11:40 E-Book

Brad Payne

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Lebensstil
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 522

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

From the moment the iceberg was spotted to the moment Titanic's fate was realised, it was a race against time for the 2,208 souls on board. At 11:40 p.m. on 14 April 1912, Titanic collided with an iceberg in the middle of the North Atlantic. Less than three hours later, it had disappeared completely beneath the waves. From the second the iceberg hove into view, the ship was on a collision course with destiny, those on board embarking on a race against time to inspect the damage and determine their fates. 11:40: Analysis of Evasive Manoeuvres & Damage Assessment on RMS Titanic is a comprehensive new study that breaks down and forensically analyses every event on that fateful night, order by order, moment by moment. With the backing of an exhaustive collection of both historical and modern data, along with over twenty years of personal research, Brad Payne separates fact from myth, revealing the truth about what really happened on board Titanic during its critical last moments.

Leseprobe

First published 2023

The History Press

97 St George’s Place, Cheltenham,

Gloucestershire, GL50 3QB

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

© Brad Payne, 2023

The right of Brad Payne to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 1 80399 176 4

Typesetting and origination by The History Press

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ Books Limited, Padstow, Cornwall.

eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

This book is dedicated to my father and mother,Mike and Ruth.

(Drawing by Alessandro Pirronitto)

‘Titanic’s story fascinates us all, as evident by all the TV shows, movies, books and other literature. Titanic’s legacy is something that has drawn us all in; my personal fascination is with her wreck. She is the physical monument to all those people who lived or perished, and the actions taken that night to bring the ship into the splintered mess that it is now on the bottom of the North Atlantic. Researching, watching wreck footage, and piecing together what used to be is what I enjoy doing – doing my best to figure out what happened and what landed where on the ocean floor. But what is so special about this book? This book explains those fateful manoeuvres that decided her fate. I have never seen a book so thoroughly go through these actions and the actions that followed the fateful collision.’

I enjoyed this book, and I think you will too.

Cameron Houseman

Titanic Researcher and Wreck Historian

Contents

Foreword by George Behe

Introduction

11:38: A Prologue

PART 1: EVASIVE MANOEUVRES

1   ‘Iceberg Right Ahead’

A Black Mass

Three Bells

Phone Call to the Bridge

Relaying the Lookout’s Message

2   37 Seconds

Helm Order Part 1

Telegraph Order Part 1

Effects of Evasive Manoeuvre Part 1

Titanic’s Turn to Port

3   Movements in the Night

Telegraph Order Part 2

Thomas Dillon

Frederick Scott

Movements

4   A Zigzag Manoeuvre

Helm Order Part 2

Timing

Effects of Evasive Manoeuvre Part 2

Titanic’s Turn to Starboard

5   Activities on the Bridge

Activating the Watertight Doors

Logging the Collision

Captain Smith Comes to the Bridge

Briefing the Captain

6   A Deduction of the Evidence Part 1

PART 2: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

7   Immediate Actions

Captain Smith’s Initial Actions

Chief Officer Wilde’s Inspection

Quartermaster Olliver’s Messages

Fourth Officer Boxhall’s Inspections

Thomas Andrews’ Initial Actions

8   Inspections Below Decks

Andrews’ Trip Below

Captain Smith Heads Below

Mail Room

Captain Smith’s Engine Room Trip

9   Realisation

Captain Smith Comes Up

Andrews Comes Up

Wireless Room

10   Actions of Other Key Figures

Bruce Ismay’s Actions

Other Actions of Purser McElroy

Other Actions of Second First Class Steward Dodd

Third Officer Pitman’s Inspection

11   A Deduction of the Evidence Part 2

PART 3: TIMELINE

Acknowledgements

Sources

Notes

Forewordby George Behe

Brad Payne’s manuscript 11:40: An Analysis of the Evasive Manoeuvres & Damage Assessment Done Aboard the RMS Titanici is a carefully researched document that analyses the various eyewitness accounts describing the 45 minutes that elapsed between the time Titanic struck the iceberg and the time it was determined that the ‘unsinkable’ ship was doomed. This analysis was not an easy one to accomplish, because (just like all eyewitness testimony) Titanic’s passengers and crewmen often had different time estimates of various pre- and post-collision occurrences. What time did the various damage inspection trips below decks begin, and what did they entail? Who went on those trips, and how long was it before the inspections were completed? When did Captain Smith order his crewmen to uncover the ship’s lifeboats merely as a precautionary measure, and when did Smith ‘upgrade’ that order and begin the evacuation of the ship in earnest? Different survivors had different time estimates, and Brad Payne has done a fine job of bringing together these various accounts in an attempt to determine their probable correct timing.

Brad’s book is definitely not aimed at casual readers who hope to do some light reading during an afternoon at the beach; instead, his book is aimed at serious Titanic researchers who are familiar with the various historical uncertainties and have attempted to reach their own conclusions about what happened immediately before and after Titanic collided with the iceberg. In his book’s introduction, Brad acknowledges that not all researchers will agree with all his conclusions, but it must be remembered that every history book in existence contains at least a few snippets of information that subsequent historians will continue to quibble about. Be that as it may, Brad Payne has done a good job of assembling and analysing the available evidence about how Titanic’s iceberg damage was determined to be fatal, and I feel that serious Titanic researchers will welcome his book as being an important contribution to the subject.

i The original title of this work.

Introduction

This book has been in the process of writing now, in some form or another, for a very long time. Though long, the nature of the data required such, and it was the data that dictated the speed at which the book was written. It was important to this author not only to make sure that the information was presented as accurately as possible, but also to be as wholistic as possible. That entailed reading and re-reading countless articles, books and other publications, looking for minute clues and processing them within the data. It also meant taking the time to understand the complexity of many of the topics presented, through reading and further research, or through the help of the many generous historians and researchers out there.

There is no doubt that once this book is published, new data, or even existing data that this author is unaware of, will surface. Some of it may support this author’s deductions, while some will inevitably go against them. All of which is fine. That is the nature of the beast, and what makes research enduring. What this author can say, though, is that he has tried to leave no stone unturned, and all the data he could find is presented within, whether supportive or contradictory to his deductions. Deductions that were made based solely on the data.

The evasive manoeuvres, which form the first part of this book, have been speculated over since Titanic struck the iceberg. From newspaper articles, the US and British governmental inquiries, the two civil court hearings (Ryan vs. Oceanic Steam Navigation Company and Limitation of Liability), and the countless books afterwards, many conclusions have been made about the actions of First Officer Murdoch before, during and after Titanic struck the iceberg. The words of Boxhall, Hichens, Fleet, Olliver, Barrett and more have all been interpreted and reinterpreted to reflect these conclusions. This author is continuing that trend, though his deductions will hopefully shed a much broader light on this subject.

The second part of this book has never been completely explored before. Several books have brief mentions, or some details sprinkled throughout their text, but never collectively presented until now. There is a reason for this: unlike the first part of this book, the second part is a tangled web of contradicting accounts, sometimes given by the same person. Trying to string together any sense of a timeline takes looking at ever further evidence with no direct relation to the main topic. It is very time consuming, and it was the collection of this data that became the most formidable task of this writing.

Part three is a timeline based on the deductions made in parts one and two. This timeline should not be seen as absolute, though, for even with the large amount of data collected, and deductions that have been made, there are still holes in the overall story. Testimonies given by survivors often conflict, even within the testimonies of the same individual, and most times stated should only be seen as estimates unless an actual time piece was involved. Also, the time it would take for individuals to move about the ship can only be estimated by this author based on the data presented.

This author feels that the completeness of the data presented should allow the reader to agree with some, if not all, of this author’s deductions; however, it may also be that the reader will come to their own conclusions, which again is fine, as this should not be seen as the ‘final word’ but as a springboard for further research.

Enjoy!

11:38: A Prologue

It was 11:38 p.m., 14 April 1912, the fourth full day of Titanic’s maiden voyage. On the bridge was First Officer William Murdoch, who had taken control of the bridge after relieving Second Officer Charles Lightoller at 10. Lightoller, who earlier conversed with Titanic’s captain, Edward Smith, about the lack of moon and wind – which caused the sea to be dark and as still as a mill pond – passed along Smith’s orders that if it were to become at all doubtful, to let him know. On duty with Murdoch was Fourth Officer Joseph Boxhall and Sixth Officer James Moody. At Titanic’s helm was Quartermaster Robert Hichens, while Quartermaster Alfred Olliver was also on duty performing various tasks before the end of his watch. Quartermaster George Rowe was stationed on the poop deck at the very end of the ship.

In the crow’s nest were Frederick Fleet and Reginald Lee. Both received orders to look out for small ice and growlers from the previous watch when they came on duty at 10 p.m. In the wireless shack was Senior Wireless Operator Jack Phillips, tirelessly working, while his colleague, Junior Wireless Operator Harold Bride, slept before his shift. The wireless apparatus had previously broken down and both men, against company policy, fixed it but were now backlogged.

Below deck the men in the boiler rooms, such as Fireman George Beauchamp – under the guidance of Lead Stoker Frederick Barrett – fed coal into the furnaces, generating steam to power Titanic’s massive engines. The engineers, under the watchful eye of Chief Engineer Joseph Bell, kept Titanic’s two colossal reciprocating engines, and its low-pressure turbine, pushing Titanic through the frigid waters of the North Atlantic at a speed of 22 knots.

On board from Harland & Wolff, the shipbuilding firm that built Titanic, was Thomas Andrews. He was the head of the Guarantee Group; a selected group of men from Harland & Wolff whose job it was to make sure Titanic performed splendidly on its first voyage. Also on board, and representing Titanic’s owners, the White Star Line, was the chairman of the company, Bruce Ismay. It was not abnormal for Ismay to accompany a new ship on its maiden voyage, and there is no doubt he was proud of this latest accomplishment.

All together there were 2,208 souls on board the great ship. Most of the passengers had turned in, while others were still up, burning the midnight oil. For some crew, another watch was almost over, while for others a new one was about to begin. It had just been another typical day at sea, on another routine crossing, on the largest ship in the world, until …

Part 1Evasive Manoeuvres

1

‘Iceberg Right Ahead’

A Black Mass

Lookouts Frederick Fleet and Reginald Lee would describe the iceberg as being a ‘black’ or ‘dark’ mass, or ‘black object’, when it was first spotted.1 Fleet, upon seeing the black mass, recalled it being the size of two of the tables used during the US Senate hearing put together.2 The New York Herald of 24 April 1912 gives two sizes for this, one being 10sqft, and the other a diameter of 30ft. Without an accurate picture of what tables Fleet was referring to, the idea of size is open for interpretation and is perhaps pointless to ponder. Lee would state that the iceberg was roughly half a mile or more away when first spotted, thus around 3,038ft or more.

Carlos Hurd, a reporter for the New York World and passenger on board the rescue ship Carpathia, would write, as Carpathia made its way to New York, an account of the disaster based on conversations he had with various survivors. After erroneously stating, ‘At 11:45 came the sudden sound of two gongs,3 a warning of immediate danger,’ his story would read, ‘The crash against the iceberg which had been sighted at only a quarter of a mile …’4 It is unclear who gave Hurd this bit of information, though another Carpathia passenger, Wallace Bradford, would write in a letter that he heard Quartermaster Hichens’ story, and Hichens would say that it was unlikely that the lookouts could have seen the berg any more than a quarter mile away,5 a quarter of a mile being 1,519ft.

Quartermaster Hichens was at Titanic’s helm the night of the collision. He would be stationed within the wheelhouse, the windows of which would have their blinds ‘always closed just after sunset’,6 making it impossible for Hichens to determine, via sight, the distance of anything the lookouts spotted, meaning any estimation as to distance was either based on time or a mere guess. Titanic was going at a speed of around 22 knots, or 38 feet per second, which for 1,519ft gives a transverse time of 40 seconds.

Three Bells

Sighting the berg, Fleet would comment, ‘Before I reported, I said, “There is ice ahead,” and then I put my hand over to the bell and rang it three times …’ He would also state during both inquiries that he reported the berg as soon as he ever saw it.7

More than fifty years after the disaster, author Leslie Reade would interview Fleet, and from this interview Reade would suggest the possibility of a delay between the sighting of the berg and its reporting when Fleet reminisced that he saw the ‘black thing’ looming and he did not know what it was. He asked Lee if he knew, to which Lee replied he did not. It was then that Fleet thought it best to ring the bell. From this, Reade contemplated how long the interval was of Fleet questioning Lee, though apparently Reade did not probe Fleet on the matter, for no answer is given.

The bell being rung three times was the customary amount for when an object was spotted dead ahead. Had something been seen to the port, the bell was to be rung once, and twice for starboard.8 Fleet would make clear that ringing the bell did not signify anything more than something being spotted, ‘it just tells them on the bridge that there is something about. That is all we have to do up in the nest; to ring the bell …’9

It must therefore be remembered that these bells did not signify danger, or more importantly, imminent danger. Nor did the bells indicate the distance for which an object was seen. The only ones who would have been aware of Titanic’s precarious situation at this moment, as far as the record shows, would have been Fleet and Lee. Being in a busy shipping route, and within a region of reported ice, the bells being rung would not have been out of the ordinary. In fact, Second Officer Lightoller suggested that the bells could be rung over nothing with no consequence, so long as the lookouts acknowledged their mistake.10

The bells would be heard by various people including Quartermaster Hichens, who recalled, ‘All went along very well until; 20 minutes to 12, when three gongs came from the lookout …’;11 Quartermaster Olliver, at the compass stand, recalled:

When I was doing this bit of duty I heard three bells rung up in the crow’s nest, which I knew that it was something ahead; so I looked, but I did not see anything. I happened to be looking at the lights in the standing compass at the time. That was my duty, to look at the lights in the standing compass, and I was trimming them so that they would burn properly. When I heard the report, I looked, but could not see anything, and I left that …12

Fourth Officer Boxhall would also hear the bells, though his whereabouts are a bit harder to pin down. During the US inquiry he would say, ‘At the time of the impact I was just coming along the deck and almost abreast of the captain’s quarters, and I heard the report of three bells …’13 Though this statement can be interpreted as him hearing the bells after feeling the impact, his later testimony, in which he states that he ‘heard the bells first’, as he was, ‘just coming out of the Officer’s quarters’,14 makes it more likely that he was adding the fact that he heard the bells, after having left it out.

In 1959, Boxhall would claim that he had just done a tour of the ship and peered into his cabin when he heard the lookout’s bells, prompting him to immediately go on deck again.15 During a 1962 radio interview, Boxhall recalled, ‘At the time, when the iceberg was reported, from the crow’s nest, when they struck the bells, I was sitting in my cabin having a cup of tea, and immediately got up and walked along the bridge; about 60ft away on the same deck.’16

As the reader can see, with each progressive telling Boxhall places himself further inside the ship. One may rightfully ask whether Boxhall could have heard the bells from inside the officers’ quarters, though there is no way to know, nor is there any reason to doubt his recollection of this matter. As far as his actual location, all that can be ascertained is that he was somewhere around his quarters, either inside or just leaving, when the bells were struck.

Phone Call to the Bridge

As Fleet had testified, all the lookouts had to do was ring the bell to notify the bridge that something had been spotted, ‘and if there is any danger ring them up on the telephone’. Fleet would indeed feel obligated to do just that, recalling, ‘Well, it was so close to us. That is why I rang them up.’17 Lee would place the location of the phone as being in the starboard corner of the nest.18

Fleet testified during his US interrogation:

I struck three bells first. Then I went straight to the telephone and rang them on the bridge. I got an answer straight away – what did I see, or, ‘What did you see?’ He just asked me what did I see. I told him, ‘Iceberg right ahead.’ He said: ‘Thank you.’

Though saying he got an answer ‘straight away’, Fleet would later hint during his British testimony of a possible delay on the receiving end of this call:

I struck three bells. As soon as I saw it. I went to the telephone. Rang them up on the bridge. I asked them were they there, and – they said, ‘Yes.’ Then they said, ‘What do you see?’ I said, ‘Iceberg right ahead.’ They said, ‘Thank you.’19

The possible delay emerges as to what prompted Fleet to ask, ‘Were they there?’

Lee, now displaced to the front of the nest, as Fleet was telephoning from his area on the starboard side,20 would recall, ‘Three bells were struck by Fleet, warning “Right Ahead”, and immediately he rung the telephone up to the bridge, “Iceberg right ahead.” The reply came back from the bridge, “Thank you.”’21

A telephone like the one used to relay the iceberg message. (The Shipbuilder, Archives.org)

Hichens testified that, ‘All went along very well until 20 minutes to 12, when three gongs came from the lookout, and immediately afterwards a report on the telephones, “Iceberg right ahead.”’22 He would tell the British committee that the phone rang ‘immediately after’ the crow’s nest bells. He would also state that he could not ‘hear the message’, but that he heard Moody’s reply, ‘Thank You.’23

There are two sources that give another indication of time besides Hichens’ use of the word ‘immediately’. One is from a paper entitled ‘Account of the Disaster told by the Quartermaster at the Wheel’, by Carpathia passenger Howard Chapin, which gives a time of 5 seconds between the lookout’s bells and the telephone call.24 The other is the New York Herald, 19 April 1912, which quotes Hichens giving the interval of 4 or 5 seconds between the bells and the phone call.25

When asked how long he was at the phone, Fleet would answer, ‘I suppose half a minute.’26 Hichens would later collaborate this time when answering the question, ‘How long was that before the order came “Hard-a-starboard”?’27 His answer will be looked at shortly. However, half a minute appears to be much too long when reading the overall conversation. Could some of this half minute come from the delay in answering, which is what prompted Fleet to ask, ‘Were they there?’

First-class passenger Arthur Peuchen, in boat 6, the same boat as both Hichens and Fleet, would remember a conversation that he had with Fleet while rowing:

I was interested when I found he was in the crow’s nest, and I said, ‘What occurred?’ In the conversation he said he rang three bells, and then he signaled to the bridge … The only thing he said was that he did not get any reply from the bridge.

This statement has led to many debates and some conspiracy theories. It clearly goes against the testimony of Fleet, Lee and Hichens, all of which claim that Moody did answer the phone. To better understand this statement, it may be important to continue Peuchen’s evidence:

Maj. PEUCHEN: I heard afterwards that really the officers were not required to reply.

Senator SMITH: That is, the information is imparted from the crow’s nest to the officer at the bridge, and that is the end of that information?

Maj. PEUCHEN: I spoke to the second officer on the boat regarding the conversation; and he told me it is simply a matter of whether the officer wishes to reply or not. He gets the information, probably, and acts right on it without attempting to reply to the crow’s nest.

It appears that Lightoller’s interpretation of there being no reply merely meant that nothing else was said after the lookouts relayed their message. The officer merely received the information and that was that; thus it was not so much that no one answered the phone, in as much as no one replied any further information other than a simple ‘thank you’ to the lookouts. However, this is merely Lightoller’s interpretation. Another interpretation harks back to the delay in Moody’s answering of the phone. Could Fleet have meant not necessarily that no one answered at all, but that no one answered right away?

Relaying the Lookout’s Message

Fleet would state that he did not know who it was that he was speaking to on the phone,28 though evidence shows it was Sixth Officer Moody. Once Moody answered back, ‘Thank you,’ neither Fleet nor Lee recalled hearing anything else. In fact, Lee could only speculate as to what happened afterwards, hinting, ‘As soon as the reply came back, “Thank you,” the helm must have been put either hard-a-starboard or very close to it …’29

Hichens recalled that after Moody said, ‘Thank you,’ Moody repeated the lookout’s message of ‘Iceberg right ahead’ to First Officer Murdoch.30 Boxhall would recall not knowing what had occurred until, ‘I heard the sixth officer say what it was … He said we had struck an iceberg.’31 There is no evidence of Moody ever saying anything more about the iceberg before Boxhall learned what had occurred via Murdoch’s report to Captain Smith. In fact, evidence places Moody going to fill out the ship’s log after the collision, leaving no time for Boxhall to have had a private conversation with Moody, especially within Boxhall’s own accounts. So, either Boxhall is recalling Moody repeating the lookout’s message, or he mistakenly said Sixth Officer instead of First Officer, which may actually be the case as later Boxhall would testify:

Mr. BOXHALL: Mr. Murdoch saw it when we struck it.

Senator SMITH: Did he say what it was?

Mr. BOXHALL: Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH: What did he say it was?

Mr. BOXHALL: He said it was an iceberg.

It may be of some importance here to at least acknowledge another bit of evidence given by Peuchen that has also stirred up some debate. Peuchen would testify: ‘He was Quartermaster Hichens. I think probably you can find him; but he was the man at the wheel, and he was calling out to the other boats wanting to know what officer was on duty at that time. He did not seem to know which officer, at the time of the sighting of the iceberg, was on duty.’32

Maj. PEUCHEN: They [Fleet and Hichens] had some conversation – the quartermaster was asking them who was on the bridge and they were calling over, and they did not know which officer was on the bridge, and the quartermaster called out to another boat, to the quartermaster or whoever was in charge of the other boat.

Senator SMITH: Another lifeboat?

Maj. PEUCHEN: Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH: From your boat?

Maj. PEUCHEN: Yes, sir; they were not far off.

Senator SMITH: What did he say?

Maj. PEUCHEN: I did not catch the answer.

Senator SMITH: No; I mean what did the quartermaster say?

Maj. PEUCHEN: He said, ‘You know one officer was on duty on the bridge at the time we struck.’ So far as I could gather, the officer was in command of the other boat. He did not know; he might not have been on duty.

Senator SMITH: And the lookout in the crow’s nest did not seem to know?

Maj. PEUCHEN: No.

It is hard to reconcile what it was Peuchen was hearing, mainly because there is not enough data, and subsequent testimony from Hichens shows that he was well aware of who was present on the bridge, and that there were two officers on duty, though he may have been referring to Moody only being present on the bridge as he believed (as will be seen) Murdoch was on one of the wing bridges. Fleet, on the other hand, would not have known who was on the bridge, even recalling he did not know who he spoke to on the phone. As will be seen, it appears that Fleet and Hichens did not personally know each other and were not on the best of terms. Could it be that Hichens was merely toying with Fleet’s lack of knowledge? Or was Hichens searching for Moody and Murdoch, not knowing they did not survive? Again, it is hard to know, and without going into unnecessary conspiracy theories it is unfortunately here we will have to leave this.

2

37 Seconds

Helm Order Part 1

The only establishment of Murdoch’s location immediately prior to the collision comes from Hichens, who said, ‘The chief officer1 rushed from the wing bridge, or I imagine so, sir. Certainly I am enclosed in the wheelhouse, and I cannot see, only my compass.’2 It is clear from this statement that it is merely a guess on Hichens’ part as to Murdoch’s location. Hichens also does not state from which wing bridge he is referring to, if Murdoch was on a wing bridge.

Hichens would continue to tell of Murdoch’s actions: ‘He rushed to the engines. I heard the telegraph bell ring; also give the order “Hard astarboard” …’3 While in Britain he would testify pretty much the same, saying he heard Moody relay the lookout’s message to Murdoch, and then, ‘I heard Mr. Murdoch rush to the telegraph and give the order, “Hard-a-starboard.”’4 Hichens, when asked how long it was after hearing the lookout’s bells that he received this order for hard-a-starboard, would answer, ‘Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute.’

This half a minute correlates with Fleet’s account of the duration of his phone call, thus imposing the fact that Murdoch made the order for hard-a-starboard almost immediately after Moody relayed the lookout’s message after the telephone call. However, what this does not tell us is the reasoning for this 30-second delay. Was it because Murdoch could not make out the iceberg, possibly scanning the horizon, not realising the berg was inside the horizon? Was it because Murdoch was trying to figure out the best course of action? Unfortunately, we will never know. It has also been asked, and is worth repeating, how literally this half a minute should be taken, as it could merely be a passing phrase meaning just a short amount of time.

A quartermaster at the helm of a German liner.

Boxhall testified during the US inquiry that, ‘Three bells were struck … That signifies something has been seen ahead. Almost at the same time I heard the first officer give the order “Hard-a-Starboard”, and the engine telegraph rang.’ In Britain he would state having heard the bells while he was, ‘just coming out of the Officer’s quarters,’ and then, ‘heard the First Officer give the order, “Hard-a-starboard,” and I heard the engine room telegraph bells ringing.’5 It seems that Boxhall’s account is much more condensed than that of Lee, Fleet and Hichens, as there is no room for a phone call, let alone a 30-second one. If one does not believe the phone call took such time, this also goes against the 30 seconds Hichens claimed took place between the bells ringing and the helm order. This may support the theory that this half a minute was a turn of phrase.

Hichens would relate that Sixth Officer Moody would repeat the order for hard-a-starboard,6 and he immediately started to put the wheel hard-a-starboard.7 He recalled, ‘Mr. Moody was standing behind me when the order was given,’8 as ‘that was his place, to see the duty carried out.’9 He would tell the US committee, ‘I heard the bell ring; also give the order “Hard-a-starboard,” with the sixth officer standing by me to see the duty carried out and the quartermaster standing by my left side, repeated the order, “Hard-a-starboard. The helm is hard over, sir.”’

It is here that Hichens adds another character to this moment, that being the quartermaster to his left. Hichens would also speak of this quartermaster at the British inquiry when asked if any officer witnessed him performing the order to turn the ship hard-a-starboard: ‘Mr. Moody, and also the Quartermaster on my left. He was told to take the time of the collision.’10

There were three quartermasters on duty at the time of the collision: Hichens, Rowe on the poop deck, and Olliver. Olliver never states in his testimony hearing any order for hard-a-starboard, nor does he ever mention hearing the telegraph ring. Within the time it took from the ringing of the bells to the order for hard-a-starboard, Olliver should not have been able to arrive on the bridge from the compass stand unless he hustled for some unknown reason. All of Olliver’s statements agree with him not being at, or around, the bridge as early as the order for hard-a-starboard. Olliver does, however, state of a similar situation for another helm order that will be looked at later.

It is to be forever unknown why Murdoch ordered the ship to port. Speculating theories suggest that the berg stretched a bit more to the starboard thus making the shortest route around it to the port. Others suggest that, based on a drawing done by Fleet, the iceberg was not directly dead ahead but slightly to the starboard, thus prompting Murdoch to order the helm to port. Still another theory has it that Murdoch was on the port wing bridge, and such position made him believe the best route would be to the port. It may just boil down to Murdoch believing he needed to turn the ship one way or the other, with equal chances either way, and for no reason at all, he chose port over starboard.

Titanic’s boat deck with Fourth Officer Boxhall’s quarters circled.(Plans courtesy of Bruce Beveridge)

Telegraph Order Part 1

Titanic’s telegraphs were backlit, though at night these lights would be extinguished so as not to impair the vision of the officer on watch who would also be on the lookout. The telegraph dials were laid out as detailed below.

As detailed in the previous section, both Boxhall and Hichens testify to there being a telegraph order right along with the order for hard-a-starboard. Both men would place this telegraph order happening before any form of shock or collision. Boxhall would put the telegraph and the order for hard-a-starboard ‘just a moment before’ feeling a shock.11 This ‘moment before’ would turn into a few minutes later in 1959.12 This short lapse of time between hearing the helm order, the telegraphs and the feeling of the shock is conducive to where Boxhall claims he was when he felt the shock, which was almost on the bridge,13 or ‘almost abreast of the captain’s quarters’.14 This factor would remain the same in his later recollections, with him placing himself about halfway between the officers’ quarters and the bridge.15

The distance between his quarters and the bridge was 60ft. With the average walking time of a person being around 3.1mph (4.6ft per second), we can easily calculate that it should have taken Boxhall about 13 to 14 seconds to walk 60ft had he left immediately, which he only claims to have done in his later years. This would mean that Boxhall had only been walking for around 6–7 seconds before feeling a ‘shock’ if he were only halfway to the bridge.

Boxhall would be the only witness on the bridge to testify seeing what the telegraphs supposedly signalled immediately after impact,16 stating, ‘I heard the bells ring, but I did not know what the movement was until I got to the bridge,’17 where he would see both telegraphs at FULL SPEED ASTERN.18

Able Seaman Joseph Scarrott, underneath the forecastle, recalled, ‘The shaking of the ship seemed as though the engines had suddenly been reversed to full speed astern.’19 At the British inquiry he would say how he heard three bells from the crow’s nest ‘round about half past eleven’. He then would say, ‘Well, I did not feel any direct impact, but it seemed as if the ship shook in the same manner as if the engines had been suddenly reversed to full speed astern, just the same sort of vibration, enough to wake anybody up if they were asleep.’

An engine order telegraph on the bridge of a German liner.

He would give a timeline as far as how long it was after he had heard the bells that he felt the engines reverse: ‘As I did not take much notice of the three strikes on the gong, I could hardly recollect the time; but I should think it was – well, we will say about five or eight minutes; it seemed to me about that time.’20

Able Seaman John Poingdestre, also under the forecastle, related feeling a vibration that he could not say was the ship’s engines being put in reverse, but was similar.21 His statement, though, was based more on his line of questioning than his own recollections. The fact that both Scarrott and Poingdestre were at the area in which the iceberg struck must be considered, as it is entirely possible that both men felt the collision and not the engines being reversed.

Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule, in his bunk on the aft port side of E deck, would remember the engines being put astern. He states that he was awakened by the stoppage of the engines, and then he felt the engines go full astern, and at the same time he heard the watertight door alarm ring.22 He would later state, ‘The stopping of the engines woke me. I got up and dressed immediately the engines stopped. The engines reversed.’ When asked when did the ship stop, he would state, ‘Almost immediately and the electric bells below started ringing, and I dressed and went right up on deck.’23

Quartermaster Rowe was rounding the port side of the poop deck to head back starboard, when he noticed a motion followed by the iceberg, which he said was less than 10ft from the ship – so close that he thought it would strike the overhanging docking bridge. He would say that half a minute after the berg was gone, he went up the stairs to the docking bridge to read the taffrail log and await any orders that may be called to him via the docking bridge phone.

During the inquiries he said that he merely looked at the log and noted that the dial read 260 nautical miles.24 In a letter to author Walter Lord (date unknown, though Lord’s response was dated 1955), Rowe would state that he not only read the log but he pulled in its tow line as well, saying that he did so because the engines were going astern at that time. This would be echoed in a TV appearance in 1956, when Rowe stated that the engines were put full speed astern, so he pulled in the log.

First-class cabin on board Olympic.

First-class cabin on board Olympic.

First-class cabin on board Olympic.

In a 1962 article in the Belfast Telegraph,25 Rowe would be reported as saying:

Looking forward, I saw what I thought was a sailing ship, but as it came along, or as we passed it, I saw it was an iceberg. After the noise of engines racing astern and escaping steam had died down, I [?] down for a bit but after a while saw figures [?] on the aft side of the [?] deck …

Rowe would write in a letter to the Titanic Historical Society’s Edward Kamuda, dated 1963, that he was walking from the starboard side of the poop deck to the port side and, on turning around, there was an odd motion. He would notice the iceberg and then the engines would start reversing, and the vibrations were terrific. He would then say he went to the port side and pulled in the log so it would not be caught in the propellers.

Being that Rowe does not bring up pulling in the log, or the engines being reversed, during any of the inquiries has led to speculation as to how trustworthy this information is. Rowe would say during the inquiries that he did not go to the docking bridge until half a minute after the ship had passed the berg. His 1955 and 1956 accounts, however, appear to make his action of pulling in the log coincide with him seeing the berg, thus also coinciding with the reversal of the engines. His 1963 account clearly makes it sound as if the engines were not reversed until after the iceberg had passed, and his 1955 account could also be perceived as saying such – instead of suggesting the former.

Could it be that Rowe saw the berg, went to the docking bridge to read the log, and while there, sometime afterwards, the engines were reversed, prompting Rowe to pull in the log? If so, this suggests the idea that the reversal of the engines did not take place until after Titanic went beyond the berg.26

First-class passenger Jane Hoyt, in her cabin C-93, would be quoted in the Amsterdam Evening Recorder and the Daily Democrat on 23 April 1912 as noticing a sound that, ‘seemed to indicate that the engines of the ship had reversed’.27 Second-class passenger Kate Buss would recall that she felt what she described as a ‘big ice-skate gliding on ice’ and wondered if the ship had not struck a derelict. She would listen and feel the engines reverse, and note that the ship moved a little, but then it appeared that the engines began working very hard with no results, and that they ‘seemed disabled’.28

Another first-class passenger, May Futrelle, in cabin C-121, would state:

I had fallen into another sleepy spell when I felt a shock and a kind of shiver of the ship. It was so slight that it did not disturb anything but I sat up in bed. I heard the engines pounding below – reversing. For about twenty seconds, I should say, this pounding continued. Then followed another shock, scarcely heavier than the first.29

It is questionable as to whether the passengers would have known the feeling of the engines reversing, though Futrelle’s time is of interest as it is similar to what it is believed Titanic was to take for a one-to-two-point turn, as will be looked at further on.

Futrelle’s recollection of multiple shocks over an extended period of time can also be seen as more evidence in support of Boxhall, for it is known that putting a ship immediately into reverse, having been steaming forward at full speed ahead, would have caused some amount of vibration through the ship. If the engines were put astern, and some amount of time passed between this order and the collision, then this would give the sensation of two distinct shocks or vibrations.

In her cabin A-11, which was below the chart room on the boat deck, immediately in the proximity of where Boxhall was, Edith Rosenbaum would relate having felt three jars, the first two slight, while the third made her reach for her bedpost.30 Miss Elizabeth Allen would tell The New York Times on 19 April that, ‘The first crash came at 11:40 p.m. I am sure of the time.’31 Her cabin was B-5.

Second-class passenger Lawrence Beesley, in cabin D-56, would write:

There came what seemed nothing more than an extra heave of the engines and a more than usually obvious dancing motion of the mattress on which I sat. Nothing more than that – no sound of a crash or of anything else: no sense of shock, no jar that felt like one heavy body meeting another. And presently the same thing repeated with about the same intensity.32

Along with the feeling of multiple shocks there are accounts from survivors as to having felt a shock and having enough time to get from one place to another, while also being able see the berg when they arrived. This is significant, as with Titanic’s speed of around 38ft per second, she shipwould have passed the berg in roughly 23 seconds, with the damage occurring in roughly the first 7 seconds, thus giving people very little time to make it around the ship in order to see the berg once having felt the shock of the collision.

Trimmer Alfred Shiers would relate during the British inquiry how he felt the shock, got up from his bunk, and went underneath the forecastle head and looked out a window. Not seeing anything, he went on the starboard side of the forward well deck, and when looking over the side, noticed the berg ‘on the starboard quarter, off the stern’. However, he would place this sighting as being 4 or 5 minutes after feeling the ‘striking of the berg’.33 If his 4 or 5 minutes is correct, then this should place the berg abaft the ship off the starboard quarter due to Titanic’s route around the berg.

The route to the nearest window Rheims could have looked out of to see the iceberg. (Plans courtesy of Bruce Beveridge)

Shiers would be clearer on this when speaking at the Limitation of Liability hearings, saying that the ship, ‘just seemed to be moving when I looked over the side’. Shiers would agree to a statement he made at Southampton, in which he stated, ‘The ship had almost stopped and the iceberg was just discernible.’ He would say the berg ‘was astern of the ship … About two ships’ length from where I stood.’ He would further acknowledge, ‘In the distance where the berg was I could just see the outline of it.’

Able Seaman Scarrott would claim that once feeling the shock he rushed down to call his mate, and then rushed on deck with all those who had turned out. When he looked over the rail, the berg he believed they had struck was ‘abaft the starboard beam’, ‘not a ship’s length’.34 His ‘not a ship’s length’ also infers that the berg may have been seen abaft the ship off the starboard beam like Shiers, though his comment, ‘Her stern was slewing off the iceberg. Her starboard quarter was going off the icebergs, and the starboard bow was going as if to make a circle round it,’35 makes it sound as if this was during the evasive manoeuvre, though if we take into consideration his shock occurring ‘five or eight minutes’ after the bells then this could not be.

Leading Fireman Charles Hendrickson was asleep in his bunk when the collision occurred, which did not even wake him. His mate T. Ford would wake him instead and Hendrickson would recall, ‘When I got on deck first I saw a lot of ice on the deck, and I looked out and saw an iceberg astern just abaft the engine room.’ Finding it surprising that Hendrickson could make it on deck so quick, his interrogators would note, ‘You came up very quick,’ to which Hendrickson replied, ‘No, I walked up behind the others who were walking up.’36

Bedroom Steward Alfred Crawford, just getting off duty, was on the starboard side of B deck. He would tell the US committee, ‘I heard the crash, and I went out on the outer deck and saw the iceberg floating alongside. I went back, and there were a lot of passengers coming out.’37

Lastly we have first-class passenger George Rheims, who would state in his deposition for the Limitation of Liability hearings that he was coming out of the bathroom on the forward part of A deck when ‘I felt a slight shock, and I turned to see what had happened and in looking to the right I saw through the window something white; it seemed to pass rapidly; of course at that time I did not know what it was; I now suppose it was an iceberg’.38

It should be noted that there was no porthole immediately to the right of the bathroom which Rheims could have looked out of. To the nearest starboard window, he would have had to exit the bathroom, go right down a corridor, turn right again and head aft just a tiny bit past a corner, and then look left down another corridor. Through this window he would also have to peer through the A deck promenade window. The drawing Rheims made of this part of the ship, though not completely accurate, is accurate enough when taking into account that it was drawn quite a while after the tragedy.

Back to Boxhall, he would say during the British Inquiry:

15356. Did the Captain and the First Officer go to the starboard side of the bridge to see if they could see the iceberg?

– Yes.

15357. Did you see it yourself ?

– I was not too sure of seeing it. I had just come out of the light, and my eyes were not accustomed to the darkness.

…

15496. After the collision I understand that you and some other Officers went on the bridge to look at the iceberg. Is that so?

– That is so. Yes.

15497. And you saw the iceberg?

– Well, I was not quite sure of seeing it.

15498. What length of time was this after the collision?

– Only a couple of minutes afterwards.

15499. What distance from you did the iceberg appear to be then?

– I do not think it would be a couple of minutes afterwards. It appeared to me, what I fancy I saw, about a ship’s length away from the ship’s bridge.

15500. Now, you were examined in America in regard to the appearance which the iceberg presented at that distance?

– Yes.

15501. Would you give your impression of it to my Lord?

– Yes, I said I fancied I saw a black mass, a low-lying black mass on the quarter.

15502. Was it difficult to discern what the object was even at that short distance, a ship’s length?

– That is only an approximate distance you understand; it might have been more.

15503. It might have been three ship’s lengths?

– It might have been three ship’s lengths.

15504. Would that be the outside – three ship’s lengths?

– No, I am not sure. You must understand I had just come out of the light into the darkness and my eyes were not accustomed to it.

15505. I also recollect that we have been told in the evidence that after the collision you went astern?

– The engines were going full speed astern for quite a little time.

15506. Did you go forward after that?

– Not that I know of.

15507. So that from the place where the collision occurred you had not moved much up to the time you went on the bridge to look for this iceberg?

– No, I do not think the ship could have gone so very far.

15508. So that you were within a few ships’ lengths of her probably?

– Yes.

15509. Is it your evidence that even at that distance it was very difficult to make out that this was an iceberg – to make out what it was?

– To make out what it was, yes.

15510. Was that on account of the weather conditions or the condition of the atmosphere?

– I think it was due to the conditions that were then prevailing at the time, a calm oily sea.

The Commissioner: It appears to me to be more due to the fact that he had come out of the light room.

15511. (Mr. Scanlan.) Yes, My Lord. (To the witness.) Besides you who else were on the bridge?

– Mr. Murdoch and Captain Smith.

15512. They had not been in the lighted chart room up to that time?

– Not that I know of. Mr. Murdoch and Captain Smith were on the bridge as far as I know when I went there.

15513. Was Mr. Murdoch standing with you while you were observing the iceberg?

– Yes, he pointed at it – like that.

15514. How long were you watching it?

– That I cannot say. It was not very long because I went down below into the passengers’ accommodation.

15515. A couple of minutes?

– I am not going to stick to minutes; I do not know what it was.

From the impression you got as to the difficulty of seeing objects that night, did it occur to you—

The Commissioner: You must not put it in that way; the difficulty was a personal one, it was not due to the night; it was because his eyes were not accustomed to the darkness, coming from the light.

15516. (Mr. Scanlan – To the witness.) Before you took your eyes off this iceberg had you been there a sufficient length of time to accustom your eyes to the difference in light from the chart room to the bridge?

– No, I do not say so; I do not think so.

Boxhall, and the Commissioner of the British inquiry, defends his not being sure of seeing the berg due to having ‘just come out of the light, and my eyes were not accustomed to the darkness’. We know that the bridge would have been dark at night due to the very reason of not hindering the vision of the officer on watch, and Boxhall himself says Murdoch spotted the berg when on the wing bridge and ‘pointed at it’, therefore it is clear that Murdoch’s vision was not impaired. If Boxhall’s eyes were not impaired from anything on the bridge, then they must have still been impaired from having been in the officers’ quarters, or walking along the deck towards the bridge from the officers’ quarters. Though eyes would take time to adjust, this may be suggestive that these events took place in quick succession, which goes against Boxhall seeing the berg ‘only a couple of minutes afterwards’ of the collision.

Any time for eyes adjusting did not seem to hinder Shiers, Scarrott and Hendrickon. All three of these men would come on deck and, unlike Boxhall, would have no problem seeing the berg. Both Scarrott and Shiers place seeing the berg off the starboard side 4–8 minutes after the collision. Scarrott puts the berg not a ship’s length from the berg, while Boxhall places it from 1–3 ship’s lengths.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence that may support the feeling of the engines being reversed is the location survivors give as to where they believed the shock originated from. Lightoller believed the ship lost a propeller blade, though he would say that the sound naturally made him believe that it had come from the forward end.39 Other survivors believed what they felt was the ship losing a propeller, or that something had gone wrong with the engines, both of which acquaint to the belief that something occurred aft and not the feeling as if something occurred forward. These accounts, however, can easily be chalked down to being mere guesses by survivors trying to relate what they felt to something practical.

When the British inquiries asked Lightoller if he could help them ascertain whether the engines were put full astern, Lightoller answered, ‘No, I cannot say I remember feeling the engines going full speed astern.’ Some researchers put this as the proverbial nail in the coffin to Boxhall’s claim of a full astern order as Lightoller was present during Titanic’s sea trials, in which a crash stop was performed, and as such, would have been familiar with the sensation of the ship performing such a manoeuvre. However, Boxhall was also present during these same sea trials, and therefore must have been familiar with how Titanic would have responded. Though not feeling the engines being reversed, Lightoller did claim that once he made his way on deck, 2–3 minutes after feeling the shock, Titanic was only going around 4–6 knots – a 16-knot reduction in only 2–3 minutes.

Third Officer Herbert Pitman, when asked ‘whether the engines were reversed and the ship was permitted to drift, or whether she was kept under her power’ after the collision, would answer, ‘Oh, as far as I heard she went full astern immediately after the collision.’ He would further state, ‘She reversed her engines and went full astern.’ When asked if ‘she reversed her engines, then, and receded from the point of contact’, he would say, ‘She was past it then, I think. We brought the ship to a standstill.’40

Boxhall would make the shock out to be slight, stating that it did not break his step.41 In fact, a mass majority of the testimony points to any jolt felt as being slight with nothing as aggressive as one would believe putting a ship suddenly in reverse would be, though how much any such vibration would be is impossible to say with any amount of certainty.

One could reasonably argue that there should have been more survivors who recalled vibrations likened to the ship being reversed, though one could also argue that if the ship’s collision with the iceberg was slight, what did those aft actually feel? Did some feel the engines being reversed and later contribute it to the iceberg or vice versa? Could the reason why there are so few eyewitness accounts of a full astern order be because those who would have felt it, or saw it, did not survive? It is easy to make arguments in either direction, and though all evidence should be considered, we should be cautious of fitting evidence in either direction.

Shaking would not be the only possible consequence of a crash stop procedure. Such a manoeuvre always poses a risk to the engines. Any concern of what a crash stop order would have done to Titanic’s engines that night was never voiced during the inquiries. As will be seen, Harland & Wolff architect Edward Wilding would testify Olympic’s engines, upon request, were put under such strain to better understand what occurred on board Titanic. It is of no question that in an emergency, any concern of damage to the engines should be of second thought:

Reversing.- When reversing, the throttle should first be closed, and engine then reversed; but when the emergency signal is received (that is, a signal to back full speed when going ahead), the engine should be immediately reversed, even at a risk of breaking something. This signal should never be given from deck unless it is an emergency signal.42

Such a procedure would not be limited to Titanic that night. Captain Stanley Lord of Californian would relate to the US committee, ‘but on seeing the ice, we were so close we had to reverse the engines and put her full speed astern’.43Mount Temple’s Captain James Moore would state to the US committee, when speaking of a mystery schooner, that ‘he blew his foghorn, and we immediately put the helm hard a starboard, and I ordered full speed astern and took the way off the boat’.44 At the British inquiry, Captain Arthur Rostron of the rescue ship Carpathia recalled, ‘Then I saw the light on my starboard side. I saw the light showing. It was getting close. I went full speed astern.’45

Like all ships, Titanic was tested in a crash stop scenario. Wilding stated during the Limitation of Liability hearings that during Titanic’s sea trails, which took place on 2 April 1912, ‘The telegraph showed full speed, but we were not doing that; we were doing about twenty knots. It was fast; it was not slow. The ship was going at twenty knots with the indicator at full speed and the order was given full speed astern.’ When asked what distance it took Titanic to stop, Wilding replied, ‘Rather under half a mile … I mean a nautical mile; about half a land mile.’46

Half of a land mile is 2,640ft, which is less than the 3,038ft of half a nautical mile Lee gave as to how far away the iceberg was when it was spotted. Murdoch was present during Titanic’s sea trials, which can lead to the speculation that Murdoch knew of this distance, and was trying to bring Titanic to a stop before hitting the berg, and perhaps merely turned to port as a precaution in case the ship did not stop in time.

Wilding would also give information of a crash stop done on board Olympic at 18 knots, saying:

The trials that I have were made again off Belfast Lough. Both engines were running at about 60 revolutions, corresponding to a speed of about 18 knots. The helm was left amidships and both engines were reversed. The way was off the ship in about three minutes and 15 seconds from the order to reverse engines being given, and the distance run was just over 3,000 feet. I might mention in that connection that, so far as we on the bridge could see, the engines were not reversed as quickly as we had seen them, and the distance is probably a little on the large side; but that is what we actually observed, and it would be very difficult to put an estimated correction on it.47

These 3.25 minutes are often mentioned with such statements as, ‘Titanic didn’t have 3.25 minutes to avoid the iceberg,’ and though true, this is not an accurate representation of the time. Olympic was going 18 knots, and in 3.25 minutes its speed was reduced to 0 knots, which is a loss of 5.54 knots per minute (18/3.25). Taking this 5.54 and applying it to Titanic