 2015
3.3
Employment rates of men and women aged sixteen to sixty-four, UK, 1971–2013
3.4
Share of women in the occupations held by both men and women, UK, 2003–2012
3.5
Part-time work as a percentage of employment of men and women in selected OECD countries, 2016
3.6
The UK gender pay gap, 1970–2016
3.7
Average unpaid and paid work among working-age men and women in selected OECD countries, 2005
3.8
Proportion of women in aspired jobs of teenage boys and girls, 2015
3.9
Proportion of women in jobs carried out by men and women, 2003–2012
4.1
Size and share of white and minority group populations, 1991–2011
4.2
Distribution of ethnic minority groups in England and Wales, 2011
4.3
Timing of arrival by selected countries of origin, England and Wales, 2011
4.4
Economic status: men aged sixteen to sixty-four, England and Wales, 2011
4.5
Economic status: women aged sixteen to sixty-four, England and Wales, 2011
5.1
Share of top ten countries of origin as a percentage of all those foreign born, England and Wales, 2011
5.2
Share of top ten nationalities of all foreign nationals, England and Wales, 2011
5.3
Unemployment gap between migrants and non-migrants among those aged sixteen to sixty-four in selected OECD countries, 2017
5.4
Unemployment rates for the population aged twenty to sixty-four across the EU, by whether native born, foreign born (EU) or foreign born (outside the EU), 2008–2017
5.5
Distribution of qualifications among those native and foreign born of working age (fifteen to sixty-four), selected OECD countries, 2017
5.6
Difference in rates of overqualification among migrants compared to non-migrants of working age (fifteen to sixty-four), selected OECD countries, 2017
5.7
Health status of those aged thirty-five to forty-nine by time of arrival in the UK, England and Wales, 2011
6.1
Employment, unemployment and economic inactivity rates among disabled men and women, UK, April–June 2017 (%)
7.1
Rowntree's perspective on the life-cycle alternation of poverty and prosperity
7.2
Life expectancy at age sixty-five, selected OECD countries, 2015
7.3
Poverty rates among older adults and the whole population, selected OECD countries
8.1
Trends in those attaining at least upper secondary and tertiary qualifications, by birth cohort and age, OECD average, 2011
8.2
Tertiary qualifications across two age bands, selected OECD countries, 2016
8.3
Highest qualification of resident population of England and Wales by age group, 2011, men
8.4
Highest qualification of resident population of England and Wales by age group, 2011, women
8.5
Attainment of tertiary qualifications among those aged thirty to forty-four with and without a tertiary-educated parent, selected OECD countries, 2015
8.6
Attainment of GCSE grades A* to C in English and maths, by free school meals status, England, 2010/11–2015/16
8.7
Share of graduates from tertiary education who are women, selected OECD countries, 2015
8.8
Attainment of more than five GCSEs at grades A* to C by sex, ethnic group and free school meals status, England, 2013–2014
9.1
Poverty rates across selected countries and by individual characteristics, 2014
9.2
Persistent and total poverty across the EU and other selected countries, 2015
10.1
Infant mortality (rates per 1,000 live births) by neighbourhood deprivation, England, 2016
10.2
Obesity (BMI > 30) among adults (aged over eighteen), selected countries, 2016
10.3
Different causes of amenable mortality for men and women in the EU, 2015 (% of total deaths)
10.4
Different contributors of preventable mortality for men and women in the EU, 2015 (% of total deaths)
11.1
Employment rate (% employed of all those aged sixteen to sixty-four) in the UK, by region, 2018
11.2
Housing tenure across Europe, 2014
11.3
Housing type by tenure, England, 2008
Tables
1.1
Key indicators of selected OECD countries used for cross-country comparisons
2.1
Illustration of relative and absolute mobility chances
3.1
Shares in various occupations of men and women (percentages)
4.1
Ethnic group categories in England and Wales, 1991–2011
4.2
Proportion of ethnic groups born outside the UK, England and Wales, 2011
4.3
Hourly rates of pay by ethnic group and migration status, men and women, UK, 2014
5.1
Those wishing to migrate permanently to another country, by region of residence, 2013–2016
5.2
Unemployment, employment and participation rates among migrants age sixteen to sixty-four in selected OECD countries, by sex, 2017
6.1
The medical (individual) and social models of disability
6.2
Attainment at the end of compulsory schooling in England, 2014
9.1
Gini coefficients and income distribution, selected OECD countries, 2007 and 2015
9.2
Top ten countries for global shares of income, 2012
9.3
Income distribution across ethnic groups, UK, 2016
9.4
Poverty rates by individual and family characteristics and region, 2015–2016
10.1
Top ten global causes of death, 2016
10.2
Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for the ten countries with lowest and highest life expectancy, 2016
10.3
Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, selected OECD countries, 2016
10.4
Suicide rates for the ten countries with the lowest and highest rates (numbers per 100,000), 2015
10.5
Suicide rates per 100,000 population, selected OECD countries, 2015
10.6
Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for men and women in countries with lowest and highest life expectancy overall, 2016
11.1
Local authorities by deprivation according to the indices of multiple deprivation, 2015
Boxes
1.1
Defences of inequality
2.1
The NS-SeC
3.1
Key concepts in measuring labour market differences between men and women
4.1
Sources of variation across the UK's minority groups
4.2
Potential reasons for differences in work and pay
4.3
Ascertaining discrimination
5.1
Types of migration
6.1
Measuring disability in the UK
6.2
Disability and the life course
6.3
Ways in which disabled children are disadvantaged
6.4
Domains of disadvantage faced by disabled adults
7.1
Time and inequality
7.2
Age, cohort, period
7.3
Factors influencing the economic vulnerability of older people and the gendered differences in old-age poverty
9.1
The measurement of income
9.2
Approaches to poverty measurement
9.3
Differences in key ‘risk factors’ across ethnic groups
9.4
Explanatory factors contributing to differential poverty risks across minority groups
10.1
Causes of inequalities in health
10.2
Health behaviours and recommended levels/limits pertaining in England, 2010–2014
10.3
Healthcare
11.1
Fifteen mechanisms of neighbourhood effects
11.2
The potential functions of housing
11.3
Housing tenures
Acknowledgements
This second edition, which is substantively different from the first, has benefited from my experience of teaching at the London School of Ecoomics. Colleagues who have particularly stimulated my thinking on topics covered in this book are Stephen Jenkins, Berkay Özcan and Isabel Shutes. The positive and constructive comments from all the reviewers who read chapters along the way have helped to make this a better book. I would also like to record my thanks to all at Polity who have helped see my manuscript through to publication and have borne patiently with the various delays, especially Jonathan Skerrett, Evie Deavall and Caroline Richmond.
Chapter One Introduction
1.1 The importance of inequality
Within countries and across the world, individuals face very different life chances (Commission on Global Poverty 2016; Milanović 2016). They encounter inequalities of income and class, differences in health and life expectancy, and unequal access to education, housing, leisure and rights. And these inequalities differ systematically between low- and high-status groups, between those with valued skills and abilities, and between those who were born into more or less advantaged economic circumstances – whether of place, time or family circumstances (Dorling 2015; Dean and Platt 2016; Milanović 2016). Those who are the ‘lucky’ ones can look forward to longer, happier, healthier, more satisfying and highly respected lives, while the unlucky ones face costs. Inequalities derived from the social class into which you are born can mean, quite simply, having fewer years of life to live. Inequalities experienced by disabled people can mean reduced opportunities for achieving educational qualifications and consequently greater difficulties in obtaining employment. Inequalities associated with minority ethnicity or religion can increase the chances of being unemployed and of being in lower quality housing, and can result in higher chances of being the victim of violence. Gender inequalities can mean lower lifetime incomes for women and greater possibilities of being poor in old age. In addition, the inequalities faced by disabled people, ethnic minorities, women, and those from lower social classes can involve daily humiliations of being patronized, insulted, demeaned or denigrated. Such discrimination can cause psychological or emotional damage and impact self-perception, aspirations and overall engagement with society (Reay 2005). The impacts can be internalized as shame (Sayer 2005; Skeggs 1997) as well as resentment, anger and lack of self-worth. Inequalities mean some people having fewer or no choices to live their lives in ways that others take for granted. They matter.
If inequalities matter at the individual level, there are also strong arguments that they are bad for society and that unequal societies are bad for individuals, regardless of where they are placed in the social hierarchy. In The Spirit Level (2009), Wilkinson and Pickett enumerated the ills of inequality in its consequences for societies. As they graphically summarized: ‘Across whole populations, rates of mental illness are five times higher in the most unequal compared to the least unequal societies. Similarly, in more unequal societies, people are five times as likely to be imprisoned, six times as likely to be clinically obese, and murder rates may be many times higher’ (ibid.: 176). In their work, these authors highlight the fact that inequality brings social costs. Other studies have emphasized the invidious effects of inequality on political participation and democratic processes, on social cohesion, and on the lives and livelihoods of populations (Marmot 2015).
This recognition that inequalities are of fundamental importance to both the welfare of societies and the wellbeing of individuals is the rationale for revealing, analysing and attempting to understand them. An investigation of inequalities is fundamental to grasping how people live, how they relate to and are treated by others, and how those relationships are maintained or altered. This is the motivation for this book. Describing and accounting for inequalities is the main focus of the chapters that follow. But, first, this introduction aims to provide some context and to outline some key conceptual issues in discussing inequality.
1.2 What do we mean by inequality?
Discussion of inequality has increased substantially in recent years. As inequality in many countries, including the UK, has grown over the last few decades (Stiglitz 2015; Jenkins 2016, 2017), increased attention has been paid to the reversal of the levelling of incomes in the decades following the Second World War and its implications (Atkinson et al. 2011). Similarly, attention to the accumulation of wealth and its consequences in Piketty's best-selling (2013) account of Capital in the Twenty-First Century has shown how wealth inequality has escalated and capital has become concentrated to a degree that approaches the levels not seen since before the First World War. There has been heightened recognition of the exceptional position of the ‘top 1%’, who are increasingly distant in economic and cultural terms from the other 99 per cent (Jenkins 2016; Dorling 2015; Anand and Segal 2017), while executive pay has reached exceptional levels (Piketty 2013; DiPrete et al. 2010). Influential researchers with years of accumulated knowledge and experience of analysing inequality have addressed themselves to broader audiences, considering not only the consequences of inequality for societies but also, in Atkinson's words, what can be done about it (Atkinson 2015; Stiglitz 2015).
At the popular level, the formation of groups such as ‘We are the 99 per cent’ has focused on that peculiarly privileged – and powerful – position of a small section of the community and has highlighted the implications of the size of the relative inequalities in economic position for a cohesive and democratic society. While the children of the rich benefit from intergenerational transmission of rewards, with wage stagnation, the living standards of the previously comfortable – the squeezed middle – have come under pressure (Machin 2016). Concern with inequality has in some contexts replaced concern with poverty or disadvantage as the ‘problem’ to be resolved.
At the same time a focus on global inequality has highlighted how the biggest inequalities are those between countries rather than those within countries (Milanović 2016), even if the tide may be beginning to turn, and the top 1 per cent (or some smaller share of them) are perhaps best seen as a global rather than a national phenomenon (Anand and Segal 2017). Yet the internationally equalizing forces of globalization are experienced as uneven in their benefits. In rich countries, globalization as well as the migration of those aiming to improve their life chances may be felt as threatening traditional livelihoods and as limits on the potential of those in rich countries to achieve the sorts of social mobility for themselves or their children that characterized the experiences of earlier generations (Stiglitz 2002). This anxiety about declining living standards or the challenges to a comfortable existence have been linked to the rise of populism in Europe and the US (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Thus questions of fairness within and between countries and generations, as well as between individuals and different groups, together with issues of who is affected – and how – and the potentially far-reaching consequences, are stimulated by these proliferating discussions of inequality. So what is at stake?
Inequality and its counterpart, equality, can refer to different concepts and to different understandings of the world. The term ‘inequality’ is deployed in diverse settings by a range of actors. It is both assumed as a fact of everyday life and denounced as an offence to a civilized society. Inequalities can be distinguished in terms of whether they are inequalities of opportunity, inequalities of outcome, inequalities of access or inequalities in entitlement, and they are also differentiated as to whether they are characterized as just or unjust, avoidable or unavoidable, ‘natural’ or artificially sustained. At the same time, these uses often merge or overlap, creating apparent contradictions or confusions or resulting in slippages that allow for different understandings of inequality to operate side by side. One person's equality is another's inequality. Inequality and the discussions and debates associated with it are underpinned by normative perspectives on human motivation and the way that society functions, perspectives which themselves are subject to re-creation as different discourses come to dominate and shape people's thinking (Foucault [1969] 1972). These discourses and the different meanings and uses of ‘inequality’ are the focus of the first part of this introduction, which looks forward to the ways they are employed in subsequent chapters. It focuses on discussions of inequalities within rather than between countries, though recognizing that the global context is also relevant, particularly when we come to consider migrant inequalities.
The first aim, then, is to describe how the terms ‘equality’ and ‘inequality’ are used and to identify both the underlying concepts and literatures from which they derive and how they are reworked in practice. In particular, the intention is to highlight how commitment to equality may operate alongside the acceptance of wide inequalities between individuals or groups of people. Separating the more technical usage of commonplace words from the general currency is something with which sociologists have continually to engage, and this often requires some compromise between the two to facilitate communication outside the academy.
The second part of this chapter considers more directly the coverage of the book: what is included and what is excluded, which groups are considered as subject to inequalities and on what basis. It asks: What are the major inequalities that affect people's lives, and how do they vary with circumstances? It also treats the question of the extent to which individual bases of inequality can be considered separately and how far the experience of inequality always has to be considered in a multifaceted or intersectional context. It ends by outlining the structure of the book.
Inequality in policy and research
Inequality is a longstanding subject of sociological concern. It is implicit in research on stratification as well as on poverty, wealth and the varying aspects of social position. These concerns and bodies of sociological research often reappear in new forms in the mouths of politicians and commentators who help to frame the ways we think about our society. Discussions of inequality have come to much greater prominence in political debate in recent years, and the UK provides a prime example of that, with cross-party endorsement of the importance of equality of opportunity and the need for greater social mobility. A Social Mobility Commission was established in 2010 in the UK and, despite the fact that one set of commissioners resigned en masse in 2018 at the failure to make progress, has produced a wide range of reports on the extent of social mobility and the obstacles to it across different social groups. These reports highlight in particular concerns over limited social mobility, the lack of access of those from less advantaged backgrounds to prestigious positions, and the need to make further progress (e.g. Milburn et al. 2016). Overall, there appears to be a widespread acknowledgement of the value of equality and its promotion within policy and society. But that support for equality can be found on closer inspection to be bounded.
Social mobility has for decades proved a major component of the sociology of stratification and the subject of some of the pioneering works of British sociology, from Glass's (1954) study onwards. The fact that it has become a key concern of both left and right suggests that this is a good moment to reconsider both the implications of a commitment to a particular concept of equality implied by social mobility and the contribution to our understanding that sociological analyses have to offer. Social mobility and an open society, though widely regarded as ‘good things’ for both individuals and that state (Heath 1981; Swift 2000), raise a number of problems for the realization of a just society and demand scrutiny of what might be regarded as fair outcomes for individuals. These problems typically remain unacknowledged in the general endorsement of the need for social mobility.
Increasing attention has also been paid to inequality as difference in all its facets. Intersectionality, developed, refined and debated within feminist theory (Crenshaw 1991; McCall 2005), is now a core term for policy organizations, such as, in the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, or, in the international arena, development agencies. Such attempts to mainstream inequality and its intersections, to pin it down and to operationalize it in relation to an extended set of inequality ‘domains’, are accompanied by a revival of debates in the sociological and policy literature on its proper usage and its shifting application. Inequality in everyday lives is picked up in policy concerns with work–life balance, which have begun to appropriate insights from research and analysis into the domestic division of labour that challenged the earlier tendency of sociology to focus on the ‘public sphere’ (Oakley 1974b). Anxieties about immigration also raise questions about who or who is not recognized as ‘other’ or who is included in society and eligible for equal rights and treatment. To what extent is citizenship differentiated (Shutes 2016), and how far can that be justified (Milanović 2016; Ruhs 2013)? Such questions raised by highlighting the experience of marginalized and continually redefined outsiders also serve to re-emphasize the salience and persistence of national boundaries and the operation of rights and (in)equalities within them, despite the challenges to a nationally oriented analysis (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003; Urry 2007; Waldinger 2015). New boundaries and new inequalities also come to the fore in the recent emphasis on religious inequality and difference – an emphasis which both stimulates and feeds on the expansion of sociological investigation into religious minorities and on the intersection of religious affiliation with more traditional interpretations of ethnic difference.
In these – and other – ways, (in)equality is very much in the mainstream of debate. Yet in its very prominence there is a risk that concepts, and the differences between uses of equality, become blurred. It often appears that the contradictions between the promotion of equality and the simultaneous implementation of measures that perpetuate inequalities are not fully recognized. For example, we can observe the consensus that has developed among politicians from both sides of the political spectrum in espousing social mobility, fairness and the fact that children should not be constrained in their opportunities by accidents of birth. This occurred at the same time as an increase in economic inequality in many countries. It also coincided in the UK and elsewhere with an increasing tendency for punitive sanctions against those who do not engage in paid work to be built into the changing form of the welfare state (Loopstra et al. 2015; Adler 2016).
On the one hand, equality of opportunity is regarded as fundamental and in accordance with the right of everyone to ‘get on’, presupposing that there must be some who do not make it. On the other hand, the belief in human motivation does not extend to those who cannot for whatever reason achieve: instead, those who are in the most precarious situations are considered to require external inducements – or penalties – and to lack the intrinsic motivation to get on that is part of the argument for justifying inequalities in the first place.
Such contradictory positions are typically held across the population (McCall and Kenworthy 2009). Studies have highlighted the contradictions and paradoxes of individuals’ responses to inequality (Georgiadis and Manning 2012; Sayer 2005) and the fact that, in recent decades, a decline in egalitarianism took place at the same time as widening economic inequality (Orton and Rowlingson 2007). Among the public there has been, for example, an intolerance of large income gaps at the same time as a widespread popular belief that economic inequalities are justified and that those who do better ‘deserve’ it (Bamfield and Horton 2009; Park et al. 2010) and that governments should not intervene to reduce inequalities (McCall and Kenworthy 2009). Large inequalities of socio-economic position are not only tolerated but even endorsed, and merit is seen as underpinning inequalities, even when the arbitrary nature of some rewards, such as inheritances, is acknowledged.
Such contradictions have been explained in terms of psychological adaptation in the tendency to rationalize the success of others but also to locate oneself in relation to others in such a way as to minimize the conflict between attitudes and personal reality. Runciman's ([1966] 1972) influential discussion of relative deprivation illustrated the power of ‘reference groups’ in rationalizing inequalities and incongruities in position; and Sayer (2005) has pointed to the tendency of individuals to underplay both the random and the structural features of society which benefit some while harming others. He notes that ‘even the unlucky may prefer to avoid the pain of resentment’ by assuming that wealth is earned or entitled; and that ‘belief in a just world motivates actors to both be moral and to blame the unfortunate and disregard injustice, by attributing disadvantage to personal failure’ (Sayer 2005: 957). It has similarly been argued that a tendency to believe in a ‘just’ society will cause adjustment to changing levels of inequality (Trump 2013), while perceptions themselves can be affected by prior orientations (Kteily et al. 2017).
To grasp the implications of these formulations of the meanings of injustice and inequality, and to gain the ability to challenge or resist the dominant ways of talking about them, requires us to pay attention to the logic and the illogic in the ways in which inequality is understood and used. It involves breaking down some of the inherent contradictions in concepts relating to equality and inequality. This introduction aims to elucidate distinctions between equality and fairness, the internally contradictory notion of equal opportunity, the distinction between entitlement and desert, and the distinction and interconnection between concepts of inequality and difference. One central issue is the consideration of inequality within society (or within groups) compared with inequality between social groups – sometimes referred to horizontal as opposed to vertical inequalities (Stewart 2002). While the implications are apparently rather different if a focus is on overall inequality rather than on inequalities between groups within a society – who themselves may have very different outcomes – the two are not in fact neatly separable. Differences between groups imply wider social inequality, and the greater the vertical inequality the more serious the potential inequalities faced by specific group. Hence, a strict attempt to contrast the two approaches may be somewhat misleading (Hills et al. 2010).
A further distinction can be found in relation to whether we focus on groups defined by their (potential) inequality – such as disabled people – or on unequal circumstances – such as poverty – which are suffered more by some groups than others. Both ways of looking at intergroup inequalities are pertinent to describing and understanding them, and this book aims to balance these two approaches. For example, class is treated as a social grouping – albeit one often considered in economic terms – and income as an experience which may differ across social groups. Social groups are covered in more detail further on, but first this chapter returns to the question of what is ‘fair’ – a term often considered synonymous with ‘equal’, but which can also be used to justify and maintain inequalities of income, class or social position.
1.3 Equality and inequality: concepts and definitions
What is fair?
Despite widespread approval of opportunity, mobility and versions of equality, these concepts are not straightforward: they are subject to intense sociological debate and are beset by questions of value and worth. If people should receive their ‘desert’, how are we to judge what they deserve? Discussions of opportunity and mobility are riven by contests over what such concepts actually mean and over the nature of competition and reward, as well as which inequalities we should care about and which are ‘natural’. Are inequalities that arise simply because of the way a society structures its opportunities and rewards acceptable – or even desirable? After all, in democratic nations, those structures can presumably be said to command popular support.
General commitments to ‘fairness’ disguise the extent to which there is little agreement as to whether an unequal society is really undesirable or is instead not only unavoidable but positively to be welcomed. An emphasis on ‘fairness’ can encompass either egalitarianism or highly differentiated outcomes in wealth, health and other resources. The meaning of ‘fairness’, and the ways it interpenetrates inequality and equality, is influenced both by normative perspectives on how the world and those who populate it function and by the organizing principles of societies. Attitudes hinge on considerations of what it is that brings economic stability, welfare, prosperity and comfort to citizens and what is desirable in a ‘good society’. In this light, is inequality necessary, or does it impede the effective functioning of societies and states? Even if inequality is undesirable in some ways, is intervention even more undesirable in terms of introducing distortions into ‘natural’ processes?
Views on fairness link to views on the extent to which people are seen as victims of wider social processes or as makers of their own fates. The former view can lead to an overly deterministic understanding of the individual's life chances, while the latter assumes that all those who wish to succeed are in an unfettered position to do so (Bamfield and Horton 2009). Substantial attention has been paid within sociological theory to the question of how individual agency can be acknowledged without dismissing the constraints that clearly restrict people's lives. Giddens's structuration theory argued for a way of integrating an acknowledgement of the power and relevance of both social structures and individual agency, by suggesting that it is ‘in and through their activities [that] agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible’ (Giddens 1984). This was further developed by Stones, who argued that ‘Social structures almost always either have agents within them and/or are the product of the past practices of agents. And agents, for their part, have social structures within them’ (Stones 2005: 4). In repetition of action, over time structures come into being that themselves shape action, but these actions are undertaken self-consciously or ‘reflexively’.
Rational action theory also links series of individual decisions to the perpetuation of social structures. It maintains that individuals in different social locations make decisions that are equally rational but are shaped by what forms an intelligible decision given the context and perceived options. It is a ‘theoretical approach that seeks to explain social phenomena as the outcome of individual action that is construed as rational, given individuals’ goals and conditions of action’ (Goldthorpe 1996: 109). Rationality is subjective rather than objective – it is bounded by situational influences on the actors’ beliefs. In this way it finds a parallel in the social-psychological literature on decision-making among poor people which has demonstrated the important immediate functions that ‘poor’ decision-making may fulfil (Sheehy-Skeffington and Rea 2017). Rational action theory emphasizes the purposive actions of individuals or agents, while structuration theory emphasizes their routinized aspects (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Both these approaches oppose an understanding of social stratification – or systematic social inequalities – that is determined by social laws or by externally reproduced cultural or cognitive differences between more and less advantaged groups.
Recognition of the limits on agency and that what is rational will be interpreted in context is important in modifying the assumptions that equality of opportunity will necessarily result in ‘fair’ outcomes. Opportunities are conditioned by circumstances and histories, and finding a starting point from which to consider opportunities as equal can lead to a vanishing point. On the other hand, allowing a role for agency and the considered actions of rational actors in different social spaces avoids a deterministic perspective whereby inequalities become unavoidable and irremediable. Lives are not fully predictable, and differences across individuals and variations in otherwise similar sets of circumstances may lead to widely different futures.
Opportunity as equality
Equality of opportunity is the freedom to pursue success, achievement or individual goals unimpeded by artificial constraints. According to this view, any resulting inequalities that remain in society are then considered both natural and fair. Equality of opportunity does not imply equality across society. Indeed, the implication is that, because human beings are different and have different talents, interests and preferences, there will be substantial overall inequality. By contrast, those concerned with inequality of outcome evaluate fairness by the extent to which there are disparities in outcomes, be they in income, education or health. These are themselves revealing of the way that society is organized and of its systems of reward and allocation.
Equality of opportunity is often used to refer specifically to social mobility – equal chances for those from different backgrounds of ending up in either high or low social positions (Neckerman and Torche 2007). I discuss the debates around social mobility further in chapter 2. But it can in theory apply to any situation where the assumption is that differences in circumstances at birth (or at various crucial points in life) should not affect the possibilities for realizing one's potential. This is demonstrated by the use of the term in an employment-related context. For example, we may consider whether opportunities for promotion or retention are equivalent across otherwise similar people with different backgrounds. If none are obstructed, even if not all can be promoted, we may be confident that we have equality of opportunity. Equally, we might look at the extent to which those who are best qualified do actually succeed. This perspective accords primacy to the potential of human agency and worth/merit, as long as it is enabled by the removal of obstacles. All those who are potentially eligible for promotion can take their chance. There should be a level playing field, but, once given that, everyone should be left to themselves. This does assume, however, that all those ‘eligible’ will encounter the same expectations, have similar information and respond equally well to the conditions placed on them, over and above their ability to fulfil the higher level post.
Since we can rarely actually determine whether people have equality of opportunity, it has to be inferred. Typically, in the case of measuring social mobility, its absence is inferred simply on the basis that those with different social backgrounds have systematically different outcomes. Assuming that abilities and talents will be evenly distributed across the population, any resulting association between social background and outcomes can be interpreted as evidence of lack of opportunity. The fact that, if there is no association between background and outcomes, there may still be large disparities between the successful and the non-successful is often regarded as of lesser concern, since these disparities are understood to represent individual differences in talent, motivation and hard work or in preferences for particular types of lifestyle or behaviour, and therefore worthy of differential success or reward. Indeed, some would argue that large inequalities of outcome encourage social mobility, since they provide motivation for success. Moreover, in order to establish that there is social mobility, it is necessary that people come from different backgrounds in the first place, or opportunities to rise and fall would not be available.
Those concerned to emphasize equality of outcome, by contrast, are interested in correcting disadvantage and attempting to get rid of the biggest disparities in social position, regardless of the cumulative series of actions that may have led to them. Indeed, they would see that correction of disadvantage as a precondition for enabling mobility. Rather than allowing those at the bottom of the social, income or class hierarchy to rise (and those at the top to fall), an alternative would be to reduce the difference between the top and the bottom, thus removing the salience of the gap between them. While this might seem a logical alternative towards achieving more equal chances across society, it is often resisted, on the grounds that it doesn't allow sufficiently for genuine differences between individuals.
By merging some consideration of outcomes with attention to opportunity, as is often the case, when a programme for social mobility is combined with one for addressing the circumstances of the most disadvantaged, societies and policies often evade the tensions between a commitment to equality of opportunity (equality as ‘fair’) with an endorsement of inequality of outcomes (inequality as ‘fair’). We can see the interconnectedness of opportunity and inequality more clearly if we turn to some of the defences of inequality that have been put forward (Hayek 1945; Marshall et al. 1997; Nozick 1974; Rawls 1971). Box 1.1 summarizes some reasons why inequality has been regarded as not only defensible but even to be aspired to.
Box 1.1 Defences of inequality
It enables people to achieve their potential and to know what they have is their entitlement.
It values freedom, which is often considered to be an essential or fundamental value: once allowed certain freedoms, people are able to fulfil their own trajectories and to be rewarded or suffer according to their deserts.
It values equality of opportunity, and the outcomes can take care of themselves.
It is intuitively sensible at the individual level: each person knows that there are differences in talent and in application – therefore these should somehow be differentially rewarded.
It creates incentives: people will feel motivated to aim for the top as long as they believe that any position is potentially open to them.
A gap between the better off and the worse off is not a problem as long as those at the bottom do not fall further behind.
Fundamental freedoms are only achieved if inequality is allowed.
The market will not operate successfully unless inequality is at least a potential outcome. The regulation of talent or of gifts – ‘innate’, ‘inherited’ or transferred (income or personal) – is more dangerous and damaging than allowing such talents to get themselves where they will.
These arguments are both persuasive and accord to a substantial degree with common perceptions of the way the world works, at least in the West. Yet they have not gone unchallenged. One issue is that, setting aside the specific arguments of the proponents of these ideas, those who adopt such views typically conflate the need for opportunities with arguments based on worth and merit. As Marshall and his colleagues put it:
What we find in most non-philosophical efforts to justify inequality is a combination of arguments from desert, merit, entitlement, equality of opportunity, and functionality, without any clear recognition that these may involve disparate, and in some cases incompatible, assumptions. On the one hand, there is nothing wrong with people climbing the social ladder as long as it is through their own efforts, while on the other they are entitled to pass on their advantage to their children. Unequal outcomes are justified both on the grounds that they are needed to give people incentives, and so contribute to social justice by helping the poor, and because they give individuals what they deserve. Clearly, conceptions of justice that validate some forms of inequality may invalidate others.
(Marshall et al. 1997: 12–13)
Equality of what?
A further crucial criticism of these endorsements of inequality demonstrates that claims for equality at some level are at their core. It is simply that some forms of equality are being accorded more primacy than other (economic) forms of equality. The issue of the choice between different forms of equality is one that Sen has cogently elaborated.
If a claim that inequality in some significant space is right (or good, or acceptable, or tolerable) is to be defended by reason (not by, say, shooting the dissenters), the argument takes the form of showing this inequality to be a consequence of equality in some other – more centrally important – space. Given the broad agreement on the need to have equality in the ‘base’, and also the connection of that broad agreement with this deep need of impartiality between individuals (discussed earlier), the crucial arguments have to be about the reasonableness of the ‘bases’ chosen.
(Sen 1992: 21)
For Sen, therefore, the argument should not be about inequality or equality in themselves but about where (at what level) we demand that there should be equality and where we consider it to be peripheral or inequality to be tolerable. The difference of opinion between those who tolerate distributional inequality and those who do not thus becomes one not about whether equality or inequality is a ‘good thing’ but about where we insist that equality should be enacted and where we are happy to restrict it.
We can find, for example, that the emphasis on freedom that is at the heart of libertarian views and is seen as the non-negotiable element, the fundamental ‘equality’, is disputed by those who regard distributional justice as more important. Supporters of greater social equality, such as Tawney (1931), acknowledged that freedom needs to be restricted in the pursuit of equality. Freedom itself, though, is contextually specific. And the question, of course, becomes: whose freedom?
There is, additionally, the question of whether, even if it could be achieved, equality of opportunity actually represents fairness. Given differences in people's dispositions and skills, why should we reward some and not others? Is leaving people to their own devices or possibilities just and fair? It may be good for society to reward particular talents more than others, but it is not necessarily fair or just. This point has been made by a number of commentators in different ways. Sen points to the fact that individuals are diverse and that therefore providing some notional level playing field misses the point. He succinctly states that ‘equal consideration for all may demand very unequal treatment in favour of the disadvantaged’ (1992: 1). His solution is to argue for – and attempt to measure – the ‘capability’ to achieve various essential functionings (Sen 1983, 1992). This avoids both conflating outcomes with opportunities and treating adaptation to suboptimal conditions as a preference for less. Swift made the point more explicitly when he asked:
in what sense are the more able the more deserving? Imagine the parent of two children: one unusually gifted, the other who finds learning difficult. Does society give them justice when it gives them radically different amounts of resources over their lifetimes? Some contributors to this debate seem particularly concerned about the clever children of poor parents. What about the well-being of not-so-talented children, whatever their social origins?
(2003: 209)
We can compare also Miller's comment:
If we try to take seriously the idea that people can only deserve things when they are fully responsible for what they achieve – in the sense that the outcome was not affected by the contingencies which impinge unequally on different people – we find that the scope of desert shrinks to vanishing point. We can never say, in a real sense, that a person deserves rewards and benefits for what they have done, because it is always reasonable to assume that their performance was affected by factors for which they were not responsible.
(1997: 91)
The influential philosopher John Rawls used the image of the ‘veil of ignorance’ to engage people in how they might wish a society to be organized should they not know which life chances they had been dealt in the handing out of different risks and abilities. Making decisions from behind such a veil would be fair in that it would not predispose them to favour their own circumstances (not knowing what they were) but would instead force them to consider the range of situations they might face. The outcomes, he then argues, would be just – justice as fairness would be achieved. Although Rawls defended inequalities of reward or position as being functional for society, this is conditional on their being for the benefit of the least advantaged members of society. While he does not reject the principle of equality of opportunity, his argument is that it is possible to achieve it ‘fairly’ only in a society structured under such terms. In this way he attempts to argue the case of combining adherence to inequality with consideration for disadvantage.
However, the device of the ‘veil of ignorance’ does not fully take account of how people have reached the position in which they are imagining themselves. Life experiences are cumulative, and to realize Rawlsian justice from any particular position requires addressing all the different life stages at the same time. For example, I may favour having support for pensioners if I imagine I could end up as a poor pensioner, but that also implies going through various cognitive stages to envisage how I might end up as a poor pensioner. And are all pensioners equally worthy of the same amount of support? Or should there be differentiation between, say, a previously wealthy adult who has spent all their money and someone who has never earned more than a small amount in their life? Or should we assume that the fairness will have applied to the unskilled worker throughout their life to reward them more highly so that they cannot be poor as a pensioner? Is it the current situation or history that determines what is just? How a society is structured will also influence the chances of certain accidents or life events occurring in the course of time and the risks associated with them. So should all life events be treated as equivalently accidental?
One response is to assume that it is the scale of any disparities (in income, in educational qualifications, in mortality), whether or not they differ by social group, that renders them problematic, and that such large disparities will also lead to greater reproduction of inequality and hence to lower equality of opportunity. It is in such cases that the argument is sometimes made that it is the responsibility of the state to intervene. But such an approach would be to modify some of the more fundamental principles in defence of inequality as an outcome of freedom.
Limits to equality
Support for (particular forms of) inequality or equality, then, depends substantially on particular perspectives on the world that prioritize certain elements of society as fundamental or unassailable. Moreover, the language of fairness and freedom (and of rights) can be manipulated or adapted to conditions to support divergent views on maintaining or undermining status hierarchies (Fish 1994). The language of equality is sometimes invoked to justify the position of more powerful groups, for example, in resistance to affirmative action. By ‘speaking in code’ in such ways, people can take words such as ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’ and use them to argue for the sustaining of an ‘unfair’ and systematically disadvantaging status quo.
