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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Peace operations remain a principal tool for managing armed conflict and protecting civilians. The fully revised, expanded and updated third edition of Understanding Peacekeeping provides a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to the theory, history, and politics of peace operations. Drawing on a dataset of nearly two hundred historical and contemporary missions, this book evaluates the changing characteristics of the contemporary international environment in which peace operations are deployed, the strategic purposes peace operations are intended to achieve, and the major challenges facing today's peacekeepers. All the chapters have been revised and updated, and five new chapters have been added - on stabilization, organized crime, exit strategies, force generation, and the use of force. Part 1 summarizes the central concepts and issues related to peace operations. Part 2 charts the historical development of peacekeeping, from 1945 through to 2020. Part 3 analyses the strategic purposes that United Nations and other peace operations are intended to achieve - namely, prevention, observation, assistance, enforcement, stabilization, and administration. Part 4 looks forward and examines the central challenges facing today's peacekeepers: force generation, the regionalization and privatization of peace operations, the use of force, civilian protection, gender issues, policing and organized crime, and exit strategies.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
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CONTENTS
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Peacekeeping in global politics
Enduring themes
Structure of the book
Part I Concepts and Issues
1 Peace Operations in Global Politics
1.1 Westphalian and post-Westphalian order
1.2 Theorizing peace operations in global politics
1.3 The impacts of peace operations on armed conflict
Conclusion
2 Who Deploys Peace Operations?
2.1 The universe of modern peace operations
2.2 States as peacekeepers
2.3 International organizations as peacekeepers
2.4 United Nations peace operations
2.5 Partnership peacekeeping
Conclusion
Part II Historical Development
3 Peace Operations during the Cold War
3.1 United Nations peace operations during the Cold War
3.2 Non-UN peace operations during the Cold War
Conclusion
4 Peace Operations during the 1990s
4.1 The transformation of peace operations
4.2 The nature of the transformation
4.3 Failures and retreat
4.4 Lessons learned?
Conclusion
5 Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century
5.1 Peacekeeping reborn: 1999–2002
5.2 The Brahimi Report
5.3 Peace operations after the Brahimi Report
5.4 The rise of stabilization
Conclusion
Part III The Purposes of Peace Operations
6 Prevention
6.1 Preventing violent conflict and preventive deployments
6.2 Preventive deployments in practice
6.3 The politics of preventive deployment
Conclusion
7 Observation
7.1 From observation to traditional peacekeeping
7.2 Observation in practice
7.3 Problems
8 Assistance
8.1 Assisting war-to-peace transitions
8.2 Assistance in practice
8.3 Key challenges
9 Enforcement
9.1 What is peace enforcement?
9.2 Peace enforcement in practice
9.3 Key challenges
10 Stabilization
10.1 Stabilization in theory
10.2 Stabilization in practice
10.3 Key challenges for stabilization
11 Administration
11.1 Transitional administrations in theory
11.2 Transitional administrations in practice
11.3 Key challenges
Part IV Contemporary Challenges
12 Force Generation
12.1 The force-generation process
12.2 Why do states provide peacekeepers?
Conclusion
13 Regionalization
13.1 Regionalization and trends in peace operations
13.2 The strengths and weaknesses of regional peace operations
13.3 Regional peace operations in practice
Conclusion
14 Privatization
14.1 The private security industry and peace operations
14.2 The costs and benefits of privatizing peace operations
14.3 A future of privatized peace enforcement?
Conclusion
15 Use of Force
15.1 The evolution of force in peace operations
15.2 Key questions about using force in peace operations
Conclusion
16 Civilian Protection
16.1 The rise and evolution of POC mandates
16.2 Consequences of POC mandates
16.3 Tensions and challenges raised by POC mandates
16.4 Assessing and reforming the UN’s POC record
Conclusion
17 Gender
17.1 Peace operations and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda
17.2 Increasing women’s participation in peace operations
17.3 Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations
Conclusion
18 Policing
18.1 The evolution of policing in peace operations
18.2 Approaches to policing in peace operations
18.3 Challenges facing police peacekeepers
Conclusion
19 Organized Crime
19.1 Organized crime and peace operations: growing convergence
19.2 Peacekeepers and organized crime
19.3 Responding to organized crime
Conclusion
20 Exit
20.1 Exit in theory and practice
20.2 Political challenges
20.3 Operational challenges
20.4 Economic challenges
Conclusion
Appendix
References
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Begin Reading
Appendix
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1
Levels of analysis for studying peace operations
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1
Number and type of peace operations, 1947–2019
Figure 2.2
Generic structure of a multidimensional peace operation
Figure 2.3
Authority, command and control in multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations
Figure 2.4
UN peacekeeping expenditures, 1947–2019
Figure 2.5
Models of partnership peacekeeping
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1
Total number of uniformed UN peacekeepers, November 1990 – September 2019
Figure 5.2
Number of ongoing UN peacekeeping operations, 1947–2019
Figure 5.3
Number of ongoing UN-authorized and non-UN peace operations, 1947–2019
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1
The ‘holy trinity’ of traditional peacekeeping
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1
UN peacekeeper fatalities by year and incident type, 1948 – November 2019
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1
Mentions of the term ‘stabilization’ in UN Security Council open meetings, 2001–…
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1
Peace implementation pillars in Bosnia
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1
United Nations force generation in the pre-deployment phase
Figure 12.2
Number of countries contributing UN uniformed peacekeepers, November 1990 – Octo…
Figure 12.3
Uniformed UN peacekeepers provided by the P5, November 1990 – December 2019
Chapter 13
Figure 13.1
Number of regional peace operations, 1946–2019
Figure 13.2
Number of regional and UN peace operations by region, 1946–2019
Chapter 14
Figure 14.1
Contracts in battlespace
Figure 14.2
UN procurement statistics by major commodity, 2017
Figure 14.3
UN procurement statistics by country of origin, 2017
Chapter 15
Figure 15.1
UN peacekeeper fatalities by malicious act, July 1948 – June 2019
Figure 15.2
UN peacekeepers and fatalities from malicious acts, 1990–2018
Chapter 17
Figure 17.1
Female uniformed UN peacekeepers, 2005–2019
Figure 17.2
Types of female uniformed UN peacekeepers, 2005–2019
Chapter 18
Figure 18.1
UN police in peacekeeping operations, 1990–2019
Figure 18.2
Policing operations organized by activities
Chapter 19
Figure 19.1
Organized crime and illicit flows in UN Security Council resolutions, 2000–2018
List of Maps
Chapter 4
Map 4.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Chapter 5
Map 5.1
Sudan and its neighbours
Chapter 6
Map 6.1
Macedonia
Chapter 7
Map 7.1
Cyprus
Map 7.2
UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea
Chapter 8
Map 8.1
El Salvador
Map 8.2
Cambodia
Map 8.3
Rwanda
Map 8.4
Sierra Leone
Chapter 9
Map 9.1
Somalia
Map 9.2
Timor-Leste
Map 9.3
Eastern-Central Democratic Republic of the Congo
Chapter 10
Map 10.1
Afghanistan
Map 10.2
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Map 10.3
Mali
Map 10.4
Central African Republic
Chapter 11
Map 11.1
UNMIK in Kosovo
Chapter 13
Map 13.1
Liberia
Chapter 16
Map 16.1
South Sudan
List of Boxes
Chapter 1
Box 1.1
Advocates of liberal peace
Box 1.2
The global cultural determinants of peace operations
Chapter 2
Box 2.1
‘Uniting for peace’ in the UN General Assembly
Box 2.2
Assembling a United Nations peacekeeping operation
Chapter 4
Box 4.1
Boutros-Ghali on the failure of UN peace operations
Chapter 5
Box 5.1
The Brahimi Report and the future of peace operations
Chapter 6
Box 6.1
Ken Menkhaus’s conflict prevention chain
Box 6.2
Proposals for UN standing forces: a very short history
Chapter 7
Box 7.1
Hammarskjöld’s principles for the conduct of UNEF I
Box 7.2
UNEF I’s mandate
Chapter 8
Box 8.1
UN responsibilities under the Chapultepec Accords
Box 8.2
UNAMIR: small and cheap
Chapter 9
Box 9.1
Security Council action under Chapter VII
Chapter 11
Box 11.1
Institutionalization before liberalization: six priorities
Box 11.2
Security Council Resolution 1244 and the transitional administration in Kosovo
Chapter 12
Box 12.1
Training United Nations peacekeepers
Box 12.2
Key capability gaps in UN peacekeeping operations, May 2017
Chapter 13
Box 13.1
Boutros-Ghali on the UN and regional arrangements, 1992
Chapter 14
Box 14.1
The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)
Box 14.2
Bancroft Global Development’s support to AMISOM in Somalia
Box 14.3
Executive Outcomes in Angola, 1993–5
Chapter 17
Box 17.1
Barriers to the deployment of uniformed women in peace operations
Chapter 18
Box 18.1
United Nations police mandated tasks, most to least frequent, 1995–2013
Box 18.2
Types of police peacekeepers
Box 18.3
Traditional policing in ONUMOZ
Box 18.4
Executive policing in Kosovo
Chapter 19
Box 19.1
Blue helmets and black markets in the siege of Sarajevo
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1
Westphalian, post-Westphalian and stabilization approaches
Chapter 2
Table 2.1
Peace operations: a typology with examples
Table 2.2
Old and new UN peacekeeping scales of assessment
Chapter 3
Table 3.1
The United Nations: lessons learned?
Table 3.2
UN-led peace operations, 1945–1987
Table 3.3
Examples of larger non-UN peace operations, 1947–1987
Chapter 4
Table 4.1
Explaining the triple transformation
Table 4.2
UNPROFOR’s changing mandate
Table 4.3
Key DPKO recommendations from its
Comprehensive Report on … UNAMIR
(1996)
Chapter 5
Table 5.1
Implementing the Brahimi Report: a contemporary scorecard
Chapter 8
Table 8.1
Problems and success factors in assisting transitions
Chapter 9
Table 9.1
Chapter VII resolutions, 1946–1989
Chapter 11
Table 11.1
Contending approaches to transitional administrations
Chapter 13
Table 13.1
Examples of peace operations conducted by regional organizations since 1990
Chapter 14
Table 14.1
The variety of arrangements for allocating violence
Chapter 16
Table 16.1
Caveats in UN protection of civilians peacekeeping mandates
Chapter 17
Table 17.1
SEA allegations in UN peace operations, 2007–2019
Chapter 18
Table 18.1
Top ten UN police contributors in the twenty-first century
Chapter 20
Table 20.1
Potential modes of exit for peace operations
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Understanding Peacekeeping
Third edition
PAUL D. WILLIAMS WITH ALEX J. BELLAMY
polity
Copyright © Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy 2021
The right of Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First edition published in 2004 by Polity PressSecond edition published in 2010 by Polity PressThis third edition first published in 2021 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8675-2
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Williams, Paul D., 1975- author. | Bellamy, Alex J., 1975- author.Title: Understanding peacekeeping / Paul D. Williams, with Alex J. Bellamy.
Description: Third edition. | Medford, MA : Polity Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “New edition of the most comprehensive introduction to the field of peacekeeping”-- Provided by publisher.Identifiers: LCCN 2020012849 (print) | LCCN 2020012850 (ebook) | ISBN 9780745686714 (hardback) | ISBN 9780745686721 (paperback) | ISBN 9780745686721 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Peacekeeping forces.Classification: LCC JZ6374 .B45 2021 (print) | LCC JZ6374 (ebook) | DDC 341.5/84--dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020012849LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020012850
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Abbreviations
ADF
Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)
AFP
Australian Federal Police
AFISMA
African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB
African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS
African Union Mission in the Sudan
AMISEC
African Union Mission in the Comoros
AMISOM
African Union Mission in Somalia
ANSP
National Academy for Public Security (El Salvador)
APC
armoured personnel carrier
AQIM
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF
African Standby Force
ASIFU
All Sources Information Fusion Unit (MINUSMA)
AU
African Union
AusAID
Australian Agency for International Development
C34
UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping
CAR
Central African Republic
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVPOL
civilian police
CNN
Cable News Network
CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
CPP
Cambodian People’s Party (PRK)
DDR
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
DFID
Department for International Development (UK)
DFS
UN Department of Field Support
DOMREP
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
DPKO
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO
UN Department of Peace Operations
DPPA
UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
DSL
Defence Systems Limited
ECCAS
Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMIB
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
ECOMICI
ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMIG
ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia
ECOMIL
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG
Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EISAS
Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
EO
Executive Outcomes
EU
European Union
EUFOR
European Union force
EUFOR RD
European Union Reserve Deployment
EUPM
European Union Policing Mission
EUTM
European Union Training Mission
FARDC
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FIB
Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO)
FMLN
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (El Salvador)
FNI
Nationalist and Integrationist Front (DRC)
FOMUC
CEMAC Mission in Central African Republic
FPU
formed police unit
FUNCINPEC
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
FYROM
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G5 Sahel
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger
GPSP
Global Peace and Security Partnership
HIPPO
High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015)
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICGLR
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICU
Islamic Courts Union (Somalia)
IDG
International Deployment Group (Australian Federal Police)
IDPs
internally displaced persons
IED
improvised explosive device
IEMF
Interim Emergency Multinational Force (DRC)
IFM
Isatabu Freedom Movement (Solomon Islands)
IFOR
Implementation Force (NATO-led)
IGAD
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL
international humanitarian law
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IMT
International Monitoring Team (Mindanao)
IMTF
Integrated Mission Task Force
INTERFET
International Force in East Timor
IPMT
International Peace Monitoring Team (Solomon Islands)
IPO
individual police officer
IPOA
International Peace Operations Association
IPTF
International Police Task Force
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISF
International Stabilization Force
ISOA
International Stability Operations Association
JMAC
Joint Mission Analysis Cell
KFOR
Kosovo Force
KLA
Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC
Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS
Kosovo Police Service
LAS
League of Arab States
LDK
Democratic League of Kosovo
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
MAES
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (Comoros)
MEF
Malaita Eagle Force (Solomon Islands)
MFO
multinational force observers
MICEMA
ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MICOPAX
ECCAS Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic
MINUCI
United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUGUA
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSAL
Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador
MINUSCA
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic
MINUSMA
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MISAB
Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements
MISCA
African Union Mission in the Central African Republic
MNF
multinational force
MNLA
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad
MONUA
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO
United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU
memorandum of understanding
MPRI
Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MUJAO
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NAM
Non-Aligned Movement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
non-governmental organization
NLA
National Liberation Army (Macedonia)
NPFL
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAS
Organization of American States
OAU
Organisation of African Unity
OCHA
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLMEE
OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea
ONUB
United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC
United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA
United Nations Observer Group in Central America United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUVEN
United Nations Observer Mission for Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua
OROLSI
UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P5
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russian Federation, United States)
PAE
Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCC
police-contributing country
PCRS
UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
PDK
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)
PIF
Pacific Islands Forum
PLO
Palestine Liberation Organization
POC
protection of civilians
PRK
People’s Republic of Kampuchea
PRTs
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghanistan)
PSC
Peace and Security Council; private security company
QIP
quick impact project
RAMSI
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RDHQ
rapidly deployable headquarters
RECAMP
Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
ROTC
Reserve Officer Training Corps
RPF
Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSIP
Royal Solomon Islands Police
RUF
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SAIC
Science Applications International Corporation
SCR
Security Council resolution
SEA
sexual exploitation and abuse
SFOR
Stabilization Force (NATO-led) in Bosnia
SHIRBRIG
Standby High Readiness Brigade
SMC
Strategic Military Cell
SNA
Somali National Army
SPLM/A
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPC
UN standing police capacity
SRSG
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR
security sector reform
SWAT
Special weapons and tactics
TCC
troop-contributing country
TFG
Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TRW
TRW Automotive (part of the Northrop Grumman Group)
TSZ
Temporary Security Zone (Ethiopia–Eritrea)
UAV
Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN
United Nations
UNAMIC
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMID
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Sudan)
UNAMIR
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAMSIL
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM I
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNEF I
United Nations Emergency Force I
UNEF II
United Nations Emergency Force II
UNEPS
United Nations Emergency Peace Service
UNFICYP
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG
United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM
United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Military Observation Mission
UNIPOM
United Nations India–Pakistan Observer Mission
UNISFA
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITA
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF
Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNITAR
United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMEE
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH
United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK
United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL
United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS
United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET
United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor
UNMISS
United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT
United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOT
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCA
United Nations regional office in Central Asia
UNOCI
United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOGIL
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR
United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda
UNOSOM I
United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNOWA
United Nations regional office in West Africa
UNPA
United Nations Protected Area (Croatia)
UNPOL
United Nations Police
UNPREDEP
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia)
UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
UNSAS
UN Standby Arrangements System
UNSCOB
United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSMIH
United Nations Support Mission for Haiti
UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, Western Sirmium
UNTAET
United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor
UNTAG
United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTEA
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UNTMIH
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
USAID
US Agency for International Development
WPS
Women, Peace and Security
Acknowledgements
In compiling the third edition, we would like to thank the many friends, colleagues and peacekeepers who have influenced our views on these issues. In addition, we have benefited enormously from discussing these topics with students who have taken our respective courses on peace operations over the last two decades. The team at Polity, as well as the anonymous reviewers, also deserve thanks for their incisive editing and comments, which helped improve the manuscript in several ways. Our thanks are also due to Eric Rudberg for his help in compiling the book’s index.
Finally, the authors and publisher would like to thank the following for permission to use copyright material: Figure 12.1 © 2013. Reprinted with permission from the International Peace Institute; figure 14.1 (adapted) and table 14.1 (adapted) © 2005 by Deborah D. Avant. Reprinted with permission from the author and Cambridge University Press; box 18.1 © 2014 by William Durch. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked, the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity.
Introduction
Since the late 1940s, peace operations have become one of the principal international instruments for managing armed conflicts. Nearly 200 such missions have been conducted in every region of the world by a range of multinational organizations and coalitions of states. Peace operations have assumed a wide range of shapes and sizes but they share some important family resemblances. First, all peace operations stem from a desire on the part of the actors that authorize and participate in them to limit the scourge of war. Second, peace operations are almost always collective endeavours undertaken by multiple actors for purposes that go beyond the interests of any one of them. Third, these missions have always been ad hoc responses to particular problems, most notably how to manage and potentially help resolve armed conflicts. Fourth, they are principally political instruments with an admixture of military force, which is usually intended to provide assurances to the conflict parties.
With these family resemblances in mind, this book focuses on peace operations that involve the expeditionary use of military personnel, with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme to:
assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process;
serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; and/or
enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.
Peace operations often include civilian personnel working alongside their military colleagues, but our focus is not on missions that deploy only civilians, which generate rather different dynamics than those involving contingents of troops. Understood in this manner, peace operations are one type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild states and societies in its aftermath. Other instruments in the international toolkit are conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, sanctions, humanitarian military intervention, and transitional justice mechanisms.
Not surprisingly, there have often been heated debates about what peace operations are for and what strategies and tactics peacekeepers should employ to achieve their objectives. These differences revolve around competing conceptions of the causes and nature of violent conflict, disputes about the relative value of sovereignty and human protection, arguments over the foundations of stable peace, and contending political priorities.
Within this broad remit to manage armed conflict, the world’s peacekeepers have been mandated to perform a daunting and growing range of tasks, frequently in areas where there is no peace to keep. As well as the original tasks of confidence-building and ceasefire monitoring, modern peacekeepers have been tasked with helping to implement peace agreements; preventing the outbreak of hostilities; supporting local police and military forces; protecting humanitarian and official personnel and facilities; providing maritime security; engaging in security monitoring, patrolling and deterrence activities; ensuring the free movement of personnel and equipment; security-sector reform (SSR); demilitarization and arms management; facilitating humanitarian support; promoting human rights and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda; strengthening the rule of law and judicial institutions; assisting local political processes; delivering electoral assistance; supporting state institutions; facilitating international cooperation and coordination; supporting the implementation of sanctions regimes; disseminating public information; promoting civilian–military coordination; contingency planning; conducting mission impact assessment; combating and sometimes ‘neutralizing’ so-called spoiler groups; and, perhaps most fundamentally, protecting civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
When it comes to understanding peacekeeping, therefore, the stakes are very high. Done well, peace operations can significantly improve the chances of building stable peace in the world’s war-torn territories. Done poorly, however, peace operations can be ineffective and exacerbate some of the problems. It is imperative that students, analysts and practitioners alike have a sophisticated understanding of peacekeeping – its key concepts and theories, its contested histories, its place in global politics, its different variants and its contemporary and likely future challenges. That is the purpose of this book.
Peacekeeping in global politics
Although the term ‘peacekeeping’ was invented in the 1950s, the international management of political violence has a far longer history. As the most sustained international attempt to work in an organized and usually multilateral fashion to reduce and manage armed conflict, understanding the theory and practice of peacekeeping sheds important light upon trends and developments in global politics more generally. In particular, it provides important insights into the codes of conduct that states have collectively devised to maintain international peace and security, the relationship between the great powers, and the creation and diffusion of shared norms about the appropriateness of warfare itself and legitimate conduct within wars. Yet, at the same time, to gain a sophisticated understanding of peacekeeping we must remain sensitive to how it fits in with the ebb and flow of global political currents.
Peace operations are shaped by the international order from which they emerged. The international order that was constructed from the ashes of the Second World War in the mid-1940s consisted of a series of rules and institutions based on the United Nations system designed to manage great power relations and thereby avoid a third world war. The Cold War struggle prevented these institutions and rules from functioning smoothly for over four decades and also ensured that there was never a complete consensus about the roles that peace operations should play. At the macro-level, a struggle persists between those who see the role of peace operations in global politics in mainly ‘Westphalian’ terms and those who see it in more ambitious, ‘post-Westphalian’ terms.
In the former view, the primary function of peace operations is to assist the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. From this perspective, the conduct, ideological persuasion and political organization of states, as well as the relationship between state and society, should not concern peacekeepers, so long as states subscribe to the Westphalian norms of sovereign autonomy and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In its most extreme form, this perspective suggests that human suffering within states, no matter how grotesque, should not concern peacekeepers unless it directly threatens international order and the maintenance of peace and security between states.
In contrast, a post-Westphalian conception of peace operations suggests that, in the long run, peaceful relations between states are best served by promoting democratic regimes and societies within states. This is based on the assumption that domestic peace and the way a state conducts its foreign relations is inextricably linked to the nature of its political system and society. From this perspective, threats to international peace and security are not limited to acts of aggression between states but may also result from violent conflict and illiberal governance within them. Moreover, proponents of this view generally argue that states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and that, when they manifestly fail to do so, international society acquires a duty to protect vulnerable populations (Bellamy and Dunne 2016). Consequently, the role of post-Westphalian peace operations is not limited to maintaining order between states but instead takes on the much more ambitious task of promoting and sometimes enforcing peace, security, and political, institutional, social and economic reconstruction within states. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, this was to be achieved by promoting liberal democratic polities, economies and even societies within states that experienced violent conflict (Paris 2004, 2010). In principle, there is no intrinsic reason why post-Westphalian approaches must converge on promoting liberalism as the route to state reconstruction. As a result, other approaches to peace operations have been proposed as alternatives to the ‘liberal peace’ agenda, including republican, bottom-up and hybrid forms of peacebuilding (see Barnett 2006; Autesserre 2009; Mac Ginty 2010).
In many respects, the ongoing struggle between Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of peace operations reflects a tension in the UN Charter over when the security of states or the security of human beings should be prioritized. In addition, the struggle reflects different concerns about the legitimacy of peace operations and the scope of multilateral authority vis-à-vis sovereign authority more generally. It also reveals different ideas about how best to promote rather than simply maintain international peace and security.
Until the end of the Cold War, the Westphalian conception of peace operations was usually privileged within debates in the United Nations, with supporters coming from across the globe, but particularly from post-colonial states in Asia and Africa, as well as the USSR/Russia and China on the Security Council (e.g. UN 2000). In comparison, after the Cold War the international debate tilted heavily in favour of the post-Westphalian conception and saw the majority of peace operations deploy to civil war settings. Initially, its most vocal supporters were found in Western states and humanitarian NGOs. Its vision was arguably reflected most intensely in the UN-run transitional administrations established in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor in the late 1990s. However, particularly after the introspection generated by the timid response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in the early 2000s the new African Union also advanced a distinctly post-Westphalian approach and a new set of frameworks for what it called ‘peace support operations’ (de Coning et al. 2016a). Another important symbolic moment came in late 2005, when over 150 UN member states acknowledged their ‘responsibility to protect’ their populations from genocide and mass atrocities and promised to take steps to prevent such crimes, including through the use of peace operations (Hunt and Bellamy 2011).
In the last few years, however, the international political climate has turned away from promoting the most intense forms of liberal peacebuilding. There are four main reasons why. First, the international financial crisis of 2008 generated intensified calls to reduce expenditure on foreign interventions, including peace operations. Second, as noted above, various criticisms of liberal peacebuilding were advanced that questioned its effectiveness. One prominent analyst concluded that ‘peacekeeping is broken’ and that ‘UN peacekeepers too often fail to meet their most basic objectives’, mainly because the organization operates with ‘a fundamental misunderstanding about what makes for a sustained peace’ that is preoccupied with top-down strategies (Autesserre 2019). Third, in 2017, the new UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, made clear that his priority was implementing more effective preventive diplomacy and special political (mainly civilian) missions with ‘lighter footprints’ than big, militarized peace operations. Finally, the arrival of President Donald J. Trump in the White House saw the United States significantly reduce its engagement with the United Nations, call for over US$1 billion in cuts to the UN’s peacekeeping budgets and the closure of several missions, and accrue over US$1 billion in arrears. In response, Russia and China articulated a more traditional Westphalian view of peace operations.
These pressures are promoting a new Westphalian concept of peacekeeping focused on helping states impose their authority across their territory but without necessarily reforming their governments to make them more legitimate, effective or democratic. At the same time, peacekeepers are tasked with mitigating some of the worst effects of civil wars on civilian populations without tackling the underlying causes. The word most commonly used to describe this approach is ‘stabilization’.
Enduring themes
These contemporary political developments do not signal the end of peace operations. Indeed, the relative spike in armed conflicts worldwide since 2011 suggests a continued demand for peace operations to help manage their endings and aftermaths. Moreover, near record numbers of peacekeepers remain deployed across some of the world’s most protracted war zones. As we seek to explain and understand these dynamics, it is worth briefly highlighting four enduring themes that continue to shape contemporary peace operations and thus lie at the heart of this book.
First is the ongoing and inherently political struggle between proponents of the more limited Westphalian conception of peace operations and the more ambitious agenda of those who understand them in post-Westphalian terms. It is important to recall, however, that even the post-Westphalian approach has some important practical limits, notably most of its advocates suggest that peace operations should deploy only with the consent of the de jure host government except in the rarest of circumstances.
A related theme is the struggle to conceptualize and respond effectively to the changing character of armed conflict. In particular, the design of peace operations should be based on a sophisticated and accurate understanding of key concepts related to armed conflict, notably globalization, stabilization, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and mass atrocities. Ultimately, peace operations will remain little more than band-aids or exercises in damage limitation unless they are based on an accurate theory of change for how their personnel and other international instruments of conflict resolution can turn war-torn territories into zones of stable peace.
A third enduring theme is the struggle to close the often very large gaps between the means and ends of peace operations. The subsequent capability gaps have assumed several forms, including not authorizing sufficiently large operations in order to save money; failing to deploy the authorized number of peacekeepers into the field; and failing to generate the appropriate type(s) of capabilities required to implement the mission’s mandate. It is therefore quite common for there to be large gaps between the theory and practice of peace operations.
Finally, as we will discuss throughout this book, it is important to remember that the United Nations does not have a monopoly on peacekeeping. Numerous multilateral organizations and states have conducted peace operations. An important part of understanding peacekeeping is therefore understanding the partnerships that have emerged and the ongoing struggle to professionalize and institutionalize the multiple bureaucracies of peace operations. This is not to suggest that peace operations can or should ever become formulaic. They are, by definition, responses to mostly unforeseen crises. But there is value to maintaining a degree of core bureaucratic and institutional predictability and capacity, as long as those mechanisms can remain flexible in responding to unique crises, work with partners, and adapt when circumstances change. This is something with which every organization and actor engaged in peace operations has to struggle.
Structure of the book
In order to explore these issues, this book is divided into four parts. Part I, ‘Concepts and Issues’, provides an overview of the main theoretical debates and technical issues relevant to contemporary peace operations. Chapter 1 investigates different ways of understanding peace operations and their relationship to broader processes and trends within global politics. As the number, range and complexity of peace operations has grown, so too has the number of theories and concepts used by analysts and practitioners alike to explain and understand them. Chapter 2 then develops this approach by identifying different types of peacekeepers (individual states, coalitions of states and international organizations, especially regional arrangements and the UN) and explaining how peace operations are assembled.
Part II, ‘Historical Development’, provides a narrative overview of how the theory and practice of peace operations has developed from the 1940s to the present day. Chapter 3 notes some of the historical antecedents of UN peace operations, such as the conference and congress systems of the nineteenth century, as well as the activities of the League of Nations. It focuses, however, on the main theoretical and practical developments in UN peace operations during the Cold War. The story of how peace operations continued to develop after the end of the Cold War in the crucial decade of the 1990s is the subject of chapter 4. This begins by charting how the end of superpower confrontation saw UN member states place an increasing number of demands upon peacekeepers without a requisite rethinking of the nature, role and scale of peace operations. Chapter 5 then analyses peace operations in the twenty-first century, focusing on the steady expansion of UN missions and the increasing prominence of regional organizations to satisfy the world’s growing demand for peacekeepers.
As part II demonstrates, peace operations have not evolved in straightforward ‘generations’ with clear and obvious chronological phases. The reality is far messier and linked to the distinct forms of armed conflict confronting peacekeepers. Part III, ‘The Purposes of Peace Operations’ (chapters 6–11), therefore offers a conceptual framework supported by short practical case studies that highlight the distinct strategic objectives peace operations are intended to achieve. We focus here on the strategic intent behind these operations rather than on the means employed to achieve them. We identify six strategic purposes for peace operations.
Prevention
: Conducted with the consent of the host state, preventive deployments envisage peacekeepers either preventing the outbreak of violent conflict or avoiding another form of crisis from materializing.
Observation
: This is the hallmark of ‘traditional peacekeeping’ where peacekeepers are deployed to monitor ceasefire agreements and act as a confidence-building mechanism, thereby hopefully facilitating peacemaking between the conflict parties. Such observation missions take place in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict.
Assistance
: These multidimensional operations involve the deployment of military, police and civilian personnel to assist the conflict parties in the implementation of a political settlement or the transition from a peace heavily supported by international actors to one that is self-sustaining. They tend to take place after both a ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached. The mandate of such operations revolves around the implementation of the peace settlement and responding to the negative legacies of the armed conflict, such as humanitarian strife, displaced populations, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) issues.
Enforcement
: Peace enforcement operations aim to impose the will of the UN Security Council upon some or all of the parties to a particular armed conflict. Peace enforcement operations are relatively rare but are the closest manifestation of the collective security role originally envisaged for the UN by the authors of its Charter, though they have tended to depart from that vision in important respects.
Stabilization
: These multidimensional but usually military-heavy operations are intended to facilitate a transition from war to peace in the context of failed or partial peace agreements and where organized violence continues. As part of this remit, they are mandated to degrade and contain designated ‘spoilers’, deliver short-term peace dividends to local populations, and support the extension and consolidation of host-state authority.
Administration
: These are also multidimensional operations deployed after a peace agreement, but they are distinguished by their assumption of sovereign authority over a particular territory. In addition to keeping the peace, protecting civilians, supporting peace agreements, and the other activities associated with large and complex operations, transitional administrations have the authority to make and enforce the law, exercise control over aspects of a territory’s economy, infrastructure and borders, regulate the media, and administer the judicial system. In their liberal variant, they are designed to help establish liberal democratic political systems and societies within states as an antidote to future war.
These strategic goals have not developed in chronological order. Nor are they mutually exclusive. A single operation may well pursue various strategic aims at different times or more than one simultaneously. We have made extensive use of case studies in part III to illustrate the complexities encountered by individual missions.
Having so far considered the theoretical debates surrounding peace operations, their historical development, and their different strategic objectives, part IV, ‘Contemporary Challenges’, assesses some of the major operational problems facing peacekeepers for the foreseeable future. The challenges considered in this part of the book can be categorized into two broad types. The first revolves around the problem of satisfying the global demand for peacekeepers. Chapters 12 to 14 therefore examine the challenges of force generation as well as two alternative sources of peacekeepers to augment the UN’s efforts, namely, the use of regional arrangements and private contractors. The second set of challenges for contemporary peace operations revolves around the expansion of their scope and gradual professionalization. In particular, chapters 15 to 20 focus on six of the most prominent areas that have seen major expansion: the use of force, civilian protection, gender, policing, organized crime and exit.
Ten years on from the second edition of Understanding Peacekeeping, it remains our conviction that peace operations play a vitally important role in managing armed conflict, supporting stable peace and – increasingly – protecting endangered populations. Through past experience and theoretically informed analysis, we have a better understanding today of what it takes to build stable peace and the roles peacekeepers can play in the process. Although this has created significant global demand for peace operations, peacekeepers are still frequently sent on difficult missions without the necessary resources and political support. We hope this book can help people understand why they deserve both.
PART ICONCEPTS AND ISSUES
1Peace Operations in Global Politics
This chapter analyses the relationships between peace operations and global politics. Initially, peacekeeping was concerned mainly with creating the conditions for states to settle their disputes peacefully. Over time, as interstate war diminished and the frequency of civil wars within states increased, peace operations were used more frequently to maintain peace within states and sometimes to influence domestic structures in order to turn war-torn territories into peaceful democratic societies. Whereas the Westphalian order rested on a notion of sovereignty that granted states protection from interference by outsiders, the post-Westphalian account conceived of sovereignty as entailing responsibilities, especially for the protection of their populations from atrocity crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. As the number and scope of peace operations informed by the post-Westphalian approach has grown, so too has the number of theories and conceptual frameworks used to understand them.
To address these issues, this chapter starts by summarizing the basic principles of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of international order and the respective role of peace operations within them. The second section then presents different ways of theorizing peace operations and five prominent theoretical approaches that offer insights into the roles that peace operations play in global politics. Finally, we note the conclusions of existing scholarship about the overall impacts peace operations have had on trends in armed conflict.
1.1 Westphalian and post-Westphalian order
Peace operations were initially conceived as a tool for maintaining order between states. As discussed in this book’s Introduction, we label this context the ‘Westphalian’ international order even though it coexisted with continuing forms of empire and colonial rule. Within this context, the principal role of peace operations was the facilitation of decolonization and the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. In contrast, advocates of what we call a ‘post-Westphalian’ order suggested peace operations should sometimes also play a role in shaping the domestic governance structures of states to ensure the government fulfilled its responsibilities to its civilian population. This post-Westphalian view rose to ascendancy at the United Nations during the 1990s, although it remained highly controversial for some UN member states which preferred a more limited vision of what peace operations should be for. To some extent, the twenty-first century has seen a merging of these two visions as more peace operations were tasked with ‘stabilization’ activities, helping the host state impose its authority across its territory. These missions, such as those in Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali and, initially, South Sudan, have been quite intrusive in terms of their involvement in domestic affairs (and are thus ‘post-Westphalian’). But their principal aim is to support the state in fulfilling its basic functions (and are thus to some degree classically ‘Westphalian’).
The Westphalian order takes its name from the settlements concluded at the end of Europe’s Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), which took place between the ‘Union’ of Protestant German princes and free cities and the ‘League’ of their Catholic counterparts (Jackson 2000: 162–7). Politically, the treaties recognized the territorial sovereignty of the approximately 300 states and statelets within Europe. They also symbolized the sovereign state’s success in prevailing over other forms of political organization (Tilly 1992). In doing so, the state forcibly acquired five key monopoly powers:
the right to monopolize control of the instruments of violence;
the sole right to collect taxes;
the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
the right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens; and
the exclusive right of representation in international society (Linklater 1998: 28).
The treaties also reaffirmed the Peace of Augsburg (1555) at which the principle of cujus regio ejus religio was formulated, whereby each ruler declared which brand of Christianity (Protestantism or Catholicism) would hold exclusive rights within their territories and other rulers agreed to respect the sovereign’s right to determine the country’s religion (Jackson 2000: 163).
The state’s success in Europe brought with it the development of three fundamental norms (Jackson 2000: 166–7). The first norm held that the monarch was emperor in their own realm. Thus, sovereigns were not subject to any higher political authority. The second was that outsiders had no right to intervene in a foreign jurisdiction on the grounds of religion, while the third affirmed the European balance of power as a means of preventing one state from making a successful bid for hegemony that would, in effect, re-establish empire on the continent. These three norms created an international order that permitted different cultures and nations to live according to their own preferences while respecting the rights of others to do likewise and avoiding the danger of assimilation.
These norms evolved incrementally and took nearly three hundred years to develop fully. Nor was this system anywhere near universal. Despite the rise of sovereign states, until 1918 most of Europe was actually governed by empires (Russian, Austrian and Ottoman), and these norms applied only to European – and a small handful of non-European – states. A quite different set of rules applied in the colonized world. Finally, the norms and practices that characterized European diplomacy in this Westphalian order were Christian and Latin (Stern 1999: 65–9).
After the Second World War the Westphalian order gradually expanded to cover the entire globe, as former colonies sought to take their place as sovereign states (Bull and Watson 1984; Jackson 2001). Between 1947 and 1967, membership of the United Nations expanded from about fifty to over 160 (Jackson 2001: 46). By 2011, the UN had 193 members and roughly fifty additional political entities making claims to statehood. In some places the transition to sovereign statehood was relatively peaceful, but in others – such as Indochina, South Asia and Algeria – it was a bloody affair. If a global Westphalian order was to survive and achieve a degree of stability, it had to protect a sovereign’s right to rule and prevent strong states simply overpowering weak states. With decolonization and the expansion of the Westphalian order, therefore, came calls to protect the sanctity of state sovereignty through law.
Arguably the cornerstone of the Westphalian order was Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibited the threat and use of force in international relations. Alongside it, Article 2(7) insisted that the new global organization would not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members. In the subsequent years, these messages from the newly decolonized world came loud and clear and used the UN General Assembly to issue several declarations on the importance of self-determination and non-interference.
Many academics supported the idea that national communities were so different, and that diversity was a good worth preserving, that international order can be achieved only by rigid adherence to such Westphalian principles (Jackson 2000: 291). It was thought to be a short road from relaxing these Westphalian principles to relegitimating colonialism. Even today, international commitment to non-interference remains widespread and steadfast.
It was in this Westphalian order that modern peace operations were born and developed (see part II of this book). They were concerned primarily with the peaceful resolution of disputes between states but also ended up facilitating decolonization and assisting some states to suppress separatists. The Westphalian rules meant that peace operations deployed only with the consent of the host state(s). Particularly since the end of the Cold War, however, the Westphalian order was challenged by an alternative conception of sovereignty and order, which had major implications for the theory and practice of peace operations (see table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Westphalian, post-Westphalian and stabilization approaches
Echoes of the post-Westphalian approach appeared well before 1989, of course. They can even be heard in the Preamble of the UN Charter, which in many other ways is a document prescribing Westphalian rules for the world. Yet the Preamble starts with ‘We the peoples’ of the United Nations (not the member states), determined to – among other things – ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ – ambitions that go well beyond the maintenance of stable peace between states through rules of mutual coexistence.
In the post-Cold War era, prominent post-Westphalian voices came from around the world. They included the British prime minister Tony Blair, who developed a ‘doctrine of the international community’ to justify NATO’s intervention in Serbia/Kosovo in 1999 and British military operations in Sierra Leone the following year. Another particularly important voice was that of the former Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng, who served as the UN’s Special Representative on Internal Displacement and then Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide. With his focus on the plight of IDPs, Deng argued that, where a state was unable to fulfil its responsibilities to protect its neediest citizens, it should invite and welcome international assistance to ‘complement national efforts’ (2004: 20). Or, as he and his collaborators put it nearly a decade earlier, ‘Sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not only to their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community’ (Deng et al. 1996: 1). In a similar vein, in the late 1990s, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan provided a useful shorthand for this debate as a struggle between two conceptions of sovereignty, each of which protects certain values worth preserving. As Annan noted, the ‘old orthodoxy’ of Westphalian sovereignty
was never absolute. The Charter, after all, was issued in the name of ‘the peoples’, not the governments, of the United Nations. Its aim is not only to preserve international peace – vitally important though that is – but also ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’. The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a licence for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power …
Can we really afford to let each State be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in another State’s internal conflict? If we do, will we not be forced to legitimize Hitler’s championship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? (Annan 1998a)
This post-Westphalian understanding of international order viewed the state’s sovereign rights as contingent on fulfilling its responsibilities to its civilian population, most notably protecting them from atrocity crimes, civil wars, forced displacement, famine, gross human rights violations, and other ills. This implied a much broader set of roles for peace operations than that envisaged by a Westphalian view. In a post-Westphalian order, peace operations need to help build states and societies capable of fulfilling these responsibilities. Where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so, peace operations should be prepared to step in. The ongoing debate between advocates of Westphalian sovereignty and proponents of the post-Westphalian approach continues to underpin contemporary arguments about the purpose of peace operations (see SIPRI 2015). But it is not the only way of thinking about the roles of peace operations in global politics. There are other prominent theories and frameworks to which we now turn.
1.2 Theorizing peace operations in global politics
Students might ask why we need to think theoretically at all about peace operations as inherently practical activities. One good reason was summarized by Roland Paris when he noted that, for too long, the study of peace operations had suffered from a ‘cult of policy relevance’ whereby ‘students … neglected
