Border Bloodshed E-Book

Alastair J. Macdonald

• Herausgeber: John Donald
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 746

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2008

Beschreibung

Scottish military offensives against England from 1369 were largely the product of government policy, were launched with careful timing and, in the reign of Robert II, involved close co-operation with France. They succeeded militarily, encouraging the Scots to the point where they were willing to engage in attacks on England beyond the ambition of their French allies. However, diplomatic gains fell well short of forcing English recognition of Scottish independence. Hopes of achieving this by military means were ended in the reign of Robert III when the Scots were heavily defeated in 1402. War was not solely fought with political objectives in mind or other 'rational' factors such as the quest for financial gain. The Scots went to war for emotive reasons too, such as hatred of the English, the search for renown and the sheer enjoyment of fighting. All these factors inspired the Scots to launch a series of bloody, brutal and ultimately futile offensives against England.

Leseprobe

BORDER BLOODSHED

CROSSING THE BORDER

I sit with my back to the engine, watching

the landscape pouring away out of my eyes.

I think I know where I

am going and have

some choice in the matter

I think, too, that this was a country

of bog-trotters, moss-troopers,

fired ricks and roof-trees in the black night – glinting

on tossed horns and red blades.

I think of lives

bubbling into the harsh grass.

What difference now?

I sit with my back to the future, watching

time pouring away into the past. I sit, being helplessly

lugged backwards

through the Debatable Lands of history, listening

to the execrations, the scattered cries, the

falling of roof-trees

in the lamentable dark.

Norman MacCaig

(Collected Poems (London, 1990), 174)

BORDERBLOODSHED

Scotland and England at War 1369–1403

Alastair J. Macdonald

First published in Great Britain in 2000 by

Tuckwell Press

The Mill House

Phantassie

East Linton

East Lothian EH40 3DG

Scotland

Copyright © Alastair J. Macdonald. 2000

ISBN 1 86232 106 X

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available

on request from the British Library

The right of Alastair J. Macdonald to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Design and Patent Act 1988

Typeset by Edderston Book Design

Printed and bound by Cpod, Trowbridge, Wiltshire

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Introduction

Chapter 1: 1369–76: Robert II, England and The International Situation

Chapter 2: 1377–83: The Scottish Ascendancy

Chapter 3: 1384–9: Full-Scale War

Chapter 4: 1390–1403: Peace and War in the Reign of Robert III

Chapter 5: Causes of War

Chapter 6: War and Border Society

Bibliography

Index

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Acclamation of Charles V of France at his coronation in 1364.

The battle of La Rochelle, 1372.

Robert II in military dress.

The enthronement of Richard II.

Eighteenth-century engraving of the ruins of Coldingham Priory.

Ruins of Lochmaben Castle.

The execution of Sir Robert Tresilian, chief justice of the King’s Bench.

‘The Hunting of Chevy Chase’, by Sir Edwin Landseer.

Isabella of France.

The coronation of Henry IV, in 1399.

Eighteenth-century engraving of Dunbar Castle.

Fast Castle.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe debts of gratitude to many people who have helped me in completing this book, which started life as a PhD thesis undertaken at the University of Aberdeen. I am grateful firstly to Grant Simpson for his patient and skilled supervision of my postgraduate research and his continued support in recent years. David Ditchburn has provided invaluable help and encouragement, and he was kind enough to read the draft chapters of this book and make helpful comments on them. I would also like to thank Steve Boardman, not just for his work on late fourteenth-century Scotland – which has influenced my analysis considerably – but also for his willingness to engage in keen historical debate. Anthony Goodman’s generous encouragement, meanwhile, was important in convincing me to persevere with the topic of this work. Thanks also to Norman Little for turning my washed-out holiday snaps into photographic masterpieces. I remain indebted to Sandra Williams for her tremendous efforts in typing my original thesis, and to the postgraduates in Aberdeen – Joyce Walker, Fiona Downie, Douglas Hamilton, Simon Appleyard and Ian Donald – who efficiently proof-read the chapters in rapid time. For financial assistance during my postgraduate studies I am grateful to the Scottish Education Department and the trustees of the John Reid Trust.

Many friends helped me in different ways during my postgraduate studies. I would like firstly to thank Tamsin for her companionship during these years. Accommodation in Aberdeen was provided by Jim and Ruth Macdonald, Catriona and Greig Fraser, Mike Walsh, Eddie Mackenzie, and Colin and Sarah Bell. My thanks, also, to those who made me welcome in London: Glyn and Kirsty Legge, Chris Darby, and Seamus and Kate Lobban. All of the above have helped me in more ways than simply by providing a place to stay. In this connection I would like to mention in particular Jon Attenburrow, and also John Matthew, Jason Reynolds, Dot Mackinnon, ‘Chalkie’ Clelland and Sandie, Bob and Liz Attenburrow. Aberdeen University and Old Aberdonians Football Clubs and the staff and customers of the St Machar Bar, meanwhile, have my gratitude for having provided enjoyable distraction from the middle ages.

My special thanks go to Clare for sticking with me as I staggered towards this book’s completion. My greatest debt is to my parents, who have been constantly supportive and understanding. I would like to dedicate this work to them.

Alastair J. MacdonaldAberdeen

ABBREVIATIONS

AN

Archives Nationales, Paris

‘Annales Henrici Quarti’

‘Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti’, in Johannis de Trokelowe et Henrici de Blaneforde monachorum S Albani, necnon quorundam anonymorum, Chronica et Annales, ed. H. T. Riley (Rolls Series, 1866)

APS

Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson & C. Innes (12 vols, Edinburgh, 1814–75)

BIHR

Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (London, 1923–)

BL

British Library, London.

CCR

Calendar of Close Rolls (London, 1892–)

CDS

Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain et al. (5 vols, Edinburgh, 1881–1986)

CFR

Calendar of Fine Rolls (London, 1911–)

Chron. Bower

Scotichronicon, ed. D. E. R. Watt (9 vols, Aberdeen, 1987–98)

Chron. Fordun (Skene)

Johannis de Fordun, Cronica Gentis Scotorum, ed. W. F. Skene (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1877–8)

Chron. Hardyng

The Chronicle of John Hardyng, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1812)

Chron. Pluscarden

Liber Pluscardensis, ed. F. J. H. Skene (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1877–80)

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing)

The Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland, ed. D. Laing (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1872–9)

Chronicon Angliae

Chronicon Angliae auctore monacho quodam Sancti Albani, ed. E. M. Thompson (Rolls Series, 1874)

CIM

Calandar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (London, 1916–)

CIPM

Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem (London, 1904–)

CPR

Calendar of Patent Rolls (London, 1891–)

CWAA

Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society (1874–)

EHR

English Historical Review (1886–)

ER

The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, ed. J. Stuart et al. (23 vols, Edinburgh, 1878–1908)

Foedera

Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Cuiscunque Generis Acta Publica, ed. T. Rymer (4 vols, London, 1816–69)

Foedera (0)

Foedera (etc.), (20 vols, London, 1704–35)

Froissart, Oeuvres

Oeuvres de Jean Froissart, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (27 vols, Brussels, 1867–77)

Hingeston, Letters

Royal and Historical Letters of Henry IV, ed. F. C. Hingeston (2 vols, Rolls Series, 1860)

Historia Anglicana

Historia Anglicana, ed. H. T. Riley (2 vols, Rolls Series, 1863–4)

HMC

Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (London, 1870–)

NAS

National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh.

John of Gaunt’s Register

John of Gaunt’s Register 1379–83, ed. E. C. Lodge & R. Somerville (2 vols, Camden Society, 1937)

NCH

Victoria History of the County of Northumberland (15 vols, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1893–1940)

Perroy, Diplomatic Correspondence

The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II, ed. E. Perroy (Camden Society, 1933)

POPC

Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England, ed. H. Nicolas (7 vols, London, 1834–7)

PRO

Public Record Office, London

PSAS

Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland (1851–)

RMS

Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scottorum, ed. J. M. Thomson et al. (11 vols, Edinburgh, 1882–1914)

Rot. Parl.

Rotuli Parliamentorum, ed. J. Strachey et al. (6 vols, London, 1783)

Rot. Scot.

Rotuli Scotiae, ed. D. Macpherson et al. (2 vols, London, 1814–19)

SHR

Scottish Historical Review (1903–28, 1947–)

SHS

Scottish History Society

STS

Scottish Text Society

TDGAS

Transactions of the Dumfriesshire and Galloway Natural History and Antiquarian Society (1864–)

TRHS

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society

Tuck, Border Societies

J. A. Tuck & A. Goodman, eds, War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages (London, 1992)

Westminster

The Westminster Chronicle, ed. L. C. Hector & B. F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982)

Introduction

In the 1370s and 1380s, and again in the early 1400s, substantial areas of the north of England were reduced to misery by Scottish military activity. This much is quite clear; the local impact of Scottish invasion has been well demonstrated, perhaps nowhere more so than in the work of Henry Summerson. His great knowledge of north-western England in the middle ages allows him to depict in detail an embattled, war-torn society. In 1381, at a time of official Anglo-Scottish truce we are told that ‘north-west England stood on the defensive, its fortresses prepared for resistance, its inhabitants ready to take refuge in them.’1 This accurately captures the mood of northern England’s inhabitants in the later fourteenth century; and widespread evidence of the destruction caused by Scottish raids shows that the fears of local inhabitants were not idle ones.

Historians of the English borders have carefully outlined the experience of the region under the impact of war in the late fourteenth century and beyond. They have pointed out that a highly destructive period in the region’s history began in the 1370s. What they do not find so easy to outline is why, exactly, the Scots should have caused so much damage at this time. There is a sense of enigma to the Scottish attacks. The northern warriors are inscrutable carriers of death; the bearers of God’s wrath, perhaps. The intensity of Scottish attacks remains ill-understood because no-one has examined the military activity of the period from the Scottish perspective; and this is the essential perspective since Anglo-Scottish warfare in this period was absolutely driven by the Scots. English attacks were reflexive, overwhelmingly undertaken in response to repeated Scottish raids.

One reason that the subject has been so neglected is that this great upsurge in Scottish aggression occurred under Robert II (1371–1390) and Robert III (1390–1406), kings whose long-perceived weakness and incapacity has made their reigns seem highly unglamorous subjects of study. Indeed, it is only recently that these most neglected of Scottish kings have received any detailed historical attention.2 According to the traditional assessment of the two Roberts there was scant point in analysing the Scottish war effort in the period. Neither king had meaningful control over policy, so no easily understood pattern governing Scottish raids was likely to emerge. All that would emerge would be patternless and chaotic overmighty magnate rapacity and local border feuds driving the conflict. So Anglo-Scottish warfare at this time has never been given detailed treatment, and only one specialist article has carefully approached the conflict of the 1370s and 1380s from a Scottish perspective.3

The result of this neglect has, of course, been ignorance, not just of the significance of Anglo-Scottish conflict, but also of its actual nature, course and above all scale. In 1380, as we shall see, the Scots launched a stunningly effective two-pronged offensive against northern England. This featured widespread devastation in the English west march, and the defeat of an English force on the east march at the battle of Horse Rigg. Militarily successful, the Scottish offensive had been carefully planned; it was precisely timed to link with wider international developments and it had important local and international repercussions. Yet older Scottish historians routinely misdated the battle of Horse Rigg, and the most detailed recent account of later medieval Scotland did not even deem the event worthy of a mention.4 Obscurity enfolds approaches to the Scottish war effort at this time even in the supremely well-researched recent edition of the mid-fifteenth century chronicle of Walter Bower. There, the battle of Horse Rigg is at one point described as an unidentified encounter, about which nothing is known.5

Some episodes in Anglo-Scottish conflict are more fully understood than this one. In particular, the collection of articles produced to mark the anniversary of the battle of Otterburn, War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages (1992), provides a detailed account of warfare in 1388–89 and touches on conflict in the preceding decade. The English royal invasions of Scotland, in 1385 and 1400, have also received careful study.6 Other than this, approaches to Anglo-Scottish conflict usually have to be gleaned from more general works. Major developments in diplomacy are outlined in ‘Anglo-Scottish relations in the reigns of Robert II and Robert III’ by Edna Hamer, while the development of March Law in the medieval period is the subject of a recent monograph. James Campbell, in his article, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the fourteenth century’, also explores some aspects of the relations of the two realms in the context of the continental war.7 Detailed work has been done on English history during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, with particularly close attention having been paid to the reign of Richard II (1377–1399). Much of this deals at some length with Anglo-Scottish relations, such as Tuck’s Richard II and the English Nobility, Wylie’s History of England under Henry IV and Goodman’s John of Gaunt, although the most recent monograph dealing with the reign of Richard II, by Nigel Saul, relegates the Scottish situation to a position of marginality bordering on irrelevance.8 Naturally, the perspective in these works is an English one, even in those which accord relations with Scotland some prominence: we cannot expect that these authors should provide the Scottish framework which is needed for a full understanding of the contentious relations of the two realms. For this, the long-standing vacuum in Scottish historical writing is to blame.

Unfortunately, the vacuum has been filled by unsubstantiated and simplified assertions. The key traditional explanations for Anglo-Scottish warfare in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries have been founded on two things: the actvities of uncontrollable noble families (‘overmighty magnates’) and equally uncontrollable feuding among turbulent border families. These interpretations are not based on detailed research, and the application of such theories has led to some distinctly odd interpretations. James Campbell, for instance, was presumably at a loss to explain the sheer intensity of Scottish attacks on England in the 1380s by reference to these factors. His solution was to suggest that during the decade something akin to the Free Companies which had plagued France came into existence on the Scottish side of the Border. Free Companies in France developed when large numbers of soldiers who were in the country to receive payment for their military services had their employment terminated: during periods of Anglo-French truce such groups periodically caused much damage. However, Campbell’s assertion is innately improbable when applied to Scotland. In Scotland, the army was unpaid: there was no inducement for the dregs of Europe to arrive on the Scottish border in the first place in pursuance of employment. Campbell provides no evidence in support of his statement – he has noted the high level of Scottish military activity in the 1380s and presumably reached his judgement on the basis of a preconception that uncontrolled groups of marauders were responsible for it.9 Campbell’s article is still, furthermore, routinely cited as an authority on Anglo-Scottish relations in this period.

In short a more precise focus on Anglo-Scottish warfare in this period is required: Scottish military activity in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was of a scale which has not been readily appreciated by historians and its details have never been accurately or fully presented. Partly as a result the nature of the Scottish offensives and their political consequences have been regularly misconstrued. One reason for this is previous neglect of the crucial international angle in approaching Anglo-Scottish relations. Traditional accounts have allowed for an international angle in suggesting that the Scots went to war in this period at the behest of the French: they were readily manipulated puppets on the international stage either because of their political or economic dependence on France.10 It is true, certainly, that Scottish attacks were carried out with a careful eye on the wider international scene. This is why 1369 (not coincidental with major political developments in Scotland) marks the start of this study: that year saw the resumption of another phase in the long Anglo-French conflict known as The Hundred Years War. Anglo-French warfare immeasurably strengthened Scotland’s international position, and in 1369 the Scots immediately took advantage militarily and in the field of diplomacy. Far from being puppets, in fact, the late fourteenth-century Scottish governments had great freedom of action in their foreign policy decision-making. Sometimes, during times of Anglo-French war, the Scots opted to launch attacks on England; sometimes they did not. Finally, in the early fifteenth century, the Scots – disastrously for them – were far more belligerent towards England than were their French allies. Certainly, French pressure did not produce the violent Scottish campaigns of 1399–1402 which culminated in a catastrophic defeat for the Scots at Humbleton Hill.

The Franco-Scottish diplomatic relationship was far from a straightforward one, and analysing its nature is an important part of what follows. The other, connected, international scene to which the Scots were closely attuned was the situation in England. Military attacks were clearly timed to coincide with the departure of English expeditions to the continent; they were also launched when there were domestic political crises for the English crown or distractions in Ireland or Wales. All of these factors occurred with frequency. English weakness at this time was not illusory and is illustrated by the present study: only a troubled regime would have allowed a weaker neighbour to establish a local dominance such as the Scots enjoyed on their mutual frontier.

It will be obvious from the foregoing that the present work suggests a sensitive guiding hand behind Scottish military behaviour in this period, and that the image of individualistic turbulence is rejected. Scottish offensives are represented here as national endeavours, featuring the involvement of the Scottish government with articulate political aims as their objectives. Alexander Grant has recently gone some way towards expressing a similar viewpoint with regard to Scottish attacks in the 1380s, but his article can hardly be said to have superseded a strongly entrenched orthodoxy which views Scottish military activity in the years under consideration as the combined result of the rapacity of individual magnates, criminality, and manipulation of a hapless government at the hands of France.11 Here it is argued that Scottish offensives against England in the period 1369–1403 were largely the product of governmental policy. The point cannot be proven with reference to each individual raid: sometimes the evidence needed to make the governmental link is simply lacking, though this does not necessarily mean that there was no such link. At other times, no doubt, raids were indeed carried out by individuals in pursuance of private aims. Nevertheless, the wide involvement of the Scottish political community in conflict in these years is demonstrated. Taking a long view of the period as a whole the evidence to this effect is strong; in specific years of open warfare evidence of extremely wide Scottish participation is overwhelming.

Establishing a governmental context for Scottish attacks against England opens up an array of interpretative possibilities beyond the tired and oftrepeated generalisations about ‘overmighty magnates’ and border reivers. Domestic politics in Scotland, for instance, are placed in a different light by reference to the conduct of foreign policy. Blanket condemnation of the weakness of early Stewart monarchy requires amendment in this context. Sophisticated execution, awareness of international developments and coordination with diplomatic policy were the hallmarks of military strategy under Robert II. The political community appears to have been largely united in supporting the pursuit of war against England at times of opportunity. As a result the Scots achieved local military dominance in the borders, permanently recovered lands in southern Scotland previously held by the English and gained limited diplomatic victories.12 Warfare in the reign of Robert III, however, led to disaster. The divisive effects of political discord at the heart of the Scottish government played an important part in this. Comparison of the conduct of war under Robert II with the military effort under Robert III shows that in one sphere, at least, there was a marked decline in the efficacy of Scottish government. We might expect it to have been mirrored in other areas.13

Sensitivity to the governmental involvement in Anglo-Scottish warfare and to the international imperative facilitates a wider discussion of other aspects of the subject. For instance, detailed consideration has never been attempted of why the Scots, at governmental and individual levels, chose to attack England. The crucial question of why conflict occurred has not previously been carefully addressed. Studies of late medieval warfare have often laid a stress on material considerations as the primary motivating factor for those involved. That Scottish military offensives were guided by a government seeking political advantage might seem to support this interpretation. For the Scots such considerations certainly had their weight, but they are not the whole story. Less tangible factors such as hatred of the English, the search for renown and sheer enjoyment of fighting played a part. It was not just the fighters, but governmental decision-makers also, who were influenced by such emotive impulses. It was a mixture of motivating factors that inspired the Scots to launch a series of bloody, brutal and ultimately futile offensives against England. My stress is on the complexity, and in this case the destructive results, of human motivation.

The final sphere examined here is the effect of Anglo-Scottish warfare in the borders in this period. Just how destructive such conflict was is a problematic issue. An impression of war inducing misery is vividly conveyed in primary sources, but statistical evidence is unable to quantify its effects in economic terms. The approach adopted here is to focus instead on the effects of war on the behaviour and attitudes of Scottish borderers. The borders were by no means the only part of the country affected by warfare, but the limitation of my investigation to that area was dictated by the strong tradition in historical writing which depicts the borders (of both realms) as an area strongly and uniquely influenced by Anglo-Scottish conflict. A vivid depiction of this tradition can be found in Norman MacCaig’s poem, ‘Crossing the Border’.14 We have here a powerful image of the desolation caused by border warfare. Vital, also, to the effect of the poem is the timeless sense of this (clearly sixteenth-century) border brutality: it could be occurring at a time deep in the past or (in a slightly different sense) in the future.

The poem reflects – it does much more, but this as well – the historical tradition which has been the long-established and barely challenged view of the late medieval Scottish borders. This view – that the borders were wracked by endemic, self-inflicted warfare and its inhabitants estranged from the heartlands of the kingdom – is assumed to apply to the period under consideration here, although this has not been demonstrated with reference to contemporary evidence. Patterns of life apparent in the sixteenth-century Scottish border region have been applied backwards, while it has been assumed that contemporary manifestations of an English border ‘problem’ would be reflected in Scotland also. My examination of border society focuses on Scottish evidence of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. It is essential also, for comparative purposes, to investigate the border problem as perceived in England, a problem whose manifestations have been outlined rather more convincingly than its possible causes – and to see if we should expect a similar situation to have arisen in Scotland. This section is perhaps the most controversial in the current work: the ‘journalistic trivia that passes for border history’ has a powerful hold on a public in thrall to the romantic vision of the reiver.15 The Scottish borderers, though, seem to have been rather more conventional in their behaviour and attitudes in the late fourteenth century than has been previously assumed. The genesis of specifically border problems is also discussed: it may well lie in the early fifteenth century when a series of destabilising national and local developments occurred.

My stress on the potency of the threat posed by the Scots to the English North and their close involvement with international developments does not suggest that they were important players in the world of European diplomacy. On the contrary, the Scots were a relatively minor concern of the English crown (because from its Westminster base it was neglectful of the North) and only marginal players on the international stage. They were telescoped into a position of rare importance in the 1370s and 1380s as a central element of the French attempt to vanquish England. Nonetheless, Scotland was not one of the great states of Christendom and was far from being a dominant concern even of the English government. The very success of the Scots in border warfare under Robert II displays this. The regimes of Edward III (1327–1377) and Richard II tolerated Scottish attacks on northern England because of the relative lack of importance of the region from the perspective of Westminster and the more pressing domestic and international problems which afflicted the English state. Only in response to flagrant and concerted Scottish attacks did the English government launch retaliatory invasions. To achieve the diplomatic aim of recognition of independence, however, the only means of coercion available to the Scots was the infliction of devastation in the north of England on a massive scale. There was an insuperable dilemma for the Scots in that the more successful they were in this sense the more likely became military retaliation before which they were helpless. The Scots did not have the means to force a political settlement on their enemies.16

Above all, the intention of this work is to analyse how a second rate power, Scotland, was able to impose a reign of terror on the northern province of one of the European superpowers, England. A panicky correspondent of Richard II felt that the whole power of Scotland had descended on the beleaguered West March in August 1388. He seems not to have known that a force capable of defeating the assembled military power of the English East March was simultaneously operating in Northumberland.17 This was not an accidental occurrence; and comfortable generalisations about ‘overmighty magnates’ and border reivers are not adequate explanations for it. Scottish attacks on England must be examined from a governmental perspective and firmly in an international context. This approach allows the wide political ramifications of Anglo-Scottish warfare to be examined. It also provides a framework essential for a detailed examination of what motivated individuals to fight in the wars, and of the effects that conflict had in border society in the period.

Warfare in this period (officially declared or not) resulted in the main from a series of Scottish offensives directed against England. These offensives were the defining characteristic of Anglo-Scottish relations in these years, English military efforts were largely a response to them, and abstinence from war was the result of external considerations rather than any genuine rapprochement between the realms. In the 1370s and 1380s the Scots enjoyed great military success. By the early fifteenth century the recent past offered confidence-inspiring precedents. Displaying markedly less caution than had been shown earlier the Scots felt that war against England could yield profitable results even in the absence of war between France and England. Catastrophic defeat was the logical result of such reckless policies. The Scottish debacle at Humbleton Hill in 1402 and its aftermath marked, it is argued, a decisive end to the themes which had dictated Anglo-Scottish relations since 1296. English military activity could not conquer Scotland; the Scots could not force the treasured concession of independence from the English crown. Their last serious attempt to do so was in the late fourteenth century and the early fifteenth; this is the story of their gruesome failure.

_______

1 H. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle: the city and the borders from the late eleventh to the midsixteenth century (2 volumes, Kendal, 1993).

2 The gap has been expertly filled by S. I. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings. Robert II and Robert III 1371–1406 (East Linton, 1996).

3 A. Grant, ‘The Otterburn War from the Scottish point of view’, in Tuck, Border Societies, 30–64.

4 A. H. Dunbar, Scottish Kings (Edinburgh, 1906), 162; ER, iii, lxiii; E. Hamer, ‘Anglo-Scottish Relations in the reigns of Robert II and Robert III’ (unpublished MLitt thesis, University of Glasgow, 1971), 91: R. Nicholson, Scotland. The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974).

5Chron. Bower, viii, 201, n. 18.

6 Tuck, Border Societies; N. B. Lewis, ‘The last medieval summons of the English feudal levy, 13 June 1385’, EHR, lxxiii (1958), 1–26; idem, ‘The feudal summons of 1385’, EHR, c (1985), 729–43; J. J. N. Palmer, ‘The last summons of the feudal army in England (1385)’, EHR, lxxxiii (1968), 771–5; A. L. Brown, ‘The English Campaign in Scotland, 1400’, in H. Hearder & H. R. Lyon, eds, British Government and Administration: essays presented to S. B. Chrimes (Cardiff, 1974), 40–54.

7 Hamer, ‘Anglo-Scottish Relations’; C. J. Neville, Violence, Custom and Law (Edinburgh, 1998); J. CampbeII, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, in J. R. Hale, et al., eds, Europe in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1965), 184–216.

8 A. Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility (London, 1973); J. H. Wylie, The History of England under Henry IV (4 vols, London, 1884–98); A. Goodman, John of Gaunt: the exercise of princely power in fourteenth-century Europe (Harlow, 1992); N. Saul, Richard II (London, 1997).

9 CampbeII, ‘Hundred Years War’, 214. On the Free Companies in France, see C. AIImand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at war c.1300–c.1450 (Cambridge, 1989), 73–4.

10 The most detailed articulation of this theory, hinging on the economic angle, is: A. Stevenson, ‘The Flemish Dimension of the Auld Alliance’, in G. G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and the Low Countries 1124–1994 (East Linton, 1996), 28–42, which develops themes first expressed in A. W. K. Stevenson, ‘Trade between Scotland and the Low Countries in the later middle ages’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1982), 62–70.

11 Grant,‘Otterburn War’.

12 Most striking, perhaps, was de facto recognition of the Scottish reconquest (Hamer, ‘Anglo-Scottish Relations’, 152–61).

13 The domestic slant on Anglo-Scottish warfare perhaps suggests a slightly different interpretation from that presented in Boardman, Early Stewart Kings.

14 N. MacCaig, Collected Poems (new edition, London, 1990), 174. It was from this poem, and its evocative layers of meaning, that the title of my PhD thesis was derived (A. Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border: a study of the Scottish military invasions of England C.1369–C.1403’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1995). The current work is a development of this thesis.

15 Quotation from W. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England: a survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1977), 283, n. 14.

16 See A. A. M. Duncan, ‘The War of the Scots, 1306–23’, TRHS, 6th series, 2 (1992), 125–51. Only in the rare circumstances of 1328 did the Scots achieve their political aims through war against England.

17 Edinburgh University Library, MS 183, fo. 94–94d. No year is given in the letter, but the dating of 3 August and the fact that French forces are not mentioned strongly suggests 1388.

1

1369–76: Robert II, England and The International Situation

Between 1357 (when an Anglo-Scottish truce was agreed) and 1369 (when the war between France and England was renewed) there was relative peace in the border regions of England and Scotland. The caveat ‘relative’ is a necessary one. In both 1364 and 1366, for example, Henry Locker, an Englishman, murdered one of his countrymen before returning with his Scottish colleagues across the Border, where he resided as an adherent of the Scots. In 1358, meanwhile, John of Hayton, a Scot at English allegiance, stole fifty-two head of cattle at Stapleton, Cumberland.1 There was also more serious raiding of greater destructiveness. In 1364 the English administration in Scotland could collect no rents from the church of Hawick (at that time, like other parts of southern Scotland, in English hands) because of destruction and devastation by the Scots. The western Anglo-Scottish border region appears to have been the area of greatest instability in these years with Annandale in particular (again, in English hands at this stage) suffering frequent raiding by English and Scottish forces in 1363–1368.2 Bishop Appleby of Carlisle, in his capacity as warden of the English West March, wrote to the Scottish king David II in 1367 claiming that breaches of the truce in his jurisdiction had not been so bad for many years. We must take Appleby’s appeal seriously even if he was of an unusually pacific cast of mind by the standards of the times: he once wrote to the English king, Edward III, expressing moral qualms at undertaking military duties which were part of his remit as a warden of the English Marches towards Scotland.3

Deaths, the taking of prisoners, damage to property and the seizure of booty in various forms were the ingredients of late medieval warfare. Yet the occurrences outlined above do not amount to undeclared warfare. There is a significant difference in magnitude between the signs of conflict in the years 1358–1368 and the chief focus of this book, the warfare that occurred thereafter. The border nobility was not prominently involved in the incidents described so far (although Anthony Lucy, who raided Annandale in 1366, was a prominent man on the English West March). Only Hawick, in a detailed account of Scottish lands controlled by the English in 1364, could render no rents to the royal officer in charge of these matters, the chamberlain of Berwick.4 Appeals from the institutions and inhabitants of northern England claiming poverty due to Scottish raiding, such a resounding chorus in later years, were rare. The English government, furthermore, did not grant remissions of taxation on the basis of such claims. The difference in scale between conflict up to 1368 and that evident from 1369 is that we can be sure there was no governmental sponsorship or involvement in the disturbances of the earlier period.

The evidence for this claim is partly negative: the English crown did not finance any expeditions against Scotland in these years and we know of no major Scottish raids into England. Detailed legislation aimed at dealing with and preventing breaches of the truce was agreed in 1367, and this is strong evidence of a mutual desire to keep good peace between the realms. March Law was invariably developed and extended during periods when the governments of both kingdoms were keen to retain friendly relations.5 In 1368, furthermore, Edward III was at pains to prevent his subjects making retaliatory raids on the Scots and instructed his border officers to prevent such activities. The problematic English-controlled lordship of Annandale was subject to particularly close attention. A pragmatic and flexible approach was taken by Edward III in allowing the English lords of Annandale to split the rents of the lordship with the Scots. Scottish wardens of the West March, meanwhile, gave guarantees against damage to the inhabitants and lands of the valley in 1360 and 1364, while local arrangements for redress of grievances were made in 1366.6

These attempts at peace keeping are hardly surprising: neither the government of Scotland nor that of England had an incentive to seek war in the years 1357–1368. Edward III was owed huge sums by the Scots at this time as payment for the ransom of David II, captured by the English in 1346 at the battle of Neville’s Cross. Edward III’s negotiating position on this matter was subject to variation depending on changing circumstances. Latterly he may well have been happy to settle for a truce and the payment of the Scottish king’s ransom in instalments. Earlier, Edward’s strong negotiating position over the ransom had offered him the prospect of a highly suitable settlement with Scotland; in any case he had no need to resort to expensive and troublesome military activity.7 Having campaigned at length against the Scots earlier in the century Edward knew that military force was a tool not guaranteed to yield satisfactory results. As far as Scotland was concerned the issue was even more clear-cut. During the 1360s France was at peace with England. War against the English state could simply not be contemplated in these circumstances, as it would leave the Scots to face alone the greater military force of their southern neighbour. In 1359 a Franco-Scottish treaty was drafted which envisaged joint war against England. Even with France offering direct support in the war the Scots needed an attractive deal to sway them: France was to provide substantial monetary assistance with the ransom payments due to England. The treaty was never actually ratified and when France and England agreed the treaty of Bretigny in 1360, one of the terms stipulated the repudiation by France of its alliance with Scotland.8 In this international situation the Scots could not contemplate major provocation of England. When both governments had the will, as they did prior to 1369, they were largely able to control border violence; and when it did occur it did not provoke wider Anglo-Scottish conflict.

One of the problems involved in investigating late medieval Anglo-Scottish warfare is partly solved by reference to the largely peaceful years between 1357 and 1368. The unruly borderers of both realms have been blamed for much of the conflict occurring in the late fourteenth century, yet such an approach is at a loss to account for the vast fluctuations evident in the scale of border violence. Why, if the marchers were the main cause of armed conflict, were they sometimes so controllable, sometimes not?9 We must clearly look beyond exclusively local causes to make sense of the varying intensity in the pattern of late fourteenth-century conflict. To dismiss the marchers as the sole cause of warfare is not to eliminate the problem of their role completely. They clearly did engage in raiding activities which were not sanctioned by their respective governments. Such behaviour was criminal. We might also expect it to have increased at times when there was more widespread Anglo-Scottish conflict. The dividing line (especially during times of official truce) between illegal activities and those sanctioned by government remains a difficult one to establish.10 Leaving unruly marchers aside for the moment, another explanation for conflict, connected but not identical, sees the Scottish nobility (‘overmighty magnates’ in traditional parlance) pursuing personal aims through military means. They are said to have been able to do this without restraint from the crown under the allegedly weak kingship of Robert II (from 1371). More recently it has been strongly suggested that the very nature of Scottish border lordship encouraged, or even actively demanded, high levels of military activity.11 One starting point for investigating this ‘overmighty magnate’ theory is to examine the extent of the English occupation of southern Scotland in 1369, its nature, and the beginnings of what would be a lengthy process of Scottish reconquest in the region.

Of the English possessions in southern Scotland their position in the west was most isolated.12 Since 1360 it had been agreed to divide the rents of Annandale with the Scots, while in 1366 they were granted a degree of joint administration of the lands in question. These measures indicate that the English presence in the area was not entirely secure. David II seems also to have enjoyed physical control over at least some parts of Annandale in the 1360s. In 1361 a contribution towards a Scottish national tax was levied from the deanery of Annandale. The Scottish king also issued charters granting Annandale lands, one of which, granted in 1362, was dated at Mouswald, within the lordship itself.13 It would seem that the English administration in Annandale during the 1360s amounted to rather less than the extensive lands originally granted to Edward de Bohun in 1334, which included the whole of Annandale and Moffatdale. We know little more than this about the extent of English control in the lordship of Annandale, which was in the private hands of a magnate family, until it reverted to the English crown on the death of the earl of Hereford in 1373.14 Only then are the Annandale rents accounted for at the English exchequer, and this allows us to gain a clearer picture of their extent. We can assume with some safety that the extent of English control was at least as great in 1369 (because the Scottish reconquest began in earnest atfer that date) as the area of occupation indicated by the accounts from 1373.

We can be fairly sure, also, that by 1369 communications between Annandale and Cumberland were at best tenuous, and that with the other English-occupied lands in Roxburghshire and Berwickshire they were probably non-existent. Traversing the Scottish border areas from west to east was, at the best of times, difficult due to the topography of the region.15 The English administration in Teviotdale, in the central borders, lay approximately 35 miles north-east of Annandale; and the intervening countryside was rugged and difficult. Since Eskdale was in Scottish hands at this time, the main transverse route that the English could possibly have used would have been Liddesdale. In 1365 Edward III extended his protection to John Thirwall and his tenants in ‘Grenhowe’ and ‘Rileygh’ in Liddesdale, suggesting at least a hint of some English control in the valley. The castle of Hermitage in Liddesdale had, however, been captured by William, earl of Douglas in 1358.16 The Scots controlled northern Liddesdale at least, effectively cutting off the route from English-controlled Annandale to English-controlled Teviotdale.

In the central borders, English control in Roxburghshire was described by the line of the Tweed and Teviot rivers, and in 1364 at least, extended as far as Hawick. South and east of this line there appears to have been a solid English presence as far as the Border-line itself.17 Jedburgh and Jedforest were held by Sir Henry Percy in 1369, one of the greatest of northern English magnates and future earl of Northumberland.18 He probably enjoyed undisturbed possession here since it is only in the 1370s that a feud with the earl of Douglas over these lands appears to have developed. David II was able, however, to appoint Scottish sheriffs of Roxburghshire and levy taxes in the county. English control in Roxburghshire does not, in fact, seem to have extended far north and west of the Tweed/Teviot line. Kelso and the barony of Ednam were in English hands, for instance, but according to a complaint of Alexander de Mowbray in 1361 Makerston, a place situated only five miles further along the Tweed, was not.19 The English occupation in Roxburghshire was anchored by the castles of Jedburgh and Roxburgh. With Carham, Wark and Norham further down the Tweed and the fortified town of Berwick there existed a chain of English strength stretching from the heart of Roxburghshire to the sea.

We can gain a reasonably accurate picture of the extent of English control in Berwickshire through use of the accounts of the chamberlain of Berwick, the officer with administrative responsibility in the county. From 1369–70 onwards these give considerable detail of the rents received from the occupied lands, and of those rents which should have been levied but could not be due to recovery by the Scots. The process of reconquest had occurred in a number of places by the time of the 1369–70 account.20 Scottish reconquest, it is argued below, was most unlikely to have occurred on a large scale prior to 1369, so it can be assumed that the English administration was accustomed to levying rents from the places mentioned in the 1369–70 account throughout the 1360s. The pattern of occupation amounts to virtually the whole of the Merse, the low-lying coastal plain of Berwickshire, embracing the lands of Coldingham Priory and reaching the foothills of the Lammermuirs in the east but contracting sharply towards the Tweed further west beyond Kelso. There is no evidence, however, that Fast Castle was in English hands at this time as has been claimed.21 Instead, brief English control over the castle in the early fifteenth century was due to the switch in allegiance at that time of its Scottish owner, George Dunbar, earl of March.

Until 1369 this de facto border between the Scottish and English allegiances probably remained fairly stable. The existence of the occupied zone did nonetheless constitute a latent threat to the peace of the region. Clearly, Scottish landowners had a material interest in regaining lands to which they had a claim while their English counterparts were keen to retain possession. Even in the placid 1360s this dichotomy would lead to actual confrontation. On 10 February 1368, Patrick Dunbar, earl of March apparently seized the lands in Berwickshire which had belonged to Sir Edward de Letham who had died at Edward III’s allegiance two days previously. We do not know if force was used to achieve this and must assume that the earl did not retain possession for long as many of the lands at issue were deep within the area of English control. This incident serves, however, as a prefigurement of the larger-scale activities still to come and also, perhaps, of the belligerent career of George Dunbar, who was shortly to inherit the earldom of March. It may have been George, rather than the octogenarian Earl Patrick (who was soon to die) who was responsible for this aggressive demonstration.22

Apart from enjoyment of the profits of the lands at issue, the English had a further incentive for retaining, and the Scots for trying to reduce, their hold on southern Scotland. This was the value of the area as a buffer zone protecting northern England from Scottish raids. In 1541 the inhabitants of Kidland, Northumberland, looked back to the period when the English controlled Teviotdale as one of prosperity and high population. For the Scots, of course, the reverse was true: the occupation brought areas relatively distant from the Border proper into close proximity to the area under English administration. A Scottish grant of lands in Roxburghshire to William Cochrane in 1360 hints at the resultant insecurity, stipulation being made for the maintenance of men-at-arms and horses in time of war and peace. Scots in the occupied zone may have had still stronger reasons for wishing to rid Scotland of the English presence. They were, as we have seen in the case of Annandale, exposed to criminal raiding by both Scottish and English forces. There is evidence, too, that Scots at English allegiance, in Roxburghshire at any rate, were discriminated against by the crown’s officers.23

The early stages of the Scottish reconquest of these English-occupied lands are clearly demonstrated by the accounts of the chamberlain of Berwick. The 1369–70 account mentions nine places in Berwickshire which rendered nothing due to occupation by the Scots enemies. Fifteen other lands are mentioned, paying dues in the normal manner. The account of 1370–1 records Scottish occupation of a further two places, although one that had been reoccupied by the Scots, Thornydykes, appears to have reverted to English control.24 The topographical pattern of the Scottish reconquest is, as one might expect, that the lands retaken tended to be those furthest from Berwick and the Tweed. By 1371 the places still returning rents to the English administration in Berwick were no further than five miles from the river, with the exception of Thornydykes. Other evidence from around this time supports the pattern of English control tending to remain near the Tweed.25 On the accession of Robert II the English occupation of Berwickshire, bar the lands of Coldingham, which were inhabited by monks of Durham, had been reduced to a fairly narrow strip of land.

It seems most unlikely that this re-occupation by the Scots on the East March occurred before 1369. On 27 and 31 March of that year the burgesses of Berwick petitioned Edward III to renew the commission of John Bolton as chamberlain of the town. Among the reasons for this request they mention the good peace they have been at with the Scots during Bolton’s tenure.26 This does not sound like the voice of merchants witnessing the substantial erosion of their natural hinterland. By February 1371, in contrast, Edward III was ordering an inquisition into the claim by John Bolton, whose appointment had been renewed, that he could not levy rents from certain burgages, as some were empty, others destroyed by Scots and others occupied by them. Berwick itself had been attacked and so had Northumberland, more heavily than at any time since the 1350s. The sheriff of the county, Richard Horseley, was excused from accounting for rents he had been unable to levy since Northumberland was ‘so wasted by frequent incursions of the Scots, lately coming in warlike manner’.27 These attacks were surely connected with the process of reconquest. They were also the early portents of what would be a lasting nightmare for the English North.

Evidence of both Scottish reconquest and conflict itself is much scantier for the Middle and West Marches. This may be partly because of a lack of evidence. Alan Strother, English sheriff of Roxburgh, did not render accounts to the chamberlain of Berwick for Roxburghshire in either 1369–70 or 1370–1, so very few lands and rents of the county are mentioned in the chamberlain’s returns. In 1369–70, however, the lands of Fairnington yielded 50 shillings, but are said in the next account to have been occupied by Sir Archibald Douglas and to be yielding nothing to the English administration.28 Fairnington lies between the Tweed and the Teviot, but we have scant information as to whether Teviotdale itself, or the area south of it towards the Border, was being infiltrated by the Scots at this stage. Charter evidence, however, would suggest that the earl of Douglas controlled the barony of Cavers on the Slitrig Water south of Hawick. This was within potential striking distance of Percy-occupied Jedforest.29

There is even less evidence regarding Scottish reconquest in Annandale, though there are signs of increased tensions in that area too. A charter of 1369, for instance, granted by George Dunbar, earl of March (who had by now succeeded Earl Patrick) contains a clause of warrandice engaging to defend certain Dumfriesshire lands against those adhering to the English allegiance.30 This suggests, perhaps, that the uncompromising attitude of the new earl readily transferred itself to the West March, and that there was a perceived danger of an English backlash there. Tension, too, can be seen in the indenture of March 1371 whereby the current lord of Annandale, the earl of Hereford, engaged William Stapleton to undertake the ward of Lochmaben Castle and the lordship. Although the stipulations of this indenture are similar to previous ones, there is a new clause that the keeper should have the castle provisioned for six months, within which time the earl should relieve any siege. An increase in wages was to be given to Stapleton in the case of war and the possible death or capture of the keeper was also allowed for. Works undertaken to improve the defences of Carlisle Castle in 1369–71 seem to have been advanced with some urgency.31

There is, then, no evidence of a widespread Scottish reconquest in the western and central borders, in contrast to the situation in Berwickshire. Possibly rent-sharing arrangements agreed in 1369 for English-held lands in Annandale and Roxburghshire, but not in Berwickshire, can help to explain this. If so it is a hint that there was some sophistication in the Scottish offensive of these years. The important point, however, is the timing of this offensive, consisting in the east at least of raiding as well as re-occupation of lands. If we regard ‘overmighty’ nobles as to blame for such activities (we have already seen that lesser borderers cannot solely be blamed for raiding of this magnitude) then we must account for the upsurge in their aggression occurring in 1369. If there was a problem of governmental control of magnate military activity then it started in the reign of the assertive David II rather than in that of the supposedly weak Robert II.

Was the government of David II actually supporting, rather than failing to curb, these activities in 1369–1371? A closer glance at the involvement of Sir Archibald Douglas ‘the Grim’ in the Scottish re-occupation has particular bearing on this issue. A royal servant of impeccable pedigree throughout the reign of David II, he seems the most unlikely of figures to be engaging in unsanctioned breaches of the truce. In 1364 Douglas first appears in the role of warden of the Scottish West March, which he was to hold for the rest of his career, by taking part in the Annandale arrangements with the keeper of Lochmaben, Sir John Multon. In 1369, he was granted Eastern Galloway, mention being made in the charter of his unspecified labours and services on behalf of the crown.32 The suggestion has been made that these services were especially connected with helping to convince the men of Galloway to come back to the allegiance of the king of Scots in the early 1350s. It would seem that Archibald the Grim was being established on the West March as a reliable bulwark against treason or English invasion, and, by 1371, as a means to encroach on the English-occupied lands. His military credentials were strong and included continental experience: at the battle of Poitiers in 1356, Douglas was captured by the English fighting for France. He also went on embassies to France, including one in 1371 during which he negotiated two Franco-Scottish treaties, one of which had terms so aggressive towards England in intent that it appears to have been rejected by the rest of the Scottish political community.33 Clearly, Sir Archibald Douglas was no friend of the English; the Scottish government must have realised this, and his deployment on the West March may indicate a more belligerent Scottish governmental attitude towards England from 1369.

With this possible governmental perspective in mind, the year 1369 acquires a further significance: the reason for the sudden application of military pressure was the international situation, which allowed Scotland to pursue a more aggressive attitude towards the English. The Scottish position relative to England was vastly strengthened by Anglo-French war, which broke out in this year. Indeed, it has been claimed that throughout the 1360s ‘the impetus in war passed imperceptibly to Scotland and to France’.34 In the tangle of alliances and autonomous powers associated with the wider Anglo-French conflict a number of diplomatic defeats at the hands of France in the 1360s ensured that England entered the war in 1369 in a vulnerable position. As early as 1364 France had achieved some important aims. Although France was defeated in war against Brittany, England’s ally, the diplomatic settlement effectively neutralised the duchy. The constant threat to France of the rogue Pyrenean ruler, Charles of Navarre, had meanwhile been crushed militarily. A serious reverse was suffered by England over the marriage of Margaret, the heiress of Flanders and other extensive continental lands (Burgundy, Artois, Nevers and Rethal). She had been contracted to marry Edmund Langley, fourth surviving son of Edward III in 1364, but French pressure at the papal curia led to the refusal of a dispensation for the marriage. Agreement was finally reached instead between France and Flanders in April 1369 for the marriage of Margaret with Philip, duke of Burgundy, brother of the king of France. Another powerful potential ally had been cut off from England; the diplomatic prelude to the real war was being comprehensively lost.35

It was in Castile, the most powerful kingdom in the Iberian peninsula, that the worst pre-war set-back for England was to occur. By 1362 the French were making arrangements for military intervention in Castile in favour of Enrique of Trastamara, pretender to the throne, against King Pedro I, who had recently concluded an alliance with England. In 1366 these plans became a reality, when with the aid of mercenary forces sponsored by France and led by Bertrand du Guesclin, ostensibly engaged only in private enterprise, Pedro I of Castile was chased out of his kingdom and Enrique of Trastamara was established on the throne. In the following year Edward III’s son the Black Prince responded to this worrying development. From Gascony, the English-controlled region in south-western France, the prince led a force into Castile which succeeded in defeating Trastamara and his French allies at Najera. The pro-English regime of Pedro I was re-established.36 War trailed on, however, and it was Enrique of Trastamara who finally triumphed in 1369; he ensured the establishment of a strong Franco-Castilian alliance. This was serious for England; Castile possessed a powerful fleet of galleys which, in a war situation, would now aid the French. Given these international developments it is not surprising that in 1369 it was France that initiated a further phase in the long wars with England. The heavy defeats suffered by France earlier in the century were a fading memory. In this new war France held the initiative. The English hold on Gascony had already been heavily undermined by the French in the long preamble to the renewal of war.37 To add to the problems facing England, the situation in Ireland continued to deteriorate for the Anglo-Irish administration. French confidence was high enough in 1369 to contemplate vigorous offensive war against England, and a revamped fleet was being prepared to invade across the Channel, although this plan was interrupted by an English invasion of France.38

There were various means by which the Scots may have gathered knowledge of these political and military developments further afield. Merchants, pilgrims, students and suppliants to the papal curia were in a position to provide a regular supply of information from the continent. Scots were also employed as mercenaries, not least in the service of England: large numbers of them were employed in the garrison of English-held Calais in 1370. Numerous Scots were also said to have been captured in 1367 fighting in French service in Castile at the battle of Najera.39 Soldiers such as these would have returned to Scotland with accurate, first-hand accounts of the military affairs of Europe. When French envoys appeared in Scotland in 1369, we can be sure that they furnished the Scots with details of the difficulties being encountered by England in Europe. The English knew about such envoys and did what they could to stop them: in 1369 Walter Frost of Kingston-upon-Hull was paid by the English exchequer for taking eight ships ‘beyond seas in the North, as well to resist divers French and Danish enemies as to intercept the messengers of the King of France, being in Scotland.’40

The diplomatic and military situation in Europe had an enormous effect on Anglo-Scottish relations. This was manifested in aggressive Scottish self-confidence in the borders after 1369, and in the field of diplomacy. In the early 1360s, with Scotland defaulting on the outstanding ransom payments for David II and with peace reigning on the continent, England was in an extremely strong position relative to Scotland. It seems that the Scots were willing to discuss carefully the English offer of peace in return for the prospect of Edward III or one of his sons succeeding to the throne of Scotland. The Scots rejected these offers and had to face the consequences, a further ransom agreement committing the Scots to a larger total payment, £100,000, with the previous sums paid by the Scots disregarded. The truce was to last for only five years and could be cancelled on six months notice thereafter.41