"Die Spiegelschrift Gottes ist schwer zu lesen" E-Book

Christiane Tietz

• Herausgeber: Gütersloher Verlagshaus
• Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
• Serie: Dietrich Bonhoeffer Studien
• Sprache: Deutsch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Seitenzahl: 777

Beschreibung

Pointierte Analysen

Christiane Tietz ist auf dem Feld der internationalen Bonhoeffer-Forschung eine der profiliertesten Wissenschaftlerinnen. Sie hat nicht nur eine viel beachtete Bonhoeffer-Biografie vorgelegt, sondern beschäftigt sich seit mehr als 25 Jahren auch intensiv mit seinem theologischen Werk. Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit versammelt dieser Band. Er enthält bisher verstreut vorliegende Aufsätze, die in kritisch-aufgeklärter Nüchternheit nach den Details und Tiefenstrukturen seiner Theologie, nach den Einflüssen, die auf Bonhoeffers Denken wirkten, sowie nach Rezeption und Aktualität fragen.

Leseprobe

Dietrich Bonhoeffer Studien

Auf dem Feld der internationalen Bonhoeffer-Forschung ist Christiane Tietz eine der profiliertesten Wissenschaftlerinnen. Seit mehr als 25 Jahren beschäftigt sie sich intensiv mit seinem theologischen Werk und hat darüber hinaus eine viel beachtete Bonhoeffer-Biografie vorgelegt.

Dieser Band versammelt die wichtigsten Beiträge ihrer Forschung. Er enthält bisher verstreut vorliegende Aufsätze, die in kritisch-aufgeklärter Nüchternheit nach den Details und Tiefenstrukturen der Theologie Bonhoeffers, nach den Einflüssen, die auf sein Denken wirkten, sowie nach seiner Rezeption und Aktualität fragen.

Christiane Tietz, geb.1967, Dr. theol., ist Professorin für Systematische Theologie und Leiterin des Instituts für Hermeneutik und Religionsphilosophie der Universität Zürich. Sie hat über Dietrich Bonhoeffer promoviert und war über längere Zeit Vorsitzende der deutschsprachigen Sektion der Internationalen Bonhoeffer-Gesellschaft.

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER

STUDIEN

Herausgegeben von Hartmut Rosenau und Christiane Tietz

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER

STUDIEN

2

Christiane Tietz

»Die Spiegelschrift Gottes ist schwer zu lesen«

Beiträge zur Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers

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in der Penguin Random House Verlagsgruppe GmbH,

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Umsetzung eBook: Greiner & Reichel, Köln

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Für Clifford J. Green,

Bonhoeffer-Kollege und Freund

Inhalt

Vorwort

Einflüsse

Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

1. Ecclesiology

1.1 Social Community in the Primal State

1.2 Original Sin as Destroyed Community

1.3 The Church – Realized by Christ

1.4 The Church – Actualized by the Holy Spirit

2. Religion

2.1 The Peculiarity of Religion

2.2 The Necessity of Religion

2.3 Religious Self-consciousness as Object of Theology

Standing »in the Tradition of Paul, Luther, Kierkegaard, in the Tradition of Genuine Christian Thinking«. Bonhoeffer’s Reception of Søren Kierkegaard

1. Revelation and Faith

2. The Ethical

3. Christianity as Discipleship

4. Suffering

5. Conclusion

Eberhard Bethges Anteil an Bonhoeffers Gefängnistheologie

1. Religion und Religionslosigkeit

2. Der Raum Gottes in der Welt

3. Die Kirche in der Welt

4. Diesseits und Jenseits

Sprache und Vernunft

Die Grenzen des Menschen als Grenzen seiner Sprache

1. Die Sozialität des Menschen und seine Sprache

2. Die Grenzen des Menschen

3. Die Grenzen der Sprache und des Redens

4. Hörendes Schweigen

5. Befreites Schweigen

6. Das Geheimnis

Verkrümmte Vernunft und intellektuelle Redlichkeit. Zu Bonhoeffers Erkenntnistheorie

1. Verkrümmte Vernunft und Glaube

2. Intellektuelle Redlichkeit und Glaube

3. Konsequenzen für die Gestalt des Christentums im 21. Jahrhundert

Bonhoeffer on the Uses and Limits of Philosophy

1. Thinking as a Closed Circle

2. The Uselessness of Philosophy

3. Christian Thinking

4. The Usefulness of Philosophy

5. Reason Included in God

Christologie und Gotteslehre

The Role of Jesus Christ for Christian Theology

1. Why Jesus Christ is the Orienting Point of Bonhoeffer’s Theology

2. The Relevance of Jesus Christ for Bonhoeffer’s Theology – and for Today

2.1 The Role of Jesus Christ for Ecclesiology

2.2 The Role of Jesus Christ for Christology

2.3 The Role of Jesus Christ for the Doctrine of Creation

Der leidende Gott

1. Das klassische Apathieaxiom

2. Dietrich Bonhoeffers Rede vom leidenden Gott

3. Angelsächsische Vorläufer der Rede vom leidenden Gott

4. Kritik an der Rede vom leidenden Gott – und Kritik dieser Kritik

»Gott ist uns immer gerade heute Gott«. Von der Konkretheit Gottes

1. Bonhoeffers eigenes Reden von Gott

1.1 Direktheit

1.2 Härte

1.3 Konkretheit

2. Konsequenzen für unser Reden von Gott heute

Kirche und christliche Existenz

Das Kind als Paradigma des Christseins

1. Biographische Verortung

2. Zum Wesen des Kindes

3. Das glaubende Kind

4. Das gehorsame Kind

The Ontological Structure of the Church

1. The Theological Premise of Bonhoeffer’s Early Concept of the Church

2. The Premise of Theology

3. The Sociality of Human Spirit and of the Christian Concept of Personhood

4. The Ontological Relation of Christ and the Church

5. The Ontological Structure of the Church

Ethische Grundfragen

Rechtfertigung und Heiligung

1. Betonung der Rechtfertigungslehre

2. Gerechtigkeit Gottes

3. Glaube als Anerkennen der Gerechtigkeit Gottes

4. Die Zusammengehörigkeit von Rechtfertigung und Heiligung

5. Die Ausrichtung des menschlichen Handelns auf Christus

6. Gericht nach den Werken – Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben

7. Glaube als Verzicht, einen Heiligen aus sich zu machen

»Nur der Glaubende ist gehorsam, und nur der Gehorsame glaubt.« Beobachtungen zu einem existentiellen Zirkel in Dietrich Bonhoeffers Nachfolge

The Mysteries of Knowledge, Sin, and Shame

1. Sin

1.1 Asking a Question

1.2 Eating the Fruit

2. Shame

2.1 The Essence of Shame

2.2 The Dialectic of Covering and Uncovering

3. Knowledge

3.1 The Disunity of Knowledge

3.2 The Circular Structure of Knowledge

3.3 Acknowledgement

3.4 Theology

Ethische Einzelfragen

Wer hält stand? Gewissen oder Verantwortung

1. Das Gewissen als Phänomen des Sündenfalls

2. Die Fehlleistungen des Gewissens

2.1 Das Gewissen als vermeintlich Anderer

2.2 Das Gewissen als den Menschen über seine wahre Situation täuschend

2.3 Des Gewissens Versagen als ethische Richtschnur

3. Christus als das Gewissen des Menschen

Eine Korrespondenztheorie besonderer Art. Bonhoeffers Wahrheits-begriff im Horizont traditioneller Bestimmungen von Wahrhaftigkeit und Lüge

1. Darf ein Christ lügen? – eine Grundfrage christlicher Ethik

1.1 Notizen zum biblischen Befund

1.2 Eine kurze Geschichte der Lüge

2. Dietrich Bonhoeffers Antwort auf die Frage »Was heißt die Wahrheit sagen?«

2.1 Situationsgemäßheit

2.2 Wirklichkeitsgemäßheit

2.3 Mandatsgemäßheit

3. Fazit

War Bonhoeffer Pazifist? Oder: Bonhoeffers Äußerungen zum Krieg

1. Bonhoeffers frühe Äußerungen zum Krieg

2. Bonhoeffers Äußerungen zum Krieg in den USA und kurz danach

3. Bonhoeffers Äußerungen zum Krieg in der Ökumene und als Mitglied der Bekennenden Kirche

3.1 Der Krieg und das Gebot »Du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben«

3.2 Überwindung des Krieges durch Nachfolge Christi

3.3 Teilnahme des Christen am Krieg?

4. Der Krieg als Grenzfall

Aktualität

Mensch, Welt und Gott. Die Bonhoeffer-Rezeption in neueren dogmatischen Entwürfen

1. Mündigkeit, Verantwortung, Gehorsam

2. Letztes und Vorletztes

Unzeitgemäße Aktualität. Religionskritik in Zeiten der »Wiederkehr der Religion«

1. Bonhoeffers Beobachtung, Religion sei nicht mehr zeitgemäß

2. Bonhoeffers These, Religion sei nicht der Sache des christlichen Glaubens gemäß

3. Zur Aktualität von Bonhoeffers Religionskritik

Bonhoeffer’s Strong Christology in the Context of Religious Pluralism

1. Bonhoeffer’s own Awareness of other Religions

2. Bonhoeffer’s Strong Christology as a Starting Point for a Christian Perspective on Religious Pluralism

3. The Hermeneutical Premise of Bonhoeffer’s Strong Christology

4. Practical Consequences for Interreligious Encounter from Bonhoeffer’s Christology

Erstveröffentlichungsorte

Abkürzungen

Namenregister

Vorwort

Als Dietrich Bonhoeffer Ende Oktober 1934 in seiner Londoner Gemeinde über das 13. Kapitel des 1. Korintherbriefs predigte, schärfte er seinen Hörerinnen und Hörern ein: »Gottes Gedanken sind in der Welt nur wie im Spiegel aufgefangen. Wir sehen sie nur in der Spiegelschrift. Und die Spiegelschrift Gottes ist schwer zu lesen.« (DBW 13, 397)

In der Welt sind Gottes Gedanken nicht ohne weiteres zu erkennen. Nichts in der Welt ist direkt mit dem Willen Gottes zu identifizieren. Dies wollte Bonhoeffer in Anschlag bringen gegen den damaligen theologischen Trend, das, was in der Welt geschah, als Willen Gottes anzusehen. Was der Mensch in der Welt an Göttlichem zu erkennen meint, ist zumeist nur Ausdruck seiner eigenen Werte, Ideale und Wünsche. Die Spiegelschrift Gottes hingegen »heißt ja wohl, daß Großes klein und Kleines Großes, Rechtes verkehrt und Verkehrtes recht ist, daß Hoffnungsloses Verheißung und Hoffnungsvolles das Gericht erwartet« (ebd.). Durch sie werden die menschlichen Wertungen und Maßstäbe umgekehrt.

Diese Umkehrung ist aber wieder keine allgemeine Lebensregel, sondern hängt an Gottes Selbsterschließung in Jesus Christus. Hier findet die Umkehrung statt: Die Spiegelschrift Gottes »heißt ja wohl, daß Kreuz Sieg und Tod Leben bedeutet. Wir lesen die Spiegelschrift Gottes in Jesus Christus, in seinem Leben und Reden und Sterben. […] das dunkle Wort des Kreuzes [ist …] die Spiegelschrift Gottes« (DBW 13, 397 f.).

Bonhoeffers Denken ist der Versuch, diese Spiegelschrift Gottes in Jesus Christus zu entziffern und dabei durchzubuchstabieren, was es für die Welt bedeutet, ein Spiegel der Gedanken Gottes zu sein. Angesichts dieses Entzifferungsprozesses verwundert es kaum, dass auch das Lesen von Bonhoeffers eigenen Texten Sorgfalt und genaues Hinsehen verlangt. Doch Bonhoeffers Rezeption hat sich anders vollzogen. Dietrich Bonhoeffer gehört zu den einflussreichsten Theologen des 20. und noch jungen 21. Jahrhunderts. Seine Texte wurden und werden weltweit von Christinnen und Christen verschiedener Konfessionen gelesen. Dabei sind vor allem einzelne knappe Impulse wie »mündige Welt«, »Kirche für andere«, »Beten und Tun des Gerechten«, »billige Gnade«, »Frieden als Wagnis« oder »Christus als Gemeinde existierend« prägend gewesen. In unterschiedlichen kirchlichen, gesellschaftlichen und politischen Kontexten wurden sie als inspirierend wahrgenommen und kraftvoll umzusetzen versucht.

Die Kehrseite dieser impulsorientierten Rezeption ist, dass die sorgfältige Text-exegese oft unterblieben ist. Man meint ja zu wissen, was Bonhoeffer mit diesen Schlagworten gemeint hat. Seine griffigen Formeln scheinen ausreichend klar zu sein. Differenzierte Aussagen Bonhoeffers werden übergangen, komplexe Gedankengänge bleiben unbedacht.

Die hier zusammengetragenen Aufsätze versuchen genauer hinzusehen. Manches Ausgeblendete wird so in den Blick gehoben. Unerwartetes verändert das gewohnte Bild. Neu entdeckte Details bewirken Scharfstellung.

Diedrich Steen vom Gütersloher Verlagshaus danke ich herzlich für die Möglichkeit, an ganz verschiedenen Orten erschienene Bonhoeffer-Arbeiten aus den vergangenen Jahrzehnten in diesem Band leicht überarbeitet zu bündeln und damit einfacher zugänglich zu machen. Meinem langjährigen Mitarbeiter Dominik Weyl bin ich tief verbunden für die kundige, sorgfältige Durchsicht der Texte vor dem Wiederabdruck, aber auch für unzählige Gespräche über Bonhoeffer, Gott und die Welt.

Zürich, im Advent 2020

Christiane Tietz

Einflüsse

Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

While Karl Barth’s influence on the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is obvious,1 the impact of Friedrich Schleiermacher, the other great figure in modern Protestantism, is far more inconspicuous. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher, the church father of the nineteenth century,2 was of no little importance for Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology (1.). And Schleiermacher’s idea of religion was part of the background against which Bonhoeffer developed his own understanding of religion and faith (2.). When discussing both subjects in the following I will not so much ask if Bonhoeffer understood Schleiermacher correctly but show how what Bonhoeffer understood as Schleiermacher’s point of view became important for his own theology.

1. Ecclesiology

It is quite astonishing how many aspects of Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology are influenced by Schleiermacher, always in both appreciation and criticism. Bonhoeffer appreciates that Schleiermacher focuses on the church3 and correspondingly has a strong interest in the idea of social community.4 But Bonhoeffer criticizes the way this community is conceived.

In Bonhoeffer’s eyes, the concept of community is the crucial point of salvation history: the primal state is the »idea of unbroken community«5 (1.1); sin is the breaking of this unbroken community (1.2); the church finally is the reconciled community with God and with human being (1.3 and 1.4).

1.1 Social Community in the Primal State

Bonhoeffer pays tribute to Schleiermacher as »the first to speak of relationships in community in the primal state.«6 Schleiermacher recognized that the primal state not only means community with God (which in Bonhoeffer’s eyes »has always been recognized«) but also social community of human beings. Thus, Schleiermacher understood that »community [with God] and social community belong together.«7 He comprehended that »apart from [social] community ›there is no living and vigorous piety‹.«8 For Bonhoeffer, the insight »that human beings, as spirit, are necessarily created in a community – that human spirit in general is woven into the web of sociality«9 is of great importance. It is nothing less than the characteristic of creaturely existence: »The creatureliness of human beings […] can be defined in simply no other way than in terms of the existence of human beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another.«10 Being a creature means being created in social community.

While appreciating Schleiermacher’s emphasis on this primal social community, Bonhoeffer complains how Schleiermacher understands this community. Schleiermacher names as reason for the human community »the inner union of species-consciousness [Gattungsbewußtsein]« and »personal self-consciousness.«11 For Schleiermacher, this union has a twofold function: On the one hand, it is »the general source of all recognition of others as being of like nature with ourselves.«12On the other hand, it is »the only source of the presupposition and the ground of the fact that the ›inner‹ is known and grasped along with and by means of the ›outer‹.«13 »This inclusion of the species-consciousness [Gattungsbewußtsein] in the personal self-consciousness and the communicability of the ›inner‹ through the ›outer,‹ which is connected with it, is the fundamental condition or basis of social life, for all human fellowship rests solely upon it.«14 Through the unity of species-consciousness and self-consciousness a person is connected with all the other persons by »a common bond of consciousness.«15

Bonhoeffer can summarize: »only in species consciousness does one human being encounter another.«16 It might not be precise to say that human beings encounter each other in species consciousness. However, the latter is the reason for their encounter.17

Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of human encounter is quite different. Certainly, Bonhoeffer as well discusses the general character of the human spirit. Like Schleiermacher, he is convinced that people »understand, express themselves, and are understood.«18 But Bonhoeffer distinguishes this general characteristic of the human spirit from the ethical I-You-relation, which is the place where people truly encounter each other.19 What is the character of such an encounter?

For Bonhoeffer, human beings truly encounter each other only in the ethical sphere of claim and responsibility. Here human beings »constitute limits, boundaries, or ›barriers‹ [Schranke, Grenze] for each other.«20 In the encounter with the other his or her claim is a barrier for me which forces me to decide if I want to answer this claim or not. The situation of responding to the other’s claim is basic for human community; here responsibility and personhood take place: »It is a Christian insight that the person as conscious being is created […] in the situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation by an overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the concrete situation.«21 Thus, the true encounter between two human beings takes place when »the other […] places me before an ethical decision«22. So, acknowledgement of the other is not possible through recognition of »others as being of like nature with ourselves« in the species-consciousness but only in the ethical situation. If I am truly acknowledging his or her ethical claim, then I’m acknowledging the other – as a You. And in this I am becoming a person.23

In Bonhoeffer’s opinion, the acknowledgment of the other as an I is neither given through the union of species-consciousness with self-consciousness and the nature of human spirit nor is it found through that encounter with the other as a You.24 The I of the other can be acknowledged only if the other reveals him/herself.25 This means that it is not the species-consciousness which makes the encounter with another I possible but his or her self-revelation: »there is no encounter with another person except that the person wills to reveal him/herself.«26Such a self-revelation does not happen always; it only takes place from time to time and when the I wants to. Bonhoeffer himself distinguishes three basic structures existing in the church: »Einzelperson« (the I), the »community of persons« (the I-You-relations), and the »collective person«27 – or, put in pneumatological terms: »plurality of spirit,« »community of spirit,« and »unity of spirit.«28 Whenever Bonhoeffer argues that Schleiermacher somehow fails in understanding these ecclesiological structures the question of personhood turns out to be decisive. Idealism (which includes Schleiermacher in this case29) fails to understand the structures of the church because it does not see the necessity of the described ethical concept of the person.30

Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer acknowledges that Schleiermacher’s insight in the sociality of the community in the primal state is »an important doctrine without which the ideas of original sin and especially the church could not be fully understood.«31

1.2 Original Sin as Destroyed Community

In Bonhoeffer’s view, the main problem of the doctrine of original sin is how »the individual culpable act and the culpability of the human race« can »be connected conceptually.«32 Bonhoeffer stresses that Schleiermacher managed to connect both because he »rediscovered the significance of original sin as a problem of social philosophy.«33 From his theory of the social orientation of the individual in the primal state, Schleiermacher deduces the simultaneity of the individual character and the social character of original sin: He calls original sin »the individual’s own guilt« because it is perpetuated by the exercise due to the voluntary action of the individual.«34 But original sin is also »genuinely common to all.«35 On the one hand, it »operates in every individual through the sin and sinfulness of others«, and, on the other hand, »it is transmitted by the voluntary actions of every individual to others and implanted within them.«36 In this respect it is »each work of all, and in all work of each« because »the sinfulness of each pointes to the sinfulness of all alike.«37 Thus the individual constitutes the »representative of the whole human race.«38 This expression is almost identical to Bonhoeffer’s discussion of original sin. »Every person represents fallen humanity […].«39 For Bonhoeffer this means that when, »in the sinful act, the individual spirit rises up against God, […] the deed committed is at the same time the deed of the human race […] in the individual person. One falls away not only from one’s personal vocation but also from one’s generic vocation as a member of the human race. Thus all humanity falls with each sin, and not one of us is in principle different from Adam; that is, every one is also the ›first‹ sinner.«40

This train of thoughts includes the ethical assumption that there »is a will of God with a people just as with individuals.«41 Bonhoeffer follows from this the necessity of the concept of collective person which describes a community as an ethical person.42 Especially the human race is a collective person: the »humanity-in-Adam […] is ›Adam‹, a collective person.«43 Even if Schleiermacher did not develop such a concept of a collective person, he »was doubtless correct in one respect, namely seeing that the concept of sin implies fulfillment in a social, collective concept.«44 But Schleiermacher in Bonhoeffer’s opinion is mistaken in his description of sin as »sensuality, inhibition of God-consciousness.«45 Again, Bonhoeffer is not very precise in saying that sin is sensuality. While in the first edition of The Christian Faith Schleiermacher seems to interpret sensuality as such as sin, in the second edition (which Bonhoeffer used) he argues differently.46 Now sin is a question of the proper relation of God-consciousness and sensuality.47 Sensuality can inhibit the God-consciousness,48 but it can also adequately be related to it.49

However, Bonhoeffer stresses that in relating sin to sensuality Schleiermacher interprets sin as »a biological category instead of the ethical-social one.«50 Bonhoeffer himself tries to understand sin as an ethical phenomenon: »Whereas in the primal state the relation among human beings is one of giving, in the sinful state it is purely demanding.« Sin means »ethical atomism.«51 Everybody lives for his or her own benefit. Community with God and with the other human beings is destroyed. No longer is humanity a biological category: »›Humanity‹ [is] not [a] biological concept, rather derived from revelation.«52 This means: humanity is either »humanity in Adam« or »humanity in Christ«.53 The latter is »God’s new will and purpose for humanity«54 or, in the most precise term, the church.

1.3 The Church – Realized by Christ

Schleiermacher proclaims the formation of the church as necessary because religion is necessarily social: »Once there is religion, it must necessarily also be social.«55 Religion is social out of two reasons: the nature of human beings, and the nature of religion itself. First, it is the human nature to share the things inside oneself with others: It is »highly unnatural for people to lock up in themselves what they have created and worked out.«56 Second, this impulse is even stronger in case of religion. The individual especially wants to share his/her religious feelings with others »to have witnesses for and participants in that which enters his senses and arouses his feelings.«57 And s/he wants to listen to other religious people to amplify her/his own religious experience.58 Church originates from this impulse: Church is »an ever self-renewing circulation of the religious self-consciousness within certain definite limits, and a propagation of the religious emotions arranged and organized within the same limits.«59 Therefore, »piety forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions.«60 Of course, Bonhoeffer acknowledges that Schleiermacher conceives community and church as necessary.61 But he refuses Schleiermacher’s theory of the genesis of the church on the basis of five interdependent reasons.

First, Bonhoeffer judges that Schleiermacher concentrates at last on the individual: »The reason for the formation of religious community lies in the need of the individuals to communicate. The church […] is constructed individualis-tically.«62 Even if Schleiermacher has a strong interest in the community he begins with the individual and argues from the perspective of the individual. He conceives »the individual’s community with Christ […] as being independent of the church.«63

Bonhoeffer recognizes also the opposite that Schleiermacher sometimes sees the church »as the entity that exists before any individual, outside of which there is no religious self-consciousness.«64 In fact, Schleiermacher repudiates »the idea that one can share in the redemption and be made blessed through Christ outside the corporate life which He instituted, as if a Christian could dispense with the latter and be with Christ, as it were, alone.« Such a view implies »an activity of Christ which is not mediated in time and space.«65 Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer is convinced that in the end Schleiermacher is »ultimately giving priority to the individual dimension over the communal«66. Vice versa, the significance of the community lies in the development of the individual.67

Second, Bonhoeffer complains about Schleiermacher’s question for the desires which are fulfilled in the church. »The reason for the formation of religious community lies in the need of the individuals to communicate. The church is the satisfaction of a need.«68 In this Schleiermacher’s concept of the church is »utilitarian.«69

Third, Bonhoeffer criticizes that Schleiermacher »thought he could deduce the concept of the church from the general concept of religion«70. Bonhoeffer judges Schleiermacher’s argument as wrong that church is necessary because of the nature of religion itself. Of course, the community with God is integral for religion; but »an impulse toward religious community is not in principle entailed in religion, and this must be so; the value of the holy is not exclusively actualized in a social context as, for example, the value of justice, or love, or equality […], but also in solitary communion with God. The mystics too were religious.«71 The fact that religion mostly is social [gesellig] is rooted in »psychological causes that are more or less accidental.«72

That the church emerges from the individual wills which come together73 in Bonhoeffer’s judgment is a psychological and historical understanding of the genesis of the church,74 because it talks about the process of becoming a unity. Church, and this is Bonhoeffer’s fourth point, is thus constituted by human beings.75 The individual wills have to become united.76 Thus Bonhoeffer criticizes: »[…] Schleiermacher’s concept of unity is not theological, but psychological, and therefore profoundly mistaken. It is based on an identification of ›religious community‹ and ›church‹.«77 This leads to a concentration on religious experience and to an »ideal of experience.«78 Bonhoeffer warns of this concentration on religious experience. He sees »the danger of confusing Christian community with some wishful image of pious community, the danger of blending the devout heart’s natural desire for community with the spiritual reality of Christian community.«79

By identifying religious community and church, and this is Bonhoeffer’s fifth criticism, Schleiermacher makes the methodological mistake of viewing the church only from the outside. Of course, church also is a religious community: »when viewed from the outside, the church is a religious community, but this is precisely an untheological perspective.«80 It is untheological because it excludes what God does for the reality of the church: Schleiermacher »points […] to the ›religious motives‹ that in fact lead to empirical community (the missionary impulse, the need to communicate, etc.);« in this he »overlooks the fact that the new basic-relations established by God actually are real.«81 This is with what Bonhoeffer starts his own ecclesiology: with the divine reality of the church. The reality of the church is not made by human beings. Christ’s presence in the church is constitutive for it. What does this mean?

First of all, through Christ the broken community with God is reconciled: »In Christ humanity really is drawn into community with God.«82 And Christ is present only in the church – a fact which leads to the insight that community with God is possible only in the church: »Community with God exists only through Christ, but Christ is present only in his church-community, and therefore community with God exists only in the church.«83 This means that being a Christian is possible only in the church. Being in the church is not a consequence of Christian existence but a necessary element of it since »there is no relation to Christ in which the relation to the church is not necessarily established as well.«84 Thus, »[e]very individualistic concept of the church breaks down because of this fact.«85

Fundamental for understanding the character of the church is the insight that the church is a mode of being of Christ.86 The church is »Christ existing as church-community«87. This is why »Christian community is […] a divine reality,«88 a reality realized in Christ. »[…] God established the reality of the church […] in Jesus Christ – not religion, but revelation, not religious community, but church.«89Whereas the unity of a religious community in fact is psychological, the unity of the church »transcends psychological categories, it is divinely established.«90 It is the unity constituted by Christ in whom »the plurality of persons [is united] into a single collective person.«91

Even in Life Together when Bonhoeffer describes the concrete daily life of a Christian community, he emphasizes that it is Christ who constitutes the reality of the church and not the communication of »piety«: »The fact that we are brothers and sisters only through Jesus Christ is of immeasurable significance. Therefore, the other who comes face to face with me earnestly and devoutly [fromm] seeking community is not the brother or sister with whom I am to relate in the community. My brother or sister is instead that other person who has been redeemed by Christ […] What persons are in themselves […], in their inwardness and piety, cannot constitute the basis of our community, which is determined by what those persons are in terms of Christ. Our community consists solely in what Christ has done to both of us.«92

Bonhoeffer interprets Jesus Christ’s presence in the church which is essential for the church’s reality as his personal presence. And he argues convincingly that this kind of presence is possible only on the background of Christ’s resurrection.93 Bonhoeffer judges that Schleiermacher is not able to conceive Christ’s presence in the church as personal because Schleiermacher understands Christ’s resurrection only symbolically.94 Schleiermacher himself argues: »The facts of the resurrection and the ascension of Christ […] cannot be laid down as properly constituent parts of the doctrine of his person.«95 Different from Bonhoeffer, Schleiermacher claims that »neither the spiritual presence which He promised nor all that He said about His enduring influence upon those who remained behind is mediated through either of these two facts.«96 This means: For his presence, no resurrection is necessary. Bonhoeffer recognizes that Schleiermacher interprets the presence of Christ as »the influence that emanates from him […]. This is a dynamic understanding of Christ – he is seen as an energy in history that is not lost but goes on communicating itself. The presence of Christ can be seen here as belonging to the category of cause and effect.«97 At the same time, Schleiermacher interprets the presence of Christ as rooted in the human attempt »to reach across history to keep bringing the image of Christ into view.«98 Bonhoeffer thinks that in both cases Schleiermacher understands Christ as a power, but not as a person.99

In Bonhoeffer’s opinion this neglecting of the personhood of Jesus Christ is repeated in Schleiermacher’s determination of the relation of the person and the deeds of Jesus Christ. Bonhoeffer sees Schleiermacher interpreting the person of Christ out of his deeds and thus dissolving the Christological question into the soteriological one.100 Admittedly, Schleiermacher argues that talking about the deeds of Christ means the same as talking about the person of Christ.101 But he describes both: the person of Christ102 and the duty of Christ103 and connects both reciprocally.104

However, Bonhoeffer himself argues for an interpretation of the deeds of Christ through the person of Christ. For, the deeds of Christ are conceived differently, depending on how the person of Christ is understood: »Only when I know who has done any particular work do I understand these works. Everything depends on knowing whether Jesus Christ was the idealistic founder of a religion or the very Son of God. […] If Jesus was only the idealistic founder of a religion, I can be uplifted by his work and feel the urge to follow his example, but my sins are not forgiven me. […] But if the works of Christ are God’s own works, then […] I am affected by these works as one who could in no way perform them myself. At the same time, […] through this Jesus Christ, I have found the God of mercy.«105 This makes clear that the deed of Christ is ambiguous106 which can be put down to the fact that for knowing Christ a revelation is necessary.107

From this follows that for understanding the essence of the church, which is Christ’s personal presence, as well a revelation is necessary: »Only the concept of revelation can lead to the Christian concept of the church.«108 This means: »The reality of the church is a reality of revelation, a reality that essentially must be either believed or denied.«109

Bonhoeffer is of the opinion that Schleiermacher’s misunderstanding of Christ’s personhood is not even avoided when Schleiermacher talks about the »personality« of Christ: »we can represent the growth of His personality from earliest childhood on to the fullness of manhood as a continuous transition from the condition of the purest innocence to one of purely spiritual fullness of power.«110 Bonhoeffer judges: »Personality, in this context, means the opposite of what is meant by person.«111 Jesus Christ’s personality is interpreted as the appearance of a value: the idea of a religious personality, »the personality with a strong and unclouded ›God-consciousness‹.«112 Christ is »the representative of this idea, he who embodied it in history.«113 Bonhoeffer sees this as »docetism:« »One starts with a particular religious idea that one already has and applies it to this historical Jesus.«114That Jesus Christ was a real human being is ignored.115 Whoever understands Christ as the appearance of a religious idea which is true independently of this appearance ignores the historical revelation of Christ.116 The historical revelation of Christ »is always anew a challenge to man. He cannot overcome it by pulling it into the system which he already had before.«117

1.4 The Church – Actualized by the Holy Spirit

In Bonhoeffer’s view, Schleiermacher ignores the difference between psychological and theological categories and repeats this mistake in his pneumatology. Schleiermacher assumes that every community has a »common spirit [Gemeingeist]«. It is »the common bent found in all who constitute together a moral personality, to seek the advancement of this whole; and this is at the same time the characteristic love found in each for every other.«118 The Holy Spirit is nothing else but »common spirit« of the Christian community.119 Through the Holy Spirit »a multitude of people« becomes »a true unity through which the multitude of Christians also become a unity and the many individual personalities become a true common life or moral personality.«120

Bonhoeffer acknowledges Schleiermacher’s orientation on the community character of the Holy Spirit.121 And he appreciates Schleiermacher’s idea of a »collective life [Gesamtleben]« of the church.122 Bonhoeffer praises emphatically Schleier-macher’s pneumatological foundation of that »Gesamtleben:« »Schleiermacher pointed out new paths by skillfully identifying communal spirit and the Holy Spirit […] Schleiermacher did not proceed in an exemplary way with his daring identification, but he certainly saw something that dogmatics should never be allowed to forget. If the relationship between the Holy Spirit and churchly community had been sufficiently considered early on, then the praxis could perhaps have been quite different.«123

Furthermore, Bonhoeffer acknowledges Schleiermacher’s general concept of spirit in his own idea of »objective spirit«: »where wills unite, a ›structure‹ is created – that is, a third entity, previously unknown, independent of being willed or not willed by the persons who are uniting. This general recognition of the nature of objective spirit was a discovery of the qualitative thinking that became dominant in romanticism and idealism. […] Two wills encountering one another form a structure. A third person joining them sees not just one person connected to the other; rather, the will of the structure, as a third factor, resists the newcomer with a resistance not identical with the wills of the two individuals. Sometimes this is even more forceful than that of either individual […] Precisely this structure is objective spirit. […] the persons themselves experience their community as something real outside themselves.«124

However, Bonhoeffer complains Schleiermacher’s concept of the Holy Spirit itself. Again, Bonhoeffer sees an ignoring of personhood: Schleiermacher understands the Holy Spirit as »apersonal,«125 as a neutral power, as effect.126 Bonhoeffer judges Schleiermacher’s idea of the Holy Spirit as solely anthropological-biological, being a »category of the psychology of peoples and species.«127 Bonhoeffer finds the fault in this that »the HolySpirit is apparently nothing but the consciousness of the species.«128 So Schleiermacher again ignores the basic difference between a psychological and a theological understanding of the church. While the consciousness of the species »is part of any community as such,« the Holy Spirit »is present in principle only in the church.«129

In his dogmatic thinking Schleiermacher does not identify Holy Spirit and consciousness of the species in a clear manner. He argues that the consciousness of the species in its unity with the God-consciousness is »no mere natural principle that would have developed of itself out of human nature as human nature would have remained without Christ.«130 This shows that Schleiermacher assumes a Christological reason for the case that the consciousness of the species is the Holy Spirit.131 Bonhoeffer himself interprets the Holy Spirit – like Schleiermacher – as »the Spirit of the church-community.« But he emphasizes that this means »something quite different«132 than Schleiermacher’s concept of »Gemeingeist«. Bonhoeffer is of the opinion that in talking about the unity which the Christians have to become in the »Gesamtleben,« Schleiermacher misunderstands the unity of spirit.133 The unity of spirit of the church-community is already given; it lies in the collective person of Christ: »The unity of spirit of the church-community is a fundamental synthesis willed by God; it is not a relation that must be produced, but one that is already established.«134 The unity of the church is »its existence as a collective person,« it is »Christ existing as church-community.«135 From this follows that »[t]his unity does not exist because the members of the body have the same intentions; rather, if they have the same intentions at all, they have them only as members of the body of Christ.«136

Over and above that Christological unity, the church of course should become a community of love; but this human action is possible only on the basis of the unity already established by God in Christ.137 That is why the »immanent unity of spirit is only the initial actualization of the transcendent unity of Spirit that is in reality established in Christ.«138

In the church community, »the plurality of persons [is united] into a single collective person without obliterating either their singularity or the community of persons.«139 Schleiermacher also misunderstands the community of spirit. The community of spirit is possible only between persons.140 But in Schleiermacher’s concentration of the effect of the Holy Spirit on the consciousness of species »the individual must become a tool, which means […] that the individual must be extinguished as a person.«141Because the individual spirit is swallowed by the community spirit, »dissolving the personality,«142 Schleiermacher has no »social concept of community.«143 Bonhoeffer judges harshly: »In summary, we have to say that Schleiermacher not only fails to understand social community, and thus the essence of social ›unity‹, but that, in spite of his efforts to develop the concepts of the corporate life and the union of humanity, he does not reach the social sphere at all. […] He is a metaphysician of the spirit, and as such founders on the concept of sociality.«144

2. Religion

Without doubt, Schleiermacher’s reflections on religion are the basic source of the modern significance of the term »religion«. In his works, Schleiermacher argues for the peculiarity of religion to the other expressions of human existence (2.1) and for the necessity of religion (2.2); he also describes the religious self-consciousness as the main object of theology (2.3).

2.1 The Peculiarity of Religion

The main achievement of Schleiermacher’s famous Speeches on Religion from 1799 is that they bring out the originality of religion. Compared with metaphysics and morals, religion is »something integral [etwas eigenes].«145 Religion has the same object as metaphysics and morals, namely »the universe and the relationship of humanity to it.«146 But it deals with this object differently: Religion »does not wish to determine and explain the universe according to its nature as does metaphysics; it does not desire to continue the universe’s development and perfect it by the power of freedom and the divine free choice of a human being as does morals.«147 Religion is neither »thinking« (= metaphysics) nor »acting« (= morals), but »intuition and feeling«148 regarding the universe or, as Schleiermacher says in The Christian Faith, a »feeling of absolute dependence.«149 It has its own anthropological function and its mental place, »its own province in the mind.«150

In an early writing, an exegesis on Jas 1, 21–25, Bonhoeffer makes a sceptical comment on this concept of religion. In Bonhoeffer’s judgment, Schleiermacher’s definition of religion means an exclusion of »doing«: »There can scarcely be a sharper contrast than between the Schleiermacherian definition of religious terms (knowing and doing as mutually exclusive) and the conception of the letter of James,«151 a letter which focusses precisely on »doing«. Bonhoeffer himself argues for a strong connection between faith and action in form of obedience to Christ (»[c]ould there possibly be Christian concepts that are more tightly woven together than faith and obedience?«152) and, accordingly, against a sharp contrast between the theology of James and that of Paul153 – a position which remains crucial in his whole life.154

Truly, Schleiermacher distinguishes faith and morality but he does not separate faith and morality: »All actual action should be moral, and it can be too, but religious feelings should accompany every human deed like a holy music; we should do everything with religion, nothing because of religion.«155 Religion »grounds the desire to act,«156 and »Christian piety is an incentive to action.«157 But of course, Bonhoeffer would stress that only the person who acts really believes.158

2.2 The Necessity of Religion

Because religion has its place in an own »province in the mind«, having religion is essential for human existence. Religion »shows itself to you as the necessary and indispensable third next to those two [metaphysics/speculation and morals/praxis], as their natural counterpart, not slighter in worth and splendour than what you wish of them.«159 Having religion is »not an accidental element, or a thing which varies from person to person, but is a universal element of life.«160

This assumption includes the idea of a religious a priori: »A person is born with the religious capacity as with every other, and if only his sense is not forcibly sup-pressed, if only that communion between a person and the universe […] is not blocked and barricaded, then religion would have to develop unerringly in each person according to his own individual manner.«161 Or, as Schleiermacher argues in The Christian Faith, the feeling of absolute dependence develops from »the absolutely general nature of humanity.«162

Bonhoeffer criticizes the idea of a religious a priori in human self-consciousness, because he fears that thus religion is »only anthropology« and hence »incapable of overcoming the immanence of the spirit.«163 As Barth he believes that religion then remains »the final and finest possibility for human beings. Human beings were discovered to be related to God.«164 This leads to a »›grand confusion‹ of religion and grace«165.

In accordance to his understanding of religion as an anthropological constant, Schleiermacher sees atheism inversely as a »sickness of the soul«166 in which the religious a priori remains undeveloped. Because religion is essential for the human soul, Schleiermacher assumes that this atheism might »revive sporadically and from time to time,« but it will never become »anything that is historically permanent.«167 For theological reasons Schleiermacher does not reckon with a time of religionlessness.

Quite differently, Bonhoeffer is of the opinion that the religious a priori is only a »historically conditioned and transitory form of human expression.«168 And he substitutes the idea of a religious a priori by the assumption: »We are approaching a completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore.«169 As Schleiermacher, Bonhoeffer has not only historical, but also theological arguments for his position: Religion is not adequate for Christian faith. For Jesus Christ is »the opposite of everything a religious person expects from God.«170

While this seems to be a fundamental refusal of religion as such, we have to keep in mind that Bonhoeffer’s late concept of religion is different from Schleiermacher’s. Schleiermacher describes a basic anthropological dimension while Bonhoeffer’s late understanding of religion concentrates only on a few aspects of religion: metaphysics, inwardness, individuality, and partiality.171 But if we look carefully, we can see that Schleiermacher is at least in mind when Bonhoeffer argues against those elements of religion.172 Of course, Schleiermacher’s idea of religion is not metaphysics in that supernatural sense of a deus ex machina who breaks through the worldly order.173 But the term inwardness seems to refer to Schleiermacher’s concept of religion as self-consciousness. And Bonhoeffer’s critique of religious individualism might refer to his early remarks on Schleiermacher’s individualistic ecclesiology. Could it finally be that the aspect of partiality refers to Schleiermacher’s concept of religion as a special »province in the mind?«174 »[…] the ›religious act‹ is always something partial, whereas ›faith‹ is something whole and involves one’s whole life. Jesus calls not to a new religion but to life.«175

Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer’s criticism of religion is not arguing against every form of what Schleiermacher would call religion. When Bonhoeffer asks: »In a religionless situation, what do ritual and prayer mean?,«176 we see that religionlessness is no contradiction to cultus and prayer. Faith necessarily seeks expression in religious forms.

In this we can perceive the re-adoption of an early insight of Bonhoeffer. The young Bonhoeffer distinguishes religion and faith. Faith is »directed towards Christ,« »pure intentionality,«177 is »actus directus,«178 non-reflexive. But faith necessarily becomes religion (»in the community of Christ faith takes form in religion«179), or, as Bonhoeffer says, credulity (Gläubigkeit). »Every act of faith is credulous insofar as it is an event embedded in the psyche and accessible to reflection.«180 »[…] Christ is apprehended in believing [gläubigem] faith«181. In this »Gläubigkeit«, the Schleiermacherian terms like »experience, piety, feeling« have their right.182 But: »Gläubigkeit« and faith are not identical.

2.3 Religious Self-consciousness as Object of Theology

For Schleiermacher, the religious self-consciousness is the topic of theology.183 Theology reflects the religious feelings or – as Schleiermacher says in The Christian Faith: »Christian doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech.«184 For Schleiermacher, »we must declare the description of human states of mind to be the fundamental dogmatic form«185 whereas sentences on the essence of God or the world are acceptable only if they can be developed from the sentences on the religious self-consciousness. For example, God is the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence.186

Bonhoeffer conjectures that in concentrating on the religious self-consciousness the question of truth remains unasked.187 Here we have no criterion of right or wrong.188 Schleiermacher himself says that if we look at the consciousness everything is true: »it can rightly be said that in religion everything is immediately true, since nothing at all is expressed in its individual moments except the religious person’s own state of mind.«189In religion, »in the infinite everything finite stands undisturbed alongside one another; all is one, and all is true.«190 In Bonhoeffer’s eyes, this would mean: »If everything is true, then the concept of falseness is abolished; as a result, so too is the concept of truth.«191 For Bonhoeffer, this is unacceptable, because the question of truth is fundamental for Christianity.192 In Bonhoeffer’s view, Ludwig Feuerbach – who, like Schleiermacher, concentrates on a person’s religious self-consciousness but comes to the conclusion that there is no God beyond the religious feelings – is worthy to be called »Schleiermacher’s most consistent pupil.«193 Indeed, this is a quite devastating judgment.

As we saw, Bonhoeffer acknowledges Schleiermacher’s interest in sociality: his emphasis on the primal social community, his collective concept of sin, the interest in the church, and Schleiermacher’s attempt to connect Holy Spirit and church-community. But Bonhoeffer criticizes Schleiermacher’s carrying out of these ideas in numerous ways. They can be summarized as the critique that Schleiermacher has a mere psychological approach to sociality with no understanding of the ethical-social relations between persons and ignores the theological characteristics of the church. Furthermore, Bonhoeffer sees Schleiermacher’s concept of religion excluding action, passing by, and suspending the question of truth.

1 See Andreas Pangritz, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: »Within, not Outside, the Barthian Movement«, in: Peter Frick (ed.), Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation. Theology and Philosophy in His Thought, RPT 29, Tübingen2008, 245–282.

2Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in 1768 in Breslau and educated in Moravian spirituality. He studied Protestant theology in Halle/Saale. As a pastor he became a member of the early romanticism movement in Berlin. 1804 he became professor at the University of Halle, 1810 at the newly founded University in Berlin. He was one of the most influential intellectuals at the time. Schleiermacher died in 1834 in Berlin. Cf. Kurt Nowak, Schleiermacher. Leben, Werk und Wirkung, Göttingen 2001. – Bonhoeffer studied Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion already as a pupil (cf. Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. A Biography, revised edition, ed. by Victoria J. Barnett, Minneapolis2000, 42).

3Cf. DBWE 11, 284 (DBW 11, 253): »In him [Schleiermacher], there is a new valuation of the church. [… His] central thought is the ›church.‹«

4Cf. DBWE 9, 319 (DBW 9, 347): »The fact that idealism understood the concept of church so poorly also derives from the fact that, although the concept of the spiritual personality was clearly understood, the concept of the community remained completely ignored and had to be reintroduced in the romantic era in the theology of Schleiermacher.«

5 DBWE 1, 62 (DBW 1, 37).

6 DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1).

7 DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1). Cf. DBW 11, 276: »[Der] Begriff des Individualismus [ist] bei Schleiermacher noch bereichert!« and note 255: »Schleiermacher bereichert das durch soziale Bezogenheit.«

8 DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1). The Schleiermacher citation is from Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (1830/31), 2 volumes, ed. by Hugh R. MacKintosh and James S. Stewart, New York1963, vol. 1, § 60.2, 246.

9 DBWE 1, 65 (DBW 1, 39).

10 DBWE 3, 64 (DBW 3, 60).

11Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 60.2, 246; Bonhoeffer’s citation in DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1) is not very precise.

12Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 60.2, 246; emphasis added.

13Ibid. Cf. DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1): This union »is intended to ensure the possibility of mutual communication, of religious relationship in community […] If this were not present, people could never enter into relationship in community.«

14Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 60.2, 246.

15Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion. Speeches to its Cultural Despisers. Introduction, translation and notes by Richard Crouter, Cambridge1988, 80. Cf. Eilert Herms, Schleiermachers Erbe, in: idem, Menschsein im Werden. Studien zu Schleiermacher, Tübingen2003, 200–227, 204, and Dorothee Schlenke, »Geist und Gemeinschaft«. Die systematische Bedeutung der Pneumatologie für Friedrich Schleiermachers Theorie der christlichen Frömmigkeit, Berlin / New York1999, 102: The individual is »qua Gattungsbewußtsein […] gleichursprünglich auf andere Individuen bezogen.«

16 DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1).

17 Species-consciousness makes possible a »geistige[n] Akt der Identifikation mit einem anderen Menschen als einem Wesen gleicher Natur […] An diesen geistigen Akt […] schließt sich dann unmittelbar ein Mitempfinden des spezifischen Lebenszustandes des anderen Menschen an« (Schlenke, »Geist und Gemeinschaft«, 43).

18 DBWE 1, 68 (DBW 1, 41).

19 Cf. DBWE 1, 66 (DBW 1, 40).

20Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer. A Theology of Sociality. Revised Edition, Grand Rapids MI / Cambridge UK1999, 31.

21DBWE 1, 49 (DBW 1, 29). It is important to note that for Bonhoeffer the You has this significance only because it is God’s You that encounters me in that human You (cf. DBWE 1, 54 f. [DBW 1, 32 f.]).

22 DBWE 1, 52 (DBW 1, 32).

23 Cf. DBWE 1, 48 (DBW 1, 28): »The person exists always and only in ethical responsibility«.

24Cf. DBWE 10, 455 (DBW 10, 427): »For Christian thought, personality is the last limit of thinking and the ultimate reality. […] Personality is free and does not enter the general laws of my thinking.«

25 Cf. DBWE 1, 56. 213 (DBW 1, 34. 144) and DBWE 10, 456 (DBW 10, 428).

26 DBW 12, 290 (DBWE 12, 309; my translation); in the original: »Es gibt keinen anderen Zugang zum Menschen, als daß dieser sich von sich aus offenbart.«

27Cf. DBWE 1, 193. 30 (DBW 1, 129 f. 16).

28 DBWE 1, 193 (DBW 1, 129 f.). Cf. DBW 14, 440, note 93 (DBWE 14, 451, note 98; in the transcript of Erich Klapproth): »Einheit der Gemeinde – Gemeinschaft – einzelner. Fehlt einer dieser drei Begriffe, so ist etwas verkehrt!«.

29 Sometimes Bonhoeffer counts Schleiermacher as an idealistic thinker (cf. DBWE 1, 196, note 68 [DBW 1, 131, note 68] and DBWE 11, 186 [DBW 11, 149]), sometimes he does not (cf. DBWE 9, 319 [DBW 9, 347]).

30 Cf. DBWE 1, 193 (DBW 1, 130).

31 DBWE 1, 64, note 1 (DBW 1, 38, note 1); my emphasis.

32 DBWE 1, 110 f. (DBW 1, 71).

33 DBWE 1, 113, note 11 (DBW 1, 245, note 9).

34Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 71.1, 286 f.

35 Id., § 71.2, 288. Therefore, the doctrine of original sin is not an expression of the individual self-consciousness but of the consciousness of the species (cf. ibid.).

36 Id., § 71.2, 287.

37 Id., § 71.2, 288.

38Ibid., discussed in DBWE 1, 113, note 11 (DBW 1, 245, note 9).

39DBWE 10, 405 (DBW 10, 375).

40 DBWE 1, 115 (DBW 1, 72).

41DBWE 1, 119 (DBW 1, 74).

42 Cf. DBWE 1, 121 (DBW 1, 76).

43 DBWE 1, 121 (DBW 1, 76).

44 DBWE 1, 114, note 11 (DBW 1, 246, note 9).

45DBWE 1, 114, note 11 (DBW 1, 246, note 9). Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 66, 271–273.

46 Cf. Maureen Junker, Das Urbild des Gottesbewußtseins. Zur Entwicklung der Religionstheorie und Christologie Schleiermachers von der ersten zur zweiten Auflage der Glaubenslehre, Berlin / New York1990, 114 f.

47Cf. id., 156–158.

48Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 66.2, 273: sin is »an arrestment of the determinative power of spirit, due to the independence of the sensuous functions.«

49Cf. id., § 5.3, 20–22.

50DBWE 1, 114, note 11 (DBW 1, 246, note 9).

51 DBWE 1, 108 (DBW 1, 70). Jacqueline Mariña argues that Schleiermacher’s comprehension of sin includes that the self understands itself as »independent of others and in competition with them for finite resources« (Jacqueline Mariña, Christology and Anthropology in Friedrich Schleiermacher, in: idem [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Cambridge2005, 151–170, 164). Schleiermacher himself claims his own concept of sin as consistent with the idea of sin as a »turning away from the Creator« (Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 66.2, 273).

52 DBWE 11, 293 (DBW 11, 263).

53 Cf. DBWE 11, 293 ff. (DBW 11, 263 ff.) and DBWE 2, 153 (DBW 2, 152).

54 DBWE 1, 141 (DBW 1, 87).

55Schleiermacher, On Religion, 163, cited in DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18). Cf. Schleier-macher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 6, 26: »The religious self-consciousness, like every essential element in human nature, leads necessarily in its development to fellowship or communion.«

56Schleiermacher, On Religion, cited (translation altered) in DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18). Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 6.2, 27: »the consciousness of kind [Gattungsbe-wußtsein] which dwells in every man […] finds its satisfaction only when he steps forth beyond the limits of his own personality and takes up the facts of other personalities into his own.«

57Schleiermacher, On Religion, 163. Cf. DBWE 11, 308 (DBW 11, 278), where Bonhoeffer describes the psychological derivation of the church: »psychological: religious community [arises] through the human drive to communicate, evangelize, etc. […]«.

58Cf. Schleiermacher, On Religion, 163.

59 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 6.4, 29. Cf. also § 115, cited in DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 101 f., note 18): »The Christian Church is formed through regenerate individuals coming together for mutual interaction and cooperation in an orderly way«.

60Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 3, 5.

61Cf. DBWE 1, 195, note 68 (DBW 1, 131, note 68). Bonhoeffer implicitly appreciates the structure of Schleiermacher’sThe Christian Faith when he argues that »it would be good […] if a presentation of doctrinal theology were to start not with the doctrine of God but with the doctrine of the church« (DBWE 1, 134 [DBW 1, 85]) which in fact is what Schleiermacher does (cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, §§ 3–6, 5–31).

62DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18); my emphasis. In Bonhoeffer’s eyes, this can lead to an understanding of the church as »private matter«. Bonhoeffer believes that »Schleiermacher forged [the] weapons for this« (DBWE 11, 306 [DBW 11, 276]).

63 DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18).

64DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18). Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 2, § 113, 525–528. For Schleiermacher, the existence of the church in which the believer finds him/herself means that there existed already »a collective need for redemption and expectation of it« (id., § 113.2, 526).

65Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 2, § 87.3, 360.

66 DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18). Bonhoeffer takes this critique from Albrecht Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, vol. 1, Bonn 21882. Ritschl notices that Schleiermacher’s concept of redemption and reconciliation is individually in focussing on the change of the individual’s will and feeling: »und indem diese Wirkungen immer nur an den Einzelnen anschaulich gemacht werden, so wird der Begriff der Lebensgemeinschaft […] unter der Hand zum Ausdruck eines ganz individuellen Verhältnisses, und das neue Gesammtleben tritt aus der Stellung der Voraussetzung in die der einfachen Folge davon.« (Id., 519; cf. 520).

67Cf. DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18).

68DBWE 1, 159, note 18 (DBW 1, 102, note 18); emphasis added. Cf. DBWE 1, 160, note 18 (DBW 1, 103, note 18): Schleiermacher claims »the individual’s need to communicate to be the basic sociological structure of the church.«

69DBWE 1, 132, note 23 (DBW 1, 253, note 25). This judgment can also be seen in Bonhoeffer’s university lecture on The Nature of the Church (DBWE 11, 308, note 285 [DBW 11, 278 f., note 277]) where Bonhoeffer discusses the difference between »Gesellschaft« and »Gemeinschaft« which Ferdinand Tönnies argued for: While the later wills the »being-with-one-another« »as an end in itself« the former wills the »being-with-one-another« »as a means to an end« (DBWE 1, 88 [DBW 1, 56]). In Schleiermacher’s concept, community is needed for satisfying the »Mitteilungstrieb« and thus is only a means to an end (cf. DBWE 11, 308 [DBW 11, 278]). Bonhoeffer himself sees the community in the church above all as »Gemeinschaft«; cf. DBWE 1, 266 f. (DBW 1, 185 f.).

70DBWE 1, 133, note 23 (DBW 1, 254, note 25).

71DBWE 1, 131, note 23 (DBW 1, 252, note 25). Cf. DBWE 11, 308 (DBW 11, 278): »This need to communicate is a sign of every community. Piety [is] also possible individualistically.« Bonhoeffer is keen to emphasize against Schleiermacher that there is »in fact only one religion in which the idea of community is an integral element of its nature, and that is Christianity« (DBWE 1, 130 f. [DBW 1, 84]); this means that community is an essential element of Christianity but not of religion as such.

72DBWE 1, 133 (DBW 1, 84).

73Cf. DBWE 11, 292 (DBW 11, 262).

74Cf. DBWE 11, 306, note 268 (DBW 11, 276, note 259).

75Cf. DBWE 11, 306 (DBW 11, 277). Cf. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. 1, § 2.2, 3: Church »is a society which originates only through free human action and which can only through such continue to exist.«

76Cf. DBWE 11, 292 (DBW 11, 262).

77DBWE 1, 195 f., note 68 (DBW 1, 131, note 68).

78DBWE 11, 307 (DBW 11, 277).

79DBWE 5, 34 f. (DBW 5, 22).

80DBWE 1, 196, note 68 (DBW 1, 131, note 68). Cf. DBWE 1, 126 (DBW 1, 79 f.): »it is certainly possible to focus on the empirical phenomenon ›church‹ qua ›religious community‹ […] and to develop a sociological morphology of it. In that case all theological reflection would be superfluous.« – Similarly, Bonhoeffer summarizes in his lecture on Das Wesen der Kirche that for Schleiermacher »›church‹ is the voluntary union of pious Christians. Thereby [the] church is traced back to the piety of the individual.« In Bonhoeffer’s eyes, this includes that the church is deduced but not presupposed: »The church is not the ultimate presupposition. Individual religiosity is the presupposition of everything.« (DBWE 11, 284 [DBW 11, 253]; emphasis added) Cf. DBWE 11, 306 (DBW 11, 277): »Church is […] something derived […] where it is seen as religious community.« Cf. DBWE 11, 307 (DBW 11, 277): »Religious community is always something secondary, [even when the] concept of community is derived from [the] concept of religion, for religion must be there [first].«

81DBWE 1, 125 (DBW 1, 79).

82DBWE 1, 146 (DBW 1, 91).

83DBWE 1, 158 (DBW 1, 101).

84DBWE 1, 127 (DBW 1, 81).

85DBWE 1, 158 (DBW 1, 101).

86Cf. for example DBWE 1, 189 f. (DBW 1, 126 f.).

87DBWE 1, 199 (DBW 1, 133).

88DBWE 5, 35 (DBW 5, 22). Cf. DBWE 1, 127 (DBW 1, 80): »The concept of the church is conceivable only in the sphere of reality established by God.«

89DBWE 1, 153 (DBW 1, 97). Cf. DBWE 1, 126 (DBW 1, 80): The fact that constitutes the church is »the fact of Christ, or the ›Word‹.« Cf. DBW 11, 276 f. (DBWE 11, 306): »Kirche ist […] die schon in Christus realiter gesetzte Kirche!! Durch [die] Tat Gottes ist Kirche da.«

90 DBWE 1, 196, note 68 (DBW 1, 131, note 68). Cf. DBWE 5, 35 (DBW 5, 22): »Christian community is a spiritual and not a psychic reality.«

91DBWE 1, 193 (DBW 1, 129).

92DBWE 5, 34 (DBW 5, 21 f.); emphasis added.

93Cf. DBWE 12, 312 (DBW 12, 293): »Only where the risen Christ is understood as the ground and the prerequisite for Christology is it possible to grasp his presence as person.«

94