50 Great Myths About Atheism E-Book

Russell Blackford

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Seitenzahl: 530

Beschreibung

Tackling a host of myths and prejudices commonly leveled at atheism, this captivating volume bursts with sparkling, eloquent arguments on every page. The authors rebut claims that range from atheism being just another religion to the alleged atrocities committed in its name. * An accessible yet scholarly commentary on hot-button issues in the debate over religious belief * Teaches critical thinking skills through detailed, rational argument * Objectively considers each myth on its merits * Includes a history of atheism and its advocates, an appendix detailing atheist organizations, and an extensive bibliography * Explains the differences between atheism and related concepts such as agnosticism and naturalism

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright

Acknowledgments

Introduction

What is Atheism?

Why Bother About Myths?

Drawing the Lines

Do These Myths Actually Exist?

How Did We Decide What Myths are Worth Investigating?

Are We Picking Easy Targets?

Have We Defeated Theism?

Chapter 1: What is Atheism?

Myth 1 Atheism is Just Another Type of Religion

Myth 2 But the Courts Recognize Atheism as a Religion

Myth 3 Atheists Believe in God but are in Denial

Myth 4 Atheists are Certain There is No God

Myth 5 Atheists Hate or are Angry with God

Myth 6 Atheism is a Rebellion Against God's Authority

Myth 7 Atheists See No Good in Religion

Myth 8 No Atheist Believes in Anything Supernatural

Myth 9 It Makes No Sense for an Atheist to Practice Any Kind of Religion

Myth 10 Atheists Worship False Gods (Satan, Money, Materialism, etc.)

Chapter 2: Atheist Living

Myth 11 Atheism Robs Life of Meaning and Purpose

Myth 12 Atheism is Depressing

Myth 13 Atheists Have No Sense of Humor

Myth 14 Atheists Don't Appreciate Some of the Greatest Works of Art

Myth 15 There is no Christmas in Atheist Families

Myth 16 Atheists Don't Appreciate the Beauty and Perfection of God's Creation

Myth 17 Atheists Fear Death (More than Others)

Myth 18 Atheists Turn to God When Death is Near

Myth 19 There are no Atheists in Foxholes

Chapter 3: Atheism, Ethics, and the Soul

Myth 20 Without God There is No Morality

Myth 21 Atheists are Moral Relativists

Myth 22 Atheists Don't Give to Charity

Myth 23 Atheists Deny the Sanctity of Human Life

Myth 24 If There is No God We are Soulless Creatures

Chapter 4: Name Calling

Myth 25 Atheists are all Communists, Left-Wing, Liberal…

Myth 26 Atheists Can't be Trusted

Myth 27 Many Atrocities Have Been Committed in the Name of Atheism

Myth 28 Adolf Hitler was an Atheist

Myth 29 Atheists Give a Free Pass to Non-Christian Religions

Chapter 5: Horrible, Strident Atheists

Myth 30 Atheists are Arrogant

Myth 31 Atheists are Intolerant

Myth 32 Atheists Want to Ban Teaching Religion to Children

Myth 33 Atheists Want to Strip People of their Beliefs

Myth 34 Atheists Want to Ban Religion from the Public Square

Myth 35 Atheists Don't Understand Moderate Religion

Myth 36 We Should Fear a “Fundamentalist” or “Militant” Atheism

Myth 37 Atheists are to Blame for Religious Fundamentalism

Chapter 6: Faith and Reason

Myth 38 Atheists Don't Understand the Nature of Faith

Myth 39 Atheism Depends on Faith, Just the Same as Religion

Myth 40 Atheism is Self-refuting, as Rational Argument Presumes the Existence of God

Chapter 7: Religion and Science

Myth 41 There is No Conflict Between Religion and Science

Myth 42 Atheists Confuse Two Forms of Naturalism

Myth 43 Atheism Implies Scientism

Myth 44 Evolutionary Theory is a Form of Atheistic Religion

Myth 45 Albert Einstein Professed a Belief in God

Myth 46 Atheists Can't Explain Miracles

Myth 47 Atheists Can't Explain the Resurrection

Chapter 8: No Future for Atheism?

Myth 48 Atheism is a Bad Bet (Pascal's Wager)

Myth 49 Atheism is Only for an Educated Elite

Myth 50 Atheism is Doomed in a Postsecular Age

Chapter 9: The Rise of Modern Atheism

A Very Short History of Atheism

Beginning Atheism

How Did We Become Secular?

Classic Theistic Arguments

Religion and Science—Conflicting or Compatible?

Conclusion—the Reasonableness of Atheism

International Atheist and Related Organizations

References

Index

This edition first published 2013

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Blackford, Russell, 1954-

50 great myths about atheism / Russell Blackford, Udo Schklenk.— 1 [edition].

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-470-67404-8 (cloth : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-0-470-67405-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Atheism— Miscellanea. I. Title. II. Title: Fifty great myths about atheism.

BL2747.3.B575 2013

211′.8— dc22

2013006626

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover design by Simon Levy, www.simonlevy.co.uk

Acknowledgments

We wish to acknowledge assistance from Ophelia Benson, Jenny Blackford, Robert Brookey, Jerry Coyne, Darragh Hare, Tauriq Moosa, Antonio Marturano, Nikoo Najand, Graham Oppy, Jacques Rousseau, Grania Spingies, Naomi Stekelenburg, and Peter Sy. All offered us their favorite myths about atheism, and some went beyond this with other valued assistance or advice. In particular, Professors Coyne and Oppy gave valued comments on an earlier draft of the chapter entitled “The Rise of Modern Atheism.”

The following Queen's University students provided us with valuable research assistance at different times during this project: Monica Joshi, Geoff Mason, Brendan McCreary, Nikoo Najand, Matthew Pike, and Eamon Quinn.

We also thank the originator of the Jesus and Mo cartoons featured in this volume for his generous permission to use his wonderful art work.

We owe a particular debt of gratitude to our copy-editor Jenny Roberts, whose rigor, skill, and eye for detail saved us from numerous infelicities and errors (we take full responsibility for those that remain).

Last but by no means least, Jeff Dean, our then editor at Wiley-Blackwell, approached us with the idea for this book. In a way it owes its very existence to him.

Introduction

Atheism is responsible for Stalin, Hitler, and Pol Pot's genocides.

Atheists have no values.

Atheism is just another religion.

No doubt you will have heard such statements about atheism and atheists, in this or some closely related form or shape. All of them are false, just like many others. And yet they have managed to persist remarkably well over time.

The attacks on atheism are often driven by strong emotions, perhaps because atheism threatens values associated with religion (at least in the minds of the attackers). Thus atheists receive a barrage of questions such as the following:

Without god, what is left of morality? Without god, what purpose is there in man's life? If we do not believe in god, how can we be certain of anything? If god does not exist, whom can we turn to in a time of crisis? If there is no afterlife, who will reward virtue and punish injustice? Without god, how can we resist the onslaught of atheistic communism? If god does not exist, what becomes of the worth and dignity of each person? Without god, how can man achieve happiness?

(Smith, 1979, p. 6)

There is an old saying about propaganda—probably not a myth (Macdonald, 2007, p. 38)—that a falsehood repeated often enough will eventually be taken as truth. This is, of course, likely to be true if those who propagate such falsehoods also control large segments of the mass media. A good example of this circulated in the United States even as we were writing this book. The myth was created that Barack Obama, the US President no less, was not born in the United States and so was illegitimately president of the country, since only natural-born citizens of the United States may serve in that role. The story was repeated time and again in mass media outlets such as Fox News, by wannabe presidential contenders and others with a vested interest in undermining Obama's presidency. Eventually President Obama was forced, in an act unprecedented in US history, to publish his long birth certificate to prove that he was really born in Hawaii, as he had always said.

At the height of this myth-generating campaign, according to one opinion poll, a majority of registered Republican voters in the South of the country declared a belief either that Mr Obama was not born in the United States (28%) or that they did not know what to believe (30%) (Schlesinger, 2011). Even if you give the 30% the benefit of the doubt, about one in three to four registered Republicans in the South bought into the myth. This tells you something about the power that myths hold over a susceptible public.

What is Atheism?

But what is atheism anyway? That is a fair point to raise, and is not without its share of controversy. We will return to certain aspects in the first batch of myths we examine, but here's an overview of our approach.

Even atheists, and the various organizations they have formed, often argue about what the proper atheistic view should be regarding the existence of gods, including the traditional God of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Some argue that an atheist is simply a person who does not believe in God. Others claim that an atheist must think that there is incontrovertible proof that God does not exist. Some atheists think that there is nothing that they have to prove at all. They insist that those claiming the existence of a particular god, or a set of gods, need to demonstrate the truth of their claims. Then there are humanists, secularists, and agnostics, and others with their own labels.

People may choose their labels, and we don't wish to insist that all people who lack theistic belief self-identify with the label “atheist.” Some claim to be “agnostic” because they say they have suspended judgment on the issue of God, or a god, or a pantheon of gods. They may point out that this fits with the etymology of the word “agnostic”: a denial of gnosis, or knowledge. It is not our desire that they renounce their use of this word, but many of the myths apply to them as much as to others who prefer to call themselves “atheists.”

Religious adherents and apologists often have their own ideas about what they are attacking. For example, Alister McGrath (2004, pp. 174–175) claims that if you include as an atheist anyone who does not believe in the existence of any god then this is too watered down. Indeed, he describes it as a desperate redefinition to build up the appearance of a substantial atheist demographic. We should, however, note that what attracted McGrath to atheism as a young man was what he saw as its proposal to eradicate religion and to change the world in a “totalizing” way (2004, p. 177). A reading of his book The Twilight of Atheism makes it clear that he associates atheism closely with the all-encompassing Marxist-Leninist communism that he embraced in his youth. McGrath's equation of atheism with totalitarianism is exactly one of the myths that we expose and challenge.

Writing over 30 years ago, and not at a time when atheists should have been feeling any desperation of the sort that McGrath mentions, George H. Smith adopted a very broad view of atheism as simply “the absence of religious belief.” According to this approach, any person who does not believe in the existence of any god or gods is literally an atheist (Smith, 1979, p. 7). For the purpose of this book we take a similar approach. Not coincidentally this maps nicely on the ancient Greek origin of the word “atheist”: the Greek atheos means “godless.” The epistemological controversies among those who call themselves atheists, as well as their differences about sensible strategies to achieve their political objectives, are interesting, but they are not the subject matter of this book. Accordingly we will not concern you with the details of these controversies, but do feel free to read up on them (Cimino and Smith, 2007).

If this wide definition bothers you, let us add that we are not primarily interested in, for example, children who have not yet had the opportunity to consider religious questions carefully and come to a conclusion. The myths we discuss are, by and large, aimed at more explicit forms of atheism—the atheism of somebody who is familiar with the idea of a god, but has rejected (or been unable to accept) theistic belief after consideration. We are, in other words, concerned with autonomous, thinking individuals. Of course, there are arguments among moral philosophers about the question of what constitutes a truly autonomous individual, but for the purposes of this book we are addressing people capable of making their own informed choices with regard to whether or not they are atheists or believe in a deity of some kind (Dworkin, 1988).

Credited to Jesus and Mo, www.jesusandmo.net

Why Bother About Myths?

We decided that it might be valuable to investigate popular myths about atheists and atheism to see whether there is something more substantial to them that keeps them alive, other than ignorance or mischief making by those who perpetuate them. Belief in some of these myths has had outright harmful consequences for people known to be or believed to be atheists. Atheists have been persecuted, tortured, and even killed for their rejection of monotheistic or other religious ideologies.

Consider one fairly recent example reported from the USA. Damon Fowler was a student at Bastrop High School in Louisiana. When he discovered that his public school planned to include a prayer as part of its graduation ceremony he contacted the school's superintendent in order to alert him to the fact that the planned prayer would be unconstitutional. He requested that the prayer part of the program be cancelled. The superintendent initially agreed, but then the story leaked. Fowler was ostracized in his community, one of his teachers publicly demeaned him, students and anonymous others threatened to beat him up or even kill him. Your life can be threatened today in the USA just because you insist that your constitutional rights not be trampled upon in a public school (Christina, 2011).

A recent sociological survey from the USA shows that atheists constitute the most disliked among marginalized groups, including African Americans, gay people, Muslims, and recent migrants. In fact, most US Americans define themselves as good people against the other, in this case the other being your friendly neighborhood atheist (Edgell et al., 2006). While the laws are not enforced, it is nonetheless true that in some US states atheists are prohibited from holding elected office, and reportedly no less than 40% of the country's citizens refuse to vote for an atheist (R.M., 2012).

Drawing the Lines

It is difficult to discern clear dividing lines between some of the myths. It is not unusual for several of them to be thrown together in the pot of myths, stirred and—voila!—a new myth is born. For instance, there is a myth that atheists have no moral core: that we are all wreckers, egoists, or the worst kind of nihilists. There are also myths claiming that atheists are more prone to commit all sorts of heinous crimes. Well stirred in the pot, these two myths give birth to the myth that atheists have no moral core and are, for that reason, more likely to end up committing crimes.

As an example, consider the following quote from a sociological survey. One of the study participants went on the record as follows: “I would say…the prisons aren't filled with conservative Republican Christians. The prisons are probably filled with people who don't have any kind of a spiritual or religious core” (Edgell et al. 2006, p. 228). This claim is, in fact, untrue. Such claims are slanders against atheists.

Which leads us to an important point. During the months we have spent working on this book, we have often asked ourselves where to draw the line between a myth and a legitimate disagreement with our own views. We have thought about this carefully in choosing and examining the 50 myths that follow. In each case, we are convinced that something is being claimed that is, if not straightforwardly false, at least seriously and demonstrably misleading. We will try, in each case, to explain why that is.

Even in one or two cases where the myth might be literally true, we identify what we consider misleading, as with the claim that atheists don't recognize the sanctity of human life. Well, perhaps we don't, or many of us don't, but the implicit idea that human life possesses “sanctity” needs to be teased out and challenged, as do the implications of the myth for atheists' moral conduct and our view of our fellow humans. There are good reasons to treat each other with kindness and respect, but does ordinary human morality really need such a grandiose idea as sanctity to do its work? In such cases, we will make clear what we think is misleading, allowing the reader to be the judge. In all cases, we don't expect to confuse our readers about what we consider straightforward factual errors and what are “merely” tendentious, simplistic, unfair claims.

Related to this, we intend to give the various myths as good a run as we can. If there is a grain of truth in a particular myth, or a point that seems to us arguable, we will honestly identify it. We want to encourage more fairness to atheists, but in doing so we intend to be fair ourselves.

Do These Myths Actually Exist?

Now, you might harbor quietly (or even not so quietly) the suspicion that we could be making these myths up, and that nobody is actually foolish enough to hold some of the views we will be examining. In other words, how can you be sure that we are not creating straw men to attack at our leisure? Well, we have gone to some trouble with this. In most cases, we will provide specific examples of what we are talking about. The usual format, with only minor variations for convenience, will involve referencing examples at the beginning of each myth.

No one should leave this book thinking we are attacking imaginary positions.

How Did We Decide What Myths are Worth Investigating?

In many ways the myths chose themselves—they all seem prominent in the arguments and publications of atheism's critics. We also consulted widely, though informally, with our network of contacts, looking to see what myths they had most often encountered.

But there was nothing scientific about this, and we cannot claim that we were able to conduct representative surveys of people's most favored or most widely held myths about atheism and atheists across the globe. In the end, we chose those myths that we have come across most frequently since we became involved in debates about God. We invite readers to send us their favored myths—perhaps we can use them in future editions of this book.

Are We Picking Easy Targets?

We foresee an inevitable criticism of this book, and it is one that is impossible to prove uncontroversially false. Critics will almost certainly argue that we have chosen “easy targets,” that is, we have chosen views or myths that are only held by unreasonable religious people, while ignoring sensible religious views that would have been more difficult to address. It is a variety of the criticism that we have addressed in Myth 35, as well as elsewhere in this book.

One reason why it is difficult to show that this criticism is false is that it resembles people moving the goalposts during a soccer game. Each time we prove a particular myth to be false someone will say, “but you have not shown this—slightly different—variety of the criticism to be wrong, too,” or “but you have not addressed the interpretation put forward by theologian X,” and so on and so forth. It is, of course, impossible to cover every scrap of argument that was ever uttered by a religious apologist, or even every scrap offered by academic religious apologists. There are simply too many of them out there. What we have done is to ensure that leading religious apologists are referenced generously and honestly throughout this book. It is also worth making another point: apologists who might genuinely be academically weak—they shall remain anonymous here—but who are demonstrably culturally very influential in religious circles are considered fair game by us. No doubt some readers will claim that these are the “wrong” apologists, or that they are “weak” apologists, and that others were not cited by us because we were unable to address their compelling arguments, and so on. Our invitation to readers would be to pass these “better” arguments on to us. Perhaps we can cover your favorites in a further book or a future edition of this one. For now, we boldly predict that others will then deem your favorite apologists the “weak” ones.

Have We Defeated Theism?

We should not beat around the bush about this: are we claiming to have defeated theism? No, that would be wishful thinking. We confront many misconceptions about atheism throughout this book, but does atheism logically follow from that? That certainly is not the case. After all, as mentioned earlier, we have not debunked every possible argument put about by religious apologists, so we cannot claim to have proved all theist views of the world wrong, and equally we cannot claim to have proved that atheism is right. What we have done is debunk a fairly significant chunk of popular myths about atheism.

In the long final chapter entitled “The Rise of Modern Atheism,” we go a bit further. This chapter does not claim to defeat theism once and for all, but we allow ourselves to be more opinionated. It should provide a reasonably clear outline of our thinking, while offering readers some useful entry points into the long-standing philosophical debate between theists and atheists. It would take an entire book, or maybe several of them, to present our positive case for rejecting all kinds of religion. Meanwhile, we provide some historical perspective on the rise of atheism, examine why the traditional arguments for the existence of God turned out so inconclusive when philosophers subjected them to scrutiny, and offer some deeper thoughts on the relationship between religion and science. Enough is said, we think, to convey the reasonableness of atheism and suggest the problems with religious alternatives.

Chapter 1

What is Atheism?

Myth 1 Atheism is Just Another Type of Religion

There is a legitimate argument to be had about what it is to call something a religion. Before we go deeper into that question, however, let us begin with someone who thinks that atheism is just another religion. The perfect place to start looking for pretty much anything these days, is—no doubt you expected this—the internet. One blogger has this to say: “I think it's fair to say that atheism is just another religion, given how certain atheists seem to be about their case. When you debate an atheist it is very much like debating a religious person. They are almost fanatical about their stance.”

In case you would rather have it from a more established source, here is a quote from the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Peter Jensen: “Atheism is every bit of a religious commitment as Christianity itself” (Godfrey, 2010). Or try Jamaica's Reverend Earlmont Williams:

At the end of the day, expressing no belief in any god, and holding that to be absolute, is basically placing that non-belief on a pedestal, very much like Christians locate their God on the “highest plain”. In essence, atheism itself is unwittingly given divine status.

(Williams, 2012)

Sometimes the idea appears in a more restricted form. Consider the popular book I Don't Believe in Atheists, by Christopher Hedges (2008), which was issued in a softcover edition with the title When Atheism Becomes Religion: America's New Fundamentalists. Hedges claims throughout that atheism is a kind of religion, though he seems unsure whether this applies to all atheism or only to the views of a small group of high-profile contemporary atheists, among them Sam Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens. At one point, he blames much in the way of modern Western thought for bequeathing us a “godless religion,” naming such historical figures as Descartes, Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Kant, Diderot, Rousseau, and Paine (Hedges, 2008, p. 17). Never mind that the majority of these were, in fact, not atheists at all. More often, his emphasis is on the creation of a surrogate religion by the contemporary atheists whom he most despises (e.g., Hedges, 2008, pp. 17–18).

But what is meant by a “religion”? For something to be a religion, does it have to be a comprehensive worldview, a system of rituals and canons of conduct, or something else? If it was sufficient for a comprehensive worldview to be called a religion, then many detailed ideologies would have to be considered religions. Arguably a religion needs to be based on belief in some kind of entity or force with supernatural powers.

Michael Martin is one thinker who has wrestled with the problem, pointing out that we could understand religion in different ways (Martin, 2007, pp. 217–220). We could understand it in terms of such indicators as belief in supernatural beings, the identification of sacred objects and the practice of rituals involving them, and an associated moral code. Alternatively, we can understand religion in terms of the questions that it asks and answers, such as those about the fundamental characteristics of human beings and nonhuman reality. On the latter approach, any sufficiently comprehensive and integrated worldview—one with metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological components—might count as a religion.

In fact, the concept of religion itself is by no means unproblematic. There does not seem to be an uncontroversial definition for the purposes of scholarly fields such as anthropology, or for the purposes of the law. William James, in his classic discussion of religious experience, doubted that an exact definition was possible (James, 1982 [1902], pp. 26–52). We might question whether what we know as religion is a single phenomenon at all. Frieder Otto Wolf has recently suggested that the concept of religion is “most deeply imbued and tainted by Euro-centrism and naïve assumptions derived from an often unilaterally simplified Christian tradition.” He adds:

It is, indeed, doubtful that there is any meaningful common denominator between the “everyday magical practices” of an indigenous tribe, Judaic obeisance to the commandments of God to be found in the Tora [sic], the practice of Sunni Islam based on the Qur'an, of Sufi mysticism, of Jainism, of Shintoism, or of Buddhism.

(Wolf, 2009, p. 250)

To make matters even more complicated, the oldest societies did not specifically distinguish a religious sphere. In such societies, various spirits and gods were seamlessly continuous with the observed phenomena of nature. Such societies' “religious” beliefs and rituals were tightly interwoven into everyday thought and action, and were not clearly distinguished from nonreligious spheres of activity (Wright, 2009, pp. 17–20).

So is the question, “Just what is a religion?” unanswerable? The concept had better have some content, or scholarly discussions of the phenomenon of religion will lack boundaries; the courts will be unable to decide cases in which they need to work out whether, for example, Scientology is a religion for tax purposes; and claims that atheism is a religion will be simply meaningless. It appears to us that the situation is not hopeless and that some meaning can be given to the “atheism is a religion” claim.

Consider the approach taken by Charles Taylor in his monumental study of the historical secularization of Western societies, A Secular Age. Writing mainly of the Abrahamic traditions, Taylor explains religion in terms of belief in an agency or power that transcends the immanent order—by which he means the operations of the natural world. For Taylor, religion relates to “the beyond,” to an otherworldly order of things, but not in just any way. He posits three specific dimensions. First, religion asserts that there is some higher good or ultimate end beyond ordinary human flourishing. Second, it includes the possibility of personal transformation, to ensure that the higher good is achieved. This, in turn, involves the existence of a transformative and transcendent power. Third, the religious account of our possible transformation involves a sense of human life extending beyond “this life” (Taylor, 2007).

Taylor's analysis is easily applied to Christianity, where the crucial transformation involves salvation through Jesus Christ (however exactly this is explained by different theological systems). Most of the dimensions described by him are also recognizable in the well-known religions of ancient and modern times. Generally, we think, Taylor's key ideas match rather well with ordinary people's understanding of what “a religion” looks like. A religion typically involves an otherworldly order of things and a related dimension to human lives; an ultimate good that transcends worldly kinds of flourishing; the possibility of spiritual transformation, such as the Christian idea of salvation; and the existence of transcendent and transformative powers, such as the Abrahamic God.

Atheism is not a religion on any of these approaches. For example, it is not a comprehensive worldview, a way of life, or a system of rituals and conduct. As we discussed in our Introduction, it is no more than an informed lack of belief in any god(s) or at most a positive belief that no god(s) exist. Atheism is compatible with many views of the world. George H. Smith complains, we think rightly, that atheism is not a “way of life,” a “world outlook,” or a “total view of life,” any more than a failure to believe in magic elves is any of these things. While some philosophical positions are atheistic, atheism in itself does not entail any specific system of thought but can be incorporated into many (Smith, 1979, pp. 21–22).

We sympathize, therefore, when Walter Sinnott-Armstrong writes, “most atheists and agnostics do not make their stance on religion central to their lives in the same way as many evangelical Christians do—and should, in their view.” We also know the feeling when he adds: “Except when I am writing books like this, the only time my thoughts turn to religion or God is when religious people raise such issues, such as by confronting me personally or basing public policies on religion” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009, p. xvii).

Arguably, some religions, such as Theravada Buddhism, are atheistic, in that they do not necessarily posit the existence of gods (see Martin, 2007, pp. 224–227). However, they do involve spiritual transformations and elements that are easily regarded as otherworldly or supernatural. By contrast, atheism as such—an informed lack of belief in any God or gods—contains no such elements. It is possible, therefore, that someone could adhere to a religion such as Theravada Buddhism while being an atheist, but atheism itself is not a religion.

Myth 2 But the Courts Recognize Atheism as a Religion

From time to time the courts have faced the issue of what counts as a religion, or rather, “What, for legal purposes, is a religion?” Like academic scholars, they have struggled to produce an uncontroversial definition. Unsurprisingly, much of the existing case law emphasizes teachings that relate to an otherworldly or supernatural order. On this approach, atheism is not a religion.

Nonetheless, some courts have treated atheism like a religion for certain purposes, and this has led to claims that they consider atheism to be a religion. We will illustrate our take on the issue by means of judgments rendered by the influential United States Supreme Court. One oft-cited case is Torcaso v. Watkins (367 U.S. 48 (1961)), involving Roy Torcaso, an atheist whose post as a notary public in Maryland had been revoked because of his refusal to declare a belief in God. Here it was held that the state of Maryland could not require a declaration of belief in God for a person to be able to hold public office. The court reasoned that such a requirement was contrary to the Establishment Clause in the US Constitution, which forbids the government from establishing a religion. For the purposes of American constitutional law, forbidden government action in breach of the Establishment Clause includes any requirement that advantages the religious against the nonreligious, as was clearly done by Maryland's requirement of belief in God for anyone wishing to become a notary public.

In a footnote, Justice Black listed “Secular Humanism” among “religions” that do not teach the existence of God. However, secular humanism, at least in some of its forms, is a far more comprehensive belief system than mere atheism. Even if secular humanism were a religion, it would not entail the same about atheism. Furthermore, Justice Black's comment was not part of his reasoning necessary for deciding the case, and is thus regarded as obiter dicta, rather than as law binding on lower courts (this is noted by Cherry and Matsumura, 1998/9). The important point is that the court did not rule that Mr Torcaso's atheism was itself a religion.

Years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled explicitly in the case of Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District (37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994)), that “evolutionism” and “secular humanism” are not religions for the purposes of the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, Mr Peloza, a high school biology teacher, was unable to demonstrate that he was required to teach a religion when his duties required that he teach evolutionary biology to his students. The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in this case, which thus stands as good law in the United States.

Nonetheless, there are cases (see Davis, 2005) in which atheism has been given some of the same legal protection as religion, and this might even be construed as treating atheism as a religion—at least for certain purposes. One such case is Kaufman v. McCaughtry (419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005)), which involved the rights of an inmate, James Kaufman, within the Wisconsin prison system.

Mr Kaufman invoked the courts to pursue a number of grievances about his treatment by prison officials. One of these was that his First Amendment rights were violated by a refusal to allow him to form a study group for atheist inmates. He intended that the group would study such matters as religious doctrines and practices, apparently from an atheistic perspective. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld his claim in this regard, and was thus prepared to treat Kaufman's atheistic view of the world as his religion for the relevant purpose. He was allowed to exercise his “religion” in the sense of forming and conducting the study group.

Such cases suggest that the current myth is at least partly true. For some purposes, in some situations, the US courts will give nonreligious viewpoints the same protection as religious ones. In that limited sense, they may treat even atheism as a religion. It does not follow, however, that the US courts are foolish enough to treat nonbelief as another form of belief. Consider Wallace v. Jaffree (472 U.S. 38 (1985)). This case involved a one-minute period of silence in public schools for prayer or meditation. The court made clear that the constitution requires not only equal treatment between different kinds of religious belief, but also equal treatment between belief and nonbelief. It clearly distinguished the right to choose any religious faith, Christian or otherwise, from the right to choose no faith at all (472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985)).

The same ideas can be found in other Supreme Court cases, such as Engel v. Vitale (370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962)) and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter (492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989)). A more recent case was McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union (545 U.S. 844 (2005)), which involved official displays of the Ten Commandments. Throughout this developing body of jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has been clear that the First Amendment rules out any favoring of religion over irreligion, as well as any favoring of one religion over another. Irreligion is not thought of here as just another form of religion, even though it receives constitutional protection.

In short, the US courts treat nonbelief with the same protection that they give to belief, at least where relevant. It does not follow, however, that atheism is a religion for legal purposes, even in the United States. Indeed, it would normally fall under the concept of “irreligion”—something that is not to be subordinated to “religion.” In any event, whatever the stance of the American courts it does not follow that the courts of other countries will take the same approach.

Once again, the crucial conceptual point we wish to make is this: a lack of belief is not simply the same as a form of belief. Atheism requires no more than a lack of belief in any God or gods, and this distinguishes it from typical religions, with their rich creeds, doctrines, rituals, and other practices.

Myth 3 Atheists Believe in God but are in Denial

This claim overlaps to some extent with the myth that atheists hate God, because in order to hate God you also need to believe that God exists. We must be careful here with regard to what we take this myth to mean. If we take it to mean that there are self-professed atheists (people who claim to be atheists) who secretly believe in a god, then it is plausible enough, if trivial. Surely there will be people out there who claim to be atheists when really they believe in a god of a kind, just as there have been Christian ministers who were actually atheists. Most historically prominent of the latter, perhaps, was the seventeenth-century cleric Jean Meslier (see Meslier, 2009 [1729]). For more modern examples, consult the stories of Dan Barker (2008) and John W. Loftus (2012a).

Michael Martin (1996) evaluates, and argues against, a strong version of the myth, namely the claim that no atheists exist (a proposition put forward in Van Til, 1969). As Martin points out, even if some phenomenon, such as morality or the efficacy of logic, could only be explained on a theistic basis it would not follow that atheists actually believe in the existence of God.

Some Christian apologists have speculated about what might motivate professed atheists to be not really atheistic in their worldviews. One good example is a YouTube video that you should be able to access on the internet if you feel so inclined. The narrator aims to demonstrate that we all really believe in God, but that atheists remain in denial for their own nefarious purposes (Lawley, 2009).

Dinesh D'Souza's book What's So Great About Christianity provides us with an example as good as any of a high-handed approach by a Christian apologist with pretensions to moral expertise. D'Souza claims that atheism's appeal is being able to escape from moral requirements, since atheists do not believe in Hell or divine judgment (D'Souza, 2007, pp. 268–270). This might, in turn, motivate some of us to deny what is supposedly obvious, namely the existence of God. Ironically enough, D'Souza has himself been in some disgrace among many of his conservative Christian colleagues over his own apparent lapses from a strict Christian sexual morality. This led to his resignation as President of The King's College in New York in October 2012. So it goes.

But why should fear of an afterlife lead to atheism? There are also theistic positions that reject the idea of divine judgment and particularly that of Hell. Why not be motivated to adopt one of those positions, especially if the existence of God is so obvious? If belief were simply volitional—if we could decide at will what to believe, and could adopt whatever beliefs seemed “nicest” or most convenient—we would probably move to some kind of liberal religious position that teaches a doctrine of universal salvation. On such an account, everyone ends up in Heaven, with sins forgiven by a loving God. Compared to this, atheism would surely come a distant second.

The fact is, however, that atheists have many other reasons to reject religious claims. Some atheists do indeed reject many moral strictures that have been favored by Christian churches, but this is usually based on the perception that the strictures lack rational justification.

In his 2007 encyclical letter Spe Salvi, Pope Benedict XVI acknowledges a distinctively moral element in modern atheism:

The atheism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is—in its origins and aims—a type of moralism: a protest against the injustices of the world and of world history. A world marked by so much injustice, innocent suffering, and cynicism of power cannot be the work of a good God. A God with responsibility for such a world would not be a just God, much less a good God. It is for the sake of morality that this God has to be contested.

(Benedict, 2007)

D'Souza, too, acknowledges that one factor motivating atheism is incomprehension at the suffering and other evils in the world, which cannot be reconciled in any straightforward way with the existence of a benevolent and all-powerful deity (D'Souza, 2007, pp. 271–276). Atheists do, of course, deny many religious claims—for example, Aikin and Talisse offer a long list of claims that atheists reject (Aikin and Talisse, 2011, pp. 48–49)—but that does not mean that we are in denial.

One way of making the claim in this myth is to suggest that belief in God is biologically determined or neurologically based. The grain of truth here may be that there are aspects of human psychology that lead us to attribute agency to inanimate things, and this may feed into religion (e.g., Guthrie, 2007, pp. 291–296). However, even if there are aspects of human psychology that incline toward belief in gods, they cannot be determinative. That should not be surprising, since we are quite capable of understanding that inanimate things are not actually animate. The notion that some aspect of our psychology makes theism inevitable becomes implausible when we consider the sheer number of atheists in the world—surely they are not all “really” theists! According to Phil Zuckerman, conservative estimates are that there exist between 500 million to 750 million atheists worldwide (Zuckerman, 2007).

Traditional religious institutions have experienced significant declines in both membership and church attendance. For instance, in Britain a decline in the rate of affiliation with traditional religious institutions has not been countered by a rising rate of membership in nontraditional institutions (Bruce, 2001), and 50 years of polling reveals that an actual decline in religious beliefs shadows the drop in participation.

A 2011 survey shows seemingly contradictory results. When asked in a survey “What is your religion?” 61% of people in England and Wales ticked a religious box (53.48% Christian and 7.22% Other), while 39% ticked “No religion.” One could easily interpret this as indicative of Britain remaining a predominantly religious country. However, the same survey asked this follow-up question: “Are you religious?” Only 29% of the same people surveyed said “yes,” while 65% answered “no.” Much hinges, then, on how one interprets religious identification, when those who identify with a religion indicate in a strong majority that they do not consider themselves religious (British Humanist Association, 2011).

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In line with these findings, Georges Rey and Adele Mercier have argued that most so-called theists in the West, at some level, do not really believe in God (Rey, 2007; Mercier, 2009). They claim that anyone who has been exposed to a typical Anglo-European secondary school education will hold a quasi-atheist position. This is one in which an individual may express religious beliefs, but is actually self-deceived. At some psychological level, that is, such individuals do not regard their religious beliefs as true. Even if Rey and Mercier have overstated the case, the theism of many self-declared believers does not go as deep as critics of atheism like to think it does.

Many of us do not believe in the existence of any being that resembles the Abrahamic God or the polytheistic gods of, say, Greek and Norse mythology. We see no good evidence that such beings exist, or that any other beings that could be called “gods” are more than fictional characters. On the contrary, we think that the evidence points the other way. Why not take our word for this? If most or all atheists really believed in God, one might question whether it was a good investment of time by so many prominent theists from St Anselm and St Thomas Aquinas to Leibniz, and through to the present day, to engage in a time-consuming and futile quest to prove God's existence.

Myth 4 Atheists are Certain There is No God

We wonder whether the myth of the dogmatically confident atheist is a deliberate attempt by religious apologists to suggest that atheists are somehow overreaching in their claims. This allegedly dogmatic stance can then be juxtaposed with a liberal, kind-hearted, less-oppressive-than-usual religion.

Eric Reitan, for instance, claims that the form of religion which he advocates is based on hope—a hope that there is a good, transcendent being who somehow redeems all the horrors of the world. He acknowledges that religious groups throughout history have, in fact, claimed certainty: they have “attempted to preserve the illusion of certainty by remorselessly persecuting every ‘heretic’ whose differing beliefs might threaten that illusion.” Nonetheless, he reports that most of the religious people he knows accept that they do not possess knowledge, but only hope, and that their beliefs are not beyond dispute (Reitan, 2009, p. 211). By contrast, so he asserts, it is atheists, or at least some of them, who claim certainty (Reitan, 2009, pp. 211–212). This certainty is of concern, epistemologically, because atheists are unable to prove, logically or otherwise, that the God of major monotheistic religions does not actually exist.

What should we make of this argument? First, it should be conceded in fairness that not all religions have been persecutory, though the Abrahamic monotheisms have been more so than most (e.g. Blackford, 2012, pp. 20–33). We should also take note of Reitan's suggestion that human beings have a hunger for certainty, something that is useful in practical situations (such as knowing whether there are rabid wolves in the forest). He adds that this relates poorly to issues concerning the ultimate nature of the universe (Reitan, 2009, p. 211). That may well be so, but it does not detract from the fact that many religious organizations and leaders have historically claimed certainty about such things to the point of imposing their beliefs and canons of conduct through exercises of violence and power. If you are doubtful about this claim, consider Karlheinz Deschner's magisterial study Kriminalgeschichte des Christentums. Deschner, a German historian, dedicated his nine-volume magnum opus to writing the criminal history of Christian churches (Deschner, 1986–2008).

The suggestion that religion is open to uncertainty, while atheism is the opposite, distorts humanity's historical experience with both.

Perhaps we need harp no further on the dogmatism that is often shown by religious believers and their leaders—but what about atheists? Given the minimalistic definition adopted for the purposes of this book, atheists are simply people who lack belief in any god or gods. We atheists need not even make a positive claim that no gods exist, let alone that our claim is objectively justified in some way. Some atheists do make a stronger claim: they claim that no gods exist and that this is a conclusion sufficiently supported by argument and evidence to count as knowledge. Even that, however, is not the same as a claim to certainty—that is, a belief that is, or should be, held without doubt. The nature of scientific, naturalistic inquiry precludes any such certainty. Falsification still reigns supreme, and scientific findings are always regarded as provisional.

Even where an atheist claims knowledge, that is no more than a claim that a certain belief is justified and true (and, perhaps, that it tracks the evidence in an appropriate way), not that it is established beyond all doubt. Atheism is not based on a claim to certainty, and there are actually very few things about which we can be certain. Nonetheless, there are many things that we can be confident about: for example, very few living people believe in the existence of Zeus; most of us are quite confident that he does not exist, even though there is no absolute certainty of it. We can also be confident about many well-established scientific findings, such as the basics of evolutionary theory and the heliocentric picture of the solar system.

A qualification that should be added here, however, is that some particular conceptions of God may turn out to be self-contradictory or otherwise too vague or incoherent to be true. Where that can be demonstrated to be the case to the satisfaction of a particular atheist, he or she may, indeed, feel certain that this particular god does not exist. But that can apply to any set of claims that is vague, incoherent, or just plain internally inconsistent.

While atheists do not generally claim certainty with regard to the (non)existence of gods or God, some atheists are clearly pretty confident and forthright, and may even be sure of their positions beyond any kind of doubt that they consider reasonable. But even this does not make them dangerous in the way that Reitan suggests when he discusses the work of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. It is worth dwelling on Reitan's accusation for a moment to see just how far the myth about atheism and certainty can be taken: “And in a different world, under different conditions, the false certainty that fuels the rabid atheism of Dawkins and Hitchens and Harris might have inspired a crusade against religion far more bloody than the crusade of words they now pursue” (Reitan, 2009, p. 212).

The rhetoric here is both unfair and irresponsible. There is neither a historical case nor current-day evidence to support this sort of excited hand-waving. Reitan insinuates a relationship between his targets (“Dawkins and Hitchens and Harris”) and such ideas as disease (“rabid”), violence, and fanaticism. Never mind, that these people have never called for persecution of religion or the imposition of their own views on the world. By means of a metaphor of religious warfare (“crusade”), Reitan suggests that forthright, confident criticism of religion is akin to the acts of invasion and slaughter Christianity has become notorious for (Riley-Smith, 1999). This is not merely the inadvertent use of lazy metaphors. Rather, Reitan piles on this language, suggesting on the same page that Hitchens's book God is Not Great is drenched in “aggressive self-righteousness,” and that this is caused by the aforementioned false certainty, which also leads to “battle lines being drawn,” “joyous delight in stomping all over what others find sacred,” “grinding” others' reverent feelings “underfoot,” and such overt acts as the destruction of Afghanistan's giant Buddha statues by the Taliban (Reitan, 2009, p. 212).

As a matter of fact, neither Dawkins nor Hitchens nor Harris has recommended any actual stomping, grinding, or destruction of statues. But the impression is created that they are driven by a false certainty which motivates them to behave with Talibanesque fanaticism. All these particular atheists have done is set out their arguments in books, speeches, and the like, doubtless wording them in trenchant, sometimes humorous, ways, but never resorting to force or proposing the use of force. Whatever iconoclasm they have displayed has been metaphorical. There is no evidence to conclude that certain atheists are particularly radical or prone to incite violence. Generally, we are peaceful people, and most of us are painfully aware of our own epistemic limitations.

Myth 5 Atheists Hate or are Angry with God

This common myth appears in a news story by Miles Godfrey, covering a number of attacks on atheism by church leaders in Australia. Here, the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Peter Jensen, has this to say on the supposed atheistic hatred of God: “as we can see by the sheer passion and virulence of the atheist—they seem to hate the Christian God.” He then elaborates his views in even stronger terms: atheism, he says:

represents the latest version of the human assault on God, born out of resentment that we do not in fact rule the world and that God calls on us to submit our lives to him…. It is a form of idolatry in which we worship ourselves.

(Godfrey, 2010)

Well, do atheists hate, or are we angry with, God?

Let us start with a pretty obvious point: atheists cannot be angry with God, and we cannot even resent God, as Archbishop Jensen claims we do, because we do not believe God actually exists. How could you hate or resent something you do not think exists? That would be a pretty pointless activity. The claim that we are angry with God can be seen as wishful thinking.

It might suit Jensen and like-minded religious figureheads if we were not sincere or serious in our view that God does not exist. Robert T. Lee is one critic of atheists who makes this quite explicit. He argues that atheists “think since they deny the existence of God, they cannot hate Him. But it's really the other way around: they know He exists, that's why they hate Him” (Lee, 2004). It goes without saying, perhaps, that this kind of logic is question-begging. From an atheistic viewpoint, the various gods worshiped by Christians and others are essentially fictional or mythological characters. Why hate them?

Of course, that does not prevent atheists from viewing the Abrahamic God, as depicted for example in various books of the Bible, as a most unattractive character. It is easy to see this being as loving vengeance and warfare, as being prurient in its obsession with matters of sex, and as especially repulsive in its demands for endless praise and worship, and in its requirement of blood sacrifice before forgiving sins. For that reason, many atheists are glad not to live in a world that contains this being. Such a world is clearly not the same as one created and ruled by a truly benevolent deity. Unfortunately, we appear not to be living in that world either.

Thus there is a religious cottage industry devoted to explaining (away) the evil that exists in our world despite the presence of a benevolent God, who supposedly created it. Theologians call this the theodicy problem (often referred to as the Problem of Evil). How can it be that there is so much evil existing in a world they believe has been created by an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent deity? The obvious answer is that there simply is no such deity.

Atheists tend to find the religious answers to such questions contrived or unsatisfying. That is not, however, the same as hating an actual being—God. Nor do atheists tend to hate historical or legendary figures, such as Jesus, any more than other such figures about whom little is known with certainty. Some atheists are critical of the moral character of Jesus as depicted in the traditionally accepted Gospels (e.g., Tooley, 2009), but that should not be confused with hatred.

More generally, there is a tendency for religious apologists to blur the distinction between harsh criticism and expressions of hatred. For example, Alister McGrath comments, not exactly in a charitable spirit, on Richard Dawkins: “Dawkins preaches to his god-hating choirs, who are clearly expected to relish his rhetorical salvoes, and raise their hands in adulation” (McGrath and Collicutt McGrath, 2007, p. x). Similarly, Patrick Madrid and Kenneth Hensley write, referring to atheists, “They hate the idea of God, and thus, they hate the idea that some people would believe in Him” (Madrid and Hensley, 2010, p.12). A recent article by Alvin Plantinga provides a rather worrying example:

As everyone knows, there has been a recent spate of books attacking Christian belief and religion in general. Some of these books are little more than screeds, long on vituperation but short on reasoning, long on name-calling but short on competence, long on righteous indignation but short on good sense; for the most part they are driven by hatred rather than logic.

(Plantinga, 2008)

What is disconcerting here is that many such accusations of “hatred” do not even specify hatred of a supernatural (or imaginary) being. This kind of language is problematic, because it is only a small step away from characterizing your opponents as motivated by hatred to calling for their speech to be suppressed and for stigmatizing them as enemies of the social order. Indeed, this is the objective of a long-running campaign fought vigorously by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This organization has campaigned for the recognition by the United Nations Human Rights Council that the defamation of religion constitutes a human rights violation. Had the Islamic countries in the Council succeeded with what in effect would have justified censorship of criticism of religion in the name of human rights, countries such as Pakistan with its draconian blasphemy laws could have legitimately claimed that their laws are human rights-compliant (Reuters, 2011). Though the campaign seemed to falter in 2011, it revives with each new controversy involving “blasphemous” acts.

Interestingly, and not surprisingly perhaps, surveys suggest that religious believers are often angry with the God they believe in. A study undertaken by Julie Exline and colleagues found that between one-third and two-thirds of religious people surveyed in the USA conceded being angry with their respective gods. The reason most frequently mentioned is that they feel let down by God, usually in the aftermath of a major health scare or other personal tragedy that he did not prevent (Exline et al., 2011).

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It is perhaps worth noting that even if atheists really were angry with God that would tell us nothing with regard to the question of whether or not atheism is true or false. This myth really is a curiously ad hominem kind of argument.

Myth 6 Atheism is a Rebellion Against God's Authority

As George H. Smith mentions, atheists are often accused of being in some sort of neurotic rebellion, especially if the atheist concerned is young. Smith notes, however, that atheists cannot win once this approach is taken—a middle-aged atheist can be accused of such things as “the frustration of daily routine, the bitterness of failure, or…alienation from oneself and one's fellow man.” If the atheist is old, the accusation can relate to “the disillusionment, cynicism and loneliness that sometimes accompany one's later years” (Smith, 1979, p. 24). All of this is question-begging since neither youth nor old age is evidence of any kind of neurotic response to the God question. Speculations about states of mind get us nowhere.