Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm E-Book

Philip Gamaghelyan

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 443

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

Conflict Resolution holds the promise of freeing approaches and policies with regard to politics of identity from the fatalistic grip of realism. While the conceptual literature on identity and conflicts has moved in this alternative direction, conflict resolution practice continues to rely on realist frames and acts as an unwanted auxiliary to traditional International Relations (IR). Perpetuation of conflict discourses, marginalization, and exclusion of affected populations are widespread. They are caused by the over-reliance of conflict resolution practice on the binary frames of classic IR paradigms and also by the competitive and hierarchical relationships within the field itself. Philip Gamaghelyan relies on participatory action research (PAR) and collective auto-ethnography to expose patterns of exclusion and marginalization as well as the paradoxical reproduction of conflict-promoting frames in current conflict-resolution practice applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian crises. He builds on the work of post-modernist scholars, on reflective practice, and on discourse analysis to explore alternative and inclusive strategies with a transformative potential through reflections and actions customary for PAR. The IR discipline, that has dominated policy-making, is only one possible lens, and often a deficient one, for defining, preventing, or resolving contemporary conflicts wrapped in identity politics. Other conceptual frameworks can help to rethink our understanding of identity and conflicts and reconstruct them as performative and not static phenomena. These transformative frameworks are increasingly influential in the conflict resolution field and can be applied to policy-making.

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgments

Foreword

Abbreviations

Introduction

Questions I am aiming to address

The organization of the text

Part I

Chapter 1

Binary frames in conflict resolution

Realist theories of international relations

Liberal theories of international relations

In the shadow of Track 1: interactive problem solving

Alternative to binary frames in conflict resolution

Multitrack models of conflict resolution

Network theory

The third side

Constructivist trends in conflict analysis

Reflective and elicitive practice

Theories of ethnicity and nationalism

Critical theory

Structuration theory: segue into participatory research design

Chapter 2

Participatory action research

Case selection

Auto-ethnography

First-person action research and collective auto-ethnography

Second-person action research

Ethical considerations and limitations

Chapter 3

My background, the resulting perspective and subjectivity, and their role in this research

Part II

Chapter 4

The program design and implementation

Program design vs. program reality

Intermission

Back to dialogue

Methodological agony

Reframing

Getting real

Closure

Implications of the Syrian dialogue for this research: toward inclusive frames that do not privilege the violent extremes

Chapter 5

The Nagorno-Karabakh Analytic Initiative

The first meeting

The first full symposium

The second full symposium

Working group

Implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh Analytic Initiative for recognizing power dynamics and resulting exclusion, and marginalization

Part II postscript

Part III

Chapter 6

In the shadow of the international relations discourse

Practical implications of naming initiatives “Track 2”: impact on selection

Practical implications of naming initiatives “Track 2”: impact on dialogue

Leaving the shadow: addressing patterns of marginalization influenced by the international relations discourse

Conceptual alternatives

Evolving Designs: rethinking the language of mediation

Evolving Designs: rethinking dialogue and PSW

Evolving Designs in practice: transforming the Analytic Initiative

Chapter 6 postscript: gender and other binaries that affect conflict resolution practice

Chapter conclusions

Chapter 7

Formation of a single dominant faction within initiatives

Cultural intelligibility to the organizers

Reliance on a dominant discourse external to the initiative

Competition for domination and shifting marginalization

Recognizing and addressing domination and resulting marginalization

Chapter conclusions

Chapter 8

Competition among organizations

Walking the talk: the case for the organizations preaching cooperation to lead by example

Power struggles within teams

Addressing marginalization within teams

Chapter conclusions

Chapter 9

Reflection: the learning and the key findings

Action: Evolving Designs in Imagine Center’s recent initiatives

Questions for further research

Postscript

Bibliography

Copyright

Abstract

The field of conflict resolution holds the promise of freeing approaches and policies concerning politics of identity from the fatalistic grip of realism. While the conceptual literature on conflicts has moved in this alternative direction, conflict resolution practice continues to rely on realist frames and acts as an unwanted auxiliary to official processes. Perpetuation of conflict discourses, marginalization, and exclusion of affected populations are widespread, caused by the overreliance of conflict resolution practice on the binary frames of classic international relations paradigms and also by the competitive and hierarchical relationships within the field itself.

This book learns from the reflection and action cycles customary for participatory action research (PAR) and collective auto-ethnography to expose patterns of exclusion and marginalization as well as the paradoxical reproduction of conflict-promoting frames in current conflict resolution practices applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian cases. It builds on the work of postmodernist scholars, reflective practice, and discourse analysis to explore alternative and inclusive strategies and to propose the flexible methodology of Evolving Designs that carries a transformative potential for conflict resolution.

Acknowledgments

It is hard to find words to describe the depth of gratitude I feel to my family, friends, colleagues, and mentors for years of unwavering support that allowed me to complete this book that developed out of my dissertation.

First and foremost, I am grateful to my mentor, colleague, and dissertation committee chairDr. Susan Allen for her advice, challenge, ongoing communication, feedback, and suggestions on numerous drafts of each chapter. I am particularly grateful to Susan for encouraging me to develop my own voice in the field and to stay true to my constructivist belief system, for her support to my choice of a not-very-traditional to conflict resolution action research methodology that proved to be invaluable and innovative both for the findings in this book and the practices that it touched.

I am thankful to my dissertation committee member Dr. Susan Hirsch for her amazing deconstructive and reconstructive touch that helped me to rethink the entire organization and structure of this book. I am grateful to Susan for her support in helping me develop the ethnographic angle of my research. And I am grateful to her for my times as a Graduate Teaching Assistant in the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) undergraduate program, where thanks to Susan’s collegial approach, I felt a valued and integral part of the team working on innovation of curricula and teaching methods.

I am fascinated and feel extremely lucky to have worked with my dissertation committee member Dr. Jessica Srikantia, who effortlessly combined in her approach utmost care, emotional and intellectual support for my work, with an equally blunt challenge to the patriarchy, racism, classism, and many other “isms” subconsciously held by me and present in my writing. A great many of Jessica’s comments made me pause my work, re-engage in reading, reflection, and self-questioning, very often leading to cardinal changes in my approaches to this book, practice, and life in general.

I am grateful to the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University (GMU) for serving as my academic home during my PhD studies, and for the Dissertation Completion Grant that allowed me to concentrate on writing in the most intense stage of the research.

I am forever indebted to my close friend and colleague from the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation (Imagine Center), linguist, Maria Karapetyan, who fully deserves to be named the chief editor of this book. From the very first line of the proposal to the very last line of this book, Maria has been the person with whom I discussed every section of every draft of this book; she was the first reader, the main critic, and the adviser. No time did Maria show that this work has been a burden for her, though it took weeks if not months of her time. I cannot imagine finishing the book without Maria’s friendship and support.

I am very lucky to be surrounded in my work by a great team of friends and colleagues who are always supportive, always challenging, extremely smart and courageous, devoted to each other and the vision of peace. In addition to Maria Karapetyan, our team of current and former colleagues who supported me in writing this book includes Sona Dilanyan, Veronika Aghajanyan, Sergey Rumyansev, Pinar Sayan, Christopher Littlefield, Arzu Geybullayeva, Hamida Giyasbaily, Sevil Huseynova, and Zamira Abbasova. I want to thank them for their dedication, support, and the time spent reflecting, hearing, questioning, and advising. Most importantly, I am appreciative for their openness in allowing us to experiment in our practice with the insights gained through the action research process of my research. Without such support from the team, it would have been impossible to complete the “action” part of the reflection and action cycles of the research that resulted in this book. A particularly strong “thank you” goes to Sona Dilanyan on whose judgment and advice I relied when working through particularly sensitive passages.

I am grateful to my fellow students, Jacquelyn Greiff and Matthew Graville, in the Reflective Practice class at S-CAR, GMU, for all the time they devoted to reflection sessions that would support the research that resulted in this book. During the year-long period of our joint work on some of the Imagine Center’s projects, Jacquelyn’s perspicacity through all our reflective conversations in her office and on our flights to and from the project locations shaped many of the core ideas of this book.

I thank all the colleagues working in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian conflict contexts who participated in this researchand particularly its reflection and action part, yet who I cannot name in the interest of preserving their anonymity. The insights, findings, and innovations suggested here belong to them as much as they belong to me.

And I am most appreciative of the opportunity to express how incredibly lucky I am to have near me Zara Papyan—my best friend, my life partner, and my spouse—and my two boys Mark and Mikael, who tolerated me despite my continuous evening disappearances in the bedroom with books, papers, and laptops. I am deeply touched by the care, not least in form of an ongoing supply of tea and fruit, that kept me going through hours of writing, and for all the love expressed through undeserved hugs and cheers as I would emerge from my cave. I love you!

Foreword

Philip Gamaghelyan is not only the author of this book, but also an expert conflict resolution practitioner. The book you hold now represents a synthesis of expert insights from his years of practical engagement in conflict processes, presented with careful reflection. By pairing his own experience of over a decade of facilitation with reflective practice with colleagues and in-depth study of other conflict transformation literature, Philip offers us important insights that will inspire needed developments in the field of conflict resolution.

This book challenges us to create truly inclusive conflict transformation processes. So much of conflict is about exclusion. In deeply divided conflicts, the “other” is dehumanized, and their stories and perspectives dismissed. When we start to engage in these conflicts, getting to know them and their conversations, we begin to speak the conflict’s language. That language risks perpetuating the conflict. The book challenges us to ask how dialogues on conflict issues can avoid perpetuating these exclusionary dynamics?

I have faced the struggle with exclusionary dynamics in my own work. When Philip came to the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, he worked with me on a dialogue series called Point of View. The first of these dialogues had taken place at George Mason University’s conflict resolution retreat center, Point of View, just after the August 2008 war over South Ossetia. People from Tbilisi and Tskhinval(i) came together there and considered ways to address the ongoing humanitarian needs after the war. They needed each other to address issues such as missing persons (where information from the other side of the ceasefire line was helpful), prisoners held across the ceasefire line, etc. By the time Philip joined us in 2010, the dialogues had developed into a phase of increasing understanding across the dividing line. Philip was quick to point out to me that we had framed the dialogues as Georgian-South Ossetian dialogues. But, we also had people of mixed heritage participating in the dialogues. What of the participants who were part-Georgian and part-South Ossetian? Did the dialogues make them choose a side? Yes, they traveled to the dialogues from one side of the ceasefire line, but were they being constrained by the framing of the discussion as a two-sided conversation? Could they not also have unique perspectives, drawn from conversations with relatives across the dividing line? In fact, everyone on the dialogues each brought their own unique perspectives. With Philip’s encouragement, we incorporated more thematic discussions that did not need to be framed as two-sided. As we turned to look at what would make prisoner release possible, we became a group of individuals, each with his/her own connections to the prisoner release efforts, each with his/her own expertise, and we worked on solving a shared problem. Yes, some of the group could meet only with the leadership in South Ossetia, and, yes, some of the group could meet only with the leadership in Georgia, but these were not the only defining aspects of the expertise participants brought. Some were legal experts, some were media experts, some worked with displaced people who had vocal opinions on the prisoner release issues, and some visited prisoners to monitor human rights. Drawing on these various kinds of expertise was important to allow the dialogue group to lay the groundwork that made the eventual prisoner release possible. By seeing the complexity of each participant’s identity, we drew on the many strengths in the group.

All this points out that the suggestions offered by this book are timely and pragmatic. The book touches the core of the field of conflict analysis and resolution, asking us to improve our theory and our practices, and, ultimately, the structure of our field. Starting with how we conceive of conflict transformation dialogues, and how we invite individuals to join these dialogues, moving on to how a conflict mapping organically represents the people gathered in the room, based on their own ways of categorizing themselves, and then considering how to prevent dominant factions from commandeering conversations. Our field must build more inclusive structures, overcome the competition for funding that in practice makes a mockery of our theory of collaboration, and build teams that engage all members’ voices with respect. Philip’s many years of conflict resolution work allow him to speak with authority about approaches that have worked in practice.

The Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology that informs this work was also essential to its success. Philip writes not only from his own experience, but also from that of the colleagues that joined him as co-researchers, reflecting together on their experiments with more inclusive conflict resolution practices. By engaging colleagues as co-researchers, Philip assured he was not only examining others’ assumptions, but also putting his own assumptions up for examination. Philip’s own auto-ethnography is a core part of the book, allowing him to tell his own stories of his forays into conflict transformation. In addition, a major strength here is the collective auto-ethnography he captures based on group reflection of their shared work. I hope Philip’s work will be read not only for the important theoretical and practical insights offered here, but also as an example of methodological innovation that offers our field new possibilities in research. I see many more possibilities for the expansion of Participatory Action Research (PAR) in conflict resolution research.

In conclusion, I urge colleagues and students of conflict resolution to read this book attentively. Philip offers us guidance as we develop practices that more closely align with our constructivist and inclusive theories. And, he offers guidance on how to do conflict-appropriate research with PAR. There is, of course, still more to do in this direction. Philip is already working on more in-depth consideration of gender inclusivity in conflict transformation processes. And, I encourage readers to find additional ways to build on this revolutionary work.

Susan Allen, Ph.D.

Director, Center for Peacemaking Practice

Associate Professor, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

George Mason University

Abbreviations

ADR

Alternative Dispute Resolution

CDA

Critical Discourse Analysis

GMU

George Mason University

HSRB

Human Subjects Review Board

ICG

International Crisis Group

Imagine Center

Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation

ISIL

Islamic State of Levant

LGBTI

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NK

Nagorno-Karabakh

NKAO

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAR

Participatory Action Research

PSW

Problem-Solving Workshop

S-CAR

School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

SSR

Soviet Socialist Republic

Introduction

I entered the field of conflict analysis and resolution in 2004, and soon encountered interactive problem solving, also known as problem-solving workshop (PSW) and dialogue with their variations and adaptations as central methods of conflict resolution practice. Ever since, my career has been devoted to advancing conflict resolution practice in various areas of the world, primarily in the South Caucasus. At the initial stages of my conflict resolution career, I tried to learn the conventional methods of the field and apply them in conflict contexts where I worked. Later, I grew critical of some of the conventions. Among the first, I questioned the presumed need for the neutrality or impartiality of the facilitator and the suggestion to stay away from the history of conflict seen as a dividing phenomenon, and I worked on developing respective adaptations of the PSWs and dialogue. I strove to keep to their core, while experimenting with new elements, such as methods for working with memory and history or encouraging facilitation by insider-partials. Devotee to conflict resolution and believer in its inherent goodness, I would question the effectiveness of the practices employed, but not the rationale of specific practices themselves.

It was not until 2013, when I had an opportunity to work with a group of Syrian peace activists when I started suspecting that conflict resolution practices approached uncritically can sometimes not only fail to do good but could do harm. To quote Avruch, “concern with making our conflict interventions instrumentally effective raises—or should raise—ethical questions: efficiency for whom, in the service of what?” (Avruch 2012, 29). I saw the need to rethink my work, to rethink what I knew about conflict resolution and how I knew it.

From a conceptual standpoint, the conflict analysis and resolution theories do not always define conflict as a disagreement between or among preestablished sides. In conflict resolution practice, however, “sides” are central to our understanding of conflict. PSWs and dialogues are methods focused on the process of relationship building between or among the conflict sides and on interactive forms of imagining new solutions for addressing existing problems between or among them. The taken-for-granted assumption in these methods is the presence of a specific number of identifiable sides to conflict, typically of two sides. We commonly understand any conflict as a clash between them. From the beginning of the current Syrian conflict in 2011 and until 2013, when I started working on this book, the US and Western European media routinely portrayed it as a conflict between the Bashar Assad regime and the “opposition,” by 2014 adding the Islamic State of Levant (ISIL) as a “side” and later yet started framing Syria as a multilateral conflict. In these early days, however, the binary frames prevailed. The analyses of international think tanks were more nuanced than that of media and acknowledged the presence of multiple identity groups, such as Alewites, Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, the Syrian Army, the Free Syrian Army, and various non-armed opposition groups. The think tanks also, however, framed the conflict itself as a struggle between the regime and the opposition and tried to fit the identity groups into one or the other. A report on Syria produced by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2013 consistently referred to “the regime” and “the opposition” as units of analysis. It described Alewites as supporters of the regime, Sunnis as supporters of the opposition and used phrases such as “the opposition should,” showing that to the ICG, “the opposition” is an identifiable party to the conflict that is the binary opposite of the regime (“Syria’s Mutating Conflict—International Crisis Group” 2013). Such framings dictated approaches to respective conflict resolution efforts. As the conflict was framed to be between a dictatorial regime and a fragmented opposition, the early intervention efforts led by the United States and its allies were directed at supporting and consolidating the opposition. Further, as the fragmentation of opposition was often framed as consisting of one wing leaning toward Islamic fundamentalism and another leaning toward democratic reform, the efforts were directed at the strengthening of the democratic wing. Other interventions, such as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s effort, were attempting to find a mediated solution between the “two sides” (Annan 2012).

In 2013, the binary framing seemed natural to me as well. When invited to facilitate a workshop for a group of Syrian peace activists, my colleagues and I initially followed the convention and framed the initiative as a dialogue between Assad and opposition supporters, before discovering that only the small minority of those present self-identified as belonging to either of these sides. It dawned on me then that I knew of no method that would help me integrate a group of Syrians of no side into a conflict resolution process. When describing conflict, I had learned to use the binary framing by default, without questioning the influence that such framing and subsequent interventions can have on the conflict. On the example of Syria, as we framed it as a conflict between two sides, the support for a particular side or a mediation that brought the sides together was appropriate. However, were we to frame the Syrian context as a fluid and chaotic struggle of numerous agendas and cross-cutting identities still united under the umbrella of the overarching Syrian identity, then boiling it all down to an over-simplified notion of “regime vs. opposition” would do little to help the situation. Such an approach would arbitrarily assign individuals and identity groups to one side or the other exacerbating the dichotomy that might not have been otherwise clearly pronounced, and then in a manifestation of a self-fulfilling prophecy, tried to bridge the divide it had itself created.

This is not to say, of course, that it is the mediators or the conflict resolution practitioners who construct conflicts or that the binary frames are never acceptable. Conflicts are typically in place well before we intervene. However, we should be open to a possibility that our framing and interventions could do further damage; that assuming a binary every time we see a conflict can pave the way for solidifying one. Yes, starting from 2011, Syria had some defined conflict sides, such as the Assad regime and specific armed groups opposing the regime. Nevertheless, large parts of the population did not identify with any of these actors. Many Alewites and Christians, routinely considered by commentators of that time as pro-regime, were opposed to it while they also feared the armed opposition. Moreover, many of those opposing the regime included groups, such as various nonviolent movements, ethnic minorities, nonaligned youth groups, intellectuals, to name just a few, who were opposing the armed rebels just as much. More importantly, a great many people still identified themselves as Syrians, a shared identity, and strongly resisted any attempt to classify them as pro-regime, anti-regime, Alewite, Sunni, Kurdish, Islamist, or anything else that could suggest a division. Yet these voices were rarely heard, as they were neither “the regime” nor “the opposition.” They were excluded and marginalized, among others, by the conflict resolution community.1

My questioning started from my inability to apply the concept of “sides” in the context of a particular initiative that defied all analytic frames I was familiar with. It seemed a minor inconvenience at first, but at a closer look, turned out that “sides” were central to the literature on conflict resolution practice—the first fallen domino that would bring down many others as my research progressed.

Questions I am aiming to address

At the time of my involvement with the Syrian dialogue mentioned above, I was working actively on a research project titled “How is Change Sustained?” Convinced that conflict resolution practices inherently do good, I was concerned with improving their effectiveness and longer-term influence of the change they produce. Yet I was suddenly confronted with the realization that in the Syrian case, the conventional binary frame of the conflict resolution practices that I aimed to make more effective resulted in marginalization of the majority of Syrians.

This realization prompted me to explore whether the marginalization embedded in binary frames was unique to the evolving context of Syria, and whether the contexts where the binary frame had long been established, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, were better suited for conventional and binary dialogue designs. Or was it possible that binary frames could marginalize affected populations there too? And were the binary frames the only trap in the conflict resolution discourse that had the potential to marginalize? I did not know the answers, but I knew that I could no longer assume that change produced by conflict resolution practice was necessarily positive and ask, “How is Change Sustained?” I now had a prior question: what were the possible variants of that change and was it possible that some of the change produced marginalization or other harm?

My main intention for this book is not solely to be critical. I continue to be devoted to the conflict resolution field and believe in its promise and potential for changing societies for the better. I also remain and plan to remain a scholar-practitioner in this field, working on its theory and practice. My research questions, therefore, have the goal of reflecting on my own practice and that of my colleagues, identifying patterns that could be marginalizing or otherwise harmful of affected populations, raising the awareness of my colleagues in regard to such practices, and, most importantly, exploring possible inclusive alternatives.

The following questions drive this inquiry:

Are binary frames problematic in the Syrian conflict only or do they adversely affect conflict resolution practice in other conflict contexts as well?

Are there other patterns of conflict resolution practice that (re)produce conflict or that contribute to exclusion from the peace processes of populations affected by conflict and marginalization of peace constituencies?

Do we need to rethink not only conflict resolution but conflict itself in order to develop adequate responses to today’s challenges?

If the answer to any of to the above questions is positive, what can be the alternative approaches that help us conceive inclusive conflict resolution practices?

The organization of the text

The book is organized into three parts and nine chapters, including the conclusions. Following this introduction, Part I contains three chapters. Chapter 1 is a critical review of the theories that traditionally informed policymaking and conflict resolution practice. It is also an exploration of alternative theories that can help us rethink conflict. I start with theories most often used by the policymaking community in understanding and addressing conflicts, namely with realist and liberal theories of international relations and criticize their rigid and binary frames that contribute to the reproduction of conflicts. I then examine conflict resolution theories that position themselves as a critique and alternative to international relations, yet in practice borrow its frames, as a result similarly contributing to the reproduction of the conflict discourses.

The contemporary conflict analysis and resolution theories, however, are much broader than its segments that take after international relations. They range from the long-known in the field positivist social-psychological needs theories of Burton and his colleagues and followers and post-positivist structural theories of Galtung to increasingly popular critical and hermeneutic paradigms and to post-structuralist and postmodernist approaches that either implicitly or explicitly reject dichotomies and the very notion of bounded groups as units of analysis. The discussion of the potential of the latter schools, as well as of various directions of critical theory, in transforming not only conflict analysis theories but also conflict resolution practice concludes the chapter, setting the stage for the discussion of methodology.

As one of the aims of this book was to redefine my practice and that of my colleagues who agreed to engage in this journey with me, I relied on participatory action research (PAR) as the primary methodological choice that has a transformative potential. The methodology of this project, therefore, was never only a tool for inquiry. It was an evolving intervention in itself that helped me rethink the concept of conflict and the practices of conflict resolution, and therefore deserves its own chapter. Chapter 2 details the development of the methodology for this book with a hope that it might be useful in future conflict resolution research.

Chapter 3 is short and auto-ethnographic. I reflect there on the events in my life that led me to conflict resolution work and to this book. I expose my biases and epistemological standing to your (my reader’s) judgment.

Part II of the book that contains Chapters 4 and 5, I wrote from the position of collective auto-ethnography, and in a form of a thick description of two initiatives led by teams that I was part of. These cases present a close-up view of patterns of exclusion and marginalization perpetrated by conflict resolution practice in the contexts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria. The Syrian initiative discussed in Chapter 4 is a dialogue project with an initial exclusionary frame where the workshop design created a binary that deprived of voice the majority of participants who did not see themselves as part of the conflict sides, yet where the facilitators and the participants worked together to find new and inclusive frames. An initiative from the Nagorno-Karabakh context presented in Chapter 5 followed the reversed trajectory: started with an aim to include all possible conflict voices, it demonstrated an unlimited potential in producing exclusion and marginalization as it progressed.

In Part II, I look deep into two particular cases. In Part III that contains Chapters 6–8, to the contrary, I zoom out and focus on patterns of exclusion and marginalization as learned from the analysis of over 30 conflict resolution initiatives conducted in Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other contexts. The critique is followed by a discussion of alternative and inclusive models of conflict resolution practices.

Chapter 6 explores how the macro-frames external to conflict resolution practice influence that practice in ways that contribute to the marginalization and exclusion of key groups affected by conflict and to the perpetuation of conflict discourses. The specific macro-frames discussed in the chapter are the binary frames of international relations and their influence on conflict resolution initiatives, as well as possible alternative frames and approaches to conflict. A number of other binaries, particularly the gender binary, are also discussed although in less detail. I conclude that these frames advance narrow definitions of conflict and identity and that they privilege the violent or nationalist extremes while marginalizing many of those affected by conflict yet not fitting neatly into predefined ethnic or gender roles.

Chapter 7 looks into exclusion and marginalization specific to conflict resolution initiatives. It looks into hierarchical relations between conflict resolution professionals and participants, and into the emergence of dominant factions within conflict resolution initiatives that coalesce around a common discourse pushing forward a particular exclusivist agenda and marginalizing others. Such factions can get formed around a macro-frame located outside the initiative, such as the international human rights regime, or around an affiliation with a source of power external to the initiative, such as belonging to a government, or through a greater cultural intelligibility of some of the participants to the organizers. The patterns of marginalization covered by this chapter are highly context-specific and are, therefore, amenable to change more easily than the ones discussed in Chapter 6.

Finally, Chapter 8 discusses patterns of exclusion and marginalization within the community of conflict resolution practitioners facilitated by such common to capitalist organization of the society practices as competition over resources, gate-keeping, or strict hierarchies within teams that suppress creativity and participation. After exposing the contradiction between these common practices and the values of cooperation and inclusivity advanced by that same practice in conflict zones, I explore alternative approaches to interorganizational and team relations.

1 I do not use the words “marginalization” and “exclusion” from conflict resolution processes interchangeably. By “marginalization” I refer to a context when the voice of an individual or a group affected by the conflict is silenced or continually dismissed. By “exclusion” I refer to a relationship where an individual or a group is actively precluded from physically taking part in the conflict resolution process. One can be excluded from a process but not marginalized as her voice finds a way to break through, often thanks to access to external to the context academic or media resources influencing the process. At the same time, one can be included and physically present in the conflict resolution process and yet dismissed or silenced and therefore marginalized. As it is not practically possible to always involve everyone in conflict resolution initiatives, exclusion in itself can be neutral. It becomes problematic, however, when its intention or impact is the marginalization of communities or individuals affected by the conflict.

Part I

Part I of this book lays the ground for the main arguments presented in Parts II and III. I start Part I with the critical review of the mainstream conflict resolution theories, which as I argue serve to reproduce rather than solve conflicts, followed by discussion of their conceptual alternatives. These alternatives point toward participatory research methods positioned at the intersection of research, theory, and practice and are discussed in Chapter 2. I end Part I with a short auto-ethnographic sketch intended to explain why and how I came to this work, and what are the values and personal and methodological bias that guide my writing.

Chapter 1

Critical review of conflict resolution theories

Conflict resolution practice has been rapidly diversifying and can have many shapes, ranging from negotiations to collaborations between artists, and a number of these interventions move away from binary frames. The interventions that explicitly aim at analyzing or addressing the ethnically or ethno-religiously framed violent conflicts in search of sustainable solutions, however, traditionally follow the lead of international relations field and frame conflicts in binary terms. Many of these theories and practices, including PSWs, consultations, and multitrack diplomacy, explicitly position themselves as auxiliary to international relations and borrow the preestablished binary frames of the latter. Researchers at Uppsala University, one of the leading research institutions in the field, define armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of force between two parties [emphasis added] results in at least 25 battle-related deaths a year” (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011).

As the field of conflict resolution developed, certain theories and respective practices aimed to break away from the binary frames of international relations. Some did so more successfully than others. Parts of conflict analysis and resolution theories reproduced the binary frames of international relations. Other parts of conflict analysis and resolution theories developed into an interdisciplinary field that moved increasingly toward the constructivist paradigm, drifting away from the binary frames of international relations. Conflict resolution practice, however, was slow to follow. Today constructivist analysis is routinely followed by positivist intervention models that continue to replicate the international relations frames. A few conflict resolution approaches, particularly narrative mediation, made the transition and have been offering constructivist practices particularly when working with interpersonal and family conflict as well as organizational conflicts. These practices, however, struggled to find their application when it comes to violent political conflict.

I start this review with the critical analysis of international relations theories and the dominant trends in the conflict analysis and resolution field that follow the established binary and position themselves as a complement to international relations. I then shift toward alternative trends in conflict analysis and resolution that defy the binary, and on to approaches that view ethnicity and identity as socially constructed categories and that problematize the essentialization of ethnicity and identity in traditional conflict resolution literature. Within the constructivist paradigm, I discuss elicitive and reflective practices that offer conceptually alternative intervention models and postmodernist theories of ethnicity and nationalism that offer alternative language for framing conflict.

Embarking on the journey that would become this book, I was aware that I myself am embedded in the discursive frames that I am planning to critique and find alternatives to. How could I, a person whose identity and worldview was defined by certain structures, see outside of them? In search of methodologies that would facilitate the development of reflective awareness, I was influenced by the structuration theory of Giddens with its rejection of the structure vs. agency dichotomy and argument that while actors are embedded in structures, the structures in turn are reproduced by actors and, therefore, are amenable to transformation. Through structuration, I came to PAR as a corresponding methodology that offers an alternative form of understanding research, questioning the researcher and her worldview, and forging a space where structures were accounted for and the transformation was possible.

Binary frames in conflict resolution

In the international relations field that long was at the forefront of studying conflict, the main division arguably is between the realist and liberal schools of thought. The former typically sees violent conflict as a natural condition of human behavior, with the latter accepting at least the theoretical possibility of sustainable peace. Despite these differences, both realist and liberal schools are based on a similar set of core positivist assumptions that prioritize the state as their main unit of analysis and frame conflict in binary terms. These frames have been accepted also by a number of approaches in the conflict resolution field that position themselves as a complement to international relations and share the umbrella of Track 2 diplomacy.

Realist theories of international relations

Realism has long been the most influential school in international relations. What unites many different schools of thought under the umbrella of realism is their focus on the international systems and their disregard for the internal political structures of the states. Realists believe that the state behavior is influenced mainly by their external environment and not by their internal characteristics. The central postulate of this family of theories is that the international system forces states to maximize their relative power vis à vis the others, because it is the optimal way to maximize their security (Mearsheimer 2003, 17, 21).

There are also disagreements within the different schools of realism. Human nature realism, represented primarily by Morgenthau, advances a Hobbesean argument that human nature is inherently competitive (Hans Joachim Morgenthau 1978). Defensive realism, or structural realism, argues that states aim to survive by maintaining the balance of power (Waltz 2010). Offensive realism has similarities with both, but also has major differences (Mearsheimer 2003). Offensive realism and defensive realism agree that the cause of state competition is the anarchic structure of the international system. This is also the key disagreement of offensive realism with human nature realism that argues that it is the lust for power inherent in states (or their leaders) that causes states to compete. At the same time, offensive realism agrees with human nature realism on goals: states aim to gain as much power as they can, with hegemony as an ultimate goal, in sharp disagreement with defensive realism that maintains that states aim to survive by maintaining the balance of power. Moreover, unlike offensive realism, defensive realism warns against acquiring too much power as it can mobilize others and backfire.

Power and competition, rather than cooperation or negotiation, are seen by realists as avenues for working with conflict. A number of other schools of realism differ from the mentioned three in some aspects, but they share the key principles mentioned above. Relevant to the topic of this research, states are clearly defined in realism as the main actors in conflict. The realist approach, therefore, prevalent in international relations, has the binary opposition of states in its very core and is openly disinterested in evolving intrastate environments and not-well-defined stakeholders. The marginalized populations, as well as any other nonstate actors, are left out in this paradigm.

Liberal theories of international relations

From within the international relations field, the base assumptions of realism are criticized by various liberal schools. Classical liberalism is closely linked with the names of the Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Jefferson. Unlike realism, liberalism is very much concerned with the internal characteristics of states and, similar to other positivist schools of thought that have their roots in the Enlightenment, is based on the assumption that reason and knowledge can advance reform, prevent abuse by the state, and resolve conflicts.

The key assumptions of liberalism, which place it in seeming opposition to realism, are that the internal characteristics of states vary considerably, and these differences have profound effects on state behavior (Mearsheimer 2003, 15). As a consequence, some forms of internal political organization, such as democracy, are seen as inherently preferable to others, such as authoritarianism, and are believed to lead to peaceful international relations.

The often-cited liberal theories of international relations argue for the possibility of absolute rather than relative gains. Key arguments of liberal schools include the following:

high level of economic interdependence among states makes them unlikely to fight each other (see, for example, McMillan 1997);

the democratic peace hypothesis or that democracies do not go to war with each other (see, for example, Ray 1998), an idea that originated with Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” where he argued that the majority of people would never vote to go to war, unless in self-defense (Kant 2007 [orig. 1795]);

and international institutions enhance the prospects for cooperation among states and reduce the likelihood of war (see, for example, Keohane 2005).

As liberalism accepts the possibility of absolute and not relative gains, positive-sum conflict resolution models and sustainable peace are seen as attainable. Rational choice models and mediation aimed at finding areas of mutual interest and win-win solutions are some of the main intervention practices associated with these theories.

Similar to realists, liberal theories have states as the main units of analysis, and the focus is primarily on identifying or creating conditions under which states are ready to agree to a negotiated solution. In situations of internal conflict or when the conflict involves nonstate actors, the approach is a push for a negotiated settlement that requires identification of a consolidated enough actor that can serve as a conflict party and who could sit across the table from the state actor.

Today, however, conflicts are rarely an exclusive interstate affair or a struggle for power by well-identified parties within the state. Even in conflicts when two states are involved, such as in the case with Nagorno-Karabakh or the United States and Iraq, various nonstate actors, nonrecognized states, or unaligned groups of populations are often as important to the conflict dynamics as the interstate relations. The negotiation approach might have worked as the primary tool of conflict resolution in the previous two centuries when states were presumed to maintain a monopoly over the use of large-scale violence. However, in today’s context the focus on negotiated settlement alone can be detrimental to conflict resolution.

For one, the state actors rarely negotiate with nonstate actors or with nonrecognized states. As of 2017, the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Georgia-South Ossetia, Georgia-Abkhazia, and many others include situations where the recognized state refuses to accept as a negotiating partner any stakeholder that is not an internationally recognized state. In cases where negotiations are ongoing, agreements are very rare, and, whenever reached, are likely to fail due to pressures both from within and outside the societies. Yet the question whether negotiations are the appropriate way to move forward is rarely asked. Instead, all the efforts are directed toward finding or creating actors that could, plausibly, look like a legitimate negotiating partner.

In the next few paragraphs I aim to demonstrate on the example of the Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh cases how the international relations approaches fail to bring the conflicts closer to solution. In the Nagorno-Karabakh context discussed in more details in Chapters 3 and 5, the leadership of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a key actor that is at the center of the conflict, is not allowed to the table and is represented by the government of the Republic of Armenia. The latter, an internationally recognized state, negotiates with the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the help of a mediator trio representing the governments of the United States, France, and Russia. The Republic of Armenia certainly should be at the table, as it has its role in the conflict, is in an open confrontation with Azerbaijan, and is likely to participate as a party should there be another war. At the same time, while the Republic of Armenia fully backs the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership militarily and politically, the Republic of Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are not the same entity and often have divergent political line. While the Armenian government has been stressing its willingness to find a compromise solution, the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have often stated that they would not accept any agreement signed by the government of Armenia that is not to its liking and so far expressed dissatisfaction with all the proposals that were on the table. And indeed, the government of Armenia marred in corruption and allegations of illegal electoral practices has little legitimacy with the Armenian society. As a result, it hardly can afford to sign an agreement, as any possible agreement would be deemed controversial and is likely to lead to active wave of protests and mobilization by nationalist opposition. Neither it has mechanisms for imposing an agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians against their will. Due to the convention in international relations that prioritizes state actors, we have a situation where a party that is in a position to implement an agreed upon solution (should such an agreement be reached), the authorities of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, is excluded from the peace process, while a party that has no legitimacy to sign and no leverage to enforce the implementation of an agreement, the government of the recognized Republic of Armenia, is at the table. Not surprisingly, the negotiations are long considered to be a farce by all the societies involved, and no agreement has been signed for over 20 years of negotiations, despite the principled support that the two negotiating governments expressed up to the recent past to various framework documents that outline the presumed eventual deal.

Further, the binary framing of the conflict that allows the governments of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan to monopolize the peace process marginalizes populations that have suffered from this conflict directly. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are left out of the negotiations, yet at least thanks to their affiliation with an unrecognized state of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, their presence is partially acknowledged through periodic visits of international mediators and the leadership of the Republic of Armenia, and some consultations with them in regard to the possible settlement. The populations that do not have access to any state or quasi-state entity, on the other hand, such as the Armenians and Azerbaijanis displaced by war or ethnic minorities, are silenced altogether. As a consequence, the solutions discussed take into consideration the interests of those at the table, the governments of the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and of Russia, the United States, and France, and not of the populations who suffered and still suffer from conflict. Such an approach, I argue, is not only unethical but is also unpractical and it did not bring us closer to any solution.

After over 20 years of failed negotiations and the ongoing exclusion of the affected populations, one would think, ground would be ready for questioning the adequacy of the interstate negotiation format for this conflict. Yet as of 2017, no such questioning has happened. Since the international relations theories have a tight grip on conflict discourses, the analysis of the failures remains within the confines of the negotiations approach and vocabulary. The absence of ripeness or of a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman and Berman 1982), the absence of will from the political actors, corruption, and other political or economic explanations are used to explain why the presumably adequate format of negotiations would consistently fail. And so immersed are we in the international relations paradigm that we rarely question the negotiations theory itself; we do not even seem to think that there might be alternatives.

I recognize, however, that from the point of view of the international relations field, the Nagorno-Karabakh case, with its relatively well-defined actors, might look like a negotiable case. Maslow comes to mind with his “if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” At the same time the second case under the scrutiny in this book, the Syrian conflict that started in 2011, must be a negotiator’s nightmare. It looks nothing like a nail. One actor, Assad’s regime, has been clear and visible. However, from the very first day, there has not been a counterpart. Syria, therefore, could give an even better reason to question the binary framing of conflicts, a reason to contemplate interventions other than the ones that assume binary. And while with time the growing number of actors on the ground forced the analysts of all backgrounds to question the applicability of binary models to Syria, the policy community continued to see the conflict either from a realist perspective as a proxy-war between global and regional powers or from liberal perspective as a need to forge and support a coherent moderate opposition force that can take control of Syria and engage in its eventual liberal-democratic reshaping. To take the Maslow analogy a step further, the international relations approach seemed to be that while the tool is still the hummer, and there is no nail, we will forge a nail.

From the early days of the Syrian conflict, the media and think tanks have been busy with a search of a worthy liberal counterpart to the Assad regime. Could it be the Free Syrian Army? Could it be a coalition of armed groups? Or the Kurds? If there is no one already, how can the pro-western opposition be consolidated to create such a group? In other words, the main question did not seem to be how to make sense of Syria. It was, instead, how to influence the situation in a way that an identifiable and acceptable party could emerge, so that Syria could start looking more like a two-sided conflict we know.

When it comes to Syria, the main articulated alternative to this liberal approach for a long time had been the realist one that saw the conflict as a proxy war where the external powers that are not interested in a negotiated settlement are supporting either the Assad regime or the overthrow of Assad in favor of a government that is to their liking. With all their differences, then, the liberal and the realist approaches have one thing in common: they have “sides,” the government and a possible consolidated opposition to the government, as the main units of analysis.

By 2016 and 2017, most everyone seemed to acknowledge that Syria has become a complicated and multifaceted conflict and could not be explained through simple binary terms (Huffington Post 2016; New York Times 2016; International Crisis Group 2017; CNN 2017). But has the Syrian conflict ever been a conflict of a particular opposition group with the government? It started in 2011 as a popular movement of Syrians from all walks of life and all backgrounds for better governance, freedom of expression, and other liberties. No group that has had a claim to be the alternative to the regime, including the Free Syrian Army, other rebels, the Kurds, or lately ISIL, spoke for a broad enough coalition. And if what started in 2011 in Syria were various movements that served as voice of very diverse populations and not a two-party conflict, then why did we invest years of unsuccessful effort into trying to reduce these movements into one identifiable group that could serve as an alternative to Assad? Is our attachment to seeing every conflict as a dichotomy insurmountable?

Reducing the Syrian conflict to the Assad-defined opposition duality for the first few years of the conflict meant empowering the two violent extremes at the expense of everyone else. It meant that the majority of Syrians who were neither Assad nor violent and identifiable opposition lost their voices and were being forced to either take a side with one of the extremes or be silenced. The result was that a great many Christians and Alewites who initially opposed Assad ended up siding with him as they feared opposition groups more. Some others formed their own conflict parties, leading to ongoing formation and reformation of numerous oppositions. Yet many others, arguably the overwhelming majority, who see themselves as Syrians and not as Assad or ISIL or particular opposition group, and who could be the uniting force and the natural peace constituency, are marginalized and voiceless as they do not exist on any known conflict map1 that takes into consideration only identifiable “parties.”

To summarize, the liberal approaches and the win-win negotiation theories they espouse work mainly for the cases with well-defined actors that believe they have a conflict, yet accept each other’s legitimacy. When it comes to evolving environments, however, the inherently dualistic negotiation theory tries to make the environment work for itself rather than working with the environment, often creating and sustaining divisions that initially did not exist.

In the shadow of Track 1: interactive problem solving

The international relations field, of course, is not the only one today that studies conflict. The conflict resolution field has been growing as an alternative, bringing with it criticism of the international relations. Within the conflict resolution field itself, however, a number of approaches positioning themselves as complementary to international relations and sharing an umbrella of “Track 2 diplomacy” moved to the forefront of addressing violent conflicts. What is Track 2 diplomacy? It is a term coined in the early 1980s by Montville, a retired US diplomat and academic, who has been advocating for addition of civic and nonformal methods to the arsenal of conflict settlement in addition to official diplomacy or Track 1. The Track 2 approach remains popular in conflict resolution today as evidenced by many ongoing initiatives worldwide using that title. Recent academic works on the topic further point to its contemporary relevance (see, for example, Jones 2015).

Montville’s approach is commendable, particularly coming from a former diplomat, in giving voice in conflict resolution to the civil society and not only governmental actors. Yet simultaneously, I see this term to be detrimental to its own stated goal, assuming the goal is some form of sustainable and equitable peace.