Erhalten Sie Zugang zu diesem und mehr als 300000 Büchern ab EUR 5,99 monatlich.
- Herausgeber: Science & Technology Publishing
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
British Canals: Is Their Resuscitation Practicable? is a comprehensive exploration of the history, decline, and potential revival of the canal system in Britain, authored by Edwin A. Pratt. First published in the early 20th century, the book delves into the origins and development of British canals, which once formed the backbone of the nation’s industrial transport network. Pratt meticulously examines the factors that led to the decline of canals, including the rise of railways and changes in commercial practices, and he presents a detailed analysis of the economic, social, and logistical challenges facing their restoration. The book is both a historical account and a forward-looking treatise, offering insights into the technical and financial feasibility of reviving the canal system for modern use. Pratt draws on a wealth of data, case studies, and contemporary opinions, providing readers with a nuanced understanding of the canals’ significance to British industry and society. He discusses the potential benefits of canal resuscitation, such as alleviating railway congestion, reducing transportation costs, and fostering regional development. Throughout, Pratt’s writing is informed by a deep appreciation for the engineering achievements of the canal era and a pragmatic assessment of the obstacles to their renewal. He addresses questions of ownership, management, and government policy, and he considers the experiences of other countries in maintaining and modernizing their waterways. British Canals: Is Their Resuscitation Practicable? remains a valuable resource for historians, transport enthusiasts, and anyone interested in the interplay between infrastructure, commerce, and national progress.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 230
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025
Das E-Book (TTS) können Sie hören im Abo „Legimi Premium” in Legimi-Apps auf:
Ähnliche
The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.
BRITISH CANALS
AQUEDUCT AT PONTCYSYLLTE (IN THE DISTANCE).
(Constructed by Telford to carry Ellesmere Canal over River Dee. Opened 1803. Cost £47,000. Length, 1007 feet.)
[Frontispiece.
BRITISH CANALS:
IS THEIR RESUSCITATION PRACTICABLE?
BY EDWIN A. PRATT
AUTHOR OF "RAILWAYS AND THEIR RATES," "THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE," "THE TRANSITION IN AGRICULTURE," ETC.
LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1906
PREFACE
The appointment of a Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways, which first sat to take evidence on March 21, 1906, is an event that should lead to an exhaustive and most useful enquiry into a question which has been much discussed of late years, but on which, as I hope to show, considerable misapprehension in regard to actual facts and conditions has hitherto existed.
Theoretically, there is much to be said in favour of canal restoration, and the advocates thereof have not been backward in the vigorous and frequent ventilation of their ideas. Practically, there are other all-important considerations which ought not to be overlooked, though as to these the British Public have hitherto heard very little. As a matter of detail, also, it is desirable to see whether the theory that the decline of our canals is due to their having been "captured" and "strangled" by the railway companies—a theory which many people seem to believe in as implicitly as they do, say, in the Multiplication Table—is really capable of proof, or whether that decline is not, rather, to be attributed to wholly different causes.
In view of the increased public interest in the general question, it has been suggested to me that the Appendix on "The British Canal Problem" in my book on "Railways and their Rates," published in the Spring of 1905, should now be issued separately; but I have thought it better to deal with the subject afresh, and at somewhat greater length, in the present work. This I now offer to the world in the hope that, even if the conclusions at which I have arrived are not accepted, due weight will nevertheless be given to the important—if not (as I trust I may add) the interesting—series of facts, concerning the past and present of canals alike at home, on the Continent, and in the United States, which should still represent, I think, a not unacceptable contribution to the present controversy.
EDWIN A. PRATT.
London, April 1906.
CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
BRITISH CANALS
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTORY
The movement in favour of resuscitating, if not also of reconstructing, the British canal system, in conjunction with such improvement as may be possible in our natural waterways, is a matter that concerns various interests, and gives rise to a number of more or less complicated problems.
It appeals in the most direct form to the British trader, from the point of view of the possibility of enabling him to secure cheaper transit for his goods. Every one must sympathise with him in that desire, and there is no need whatever for me to stay here to repeat the oft-expressed general reflections as to the important part which cheap transit necessarily plays in the development of trade and commerce. But when from the general one passes to the particular, and begins to consider how these transit questions apply directly to canal revival, one comes at once to a certain element of insincerity in the agitation which has arisen.
There is no reason whatever for doubt that, whereas one section of the traders favouring canal revival would themselves directly benefit therefrom, there is a much larger section who have joined in the movement, not because they have the slightest idea of re-organising their own businesses on a water-transport basis, but simply because they think the existence of improved canals will be a means of compelling the railway companies to grant reductions of their own rates below such point as they now find it necessary to maintain. Individuals of this type, though admitting they would not use the canals themselves, or very little, would have us believe that there are enough of other traders who would patronise them to make them pay. In any case, if only sufficient pressure could be brought to bear on the railway companies to force them to reduce their rates and charges, they would be prepared to regard with perfect equanimity the unremunerative outlay on the canals of a large sum of public money, and be quite indifferent as to who might have to bear the loss so long as they gained what they wanted for themselves.
The subject is, also, one that appeals to engineers. As originally constructed, our British canals included some of the greatest engineering triumphs of their day, and the reconstruction either of these or even of the ordinary canals (especially where the differences of level are exceptionally great), would afford much interesting work for engineers—and, also, to come to commonplace details, would put into circulation a certain number of millions of pounds sterling which might lead some of those engineers, at least, to take a still keener interest in the general situation. There is absolutely no doubt that, from an engineering standpoint, reconstruction, however costly, would present no unsurmountable technical difficulties; but I must confess that when engineers, looking at the problem exclusively from their own point of view, apart from strictly economic and practical considerations, advise canal revival as a means of improving British trade, I am reminded of the famous remark of Sganerelle, in Molière's "L'Amour Médecin"—"Vous êtes orfévre, M. Josse."
The subject strongly appeals, also, to a very large number of patriotic persons who, though having no personal or professional interests to serve, are rightly impressed with the need for everything that is in any way practicable being done to maintain our national welfare, and who may be inclined to assume, from the entirely inadequate facts which, up to the present, have been laid before them as to the real nature and possibilities of our canal system, that great results would follow from a generous expenditure of money on canal resuscitation here, following on the example already set in Continental countries. It is in the highest degree desirable that persons of this class should be enabled to form a clear and definite opinion on the subject in all its bearings, and especially from points of view that may not hitherto have been presented for their consideration.
Then the question is one of very practical interest indeed to the British taxpayer. It seems to be generally assumed by the advocates of canal revival that it is no use depending on private enterprise. England is not yet impoverished, and there is plenty of money still available for investment where a modest return on it can be assured. But capitalists, large or small, are not apparently disposed to risk their own money in the resuscitation of English canals. Their expectation evidently is that the scheme would not pay. In the absence, therefore, of any willingness on the part of shrewd capitalists—ever on the look-out for profitable investments—to touch the business, it is proposed that either the State or the local authorities should take up the matter, and carry it through at the risk, more or less, either of taxpayers or ratepayers.
The Association of Chambers of Commerce, for instance, adopted, by a large majority, the following resolution at its annual meeting, in London, in February 1905:—
"This Association recommends that the improvement and extension of the canal system of the United Kingdom should be carried out by means of a public trust, and, if necessary, in combination with local or district public trusts, and aided by a Government guarantee, and that the Executive Council be requested to take all reasonable measures to secure early legislation upon the subject."
Then Sir John T. Brunner has strongly supported a nationalisation policy. In a letter to The Times he once wrote:
"I submit to you that we might begin with the nationalisation of our canals—some for the most part sadly antiquated—and bring them up to one modern standard gauge, such as the French gauge."
Another party favours municipalisation and the creation of public trusts, a Bill with the latter object in view being promoted in the Session of 1905, though it fell through owing to an informality in procedure.
It would be idle to say that a scheme of canal nationalisation, or even of public trusts with "Government guarantee" (whatever the precise meaning of that term may be) involving millions of public money, could be carried through without affecting the British taxpayer. It is equally idle to say that if only the canal system were taken in hand by the local authorities they would make such a success of it that there would be absolutely no danger of the ratepayers being called upon to make good any deficiency. The experiences that Metropolitan ratepayers, at least, have had as the result of County Council management of the Thames steamboat service would not predispose them to any feeling of confidence in the control of the canal system of the country by local authorities.
At the Manchester meeting of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, in September 1904, Colonel F. N. Tannett Walker (Leeds) said, during the course of a debate on the canal question: "Personally, he was not against big trusts run by local authorities. He knew no more business-like concern in the world than the Mersey Harbour Board, which was a credit to the country as showing what business men, not working for their own selfish profits, but for the good of the community, could do for an undertaking. He would be glad to see the Mersey Boards scattered all over the country." But, even accepting the principle of canal municipalisation, what prospect would there be of Colonel Walker's aspiration being realised? The Mersey Harbour Board is an exceptional body, not necessarily capable of widespread reproduction on the same lines of efficiency. Against what is done in Liverpool may be put, in the case of London, the above-mentioned waste of public money in connection with the control of the Thames steamboat service by the London County Council. If the municipalised canals were to be worked on the same system, or any approach thereto, as these municipalised steamboats, it would be a bad look-out for the ratepayers of the country, whatever benefit might be gained by a small section of the traders.
Then one must remember that the canals, say, from the Midlands to one of the ports, run through various rural districts which would have no interest in the through traffic carried, but might be required, nevertheless, to take a share in the cost and responsibility of keeping their sections of the municipalised waterways in an efficient condition, or in helping to provide an adequate water-supply. It does not follow that such districts—even if they were willing to go to the expense or the trouble involved—would be able to provide representatives on the managing body who would in any way compare, in regard to business capacity, with the members of the Mersey Harbour Board, even if they did so in respect to public spirit, and the sinking of their local interests and prejudices to promote the welfare of manufacturers, say, in Birmingham, and shippers in Liverpool, for neither of whom they felt any direct concern.
Under the best possible conditions as regards municipalisation, it is still impossible to assume that a business so full of complications as the transport services of the country, calling for technical or expert knowledge of the most pronounced type, could be efficiently controlled by individuals who would be essentially amateurs at the business—and amateurs they would still be even if assisted by members of Chambers of Commerce who, however competent as merchants and manufacturers, would not necessarily be thoroughly versed in all these traffic problems. The result could not fail to be disastrous.
I come, at this point, in connection with the possible liability of ratepayers, to just one matter of detail that might be disposed of here. It is certainly one that seems to be worth considering. Assume, for the sake of argument, that, in accordance with the plans now being projected, (1) public trusts were formed by the local authorities for the purpose of acquiring and operating the canals; (2) that these trusts secured possession—on some fair system of compensation—of the canals now owned or controlled by railway companies; (3) that they sought to work the canals in more or less direct competition with the railways; (4) that, after spending large sums of money in improvements, they found it impossible to make the canals pay, or to avoid heavy losses thereon; and (5) that these losses had to be made good by the ratepayers. I am merely assuming that all this might happen, not that it necessarily would. But, admitting that it did, would the railway companies, as ratepayers, be called upon to contribute their share towards making good the losses which had been sustained by the local authorities in carrying on a direct competition with them?
Such a policy as this would be unjust, not alone to the railway shareholders, but also to those traders who had continued to use the railway lines, since it is obvious that the heavier the burdens imposed on the railway companies in the shape of local rates (which already form such substantial items in their "working expenses"), the less will the companies concerned be in a position to grant the concessions they might otherwise be willing to make. Besides, apart from monetary considerations, the principle of the thing would be intolerably unfair, and, if only to avoid an injustice, it would surely be enacted that any possible increase in local rates, due to the failure of particular schemes of canal municipalisation, should fall exclusively on the traders and the general public who were to have been benefited, and in no way on the railway companies against whom the commercially unsuccessful competition had been waged.
This proposition will, I am sure, appeal to that instinct of justice and fair play which every Englishman is (perhaps not always rightly), assumed to possess. But what would happen if it were duly carried out, as it ought to be? Well, in the Chapter on "Taxation of Railways" in my book on "Railways and their Rates," I gave one list showing that in a total of eighty-two parishes a certain British railway company paid an average of 60·25 per cent. of the local rates; while another table showed that in sixteen specified parishes the proportion of local rates paid by the same railway company ranged from 66·9 per cent. to 86·1 per cent. of the total, although in twelve parishes out of the sixteen the company had not even a railway station in the place. But if, in all such parishes as these, the railway companies were very properly excused from having to make good the losses incurred by their municipalised-canal competitors (in addition to such losses as they might have already suffered in meeting the competition), then the full weight of the burden would fall upon that smaller—and, in some cases, that very small—proportion of the general body of ratepayers in the locality concerned.
The above is just a little consideration, en passant, which might be borne in mind by others than those who look at the subject only from a trader's or an engineer's point of view. It will help, also, to strengthen my contention that any ill-advised, or, at least, unsuccessful municipalisation of the canal system of the country might have serious consequences for the general body of the community, who, in the circumstances, would do well to "look before they leap."
But, independently of commercial, engineering, rating and other considerations, there are important matters of principle to be considered. Great Britain is almost the only country in the world where the railway system has been constructed without State or municipal aid—financial or material—of any kind whatever. The canals were built by "private enterprise," and the railways which followed were constructed on the same basis. This was recognised as the national policy, and private investors were allowed to put their money into British railways, throughout successive decades, in the belief and expectation that the same principle would be continued. In other countries the State has (1) provided the funds for constructing or buying up the general railway system; (2) guaranteed payment of interest; or (3) has granted land or made other concessions, as a means of assisting the enterprise. Not only has the State refrained from adopting any such course here, and allowed private investors to bear the full financial risk, but it has imposed on British railways requirements which may certainly have led to their being the best constructed and the most complete of any in the world, but which have, also, combined with the extortions of landowners in the first instance, heavy expenditure on Parliamentary proceedings, etc., to render their construction per mile more costly than those of any other system of railways in the world; while to-day local taxation is being levied upon them at the rate of £5,000,000 per annum, with an annual increment of £250,000.
This heavy expenditure, and these increasingly heavy demands, can only be met out of the rates and charges imposed on those who use the railways; and one of the greatest grievances advanced against the railways, and leading to the agitation for canal revival, is that these rates and charges are higher in Great Britain than in various other countries, where the railways have cost less to build, where State funds have been freely drawn on, and where the State lines may be required to contribute nothing to local taxation. The remedy proposed, however, is not that anything should be done to reduce the burdens imposed on our own railways, so as to place them at least in the position of being able to make further concessions to traders, but that the State should now itself start in the business, in competition, more or less, with the railway companies, in order to provide the traders—if it can—with something cheaper in the way of transport!
Whatever view may be taken of the reasonableness and justice of such a procedure as this, it would, undoubtedly, represent a complete change in national policy, and one that should not be entered upon with undue haste. The logical sequel, for instance, of nationalisation of the canals would be nationalisation of the railways, since it would hardly do for the State to own the one and not the other. Then, of course, the nationalisation of all our ports would have to follow, as the further logical sequel of the State ownership of the means of communication with them, and the consequent suppression of competition. From a Socialist standpoint, the successive steps here mentioned would certainly be approved; but, even if the financial difficulty could be met, the country is hardly ready for all these things at present.
Is it ready, even in principle, for either the nationalisation or the municipalisation of canals alone? And, if ready in principle, if ready to employ public funds to compete with representatives of the private enterprise it has hitherto encouraged, is it still certain that, when millions of pounds sterling have been spent on the revival of our canals, the actual results will in any way justify the heavy expenditure? Are not the physical conditions of our country such that canal construction here presents exceptional drawbacks, and that canal navigation must always be exceptionally slow? Are not both physical and geographical conditions in Great Britain altogether unlike those of most of the Continental countries of whose waterways so much is heard? Are not our commercial conditions equally dissimilar? Is not the comparative neglect of our canals due less to structural or other defects than to complete changes in the whole basis of trading operations in this country—changes that would prevent any general discarding of the quick transit of small and frequent supplies by train, in favour of the delayed delivery of large quantities at longer intervals by water, however much the canals were improved?
These are merely some of the questions and considerations that arise in connection with this most complicated of problems, and it is with the view of enabling the public to appreciate more fully the real nature of the situation, and to gain a clearer knowledge of the facts on which a right solution must be based, that I venture to lay before them the pages that follow.
CHAPTER IIEARLY DAYS
It seems to be customary with writers on the subject of canals and waterways to begin with the Egyptians, to detail the achievements of the Chinese, to record the doings of the Greeks, and then to pass on to the Romans, before even beginning their account of what has been done in Great Britain. Here, however, I propose to leave alone all this ancient history, which, to my mind, has no more to do with existing conditions in our own country than the system of inland navigation adopted by Noah, or the character of the canals which are supposed to exist in the planet of Mars.
For the purposes of the present work it will suffice if I go no further back than what I would call the "pack-horse period" in the development of transport in England. This was the period immediately preceding the introduction of artificial canals, which had their rise in this country about 1760-70. It preceded, also, the advent of John Loudon McAdam, that great reformer of our roads, whose name has been immortalised in the verb "to macadamise." Born in 1756, it was not until the early days of the nineteenth century that McAdam really started on his beneficent mission, and even then the high-roads of England—and especially of Scotland—were, as a rule, deplorably bad, "being at once loose, rough, and perishable, expensive, tedious and dangerous to travel on, and very costly to repair." Pending those improvements which McAdam brought about, adapting them to the better use of stage-coaches and carriers' waggons, the few roads already existing were practically available—as regards the transport of merchandise—for pack-horses only. Even coal was then carried by pack-horse, the cost working out at about 2s. 6d. per mile for as much as a horse could carry.
It was from these conditions that canals saved the country—long, of course, before the locomotive came into vogue. As it happened, too, it was this very question of coal transport that led to their earliest development. There is quite an element of romance in the story. Francis Egerton, third and last Duke of Bridgewater (born 1736), had an unfortunate love affair in London when he reached the age of twenty-three, and, apparently in disgust with the world, he retired to his Lancashire property, where he found solace to his wounded feelings by devoting himself to the development of the Worsley coal mines. As a boy he had been so feeble-minded that the doubt arose whether he would be capable of managing his own affairs. As a young man disappointed in love, he applied himself to business in a manner so eminently practical that he deservedly became famous as a pioneer of improved transport. He saw that if only the cost of carriage could be reduced, a most valuable market for coal from his Worsley mines could be opened up in Manchester.
It is true that, in this particular instance, the pack-horse had been supplemented by the Mersey and Irwell Navigation, established as the result of Parliamentary powers obtained in 1733. This navigation was conducted almost entirely by natural waterways, but it had many drawbacks and inconveniences, while the freight for general merchandise between Liverpool and Manchester by this route came to 12s. per ton. The Duke's new scheme was one for the construction of an artificial waterway which could be carried over the Irwell at Barton by means of an aqueduct. This idea he got from the aqueduct on the Languedoc Canal, in the south of France.
But the Duke required a practical man to help him, and such a man he found in James Brindley. Born in 1716, Brindley was the son of a small farmer in Derbyshire—a dissolute sort of fellow, who neglected his children, did little or no work, and devoted his chief energies to the then popular sport of bull-baiting. In the circumstances James Brindley's school-teaching was wholly neglected. He could no more have passed an examination in the Sixth Standard than he could have flown over the Irwell with some of his ducal patron's coals. "He remained to the last illiterate, hardly able to write, and quite unable to spell. He did most of his work in his head, without written calculations or drawings, and when he had a puzzling bit of work he would go to bed, and think it out." From the point of view of present day Board School inspectors, and of the worthy magistrates who, with varied moral reflections, remorselessly enforce the principles of compulsory education, such an individual ought to have come to a bad end. But he didn't. He became, instead, "the father of inland navigation."
James Brindley had served his apprenticeship to a millwright, or engineer; he had started a little business as a repairer of old machinery and a maker of new; and he had in various ways given proof of
