Beyond Crisis E-Book

Gill G. Ringland

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 379

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Beschreibung

"If you want to know how countries, companies and individuals can master the winds and the waves that will dominate the next decade, this is the book for you."
—Rupert Pennant-Rea, former editor of the Economist, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England

"'If leading your organisation sometimes feels like changing the front wheel of a bicycle whilst toy are still pedalling it as fast as you can, this is a book you should read."
—Sir David Brown, former Chairman, Motorola UK

"Beyond Crisis is full of compelling reasons, clear advice and practical models to help almost any enterprise remain viable beyond the deeply unsettling systemic failures that characterise today's business environment."
—Professor Richard David Hames, Dhurakilpundit University, Founding Director Asian Foresight Institute

"We are in uncharted territory. There are few people who any longer think that the world post-crisis will be anything like the world before. Ringland, Sparrow & Lusting provide a clear description of the way that leaders need to think in this new reality. In doing so, they give us hope."
—Estelle Clark, Business Assurance Director, Lloyds Register

The next decade will present organisational challenges on an unprecedented scale.

Beyond Crisis shows how you can build a 'purposefully self-renewing organisation' which will survive and succeed in the midst of this chaos. The book shows how financial and economic crisis has blighted organisations in every sector, and then provide a range of tools and future scenarios for diagnosing problems and creating solutions.

This is a welcome dose of clarity in uncertain times.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Praise

Title Page

Copyright Page

Preface: Why You Should Read this Book

What’s our authority to do this? Why listen to us?

Acknowledgments

Introduction

How will the world be different over the next decades?

Organisations in a challenging world

A Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation

How is all of this to be put in place?

Part I - What Happened?

Chapter 1 - A Short History of the Crisis

The roots of the financial crisis

The role of the financial sector

Personal, corporate and government debt

Chapter 2 - The New Operating Environment

Demographics

Economic development and social interactions

Communications, science and technology

Resource and other systemic challenges

Chapter 3 - What Lies Ahead?

The short term

The medium term

Longer-term scenarios

Part II - What Organisations Can Do

Chapter 4 - Organisational Design

Aligned to the previous environment

Dealing with the next decades

Successful organisations in very challenging environments

Chapter 5 - Renewal

Measuring renewal

Firms’ self-perceived weaknesses

Hurdles to innovation

Foxes and Hedgehogs: their roles in renewal

The double-cone: a framework for Foxes and Hedgehogs

Chapter 6 - The Importance of Purpose

Clarity of purpose

Senior management and the Board

Leadership

Competence

Setting a purpose

Chapter 7 - Five Qualities for Renewal

The journey and destination

Values

Narrative

Insight

Generating Options

Machinery

Chapter 8 - The Structure of Renewal

Organisational change

Linking the Three Ring Circus

Chapter 9 - Managing Renewal

Getting going

Evolution of a PS-RO

Managing a PS-RO system

What about the workers?

The diagnostic tool

Part III - A Toolkit for Purposeful Renewal

Chapter 10 - Values

Core Values

The origins of Values

Aligning your Values with a PS-RO

Unlocking extraordinary competence

Measuring behaviours

Legacy

Chapter 11 - Insight

Scenarios as a source of Insight

Relationship of Insight to the other PS-RO qualities

Methods for developing Insight

Horizon scanning

Forecasting as part of Insight

The scenario process

Describing the organisation

Audit of exposure to risks

Practical aspects of gathering Insight

Quantifying scenarios

Insight and the Three Ring Circus

Chapter 12 - Generating Options

The Options journey

Innovation

Changing the portfolio

Chapter 13 - Narrative

What is a Narrative?

The individual Narrative

The organisational Narrative

Developing organisational Narrative

Chapter 14 - Machinery

Renewal

The formal planning system: the role of the Three Ring Circus

Five interlocking parts in the Machinery

The ‘95’ organisation

The ‘99’ organisation

Groups

Conclusion: A Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation

Endnotes

Index

“Beyond Crisis is the new bible for managers wanting to make sense of the changing force fields within and without our organizations.”

Bill Liao, Co-Founder of XING.com and Founder ofWeForest.com

“In Beyond Crises, Gill Ringland, Oliver Sparrow and Patricia Lustig have given us a simple and powerful look at the kind of organizations that will thrive in the ‘new normal’.”

Chris Worley, Center for Effective Organizations,Pepperdine University

“A real wake up call. The real world and the financial world are in flux. Organisations and their managements must be self-renewing, alert, adaptable and ready to prosper in the new circumstances and uncertainties.”

John Grout, Policy and Technical Director, TheAssociation of Corporate Treasurers

“If you want to know how countries, companies and individuals can master the winds and the waves that will dominate the next decade, this is the book for you.”

Rupert Pennant-Rea, former editor of the Economist,Deputy Governor of the Bank of England

“If leading your organisation sometimes feels like changing the front wheel of a bicycle whilst you are still pedalling it as fast as you can, this is a book you should read.”

Sir David Brown, former Chairman, Motorola UK

“Beyond Crisis is full of compelling reasons, clear advice and practical models to help almost any enterprise remain viable beyond the deeply unsettling systemic failures that characterise today’s business environment.”

Professor Richard David Hames, Dhurakij PunditUniversity, Founding Director Asian Foresight Institute

“We are in uncharted territory. There are few people who any longer think that the world post-crisis will be anything like the world before. Ringland, Sparrow and Lustig provide a clear description of the way that leaders need to think in this new reality. In doing so, they give us hope.”

Estelle Clark, Business Assurance Director, Lloyd’s Register

“This book really gets to the heart of how to turn crises to your advantage. In this next decade organisations must face and overcome new challenges and if you read this book then you will see a clear path to take to emerge as a winner.”

Peter Blampied, Country Manager, Navigon AG

“The authors’ deep and broad experience is transformed into essential material for companies wishing to face today’s challenges of volatility, unpredictability, complexity and accelerating change. Here is a book which every leader must not only read, but also buy for everyone on the management team.”

Prabhu Guptara, Distinguished Professor of GlobalBusiness, Management and Public Policy, William CareyUniversity, India, and Executive Director, OrganisationDevelopment, Wolfsberg, Switzerland

This edition first published in 2010

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ringland, Gill.

Beyond crisis : achieving renewal in a turbulent world / Gill Ringland, Patricia Lustig and Oliver Sparrow.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

eISBN : 978-0-470-66189-5

1. Financial crises — United States. 2. Finance — Government policy — United States. 3. Bank failures-United States. 4. Intervention (Federal government)-United States. I. Lustig, Patricia. II. Sparrow, Oliver. III. Title.

HB3722.R56 2010

658.4’01-dc22

2009054376

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.5/15 Monotype Janson by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited

Preface: Why You Should Read this Book

It is a universally acknowledged fact that the financial crisis of 2006-2009 highlighted massive faults in the banking and credit systems and precipitated a rapid slide into panic and a grudging bailing out at governmental level. In the ensuing months many political and economic experts voiced different views of why the monetary systems went wrong, and how they may be better arranged in the future. Some observers have taken the discussion further and looked at the implications for major organisations from the position of the bottom line.

But we believe the days when you could expect ‘Business as Usual’ are gone for good; organisations must now adapt and change or they will fail. They have become toxic; people, at all levels, are unsure about what to do, what the rules are, what’s expected of them and of the organisation. Staff have become increasingly risk averse and lack confidence. We have devised the antidote to toxic organisations, and have designed a blueprint for success in the twenty-first century.

What’s our authority to do this? Why listen to us?

Between us we have over 100 years of experience working as senior managers in multinationals, and as consultants to major corporates, governmental departments and third-sector organisations. Our expertise, in common with our colleagues in SAMI Consulting, is futures, strategy planning, organisational change and development; we work constantly with uncertainty. That said, we are pragmatic - we want to know what works and why. We’ve worked with hundreds of organisations across the world, enabling them, by applying aspects of what is now included in this book, to become more effective and successful. You will see that we use many examples and case studies; most of them come from our direct experience.

There’s no question that, in order to change successfully, you need to be clear where you have come from and why. For some time now, we have been analysing what has been happening in organisations over the last decades. The financial crash of 2006- 2009 provided the spur for us to co-ordinate our analysis and our thinking, and formalise our ideas for a successful twenty-first-century organisation.

In this book we lay out the hugely complicated situation which is the current operating environment for many organisations and make sense of it. We help you to recognise not only the patterns which are now emerging globally, but also your place - and your organisation’s place - within them.

We have identified what the organisation of the future needs to be like. We believe organisations will need to follow the Darwinian imperative and evolve. We’ve called this evolving organisation the Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation or PS-RO.

It is a relatively simple remedy; but it requires senior managers to accept that they will need to continually take stock of the environment in which they find themselves and adapt and respond to what they find; they will need to be continually renewing. This evolution will require them to identify and adapt their best ‘genes’: procedures, processes, thinking, innovation and creativity. They will also need to reject ‘bad’ genes. The good news is that it is not costly to build a Purposeful, Self-Renewing Organisation. However, it does take time to analyse what is needed, and it takes a different style of leadership to make use of the structure that results from this. It requires training, chiefly for doing tasks which nobody undertook before.

In this book we demonstrate HOW the future organisation will work and WHY this will be successful. We hasten to add that we recognise every organisation is different and that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. But we do know that to be successful, a PS-RO will need to have five qualities: Values, Insight, Options, Narrative and Machinery. To that end, we supply a toolkit which provides you with the necessary tools to create your own PS-RO.

We believe that the future need not be overwhelmingly daunting; ‘getting the job done’ can be challenging, stimulating, inspiring, rewarding and enjoyable. PS-RO staff are respected and responsible, informed and insightful, exhibiting qualities of confidence and leadership that lead to long-term success - and, crucially, profitability.

Finally, to create your own PS-RO we do not ask you to establish planning groups or other cost centres because we believe that the wisdom of the organisation must be tapped directly. What are needed are long, purposeful conversations, backed by insight into which everyone with something to say has their voice. Then you will see renewal: establishing clarity, hunting out useful ideas and capabilities, creating options for the future and exploiting new abilities for the present. As you can see, this goes beyond traditional strategic planning; what we envision is the desire - and the will - to create an environment which encourages and enables a whole organisation to take charge of its destiny.

We hope that you enjoy reading Beyond Crisis.

Patricia Lustig [email protected]

Gill Ringland [email protected]

Oliver Sparrow [email protected]

Acknowledgements

First we have to thank our families for putting up with the gestation of this book, as we neglected them and most other things during various stages of writing and as a final disruption moved editorial meetings around our houses.

The ideas in this book have, as the Preface makes clear, been developed over a number of years. This has involved discussion with a number of SAMI colleagues: Mike Atack, Andrew Black, Adrian Davies, Cathy Dunn, Colin Fletcher, Ilaria Frau-Hipps, Jane Langford, Lynda McGill, Michael Owen, David Pearce, Andreas Priestland, Nic Pulford, John Reynolds, Gordon Ringland, Richard Walsh and Molly van der Weij.

We were encouraged as we developed the ideas into a book by comments and positive encouragement from many people - Sir David Brown, Jeremy Brown, Estelle Clark, Louis Cooper, Miles Cowdry, John Grout, Prabhu Guptara, Richard David Hames, Gwyn Jones, Bruce Lloyd, Laura Mazur, Martin O’Donovan, Bernado Sichel, Martin Thomas and Chris Worley. Some of these have kindly let their names and comments be used on the cover.

Nic Pulford provided technical support as we wrestled with the text, endnotes and figures, and Lynda McGill provided a logical brain, a sounding board and editing skills to vastly improve the manuscript. Oliver Sparrow produced the figures from the amateurish input of his co-authors.

Ellen Hallsworth at John Wiley provided guidance on early versions of the book and provided skilful editorial advice throughout, and Nick Mannion of John Wiley patiently iterated with us to arrive at the cover you see today.

Introduction

The uncertainty of the future offers us some near-certainties. Life in large organisations will become ever more complex, time and resource constrained. Competition will be more intense, and scrutiny will be unrelenting. At the same time, the world has seen a financial crisis and faces ongoing changes in the world balance and global systemic challenges. We seem to have reached a number of tipping points. How can organisations thrive in this environment?

This book provides a clear and coherent model for senior managers to use in responding to these challenges.

If you’re reading this book, you’re likely to know about strategy and to have a track record of success within established organisations. Recently, however, you may have begun to feel that the tools and systems that used to work are inadequate to the challenge of the world that is unfolding. These same structural issues confront state, private sector and non-profit organisations in equal measure.

How will the world be different over the next decades?

The last decades have had some disruptive events - the stock market crash of 1987, the Asian collapse of 1997, the dot.com boom and bust. However, consistent growth and low interest rates provided a benign umbrella. The industrial countries showed steady growth and low inflation, commodity and wage costs remained stable and the populous countries of Asia were content to grow rapidly whilst taking in the low-skilled work of the wealthy world. Energy price inflation and concerns about environmental and security issues, food price increases and related trends suggested that all was not well with this model before the financial crisis. Central bankers appeared to have inflation in hand, but their expansionist policies allowed exceptional levels of debt to develop. The resulting housing and share price boom led to an unsustainable expansion of consumer debt. This, together with the monetary slackening after the dot.com collapse, was one deep root from which the financial crisis grew.

The collapse of a short-term bubble - banking - has revealed the far larger bubble that needs to be pricked: debt. This will take time to purge from the system. So, the financial crisis which started with sub-prime mortgages in 2006 has revealed something very different beneath that tranquil surface of the last two decades.

The world ahead of us will be very different. It will be fast-moving and innately challenging. Demographic change and education mean a shift in the patterns of labour skill and cost. The ageing industrial nations - and China - are not well placed as their workforce ages and retires. Furher, skills that were once restricted to the industrialised nations are now widely available, further enhancing the shift in international competitiveness towards new entrants. Much the same can be said for technology, which continues its relentless expansion in depth and range. The debt burden of the wealthy nations means that their recovery from the crisis will be slower than the new competitor nations. Competition will be intense, and on new terms. Global systems issues - such as environmental change, but also international law and finance, access to raw materials and the management of intellectual property - all require the rich nations to sacrifice some of their power. This combination of power rebalancing and an institutional vacuum implies that the next decade will be a turbulent one.

To make sense of the emerging world order, we have developed some frameworks for thinking about the short, medium and long term. The short term is, essentially, concerned with the way out of the financial overhang, debt and unemployment situation in the West. The medium term depends on how the wealthy world comes to terms with the new economic and political conditions, with new competitors. The longer term is constrained by the events to date and in the short and medium term, and by the capability of the world to tackle global systemic challenges.

This leads us to develop three scenarios which fundamentally inform our thinking in this book: a Low Road scenario, in which the crisis extends beyond the financial sector, unemployment remains high and growth low; a My Road scenario, in which, while the industrialised countries continue to suffer, the billion new consumers in the cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America create a new style; a High Road scenario, in which the international mechanisms that have been successful in gaining emergence from the financial crisis are quickly able to develop, to start to tackle some of the global systemic challenges, in some places.

In all three scenarios, the next decade will be turbulent for the economies and organisations of industrialised countries.

Organisations in a challenging world

Economies are not, of course, much concerned with individual organisations. Markets are supposed to allocate assets to flow from mature or dying organisations to labour and capital markets where they can be allocated to new activities that require them. Though the mechanisms for this are often sticky, especially inside organisations, the key question for organisations in the industrialised countries is: how can we avoid becoming mature and, eventually, dying?

Meanwhile, many large organisations have been managed with a common set of management systems and tools: the orthodoxy was everything that could be delegated beyond the bounds of an organisation should be; and what remained when this was complete should focus on uniformity, predictability and reducing costs. At best, this leads to optimisation around what used to be appropriate. At worst, organisations lose the ability to renew themselves. Today’s world requires combining the ability to operate under a regime of increasing competition, with the ability to adapt quickly.

The use of a common set of tools and technologies has made organisations increasingly similar, intensifying competition. Product life cycles have accelerated. Profits are squeezed by this, a process called ‘commoditisation’. Actions which organisations take to evade this often use the same measures that caused it, accelerating the race. Yet this is a race which cannot be avoided.

This cycle can be broken by renewal, by changing how things are done and what is to be done. Such renewal needs to be purposeful, taking the organisation to a new, unique situation from which it can evade the forces of commoditisation. Defining and carrying out that purpose requires a number of qualities.

The Machinery - the dynamic infrastructure - to generate purposeful renewal is different from that used in the day-to-day aspects of the organisation. It takes unspecified potential, ideas and more ideas, and makes them concrete. It does this against changing criteria, often based on ‘what might be’ in the turbulent environment. This potential, evolved into project proposals, is then able to compete for the organisation’s resources.

We symbolise this with a double cone, Figure 0.1. In the lower cone, direct and indirect procedures formalise insights that directly and indirectly develop this ‘unspecified’ potential. Where the cones meet, assets are allocated and projects are approved. In the upper cone, radiating out from this, the now-specified activities are subject to normal commercial disciplines.

Figure 0.1 The double cone

What is needed?

The knowledge which purposeful, self-renewing organisations need to tap is scattered widely throughout the organisation, and amongst customers, suppliers and other stakeholders. Renewal is not often these people’s first priority. The psychological types who tend to inhabit the upper cone are often impatient with open-ended debate. Machinery is, therefore, required to generate useful conversations across these divides. The result is something which is easy to sense but often difficult to define: a sense of collective competence.

Psychologists use the term ‘competence’ to mean a situation in which an individual or group has a clear grasp of the situation and has access to the tools with which to respond to it. Groups with competence can operate at much higher levels of potential stress - in much faster and more complex environments - than groups which lack this quality. The world that we face will be complex, very fast moving and open to all manner of mistakes. Groups that are able to focus quickly on issues through sharing common insight have a particular strength.

Renewal needs to match both the current situation and the changing environment. To do this, the organisation needs analytical Insight. It also needs a clear sense of its Values, the choices which it has made around often intangible issues such as brand positioning, staff relationships and the like. Third, it needs to relate its current activity and asset base to practical ways forward, its Options. These are joined by the organisational Narrative. The Narrative is the shared set of reflexes that knit the organisation together. The first four qualities of Insight, Values, Narrative and Options generation are held together through the operation of the fifth quality, that of Machinery - used here in the sense of active and dynamic infrastructure, covering people and processes. All five qualities need to be in place if purposeful renewal is to be achieved.

Figure 0.2 shows the Machinery holding the other four qualities together and managing their interactions. An organisation which is using these five qualities for renewal is what we call a ‘Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation’, or PS-RO.

The need for and creation of a PS-RO is the focus of this book.

The Machinery that connects Insight and Values so as to generate and interact with Options generation and the Narrative will be unique to the needs of any one organisation. However, there are some generally applicable ways in which these processes can be clustered.

One of these has already been discussed: asset allocation and project approval, which sits on the point where the two cones meet in Figure 0.1. The process for asset allocation is likely to be integrated with divisional plans, both in respect of their demand for resource and also their contributions to overall activity. The required performance for each, the overall resource flow during the next few years and the expected overall balance of the portfolio are important outcomes from this part of the Machinery.

Figure 0.2 Five qualities of a PS-RO

Two other loops will be general to all organisations: one of these relates to the performance of established activities in the upper cone, the other applies to the slower activities, which clarify Insight, Values and which generate the discussions that result in renewal. These occur in the lower cone.

These three sets of activity are symbolised by the arrows wrapping Figure 0.3. Seen from above, these create three concentric loops, activities which must, of course, inter-communicate. We term this the Three Ring Circus.

Figure 0.3 Three process loops - the Three Ring Circus

A Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation

The PS-RO model defines the broad shape of the organisation that is fit to succeed in the turbulent, fast-flowing river of change. Readers should note that almost by definition there can be no single correct form for a PS-RO. A PS-RO permanently strives to adapt itself to its particular changing circumstances.

A PS-RO has all five qualities in place, and is actively changing its nature to meet anticipated situations ahead. It is aware that such anticipation can be mistaken, so it works hard to manage its Insight. It makes sure that everyone is aware of its Narrative, sure in the sense of testing that people have heard and are acting on this. It is clear about its Values and has ensured that these are uniformly applied across its expanse. It has considered its Options and has not only defined the broad nature of the journey that it wants to undertake, but has set in place processes to filter proposals so as to ensure that they meet the necessary criteria. Finally, it has in place the Machinery and flows needed to maintain all of the above - this consists of two essential components: formal processes, some long lasting, some of them ephemeral and structured to meet passing needs; and a social structure that displays extraordinary competence.

Organisations which exhibit competence have worked hard and long to instil a sense of common purpose throughout the organisation. It is embedded in the Narrative, and built from Insight, Values and Options by way of Machinery. Narrative and competence come together to create new solutions. Sources of renewal begin life completely unspecified. They are vague possibilities that have a long way to go; without a supportive process of developing the ideas, most will be lost.

The ability to detect new ideas is not universal. The people who detect ideas are often young and close to their training or engaged with suppliers and others outside the organisation. They need to recognise potential when they see it. The general nature of the kind of ideas and renewal that is welcome needs to be clear to all involved.

Isaiah Berlin suggested that the way people prefer to think about abstract problems could be classed as the way of the Fox and/or the way of the Hedgehog: ‘The Fox knows many things but the Hedgehog knows one big thing’.1 Foxes are sceptical of big ideas and grand schemes, and are always looking for pragmatic solutions to immediate problems. Hedgehogs enjoy sweeping ideas and systematisation. They are articulate simplifiers, people who can easily brush aside or overlook ideas that do not fit into their current template. Such templates can be ideas such as shareholder value, customer focus or a belief in perfect markets. Activity in the upper cone tends to reward Hedgehog-like thinking and working styles. Fox-like skills are needed if the lower cone processes are to work.

Both styles are needed. Renewal depends on the attributes of both Foxes and Hedgehogs.

How is all of this to be put in place?

Curiously, implementation is relatively easy once the understanding is in place as to what needs to be done. Lou Gerstner wrote about his time at IBM in his book Who Said Elephants Can’t Dance?:2 he concluded that even large and complex organisations like IBM could change - and change quickly - when shown how.

We can offer you a blueprint to build your PS-RO, but all organisations are different. It is a key contention here that there is no one ‘right’ design. For any given organisation, within the context of its current and particular circumstances, there will be a ‘right’ design, but matters never stand still. There will be times, for example, when technology changes rapidly or perhaps when stakeholders are particularly demanding. Your Machinery will need to shift its focus in order to accommodate such changes. The strength of a PS-RO is that it evolves to meet the emerging challenges.

Chapter 9 provides a guide to handling the issues that you may face as you create a PS-RO; and a web link to an online diagnostic tool which we provide to help you tackle some of the practical issues you face as you design your PS-RO.

Part III of this book changes tone and pace: it is about the nuts and bolts of how to create a PS-RO, combining practical advice with briefing on tools and sources of help.

Chapter 10 focuses on Values: both personal and organisational, and their alignment in a PS-RO. It will help you to see how you can implement agreed, aligned Values in your organisation. A successful, sustainable organisation needs employees who are aligned with its core Values. They give people a sense of stability when they are in an organisation undergoing course correction and operating in uncertainty.

Chapter 11 is about the Insight processes. Insight is the ability to make sense of the external world and its future, integrate it with the internal world and harness that understanding to assess the organisation’s strengths, and to provide a basis for generating options for taking the organisation forward. It fits with the other four qualities to help the organisation move from pure ambiguity and uncertainty at the bottom end of the lower cone to a place where it can use the information for its own survival, success and advantage.

Chapter 12 discusses how to develop Options generation processes for a PS-RO. Options take the information generated by Insight and, using innovation, core Values and organisational Narrative, identify the choices that are open to an organisation.

Chapter 13 covers Narrative, the glue that holds the organisation together - it connects the core Values, Insight and Options. It helps to begin to specify what was unspecified so that people can work with what was uncertain and ambiguous, and encourages innovation aligned to the organisation’s direction and strategy, facilitating renewal. It saves the time of senior managers by ensuring that projects presented to them for investment are aligned to the organisation’s direction, and allows for effective communication between senior managers and with shareholders.

Chapter 14 describes the Machinery needed. Machinery - as in ‘machinery of government’ - places a central role in a PS-RO. It supports and integrates the other four qualities to enable an organisation to be a PS-RO.

Finally, we suggest further sources of help in creating a PS-RO.

Executive Summary

• Life in large organisations will become ever more complex, time and resource-constrained, organisations will be forced to adapt quickly.

• The world ahead of us will be fast moving, turbulent and challenging. Demographic change and increased education mean a shift in the patterns of labour skill and cost. Competition will be intense and on new terms.

• Global systems issues will require the rich nations to cede some of their power. Additionally, the rich nations will take time to recover from the debt crisis. We develop three global scenarios to provide a framework for thinking about this turbulence.

• The kind of renewal needed will require the attributes of both cunning Foxes and focused Hedgehogs: most organisations have tuned themselves to the previous business environment and have lost the capability to adapt.

• The qualities of Insight, Values, Narrative and Options generation are held together through the operation of Machinery. These are the qualities needed to create a Purposeful Self-Renewing Organisation, or PS-RO.

• Implementation of a PS-RO is relatively easy once it is understood what is needed.

Part I

What Happened?

Chapter 1

A Short History of the Crisis

With the financial crisis still bubbling as we write in late 2009, we will first consider its roots and its potential impact in order to set a context for the later chapters.3 We show that some of the factors leading to the events of 2006-9 were anomalous, others will continue, but that the effects will be felt well into the next decade. Governments and consumers in the West will be particularly constrained as they tackle paying off their debt. In the meantime, the newly industrialising economies enjoy many advantages: their savings are high, their labour cheap and skilful, their access to technology is rapidly approaching that of the Western economies and many have large internal markets. All of this presents a competitive threat to established industrial powers.

The roots of the financial crisis

The financial crisis that began in 2006-7 with defaults on ‘sub-prime’ mortgages in some parts of the USA serves as a decisive punctuation mark. It marked the end of a period of ‘fake’ stability, one in which all the indicators seemed to support a mode of operation and a set of assumptions that we now have to question. We begin this chapter with a review of the roots of the crisis, in the view that to fully understand where we’re going, we need first to mark where we are.

Figure 1.1 World product and world trade

We have been through a period of asset price inflation. Figure 1.1 shows a simple plot of world trade against world product, both in money of the day, from 1950 to the present.4 There is a lengthy period in which the two maintained a 1:1 relationship5. The relationship began to change in the early 1980s, with world trade increasing at a much faster rate than world product. The Asian crisis, the dot.com collapse and the massive failure of financial management in 2006 provided a series of challenges which initially appeared to be accommodated without disrupting the growth of world trade.

The growth of world trade was a symptom; the cause was a mixture of real, external factors and a belief which persisted for a generation and beyond in the financial industries that credit was uncapped. The key drivers included the following eight factors:

1. Steady or falling (in real terms) commodity and energy prices which drove up consumption.

2. The doubling of the global work force, and the much more than doubling of their intellectual capacity through education and training, which led in its turn to mobility of labour to where it could be used effectively.

3. Near universal productivity growth was based on the use of increasingly cheap information technology. Between 1960 and 1999, manufacturing’s share in US GDP and total employment both halved, to about 15%. Over the same period, its physical output increased 2-3 times and prices decreased in real terms by 75%.6

4. Labour costs for low-skilled workers in the industrial world were nearly static in real terms.

5. Connectivity and new institutions offered access to the global work force and to world savings.

6. The end of the Cold War led to the apparent supremacy of the Western model of governance. There was near universal and immediate economic response to a standard economic model that comprised sound finance, unimpeded market forces, rational and predictable regulation and taxation, open borders to trade in manufactured goods, all making up the so-called International Monetary Fund (IMF) model.

7. There was a wave of privatisation and deregulation in the industrial world. This spread to the former Comecon countries in Eastern Europe, and in China and India.

8. Finally, financial deregulation had a series of important impacts, as discussed below.

The immediate responses to this growth of world trade were the extension of consumerism in the West and the beginnings of fast growth and liberalisation in the developing economies, most notably in Asia and the ex-Comecon countries in Eastern Europe.

The response of the financial sector was that the world had found a way to manage complexity-through bottom-up choice in markets and democracy, all integrated by sound governance - and that things would find their own equilibrium through benign neglect.

This model has much to commend it. However, ‘benign’ is a word laden with values: whose benignity? For whose advantage? In the short term it suited US and other political leaders to allow central banks to maintain historically low real interest rates, to permit a housing boom that went off the scale, with consumers taking on a vast burden of debt.

Asian savings funded some of this expansion, while demographics in the wealthy world meant that many had accumulated savings and pension funds that needed to be invested. A glut of capital forced down price/earnings ratios on securities. Increasing shareholder activism was driven by this and other factors, such as the boom in mergers and hostile acquisitions, and consumerism applied to securities markets expanded by low trading costs. Companies could not compete with the high returns from the financial sector and were squeezed for cash for organic investment. Boards were ejected by shareholders if they were not content with the company’s performance.

The role of the financial sector

The financial sector had been hugely important in the early twentieth-century stock markets, but had since declined to a small share of the market. Retail banking was famously parodied in Liar’s Poker as 3/6/3: borrow at 3%, lend at 6%, be on the golf course at 3pm. Merchant banks did esoteric things on a small scale and had no great significance. Few banks engaged in asset trading, in the sense of playing zero-sum games with other people’s money.

Changing regulation

In the early 1990s, banks discovered the joys of corporate finance and expanded rapidly into new areas. This was accelerated by the repeal of the depression-era US Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. This had separated commercial from investment banking, and its repeal opened the door to new monolithic firms.

All manner of new products were on offer. Mergers and acquisitions were studied and actively promoted to corporate chieftains with ready finance. Methods of borrowing to please shareholders with a short time horizon - such as to buy back shares, or to pay dividends - were parts of the package. The chief offer that had unambiguous positive sum value associated with it was, however, the wide range of packages that claimed to manage risk exposure.

Hedging of risk

Portfolios that are constructed from many unrelated risks that are small in comparison to the total are proportionately less exposed to volatility than the constituent components. That is how insurance works: if your house burns down, that is a catastrophe for you, but it is not such a proportional disaster for an insurance company that holds tens of thousands of such risks. You are, therefore, happy to pay a small sum to remove the financial - if not practical - risk; and the company can accept it knowing that the likelihood of all of the houses that it insures burning down in the same time period is very low.

It is, however, a crucial caveat for insurance that the risks must be ‘uncorrelated’, must not respond to a common precipitating factor, such as war.

Offers claiming to manage risk exposure allowed companies to ‘hedge’ risk; buying what was sold as insurance against currency movements, inflation, commodity price changes and supply chain defaults. This was a powerful gain and the corporate treasury function became closely linked to - or outsourced to - banks.

Borrowing

This closeness also encouraged borrowing on a vast scale, often for financial transactions - such as acquisitions - rather than for investment in plant and equipment. The new monoliths sent teams of people to visit corporate CEOs in order to suggest projects that they would then finance: acquire this, strip out that - it seemed that you could create hundreds of millions of dollars out of absolutely nothing.

Figure 1.2 shows the mergers and acquisitions value in the USA as a percentage of the GDP.7 It emphasises the amazingly large peaks of activity in the decade 2000-2008.

Own-account trading by banks and CDOs

Banks found another interesting area: own-account trading. That is, they could use their current assets to borrow, and use that money to speculate in markets. At first controlled by regulatory limits, this soon went ‘off the balance sheet’, being handled by entities to which the regulatory control did not apply. More and more complex instruments were devised, including the now-notorious collateralised debt obligations, or CDOs. As they illustrate the abstract nature of what was being done, these are worth a general description.

Figure 1.2 Mergers and acquisitions as a percentage of US GDP

A bank creates a new legal entity, usually called an SPE or special purpose entity. It places a collection of assets into this, which are divided into various classes of risk exposure, here meaning chiefly proneness to volatility. Each CDO or group of assets has a class.

Ratings agencies validated these structures, and had to compete against each other for the privilege. Over-strict assessors were less likely to be selected, all things being equal.

CDOs were purchased by other institutions. The high-risk ones offered a high return, and low-risk ones provided supposedly quality assets against which further money could be borrowed, so repeating the cycle. This is called ‘securitisation’, and allowed banks to take on dizzy levels of debt that was certified to be triple-A. As we have now seen, they in practice often contained toxic assets or assets which all moved in the same direction when times got hard.

Some figures may serve to put this in context:8

Table 1.1 World values

World added value, 2007 approximately$35 trillionWorld value of equities, 2007$40 trillionWorld value of derivatives, inc. CDOs$1000 trillionWorld values of credit default swaps$70-90 trillion

Boom and bust in financial services

The upshot was that the banking sector boomed, paid out very high salaries and bonuses, and lost control of its fundamentals. Senior staff had very little idea what their subordinates were doing, as the instruments were technical and changed very rapidly. Accounting structures that worked on a mark-to-market basis - that is, booked (marked) assets at what they were worth ‘in the market’ at the moment of booking - had to work within an extremely ill-defined framework: what, ultimately, was the market value of a derivative built on a dozen CDOs that were themselves spires above huge, mixed bunches of assets that included the now notorious sub-prime property portfolio?

Banks also found one more area in which to expand their activities. This was the churning of assets. Brokerage fees are charged when a trade is made, but not otherwise. Thus, portfolios that are extremely active - perhaps through automated (‘quaint’) trading or solely through the ‘need’ to access ever-more complex instruments - were portfolios that made money for traders.

Once again, some figures put matters in perspective. Brokers’ fees in 2007 were assessed as being around $500bn, which is 1½% of gross world product. The typical costs of such management fees are 2% of a portfolio’s worth per annum, which accumulates to half of what a pension fund is worth over 25 years.9

The consequence of all this is that financial services represented about 10% of world profit in 1965 and 35% in 2005.10 Huge fortunes were made and high salaries paid to people who did not understand - and were not in control of - their organisations. They were cruising on the success of the underlying structural features. As long as expansion continued, the bubble would continue to grow.

The bursting of the bubble placed pressure on states to bail out the banks, which in many cases they did. Figure 1.311 shows the scale of the US commitment set against other major projects from history. Some of the money spent will be recuperated by the state - ultimately from shareholders and consumers, of course - and this implies a long, slow process during which government expenditure will be severely constrained.

Figure 1.3 The scale of the US bank bailout

Personal, corporate and government debt

The unprecedented scale of personal and corporate debt in the USA from 1952 to 2009 is shown in Figure 1.4.12 During this time, the Western economies have changed from being mostly saving economies to being mostly debt-ridden economies. At its peak in 2009, the personal debt averaged 139% of income (versus, say, 62% in 1960 or 101% in 2000). Debt services took an all-time high of 14.4% of personal disposable income in 2007, from which peak it has fallen only because interest rates have declined. Personal saving in the USA fell continually from around 10% of income in 1980 to zero in 2005, and below zero thereafter.

This presents two headaches for the next decade:

• Dealing with the debt-through paying back or through defaults.

• Dealing with the slowing in growth as the OECD consumers slow their spending.

Figure 1.4 Consumer debt in the USA

Dealing with the debt

If this consumer debt generates significant default, there is absolutely nothing that any state can do to bail the situation out, because the numbers are simply too vast. The two options considered by most governments are to do nothing, which is not feasible when facing a gigantic crisis that makes 2007-9 fade into insignificance, or to print money and inflate the relevant economies out of the situation. (Inflation dilutes debt, the value of which remains constant whilst the currency in which it is denominated of course contracts in value. Ten thousand dollars would have been a large mortgage in 1970, but is less than the average outstanding credit card debt today.) Naturally, nations which did this would see their currencies collapse and their economies labour under a burden of inflationary value destruction that would last for decades.

What might precipitate a widespread default on debts? The three most immediate threats are:

• high interest rates,

• high taxes and

• high unemployment.